TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION HEARING
ON MONDAY, 11 AUGUST 1997
[VOLUME 6 : PAGES 487 - 613]
1A/0 PROCEEDINGS RESUMED ON 1997/08/11
APPEARANCES AS BEFORE
CHAIRMAN: Mr Macadam, do you just want to place on record how the proceedings will take off today?
MR MACADAM: Mr Chairperson, I received a telephone call from Mr Stewart, who represents both Mr Dlamini and Mr Luthuli. He asked to be excused from today's proceedings because of urgent matters that have arisen, which he did not anticipate when he agreed to represent the two person. He will be available tomorrow and he requests that any cross-examination or further evidence from his clients stand over to tomorrow. Secondly, Dr Williams would have been available for cross-examination at 10 o'clock this morning. His flight has been delayed. He will be arriving during the course of the morning and I would therefore ask that his further evidence stand down until he is available and can be slotted in at a convenient stage. That would leave us then with only three witnesses - Mr Mkhize, who has already given evidence-in-chief, but whose cross-examination stood over last week. Mr Romeo Mbambo has not given evidence at all, but his evidence relates purely to the Esikhaweni activities. He himself has not trained in the Caprivi at any stage. And then Superintendent Marion from the South African Police, who would merely give statistical evidence which is relevant to the hearing. Mr Mkhize and Mr Mbambo are both represented by Mr Wills, and he made a request that Mr Mkhize's cross-examination be finalised before Mr Mbambo testifies. Unless there's any objection to that suggestion, I'm inclined at this stage to call Mr Mkhize for further cross-examination.
1A CHAIRMAN: And then?
MR MACADAM: And then Mr Mbambo and if Mr Williams is available we'll then take his evidence and then finally we'll hear Superintendent Marion's evidence. Mr Luthuli has already been cross-examined. It is purely if counsel after the week-end wish to raise further issues with him. Mr Dlamini has merely to be cross-examined. He has no further new evidence.
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Macadam. We then will proceed with the further cross-examination, if any, of Mr Mkhize. Mr de Vos.
MR DE VOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. I think he must be first sworn in.
BRIAN GCINA MKHIZE (Sworn, states) (Through Interpreter)
MR DE VOS: Mr Chairman, I think I was busy last. The decision we've already taken not to proceed with cross-examination. I'm not going to put any further questions to this witness, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DE VOS
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr de Vos. Is there anybody else who would - Mr Lasich?
MR LASICH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Mkhize, I gather you know who I represent. My name is Lasich. Now, Mr Mkhize, the only time, if I understand it, that you decided to come clean, as it were, was after your conviction in the trial known as S v Romeo Mbambo and Others. --- I don't understand whether he's putting a question or whether he's telling me - or making a statement.
I am putting it to you to confirm or deny that. --- I deny that.
1A During the trial itself, when the charges were put to you, you pleaded not guilty. Is that not correct? --- I remained silent for one reason. I did not want to contest ...
INTERPRETER: The speaker is not audible enough. --- I had already made a decision. As the case went on I had already made my decision. If I may help this Commission, I made the decision at the time when I realised that IFP has turned its back towards me.
The speaker is not audible. --- The way IFP went on, not wanting to come out clean as other organizations, especially during the negotiations before the new South Africa, when it was said all the organizations should tell the truth and put their view openly and explain clearly what their stance. We knew ourselves as the IFP soldiers and how much we have wronged the nation, and we were waiting for our organization to come out clean as well as others - just like others - and also admit to the fact that they had trained a certain number of men and put out the weapons in the public and explain to the public what it has done in as far as violation of human rights. If it wasn't ready to do that ... (intervention)
MR LAX: Please just answer the question. You are going on a whole long - basically a political statement. If you could restrict yourself to explaining very briefly why it was that you changed your mind and have clean, as you've been asked.
MR LASICH: I think you've given us a lengthy explanation there, Mr Mkhize. I was actually going to endorse the views of Mr Lax there, that you tend to ramble on, instead of keeping your answers as simple as possible. We have
1A limited time as it is. Now, Mr Mkhize, I want to suggest to you that your motivation in coming clean, if we can call it that, was because you knew you were going to face a lengthy term of imprisonment and you decided to now tell the Court what was going on. Could you comment on that? --- That is not true. It is painful to me that when I decide to disclose all the reasons why I took these actions and you will restrict me in that regard. I do not know whether you are doing that so I may not come out clean or I should just go by your decision. My objective is to explain the reasons why I disclosed the truth. Because I'm here as well to tell the truth and open up.
Now, Mr Mkhize, it's already been discussed on the last occasion between yourself and Mr Visser the statement that you made to the Goldstone Commission, but what I want to find out is if you had this genuine interest to come clean, why didn't you approach the State or tell your counsel that you wanted to come clean? This is in the criminal trial for which you were convicted. --- You are not aware at the time of the mitigation in the court of law I told them exactly what I am telling this Commission as it is, but that was in connection with the cases at the time.
You said in your evidence some time back that you were involved in mobilisation at first but that you had been told to avoid police, because you were not doing anything lawful. Could you explain what was unlawful about mobilisation or contra-mobilisation? --- I don't clearly understand the question. Please explain, so that I get your question clearly.
Right, my note - I will just give you the background
/to the question.
1A to the question. You said, if it's correctly recorded here, that, "It was emphasised that we should avoid the police because we were not doing anything lawful". That was in 1988. If I understood your evidence, you were involved in contra-mobilisation. What I want to know is what was unlawful about contra-mobilisation?
MR WILLS: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I beg to differ with my learned friend's timing of that question. My understanding of this witness' evidence was that it was as far back as during the training in the Caprivi in 1986 that he was told not to - to avoid the police.
MR LAX: I confirm that, Mr Wills.
MR LASICH: Well, perhaps - all I'm asking the witness then is what did he perceive to be unlawful about contra-mobilisation, if it was unlawful. --- I had already explained to the Commission that I was getting and receiving orders from my superiors. If my superiors happened to give me some work to apply contra-mobilisation I would do that. Then there was nothing absolutely wrong with the contra-mobilisation at the time. And again, after the instructions or orders that will necessitate my skills or the offensive skills that I received during intensive training, I would do exactly that - apply the intensive training skills, and that would be wrong. That's where the wrongness came into the picture, not from the side of the contra-mobilisation.
Now, Mr Mkhize, were you ever involved in indiscriminate killings of people? --- There wasn't killing that I undertook on my own volition. It would have been an objective of the organization that I was under.
/And if I
1A And if I understand your evidence, you would go out on a - shall we call it a hit, after being instructed to do so. Is that correct? --- That is correct.
Are you able to recall about how many you - the deaths of how many people you were involved in? --- I don't have any clear recollection in as far as that, because there were instructions that needed that a mob should be attacked and killed and I've already explain to the Commission and I estimated about the bus attack. I don't know how many people got killed there. Even the bus stop attacks, I don't know how many people got killed. Now, I would not give you an number as to how many people I have killed, but what I would like to emphasise is that there would be a purpose and it was an instruction for us to undertake that kind of operation.
Now, did you not take an interest in finding out how many people were killed if a particular bus was attacked? Surely you would have gone to the local police station to get some statistics? --- I never had any interest or never got an order to go and enquire as to how many people were killed.
Now, you stressed, it seemed, in your evidence-in-chief, that you would do a hit, but it was a specific target. You quote the - I think it was the Dlamini - I can't remember the name, Dlamini or Mthethwa, where you left the wife alone and you specifically hit the husband and you had no quarrel with the wife. Is that correct? --- Yes, I did say that to this Commission.
Now, how did you feel about indiscriminate shooting at a bus load of people?
MR WILLS: With respect, Mr Chairperson, I feel that that
/is an unfair
1A is an unfair question, because it's prefaced with the word, "Indiscriminate", whereas the witness' answer previously was that it wasn't indiscriminate in so far as orders were received.
MR LASICH: Well, perhaps I should argue with the witness then. The way I see it, Mr Chairman, he's firing at a bus load of people, it's indiscriminate shooting but perhaps Mr Mkhize can clarify whether he would say that's indiscriminate or not. --- No, it was not indiscriminate shooting, because there would be a message that we would want to carry across to the organization that we will be fighting with or a group. Now, I wouldn't call that indiscriminate, and it was not my desire to do that, but it would have been a strategy that would have already been put into place at a meeting, and I've already explained that for such an instruction to come out to attack a bus, it was because of the attack of the rally, the Inkatha rally, and I did explain at length. It was not indiscriminate, because that was carrying a message across to the people that we were fighting against.
Now, you also said in your evidence that you wouldn't be in a position to judge who was right and who was wrong, that is the IFP or the UDF/ANC. Are you talking about how you see it now or how you felt at the time that you were involved in these killings? --- At the time when I was involved, I completely and absolutely believed in the IFP policy and its ideology. I completely believed in it at the time.
Now, you must have been motivated by actions on the part of - if we can call them then, the enemy - the UDF/ANC. Could you give the panel an idea of what sort of
1A acts were being committed by comrades? --- I explained to this Commission the acts that were undertaken by the UDF at length. I don't know whether you want me to go back and repeat exactly what I had already explained.
I just wanted to find out - you did mention burnings and things like that. Did you ever witness any of these atrocities? --- Yes, I saw them and witnessed them.
Can you give us an example of one of these things that you saw? --- There are quite a number of them in Hammarsdale that I've witnessed and in some various KwaZulu/Natal locations, especially in Hammarsdale. That's where I witnessed a lot of them, and being done in the IFP area.
MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Mkhize, you've been asked to give us a specific instance of such an incident. Please try and do that. --- Your Honour, there is no specific example that I have, because those are cases that implicate other people who are not present here. I don't think it is appropriate for me to talk about such.
CHAIRMAN: We are not asking you to mention the names of the people who carried them out. We're just saying give us an example of an attack or a murder that you recall which took place in Hammarsdale. You and Mr Luthuli have said that many such attacks took place. Mr Luthuli said the other day - on Friday - that what would happen is that people's houses would be attacked and they would be burned or people would be forced to take part in consumer boycotts and they were attacked or killed if they wouldn't do that. Just give us an example of something that you remember. --- My aunt's house in Hammarsdale was set alight and the kid who was in there got burnt and we could
1A not rescue that kid. We managed to rescue my aunt and others from the house, but we could not rescue the kid, and caught fire and she or he was 2 to 3 years old at the time - it was a girl - and we also caught fire because we were moving in the fire, trying to rescue everyone who was in there, especially the ladies or the women, but ultimately the kid died.
MR LASICH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Now, Mr Mkhize, you've mentioned a number of people such as M Z Khumalo, Prince Zulu, Mrs Mbuyazi, Captain Langeni and others as being involved in illegal activities. I am instructed that those people deny being involved in anything unlawful. What is your comment? --- I do expect that they will repudiate all of that. First of all, these people have high profiles now and hold high superior positions in the community and now they are trying to protect their images and their positions as well. Secondly, those are cases that we are talking about. There is no one who would like to be arrested, and they committed all these acts privately. The community did not know or have any knowledge as far as that was concerned. It was quite an embarrassment and it is an embarrassment for people to get to realise that they took part such in activities, because the aims of the organizations that they are affiliated to and it is because the IFP kept claiming that it was fighting for human rights. Now it can hear that they were not only doing that peacefully, they also had other side agendas, some things that they were doing. Now that was contradicting with the aims of the organization. Now they will refute all of that. There is no way that they will admit to that.
/Now, just one
1A Now, just one aspect, were you ever given an identity card known or it was called Omega Security or anything like that when you returned from the Caprivi? --- No.
Do you know any members of the Caprivi trainees group that received such cards? --- No.
Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LASICH
MNR VAN ZYL: Meneer die Voorsitter, mnr Van Zyl vir die rekord. Na aanleiding van u versoek verlede week of Vrydag ten aansien van of die voorstel dat ons ons posisie met betrekking tot kruis ... (tussenkoms deur tolk) ... whether we were going to - regarding our position for the cross-examination of witnesses, we considered over the week-end and we still have the same opinion - same view - and we will not participate in the proceedings regarding the cross-examination of witnesses. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN: Is there anybody else who wishes to put further questions to Mr Mkhize? Any re-examination, Mr Macadam?
MR MACADAM: Just very briefly, Mr Chairperson, on one aspect that may or may not be important. Mr Mkhize, you said that in 1989 you then went through the normal police training at the KwaZulu College at Ulundi and became a fully-fledged member of the KwaZulu Police. Firstly, were other members of the group that had trained with you in the Caprivi put through the same course as you? --- You mean those who were in Caprivi?
That's correct. Were any of them also put through the Police College in the same manner as you went through? --- Yes, there were, but not all of them. Not all the
1A Caprivians, but some of them went through the course.
Can you estimate approximately how many of them went through the course? Just a rough estimate, if you can recall. --- I think there were about 40 of them. I'm not certain about this figure. It's just a hypothetical figure.
MR WILLS: My interpretation was unclear. Was that 14 or 40?
CHAIRMAN: 40. --- 40.
MR MACADAM: Were you and these other plus/minus 40 people taken aside, given any specialised training on its own during the training period at Ulundi itself? --- No, we all received a uniform training with others who were not coming from Caprivi.
Once that training had been concluded were the persons who had been trained in the Caprivi formed into a special unit, for example like a reaction force or task force? --- No, it wasn't like that. We were deployed in various police stations and it was not done according to who we were, but whatever was done it was just done to all of us.
I have no further questions, Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MACADAM
MR DLAMINI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, just one question for clarification. Mr Mkhize, sorry to take you back. There was a time when you were instructed to attack a certain member of COSATU, but his car was driven by a different person on that day. Can you - did you know the names of the people who were inside? You said nobody died, but they were injured and also if you know how seriously they were injured, just for record purposes.
/--- Your Honour,
1A --- Your Honour, I don't know how much they were injured. That was information that I gathered after the incident. Now I do not know the extent of the injury and also how many of them. I don't have that information.
You don't know their names either? --- No, I did not know their names.
Thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRMAN: Mr Mkhize, just briefly, in your various attacks which you have testified that you carried out, on all occasions did you use Eastern Bloc weapons or were there occasions where you used R1s or G3s or South African issue weapons? --- No, Your Honour, I wasn't using only Eastern Bloc weapons. It would depend what guns we had in our possession. We had a number of weapons - guns - in a trunk. Now, we would take whatever we got first, and use them. Even the South African-made ones we used as well to carry out the attack.
Where was the trunk kept? --- It was kept at Israel Hlongwane and Romeo Mbambo's house at J2 section in Esikhaweni.
What was the origin of those weapons? Where did they come from? Not which country of origin, but who put them at Mr Mbambo's house or Mr Hlongwane's house? --- Some were brought by myself and from the instructions of Captain Langeni that I should go and get them from Thomas in Port Durnford, and some were being used by the boys. I refer to Nhlankanipho Matenjwa, who were the ones who were attacking or fighting direct with the ANC before our group, but we gathered all those weapons and guns and were administered by Romeo Mbambo. And some, like hand grenades, were brought by B B Biyela and those were home-
/made - made by
1A made - made by TNT. And there were some that I went to fetch from Port Durnford and those were not home-made ones, but were proper ones.
And in the various attacks which you took part in, whose vehicle or vehicles did you use? --- We used a Ford Meteor at times - B B, the Mayor's car.
The translation was a bit slow. You said, I think I followed your Zulu, that the Ford Meteor belonged to the Mayor of Esikhaweni, B B Biyela? Is that correct? --- It is Mr B B Biyela. B B are the initials.
And you say that he was the Mayor - Mayor of what? --- Yes, a Mayor at Richards Bay.
Isn't he the Mayor of Richards Bay? --- Yes, he is still a Mayor and then he was an Esikhaweni Mayor only.
Was the car used with his consent? Did he know that it was being used by you for these unlawful actions? --- Yes, he knew that very well.
What other cars did you use? --- Then there was one other car, a Mitsubishi, a kombi. That would be driven by Cele, who was employed as a driver in Ulundi. If I'm not mistaken, Cele was employed in the Department of the Chief Minister and would bring the car to us and also tell us that he was been sent by Mr M Z Khumalo to bring the car so we may work easier. Truly speaking, we used to complain about vehicles. That we would be given instructions, not vehicles. Now they ended up bringing cars, just like that Mitsubishi which was brought to us. And one other car was the one that I explained or referred to when I was giving evidence, when Chief Minya said we would go and fetch it from Robert Mzimela. That was the Opel Monza, white in colour. Those were such cars we used
/to carry out
1A to carry out our operations. And there was one other attack where we used a BMW car which belonged to Romeo's friend, but he did not know that we were using his car to carry out an attack and I don't even think he got to know eventually.
MR LAX: Could I just clarify something? You said that Mr Cele was a driver in what department? Couldn't catch that on the translation, sorry. --- I said, if I remember well, he used to be a driver of Chief Minister's Department, but I want to say that I am not certain about what I've just said, as to which department he belonged to, but he was employed as a driver in Ulundi. That much I know.
CHAIRMAN: So the Opel Monza, which you said was supplied by Mr Mzimela, is that Mr Robert Mzimela, who was then the - I think he was a speaker of the Legislative Assembly was he? Or was he a secretary of the Legislative Assembly? --- Yes, he was a secretary but not a speaker.
Was that his car or what car was that? --- It was not his car, it was a Government car, State car, but I don't know in which department it belonged - the car, but I'm certain that it was a State car, because I was given all the relevant documents, even the petrol documents and order books as well, and I used to sign each time I filled up the tank. Now I know that it was a State car.
And when you had your various meetings which you've testified about in Esikhaweni - sorry, did I understand your evidence to be that you participated in the meetings where decisions were taken as to who should be assassinated, or did you merely receive orders after these
1A meetings had taken place? --- Your Honour, I would receive instructions only. I never used to attend meetings where decisions would be taken as to who the targets were or who should be assassinated but often times than not I would just receive orders from Captain Langeni, who was the one I was working with, hand in hand, and receiving instructions from. On a few occasions where I could not receive orders from Captain Langeni, just like instructions like the ones I received from Chief Khayalihle Mathaba, those are the few instructions that I did not receive from Captain Langeni but from this one, and even that instruction of killing Nathi Gumede, which we received from Prince Gideon Zulu, those are the few instructions I remember that I did not receive from Captain Langeni.
So you're saying that mainly you took instructions from Captain Langeni, but you also took an instruction from Prince Gideon Zulu and you also took an instruction from Nkosi Mathaba. Is that right? Chief Mathaba? --- Yes, that is true.
Where does he live? --- He is a chief in Inyoni area but now, currently, he is in Cape Town because he is a Parliament Member, representing IFP - Member of Parliament.
How many people did he instruct you to kill? --- Two.
Were those people from his area? --- They were from his area, Inyoni area.
And did he tell you why he wanted you to kill them or did he tell you afterwards why he wanted you to kill them? --- He did explain to us and I know why they
1A were killed, but they were not killed at the same time, because they were separate - they were living in different areas and he also did not instruct us at the same time to kill those people. So he instructed us at different times to kill those people.
[Break in recording] ... the reasons that he wanted you to kill them? --- The first one was the headman, induna, in Inyoni. He told us that he was troublesome in the area, the community, because he was also pressurising people not to respect the chief, because the chief wanted the place to become predominantly IFP area. Second to that he said he was blocking people from holding traditional and using traditional weapons and it was known here at the time that it was ANC which was fighting the traditional weapon. Now that headman, induna, was influencing people not to respect the chief, because the chief is an IFP member. Now if they respected the chief they were not respecting it because they were Zulu, but were dancing to the tune of the IFP. And again, they should not pay any taxes. They would not even attend any meetings or imbizo being called by the chief in the area for one reason that the chief was IFP member. Now that made the chief to realise that if that headman is continuing doing this and being influential to the area now that would mean IFP would lose their support in the whole area and the chief would be left alone with no support. Those were the reasons why the headman was killed.
And were those people killed in Inyoni? Where were they killed? At their houses, where? --- They were killed at Inyoni, in their houses and we left them, we
1A never took them.
What was the name of the induna? --- I don't remember the name of the induna but after the investigation or during the investigation the ITU came along with me and I showed them the house where we killed the induna, and they admitted as well that the induna was killed in that house.
Did Captain Langeni know that you took instructions from other people, for example Prince Gideon Zulu and Chief Mathaba? --- Yes, he knew that.
And did he agree with that? --- Yes, he agreed with that because he never fought me with regard to that and again, as I have already indicated to the Commission, I used to give reports to him with what I had done - with the work that I had accomplished. I would give reports to him and there was never even one time when he did not praise me for the work that I was doing. Now I'm certain that he knew exactly what was going on.
Were these verbal reports or written reports? You said you reported to Captain Langeni. Did you speak to him or did you write something down? --- I used to report verbally. We were instructed heavily that we should not at all write any document in the form of a report with regard to all the activities that we carried.
And did Captain Langeni give you any guidelines as to who you should take instructions from? Did he say you should not take instructions from anybody who is not a chief? I mean, how did you know that it was proper to take instructions from Chief Mathaba, for example? --- I want to remind the Commission that the first meeting that we had at Captain Langeni's office, it was explicitly
1B explained to us that we would be working with local leadership of Esikhaweni and the neighbouring areas, and Chief Mathaba and Mr B B Biyela and Mrs Lindiwe Mbuyazi were people who were always in touch - so often in touch and they are the ones who I would say were responsible for the promotion of Inkatha interests in the area, in the neighbouring areas. Now I was working hand in hand, very closely with them. I would say in a nutshell, the IFP local leadership was working hand in hand with me.
You said that you were congratulated by Captain Langeni for various actions which you took. Were you congratulated by anybody else? --- He wouldn't be congratulating me only but also my subordinates as well. The congratulation or the praise was not only coming to me, but also coming to the group at large, the people that I've already told the Commission about.
The thing I asked was did anybody else congratulate you and/or your group - any other person, other than Captain Langeni? --- No, I was reporting to him only.
Okay, no further questions. There may be questions arising out of that evidence, to the extent that it was - some of it was new. So if anybody wants to put any further questions to Mr Mkhize, arising out of those issues.
MR LASICH: Mr Chairman, it's merely to record the previous recording of a denial as far as the allegations are concerned. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Lasich.
MR WILLS: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, there is one issue that I might - I might, and I stress might - want to raise in re-examination, but if I could just refer to my notes. If
1B the Commission could bear with me for one or two minutes. CHAIRMAN: Just while we are waiting for Mr Wills, Mr Mkhize, did the congratulations that you said Captain Langeni gave to you take any form? Did he merely congratulate you or did he - were you paid anything or given something in recognition of what you had done or was there a party which was held or anything like that? --- I explained to this Commission that I was not paid for this work. I was getting a salary just like all the other police, but with regard to the work that I used to carry on the side there was no remuneration that I was getting for such and again I was a patriot myself and wanting to further the mission of the organization, so I wasn't paid in any way or in any form.
MR WILLS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. In relation to your own questioning of this witness as regards to the congratulations he received, I just wanted to put it clearly or ask the witness clearly that as I understood the Chairperson's question, he wasn't relating - the question wasn't directed specifically at congratulations for the killings that had been described previously, i.e. those authorised by the induna, but was congratulations generally in respect of any activities and I'd like the witness to answer whether he got congratulations from anybody in relation to any - from anybody else in relation to any of the killings that were performed. --- I thought you were asking the question with regard to my reports that I was giving to the Captain. That's who I understood your question. With regards to congratulations about the work that I did, I was praised or congratulated by many other people. Even
1B Prince Gideon Zulu himself has given me a handshake and congratulated me for the good work that I have carried. Even Chief Mathaba as well congratulated me many times for the work I carried. It was not only Captain Langeni. I thought you were referring to when I was giving my report to him that he would congratulate me for the report. That's how I understood your question.
Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I have no further re-examination.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS
CHAIRMAN: Mr Macadam.
MR MACADAM: I've got no further questions, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRMAN: Go on to the next witness then.
MR MACADAM: I call Romeo Mbambo as the next witness.
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Mkhize. You may be excused.
MR DE VOS: Sorry, Mr Chairman, maybe it's a suitable time to have a tea break. I see it's quarter past eleven.
CHAIRMAN: Okay, we'll have a break for 20 minutes. Thank you. Try and be back at half past.
1B ON RESUMPTION:
CHAIRMAN: Dr Williams has arrived from Johannesburg and it's convenient now to deal with his cross-examination, if any, and thereafter to go on to a new witness, Mr Mbambo.
ROCKLYN MARK WILLIAMS (Sworn, states)
CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions which counsel would like to put to Mr Williams arising out of his evidence last week?
MR MARITZ: Yes, Mr Chairman. Maritz on the record. I have a few questions, if I may proceed.
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Maritz.
MR MARITZ: Thank you. Dr Williams, we have heard your evidence as to your academic qualifications and your experience. We don't quarrel with it, but may I ask you this? As far as the South African Defence Force and the present SANDF is concerned, in the old SADF there was a course known as, "The South African Army Senior Commanding Staff Course". Are you aware of it? --- Yes, I'm very familiar with it. I lecture on the course frequently.
You did not do that course, did you? --- No, I didn't.
And then I believe that in the SANDF there is a course which is called, "The Joint Staff Course"? --- That's correct.
You haven't done that course either? --- No, I have not. That's for qualification to Brigadier.
Now, my instructions are that the career officer in the old SADF, as well as the modern SANDF, is guided in his role as a career officer particularly by the content of these two courses. Would you agree with that? --- Those courses and other specialist courses.
/Now, as far
1B Now, as far as counter-insurgency or anti-terrorism tactics are concerned, you have referred to some principles or ideas expounded by McCuen. Now, I must tell you that my instructions are that the professional officers in the officers corps since round about 1960, or the 'sixties, were taught the principles expounded by General Pops Fraser. Would you quarrel with that? --- They were, they were taught - amongst others they were taught those.
And my instructions are further, Doctor, that in many respects the more radical approach of McCuen in employing terrorist mechanisms were rejected out of hand by General Fraser. Would you agree with that? --- I think the approach of terror was certainly not sanctioned.
As a matter of fact, I am told, and unfortunately I apologise for this, but the gremlins have been at work. I don't have a copy of General Fraser's book to hand, but I am told that at the end thereof there's an appendix, which summarises the principles that he expounded. You are aware of that? You've read the book? --- I've read the book. I don't have a copy at my disposal at the moment.
Now, will you bear with me one moment, please? Mr Chairman, sorry to take up a little bit of time. What I have is in Afrikaans and apparently there is an English copy available and it will facilitate the cross-examination. Thank you. (Pause) Thank you. Doctor, I have now open in front of me Appendix A to this little booklet by General Pops Fraser and it starts at page 48 of the copy that I have here. I am going to read the summarised principles and I'd like your comment on them as
/we go along.
1B we go along. I'll just stop after every paragraph. He says, "1. A revolutionary war is a political war." --- That's entirely consistent with ... (inaudible) ... military strategy.
Yes, and that's what you've said too.
"2. The objective for both sides in a revolutionary war is to gain the support of the mass of the population, their approval, sympathy and active participation."
That would be true? --- As far as the theoretical principles are concerned, yes.
Yes. I'm sorry, you just have to record your voice, because it is not recording. --- Yes, as far as the theoretical principles of the strategy are concerned, yes. We are speaking theory now.
The salient point is here too - and this is the point I'm trying to make - is that the professional soldier was taught these principles, and those are my instructions. --- Absolutely.
Yes, and 3. he says,
"Popular uprisings or revolutions rarely succeed without outside assistance."
A nod is not good enough. --- Sorry?
A nod is not good enough. --- Yes, no, that's correct.
"4. Propaganda, terrorism and guerillas constitute only one stage of modern warfare designed to create a situation favourable to the build-up of conventional forces for the purpose,
1B eventually, of confronting government forces on the battlefield and defeating them."
And that refers, as I understand it, to the different stages of the revolutionary onslaught. --- Ja, that's correct.
5, he says, "Time is a weapon of the insurgent". --- Correct.
"6. Revolutionary war will tax to the utmost the full resources and patience of any state."
And then he's got a sub-heading, which I must read too, "Principles concerning the support of the people", and then in paragraph 7 he says,
"A government must retain the political initiative over the insurgents by having a cause even more attractive than that inspiring them."
And I think you've said that as much in your evidence as well. --- That's correct.
"8. It is essential to create an environment that is not conducive to a successful revolution."
Is that so? --- Ja.
And, while I'm reading, may I add the comment that that would be one of the most important reasons why one would have such a thing as contra-mobilisation in order to make the theatre in which the insurgent has to operate as unfriendly as possible for him. Would you agree with
1B that? --- Ja, the contra-mobilisation would be the political component and would contribute directly to the political component of the strategy.
Absolutely. And then he says in paragraph 9,
"The life of the people under the government must be made perceptibly better than that offered by the insurgents or that in areas infested or controlled by insurgents."
Would you agree with that? --- Correct.
In 10, he says,
"Since the stake in revolutionary warfare is the control of the populace the first essential is to assure the people of their protection by active measures and by giving them the means of defending themselves, especially against terrorism."
Would you agree with that? --- That's according to Pops Fraser, yes.
And I suppose one could develop this principle somewhat in regard to the present matter before this panel, that it appears as if it would connect with the principles stated here in clear terms. Would you agree with that? --- Would you just read that principle again, please, just to refresh my mind.
"Since the stake in revolutionary warfare is the control of the populace, the first essential is to assure the people of their protection by active measures
/and by giving
1B and by giving them the means of defending themselves, especially against terrorism. --- Correct.
Then, in 11, he says,
"The morale of the population must be kept high."
Do you agree with that? --- It's self-evident. It flows from the preceding principles.
"12. Reprisals, as a long-term policy that might harm possibly innocent persons, are to be avoided at all costs."
That makes sense? --- That makes sense. Could - would you, just for my benefit - I don't think I heard the words correctly, I'm having difficulty hearing you a bit, but could you read the first component of that sentence?
"Reprisals, as a long-term policy that might harm possibly innocent persons, are to be avoided at all costs."
In other words, as far as I understand him, as a layman, he's saying that if you adopt tactics or practices in conflict with all the principles that have been stated above you are defeating the whole purpose of the exercise. --- As long-term policy.
Absolutely. --- As long-term policy.
And he says so, yes, not so?
CHAIRMAN: Sorry, Dr Williams, it may help you to put your headphones on and have them on on channel 2, which is the English channel. You'll be able to hear Mr Maritz more clearly. That's why we've all got it on. Can you hear me now? --- Ja, that's better, thanks.
MR MARITZ: Can you hear me better now too, Doctor? --- Perfectly.
/Then he says
1B Then he says in paragraph 13,
"A government must re-establish authority over the population by following a firm and demonstrably resolute policy through all its agencies."
Would you agree with that? --- That's correct.
"14. It is essential to maintain contact between the government and the population by continuing the normal functions of government."
And this appears to me to be paramount, because one has to try at one's utmost to normalise the situation if you want to benefit your own policies and strategies, not so? Then he says in 15.
MR VISSER: He didn't answer.
MR MARITZ: No, he didn't. --- Yes, that's correct.
"A government's aim must be not only to annihilate the insurgent but especially to eradicate his influence upon the population."
That is so? --- Ja, it's a well-worn military principle applied elsewhere as well.
In 16. he says,
"The population must be educated as to what revolutionary war means and what steps the government has to take to counter it."
So you've got to once again try and gain the confidence of the populace, not so? --- Absolutely.
In 17. he says,
"Effective government, supervision and
1B control of the personnel teaching at educational institutions attended by the indigenous population is essential."
It sounds like a part of the, "Hearts and minds strategy" once again. --- Well, that flows from it.
In particular. And then in 18 he says,
"A Government must have an efficient imaginative and effective information and psychological operations service."
Then he refers and he's got a sub-heading, "Principles concerning government organisation". Then he says in 19,
"The government must have strong national support reflected in an effective parliamentary majority."
So it sounds to me what he's advocating is that if you preach democracy you must practice democracy. In 20. he says,
"Bureaucratic delays and inactivities caused by long established departmental and inter-departmental procedures are frustrating enough in normal times but are as dangerous in revolutionary war as is subversion itself."
That is also self-evident. In 21. he says,
"The fighting forces, the police and government departments must be adapted to revolutionary warfare."
1B --- Correct.
Which is also self-evident.
"22. A government must establish joint control machinery (political, civil administration, police and armed forces) under single command at all levels for the implementation of the strategy laid down by the Cabinet."
Would you agree with that? --- It's really a concept of the joint operational centre liaison.
Yes. In 23. he says,
"Leaders at all levels of government, political as well as policemen, soldiers, airmen, sailors and civil servants must have a thorough understanding of counter-insurgency and the joint and several responsibilities of all departments in this type of warfare."
That harks back again to the total strategy concept, where there as an attempt at co-ordinating a cohesive joint effort by everybody concerned with the State administration and so on. You would agree with that? --- Correct.
Then he says in 24.
"There must be a first-class intelligence organization that is fully representative of all information agencies, properly integrated and able to collate, evaluate and disseminate to
1B leaders on the spot day to day tactical information that will enable them to fight their battles successfully. It must also collect, evaluate and disseminate to the appropriate leaders all other types of intelligence. The opinions of this co-ordinated intelligence organisation must be accepted and acted upon."
This is also what transpired during the revolutionary years. Do you agree with that? --- Correct, the principle at least.
In 25. he says,
"The highest possible standard of security, particularly in government departments, the police and the fighting forces is imperative."
Then he says under a sub-heading, "Some other principles", in 26.
"Conservatism or text-book wisdom is fatal whether in battle, civil administration, psychological operations or political direction. Initiative and ingenuity are vital."
"27. A government must not allow any signs of a developing pattern of revolution or spontaneous uprising to pass unheeded."
"28. The danger of complacency (i.e. refusal to recognise the true situation) before
1B and during revolutionary war must be avoided."
"It is essential to identify the enemy exactly and then isolate him from the population."
Then 30. he says,
"The law must be adapted to each stage of the threat."
And this is very important. To me, as a layman, he is saying here that to become attractive to your population, you must strive at all times to act within the law. Do you agree with my interpretation as a layman? --- There are many different interpretations of that point and it harks back to the question of using violence as a long-term policy and I think that's why it's actually qualified. So I think the point you're making now can be interpreted in different senses. That at a certain stage of the counter-revolutionary struggle the legal provisions that you normally make available in a democracy will not be pertinent to the type of methods that you're actually adopting in what becomes a rather bitter and internecine struggle. The law can be adapted in a much more coercive and authoritarian manner to enable your security forces to act effect against the insurgents they proceed and classic examples in this regard are state of emergency, extension of emergency powers to your security forces. So the law is being adapted. I think that's the key issue there.
Absolutely, and while I am about it, from what I can
1B remember, having read of Thompson - you refer to Thompson on the Malaysian Wars. --- That's correct.
He expounds exactly the same principles. He says even if you have to use draconian measures do it within the law, otherwise you're running a grave risk of defeating the whole purpose of the exercise. So I agree with you on that score. Do you agree with that? --- I agree. I mean, I agree with the principle as it's enunciated there.
Yes. And then he says in 31.,
"The government must be ready to conscript, direct and control labour."
And in 32. he says,
"In the fight against insurgents territorial borders must be possible of being disregarded by government forces, preferably by previous international arrangements. Internal boundaries within the country, administrative, police and armed forces must coincide."
Now, what he describes here, as I understand it, once again as a layman, is, inter alia, your references to the situation in Angola and Mozambique and to a lesser extent Lesotho, where this principle was, in fact, carried into practice. --- Just as a point of clarity, the principle being the recognition of the flexibility of borders.
Yes, he says,
"In the fight against insurgents territorial borders must be possible of being disregarded by government forces,
1B preferably by previous international arrangements."
So that would coincide with what you have told the panel already on the strategies in regard to Angola and Mozambique more specifically. --- That's correct. Just one point of clarity there though. There's possibly and actually are many clashes with the interpretation of that principle in the international law, so one can read that principle theoretically, certainly, but in terms of legal arrangements, particularly international law, the right to preempt a strike for instance, it can admit to very, very different interpretations. It's a somewhat glowing reference to the principle, I think, the way the phrase expounds it.
No, I appreciate that. I think that any government would have to take cognisance of principles of international law and sail those waters to the best of its ability. I appreciate that. I have no quarrel with that at all. Now, Doctor, having said all that, I want to just sketch a scenario, and that is this. You've referred in your evidence to the liberation struggle in the erstwhile South West Africa, which then became Namibia. Now, I'm going to give you a bit of background and possibly you know all this - hopefully you do. You see, General Kat Liebenberg and, I think, to an extent, maybe I should put them on the same footing, General Geldenhuys as well, were both involved in the South African effort in the erstwhile South West Africa. You are well aware of that? --- Yes, absolutely, in the 'seventies.
One of the difficulties they had is that, be it as part of the terrorist tactics, be it because chieftains
1B were hostile to the insurgent and more friendly to the forces in place, that many of them became targets and many of them were indeed killed during that struggle. You are aware of that? --- A number of figureheads were targeted.
Now, what they did then was to devise a strategy and they implemented it, whereby they also trained indigenous people to render protection to chieftains who were actually under threat, or who perceived themselves to be under threat. Are you aware of that? --- Yes, it started with the Ovambo Home Guard.
That's right. Now, when this request came to the then South African Government in regard to KwaZulu, it is no accident that General Malan, the then Minister, called upon General Kat Liebenberg to evaluate the situation and to propose a remedy, because of the experience gained in South West Africa. Well, obviously you wouldn't know that or possibly you do know it, but you could accept it? --- It's consistent with their previous system.
Yes, now, getting to this problem that we have here and may I make two remarks? For the purposes of this debate let us assume that there was a threat. Let us assume that Dr Buthelezi was genuine or, can I use the word, bona fide in his belief that he was under threat. That Dr Buthelezi was bona fide in his request for assistance and that the South African Government regarded it in that light. If we make those assumptions for purposes of the debate. Now, first of all, if one looks at the 200 Caprivi trainees, a component, some 30 of them, were trained at VIP bodyguards. Now this is a force or training which is universally practised. I think one sees
/it on television
1B it on television. High dignitaries are virtually shielded by humans in their public appearances. There's nothing new about this. Would you concede that? --- Certainly within the scenario you are painting I would, but there are many scenarios, but we can proceed with this scenario, certainly, with the scenario you are painting.
Yes. And my instructions are, and this has always been my perception I must tell you, that the bodyguards that were trained as part of the 200 were, in fact, employed immediately when they got to KwaZulu/Natal for that purpose and primarily to protect the person of Dr Buthelezi, so they were the human shield concept which was employed here. Would you agree with that so far? --- On that particular point, I mean, I can't recall exactly when they were deployed in that role. I recall that General Liebenberg actually stated that over and above the role they were trained for, according to his report, that was to be an offensive unit. They could be used as VIP bodyguards but I can't, unfortunately, remember that particular incident, unless you can refresh me with documentation.
Well, you see, all I can do is - and I'm not giving evidence - all I can do is refer you to the evidence adduced in the KwaMakutha trial of Peter Msane and several others, where, I think, it was accepted as common cause that the moment those VIP bodyguards arrived back in KwaZulu/Natal they were employed for that very purpose. Would you accept that? --- Well, not having seen that documentation, I will have to take you at your word.
MR LAX: Mr Maritz, if I could just help out there.
1B Dr Williams is getting confused between the two groups. There's the VIP group and the offensive group. The evidence in relation to the offensive group in the Liebenberg Report was that the offensive group could double as a VIP unit if necessary, and that's what he's thinking about. --- Oh.
He's not making the clear distinction between that and the people you are talking about. So just to help out there so that we are talking in the same language.
MR MARITZ: Did you follow that, Doctor? --- Ja, that's correct. I was assuming you were talking about the offensive.
No, I wasn't. There was a particular group of some 30 people who were specifically trained for the task of VIP ... (intervention) --- Ja, no, I mean they were utilised in that role.
Fine, so are we happy with that? Now, secondly, my instructions are that if you are going to - and let's first talk about a rural situation - if you are going to protect people like chieftains and important dignitaries in a rural situation, you're going to probably need a lot of things. First of all, to put it in a broad perspective, one would want to create a climate which would be unfriendly to your insurgent. That is your very broad perspective and that's why you have the contra-mobilisation element, not so? --- Politically, you would, yes.
Yes. And, secondly, one would require intelligence. In other words, you would have people moving around in your area and picking up signs as to whether there is something out of the ordinary, whether there are strange
1B people, whether there are possibly armed insurgents, anything of the kind, but what you need is intelligence to complete your broad picture, to be able to protect. Would you agree with that? --- Absolutely. For the purposes of protection, absolutely.
Yes. --- And also - I mean, I think, we are speaking about the rural counter-insurgency environment now, where much of a premium is also placed on the ability of the organization to react pro-actively.
Yes. --- So, I mean, intelligence would support both your protective and your offensive capabilities.
Then one would have a body or agents, whatever you want to call them, who would fulfil the role of listening posts. One could have geese or dogs or whatever, but they could possibly warn you of an insurgency, but you would have things such as listening posts and you would have people in place to protect, not so? --- You would have people in place to protect installations that you deem to be strategic and persons that you deem to be worthy of protection so to speak.
If you take the kraal of a chieftain, one would go about it in that fashion. You would have actually people on the ground who could protect. --- No, you would.
One could also have in reserve a strike force, which, if everything that you've got in place were penetrated and were to that extent neutralised, one could have as an ultimate protection a measure - a strike force - not so? --- You could have a strike force both to ensure that if you were penetrated you were capable of reacting but one of your principles of rural counter-insurgency operations, as I have just said now, is its
1B pro-active nature. That's reflected in the type of military strategies you have in rural counter-insurgencies, such as search and destroy, which go beyond your rural environment, if you're looking for insurgents and you're aware that they're in the area, cross-border operations, preemptive strikes. So I'd like to qualify that. I mean, I think it's a cardinal military principle here is that certainly you could use a reaction force, strike force, call it what you will, to protect your defences, but then also in anticipation of the breach of those defences you could use them pro-actively beyond your immediate lines of defence.
No, I'm not even talking on that very high level. I'm talking about a very, very simple situation of ... (END OF TAPE).
2A (START OF CASSETTE NO 2A)
MR MARITZ: ... provide protection at best, what - if one would call it a strike force. On that simple basis. --- At that simple basis, absolutely.
Yes. --- But I would just like to qualify the role of reaction force. It's not a passive entity. It acts pro-actively.
Yes. --- So if you discovered that, I mean, in a village, however many - so many kilometres away from your base, there were insurgents, you'd react pro-actively.
Absolutely, I'm not quarrelling with you. --- Absolutely. --- Okay, I just want to - I want to qualify that.
No, fine. No, I'm not quarrelling with you at all. One could have further permutations. One could, in regard to the reaction force possibly have, depending on the human material and resources that you have available to you, you could possibly have a situation where you have two chieftains in rather close proximity to one another which are both under protection and you could centre a small reaction force for that matter who could serve the protective role in respect of both these kraals? --- You could.
Yes. Now as far as that is concerned, and I think you referred to that as one of the strange things and at first blush I agree with you, it seems very strange, that if you've talking about protection you're going to train people in mortars, but now if one has the experience as I am instructed was the case in South West Africa, that villages and chieftains and kraals were attacked with
2A mortars, the best counter method is to return the attack with mortars? --- You certainly could, absolutely.
So you would train these people in the use of mortars. --- (No reply)
If one gets to house penetration, I assume that the same principle applies. If you have a situation where the insurgent has gained the upper hand and he's taken control of a particular building, inter alia your charge is in the building in a hostage situation, you must have a means of penetrating that building and undoing the harm. Would you agree with that? --- You certainly could if it was a reaction force trained specifically for that role.
Yes. And as I understand the evidence, that is particularly what they were trained to do, not so? --- According to the evidence, yes.
Yes. Now, Doctor, it appeals to me that in this case, with a very limited force of 200 people which you have to reduce to some 170 or maybe less because some of the died and what have you and maybe there were a few cooks, but let's for argument's sake say a little force of 170 comprising some 120 that were trained in contra-mobilisation, a small little unit of 30 offensive people and a small little unit of 30 intelligence people, you're really stretching it in an area as big as KwaZulu-Natal? It's a very small little force. Do you agree with that? --- Certainly it's a small force, but I mean these were - it should also be qualified that - there are two possible options, I mean, the one is that the force is going to stay that size for a long time, the other is that this was a nucleus of a force that was going to be expanded.
2A No, I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about the simple fact that this was per se a small force ... (intervention) --- Tactically.
... which must have been extremely stretched in such a big area? --- It appears small, but I think given the fact that it was operating in an environment where it was very difficult to quantify the nature of the military opposition against it numerically, it may have been quite effective.
No, no, I'm not talking about an ex post facto situation. I'm talking about the military planners that were faced with the problem. Imagine that you're General Kat Liebenberg and you were asked to give a - what would one call it - a scenario as to how one could do the job, in that sense, it is a very small, very limited force which, for obvious reasons, must have been stretched to its utmost. Would you agree with that? --- I'd still come back to my point that, I mean, this is a military force that's being inserted(?) in an area where you don't know the nature of your military threat that you're against, so ... (intervention)
That's the other difficulty. --- ... it's small against what? Small against a battalion, small against a brigade, small against a division? It's difficult to quantify something like that.
Absolutely, so the military planner or the strategist is faced with this grave difficulty on top of it. He does not know what is going to transpire in fact. He has to cater for what he could reasonably expect, but the permutations are almost uncountable. Virtually any method could have been employed by the insurgent to
2A threaten the local population, especially the VIP or their chieftains, which needed protection. Would you agree with that? --- Still not having the benefit of the military threat upon which this is based quantifiably and numerically, I think it's a very difficult question to accede to, either to agree or to disagree with. And we don't have that - we don't have that quantifiable threat. Against what precisely? The political influence of a particular organisation at the time, yes, but militarily and numerically against what? That is why a force, a company and this is basically a company's strength, depending on the circumstances and depending on the level of counter military organisation that exists, it can either be benign or it can be devastating. You've got to know against what it was actually being configured.
Yes, I suppose one could argue the matter in small detail and try and make headway, but for our purposes, we are not going anywhere. Can I just say this to you, as an example and I think you've mentioned it, is that you questioned the use of - or the training in RPG7s. Now say for instance you're taking Dr Buthelezi from Ulundi to Durban and you have to take a little team and inspect the route to obviate the threats, surely you would have to know where to expect an RPG7 attack, what the range would be, in which terrain you could use it, where you would expect to find it? Wouldn't that be so? --- Once again, my point, it depends on your estimation and determination of the military threat. You could take that point and extend it a couple of points further. You could say possibly along the way you needed to anticipate artillery attacks. Possibly along the way you needed to
2A anticipate attacks of a much more substantial nature, where do you draw the line? I think in a military appreciation you draw the line in terms of the appreciation you make of the enemy's capabilities and I think if one is speaking about light artillery pieces and RPG7s, to my knowledge and to the reading of the evidence that's been presented here, it was not the nature of the military threat that was being faced at the time, it was more a political threat that they were responding to, so ... (intervention)
Aha, but now you're getting to a very salient point or an important point. I must accept and possibly I must say to you that I put it to you that of necessity, the intelligence community in the then South Africa must have had a pretty shrewd idea of the threat that they could expect, not so? --- If one adopts the approach that you were using these forces simply as reaction forces for purely defensive purposes and amongst other things you train them in the type of training that they had received and there's still a couple of anomalies there, why are they trained in abduction, why are they trained in plastic explosives? Why are they trained in concealment of evidence? Be that as it may, you could - you you're determining it simply on the basis of a military threat that you're going to react defensively and reactively against, certainly you could factor it into that, but equally so, if you had decided to go out on the defensive, such weaponry would play a similar and an important role. So once again it becomes a question of scenarios.
I couldn't agree with you more, Doctor, because I mean you can take the poor individual like myself, who has
2A a clay pigeon rifle, a shotgun. I use it to shoot clay pigeon, that is my intent at all times, but I can turn around and become very offensive with that - exactly the same weapon. It's a state of mind. It's a choice that you make, not so? --- It depends very much on your political objectives.
Yes and ... (intervention) --- And your military objectives that you want to accomplish.
It depends in the first instance on how you decide to employ your capability. Isn't that so? --- Absolutely.
As a matter of fact, I'm going to throw this in as an example. I think it has been said by one my clients, General Malan, and I may be wrong and if I'm wrong I apologise, but this is the figure that I remember, is that say from 1970 onwards, the SADF trained some 500 000 conscripts. --- It certainly did.
In warfare. Not so? --- It did.
It does not mean that you're stating thereby that you have trained 500 000 criminals or murderers. It means that you have trained 500 000 soldiers. Not so? --- Absolutely.
Each one of them thinking that they are acting lawfully. Not so? --- Hopefully.
Absolutely. Now, Doctor, there's another thing that I just want to discuss with you very briefly and I appreciate that once again there are political difficulties, but from a military point of view there doesn't appear to be difficulties in this regard, in regard with the subject that I want to broach now. Sorry, but you are well aware of the fact that at the relevant
2A time and this appears from the documentation, Dr Buthelezi insisted upon the covert nature of this operation, because he thought it would do him political harm if it will become known that he was receiving assistance from the South African Government. You are aware of that? --- Ja, I am.
Now are you also aware of the fact - and this evidence was given in the Kwa Makutha trial that I think in a place called Jozini, I think it's Jozini. Where? Jozini, yes. There was a Zulu battalion, known as Battalion 121, which was once again, for political reasons and if I use the layman's term of rejected, don't quarrel with me, but the effect of it was that he didn't want anything to do with that battalion. He rejected it for his own political reasons, whatever they were. Are you aware of that fact? --- I'm aware of the existence of a battalion, but my reading of the evidence that was presented that he saw that as the nucleus out of which a defence force of his own could be created. I may be incorrect.
No, I think you're incorrect, because you see, that's one of the points I want to make, that I think it must be conceded for any purposes that a battalion such as Battalion 121, was a formidable force, military force with very, very handy fire power. You would have to concede that? --- It was a - it was a standard rural counter insurgency battalion.
Yes and the advantages of being able to employ Battalion 121, would far outweigh the creation of a force of 200 people trained in Caprivi in a very basic manner, wouldn't it? --- If you could employ them, I mean, I
2A don't think it's as simple as that, I mean, first of all they resorted under the SADF for purposes of command and control and as such they were known. The declared intention of actually fielding the force that was subsequently fielded, was that it be unknown, of a covert nature and presumably arising out of this its efficacy. You wouldn't be able to do that with 121 or any other rural counter insurgency battalion you wanted to use, because they were known, their members were known and your ability to conceal the activities of a unit like that would be immensely difficult, both politically and practically.
No, no, no, I'm not talking about a covert operation at all. I'm talking about overt protection, barring political difficulties or hurdles which notionally they could have been bridged(?), but in a perfectly overt manner, there is no reason, save some political reason or another, that I can perceive, why one couldn't say to Dr Buthelezi, "But there is Battalion 121. Use it to protect yourself". There's no earthly reason why that couldn't have happened. --- It would depend very much on what you wanted to use it for, because bear in mind again that this is a general rural counter insurgency battalion and a lot of the type of functions that you're looking at and the type of force that Buthelezi requested, Dr Buthelezi requested ... (inaudible) ... very specific. So you could - you could use a battalion like that in a protective role, but depending - at this stage it wasn't as big as it subsequently became. Depending on really what other tasks this unit was being mandated with. I mean it's also instructive(?) to bear in mind that this
2A was a time when defence force manpower was overstretched as a result of the state of emergency, the successive states of emergency, so it's not as though one had the ease really to - to pluck out a unit simply like that, but certainly, you could have used elements of it in that role.
Yes, and probably one would have been doing much better and by training people up in Caprivi, giving them basic training. Not so? --- You would do better if you linked it again to the type of operation that you were looking at. If this was a clear open operation ... (intervention)
That's the ... (inaudible), is it not? --- ... overt ... (intervention)
That's the ... (inaudible)? --- That scenario, yes, but this was a covert operation.
Yes. --- So you're bedeviled there in terms of doing that.
Yes, but now I have explained why it was covert. If one were to assume that it could be done perfectly overtly, one could have employed the battalion, which was much better equipped and much better trained than the fellows up in Caprivi. As a matter of fact the Caprivians were never equipped at all. --- (No reply)
They were supposed to have been equipped by KwaZulu. Do you follow? --- Certainly.
Will you bear with me one moment, please? Mr Chairman, I think I've asked all my questions, but there was a request that we just have a little bit of a rethink. If we can have a smoke break for say 10 minutes I'll be grateful?
2A CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you, Mr Maritz.
CHAIRMAN: Have you had time to consider your position?
MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, thank you very much, thank you for the adjournment. I have no further questions, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARITZ
CHAIRMAN: Any other parties?
MR WILLS: Yes, one or two matters, thank you, Mr Chairperson. Dr Williams, a lot of what has been said and understood by me in any event in your - during your cross-examination by my colleague, it's understood by me to represent a sort of a normal army scenario and I can understand - my understanding of a normal army scenario would be that people would be trained, but then not only would they be trained, they would eventually utilise their skills and their training under normal army conditions where they'd have immediate commanders possibly and the command structure would go up. Is that your understanding of how things ... (intervention)? --- Certainly(?). No, that - I mean, the way - I think that the nature of the points we've been discussing presupposes a normal, inasmuch as you can get a normal ... (intervention)
Yes. --- ... (inaudible) environment presupposes that.
Now my understanding of the evidence so far and my colleagues will be quick to correct me if I'm wrong, but these people were in fact trained and then apart from a remnant of control from the SANDF people, they were allowed to operate their skills effectively independently
2A from the normal army controls. Is that your understanding of the matter? --- That is correct. They were deployed in support of a particular organisation, which is itself - becomes in itself problematic in terms of your classic principles of war.
Now that's what I'm getting to. How does that affect the theory of the - the theory of the strategy of the army - sorry, that's not entirely accurate. Let me try and rephrase it. In the theories that we've been debating over the last couple of hours, is it consistent with those theories that such people are effectively trained and then allowed to operate independently as it appears that these trainees were or did in fact operate independently? --- My answer to that would be in two points. I'd say that first of all if one was actually dealing with conventional operations, then the environment is pretty straightforward, the armed forces are there for the protection of the sovereignty of the government in question, whether they engage themselves externally or internally. When it comes to Coin Ops, the tendency is counter insurgency operations. The tendency is for it to become much more blurred. In terms of classic counter insurgency theory, whether it's rural or urban, the military forces that one utilises and whatever counter mobilisation measures one adopts, is there to ensure the integrity of the sovereignty and legitimacy of the government of the day. Where it does appear to be blurred in this case, is firstly the fact that these forces were used in support of a particular political party, which undermines the supposedly non-partisan and apolitical role which armed forces should play. I mean that should be
2A there at the disposal of the government, whether they're in a conventional or counter insurgency capacity. I think the second point which you raised is the question of command and control, because one must bear in mind at the end of the day that this was a very volatile climate within military forces were being employed. There were also other forces available and I think that the one was mentioned earlier on by the legal counsel there, that could have played the role of protection. It could have been 121 Battalion, it could have been the police, it could have been the standard SADF citizen force unit, but a necessity was felt to create a force over and above that and that is why I have stressed one has to look at the political and military objectives of this force in relationship to those other agencies one had at one's disposal, before one can actually can - can really comment on it, so I would say it's very difficult - certainly the principles of counter revolution, counter insurgency warfare perpetually argue for unity of effort for the legitimacy of the operation and creating a force in which the command and control is shaky and vague at best, does become problematic, particularly when it is in support of a partisan objective.
Yes, thank you. Now another aspect of control that concerns me is that we've heard the evidence of a couple of the so-called hit squad operatives and a number of their hits were directed not against guerillas per se, or not against what my learned friend, Mr Maritz, referred to as insurgents, but against people who occupied positions in civil society, for example, trade union leaders. Now is that - does that correlate with the theories as we've
2A discussed? --- It doesn't, bar some counter insurgency theories have made allowance for a small area of, I suppose one can call it discretion, in which beyond the law you could actually utilise it, but generally your principles of counter insurgency and counter revolutionary warfare and I think it has been spelt out in the principles that were enunciated from Pops Fraser, states quite emphatically that support of the population, the legitimacy of the operation and a good image of the armed forces amongst our local population is essential and that you do not engage in those type of activities.
Now should the system have gone wrong and I'm emphasising on the control aspect. Let me paint a scenario here, is that if taking for granted these people were trained and they were under the command and control of the persons who trained them, like in the SANDF, for argument's sake, should they - should the individual operatives veer from the tasks given to them by the higher command let's take out civilian leaders, would there not a be an obligation on the part of the hierarchy to investigate those instances in order to prevent the reoccurrence? --- To investigate and where necessary punished through appropriate mechanisms, like the Military Disciplinary Code, regimental disciplinary measures, it would be.
And obviously this - these processes are set in motion specifically to keep the individuals who are acting - acting in a disciplined and military manner, not so? --- It's to ensure the legitimacy and integrity of command, yes.
Now at the time and I think we're talking about a
2A period roughly between let's say the end of 1986 and up until 1993 and we're talking about KwaZulu-Natal, do you have any information as regards the extent of the deployment of liberation insurgents in the area at that time? Was it rife with insurgents or was it more - was it a military - was it military stage or were we still at a political stage, if one looks at the principles of guerilla warfare? --- It was most probably and, I mean this is generally the reading that comes out and if one looks at the events that were taking place, it was most probably at a stage where Stage 1, the classic Stage 1 of political mobilisation was maturing and elements of armed actions, what's normally called armed propaganda, hitting strategic installations, for instance for political value, were being pursued. There had been a number of skirmishes report and more particularly in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal of a military nature, but from the reading of the situation and from the available evidence, we don't know what evidence is not available, it certainly wasn't a fully blown military confrontation, which would correspond to Stages 3 and 4 of classis counter insurgency warfare.
Thank you. A final point concerns the issue which you have indicated before is a, to use my word, a contentious issue in counter insurgency warfare and that concerns the issue of keeping within the law and to avoid actual, what can be described as terror attacks is, I mean, very loosely, is it not so and I speak here as a layman, that in fact that is in fact often very problematical in scenarios like this. I think that what have been described by the previous witnesses are - can
2A only be described as without the law and also as being effectively terror attacks? --- I think many of your counter insurgency strategists acknowledge the danger of going beyond the wall precisely because once you actually transgress the law, you can land up in a spiralling situation and which is very difficult to control, both the process and the forces at your disposal.
Yes. Sorry, this is the last question. Another part of the evidence which has come out over the last few days is that there was on the one hand an instruction given to the trainees to avoid the police and to keep the - their training covert. There's also been a limited amount of evidence which suggests that the - there were active measures taken by various authorities to cover up the operations that had already been executed. Now surely this would impact upon the discipline of the operatives themselves and essentially allow them to operate out of any form of control and outside the scope of what could be considered any lawful engagement? --- It certainly would give any military person considerable licence and latitude if you don't have that type of oversight.
Thank you. No further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS
MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, De Jager on record. We're not going to plough the same land as Mr Maritz. We associate ourselves with the cross-examination of Mr Maritz and in order not to hand this microphone manually from man to man and woman to woman, may I also put on record that that is the general attitude of us all.
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr De Jager. So just for the record, the counsel have indicated that they are ad idem
2A with the questions put to the witness by Mr Maritz and will not go over the same territory as it were.
MR MACADAM: Possibly just one question emerging out of questions that are raised already. With you - how familiar are you with the conflict which existed in KwaZulu-Natal in the mid eighties? --- A very broad understanding from what have been presented here and from what I've read about it.
Would you identify, at that stage of the conflict, a need for rural communities to arm their villages with mortars to defend themselves from attack? --- I think once again it comes back to the point that was made earlier, that you've got to make a pretty comprehensive political and military threat - if you villages are coming under military attack with whatever type of weaponry, then you'd devise the appropriate counter measures and I think that stage is more typically associated with Stage 3 of counter revolutionary warfare where you've moved from political mobilisation into the initial stages of armed struggle into a much more fully fledged rural armed struggle. Once you've reached that stage you could - and that would probably more accurately describe the scenario in Northern Namibia in the mid eighties onwards, where you had large amounts of insurgents coming in, hitting bases, hitting villages. To my knowledge that was not the situation in KwaZulu-Natal, there were limited rural skirmishes. There's a high level of political presence and organisation within the urban areas, but even militarily, your urban operations there were largely, as far as I can recall, limited to special operations type of attacks, armed propaganda.
2A And - I don't want to give evidence myself, but my own understanding of the conflict at that time was that the South African Defence Force was deployed in these areas primarily to deal with the - I would say the hard type of excursion. If there were a group of fully trained MK members who had crossed the border from Mozambique carrying RPG7s, heavy machine guns, that would be dealt with by the SADF itself, which was on patrol in those self-same area, whether or not the KwaZulu Government administered the areas? --- Well, typically units like 121 Battalion in a rural counter insurgency capacity would be doing that task of border protection, cordons, needs-be searches of areas.
And I don't want to dip into your own knowledge, but are you aware of any objections that were raised by the KwaZulu Government that the SADF was performing this functions in their areas ... (intervention)? --- Not to my knowledge, but as I say, I only have a very general knowledge of the period.
And it has been suggested to you that the training that these people received would be no different than the enormous number of conscripts(?) that went through the ordinary military training for the Defence Force. I'm just wondering how persons would - to perform their duties as ordinary law-abiding members of any defence force would need to know how to lie to the police, escape from police custody, as certain of these witnesses have claimed they were trained? --- I think any - military people are trained according to the corps and the function, the specialisation that they're brought into. I think what is unique about the type of training that these people
2A received ... (intervention)
MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, I'm sorry, my belated effort is caused by the fact that I didn't have a microphone available, but I want to object to this question. I went over the evidence which was available to me, over the weekend and the closest that I could get to this suggestion is that contained in the evidence of Mr Dlamini. Now Mr Dlamini said if you'll just bear with me - on the record, when he was questioned by the police, the question was by Mr Macadam -
"Now were you at any stage in the camp where you were taken to from Ulundi given any training or instructions as to how you should react with the police?".
The answer was this, "Yes" -
"Will you tell us about that? --- The said we should avoid them, not mix with them.
Anything else? --- I have forgotten".
There's nothing sinister in that answer.
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Maritz. There was also evidence from Mr Mkhize who said that they were trained to run away from the police on day one.
MR LAX: Armed combat. They were also trained how to resist arrest by making reference to personal combat techniques and where to hit people so they could escape easily; how to break out of custody. That's what he alluded to in his evidence. So I don't know if you - maybe you didn't pick it up in his evidence at all, but my recollection is intensely clear in that regard.
2A MR MARITZ: Probably I didn't hear it.
MR LAX: Ja.
MR MARITZ: But it was certainly not said in evidence-in-chief. That's my recollection. Not by Mr Mkhize either.
CHAIRMAN: I think the record will show that it was said in his evidence-in-chief and the record is available, Mr Maritz.
MR MARITZ: I have been corrected by my colleagues. They say that it was said. I'm sorry.
CHAIRMAN: Proceed, Mr Macadam.
MR MACADAM: Could you then answer that question? --- I think what differentiates the type of training that was received here, it was most probably typically akin to the type of training that Special Forces personnel would receive, although it wasn't as extensive as that, in the sense that they received training in basic infantry weapons, more advanced infantry weapons and plastic explosives which are your classic engineering skills and then in the range of type of skills that were referred to earlier on and that is house penetration, concealment of evidence, abduction and that's what makes it different from the normal generic type of training the people would receive.
Thank you, I've got no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MACADAM
CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions for Dr Williams, then we will let him go and proceed with our next witness.
CHAIRMAN: I think it is probably convenient now to break for lunch until 2 o'clock. I think it might be convenient
2A to try and get through any new witnesses which we have to day, it's Mr - Inspector Marion and Mr Mbambo. So I think if we could limit lunch for 45 minutes until quarter to two and resume here at 1.45, quarter to two, please.
CHAIRMAN: Please resume your seats. We are going to start now with the evidence of Mr Mbambo. Mr Mbambo, please can you give us your full names.
ROMEO MBUZO MBAMBO (Sworn States)
MR MACADAM: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, I'm just trying to ascertain in which language the witness wants to give evidence in and he has indicated that he wants to give evidence in Zulu.
THE WITNESS ELECTS TO GIVE HIS EVIDENCE THROUGH AN INTERPRETER
MR MACADAM: Now is it correct that you were once a member of the KwaZulu Police, but that in 1995 you were convicted of a series of crimes, sentenced to a term of imprisonment and you are now serving that term? --- That is correct.
And is it further correct that you applied for amnesty in respect of these cases in which you were sentenced as well as other offences for which you have not as yet been charged? --- That's correct.
Now in the 1980s, did you become a card carrying member of any particular party in KwaZulu-Natal? --- Inkatha Freedom Party, yes.
And is it further correct that you joined the KwaZulu Police in 1990? --- That is true.
2A And was it that you then filled in an application form, went through the normal training at the police college and once you had completed that training you were then attested as a member of the Force? --- That is correct.
And where were you posted after you completed your training? --- In Esikhaweni.
And in what branch of the Police Force did you perform your duties?
INTERPRETER: Can he please repeat the answer?
MR MACADAM: In what branch of the Police Force in Esikhaweni were you placed in? --- Crime Prevention Unit.
Was that a uniform branch component of the police or a detective branch? --- Uniform branch.
And in 1992, were you still stationed at that police station and attached to that sub-unit? --- That is true.
And Brian Gcina Mkhize gave evidence this morning. Was he also a member of the KwaZulu Police at Esikhaweni during this period? --- That is true.
In 1992, did you have any specific dealings with him over and above your ordinary duties as a member of the Police Force? --- You mean other duties outside police duties? What do you mean?
Yes. --- That is true.
Can you explain to us briefly what that entailed? --- I was a member of the hit squad. Then Mkhize came to me where I was living at home where I was living and we were already used to each other then and he introduced - and he told me what he was there for, that he was one of
2A those who had trained in Caprivi and he asked me if I knew about those and I told him yes, I have some knowledge and he therefore told me that he has been sent by the leaders to recruit the members with whom he will work to fight the ANC and I asked him what type of work he was referring to or talking about and he therefore told me that they were trained in Caprivi so they may fight the ANC or be able to fight ANC. Now that I was an IFP member from a long time ago, around the 1980s, I had no problems or objections to that. I only asked him which terms could he give me in case I decide to join him. Can he ascertain that and he therefore promised me that he will facilitate a meeting with the IFP leaders or high profile members, then he would introduce me to them, so I may be welcomed by them and thereafter they will outline my duties to me. On that day he took me to Mrs Mbuyazi's home and Mrs Mbuyazi was a councillor at G2(?) and also he(?) was a leader, IFP leader in that area. He introduced me to Mrs Mbuyazi and told her that he had already explained everything to me and I was also showing interest in joining the force, hit squad and Mrs Mbuyazi expressed her joy and also told me that I should not even worry about anything, she will call the leaders in Ulundi and facilitate a meeting where I will be introduced now to those superiors. After that we were just chatting now generally about the conflict between the IFP and ANC. It was only one weekend after that weekend or after one week, Gcina told me that I will have to attend a meeting in Ulundi where he will introduce me to others. Indeed we went to Ulundi. We went to Captain Langeni's office, which was situated in KwaZulu Parliament, right in Ulundi and that's where I met
2A Daluxolo Luthuli, Captain Langeni, who is now major and M Z Khumalo as well. He introduced me to them and further on went to tell them that he has already explained the need for my services, so a group will be created to fight the ANC in the area. I was warmly welcomed and ...[break in recording]
(END OF CASSETTE NO 2A)
2B (START OF CASSETTE NO 2B)
--- ... he further told me the type of work and what it entailed. They told me that there was a great need that we should fight at all costs the ANC and told me about Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi as well, that he was not happy about the fact that he was losing his members, because they were being killed by the ANC and he said the time had come where we had to face the ANC head-on and fight it. And they also explained to me that if we leave ANC alone and do nothing about it and continue to do its work, killing the IFP and not implementing any force to fight it, that will mean we are leaving the whole country in the communists' hands and in that way we will be letting the enemy and poverty and we will tend to be like other African countries like Angola, Mozambique and Uganda and they further explained to me that they won't allow - oh, I'm sorry, they were saying they won't allow the Zulu nation to be headed by the communists. And they explained further how we would work or how we would cope and also explained that the Esikhaweni area and surrounding areas had ANC members who were the ones behind the killing of the IFP members. It will be appropriate for us to receive orders to kill such members and we should see that they are killed. And it was explained to me that I should not
2B have any fear whatsoever, because what we would be carrying or doing, it's not out of our volition and we are not doing it for our own gain as IFP members, but we are doing it for the Zulu nation at large and the entire South African Government and they promised me that I should not fear that I will be arrested at some stage, because they have strong support behind him, being supported by the South African Government and that they will do and take whatever it costs to help us in case we will be arrested and they made a an example by Jerry Mdanda, that he was also arrested at some stage, but he was released and they made efforts that he was released and many others and they also told us that we will be working hand in hand with the Inkatha leaders in the Esikhaweni and the surrounding areas, to be able to identify the ANC members, those we had to kill, the targets and they explicitly emphasised to me that all what we will be doing, we shall not put them in paper or write or in diaries or in any papers we should not write anything. We should use our memories to capture every reports and they said in case we will be given pictures of photos of the people we did not know, we should with immediate effect, after the operation, destroy such pictures or evidence. And they told us that their ammunition were in place and they also told us that we won't be using often the weapons from the police, but we will be given AK47 weapons like that and some others which were used by ANC in their activities. That would help us so that they could not easily tell who carried the operation, either IFP or anything and they also told us - gave us the codenames that we will be using to refer to the equipment that we'd used. I remember Madlanduna and
/M Z Khumalo
2B M Z Khumalo explaining to me that we should not use the names of the weapons, as they were, but use codenames instead and they also told me that if we talk about equipment, the entire equipment, we should refer to it as farming equipment and they told us that if they were referring to hand grenades, they would talk about - they will refer to the hand grenades as "block of soil" and they explained to us that the small guns, firearms, will be referred to as - or they will refer to the small firearms as something that's hidden and they also explained to me that we won't be using the name of "killing", but instead we will refer to killing as the "first bus" and also told me that the chief will be discover and - or to realise that there's a member like me who will be working with the IFP. That was what was discussed in that meeting, the core of the meeting and some other things I've forgotten.
And you said earlier that when Gcina Mkhize approached you to join the hit squad and this led to you going to this meeting in Ulundi, he had announced that he was one of the persons who had been trained in the Caprivi and you said that you had knowledge of this group at that stage. What did you know about them? --- Yes, I knew them. Even though I wasn't so sure about where they were trained, whether in Caprivi or Israel, they were at times referred to as Israelites and with the knowledge I had, I knew that it is a group that has been posted to different police station in KwaZulu so they could be helping Inkatha fight against ANC and also, there was that rumour or the spirit that if you're a member of KwaZulu Police Station and they were suspecting you to be sympathising with the
2B ANC, those would be the person who will be contacted or the people will be contacted to kill you. Now all the police who were working in the KwaZulu police stations were working so cautious that they don't come anywhere close or have any kind of dealings with the ANC, because they were afraid for their lives, especially those trained in Caprivi or Israelites who will deal with them accordingly. That was the kind of knowledge I had about the group.
And after this meeting in Ulundi, which you've described to us, did you then return to Esikhaweni? --- That is true, I went back to Esikhaweni.
Did you have any further dealings with Gcina Mkhize once you had returned? --- Yes, I did. From then until the time when I was arrested. I explained to Gcina Mkhize that as it was explained at Ulundi that the weapons with which we'll work are not the kind of weapons that are being used by the police, but were weapons like AK47 and such. Now I explained to him that he had to train me or at least give me some knowledge about how to use such weapons and he told me that that was not a problem, he will arrange that and further told me that the leaders also indicated that I should be given some kind of training to carry such operations.
Did you in fact receive such training? --- Yes, Gcina trained me how to use these weapons. Even though the training did not take place concurrently, we had training sessions in different days, not at once. He taught me how to use and operate AK47 and how to use the hand grenade like F1 hand grenades and RGD5 hand grenades and also taught me how to use weapons or guns like
2B Scorpion, guns like Makorov and one other called Stechkin(?) and also explained about how to use RPG7, even though it was not there, but he told me that as time progressed, there will be a need for us to use that kind of a weapon and he told me that it was necessary for me to know how to operate such a gun. And explained as well that there will be a need at some stage where we will have to use PE4 and he also told me that it was necessary for me to know to operate that. And also taught me the house penetration in case we wanted to kill someone in the house and also taught me tracking and reconnaissance. He was not teaching me these things at once, but at different days at a time that was convenient for us.
CHAIRMAN: Mr Mbambo, you mentioned two weapons there. RPG7 and PE4. Just for the record, is an RPG7 a rocket propelled grenade? --- RPG7 is the rocket launcher and uses anti-tank and ant-personnel launchers.
A PE4? --- PE4 is an explosive that you use in case you want to destroy buildings, big buildings, huge bridges and is a solution like mud and you use that to weigh how much big a building you want to destroy and you put it right next to that building and insert Cortex in it and safety fuse in case you - the building is so massive -huge, you are able to put that explosive in some place and some Cortex around so you could build charges around the building and ultimately, at the end of the Cortex there will be a stick like a match stick which will be one that will be lit and after that it will explode.
MR MACADAM: Did Gcina Mkhize actually physically have in his possession firstly PE4, then the hand grenades and the Stechkins, Tokarevs, Makorovs, AK47s or was it a
2B theoretical discussion, without physically having these weapons with him? --- The RPG7, PE4, were the ones which were explained to me theoretically, but these others like AK47, Makorov, Stechkins and Scorpions were the guns that he brought with and we ended having such guns in our possession and the hand grenades as well. We kept such and we used them.
Do you know where he got these weapons and hand grenades from? --- At the time when he brought those weapons, I had no idea as to where he got those weapons, but one of the AK47s I knew that he got it in the house at Port Durnford which looked like a farmhouse and Thomas Buthelezi was guarding the house and one of the guns he had was from that house, but as for the others, I have no knowledge of.
This person, Thomas Buthelezi, did you know him yourself? --- Yes, I know him, but I knew him only that day. Before I did not know him. I knew him on that day.
Do you know if he belonged to any group or whether he was a member of the police or army or what the position was? --- I knew that he was one of those who had trained in Caprivi.
But at that time, do you know whether he was a member of the KwaZulu Police, or not? --- No, I did not know.
Now you told us earlier that you're a member of the Crime Prevention Unit of the police at Esikhaweni. Did the Unit that you belonged to change at any stage after the meeting in Ulundi which you've described to us? --- Yes, it changed. After that I joined the CIDs working as
2B a detective.
How did that come about? --- When I was still with the Crime Prevention Unit after I had joined the hit squad, the meetings we used to have with local leadership of IFP, there were complaints that were brought to our attention, like Mrs Mbuyazi, Mayor, B B Biyela and the councillors like Mr Nzuza, Mrs Njali(?), a councillor, Mrs Joyce Mathenjwa, who were the IFP leaders at the local level. Mr Mkhize, G L Mkhize who also was a councillor, Mr Nzuza, who was a councillor, all those who were leaders of the IFP locally, had a complaint that the IFP Youth, each time they fought the ANC, they will get arrested, but the ANC will never be arrested. Now the local leadership was convinced that within the police station in Esikhaweni were two officers who sympathised with the ANC, who were the ones who led to the arrest of the IFP Youth and the harassment thereof and those officers were Lieutenant Masinga, who was the Branch Commander, Internal Stability Unit and Captain Manzini, who was a DCIO(?) in charge of the investigators. The IFP local leadership believed that the IFP Youth arrests were as a result of those two police who were based in Esikhaweni Police Station. The local leadership arranged a meeting with Brigadier Mzimela who was the district commander in Esikhaweni, where they were going to lodge their complaints with regards the arrest and the harassment of IFP in Esikhaweni. Mrs Mbuyazi came to the Esikhaweni Police Station and Mr B B Biyela, who was the mayor and went to - and had a meeting with the brigadier, Mr Mzimela. After that meeting we met with Mrs Mbuyazi and B B Biyela and the police station and they told us with Constable Victor Buthelezi that they were
2B from a meeting, but they will tell us what they were discussing at that meeting and the outcome of the meeting in the afternoon, but I should come to Mrs Mbuyazi's house late in the afternoon and truly, I went to Mrs Mbuyazi in that afternoon and Mrs Mbuyazi led the story that Mzimela said even though he was an IFP member, it was going to be difficult for him to interfere with the arresting of the IFP Youth, because there were rumours existing that he was the one behind the hit squads in Esikhaweni and he further told us that he thinks the best way was, because the IFP is complaining about Internal Stability Unit and the CID unit, amongst the hit squad members there should be a member which will infiltrate these two units so that we could be able to prevent the arrest of the IFP Youth and that even after they have arrested or they happened to arrest the IFP Youth, there should be one at least among the investigators to destroy the evidence and Gcina Mkhize was working at the Internal Stability Unit, they appointed me to infiltrate the CID branch and Mrs Mbuyazi said I should fill out an application to join the CIDs so that I could conducively and infiltrate and the following day I did just that, filled out the application and gave it to the branch commander and he refused to approve that, because he said he did not want me to leave that unit for another one. And I filled out a second application and took it to branch commander, the CID one and he accepted it. But my branch commander of Crime Prevention Unit kept reiterating the fact that he will not let me join the other unit and I took this to Mrs Mbuyazi, this matter to Mrs Mbuyazi, that my application was not being approved. During those days I was called by Brigadier Mzimela in his
2B office and he told me that, "Mbambo, fill the third application and take it straight to me". I did just that and I gave it to him and he approved it. That was how I left and joined the CID unit. My work consisted of - if I was on call on standby, that meant that as a detective for seven days, will be the one who will undertake the initial investigation in all the cases that had just been reported and it was said that if I happened to be on a standby, the youth of the IFP will go and attack certain homes of ANC and I will sign dockets, so I conduct the initial investigation and thereafter destroy every evidence and mislead the evidence in such a way that it will be not understood and Gcina Mkhize in the Internal Stability Unit would take the units that will be on duty at night and take it to another work and will operate in a different area, while they were operating also in a different area. That was our duty in those units, in other words to prevent the arrest of the IFP Youth.
Did this in fact take place, or not? --- It took place till the day I got arrested.
Are you in any position - able to indicate, just as a rough estimate, how many case you would have then covered up in the manner that you've described? --- Even though I'm not certain as to how many cases there were, there were many, I think more than ten cases, because I will cover our operations and as well as Youth IFP operations.
Did you have any further role to do with the youth that were involved in the violence? You said you were going to cover up their cases for them. Did you have anything further to do with their activities? ---
2B There are many things I did with the IFP, together with the leadership of IFP. The training of the IFP Youth in Esikhaweni; the training of the IFP Youth at Port Durnford and the training of the IFP Youth in Dlangezwa and the training if the IFP Youth in Ensingweni and again the advice that we gave to the IFP Youth and the plannings.
Briefly, what training did you give the youth? --- The training we made available to the youth was the use of the AK47 guns, R1, G3 rifles and the use of the hand grenade and the ways in which we would attack the ANC and how cautious they should be each time they were going to attack the ANC, because the IFP Youth had already started fighting with the ANC a long time ago before our hit squad came into existence, but often times than not they were using petrol bombs and home-made firearms and after the hit squad came into existence, there was enough equipment, like hand grenades and guns and now we had to train them how to use such weapons safely and hand grenades as well.
Where did these weapons that you used in the training come from? --- One of the guns was the one Gcina Mkhize went to fetch from Thomas Buthelezi and other guns were brought by Mrs Mbuyazi and B B Biyela and Celani Mthethwa and Gcina brought some, Gcina Mkhize.
And did this training take place over a protracted period or just at one time and place?
INTERPRETER: Please repeat your question.
MR MACADAM: Did the training of the youth take place over an extended period of time or was it confined to just one specific time and place when this training was given? --- The one that was prolonged, the training that was
2B prolonged, is the Esikhaweni training, but the training of others was not so long, but they would just come for those few days and we'll train them within those days and then they will leave and go back to their respective areas.
And you were recruited by Gcina to be a member of the hit squad. Did he have any other members of his specific hit squad which you had joined? --- Yes, that's true. In our squad it was Gcina Mkhize, myself, Israel Hlongwane, Zweli Dlamini, Constable Victor Buthelezi, Constable Mthethwa who was working for BSI and Constable P S Ndlovu, who was also trained at Caprivi and Jeffrey Mthethwa and he was also trained in Caprivi ... [break in recording] ... Mhlongo and he was trained in Caprivi as well.
And the person you named, Zweli Dlamini, do you know where he resided when he operated as a hit squad member? --- He was residing at Mrs Mbuyazi's home.
Do you know what functions he performed at her home, why he was there? --- He was with Israel Hlongwane when they arrived in Esikhaweni and Zweli Dlamini was coming from Ulundi, Israel Hlongwane was coming from Ermelo. Israel Hlongwane was accommodated at Mayor B B Biyela and Zweli at Mrs Mbuyazi, so that they could supply strength to our squad.
Now it's correct that this squad became involved in a number of murders and attempted murders over some considerable period? --- Yes, that's true.
And at the moment we probably won't have more time than perhaps to touch with two of the incidents which you were involved in, but I just want to get some general information about the squad. You've told us a list of -
2B you've given us a list of names of people who were members of the squad. Now what I want you to establish firstly is every time the squad went to kill somebody, was it a case that all these persons would go and be part of that group or was it a case that depending on what was done, some people would take part, others wouldn't take part, people would come in, drop out, other persons coming in. Could you tell us which of those two situations applied? --- At times they will all go, at times not all of them. Given an operation, it will happen that maybe I won't take part or perhaps Gcina Mkhize won't take part, only Jeffrey Mthethwa will take part. That's how we used to work.
What type of weapons were used by the squad in these various murders and attempted murders, etcetera? --- We used guns like R1, G3 rifles, shotguns, 9mm, Makorov, Scorpions, AK47s, hand grenades and different hand grenades and there was one home-made explosive which was made by an iron. You would light a match on it and it will explode after that.
Where did all these weapons come from? --- These weapons came from different areas, different places. As I have explained that some were brought by Gcina Mkhize, some by Mrs Mbuyazi and some by B B Biyela. Some were brought by Celani(?) Mthethwa, but all these guns were said to be coming from Ulundi.
Were at any stage any firearms taken from the Esikhaweni Police Station from the normal supply that they kept for the police officers to perform their duties? --- There was one G3 and I took it from Esikhaweni Police Station myself for one reason, that Mrs Mbuyazi had a police guard which kept her house under guard and was
2B given a G3 to use, so that in case - so that there will be an investigation that was led by Captain Sumaroo of C R and took that G3, wanting to take it to ballistic and Mrs Mbuyazi was given a shotgun, because she felt insecurely. Then I booked the G3 at the police station and gave it to Mrs Mbuyazi so that her police guard could use it to guard her, but as time went on, that G3 was used in one of the operations by the IFP Youth.
The hit squad, did they - did it meet at various houses where either attacks were planned or after attacks were carried out, a report back was held? --- Yes, that is true.
And where did those meetings take place? --- These meetings will be at Nhlanganani Hall and the IFP office in Empangeni, Ulundi as well in Captain Langeni's office and Ulundi at Prince Gideon Zulu's home and Mayor, B B Biyela's home as well as Mrs Mbuyazi's home.
On these occasions when the hit squad met at these houses, were any persons other than the hit squad members present? --- Do you mean people who were not hit squad members?
Correct. --- No, it will never happen like that. There will be hierarchy which was structured by the IFP, prominent leaders and there was Zulu prominent leaders and us, as operatives.
The attacks themselves, were vehicles used to transport the hit squad members to where their victims were? --- Yes, it is true.
Whose vehicles were used? --- We would use B B Biyela's car, a Ford Meteor, white in colour and at times use a Mitsubishi, white in colour, which belonged to
2B Chief Minister's Department and use a white Monza from Chief Minister's Department as well. At times to go to the meetings we would use the IFP office car in Empangeni and Mrs Mbuyazi's car.
And as far as you yourself was concerned, were you ever present when permission was sought to use these vehicles? --- Yes, it's true. I was present when we were given permission to use the Monza, Opel Monza. At times I will be present when we will be given permission B B Biyela's car and Mrs Mbuyazi and the IFP office car, but I never was present when we were given the Mitsubishi which belonged to Chief Minister's Department. Mr Cele would usually drive that car and leave it to us and tell us that it was given by M Z Khumalo for our use. Each time that car arrived, we would have three guns, two AK47 and one UZI. Each time he left the car, it will be on Friday and we would use the car from Friday up until Sunday evening, so that Monday morning we drive the car back to his house in Eshowe and he will take it back where it belong in Ulundi with those three guns I've already told you about.
And on the occasions when you were present when permission was granted to use these vehicles, do you firstly know whether the person who gave that permission knew what you were intending to use the vehicle for, or not? --- The person would know what we will be doing with the car and what we're up to, because we had our cars, our own cars, we did not need their cars and the very people who gave us the cars were the ones who formed the hit squad hierarchy. They were the ones who were members of the decision committee to target who should be
2B killed and not.
And dealing now specifically with the cases where your hit squad took part in, did you play any role as a detective in the investigation of those cases? --- Yes, it is true.
Can you tell us what role you played? --- My role was to mislead the evidence, that when I arrived at the scene of crime to investigate initially or to conduct an initial investigation, I would destroy empty cartridges from that scene of crime and in the investigation diary, on the docket, I would write misleading information.
And can you indicate briefly what the nature of this misleading information is that you would write? --- I will write that at the scene I found no cartridges at all. I would also further write that the kind of a gun that was used, I cannot explain it, because there were no cartridges found on the scene of crime. Such things.
And this in general how - what happened when the hit squad operated. If you can come now to the murder of Sergeant Dlamini. Were you involved there? --- Yes, it's correct.
Can you describe briefly to the Commission how that killing took place? --- I would ask for the Commission to at least give me an idea where to start in the killing of Sergeant Dlamini.
Can you explain how you came to be involved firstly and then also if you're aware of any reason why he should be killed? --- The killing of Sergeant Dlamini emanated largely from the fact that he was sympathising with the ANC and that there was that kind of information that he gave the Goldstone Commission the invaluable
2B information that the Zulu police were helping the IFP to kill the ANC members and that Sergeant Dlamini did not even pretend that he hated IFP and that he hated Chief Buthelezi. He would wear ANC ... (inaudible) or T-shirts and there were already reports that were given to Brigadier Mzimela with regard to the fact that he was insulting the IFP members, calling them prostitutes of Gatsha and that emanated from Esikhaweni Police Station. Each time the ...[break in recording]
(END OF CASSETTE NO 2B)
(START OF CASSETTE NO 3A)
3A --- ... The female IFP members, each time they wear their traditional gears, the Zulu traditional gears, arrive at the police station and Brigadier Mzimela would drive his car and transport them to the IFP rally. That was the practice in Esikhaweni and each time he saw those ladies with those gears, he would call or refer to them as Gatsha's prostitutes and there were such reports about Sergeant Dlamini and that kind of information that he gave, that invaluable information to Goldstone Commission with regard to the fact there was police who were working hand in hand with the IFP.
How did you become involved in killing him? --- We were already given an instruction to kill Sergeant Dlamini and the instruction was given by Gcina Mkhize and one was given to me by Brigadier Mzimela in his office. I was with Mr(?) Mbuyazi, son-in-law and he was scolding me when he was giving me that instruction saying, "It's long overdue", this was long overdue, the hit squad was no longer as effective as it used to be, "What is happening to the hit squad? Are we now busy with ladies or
3A womanising?". It was not easy to locate Sergeant Dlamini, because he had two houses in Esikhaweni that he owned. One was in H1 next to the police station and he was with his wife, who was also a policewoman and there was one other house in J2 and he also had a wife there who was not a police and now he will be in different houses, so it wasn't so easy for us to locate his whereabouts, until one evening when Gcina came and we went to J1 where we undertook another operation and after we had done with that operation, we went to his house in J2. That's where we killed him. I do not know at this point whether the Commission wants me to elaborate as to how we killed him.
Not in very great detail, but if you could give us some idea of what actually happened there. --- We arrived there. Gcina had a shotgun and shattered the outside globe and shot twice through a bedroom window and I was on the other side, next to the kitchen, where I kicked the door open and Gcina kicked the front door open and Sergeant Dlamini insulted us. After a short while his wife went out with the child. Because we knew Sergeant Dlamini that he was a police, we also knew that he was armed. We waited for like an hour, roughly, waiting on the door until he convinced that we had left and we heard footsteps inside the house and we could not tell and detect which part of the house he was and Israel Hlongwane got inside with a gun, a ,357 Magnum and shot at him and gained exit from the kitchen side and he came to me and I asked him if he was sure that he died and Israel said he thinks he died, he thought he died and took the 9mm and went back inside and shot once more, to make sure he is dead and we therefore left the scene.
3A Did you report back to anybody the fact that Sergeant Dlamini had been killed? --- We did report to Mrs Mbuyazi at the local level and Brigadier Mzimela, who demonstrated joy for a good job that was done and Mrs Mbuyazi told me that she had already reported to Ulundi.
Did you involve yourself at all in the investigation of Sergeant Dlamini's murder? --- At the time, no, but when I was arrested, after I was arrested, that is when I helped or assisted to help - to assist the investigation.
[Break in recording] ... we'll deal with that when you come to tell us how you were arrested or happened then. The next aspect I want to deal with is do you know of anything that was done after Constable Danca of the KwaZulu Police was killed in a hand grenade attack in J1 section in Esikhaweni? --- Yes, I know.
Can you tell us briefly what happened there? --- After Constable Danca's death we had a meeting at the IFP offices in Empangeni. Those who were present were R Mkhize, who was the representative of the IFP in that office and present was Gcina Mkhize, Jeffrey Mthethwa, Zweli Dlamini as well as myself, where we addressed the matter of revenge, the death of Constable Danca and the injury too that other police sustained, because they were being attacked on duty. Jeffrey Mthethwa told us he won't be able to attend, because he had already previous engagements, but he will give us the ammunitions for AK47s. Late that after I, together with Constable Mthethwa went to Joyful Mthethwa's house in Nseleni, where he gave us the AK47 ammunition that we brought with to Esikhaweni and we planned this operation in Esikhaweni at
3A Mrs Mbuyazi. Mrs Mbuyazi was present and Chief Mathaba and Gcina Mkhize was present and Israel Hlongwane, Zweli Dlamini and Siyabonga Mbuyazi, who was a son to Mrs Mbuyazi. That night Gcina went to fetch a police van at the police station, which is ZP777 and we went to G1 to the block of flat which was occupied by the MK members who were killing the police in that area. It was already planned that the community of that area, G1 community, was predominantly ANC and not showing any interest in helping the investigation to recover the people who killed the police, because the police would be shot during daylight, but no one will furnish information who were those who killed, now we undertook one thing that we will kill that area and teach them a lesson. Indeed we were transported at night to that area and we started with that block of flat which was occupied by the Umkhonto weSiswe members and we attacked it and we found out that they were no longer occupying that flat, had left and we attacked that whole portion of G1. We started from the beginning till to the end. The 777 van kept driving around to make sure and to ensure that we are not being disturbed in any way. Now that operation, the reason why we made it clear - we made that then clear, it was so to show the community that that was the retaliation by the KwaZulu Police for the killing of the police in that area. So many people were injured in that operation, but after we had done, we went to Mrs Mbuyazi, we found Mrs Mbuyazi and Chief Mathaba waiting for us and they asked us as to what kind of weapons we used and guns and we told them that we used the normal guns and they said, the way they sounded, they sounded so unique and they were so happy and the mood was
3A jubilant and they also assured us that they will report to Ulundi. That was what happened that day.
You said many people were injured in that attack. Do you know if anybody was killed? --- There was one that I heard who died and it was a lady, but the majority were admitted to Thokozana Clinic and NPA, Empangeni Hospital and sustained injuries.
If you could finally then deal with this aspect and namely the fact that eventually you were arrested for the murder of Sergeant Dlamini. What happened there? --- If I am not mistaken, I don't remember if it was Monday, in the morning, in my house, Major Mchunu arrived with Major De Lange.
Major Mchunu, what position did he hold? --- Major Mchunu was the unit commander of the Special Investigation Unit in Esikhaweni and Major De Lange was the station commander in Esikhaweni. They arrived in the morning in my house and asked me if I had some places to go to and I told them that no, I will just go to gym in the morning and that was it for the day and they asked to go and report to the police station after I was done with gym and indeed around ten or around nine I went to Esikhaweni Police Station to Major Mchunu's office and he told me that we should wait for Gcina Mkhize, because he had already sent a message to Gcina Mkhize, he wanted to see him as well and Gcina Mkhize arrived eventually and he told us, Major Mchunu that was, that Mzimela had asked him to talk to us with regard to the Goldstone Commission, that it phoned Esikhaweni to enquire why is it that we are not arrested as a result of the murder of Sergeant Dlamini and he told us that he was sent by Mzimela, that he should
3A tell us that we should do something about it and that the Goldstone investigation regarding the murder of Sergeant Dlamini should be misled, the Goldstone Commission investigation should be misled with regard to the killing of Sergeant Dlamini. Major Mchunu further on said Gcina will be set free, because there wasn't any statement implicating him per se, but there was one that was directly implicating me and I told Major Mchunu that there was nothing I had to say to him. If he was sent by Mdu Mzimela, then it's better for me to address Mzimela and he took me straight to Mzimela and said, "Son, we have to try by all means that the initial investigation(?) be distorted in all ways, so that by the time the docket reaches the Goldstone Commission, they are unable to investigate so to result in an arrest of some kind. Major Mchunu is my mouth. You should be free to talk to him, just as much as you are free to talk to me. What he tells you, you should know that it's from me". He went on to say I should be arrested. I shouldn't worry, because I will be in detention just for a day, so that I appear at the SAP14. SAP14 was a cell where all the detainees were registered. He said I should appear there, so that the Goldstone Commission realise that I have been arrested and he asked me where would I be kept - where would I like to be kept and I told him that I'll go to Sundumbili, because it was better in Sundumbili, since Major Zama was there and I knew people there. And we planned how we will destroy the evidence. Major Mchunu brought a suggestion to our attention that we should change the cartridges at Sergeant Dlamini and he asked me how would it be if we take the cartridges off that scene of G1 and plant them in
3A the scene at Sergeant Dlamini and take those from Sergeant Dlamini and destroy them and I explained to him that it won't work out, because my gun was used in both scenes and brother Mdu Mzimela said - he said, "We will have to shoot so we can acquire cartridges that will be taken to the forensic laboratory in Pretoria", and I explained to him that I - I think my gun should be changed, the barrel of my gun should be changed, because in case it happened that they discover projectiles from the deceased, that will link my gun to such cases and Mdu Mzimela opened the cabinet in his office behind his desk and got a Z88 9mm which was just like mine and took the barrel(?) from that gun and said I should fit it in mine and we did that and I took out the magazine and gave it to Major Mchunu and I kept the magazine and ammunitions and I told them that at that scene of Sergeant Dlamini, there's - Constable Mthethwa's 9mm was used to shoot and he said there was no problem, they will get in touch with Constable Mthethwa and see how they could get out of that mess and we left the office, for Major Mchunu's office and we submitted a statement and my alibi and Constable Mthethwa's alibi and Israel Hlongwane's was(?) - we were three and Major Mchunu said, "Mbambo, this is a murder case. The statements will have to be more than that to collaborate with your alibi. Three statements are not enough" and we then decided we will say we were with our girlfriends and we get statements from our girlfriends and we will influence them to tell them what suits us, so that we build a strong alibi and we wrote the statement, I signed it and explained my involvement in the killing of Sergeant Dlamini and I was taken to Sundumbili Police Station and
3A went to Major Zama's office and he told me that they already called Mzimela and I should be free and I was taken to a cell and kept there and they said they won't lock the cell, because then I will gain access to anything I want to use, like phones, until the following day when I will appear in the Court of Law. He left me and I was left there. The following day Major Mchunu arrived to fetch me and we went to Mtunzini Court and he told me that I should not worry one bit. "There was a docket that there will be a bail of 500 that I recommend, so you will be granted a bail", and when we got to Mtunzini Court, the prosecutor remanded the case and said I will be in detention and we left the court. That got me so angry, because we agreed upon one thing that I will spend one night in detention and be released the following day. Major Mchunu said to me I shouldn't be infuriated, he will take me to Sundumbili and phone Mzimela to make arrangements so that I could be released, because he did write the bail he recommended and he doesn't know why the prosecutor didn't want to grant me bail and I told that I'm not going to Sundumbili Police Station, I told him that I would like to see Mzimela and he agreed to that. We left the court and we went to Esikhaweni Police Station. We went to Mzimela's office and I told him that I was so infuriated about what took place, it was not fair at all and Mzimela said that I should cool down, he will get in touch with the attorney, Mkabela(?) and he will be the one who will take me to court and request an application, "So you may be released. Go to Sundumbili and keep there and relax, don't worry". And we went to Sundumbili Police Station and I was kept there. That very
3A evening, Mr Mkabela arrived with his wife, brought me supper and we talked about the case and he took me into his ... (inaudible) ... and went to the bank and he withdrew 1 000 - he told me to withdraw 1 000 and I gave it to him and he said, "Tomorrow we will go to court. You will be granted bail, so don't you worry". The following day, truly Major Mchunu arrived at we went to Mtunzini to court. I wasn't taken to the cells, I was outside with Mr Mkabela. We went to Spar to buy some food and we got back. You see, Mtunzini had two courtrooms. One courtroom was in session and the other one was empty. We went inside the other one which was empty. The magistrate was already sitting on his chair. What I realised and noticed was that the prosecutor was not there and I never went into the witness stand. Mr Mkabela didn't have his gown(?), his uniform and nothing was discussed. It was just told to me that I will be granted bail for R500 and that happened and I left for Esikhaweni.
Subsequently the case was taken over by the South African Police and you were put back into custody where you remained until you were convicted in the Supreme Court. Is that correct? --- That is correct.
I've got no further questions, Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MACADAM
CHAIRMAN: Have you decided if anybody wishes to cross-examine Mr Mbambo and if so, who will proceed first?
MR MARITZ: I'm sorry, Mr Chairman, we haven't at all, but I - it's Maritz on record - I don't have any questions, thank you.
MR DE JAGER: I don't have questions neither.
MR VISSER: No questions either.
3A MR (?): Mr Chairman, we don't have any questions to this witness either, thank you.
MR LASICH: Mr Chairman, obviously I have a few questions. Mr Mbambo, I'm assuming you know who I am, you've been sitting here during these proceedings. What sentence was handed in respect of the crimes for which you were convicted, I think it was last year or the year before? --- 75 years.
Could you indicate, you mentioned that there are other crimes for which you're applying for amnesty as well, the number of crimes and what sort of crimes they are? --- Those are operations crimes. That I have already explained in my statement where we killed the ANC members.
MR LAX: Your speaker is stuck.
MR LASICH: Thank you.
MR LAX: There you go.
MR LASICH: Well, just - we've - your statement, unfortunately we don't have it at the moment. Could you indicate the number of murders which haven't been dealt with by the trial that you're in, that you're applying for amnesty for? --- Do you want me to count the cases that I've been convicted of or the cases that I'm involved in generally?
Well, let's put it this way. How many murders were you convicted of in the trial? --- Seven.
Now how many other murders are you applying for amnesty? --- There are many.
More than ten, more than twenty? --- They're not more than twenty.
Can you remember how many people you've murdered?
3A --- Maybe I can remember. Certain assassinations where we're killing individuals, but where we were shooting indiscrimately, the mobs, I wouldn't be able to say how many were killed.
Now you mentioned indiscriminate shooting. I don't want to take up too much time with this, but you heard the evidence of Mr Mkhize, one of your co-accused in the Mbambo trial. Are you referring to that sort of situation where there was a retaliation against an indiscriminate attack by ANC members? --- I am referring to mobs where we would attack buses which had people on board who were coming from - who were going to work in Richards Bay, such as Mondi, Alusaf, which were known of having COSATU employees and bus stops where you will find people at night going to work to factories like Alusaf, Mondi, that we knew were dominant by the - the union was COSATU. I'm referring to such places and such things.
Right, we've got the picture. And these attacks, was Gcina Mkhize with you during these attacks? --- That is true.
Was he regularly with you, all times with you or infrequently with you during these attacks? --- He was with me all the time. It's only time that he wasn't with me.
Now you've mentioned the investigation by the Goldstone Commission and fabrication of evidence. Did you ever make a statement for purposes of the Goldstone Commission? --- You mean me submitting a statement to the Goldstone Commission?
Yes. --- Yes, there was a statement that we wrote in Isipingo. If I'm not mistaken it was 1994.
3A I would assume that was a lie, that statement? --- That is true.
And as far as you are concerned, the docket investigating the - well, in connection with the investigation for Dlamini's death, you also lied there? --- That is true.
Your plea at your trial was a plea of not guilty, is that not correct? --- That is true.
When did you decide that you would come clean, so to speak, in that trial? --- I decided in 1994, before the trial, but as for the statements, the true statements were submitted in January 1995.
Now did it not cross your mind to apply for amnesty or indemnity when you decided to come clean with this, before you were actually prosecuted? --- May you please repeat your question again?
Did you not - when you decided to come clean, why did you not consider applying for indemnity of amnesty then instead of going through a whole trial? --- I did contemplate on applying for indemnity.
And why did you not do so? --- When we first started writing the statements, was to assist the investigation unit, task unit, ITU, so that after we're done with that, we would apply for indemnity.
Was this prior to the trial proceeding? --- You mean - the writing of the statement was done after the trial in 1995, January, but the decision to assist the Investigation Task Unit was taken in 1994.
Well, the question is did you not then go and approach some officer of the ITU or somebody like that prior to this trial proceeding to come clean? --- We
3A did contact the offices and they knew.
Now, I want to suggest to you that you only decided to come out with this story or version of events once you knew you were facing a heavy sentence for murders and you were trying to get mitigation of sentence through to the Judge. --- That is not true, I will completely refute that. I took this decision in 1994, where I even told the officers, ITU officers, I told them that they should go and talk to Mr Daluxolo Luthuli and tell him that we will disclose the truth, we'll put the truth on the table and Daluxolo Luthuli at the time was - at that time was in Ulundi, so that that when the trial approached in November 1994, before we were convicted, Mr Daluxolo arrived, came to Mtunzini Court and Colonel Dutton was present. He was heading the Investigation Task Unit at that time and I told Madlanduna at that time that we have taken a decision that we want to tell the truth as it is. That's when Madlanduna told us that it is fine, we are at liberty to tell the truth as it was, because the Caprivians were disturbed about our arrest and had a meeting with Madlanduna and wrote a letter to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi that they were requesting to see him so that they could discuss our matter and Chief Buthelezi promised that he will attend the meeting, but to no avail and he ended up saying he gave a letter from the Caprivians, written by him, gave to his driver, Mr Dumakude and he did not know what Dumakude did with the letter. The decision of telling the truth we took before we were convicted, even sentenced. The ITU knows that explicitly clear.
That begs the question as to why you didn't plead guilty then in the first place? --- We were advised by
3A our attorney, Mr John Wills, that we should plead not guilty and remain silent thereafter and not challenge the evidence which will be rendered by the witnesses and after all that we will give our version and we did that in our mitigation here in Durban Supreme Court, where we told the truth as I'm telling it today to this Commission.
Right. If we can deal with a few minor aspects or major aspects, depending on who are you are and the story you tell. You mentioned that a vehicle such as Mayor B B Biyela's vehicles was used for the perpetration of hit squad activities. Was anything done to disguise the vehicle? --- We changed the car registration numbers.
Is that in respect of all the vehicles that you've mentioned? --- It's with respect to all the vehicles.
You didn't change the appearance of the vehicle, just the number-plates? --- That is true.
Now you've heard it before, Mr Mbambo, but in your evidence you've mentioned, inter alia, Mrs Mbuyazi and Mr B B Biyela and others, they will of course deny your allegations of their involvement in hit squad activities or anything unlawful. Could you indicate whether you agree or disagree with that? --- I know that they will refute everything, because it is apparent to me that they are not into reconciliation between IFP and ANC. Until such time that they are ready to do that, they will come clean, but as for now, I know that they will repudiate everything, because they are not yet ready to get back and tie the past with the present, but what I have said to you today, it's true.
Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LASICH
3A MR WILLS: Mr Chairman, there's just one issue, which isn't really re-examination, but I was relying on you requesting if there was anything more, I wanted to bring out after the evidence leader had completed - it's just a brief issue, but obviously, if anything arises out of it, then I would imagine that you would allow any person to cross-examine. I don't think that will be the case. May I just raise this issue? Thank you. Mr Mbambo, we have heard both you and Mkhize talk about weapons and in fact Mr Mkhize indicated that the weapons were stored in a trunk. Now were you ever found by anybody, any authority, in possession of these weapons? --- Yes, it is true. One evening I was in my house, it was about 12 midnight. The Internal Stability Unit arrived at my house from SAP and they kicked my door open and it broke and I was awoken up and they pointed me with R5s and they asked me as to where the weapons were, the guns, and they asked me about the AK47s. Those were white officers and I told them that I had no guns in my home. They pushed me aside and took my 9mm and searched the whole house and under my bed they realised two AK47 and that time, one white sergeant entered and as he entered, he asked if I wasn't a police and I said, "I am" and he asked if I was not with the investigators in Esikhaweni, I said yes, I am there and he said that's fine and he asked the other two white officers with those AK47 to put them down and asked them to leave my bedroom and leave us alone and they went to the kitchen and I was left with him now in my bedroom and he asked me as to why I just leave the guns and just leave them carelessly like that and I told them(?) that I've been attacked several times, that's why I have those guns under
3A my bed and he said to me I should not place them this careless, because he knows that the police are being attacked by ANC and he doesn't think there anything wrong for police to be found in possession of AK47s and also said he was sorry about the door that they broke and said he will come on Monday, that I should come on Monday to submit a statement that they gathered wrong information, but it wasn't the MK member occupying the house, it was a policeman ... [break in recording]
(END OF CASSETTE NO 3A)
(START OF CASSETTE NO 3B)
3B --- ... police, how we worked as a Police Force and I asked him why he was asking that question and he said, "Are you divided, because we got an information about KwaZulu Police that here, in this J2 house, 491 number, we were told that the occupant of the house was an MK member who had AK47s in his possession" and I said to him, "Yes, some police do sympathise with the ANC, but others are neutral and others sympathise with the IFP" and he said I should come with him so that he could point to me the police that gave them that kind of information. Yes, I followed him and when we got outside near my gate, there were two police Casspirs with SAP - and another van from Esikhaweni Police Station and that police took me to the van and I discovered that the driver was Sergeant Dlamini and the police said, "This is the person who gave us that information that the occupant of this house is an MK member". Inside that van there was a boy called Mbuzo - I'm sorry, I made a mistake, it is not Mbuzo - it is not Sibuso(?), it is Mbuzo(?), that boy is Mbuzo. He was just a civilian and at the same time an ANC member from H1
3B Location. He had put on a camouflage, KwaZulu camouflage uniform and next to him there was Constable Gabela and also he was stationed in Esikhaweni and I said to these police, "This person is drunk and you can even smell liquor", and the police said, "You, Sergeant, leave this house, because - or leave the car, get out from the car, because we want to test you if you are drunk or not". The car was idling. He drove, accelerated and the road was curvy and he was with ... [break in recording]. These other members of ITU ran and crossed my house and tried to stop that vehicle, but he moved through those members and fled. I wasn't alone in the house. I was alone in the house and I left and I went to Mrs Mbuyazi's house and I told her all what happened. Mrs Mbuyazi said, "It's time we search for Dlamini and kill him at once. That's when she gave me her car, that is Mrs Mbuyazi, with Israel Hlongwane, because Israel Hlongwane was already in Mrs Mbuyazi's house that evening and said we should track him down, track Sergeant Dlamini. We did that and we found him in H2(?), with some other police and we waited outside until he got inside the car and drove off and we followed him and we realised that he was driving towards J2 and we parked our car and walked. I had with me a shotgun and waited for him at a T-junction and when he approached, he did not stop. It look like the car was yield - he was going to stop, but it yielded. I had already aimed with my shotgun. Just when I was about to shoot, Israel Hlongwane got hold of the shotgun barrel and the gun shot right next to the door of the car, driver's side. In that time he drove for his life, he ran away.
Now obviously the inference of your evidence is that
3B whilst the police saw you in the house with an AK47 or two AK47s, you in fact were not arrested? --- No, I wasn't arrested. They apologised for kicking and breaking my door and they said there wasn't any fault for me to be found in possession of AK47.
Thank you, that's the only issue I wanted to raise, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS
CHAIRMAN: Mr Lasich, anything arising out of that or anybody else, obviously?
MR LASICH: No, Mr Chairman, the denial has already been recorded. Thank you.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I, please? Visser on record. Sir, may I just try to summarise the gist of what you've been saying. You say one evening you were in your home. The police arrived, kicked in your door, found two AK47s under your bed and they did nothing about that? --- That is true.
Were you alone in my home? --- Yes, I was alone at the time.
Now I think you'd better tell us, do you know who the police officer was who sent the others out and had said that it's okay for you to have an AK47? --- I don't their surnames, but they did arrive to submit the statement on Monday to Mzimela and they were traced and also came to my trial at the court to give evidence with regard to this matter.
Well, were you also, inter alia, charged with the illegal possession of firearms at your trial? --- No.
What evidence did they come to present then relating to this incident you're talking about now? --- At the
3B trial I gave that evidence that I have just given to this Commission. In that way those police were traced and they were recovered and they were brought to the Court of Law to be questioned and one came, only one police came.
And who was he? --- I do not remember his surname.
And what did he tell the Court? --- He agreed to the fact that they came to my house and that they broke my door, but when he discovered that I was a police, they apologised and left my house and went to the station, police station, to submit a statement to Mzimela and said there was no gun at home.
I'm sorry, let me try to understand. You say that this police officer gave evidence to say there was no gun at your home? Is that what he's saying? --- Yes, that is true.
Well, that can surely be checked, Mr Chairman, and as to who it was as well, one would assume. Now you first stated that one white policeman came into the room while there were other policemen in the room and he then asked them to leave? --- Yes. There were man police that entered my house, about five in number.
All right. But the fact is the conversation that you referred to in your evidence took place between you and one white South African policeman of the Internal Stability Unit, as I understand your evidence? --- Yes, that's true.
Yes. Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
MR MACADAM: I have no re-examination, Mr Chairperson.
3B CHAIRMAN: Just one question, Mr Mbambo. Did you, during this period that you've been talking about in Esikhaweni, did you, amongst the many people that you have testified that you killed, was one of them or any of them an insurgent, an armed insurgent or an MK operative? --- Yes, that's true.
Who was that? --- It was Bafana Jele and the group that he was with in J1 in Esikhaweni.
And were they killed? --- Yes, they were killed.
Were they killed by you in your capacity as a KwaZulu Police Officer or were they killed by you in your capacity as a member of this hit squad? --- They were killed by me in the capacity of the hit squad.
How many were they? --- They were four.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr Mbambo.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I'm terribly sorry. Visser on record again. It seems to me there is one further question in elucidation which I should really ask of this gentleman. You referred, Mr Mbambo, to a statement which was made the Monday and which was handed to Mzimela. Have I got that correct? --- Yes.
Was it you that made the statement? --- No. The statement was made by the sergeant, the one who came with the Internal Stability Unit at my house.
The one that said it's okay for you to have the AK47s in your possession? --- That is true.
Where can we find that statement? Do you know? --- I have no idea, unless you contact Mzimela, because there were two statements that were submitted with regard to that incident.
Will you tell us who made the other statement? --- /Mrs Mbuyazi
3B Mrs Mbuyazi made the other statement.
Please, could you help us? Did you know - did you read any or both of these statements? --- I read Mrs Mbuyazi's statement, because I was the one who obtained, when it went - after she wrote it and I did not read the sergeant's statement. I was just told by Mzimela that they came to submit the statement.
What did Mrs Mbuyazi say in her statement? --- It was a citation(?) that was linking Mdu Mzimela and Mrs - that was linked by the two, Mzimela and Mbuyazi. Gcina Mkhize did explain here that in Esikhaweni there were sections and those sections were divided ... (intervention)
I'm going to stop you. I'm asking a very straightforward question. What did Mrs Mbuyazi say in her statement? --- The answer that I will give to you will be based on the information that, on the background of that statement. Without that, I cannot answer you.
CHAIRMAN: Mr Mbambo, you can clarify afterwards, if you like, but we - the question was, what did the statement contain? What did the statement say and we will allow you, if you want to, to clarify the basis on which you think it was made, but please tell us what the statement said. --- It had the consent of the IFP local leadership about the harassment of the police who were residing in J2 section and the section that was known as the IFP section. I was residing in that section myself. Now the statement was about the incident that took place that night and the concerns of the IFP local leadership about the whole thing.
MR VISSER: May I paraphrase that I think you're saying?
3B You're saying the statement made by Mrs Mbuyazi stated that if you were found in possession of AK47s, you had that with the consent and approval of the IFP in order to protect yourself. Is that what you're saying? As a policeman? --- No.
Then I'm sorry, I don't understand what you're saying. What did she say in the statement? --- Mrs Mbuyazi stated on the statement that as a leader of the IFP, stated her concern about the harassment that was taking place amongst the police who resided in J2 section. Now the J2 section was predominantly IFP section. Now the arrival of the police and the fact that they broke my door searching for AK47, were given the information by one police within the Esikhaweni Police Station in KwaZulu. That was taken by an IFP as a kind of harassment, because rumours had it in Esikhaweni that the police who resided in J2 were IFP and we're the ones who were helping IFP to kill ANC.
I just want to place on record, I haven't asked you any of this, Mr Mbambo.
MR WILLS: With respect, Mr Chairperson, I think that that is highly unfair. The - Mr Visser has asked what was contained in that statement. Mr Mbambo initially responded by trying to put a contextual aspect to the statement in order that the contents of the statement could be explained. That was denied of him. He then went and explained what was in the statement and he has now given further context. What happened there is highly - I think highly relevant in answer to the question that was sought.
CHAIRMAN: Yes, I said that he could explain the context
3B in which he thought the statement was made, so ... (incomplete)
MR VISSER: Well, is he then responding to your question, Mr Chairman? I didn't understand it that way, Mr Chairman. I'm trying to get to the point here. I'm not - but if he is responding to your question, well, then fine.
CHAIRMAN: I think I understood him to say insofar as the statement said, I think I understood him to say that the statement was a statement by Mrs Mbuyazi expressing concern that policemen living in J2 section was subject to continual harassment and then, without saying that he had stopped talking about the statement, he then went on to say that there was this perception that J2 ...[break in recording] ... sorry, the statement related to Mrs Mbuyazi's concern that people in J2 section were being harassed.
MR WILLS: Yes, that was my understanding of the answer.
CHAIRMAN: Okay. Is there anything further that needs to be clarified?
MR VISSER: Well, can we go on with my questions then? Did that refer to the harassment, as you put it, of members of the IFP in J Section by the South African Police or was it by the KwaZulu Police?
MR WILLS: Sorry, I must - with respect, Mr Visser, that question is not entirely accurate. If I can just finish? The position is, is the harassment referred not to IFP people generally, but to IFP, to policemen living in an IFP area?
CHAIRMAN: That's correct, that's the answer I heard.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I don't understand why Mr Wills
3B is getting so excited. I'm simply trying to establish and this witness could have, quite easily, told you right at the inception what the statement said. I'm trying now, I have - I'm reduced to having to drag it out of him and I'm trying my best, Mr Chairman. With the leave of Mr Wills, was the complaint about harassment directed at the South African Police or the KwaZulu Police? That's the question. I hope there's nothing with that question.
MR WILLS: I'm happy with that question. Thanks, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Well, at least you got my name right.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on. Please repeat your question.
MR VISSER: At this stage I give up.
CHAIRMAN: Mr Mbambo, the question was, was the concern of Mrs Mbuyazi that you were being harassed by the South African Police or by the KwaZulu Police or by who? --- We were not being harassed by the SAP, but it was within the KwaZulu Police in Esikhaweni. Some police, like Lieutenant Masinga, there were rumours that the police who resided in J2 were being thought of as working or collaborating with the IFP in killing the ANC. Even though we were involved, we did not approve of that, because they were not certain of the facts, so that alone to us appeared as harassment, because we would discuss it with the IFP leadership. Now the ... (inaudible) ... of the SAP police to search my house and we, the information that was given from Sergeant Dlamini, who was - and lied about the fact that I am an MK member, now that confirmed that there were some police in the Esikhaweni Police Station who were trying by all means to destroy us,
3B suspecting us to be collaborating with the IFP. Now the statement that Mrs Mbuyazi submitted, she submitted in her capacity as an IFP leader and a section councillor, giving it to Mdu Mzimela as the one who was in charge of us in the Esikhaweni Police Station, but that was just a strategy, that was linked by Mdu Dlamini(?) - Mzimela and Mbuyazi, so it could assist that some police in the Esikhaweni Police Station should be killed and instructions should be given for such police to be killed. Now that was the strategy.
MR LAX: Any further questions, Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: No, I thought I did say that I had no further questions, Mr Chairman.
MR LAX: We were just hoping that that might have answered your question for you.
MR VISSER: Anything but, but thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
MR LAX: Any more questions? We'll take a short break, 15 minutes, and then we will proceed on to Victor Marion.
4A/0 (START OF CASSETTE NO 4A)
MR LAX: Just before we take the evidence of this witness, we just want to clarify the time that people are going to need to make their submissions and when they might be ready by. Some people have indicated that they could proceed with their submissions even tomorrow after Mr Dlamini has been cross-examined. Others might want to do it on Thursday or Friday, so if we could just get an indication what would suit people and then we can plan according.
MS KRUGER: Mr Chairman, could I just have clarity with regard to one aspect? I understand your ruling that this is sort of a preliminary investigation or fact-finding mission of this committee of the TRC. Could you give an indication at what stage do you think you will conclude your investigation process or this fact-finding mission in terms of section 30?
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mrs Kruger. It's difficult to say. This is an on-going inquiry and we obviously are going to be looking at a whole range of other pieces of evidence and it's conceivable that after the submissions have been received from counsel present here that we will reserve our right to put questions to counsel for the sake of clarification. It's also possible that certain of your clients may be subpoenaed in terms of section 29, as many of them have already. So it's difficult to say when this process will be wound up, but I should imagine it will be within the next two months.
MS KRUGER: Mr Chairperson, that's why I have a difficulty in making a submission because, you know,
4A unless you have all the facts at hand and the evidence that you are evaluating, it places us in a difficult position to make submissions and, inter alia, I'm referring to I know of a particular section 29 notice that's gone out of a witness that I think might concern - his evidence might concern my client, and I am referring to a Colonel van den Berg and with regard to that I'd like a clear indication or direction of how we should then address this. I don't want to - you've raised the question of submissions and when we are going to make the submissions, so I don't want to enter into a debate with regard to the evidence perhaps already been led, but you understand the difficulty in making a submission without having all that evidence available, seeing that that evidence of that particular individual was not led during these proceedings.
CHAIRMAN: I understand, and obviously we would only expect you to comment in your submission on, for example, evidence that has already been led in other forums, such as the Msane trial, evidence that - or submissions that you may want to make about the witness - the evidence that has been given by witnesses today and why we should or should not believe them, and limit yourselves to that, and obviously you would have the right, when we send you or your clients, if we send your client a letter in terms of section, I think it's 30 - 30(2)(b) of the Act - if we were to send such a letter, which would advise your client that we are on the point of making an unfavourable finding against him, you would have the right at that stage to make a further submission.
MS KRUGER: That raises another concern and that's with
/regard to a
4A regard to a reference you've just made with regard to evidence that's been led in other forums. It makes my position very difficult because you've sent certain documentation under cover of your section 32 notice and I've obviously attended these hearings and I've heard this evidence. Other evidence that's been led in other forums I cannot make any submissions on because it's not been made available to me, so I would then request that you make that evidence available in so far as it could implicate or affect my client, because then it seems important. If you're going to take that into account, I think in all fairness that documentation should then be made available, which hasn't. With regard to what has been made available and evidence that's been led, yes, fair enough, I understand you on that.
CHAIRMAN: The only documents or the only material which is not in the public forum already, such as the Msane evidence, the so-called Malan trial evidence, is transcriptions of section 29 hearings such as the one - inquiries and we're not at liberty at this stage to make those available to you because it has to be a decision of the Commission to make that information available, but I would see absolutely no problem and in the interests of fairness I would see that the Commission would have no problem in agreeing to make that material available, in so far as it affected your clients.
MS KRUGER: Yes, well, I think, you know, it is important that that be made available because submissions can't be made and you can't rebut unless you know exactly what the allegations are. Do you intend to request the Commission to make that available?
4A CHAIRMAN: Yes, we do.
MS KRUGER: Is that then a ruling from yourselves?
CHAIRMAN: Yes, it is.
MS KRUGER: And then once that's been made available a submission can be made or a further submission be made.
CHAIRMAN: It's not a ruling, it's just that it's an expression of our intention as Commissioners present here today.
MS KRUGER: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN: But, other than that, we're not in possession of information which is not, as I say, within the public forum, such as the evidence collected in the boxes over there.
MS KRUGER: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. Just taking it up from where my learned friend has left it off, one would imagine, without being prescriptive, that the proper place to deal with any further documentary evidence would be at the time when you anticipate a hearing as provided for or as envisaged by section 30(2)(b) and at that stage one could deal with it.
CHAIRMAN: Sorry, you mean when we anticipate a finding? You said, "Anticipate a hearing". Yes, ja. No, that's correct.
MR VISSER: In other words, we're not looking at another hearing, we're now looking at the proper process?
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. While I'm on my feet, as it were, may I state my position? Mr Chairman, basically, again, it does connect with what my learned friend has just said. We submit and we will submit in our
4A oral submissions that practically what we should deal with is the evidence that was given and not documentary - documents which were placed before you by people such as Mr Varney, from which he attempted to draw various inferences. So we will confine ourselves to the evidence he actually gave and other witnesses gave. In that sense, Mr Chairman, we do not anticipate being very long, but what I would say, Mr Chairman, again from a procedural point of view and from a fairness point of view, I would suggest that Mr Stewart and Mr Wills should go first with their submissions, so that we can obviate the necessity of having replies and replies to replies, etcetera, because clearly what we will be dealing with would be issues raised on the evidence by Mr Wills and Mr Stewart, so it seems to me, Mr Chairman. So I would submit that, in fairness, procedurally it would be correct for them to present their oral submissions, if any, first. I am sorry, yes, I've just been reminded. That's obviously after Mr Macadam. He's obviously the one to lead the way, if he wishes to do so.
MR MACADAM: Mr Chairman, as I understood my position is that representations are made on behalf of persons who are implicated in the evidence to their detriment with the intention to enable them to clear any besmirching which would taken place in their client's name. I don't represent anybody. My mandate was simply to attempt in a fair and objective manner to place certain evidence before this panel. I don't think it would be proper for me to make submissions at this stage, particularly on that basis. Secondly, because the panel is not going to make a specific finding on what occurred last week and this
4A week and that any finding which the panel would make would have to hold over until the total picture has been gathered.
MR VISSER: Yes, that's entirely accepted, Mr Chairman.
MR WILLS: Mr Chairperson, I'm not sure - in fact, I don't necessarily agree with Mr Visser as regards us making submissions prior to them. I think that it's quite clear that the evidence given by my clients has got serious implications for them and that they are, in a sense, for want of a better phrase, more or less the accused in these matters and they could be prosecuted in other forums, so I am not going to agree that we give submissions first. I think that, in fairness, we should rather have the submissions of the people representing the Army and the people representing the IFP prior to us making - well, prior to me making submissions. Obviously Mr Stewart is not in a position to talk on this matter, but as regards myself, I think that would be fair in the circumstances.
CHAIRMAN: Look, it's not necessarily something that we have to decide right now, but our view is that it would be appropriate for you and Mr Stewart to go first and if absolutely necessary you can have a brief right of reply.
MR WILLS: As you please.
CHAIRMAN: But what is more important to decide now is when these submissions are going to be heard and I would ask ... (intervention)
MR VISSER: I'm sorry. That's the one thing I neglected and that I suppose was the only question you posed. I neglected to reply to it. Mr Chairman, we are ready at any time. Whenever you want to slot us in we'll be ready
/and we won't
4A and we won't be long.
MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, speaking for us here at the back, we feel that if the evidence is to be concluded tomorrow it would be nice if we have an open day. You must appreciate one thing. We don't have our offices and infrastructures available and if one does go through the trouble of making a submission one might as well put some effort into it. So, for that reason I suggest that we carry on on Thursday. I have spoken with most of my colleagues, but I cannot speak on behalf of every one of them. As far as Mr Maritz, Mr Penzhorn and myself are concerned, and so Mr Lasich, we feel that Thursday would be a good day. If you, however, make a different ruling we will abide by that. But we think that is practical and we think it's fair to all people concerned. Thank you. Mr Maritz just wants to address you.
MR MARITZ: I'm not going to announce my name. It's only because we're the peanut gallery.
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Maritz. No, we also believe that Thursday will be a fair and appropriate date on which to proceed. Will that give people enough time then? Thursday and Friday or Thursday alone?
MR MARITZ: We are happy in the peanut gallery, Mr Chairman.
MR COETZEE: Well, hopefully we will be available Thursday or at the very latest Friday.
MR MACADAM: Possibly, Mr Chairperson, if we can - I'm just concerned that perhaps if it stands over completely till Thursday, Friday, somebody who would want to make a submission might miss out that there's not enough time on Friday. So may I suggest if - I anticipate Dlamini will
/not be very
4A not be very long tomorrow. If there is a person who is ready and who has a short submission that those be heard tomorrow so that then counsel who wish to make their submissions on Thursday will have heard those submissions and been able to decide whether it's necessary to deal with anything arising there. In that way everybody has an opportunity to state their say. That would be counsel who are ready, who feel that they will not prejudice their clients at all if they state whatever they have to say tomorrow and then the other counsel then to continue on Thursday, using Wednesday for preparation time.
MR (?) : Mr Chairman, sorry, just for clarification, I think on the suggestion that Mr Macadam has made, we would just like to know, if there are going to be submissions, if you could just ascertain whether there are, in fact, going to be submissions today - tomorrow. Just to plan our logistics.
CHAIRMAN: I think unless it was something that was very short, for example counsel who has just left, Mr Grobler, he indicated that his would take no more than five minutes. But I wouldn't want there to be a lengthy submission made tomorrow, because the point of breaking early tomorrow would be to give counsel an opportunity to return to - or to make proper preparation for submissions on Thursday. So unless there was something which took place in a very short space of time tomorrow then we'd leave it all over until Thursday. Unless, as I say, there's something very short and that counsel wishes to make that submission and then go back to Pretoria and then not bother to come back.
MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, can we make one practical
4A arrangement? If somebody wishes to give such a short submission tomorrow and some of us are not here let's just make the ruling that such submission to be given in writing also, because then we will talk about a page or two. If it's tomorrow then us who are not here may perhaps look at it and then reply to it. I see Mr Visser is making a ruling against me, but perhaps you can make a different one. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN: We would obviously like to have a submission in writing, but we can't be peremptory in that regard. If counsel wishes to make a written - an oral submission, then so be it, but I think it may be better, just judging by the views expressed here if we leave this matter over until Thursday, and we'll start on Thursday and finish off tomorrow morning very briefly with the cross-examination, if any, of Mr Zweli Dlamini, and possibly of this witness, because we're running late now. Mr Macadam, do you think you can deal with Superintendent Marion in 20 minutes?
MR MACADAM: Yes, I'm sure we'll finish him.
CHAIRMAN: Okay, we will proceed then on Thursday morning with submissions and we will, if necessary, go on until Friday afternoon, when this hall is booked until and tomorrow and Wednesday will be given for preparation. We will proceed now with the evidence of Superintendent Marion. I am sorry, I apologise. I think earlier on I called you Inspector. You are a Superintendent in the SAP. Is that right?
SUPERINTENDENT MARION: That's correct.
4A CHRISTOPHER REGINALD CLIFFORD MARION (Sworn, states)
MR MACADAM: Is it correct that you are currently a Superintendent in the South African Police Services? --- That's correct, Mr Chairman.
Now, is it further correct that in the mid-eighties, in response to the violence that erupted in KwaZulu/Natal between at that stage members of Inkatha and the United Democratic Front, the South African Police established what they termed, "Special units" to investigate the violence with the aim of making arrests and bringing perpetrators to justice? --- That's correct. We had established the unit called the riot investigation unit in 1986 - in the latter part of 1986.
And were you a member of that unit? --- Yes, I joined them on the 27th October 1987.
And did you remain with that unit until such time as you were then transferred or seconded to the Goldstone Commission, when it commenced investigations in the KwaZulu/Natal area in the early 1990s? --- Mr Chairman, I remained with that unit until February 1991, but I did not go to the Goldstone Commission. I went into normal - the police mainstream. That's from 1991 to 1994.
And is it correct then at that stage you then became a member of the investigation task unit? --- That's correct. This latter unit was involved in the investigation, inter alia, of the Caprivi trainees, hit squad activity in the Esikhaweni district, amongst other mandates? --- That's correct.
Now, going back to the mid-eighties and, in particular 1987, at that stage was your unit involved with
4A the investigation of political violence in the Pietermaritzburg and Hammarsdale areas of KwaZulu/Natal? --- That's correct, Mr Chairman.
And we've heard evidence from the witnesses Dlamini and Luthuli that they, in 1987, took part in the political violence at that time. Did they ever at that stage come to the attention of yourself and your unit as suspects? --- Mr Chairman, during 1987, 1988, it was during that period some time, I remember Daluxolo Luthuli was arrested on a charge of murder and attempted murder, as well as possession of a firearm in the Hammarsdale, Inchanga area. He appeared in court and very briefly thereafter was released on bail. He never again appeared in court after this date. You know that docket has since gone missing and investigations by myself at that stage and subsequent investigation by the investigation task unit we still cannot find the docket. There is a reference to the case in registers at the Mpumalanga Police Station which was registered during that period. At the time of the investigations, investigators and myself went personally around KwaZulu/Natal, trying to look for Luthuli. We had gone to numerous places, including Ulundi. We - well, I spoke to Captain Langeni at that stage, who was the commander or unit commander of the protection services of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. You know, at times he'd deny knowing him and at times he'd deny that he knows where he is. That was about it and we could not really get anywhere with that investigation. During December ... (intervention)
MR WILLS: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, I just didn't the name of that Captain. --- Langeni. L.a.n.g.e.n.i. During
4A December 1987, David Zweli Dlamini was wanted on attempted murder charges in Pietermaritzburg and Plessislaer. At Plessislaer he was wanted to case No 300/12/87 and in Hammarsdale he was wanted on case No 84/12/87. During this incident at Plessislaer - it was ... (inaudible) ... area - he was shot and hospitalised in the Edendale Hospital. He was arrested and remanded in absentia while he recovered in hospital. He was later released on bail and disappeared. He did not again appear in court. Well, as I said, he absconded. A warrant for his arrest was authorised. During the investigation it was established that Zweli Dlamini was a policeman in the KwaZulu Police. The term, "Policeman" I put in inverted commas, because he was found in possession of a police appointment certificate which was signed by the then Brigadier Mathe. Intensive investigations by myself and other investigations with the KwaZulu Police, Captain Langeni and other KwaZulu Police Officers proved fruitless and they denied knowledge of the whereabouts of Zweli Dlamini. At times again they would acknowledge that he was a member of the KZP and at time they would say there was no record of him being a members. For years the KZP knew where he was but no assistance from them was forthcoming. Subsequent to this, Mr Chairman, we had, in fact, established that a series of appointment certificates were issued to Caprivians by Brigadier Mathe. He had a special register where he registered these appointment certificates, which was a thing of his own. It wasn't an official register. They weren't on the pay list of the KwaZulu Government or the KwaZulu Police. It was just a list of his own, which he issued to the Caprivians to sort
/of have carte
4A of have carte blanche activities within KwaZulu Natal. I seized this book and I do have it in my possession. The other one that we during 1988 - I remember the case number there was 200/4/88 where a gentleman by the name of Israel Hlongwane was wanted on charges of rape and murder in the Mpumalanga area. He was at that time stationed at riot unit 8 as a special constable. Hlongwane and other men raped two girls and murdered one of them. After the commission of the offence they deserted the police and went into hiding. The other persons implicated were arrested and charged and one of them was convicted and was sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment. Numerous attempts to arrest Hlongwane were made without success. Intensive investigations were conducted in Natal and at that stage including the KZP, but no assistance was offered from the KZP. A warrant for his arrest was authorised - for Hlongwane. During 1993 Hlongwane was arrested by police for the murder of Nathi Gumede and Sergeant Dlamini. Gcina Mkhize, Romeo Mbambo and Israel Hlongwane were convicted and sentenced on certain of the crimes to which they have referred to in the evidence. In passing sentence on them, the Honourable Mr Justice van der Reyden called for an investigation into issues they raised when they testified in mitigation of sentence. These investigations were carried out by myself and the investigation task unit. The following dockets were opened, amongst others, for investigation. Esikhaweni CR 304/12/92, which related to the attempted murder of five people including Welcome Mthimkulu, the killing of Mr Mpanza at Mandini - Mandini case No CR 82/7/93 - Eshowe case No 261/5/95, a conspiracy to kill Samuel Nxumalo,
4A Esikhaweni CR 140/4/92, the murder of Naphta Nxumalo. Inyoni CR 55/3/92, the killing of Induna Mzimela. Esikhaweni CR 136/6/92 and Esikhaweni CR 179/11/92 which has to do with the killing of Sergeant Khumalo and a gentleman by the name of Mr Mabika. In the course of these investigations the following persons were implicated and identified as suspects Mr Gideon Zulu, Mr M R Mzimela, Major Langeni, M Z Khumalo, Mrs Mbuyazi, M R Mkhize, Chief Mathaba, B B Biyela ... (intervention)
MR VISSER: I wonder whether the witness could go a little slower. I find it quite impossible.
CHAIRMAN: Certainly. Could you just start again with the list of people who were identified as suspects, arising out of those case dockets and just read their names slower than you did a few seconds ago? --- I'll do that, Mr Chairman. Gideon Zulu, M R Mzimela, Major Langeni, M Z Khumalo, Mrs Mbuyazi, M R Mkhize, Chief Mathaba, B B Biyela, Brigadier Mzimela, Major Mchunu, Joyful Mthethwa, Victor Buthelezi and Paulos Ndlovu. These dockets were forwarded to the Attorney-General of Natal. In a letter dated the 24th October 1996 the Attorney-General advised me that he had decided not to prosecute any of the above suspects in connection with the above incidents.
MR MACADAM: And in 1987 what level of unrest prevailed in KwaZulu Natal? --- Mr Chairman, for the area that I worked in, just for the record, we investigated political violence in the Mpumalanga/Hammarsdale area, Pietermaritzburg, Edendale and surrounds, Greyton, Hlagahle, New Hanover, Trust Feed - that area, Wartburg, Zwayimane, Camperdown, Hlanzeni, Mooi River, Brandville,
4A Estcourt, Wembezi and Howick and ... (inaudible). That's the areas we covered in the Natal Midlands with regard to the violence. Violence, in fact, was very high. At some stages I know, for myself, I had attended like 50 scenes per day of murder cases.
And during that period did attacks and murders of IFP leaders take place? --- Yes, they did.
The destruction of KwaZulu property and the property of IFP leaders? --- There was destruction of KwaZulu property as well, as well as the killing of IFP leaders.
Were there any disruptions of political rallies arranged by the IFP by the UDF? --- In the Pietermaritzburg area we had the police called the riot unit which policed the rallies, where the IFP held rallies in the Wardley Stadium or in the stadium at Imbali. After the rally there would be clashes with people on the way home. Buses would be attacked and incidents to that effect.
And tell me, in the course of your investigations had you come across persons in possession of firearms and had they produced appointment certificates, showing that they were detective sergeants in the KwaZulu Police? Would the question of the firearms they had in their possession and what they were doing have been taken any further or not? --- Mr Chairman, there were a number of incidents in which I was involved in respect of investigations of firearms. A gentleman by the name of Mandla Mchunu was arrested in Town Hill with a boot full of firearms - AK-47s and other firearms - and he was released and to this date hasn't been found. Other cases where IFP people were arrested in possession of firearms
4A they were released by the security police - the then security branch - and weren't actually charged. There's a number of cases that I bear knowledge of where this has happened.
You said there were a number of strange factors concerning the issue of the appointment certificates to the Caprivians by Brigadier Mathe. --- I explained earlier that none of these - you know, each appointment certificate had a number of it - you know, like a service number. I've got a service number. And this service number would obviously be on your payroll. You know, at the end of the month you get in accordance with this number. Now, the KwaZulu Police would have this number attached to a name, a person, on the payroll. Now this block of numbers or these set of numbers did not appear on the KwaZulu Police payroll. They were a separate book kept by Brigadier Mathe, issuing these appointment certificates to members of the public - I am sorry, to the Caprivians, you know, to go around showing this, purporting to be policemen.
And did you find any proof as to whether these persons who had these cards were, in fact, properly attested and qualified members of the KwaZulu Police? --- I had it investigated. Nothing of that nature was done. I, in fact, investigated a fraud matter in which the appointment certificates were found, because if people enter into members of the public's homes purporting to be policemen using an appointment certificate and discharging duties as if they are policemen, as far as I'm concerned, it's an unlawful act. I then had given the docket over to Mr McNally for attention. He declined to prosecute.
4A Lastly, we have heard evidence that there were a group of 200 trainees who were trained in the Caprivi. Now, in the course of your investigations into the violence in KwaZulu Natal in the mid-eighties and the 'nineties, did you make any enquiries to determine how many of this group of 200 could be linked as suspects to politically-motivated cases or not? --- Mr Chairman, I had the occasion to speak to the University of Natal, Durban, and also enquiries of my own. What I know is a fact, it's something in the region of about 30 that were charged for offences relating to murder, attempted murder, political violence and some are, in fact, at this point in time awaiting trial on such political killings. In the region of about 30.
I have no further questions, Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MACADAM
MS SOOKA: Mr Marion, does the 30 include the members of the Caprivi trainees who have appeared at this hearing? --- Yes, they are included.
And have you ever tracked down the other approximately 170? --- Some are dead and I've got a list of them and we've managed to trace a couple of them that we've spoken to. They've made statement to us and some are convicted, some are in gaol.
CHAIRMAN: Any questions to be put to Superintendent Marion? Mr Lasich.
MR LASICH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Marion, you said that Daluxolo Luthuli was arrested for, inter alia, attempted murder, murder and possession of firearms. --- That's my recollection, yes.
/Now, I stand
4A Now, I stand to be corrected, but my recollection, and I'm speaking from my memory of the Msane trial, was that it was simply for possession of firearms, not murder or attempted murder. --- Well, my recollection of it he was charged for murder and attempted murder. I could be wrong. As I said, this comes from my personal recollection and, as I said, the dockets were missing. There was no trace of it at Mpumalanga.
And Zweli Dlamini's charges, when he was in Edendale Hospital, when he was shot by the military, what were those? --- Attempted murder.
Not possession of firearms? --- No, no, he was found in possession - well, at that stage, you know, we were looking a bit stupid, but he was found in possession of this appointment certificate which purportedly gave him the authority to carry this HMC which we found in his possession, but he wasn't charged for it because he had this appointment certificate in his possession.
Right, now you've given the panel a list of suspects and you've mentioned these appointment certificates and other aspects. In a nutshell, no charges or no indictment has been forthcoming from the Attorney-General's office for either impersonating a police officer or being involved in hit squad activities? --- That's correct.
Have you been given any indication as to why? --- Mr McNally is of the opinion that the matter would not succeed in a court of law.
And you've mentioned that dockets are missing. I don't want to make myself a witness, but it seems nowadays even more dockets are going missing at the courts. Would you agree? --- Probably in Gauteng. But in the normal
5A function of the police at the moment it's not as high as it was in the past.
I'm sure we can ask the prosecutors at the Durban Courts about that. Mr Chairman, just one thing. I didn't anticipate Superintendent Marion giving evidence. I haven't prepared cross-examination on each detail, but I don't think it's going to take it any further and we have time limitations, so I have no further questions. Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LASICH
CHAIRMAN: Anybody else?
MR VISSER: While they are sorting out their pecking order, Mr Chairman, may I ask my few short questions? We heard evidence today, Superintendent, and you may have been present to hear the evidence, that is of the previous witness, Mr Mbambo, that - perhaps I should ask you this first - were you present at any time or all of the time during the Mbambo trial? --- No, I was not.
You were not. So it would be pointless asking you whether you know about witnesses who testified and what they testified to? --- That's correct.
Thank you. It may be helpful if you have the information available to provide us with a list of the names of each and every Caprivi trainee that you testified about that were arrested and charged with offences. That would be very helpful if you could do that. I'm not insisting on it, I'm just making a request. I think the committee members will also find that helpful. The last thing, Superintendent, if I may ask you this, I take it, although you didn't say so, you were at all times attached to the South African Police throughout the evidence which
/you gave here
4A you gave here today, throughout that whole period? You were not a KwaZulu Policeman? --- No, no.
So when you talk about, "The police", what you are doing you are distinguishing between the South African Police and the KwaZulu Police. Am I correct in assuming that? --- I don't know in what respect you are talking about, Mr Visser.
Well, when you say that, "We were looking - that is the police were looking for people to arrest them", you're talking about the South African Police. --- Well, I mentioned very clearly, the investigators and myself went to the KwaZulu Police and made enquiries there. That's my clear distinction, yes.
That's why I'm making it quite clear. And is it correct that, from a police point of view, you were trying to do your job. You were trying to find culprits or criminals. You were trying to arrest them and bring them to court. Is that a fair statement of the situation? --- That's correct, yes.
Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, we have no questions here in the back row.
MR COETZEE: No questions.
CHAIRMAN: Mr Wills.
MR WILLS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Superintendent, one small issue first. This person you referred to as Mandla Mchunu, who you found with a boot full of firearms, did he also have one of these police appointment certificates on him at the time? --- Yes, that's correct, he had an appointment certificate.
4A Okay, now, in your investigations, in following up these matters, have you found that - have you had to speak to other South African Policemen, be they in any unit, the security branch, or whatever, to follow up these investigations against these people that you've been investigating? --- Well, Mr Chairman, you know, when we go to meetings, when we had this riot investigation unit, people from different units would be at this meeting where we would discuss problems, you know, with the riot unit, the security branch, the normal detectives and the riot investigators and these aspects would be discussed with regard to who was wanted and where they can assist us.
Now, there has been evidence from Mr Luthuli specifically that his operations essentially were assisted by particular South African Policemen. He referred to a person by the name of Pollberry.
CHAIRMAN: No, he was military intelligence. That was the evidence.
MR WILLS: Sorry, I withdraw that question. The point that I'm driving at, concerning your later investigations into - from the time you became a member of the ITU - were there instances where the South African Police were not co-operative as regards your investigations? --- Well, there were a number of occasions where they wouldn't co-operate at all.
My understanding is, having had dealings with a number of the members of the ITU and I refer specifically to discussions that I've had with - is it Superintendent Dutton or Colonel Dutton, as I knew him, and others, that, in fact, they became very unpopular as regards the main
4A stream of the South African Police. Would you ... (intervention)
MR VISSER: I am sorry, Mr Chairman, is Mr Wills giving evidence.
CHAIRMAN: Yes, it sounds as though you are giving evidence, Mr Wills.
MR WILLS: If I can just ask the question specifically in relation to this person. I will rephrase the question. How does the main stream - have you had any indications from the main stream police as regards whether they like what you're doing or whether they don't like what you're doing? --- Well, Mr Chairman, there was a lot resistance from the main stream policing across the board in respect of the work that we were doing. We had very little co-operation.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. I really do have to object to this kind of questioning. I mean, how many represent the main stream? What is the main stream? I mean are we really going to get involved in this kind of argument? With all due respect, it's unfair, because it can't be challenged. It can't be proved, not in this session anyway, Mr Chairman. One would imagine that a statement like that should be accepted as being highly contentious.
CHAIRMAN: I don't think it takes the matter much further, Mr Wills. In fact, I think one of the main bases on which the ITU was regarded as not being proper was because it didn't conform with the same reporting structures. I think that's really an issue that one could debate around not in this forum. So I'd ask you to leave that sort of question out, please.
4A MR WILLS: As you please, Mr Chairperson. I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS
CHAIRMAN: Mr Lasich.
MR LASICH: Sorry, Mr Chairman, just point that arises, if I can say, bleakly from that and I don't intend to debate it over too long a period. Superintendent, the ITU was set up to investigate the KwaZulu Police and hit squad activities within the KwaZulu Police and Inkatha. Is that correct? Is that how I understand it? --- Amongst others as well, yes.
Were they ever delegated or given the task of investigating hit squads amongst the UDF/ANC members? --- That's correct.
Have there been any prosecutions for those? --- That's correct.
And how would you compare the number of prosecutions for those matters vis-a-vis Inkatha-related ones or KwaZulu Police ones? --- If I go and do some research probably I would give an answer.
Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LASICH
MS SOOKA: Superintendent, just one more question. You mentioned an investigation - a fraud investigation. In respect of who was that investigation? --- Against General Mathe.
Did anything ever arise from that investigation? --- As I explained, Mr McNally declined to prosecute.
CHAIRMAN: Do you have knowledge, Superintendent, where Brigadier or General Mathe is now? --- He's since on
4A pension, Mr Chairman.
Brigadier Mzimela? --- He's on pension as well.
Now, the certificates which General Mathe, or Brigadier as he then was, issued to these people, he issued them, as I understand it at the level of detective constable? --- That's correct.
How long would you have had to have been in the Police Force to have reached the rank of detective constable? What would be the normal period of service that one would have served to have acquired that rank? --- Firstly, you would have ... (end of tape) ... [break in recording] ... as a probationer straight from the Police College into a detective branch, but you'd only be appointed six months later. So it's about a year that you would have to do the training. Well, this was at that stage, Mr Chairman. Presently it's different.
If you have no further questions for Superintendent Marion, we thank you and excuse you, Superintendent.
CHAIRMAN: We adjourn the matter until tomorrow morning when there will be cross-examination of Mr Zweli Dlamini, unless people want to place on record now that they don't intend to cross-examine him, but we will be here to cross-examine him if people wish to do so.
MR LASICH: Mr Chairman, may I indicate I would be taking the same line with him as the other witnesses that have been dealt with in this matter. I don't think it's going to take it any further. Perhaps it can just be recorded that I join issue with him on his evidence.
CHAIRMAN: I don't want pressurise people into not cross-examining him at all. We will be here. The facilities
4A are available and if people wish to cross-examine Mr Dlamini we will certainly meet for that purpose.
MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, you will have to pressurise me if you want me to cross-examine him. I'm not going to cross-examine him.
MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, Maritz on record. I looked at his evidence over the week-end, as I promised I would do and there are really only two small contentious issues. The one relates to the house penetration training and the purpose thereof, which was debated with Dr Williams this morning as ... (inaudible) ... so you know what our position is on that. I don't think it's going to serve any useful purpose to traverse that terrain again. And the other one related to the unarmed combat training that was received in Venda and I was on the record that I received unsure as to what the witness said, because he says on the record that he was not involved, but it has a question mark directly after the word that - or whatever the word was, indicating that he was not involved. And those are the only issues that I want to clarify and I don't think it's worth the trouble to bring him back for that silly little question, really, so I would be quite happy if we adjourned now so that we can get down to the serious business of our submissions. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Maritz. If there anybody else who wants to do it, please say so now. We can certainly have him, unless we bring here for an hour on Thursday morning, so that we can - if there's anything between now and Thursday that they feel that they want to put to Mr Dlamini, we can have him here on ... (intervention)
MR MACADAM: Just for the travel arrangements, it's
4B more convenient for him to be here tomorrow, because as soon as we finish with him, he then wants to go back home. So if we can have him here tomorrow and if there are no questions there are no questions, then at least he is finished, rather than having him waiting for another two days.
MR (?) : Well, what is the end result? Do we come and see what happens tomorrow or what must we do?
CHAIRMAN: We will have him here tomorrow morning for those people who wish to put questions to him. 9 o'clock.
MR COETZEE: We don't have any questions for him either.
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Coetzee.
MR VISSER: I must place myself also on record, Mr Chairman, Visser, that we don't have any questions for Mr Dlamini.
MR WILLS: I don't have any questions for him, Mr Chairperson. It's John Wills.
CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr Lasich and Mr Maritz may want to reconsider their positions, if they - because if people can say here that they definitely don't want to have him here, we won't bother to reconvene. If they do we'll be happy to reconvene.
MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, as far as I'm concerned you don't have to bring him.
MR LASICH: Mr Chairman, as I indicated, and this panel has indicated, it is not a trial. The panel can surely take note of what I've put to previous witnesses. I would be doing the same thing with this witness tomorrow. I don't see - he's going to deny it or disagree with me in any event, otherwise he wouldn't be here. So I don't think it's going to take it any further. So for my part,
/I don't see
4B I don't see a need to question him, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRMAN: Certainly we'll take note of the sort of approach you've taken with other witnesses. In that case we will adjourn until Thursday. 10 o'clock on Thursday. 10 o'clock Thursday morning. Thank you very much.
PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED TO 1997/08/14