DATE: 07-05-1998






MR POOE: Mr Shaik, with your permission I beg leave to hand in the statement as it currently is, with some changes. Nothing material really, mainly of editing nature, except that two issues had not been dealt with and those have now been dealt with, and that is the incident which you see at page 3, paragraph 14.

CHAIRPERSON: 24th of August 1993.

MR POOE: I am sorry, my page 3, I am sorry, that is the Department of Cooperation and Development, an incident of 7 December, 198 as well as an incident of the 3rd of September 1994, Internal Affairs , Hanson Street, those have now also been incorporated in the statement.

CHAIRPERSON: So Mr Pooe, will the statement that you are handing out now, replace the statement?

MR POOE: It will replace that one, for all intends and purposes.

CHAIRPERSON: So we will call the new one, Exhibit B1. We can keep it at B, I think and if all of us can get rid of the old Exhibit B. Yes, Mr Pooe, you may proceed.

EXAMINATION BY MR POOE: (continued) Thank you Chairperson. Mr Shaik, we discussed, we were discussing yesterday when we adjourned, the incident of the 24th of August 1984, which is the incident at the Railway Police Radio Room in Johannesburg, which according to the notice issued by the Offices of this Committee, is described as Railway Police and Directorates of coloured and Indian affairs.

I would like you to carry on and describe your involvement and role in the remainder of the operations under your Unit Dolphin, starting with the incident on 3 September 1984, which is named Internal Affairs Hanson Street.

MR SHAIK: I selected this target because of the part it played in the apartheid structure. I considered it a legitimate target. I did the reconnaissance on this target which revealed that the building is usually vacated by 3.30 pm. I prepared the charge which consisted of a limpet mine and placed it on the fourth floor. The mine exploded at 4 pm, I believe that four people were injured.

MR POOE: You were also involved in the operation described as Foreign Affairs, Market Street on the 15th of December 1984. Describe your involvement in it.

MR SHAIK: I identified the target as legitimate and as Foreign Affairs, it was essential to the propaganda campaign of the government.

Reconnaissance showed that Foreign Affairs staff left by 4.30 pm and that cleaners seldom came to the floor as the Department of Foreign Affairs had their own cleaners.

The bomb detonated around 5.30 to 6.30 pm and was placed at the entrance of the Foreign Affairs Department. Seven injuries were reported. The operation was successful because of the armed propaganda value thereof.

MR POOE: Each time you refer to bomb, it was a limpet?

MR SHAIK: In most cases, yes.

MR POOE: Yes, tell the Committee about the Transvaal Medical Command, Hillbrow incident.

MR SHAIK: I identified the target as legitimate, it was occupied by SADF members. The entire floor was occupied by SADF members, so there was very little potential of civilians getting injured.

I placed two mini limpet mines directly on the floor occupied by the SADF. According to press reports, the charge was found and moved by a member of the SADF from its original place. In my opinion, this resulted in unintended civilian injuries.

16 Injuries were reported. The operation was justified as it struck a then SADF structure.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Shaik, just for further explanation on this, you say that the limpet, both limpets, were both limpets moved from their original position?


CHAIRPERSON: And they both went off later?

MR SHAIK: Yes, the two mini limpet mines were attached to each other and it was placed on the floor, outside the lift gaining access to the rest of the SADF offices.

A member of this moved it, out of that floor, down and towards where people were congregating I believe, and sort of just discarded it, and that in my opinion ...

CHAIRPERSON: And then it went off after being discarded?

MR SHAIK: Then it went off.

JUDGE PILLAY: How do you know, where do you get the idea that it was moved?

MR SHAIK: From press reports. If I can just elaborate on that, they said that I am not sure of his rank, Kinnia, carried the bomb, hero of the day, carried it down the staircase and left it in a place which would have otherwise caused a lot of injury, that is what they said in the paper.

There are press reports available, if one wants to ...


MR POOE: These press reports Mr Shaik, you have been requested to make them available, will you undertake steps to see that copies are made available?

MR SHAIK: Yes, I will.

MR POOE: I must just indicate Chairperson, that the applicant is from Natal, and apparently he did not bring it with him, but he is willing to have them send down if the need arises, if anything turns on them at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Pooe.

MR POOE: The next incident in which you were involved, as part of the Dolphin Unit, is the incident at the Krugersdorp Magistrate's court on the 16th of March 1988, which in your application you described as 1987. But I think for the time we can accept that it is 1988 operation Chairperson.

Can you please just take the Committee through your involvement in this?

MR SHAIK: I wonder if I couldn't finish off the incident at the Department of Cooperation and Development.

MR POOE: Please do so.

MR SHAIK: Thank you. We are dealing with the incident at the Department of Cooperation and Development, December 1983, the 7th.

I selected this target because of its function and role in the whole apartheid structure. It was in my view a legitimate target. I did the reconnaissance of the building, it was revealed that the building was vacated by 5.30 pm, with the exception of a security guard, who manned the ground floor.

I prepared the charge, I placed the charge which consisted of a limpet mine, on the 7th floor of the building. An explosion took place at around 7.30 pm. I am not aware of any injuries or deaths that resulted from this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Shaik, in which town was this?

MR SHAIK: Johannesburg.

CHAIRPERSON: Johannesburg?

MR VISSER: I am sorry Mr Chairman, I have lost the witness, I thought he was talking about Krugersdorp?

CHAIRPERSON: No, this new statement that has been handed in Mr Visser, includes extra incidents which wasn't included in the first statement.

MR VISSER: I understand that.

CHAIRPERSON: Before getting onto the Krugersdorp one, ge went back to one of the incidents which occurred before, it is number 14.

MR VISSER: 14, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, before getting to the - it came before the Krugersdorp incident.

MR VISSER: That is at page 3?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, page 3.

MR VISSER: I am sorry, I was lost for a minute, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And the only additional information through my question is that it occurred in Johannesburg.

MR POOE: Mr Shaik, deal with the next incident, Krugersdorp Magistrate's court.

MR SHAIK: During the second half of 1987, my Commander Aboobaker Ismail discussed with me the need to attack Police or Security Force personnel in large numbers.

After about two weeks of reconnaissance, I identified the Krugersdorp Magistrate's court as a suitable target, since it was adjacent to the Krugersdorp Police station which has a notorious Security Branch. The front of the building was occupied by the SAP, the courts were further behind.

I chose this spot as it was closest to the entrance mostly used by Police and government officials. It was also as close to the entrance of the Police station, as I possibly could get. My reconnaissance showed me that after the court's proceeded, activity on the outside, surrounding areas was to a minimum, which would minimize civilian casualties.

I prepared two charges. One being a decoy which I placed in the toilet used by Police officers, in the court complex, and the other being a car bomb. The decoy was to have exploded first, drawing out Police officers from the station, who in a few minutes would have cordoned, cleared and secured the area.

Their presence would have been very near to the car bomb, which was to explode minutes later. Unfortunately the decoy failed to explode, due to some malfunction.

The car bomb detonated as planned. The intended aim of a large number of enemy personnel being killed, injured, was not achieved. A civilian and two Security Branch members were killed.

It was also reported that there were 20 injuries. For this incident, the State tried and found Hein Grösskopf guilty through the media, for this bombing. I would just like to say I never met the man, I have never heard of him before this incident.

The operation in my opinion, was however successful and it had propaganda street value for the ANC and I may like to add that it was definitely in keeping with the policy of attacking Security Force personnel.

MR POOE: Mr Shaik, you obviously don't give details of a technical nature as to the charges you prepared, and how you went about that. Would you be prepared to give that if it is required of you?

MR SHAIK: Yes, certainly.

MR POOE: Your application for amnesty can be seen in volume six of the bundles prepared by the Investigating Unit of this Committee, and at pages - from page 75 onwards, running through to page 86.

In addition to setting out the incidents which you have described and others, you also set out in your application at page 84, the political objective you sought to achieve, the motive for the operations you have carried out. Do you confirm what is set out at page 84 with regards to your objective, with regard to motive, political context, do you confirm that as part of your evidence before this Committee as well?

MR SHAIK: Yes, I do.

MR POOE: You then set out at page 4, of your brief statement, a conclusion and perhaps you can just put that on record for the Committee.

MR SHAIK: In conclusion I would like to state that at all times, I acted within the policy and guidelines laid down by the ANC, I was comprehensively briefed on the modus operandi of special operations in MK. I accordingly attempted to avoid or minimise civilian casualties whenever I conducted operations.

To this end, whenever circumstances permitted, I timed my operations after hours when targeted buildings have been vacated by civilians. I accept that in the end there was always a possibility of civilian casualties.

Where there were civilian casualties, these were never at any stage intended to be targets, but were rather caught in the cross-fire.

To the extent that there were civilian casualties, I express my deep regret to those who experienced pain and suffering. The apartheid State left us no choice, but to take up arms in order to achieve the liberation of all the citizens of this country.

In my evidence I have given as much information as I believe is reasonably necessary to enable this Committee to consider and grant my application for amnesty. Should the Committee, however, require any further information, or clarifications, I express my willingness to do so. Thank you.

MR POOE: As it pleases you Chairperson, that will be the evidence of this applicant.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Pooe, and as stated then earlier, this will then be a convenient time to interpose the evidence of Mr Ismail, in respect of the question that was raised yesterday.

Mr Shaik, would you please mind standing down and then coming back shortly.

MR MODISE: Chairperson, I believe Mr Van den Berg has a few things to say in regard to that particular aspect.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, sorry Mr Van den Berg.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, members of the Committee, Mr Ismail has prepared in documentary form a response to the question, setting out the areas which he believes are inaccurate or incorrect and we would ask leave simply to hand that up, we believe that that would be sufficient for purposes of answering Adv Visser's question, but obviously we are in your hands in that regard.

CHAIRPERSON: Would there be any objection Mr Visser, to that?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, no, it might even curtail the proceedings. Perhaps if I may suggest with respect that I have sight of the document, and I can then perhaps intermit to the Committee whether any questions, necessarily flow from the document.

The only, I think, problem might be that Mr Ismail might have to return, but I am sure that contingency has been taken into account, when drafting the document. I will certainly have a look at it straight away and see whether we can come to a conclusion.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it a lengthy document Mr Van den Berg?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairman, it is a two page document and Mr Ismail has intermitted that he will be here throughout the course of these hearings, he has an interest in the evidence of other applicants, so he is readily available.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Pooe, you don't have any objections to the statement as being handed in?

MR POOE: I haven't had sight of it. I doubt that I will have much of an objection.

CHAIRPERSON: I will of course give you also an opportunity to put questions to Mr Ismail. Thank you Mr Van den Berg, I think then we can deal with it that way by just receiving the document which we will call Exhibit C.

And then perhaps during the tea interval, which I might indicate have been requested that we take the tea from now on from twenty to eleven till eleven o'clock. Apparently there is some direct radio broadcast taking place at eleven, and they want to have portion of the proceedings live, so we will then adjourn for tea at twenty to eleven and perhaps during that break, I am sure that we will be able to read the two page document and then you can tell us if there is any questions.

MR VAN DEN BERG: As it pleases you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. This will be regarded as part of Mr Ismail's evidence and that it was given under oath.

MR VAN DEN BERG: It is so accepted Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Then Mr Shaik, if you can return to your chair. Mr Van den Berg, sorry, do you have any questions to put to the witness?

MR VAN DEN BERG: No Mr Chairman, I don't.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you have any questions to put to the witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Shaik, starting where you ended your evidence, you say you have given as much information as you believe is reasonably necessary to enable the Committee to come to a conclusion to consider your application.

Has anybody told you about the requirement that you have to make a full disclosure?

MR SHAIK: Well, I am aware of that, and therefore I am willing to cooperate further.

MR VISSER: No, no, all that I am asking you, in your vocabulary is evidence which is reasonably necessary, similar or the same as full disclosure?

MR SHAIK: I regard this as a full disclosure.

MR VISSER: So what we have heard from you, is your full disclosure, is that what you are saying?

MR SHAIK: No, that is not what I am saying.

MR VISSER: Is there anything else that you want to disclose to the Committee?

MR SHAIK: Whatever is required of me to disclose, I will disclose it.

MR VISSER: Yes, but you are not tendering any further evidence?


MR VISSER: Will you turn to volume 6, page 75 and following pages. That is your application. First of all at the end of that document, at page 86, is that your signature appearing above the words deponent?

MR SHAIK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Why wasn't this document dated sir?

MR SHAIK: I have no idea sir, I will have to check with my legal representative who drew it up.

MR VISSER: But you signed it.

JUDGE PILLAY: Mr Visser, wasn't that supposed to be filled in by the Commissioner of Oaths?

MR VISSER: Yes, I am not making a point of that, I am just simply saying he signed it and I was going to say while it was undated. I am not making any further point of that, but I will leave that question if it is an embarrassing question or an improper one.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you Mr Shaik, recall when it was signed?

MR SHAIK: I really can't tell you the exact date, sir. I can tell you it was very close to the time when the cut off date was announced.

CHAIRPERSON: It was September 1997?

MR SHAIK: I am quite sure it was that time, sir.

MR VISSER: And did you then not hand in the document to the TRC for some time, after you had signed it, is that what happened?

MR SHAIK: Yes, I left this document with my legal representative. What happened thereafter, I can't tell you at this moment.

MR VISSER: Yes, because at page 75, it appears that the document, the application form was received on the 10th of April 1997?

MR SHAIK: Yes, I really can't account for that sir.

MR VISSER: Yes. All right. You have made a point quite eloquently if I may say so, of how it was a concern of yours, to avoid civilian casualties in your operations.

Am I correct about that?

MR SHAIK: Quite right.

MR VISSER: Was the reason for that, because in your understanding it was not the policy of the ANC to attack civilian targets?

MR SHAIK: Can you just ask me that question again?

MR VISSER: Can I put it differently, did you believe or did you understand the ANC policy to be not to attack civilian targets?

MR SHAIK: Yes, I understood that and identified with that policy personally, myself.

MR VISSER: Yes. And you stated today, well perhaps we should be fair to you and refer to all the evidence in this regard, first of all in your application form, regarding political objectives, that is at page 84 of volume 6, 10(a) states all the acts carried out by me, I take it the "the" should not be there, were done in accordance with the aims and objectives of the African National Congress.

You say as a member of Umkonto We Sizwe, Special Operations, my objective was the furtherance of the armed struggle against the South African State with the intention of overthrowing this State and replacing it with a democratic one. All my actions were geared towards this objective.

And in 10(b) you said my actions at all times relevant hereto, were politically motivated, carried out within the context of the conflicts of the past, aimed at political opponents and committed under the orders of and with the full approval of my organisation, the African National Congress.

By and large, you repeated that sentiment in your discussion such as it was, of the particular incidents, so we can accept that we are in agreement about that fact? What I want to ask you to do is to turn to page 78.

Now, understanding as I have just explained to you, that you considered a political opponents of your organisation, the ANC, as legitimate targets, can you give us some evidence about this limpet mine explosion outside the Temple of Israel Synagogue in Hillbrow in 1983.

First of all, was it only you that was involved or was Mr Mohamed Ismail there to accompany you?

MR SHAIK: We were together.

MR VISSER: All right, who identified the target?

MR SHAIK: I identified the target.


MR SHAIK: Let me say from the onset, that you see at the time, one has to see it in its political context, at the time there was strong parallels between the State of Israel and the State of South Africa. Not only were there parallels, there were military cooperation, economic cooperation, political cooperation in many respects.

The Temple of Israel was the synagogue there, was to have the State, I think it was Marais Viljoen, coming the next day and in that regard, we just felt we needed to make a political statement and that is why we identified that target.

MR VISSER: Where in Exhibit B, that is now the new Exhibit B, did you discuss this item, would you please refer me to the paragraph?

MR POOE: Perhaps before the applicant witness, goes on a fruitless exercise of trying to find it, may I just indicate that it is my understanding that that is not one of the issues which are being heard a present, if I may be mistaken.

The witness made it absolutely clear right at the outset, that he elaborates for purposes of this hearing, on those issues which have been identified as issues which are being heard now. Again my understanding might be totally incorrect, but that is as I have the picture, certainly from Mr Steenkamp in my discussions with him, and looking at the notices that went out.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, my learned friend sounds very aggressive, but then he might be surprised that I fully accept his explanation, I have no problem with that.

CHAIRPERSON: I think, of course you are free to ask on any of the listed incidents in the application form, but Mr Pooe made it clear that that didn't cover each and every of the 32 incidents.

MR VISSER: Yes, but the only, and I undertook to do so, and I will restrict myself, the only two other incidents as far as it is relevant to one of the incidents, or a principle applicable to one of the incidents in mine, and I am coming directly to that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR VISSER: You see, first of all by the by, we haven't heard of an ANC policy from anyone so far, in this hearing, that governments or other states, who cooperated with South Africa, had become legitimate targets in the views of the ANC, we haven't heard that, are you saying that is the position?

MR SHAIK: No, I didn't say that. I said, I didn't say that the State of Israel constituted a legitimate target, I said that in the political context in which things were happening, given the strong parallels and given the fact that this kind of cooperation was happening, I considered this venue to be a legitimate target.

MR VISSER: Would that then be churches of Jews or what?

MR SHAIK: Can you elaborate on that?

MR VISSER: I am not here to elaborate, I want to know why you chose this target because I am going to tell you why I am asking you that question. I am going to suggest to you that that is a purely civilian target.

MR SHAIK: Well, I chose that target as I said, because of its political significance that it had at the time and even if it was a civilian target as you say, the facts of the matter stand on the way the operation was carried out, it was in the middle of the night, in the early hours of the morning, and there were absolutely no injuries, as far as I know.

MR VISSER: So a Jewish synagogue was in your estimation, a legitimate target, that is the bottom line?

MR SHAIK: Jewish synagogues were not in my estimation legitimate targets, this particular synagogue was of some political importance at the time in the sense of it having a Marais Viljoen coming there the next day, and the bomb was placed not in the synagogue, it was placed outside the area.

MR VISSER: No, but that is not the only consideration. You have just given us another one, some sort of alignment which you have explained, between the South African government and the then government of Israel, if I understand you correctly, so there were two reasons.


MR VISSER: Yes, all right, let's go on to another one. At page 80, the limpet mine explosion or rather placing of a limpet mine at the Department of Education and Training, how does that fit in with ANC policy?

MR SHAIK: Very clearly. If you knew what was happening at the time, you would understand the context. There was at the time, during that few months when I placed this bomb, there was a lot of student unrest, there was a lot of intransigents on the part of the Department of Education to meet certain demands by students.

I cannot recollect the exact issues now. If you give me an opportunity I can look into it.

MR VISSER: All right. The next item, the mini limpet mine placed in the Judge's Chambers in Johannesburg Supreme court, how does that become part of the ANC policy of legitimate targets?

MR SHAIK: Of course, I mean the judiciary was part and parcel of the apartheid system. It enforced it, it upheld it and on any point you are asking me,it is very simple. Anything that could be as we have always been saying, could be identified with State structures, were legitimate targets.

MR VISSER: You see, that is really my question. In your estimation, was any State or parastatal institution a legitimate target, is that what you are saying?

MR SHAIK: If you could be a little bit more clear. I don't understand the question fully.

MR VISSER: I am not quite sure that I can put it more clearly.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was, was any State or parastatal organisation a legitimate target. Are you putting it to him, were all State or parastatal organisations, legitimate targets, what would you include in a parastatal organisation?

MR VISSER: Well, a university for example, because it is partly State sponsored, I would imagine Mr Chairman. I would just like to know from this witness where he draws the line, if he does draw a line at all. We now know it seems that all government departments seem to have been legitimate targets, or am I wrong?

MR SHAIK: You are wrong if you think, if you are referring to universities and stuff like that, no definitely not.

MR VISSER: So not parastatal institutions?

MR SHAIK: Not parastatal.

MR VISSER: Okay, but State institutions, yes?

MR SHAIK: State institutions which enforced or helped prop up the apartheid system, yes, like the Department of Cooperation and Development, I mentioned before.

Anything that had to do with the bureaucratic arms of government that made life unbearable or difficult for the masses of the people, yes.

JUDGE PILLAY: What about institutions that supported the State?

MR SHAIK: Such as?


MR SHAIK: No, we had no problem with that. It depends also in what context, and when.

MR VISSER: Internal Affairs, for example?

MR SHAIK: Yes, Internal Affairs too.

MR VISSER: How, why, the question is why, why was it a legitimate target? How do you fit that in with your political objective?

MR SHAIK: It is a government structure, issuing a different ID documents to everyone, it is a government structure that has different entrances for blacks and whites. I am talking at the time.

MR VISSER: But that would apply to all government departments?

MR SHAIK: That is what I said, most government departments.

MR VISSER: No, no, I am saying that would apply to all government departments of the time.

MR SHAIK: then they would all be considered legitimate targets.

MR VISSER: Are you saying so now because of the questions, or did you think so at the time?

MR SHAIK: No, I thought so at the time, I was just wanting to see exactly what you were aiming at.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Shaik, but the point is you say that the Judges of this country, were legitimate targets?

MR SHAIK: I said the judiciary.

MR VISSER: Now, what is the difference?

MR SHAIK: There is a difference, not only Judges personally on a personal basis, I said the judiciary was seen, structures of the judiciary was seen as legitimate targets, like courts and that. I did not say individual Judges.

MR VISSER: There is just one problem with your answer, you see, I put it to you, to make your answer sensible, the limpet mine would have had to be placed at the Supreme Court, but it wasn't, it was placed in the Judges' Chambers.

MR SHAIK: I was completely unaware of where it was placed, I just know it was somewhere in the Court.

MR VISSER: You know, you made an application for amnesty. At page 80, paragraph 18, you making a full disclosure, stated quite explicitly mini limpet mine in Judges' Chambers in Johannesburg Supreme Court, and thereunder you say the placing of mini limpet mine in Judges' Chambers in the Johannesburg Supreme Court, there could be no doubt about what you are saying.

MR SHAIK: No, there is no doubt about it. I am sorry, I might have misunderstood you when you said that.

When I placed the limpet mine, I am trying to tell you, I placed it in the Court, I did not intentionally go to the Judges' Chambers in particular, I went to a convenient place, which was safe enough for me to have put the limpet mine.

Obviously after press reports, one reads and one can refer to those press reports, mini limpet mine was placed in the Judges' Chambers.

MR VISSER: We haven't seen those press reports which we have asked for.

MR SHAIK: I told you I am not from Johannesburg, I will make them available to you. It is after that, when I was making my statement, that I said I tried to give as much evidence as I could, and I said it was in the Judges' Chambers.

MR VISSER: You didn't reconnoitre the area where you wanted to place the bomb beforehand, you didn't?

MR SHAIK: Of course I reconnoitred the area.

MR VISSER: But you discovered nothing, you didn't discover this is where the Judges sat?

MR SHAIK: No, I did not discover that.

MR VISSER: All right, let's go on. At page 81 ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you move on on that, just a little further information. You say that the device was discovered.

If it hadn't been discovered, at what time of the day or night, would it have gone off or was it planned for it to go off?

MR SHAIK: After the court would have closed, well in the evening.

MR VISSER: Well, what time?

MR SHAIK: I would probably think I set it for about seven o'clock.

MR VISSER: Was this a mini limpet mine?

MR SHAIK: No, that report is actually incorrect, it was a limpet mine.

MR VISSER: And the difference being?

MR SHAIK: The one is a little smaller than the other.

MR VISSER: The one has a bigger charge?


MR VISSER: So this was the one with the big charge that was placed?

MR SHAIK: That is right.

MR VISSER: Just tell us, seeing that I am helping you now to make a full disclosure, just tell us, how do you set the timing on a limpet mine?

MR SHAIK: Well, its got a timing device which has a fuse in it sort of, each fuse is a different colour. You can call it a gauge, it is a different colour.

MR VISSER: Made of ...

MR SHAIK: Of lead, and the device cuts through there, and each colour represents a different time.

MR VISSER: Yes, and you can set it from anything from about 20 minutes to about 800 hours, or something like that.

MR SHAIK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Well, then at least you have some idea then, all right. And you state that, this was set for after office hours, that is your answer to the Chairperson's question.

MR SHAIK: Well after office hours..

MR VISSER: All right. 21 at page 81, explosive device in the Anglo American, Anglo Vaal building in Marshalltown. What could have been the political intention here?

MR SHAIK: Let me just clarify that, it is actually the placing of an explosive device at the Anglo Vaal building.

MR VISSER: Not in the ...

MR SHAIK: Not in.

MR VISSER: Yes, all right. My question is what was the political objective here, other than attacking a civilian target?

MR SHAIK: The objective here, there was a major dispute at the time, labour dispute between the mines and mine workers and I could refer to further submissions by the ANC if one wants to, and one can have a look at it.

We supported worker struggles.

MR VISSER: All right, and the same would then presumably go for paragraph 22 as well?

MR SHAIK: Yes, the same would go for that too.

MR VISSER: Explain 23, as not being a civilian target in a sense. Perhaps I should first ask you. The Transvaal Medical Command in the Nedbank building in Nugget Street, Hillbrow, was that an SADF Medical Command?

MR SHAIK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: So, perhaps I am wrong if I talk about civilian target. Let's talk about a Red Cross target, if you will. Would this be similar let's say, to a Red Cross target because it is a Medical Command?

MR SHAIK: No, I wouldn't equate the two.

MR VISSER: All right, what would you say the difference is?

MR SHAIK: The one is humanitarian, it is broad sections of people, while the Medical Command is really there to support injured soldiers and the same medical officers, when one soldier is down, can pick up that same firearm and continue with combat.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think the Red Cross would be very happy with being equated to any military Medical Command.

MR VISSER: Yes, I shouldn't have asked that, yes, you are quite correct. You see, the point I am trying to make here is this, isn't it true that in terms of the Geneva protocol, medical personnel are identified as non legal targets in a war, or perhaps I am using the wrong words there as well, illegal targets, not permissible, impermissible targets?

MR SHAIK: I have no comment on that, I am not familiar with the Geneva protocol.

MR VISSER: Yes, but you also told this Committee that you received full instructions and that you went to the German Democratic Republic for training etc, and that everything you did, you did in line with the policies of the ANC.

Didn't anybody ever talk to you about medical targets, to say gosh, you know, it doesn't sound right to attack medical personnel?

MR SHAIK: Yes, of course there was always talk on what, we would say there was always political debate, political education. As I can recall yes, there were times when one speaks about these type of aspects. I am saying that I am not too familiar with that, I am not very aware of exactly what the position is there.

I have no comment on that.

MR VISSER: But doesn't one's common sense tell you that you don't attack medical personnel? Doesn't your common sense tell you that that is not a legitimate target?

MR SHAIK: My common sense tells me not to attack medical personnel, but a target like this, which houses not only medical personnel that were in and out of there, also other SADF members.

MR VISSER: I see. Was that really the reason why you targeted this place?

MR SHAIK: No, that wasn't the real reason, but I don't think you can separate the two.

MR VISSER: All right. The AECI offices, item 24, in the Carlton Centre?

MR SHAIK: Very much the same. It was to gain propaganda value, it was to psychologically support the workers' strike on at the time, between AECI and striking workers.

MR VISSER: Yes. The Southern Cross Fund, item 25, collecting money for the SADF troops? Was it a welfare organisation?

MR SHAIK: Exactly what you said, collecting money for SADF troops.

MR VISSER: Yes. 26 is rather an interesting one, I wonder what your explanation for that is going to be. This deals with an explosive device which was placed on the corner of President Street outside the Franwill building and you stated at page 81, an explosive device was placed on the corner of President Street, outside the Franwill building.

The next sentence reads the device was placed during massive public crime preventions by the SAP, where Police were placed on every corner in the city. The device was designed to demonstrate the ANC's ability to move despite the Police presence.

The device detonated late at night, and no injuries were sustained. What was the - I see what you say here, about what it was designed to demonstrate, but how do you bring that, how do you couple that to a crime prevention campaign. I am unclear about this?

MR SHAIK: You crime prevention in that day was anything from anti-apartheid protest to actual crime, everything was crime at that time. If it said anything against the government, it was crime.

So crime prevention here, must be placed in its context.

MR VISSER: I see. In the context of your interpretation?

MR SHAIK: In the context of what the facts speak for itself. That crime prevention operations at the time, to curtail the mass protest that were happening on streets, that we were talking about bringing the struggle into the white areas.

MR VISSER: Yes. In your new Exhibit B, paragraph 5, you indicated to this Committee did you not, that you first went to Swaziland after intimating to Mohamed Ismail that you wanted to become a member of MK, in 1982.

MR SHAIK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Where you med Rashid, that is Mr Aboobaker Ismail, and you had a discussion.

The matter then develops that you became one of a two man hit squad of MK, on behalf of the ANC. I want to ask you when did this happen, also in 1982, immediately?

MR SHAIK: Mr Chairperson, I object to the word hit squad.

MR VISSER: Well, what else is it?

MR SHAIK: It has different connectations.

MR VISSER: Oh, you didn't hit targets?

MR SHAIK: We were MK soldiers, an MK Unit, we were not hit squads.

MR VISSER: You didn't hit ...

MR SHAIK: It has different connectations in the political situation in South Africa.

MR VISSER: Well, I am just using language, I am not a politician.

CHAIRPERSON: I think usually the term, although it can be used in various context, but usually the term hit squad refers to a group of people who have the target of identified persons to assassinate.


CHAIRPERSON: Usually those persons being listed on a hit list, but I think let's avoid the use of it, let's refer to them as a unit.

MR VISSER: If it was taken that I was trying to make a political statement Mr Chairman, I think you know already that I don't do that. I withdraw that statement if it offends you Mr Shaik.

MR SHAIK: Thank you.

MR VISSER: When did you become, what do you want to call it now, what is this squad of yours now?

MR SHAIK: When did I become an MK operative?

MR VISSER: An MK operative?

MR SHAIK: Or a soldier.

MR VISSER: Yes, or a soldier, all right. When was that?

MR SHAIK: As I said in 1982, I was recruited.

MR VISSER: All right, and you are now the Commander of this MK solder squad?

MR SHAIK: No, MK is disbanded. I am no longer the Commander, MK is disbanded.

MR VISSER: In 1982, I am referring to.

MR SHAIK: In 1982, yes.

MR VISSER: I am sorry if I confuse you, I am talking about 1982. All right, you are the leader of the squad. The person who is the brother of Mr Ismail, Rashid, is your troop, soldier troop if I may put it that way.

MR SHAIK: He is a fellow cadre.

MR VISSER: Yes. What I want, why this introduction, let me explain to you, I want to know from you please, with that background, paragraph 8 says initially you were expected to discuss your operations, in the single, with your Commander Aboobaker Ismail, before you launched an attack.

Then you go to paragraph 9 and it suddenly becomes we. I don't' understand the differentiation. Was that intentional, do we have to read anything into that, what does that mean?

MR SHAIK: I agree with you. You know at times it is difficult to talk of I and we, given the nature of the statement, I totally agree with you.

Sometimes it was I and sometimes it was we.

MR VISSER: So we must read nothing into that?

MR SHAIK: No, you must read nothing into that.

MR VISSER: That is the short answer?


MR VISSER: Well, I am quite satisfied to accept that. What the question really is about is the period which you indicate with the word initially, I would like you to define more accurately, if you will. When did it start, when did that end? What was that initial period when you and I am using the royal you, were obliged first to clear your target selection with Mr Ismail, with Rashid. I am going to refer to him as Rashid for purposes of identification, otherwise I have to distinguish him from his brother every time, so I am referring to him as Rashid.

What was that period?

MR SHAIK: I will answer this to the best of my ability, as my memory serves me correctly.

I would think that it was until, I would like to talk about it in terms of after which operation, that is when I remember it more clearly. Could I refer to my notes.

MR VISSER: Yes, certainly, and if you can then place a date on the - if you then can couple that to a date ...

MR SHAIK: That wouldn't be possible sir, to give you exact date in the nature of work that we did, it will be difficult.

I will tell you around which time, after which target, that I could indicate.

MR VISSER: All right, first tell us what was the incident to which you want to couple that initial period, as the end of that initial period.

MR SHAIK: Yes, I am looking at volume 6 of my application, from page 74. I would think it would be more or less just after the first three or four incidents.

MR VISSER: Are you referring to page 77?

MR SHAIK: That would be page 76 and 77.

MR VISSER: 76 and 77, do you choose after the third or after the fourth, which is it now?

MR SHAIK: I am not exactly sure sir.

MR VISSER: Well, they are both it seems in 1983, June, October, so that gives a fair idea.


CHAIRPERSON: It seems that these incidents are not really in chronological order, because the one following the Warmbaths one, 10th of October, is the 28th of June, and then the one after that is July 1983, the synagogue one is also in 1983, without a month.

MR VISSER: So that doesn't really help us.

CHAIRPERSON: So it is not really in chronological order.

MR SHAIK: Can I just say something on the matter. See when we talk about initially, when I am using the word initially, in your mind you are only referring to operations, there were other things that I was doing, besides operations, which was receiving ammunition, explosives, bringing it into the country, understand?

There may have been a bit of courier work if I had to do, any MK work that was to be done, I would have done that, all in the course of what I am doing.

MR VISSER: I don't quite understand why you bring this up, because I am dealing with the issue of when you had to receive authorization for target selection, and when you were given the discretion to do so yourself, that is all I am referring to.

I want to know from you when you use the word initially, when did that initial period end?

MR SHAIK: All right, then I would say then it would end at around that time.

MR VISSER: At around the end of 1983, is that your guess?

MR SHAIK: Around that time, I would think, yes.

MR VISSER: All right, would you please indulge me. Let's run quickly through the items from page 76, and all I want you to do, is to indicate to the Committee alongside each of those items, whether it was you alone that committed the attack, or whether it was you and Ismail together, who perpetrated the attack.

I see that you have in some of the incidents, you have.

MR SHAIK: I have indicated.

MR VISSER: For example, we can take it, perhaps we can quickly run through it and stop me if I am wrong. In the first incident it was both you and Ismail. In the second incident it was both you and Ismail.

In the third incident it was both you and Ismail. In the fourth incident, similarly, it was both you and Ismail, also in the fifth and the sixth and the seventh, and please if your recollection now tells you differently, please stop me.

Also in the eighth, in the ninth, the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, now in the thirteenth incident, you said from this time onwards, for operational reasons, I worked alone. So to categorise your evidence into periods, you commenced operations in 1982, together with Ismail. From the end of 1983, perhaps the beginning of 1984, the both of you were given a discretion to select targets.

From 1985 we don't know what the month is, but from 1985, you operated on your own, and you only you, exercised a discretion about targets? Would that be a fair statement of the categorisation of your evidence?

MR SHAIK: Yes, that would be fair.

MR VISSER: Thank you. All right, and may we then accept that from item 13 onwards, they ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think my reading of it is that 13 was the two of them, because it says from this time onwards, for operational reasons, I worked alone.

MR SHAIK: That is correct sir. So from 14 onwards.

MR VISSER: 14 onwards, all right, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: If it is a convenient time, I am not stopping you now, but when it gets convenient, if we can stop for the tea adjournment.

MR VISSER: It is convenient right away Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, thank you. We will take the tea adjournment until eleven o'clock.



MR SHAIK: (still under oath)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, you may continue.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (cont) Yes, Mr Chairman, due to I think hopefully only my age, I have forgotten what the last question was, but I don't suppose it is all that important.

CHAIRPERSON: We were talking about - he said from paragraph 14 onwards, incident 14 onwards, he acted alone, and prior to that together with Mr M. Ismail.

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. May I refer you to page 3 of Exhibit B, paragraph 50.

That deals with the Roodepoort bomb as we have referred to it here. You told this Committee that you were the one that identified it as a legitimate one, being a building where Police were accommodated, not so?

MR SHAIK: I am just lost, I don't find it.

MR VISSER: I am sorry, page 3, paragraph 50, Exhibit B.

CHAIRPERSON: This is in your statement, Mr Shaik.

MR SHAIK: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Yes, not because it is all that important, but we picked it up in your third sentence you say, almost the entire second floor was occupied by the Police.

And then you went on to describe that you used two limpet mines and you placed them directly outside the door or the offices, did you intend to say that you actually placed it on the second floor?

MR SHAIK: No, I actually intended to say I placed it on a floor.

MR VISSER: On a floor, yes.

MR SHAIK: I think it was, it could have either been the second or the third, but I know it was flights of stairs up.

MR VISSER: All right, nothing turns on it, but the correct facts which appear from volume 6, page 21 to 22, appears that it was the third floor and there was a hole in the third floor and the blast ignited the material on the third floor, and the fire spread to the fourth floor as well.

In fact there is a photograph which, although it is a poor one, because it is a photocopy, but perhaps I should just point to that for the Committee. Mr Chairman, it is at page 24.


MR VISSER: I am sorry, I am referring to volume 6, page 24, and although it is a bad copy it seems that it was the third and the fourth floor, and then over the page, page 25, there is a hole in the floor, and if one reads the affidavit of the Captain Joubert, at page 21, his paragraph 7, he refers to the third and the fourth floor.

He refers to a crate somewhere, oh yes, it is at page 22, paragraph 8, he says in his investigation he found crates, 10 cm's deep in the concrete floor, on the third floor, yes, I was right, on the third floor. Nothing turns on it, I just mentions it because it seemed it was something out of tune.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you accept that it was on the third floor?

MR SHAIK: Yes, I would accept that.

MR VISSER: And according to all the statements, the explosion was on the 16th of August, that is the other technical little difference, not that it takes the matter any further.

would you explain to us, what precisely were the preparations that you made, why did you decide on limpet mines, the size limpet mines, just give us some idea of the relevant facts because I am going to suggest to you that the evidence is very sketchy, we don't really know.

MR SHAIK: For this particular incident?

MR VISSER: Well, on all the incidents, but let's stick to this one for the moment.

MR SHAIK: This particular one as I said, the floor was occupied by predominantly Policemen. The aim was to inflict maximum casualty. I used two limpet mines.

MR VISSER: Pardon?

MR SHAIK: I used two limpet mines. Like I say to inflict maximum casualty.

MR VISSER: All right, and that was it?

MR SHAIK: That is it.

MR VISSER: You put the limpet mines in your car, you drove there, and you went and placed them?

MR SHAIK: No, of course, I am sorry I thought you were asking me why I used limpet mines, yes?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Shaik, these limpet mines, were they the standard? We know there are differences between the mini limpet and the limpet, the one is bigger than the other, but with a limpet mine, could you, yourself, make a limpet mine more powerful by adding further explosives or whatever into it, or did they come in different sizes?

MR SHAIK: No, they were standard sizes, but there are things that you could do with a limpet mine to make them more powerful or more effective if you want to.

MR VISSER: Stop me if I am wrong, but one of the things is that you could fill the housing with objects like nails for example, if you wished to?

MR SHAIK: No, you couldn't fill the housing. It is enclosed, but you could put nails around the housing.

MR VISSER: Or nails around it, for more effective penetration of humans that might be in the area?


MR VISSER: Yes. Incidentally did you ever do that?

MR SHAIK: In this particular instance, I may have, I can't recall.

MR VISSER: And the purpose being to inflict as much as possible injury and death to the people around the explosion?

MR SHAIK: To the Police offices on the building, yes.

MR VISSER: Yes, you specifically said that you didn't target civilians, I heard that evidence.

The casualties in that particular instance, you see, I have just - you set out that it was again Exhibit B, page 3, paragraph 15, five Policemen and two civilians, and you say that you gathered from newspaper reports.

I have looked, and I am actually addressing the Committee now, through you, I have looked at the documentation which have been provided to us in volume 6, and I don't find a reference to the figures. I may have missed it.

MR POOE: Sorry, I was going to be of assistance and say that it appears, that perhaps there could be a reference at page 35 of volume 6.

MR VISSER: I am indebted to my learned friend, he is absolutely correct. At page 35, four SAP and two civilians whereas you said five SAP and two civilians.

Were there no deaths?

MR SHAIK: Not that I know of.

MR VISSER: That you know of, yes. It appears to be injuries, yes, indeed at page 35, yes.

I am not sure what this document is Mr Chairman, but we are quite happy to accept that this is the situation. Can I move on to the last item, I am sure you will be pleased to hear, that I am involved in, and that is at page 4, paragraph 20 of Exhibit B.

That deals with the Krugersdorp Magistrate's court. My Attorney has just reminded me that there is one aspect that I did not ask you with regard to the Roodepoort bomb, and that is this, what was Mr Ismail's part in that explosion, because you didn't tell us that?

MR SHAIK: Which Mr Ismail, Mohamed Ismail or Aboobaker?

MR VISSER: Well, I thought that we agreed that we will refer to Mr Aboobaker Ismail as Rashid and to his brother as Ismail.

MR SHAIK: Then in that case, Mr Ismail had no part in this one.

MR VISSER: He wasn't present?


MR VISSER: I see. Did he have part in the Krugersdorp Magistrate's court explosion?

MR SHAIK: Absolutely not.

MR VISSER: All right. Well I have asked you this before, there is nothing you want to add, you have told us before. What I want to take up with you here is that in terms of your reconnaissance, you were satisfied that with the intended planting of that bomb, or mine, it was a car bomb actually, the possibility of serious injury or injury to civilians would be reduced to a minimum, if I understood your evidence correctly?

Now, in regard to the Krugersdorp bomb, I am just looking for the passage where you set out the injuries, I believe it was in volume 6 ...

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 20.4 on Exhibit B, mentions that there were 20 injuries.

MR VISSER: Yes, but there is a list of names somewhere Mr Chairman, I am sorry I should have had it at my finger tips, there is a list of names, and my recollection is it originates from the applicant.

I may be entirely incorrect, I do hope that I will find it, because I need to ask some questions in that regard.

I know it exists, because I read it this morning, let me have a quick look here Mr Chairman, oh, here it is.

At page 19, it actually originates from Mr Aboobaker Ismail's application, page 19 of volume 6. Now this refers to the same incident, have you got that in front of you?


MR VISSER: And I am not certain where they obtained the information, but again I am not disputing the information.

At the bottom of that page 19 of volume 6, it starts off with Warrant Officer Simon Manymalala and Frans Mtlatlosi died. Those injured included, and then it goes on. This is slightly different from what you are saying, because in paragraph 20.4 you refer to a civilian who died as well.

Now, again that would be in terms of as you stated, information which you gathered from newspaper reports, I take it?

MR SHAIK: That is right.

MR VISSER: Yes, so it may well be according to this list, and we haven't had time to check it of course, it may be that there wasn't a civilian killed? I am saying this in your favour, but in spite of your reconnaissance and in spite of your intentions to avoid civilian casualties, it seems that every single casualty injured, was a civilian and there are the names and the addresses and it looks like approximately 20. How do you account for that?

MR SHAIK: I regret that it happened. I explain that ...

MR VISSER: Bad planning?

MR SHAIK: That wasn't the objective. I think it was more malfunction of the devices used.

MR VISSER: Yes. You actually make the use of two devices sound like a justification. You actually make it sound as if it is something which you did in order to avoid loss of life. Which it wasn't was it?

MR SHAIK: It was, yes, it was.

MR VISSER: You knew, you knew, and you said so, that at least Police personnel would be attracted to the first explosion immediately. They would be assisting civilians to get out of the area, and that is what you are using to actually promote it as a laudable thing to use a small first explosion and thereafter use the big explosion, to kill as many of the Policemen as possible. Am I correct?

MR SHAIK: Well, in your interpretation of matters, as I said if the first device went off, from previous experience and observation, we know that the Police could have cordoned and cleared the area of many civilians, minutes later, when there were only Policemen in the vicinity, the second explosion would have gone off.


MR SHAIK: And that was the objective of the mission. It was not to aim at the civilians.

MR VISSER: I put it to Mr Ismail, and I am putting it to you, that that was a callous way of running a war as a soldier. Merely going out from the point of view of killing the enemy, and as many of them as possible, but you would disagree with that in your way of thinking?

MR SHAIK: Naturally.

MR VISSER: Yes. Mr Chairman, would you allow me a moment please.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Just in conclusion, for as far as it may be of interest to the Committee, I just through you if you don't mind, Mr Shaik, I just want to put to you that in the Roodepoort explosion, the person for whom I appear, Mr Moroke, who was a Constable in the South African Police at the time, was working in an office there, where the explosion took place, and he was seriously injured in his face and in his hands.

He was connected to the administrative staff of the South African Police at the time. I don't suppose you can make any comment about that?

MR SHAIK: I regret that he sustained these injuries if he did.

MR VISSER: And in the Krugersdorp case, the person for whom we act is Mr Hermas Niewoudt and he was a Warrant Officer in the South African Police, in Social Services in Krugersdorp. He was injured as well in the blast in the motor car bomb blast in Krugersdorp. I just wanted to place that on record, through you if you don't mind.

Mr Chairman, it doesn't appear as presently advised, that there are any further questions, which we have at the present time, thank you Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, do you have any questions?

MR STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, just a few questions if you don't mind, if you will indulge me. Mr Shaik, if we can go to Exhibit B, page 4, paragraph 20.4, do you have it in front of you?

MR SHAIK: Yes, I do.

MR STEENKAMP: The middle of the paragraph, the State tried and found Hein Grösskopf guilty through the media, for this bombing. Can you explain to me how that came about?

MR SHAIK: Well, I just thought I would make mention of it, because obviously it has a bearing on many other actions. We found that many times besides my operations, many operations people were wrongly blamed, people were wrongly jailed at times.

I thought I would mention that because in this instance after it happened, well documented, it is well known that Grösskopf was sort of tried in the media, but that is how it happened. I have no connection to him, I have never met him, I have never heard of him before this happened.

CHAIRPERSON: So you mean he was blamed by the media, he wasn't found guilty by a court as a result of what the media said?

MR SHAIK: Yes, that is what I mean. I meant trial by media.

CHAIRPERSON: He was blamed by the media, yes.

MR STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman. Then if we can go to your application, Mr Shaik. Look at your application and specifically paragraph 32, on page 83.

The last sentence of paragraph 32, I will read it to you, I understood that the weapons were to be used in communities under attack by the apartheid State, and in surrogate, Inkatha Freedom Party, do you see that?

MR SHAIK: Yes sir.

MR STEENKAMP: Maybe I have misunderstood the evidence so far, but nowhere in any of the ANC submissions or the evidence of Mr Rashid or yourself, was there any mention made of the surrogate Inkatha Freedom Party, were they also targets of MK or was this part of ANC policy? Can you explain that to us?

MR SHAIK: No, I wouldn't say that it was part of the ANC policy, as per se. I would say that in that instance I perceived that the Self Defence Units given the situation that existed in townships at the time, were using those weapons to defend themselves against Inkatha led or Inkatha orientated people.

MR STEENKAMP: Did you lodge any attacks as far as you know, against any Inkatha Freedom Party structures or people or councillors, as far as you know?

MR SHAIK: Sorry, can you ask me that again?

MR STEENKAMP: Do you know of any actions or any attacks that was launched against any Inkatha Freedom Party members or councillors?

MR SHAIK: No, absolutely not.

MR STEENKAMP: You said in the beginning, and please correct me if I am wrong, that you were very well briefed, and fully brief, regularly, on ANC policy, isn't that correct?

MR SHAIK: What I said is that there was always ongoing discussions regarding ANC policy. I didn't say I was very well and very regularly briefed. We are saying whenever the occasion warranted, whenever we made contact, obviously we wouldn't talk about our social lives.

MR STEENKAMP: Just in closure, do I understand the reason why you have included the surrogate Inkatha Freedom Party here, is because at this stage they were perceived as collaborators of the apartheid State as it then existed?

MR SHAIK: Yes, that is so.

MR STEENKAMP: But then can you explain to me is it that nowhere, and please help me if I am wrong, nowhere is any mention made of this in any ANC official policy documents before the Committee?

MR SHAIK: I have no comment.

MR POOE: I don't know whether it is appropriate for me to interrupt Mr Steenkamp, but how is this witness supposed to answer for submissions put together by the ANC, without having laid a basis first, whether he had any input in the putting together of those submissions or any contribution whatsoever.

And besides, may we again add that those matters have not been canvassed specifically because they are not being inquired at this present stage and if the occasion occurs that they ought to be inquired into, they will no doubt be dealt with.

CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Steenkamp, it is a difficult question for Mr Shaik to answer for the reasons put forward by Mr Pooe.

We don't know how full the ANC submissions are that are being put forward to us here, and he wasn't involved in the drawing of it. He stated his own view with regard to the IFP.

MR STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman. So you would prefer to stick, you still would prefer to stick to this statement you made in your application, this is still correct as far as you are concerned, as far as you perceived?

MR SHAIK: That is what I perceived.

MR STEENKAMP: And then can you maybe give us some information who was the main suppliers of arms and ammunitions, bomb, explosions, limpet mines to your section, where did you get your weapons from?

MR SHAIK: I got it from my Commander.

MR STEENKAMP: Where did he get it from, do you know?

MR SHAIK: I have no idea.

MR STEENKAMP: You don't have any idea who supplied MK at any stage with weapons, except your own Commander? You said you used to deal with weapons, transport of weapons, ammunition. Can you tell us where those weapons came from?

MR SHAIK: I can't tell you directly who the source was, I wouldn't know.

MR STEENKAMP: Can't you give us any indication?

MR SHAIK: No, I am sorry, I can't.

MR STEENKAMP: Didn't you ever ask anybody where do these weapons come from, because according to some of the source material, some of the weapons were identified as so-called Eastern Block weapons?

MR SHAIK: Yes, I mean naturally they were Eastern Block weapons, but I never took it upon myself to ask exactly who gives us what.

MR POOE: Again, if I may just interrupt here, and I do so reluctantly, Mr Aboobaker Ismail testified, and surely that question should more specifically have been put to him.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we have finished with that as far as this witness is concerned, he says he doesn't know where they come from.

MR STEENKAMP: As you wish Mr Chairman. Can you and I don't want to ask you to repeat yourself, just in short maybe explanation, explain to me how do you see the difference between a guerilla attack and that of an attack of a terrorist? How did you see yourself and can you give me a distinction or explanation what the difference is?

MR SHAIK: Firstly I would say that terrorism, its main objective is to aim at civilians. A guerilla attack on the other hand, is not aimed primarily at civilians.

That is the distinction.

MR STEENKAMP: And the weapons used, is it the same, is there any other difference or is that the only difference?

MR SHAIK: Well, weapons used, of course. One cannot compare us and compare our weapons to a conventional Army or conventional soldiers.

They have different weapons, they use weapons for different purposes. Our purposes are different. We require different weaponry sometimes.

MR STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Steenkamp.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, before my learned friend, or perhaps I should wait - actually Mr Chairman, I must apologise here, I forgot, I came across this last night, when I was reading through the papers, and as to the status and the origin of papers, I think I owe you an explanation as to some of the pages which I see which were bound in your volume 6, and I refer specifically for purposes of example, to volume 6, page 63.

Those are documents, some longer than others, 63, 64 are examples of this, and you might have wondered where this comes from. It gives summaries in regard to what it states as "terreur dade, gebied RSA, maand, jaar", nature of incident, TD number, that means terrorist diary, these documents were in fact drawn Mr Chairman, by myself, for the Harms Commission.

I can, I thought I need to inform you of that. It is true that the information here was checked by myself, but certainly I can't say that the information that are contained in this and similar of these documents, contained in this volume, are absolutely one hundred percent correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that is also evident from yesterday when we got the figure of two injuries in the Church Street bombing.

MR VISSER: But I plead not guilty to that document, that wasn't mine.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I don't think the Committee is going to accept these documents as being completely accurate unless there is satisfactory proof that it is in fact so.

MR VISSER: And I hope you won't call me as a witness.


MR POOE: Chairperson, you may not call him, but on our side, we may just want to have Mr Visser as a witness.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Pooe, do you have any re-examination?

MR POOE: I don't have any, thank you.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sibanyoni, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR SIBANYONI: As the Committee pleases, Mr Chairman, yes just a few questions. Mr Shaik, you have answered the question that you don't know the origin of the weapons, but I just want to put this to you.

Is it not that in terms of your training, in terms of the military combat work which is called MCW, you wouldn't know more than you are required to know, in other words somebody will deliver to you the weapons, but you wouldn't know where that person got hold of the weapons, etc, etc.

MR SHAIK: Absolutely sir.

MR SIBANYONI: Now, in your statement for example, on page 4 when you were telling us about the Krugersdorp Magistrate's court event of the 16th of March 1988, which should be 1987, you said the media identified Grösskopf as the person that was responsible.

Would you say it is the same mistake which was done as in the case of the incident of the 17th of August, the Soweto SAP, on page 3, where we are told that a certain Mbane Johannes Masibela was killed in a skirmish with the Police, was he also wrongly identified as a person who was involved in that incident?

MR SHAIK: Yes sir, if the Police are claiming that that person was, then obviously they are very wrong. In the case of Grösskopf, obviously they are wrong.

MR SIBANYONI: Now, I have noticed that in your evidence wherever an operation didn't go well, you attribute that to malfunctioning of the limpet mines, or the charges, etc, but you remember yesterday, Mr Visser put it to Mr Ismail, that you people were insufficiently trained. What is your comment about that?

MR SHAIK: It is a difficult situation sir. I would think we were well trained, it is subjective, I would think we were well trained. I think the record speaks for itself.

I do not want to sound insensitive, but really the capacity what we had, and if we were not well trained, it would have been a very gloomy situation, to ghastly to contemplate.

MR SIBANYONI: Yes, we are told that these weapons were of highly technical nature. You were trained in such a way that you will be in a position to handle them properly?

MR SHAIK: Yes, it was all about having to handle what you could, according to the time.

If you reached a certain stage, you were given a certain kind of weapons, yes, there was adequate training for it.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Motata?

MR MOTATA: No questions, Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Dr Tsotsi?

DR TSOTSI: Just one question. Mr Shaik, in your evidence in chief, you singled out page 84 of your statement of your application, volume 6, as being a correct record.

What about the rest of the statement?

MR SHAIK: Yes, I would say the ...

DR TSOTSI: The whole of the statement?

MR SHAIK: The whole of the statement, yes sir.

DR TSOTSI: That is all, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Judge Pillay?

JUDGE PILLAY: I have no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Shaik, did you get remunerated for your operations or rewarded in any way for performing operations?

MR SHAIK: No sir, I was not a paid soldier.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you manage to pay for your day to day expenses during that whole period that you were operational?

MR SHAIK: Well, I am sorry if I misunderstood your question the first time. What I am saying is ...

CHAIRPERSON: The first question I meant to indicate in the first question was, were you paid at all for each, for performing each individual operation?

MR SHAIK: No, no, we were not paid to do operations. Yes, we received very meagre allowances. I will give you an indication like maybe for petrol expenses, we would get something, very little things, maybe something like R200-00 a month at the time.

Many a time we had to foot the bill ourselves and one had to be as economic as possible in those situations.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you during that period that you have described, a full time cadre, full time soldier?

MR SHAIK: Yes, full time sir.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't have a civilian job or anything of that nature?

MR SHAIK: Oh, yes, at times I was employed, and it was within your day to day life that you had to do other things.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't have any, you weren't pursuing another career, let me put it that way?

MR SHAIK: I don't think the situation allowed us to.

CHAIRPERSON: And where did you actually receive your training?

MR SHAIK: Which training sir?

CHAIRPERSON: In the use of explosives?

MR SHAIK: Well, in neighbouring countries, initially in Swaziland, Botswana and then as I indicated, at a later stage, I went to what was then the German Democratic Republic.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Pooe, do you have any matters arising out of questions that have been put by the Committee members?

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR POOE: Just one matter. Just in response to, just one question perhaps to clarify this, the question of the Chairperson.

Mr Shaik, other than the small allowance that you mentioned, did you receive any kind of benefit for your participation and contribution?

MR SHAIK: No sir, nothing else.

MR POOE: Did you expect any?

MR SHAIK: No sir.

MR POOE: Thank you, no further questions sir.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van den Berg, do you have any questions arising out of questions put by the Committee?

MR VAN DEN BERG: None, Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you have any questions arising?

MR VISSER: No, thank you Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp?

MR STEENKAMP: No Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Shaik, you may stand down.


MR SHAIK: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I suppose it is for me to say something, we haven't been able to come to any conclusions, it is going to need some time, and I suggest we should perhaps ...

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed with the next witness.

MR VISSER: Yes, and let this stand down till tomorrow.


MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.


MR POOE: Could you give me two minutes, just to read ...

CHAIRPERSON: Do you want a short adjournment?

MR POOE: Maybe a short adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: We will just take a short adjournment to allow Mr Pooe to arrange his presentation.



CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Pooe, are you now in a position to proceed?

MR POOE: Indeed I am Chairperson.


MR POOE: We thought that we should finalise this part, Dolphin, before we move on to the next incident, which in all likelihood will be the Church Street incident.

And to that end, I would like to call Mr Mohamed Abdula Ismail, who is also an applicant.

You have before you, a two page document which is the brief statement from which Mr Ismail will be testifying.



EXAMINATION BY MR POOE: You have applied for amnesty to this Committee and your application is set out in volume 6, and you will see volume 6 in front of you.

Turn to page 67 of that bundle and this is the application of Ismail, Mohamed Abdula, and that person is you, is that not so?

MR ISMAIL: That is right.

MR POOE: You set out at page 68 of that document, on page 68 onwards, page 69 and page 70, the incidents in respect of which you are applying for amnesty, is that correct? Mr Ismail, perhaps you can push the red button just so that we have the microphone on.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you can just repeat your last answer, because I don't think it was recorded.

MR ISMAIL: Yes, I am.

MR POOE: You confirm to the Committee that these are the incidents in respect of which you are applying?

MR ISMAIL: That is correct.

MR POOE: You set out at page 71, under paragraph 10(a), your political objective which you sought to achieve through the acts you committed, do you confirm that?


MR POOE: You also set out at paragraph 10(b) your justification for the acts, and under that you deal with the question of motive, and on page 72, the political context within which you committed the acts, is that correct?

MR ISMAIL: That is correct.

MR POOE: Do you confirm that that is the basis on which you are coming to the Committee for amnesty?

MR ISMAIL: That is right.

MR POOE: Do you accordingly confirm those pages and other pages, of your affidavit, of your application, up to page 74?

MR ISMAIL: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Pooe, the copy that I have, doesn't seem to be attested to, do you know whether the original - not signed, yes? Do you know whether the original was signed before a Commissioner?

MR ISMAIL: To what I know, the assistant of Mr Brian Curran came to me and I gave him a signed copy thereof. I don't know what has happened, but ...

CHAIRPERSON: So you in fact signed a copy of the application.

MR ISMAIL: Yes. One of Mr Brian Curran's assistants took the copy from me.


MR POOE: Do you in any event confirm that this is your application?

MR ISMAIL: That is right.

MR POOE: You have had prepared, you have a short statement and let's just get an understanding Mr Ismail, that although you list several incidents in your application for amnesty, the matter really in which you were involved in and which is presently before this Committee, is the matter relating to the Ciskei Consultate, is that not so?

MR ISMAIL: That is so.

MR POOE: And you will the describe when the time comes, your involvement in that particular matter, is that not so?


MR POOE: As far as the other matters are concerned, those are matters you will elaborate on at a later stage if and when you are called upon?

MR ISMAIL: If called upon, yes sir.

MR POOE: Perhaps you can then very slowly, in order to allow the Committee to take it in, take the Committee through your statement.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you start Mr Ismail, we will just for record purposes, refer to the statement as Exhibit D.

MR POOE: You can start from 1 - I was born ...

MR ISMAIL: I was born on the 24th of November 1953, the third of six children. I grew up in Vrededorp. (Indistinct) was heightened by the 1960's events like (indistinct), reading newspaper, listening to the radio, laws like the group areas act, inferior education, influx control influenced by political consciousness as well.

Despite the fact that I came from a (indistinct) background, the injustice that I saw around me on a daily basis, made me to take part in the struggle against injustice.

I saw the ANC as the only popular movement which had grassroots support and thus became interested in it. During the 1970's I got involved in the distribution of pamphlets and literature on behalf of the Transvaal Indian Congress.

During July 1976 my brother, Aboobaker Ismail Rashid, left the country and I continued with my political activities.

On around October 1981, Rashid contacted me from Swaziland to visit him. When I saw him, we spoke generally and he advised me that he was with MK and had undergone military training. It was the first time that I had seen him and spoken to him in more than five years.

After staying in Swaziland for two to three days, I returned home. During 1982 I had intermittent contact with Rashid. During that time Rashid was based in Mozambique and at times when he was in Swaziland, he would telephone me.

During the course of my political activities, I was contacted by Mohamed (indistinct) Shaik, whom I had known for many years, and we had discussed Rashid's involvement in MK.

He indicated to me that he would be interested in joining MK, we therefore went to see Rashid in Swaziland. As a result of our visit to Rashid, we received training particularly in the use of limpet mines. We were constituted by Rashid as a unit known as Dolphin.

The only members in the Unit was Shaik and I. Shaik was the Commander. Initially we were instructed to attack certain specific targets. At a later stage we were given a mandate to select targets at our own discretion, provided that these fell within the guidelines given to us, and in accordance with the ANC policy avoiding civilians.

MR POOE: Continue on page 2, paragraph 10.

MR ISMAIL: Before deciding on any attack, on a target, we would do some reconnaissance. On the basis of the reconnaissance, we would decide whether the attack was appropriate and would be carried out safely.

The material used in the attacks were ferried into the country via DLD, attached to a motor vehicle which was purchased with money given to us by the ANC, through Rashid.

During the commission of all the acts set out in my amnesty application, pages 2 to 4, of the application, Rashid was my Commander. At all times I acted under his command and utilised material supplied by him.

Even where we acted in terms of a broad mandate given to us by Rashid, we continued to report to him on each operation we undertook, at all times this carried his approval.

The details of the actions in which I was involved are as mentioned previously, as set out in my application. I am prepared to answer any questions on the incidents.

I wish however, to supplement the paragraph dealing with the attack on the Ciskei Consultate. The Ciskei Consultate was chosen as a target because it represented the (indistinct), the ANC led campaigns to discredit the homelands at the time. There also existed intense repression in the homelands at the time.

On this basis we considered the Ciskei Consultate was a legitimate target. Reconnaissance on the target revealed that all the offices on the floor were vacated at the latest by 7.30, cleaning staff only became active on the floor later.

I was not involved in placing of the device of explosion in the Consultate. This was done by Shaik on his own. However, as I was involved in the reconnaissance and target, I accept that to a certain extent I was responsible.

I regret the injuries caused to innocent civilians in the course of the struggle, I ensure that that was not the target of the operations and all the acts committed by me in the furtherance of the armed struggle for justice and democracy in South Africa.

I took steps to safeguard civilians and launching attacks as far as possible, after hours when buildings were deserted, or no more civilians present.

MR POOE: The incident before the Committee now, and that is the Ciskei Consultate incident, you explain that your involvement was in doing the reconnaissance?

MR ISMAIL: Reconnaissance with Shaik.

MR POOE: Did you then agree with your co-operative, Igbal Shaik that that was a legitimate target?

MR ISMAIL: Yes, that is right.

MR POOE: And it was then left up to your co-operative, Igbal Shaik to then carry out the operation to its conclusion?

MR ISMAIL: Yes, he agreed he was to carry out the attack on his own, and I agreed to that.

MR POOE: Yes, what did this particular operation achieve the purpose which you set out to achieve?

MR ISMAIL: To cause some (indistinct) effect on the enemy, the Ciskei Consulate and also to politicise the general message, I think that was the message ...

MR POOE: Yes. For this operation and others which you have not described in this sort of detail now, were you in any way compensated by your Commander or the ANC or the MK or whoever?


MR POOE: You weren't expecting such compensation either?

MR ISMAIL: No, we didn't receive any compensation, no compensation.

MR POOE: Yes. And you seek amnesty for this particular act at this stage?

MR ISMAIL: All of the acts which are in my amnesty application.

MR POOE: Yes, and all other acts, yes. If you are asked further questions, you will elaborate on this?


MR POOE: And on others?


MR POOE: Thank you Chairperson, I don't have further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Pooe. Mr Van den Berg, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Just one question Mr Chairman. There was evidence earlier this morning by Mr Shaik to the effect that at a certain stage, you no longer were a member of the Unit known as Dolphin. Could you just elaborate on that please?

MR ISMAIL: I worked with Shaik till about 1985 and then he felt that he could manage on his own, and that I had other - above board political activities and things, and he would go along himself. I then totally dissociated as Dolphin, but I did not take part in any activities after that, 1985, after the 13 incidents which were mentioned.

MR VAN DEN BERG: That is the only question I have, thank you Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Van den Berg. Mr Visser, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Ismail, please confirm for me you are not as matters stand, applying for amnesty in regard to either the Krugersdorp Magistrate's court bombing or the Johannesburg, I am sorry the Roodepoort Police station bomb, you are not applying for amnesty?

MR ISMAIL: Yes, I am not applying for amnesty. I was not there and I had nothing to do with that.

MR VISSER: Well, then no doubt you will be disappointed to know that I have no further questions for you.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Mr Steenkamp, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

MR STEENKAMP: Just one question. Sorry, you said after 1985, you were not involved, your operations basically seized in 1985?

MR ISMAIL: Yes, correct.

MR STEENKAMP: Just look at page 70 of your application, paragraph 14. It says during 1985 I was sent to military training in the GDR.

MR ISMAIL: It is a correction, it was 1986.

MR STEENKAMP: Was that 1986, okay.

MR ISMAIL: I think the fact we are referring to is sabotage attacks, up to the stage of 1985, and the military training I went to, was in November 1986.

MR STEENKAMP: Was that your last ...


MR STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Pooe, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR POOE: Perhaps just one question to clear up whatever ambiguity there might be in the light of Mr Steenkamp's question.

Mr Ismail, after 1985, do you have a recollection of when in 1985 you carried out your last operation, if you don't, you don't.

MR ISMAIL: If we have the date when the last occurrence was, it should be after that. I would say it could be the middle of 1985, exactly I can't ...

MR POOE: Yes. After you had been for military training in the GDR, did you carry out any other operations?

MR ISMAIL: No, no operations.

MR POOE: You did not? Thank you Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sibanyoni, do you have any questions?

MR SIBANYONI: Just one question Mr Chairperson. Mr Ismail, if you don't know, it doesn't matter, I just want to find out do you know why your Unit was named as Dolphin, because some Units were called Solomon Mahlango Unit, others Ntabala Unit, why was this specific one called Dolphin?

MR ISMAIL: It was a name chosen by Rashid, our Commander and he - we were debating on a name and he suggested the name Dolphin. (Indistinct), one of the ANC people was killed, was something also to do with Dolphin and to that regard, he suggested the name Dolphin and we went by that.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Motata, any questions?

ADV MOTATA: I've got none, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Judge Pillay?


CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I just want to confirm Mr Ismail, you say that in all the operations that you were involved in together with Mr Shaik, your function was to assist in the recce work, doing the reconnoitring of the target, prior to the actual placing of the limpet mine or whatever?

MR ISMAIL: In the other incidents that are mentioned in my application, I was involved with the (indistinct) and placing of the bomb, directly or indirectly.

But in a normal case one person would keep a watch and one person would place the explosives. So in more cases, he would do the bomb and I would keep the watch with a pistol.

I was present in all the other incidents where the bombs were placed, for which I apply for amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that when you say when you stopped working with Mr Shaik, plus minus mid 1985, you then continued what you termed as above board political activities. What were those?

MR ISMAIL: Like Transvaal Union Congress and I was wanted on both sides, so people said you have disappeared and I was lacking on both, but above board work, like when the UDF came about, and I was involved with UDF as well.

So not to expose myself either way, I had to do either and I chose at that time to assist the UDF.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Pooe, do you have any questions arising out of questions that were put by the panel?

MR POOE: No, I don't have.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van den Berg?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Also not Mr Chairman.



MR VISSER: I don't think I am authorised to ask questions from this witness Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp?

MR STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Ismail, you may stand down.


CHAIRPERSON: Are you in a position to proceed Mr Pooe, I think this witness might have taken quicker than you expected?

MR POOE: Chairperson, no in fact he took a little bit longer than we expected Chairperson. We are ready to proceed and the next applicant will be taken through his paces so to speak, by my colleague, Mr Modise and that would be in respect of the Church Street incident, the SAAF Headquarters, Church Street incident.


MR POOE: And Voortrekker and Wits Command.

CHAIRPERSON: Who will be the witness?

MR POOE: Mr Modise will inform us.


MR MODISE: The next witness will be Johannes Molefe.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Molefe, what language will you be testifying in?



JOHANNES MNISI: (sworn states)

MR MODISE: Mr Chairman, before he does, my device is not complete, so I would request the logistics persons to be of assistance please.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Molefe, I think you might need to put on the earphones, there are some in front of you there, and you will have to turn it into the correct channel to get the interpretation into Zulu.

If we can just wait a while, I see people are still getting headphones. I think we can now continue Mr Modise.

EXAMINATION BY MR MODISE: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Chairperson, unfortunately we only have two copies of the statement, it needed a lot of editing, so we just did not have the time to have it reworked, so it is only the two of us who would be having the statement, it that is okay with yourselves?

CHAIRPERSON: I think, will it take long to get copies made or don't you want to hand in this unedited statement?

MR MODISE: The problem is that it was not done here, it was done elsewhere.

CHAIRPERSON: It is on the computer. I think then they can make photocopies I am sure, but perhaps at this stage, if you could - the witness could read it into the record and then, if you could arrange to have copies made for the members of the panel and the legal representatives at a subsequent stage, would that be possible Mr Modise?

MR MODISE: I think so, I am sure it can be arranged. The witness is not going to read his statement. We are going to go through the interpreter, he is not going to read it.

CHAIRPERSON: I think then you can continue.

MR MODISE: Can I continue sir?


MR MODISE: Okay, Mr Mnisi, in your application your names are Johannes Molefe, is this your real name?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: Which one is your real name and which one was your MK name?

MR MNISI: My real name is Johannes Mnisi, my MK name is Victor Molefe.

MR MODISE: I think you have seen your, I am referring to volume 3 of the bundle. Page 25 of the bundle, volume 3, there is a signature there. Whose signature is that?

MR MNISI: It is myself.

MR MODISE: Which name have you used as a signature?

MR MNISI: I have used Johannes Mnisi.

MR MODISE: Let's now turn to your statement. We have agreed that we will take it paragraph by paragraph, is that correct Mr Mnisi?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: Can we then start with paragraph 1.

MR MNISI: Firstly, my name is Johannes Mnisi, I was born in 1952, on the 23rd of June in Mamelodi, in Pretoria.

I started to know about the struggle when I was still young, because of my parents. They were members of the ANC and in 1968, there was a conflict between my parents and so they parted.

Not the kind of parting that led to a divorce, but they just separated.

MR MODISE: Proceed please.

MR MNISI: In 1968 I was doing standard 6. We had domestic problems and I went to stay with my grandmum and that is when I left school.

MR MODISE: When did you become politically active Mr Mnisi?

MR MNISI: I joined politics in 1976.

MR MODISE: Now go to paragraph 2 of your statement. When did your elder brother leave the country?

MR MNISI: My elder brother skipped the country in 1976 and he was joined by my younger brother who skipped the country in 1977 and we too, followed, that was in 1979.

That was myself, my wife and my children and my brother with his family as well, and we went to Mozambique.

MR MODISE: Let's go to paragraph 3 of the statement, when did you join the ANC?

MR MNISI: I joined the ANC in 1979 and in 1980, I went to Angola where I underwent my general training in that very same year, still in Angola I went to Gashito where I went for a specialised training in military engineering.

MR MODISE: You referred to specialised, that you specialised in military engineering. Can you explain a bit what that means, what did the training involve?

MR MNISI: This means that one should understand what equipment one is going to use, how to go about one's duties because we were using explosives, because if one was not careful enough, the explosives would be dangerous to oneself as well.

MR MODISE: And in 1985 you went to Moscow?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: What were you going to do in Moscow?

MR MNISI: I went to Moscow to specialise in plans for military operations.

MR MODISE: Let's now go to paragraph 4 of your statement. MR MNISI: In 1980 I became a member of the Special Corps that was commanded by Joe Slovo and Aboobaker Ismail and (indistinct).

MR MODISE: So you became part of a smaller unit under smaller operations?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct. I used to command smaller units, the ones that were sent to infiltrate the country and other operations as well.

People for example who used to attack power stations.

MR MODISE: Okay, let's go to paragraph 5. You have applied for amnesty is that correct?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: And your amnesty application, in this statement you do not deal with acts for which you have applied for amnesty, because some of them are not the subject of this hearings, is this correct?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: However, your amnesty application is set out in pages 21 to 23 of the bundle, do you want to confirm this, that this is your amnesty application?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: Pages 20 to 25 of volume 3 of the bundle, do you have it Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: No, I don't have volume 3 sir, just forget about me for the moment. I think it is in volume - I see you are referring to volume 3, are you, at page 20?

MR MODISE: Page 20 to 25.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

MR MODISE: Mr Mnisi, let's now go to paragraph 6 of your statement. Paragraph 6 deals with the attack on Voortrekkerhoogte.

You became part of the unit which attacked Voortrekker military base, is that correct?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Modise, your microphone was off, if you could just repeat that question for record purposes?

MR MODISE: Mr Mnisi, on the 12th of August 1981 you became part of the unit which attacked Voortrekkerhoogte Military Base, is that correct?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: Can you just tell us who commanded the unit and who were the other people who were involved?

MR MNISI: Banni Mulukwani commanded the unit, he is now deceased. And we had members such as Johnny, he is also deceased, Sidney, he is also deceased and myself and Philemon, he is also deceased.

MR MODISE: Can you go to paragraph 7 of the statement. Were you initially supposed to have been part of this Voortrekkerhoogte operation?

MR MNISI: No, I was not supposed to be part of this unit.

MR MODISE: Can you explain why?

MR MNISI: Because at the time when preparations were made for this operation, I was in the country for another purpose, for the power stations.

MR MODISE: Just to clarify it, you say at the time when the Voortrekkerhoogte operation was being planned, you were in the country on a mission to blow power stations, is that correct?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: Okay, can you proceed. How then did you get involved, how did it become that you became part of the unit that attacked Voortrekkerhoogte?

MR MNISI: After the power station operations on returning back, I was then told that I was supposed to join the unit that was to go to Voortrekkerhoogte and therefore I had to come back.

Joe Slovo approached me about this, and Aboobaker Ismail. These are the people under whose command I were. Aboobaker, myself and Johnny and Sidney Sebepi and Vix, we then went to Swaziland and Banni Mulukwani was by then here in South Africa at the safe base.

MR MODISE: Okay, where was comrade Sidney Sebepi?

MR MNISI: Sidney Sebepi went to Mozambique, to Swaziland with him from Mozambique and we then came to South Africa.

MR MODISE: Who did you join up with in South Africa?

MR MNISI: It was Philemon, he was one of our drivers. He used to assist us with accommodation, safe accommodation of the comrades, and he also transported us.

He collected us at the South African border.

MR MODISE: Okay, let 's go to paragraph 11 of the statement. You then went to Pretoria, is that correct?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: Then you headed for Mamelodi?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: And then can you proceed, tell us more about that.

MR MNISI: From the border, we went to Mamelodi, myself, Vips, Johnny and Philemon and we arrived on the very same day and we did not go, proceed to look for another comrade and the following morning, as we were just about to go, myself and Philemon, to go and look for Banni, we left three comrades in Mamelodi and we met Banni and explained to him that we have left other comrades in Mamelodi, we had just come to check on him.

And later we picked them up and we went to Rasmere where the base had been organised, that is where we met Banni.

MR MODISE: Let's go to 13 Mr Mnisi. What happened when you arrived at Rasmere?

MR MNISI: On arrival at Rasmere, we met Banni and he briefed us all. I had already been briefed. Some people were also briefed, but they did not know about the whereabouts or where to find Banni.

And Banni then indicated to us what job we were supposed to carry out. And it was indicated that those who were charged with carrying out the reconnaissance, had carried out their duty and now we had to carry it out.

That very same day, we could not work because there was a funeral of the late Joe Qabi who died in Harare.

Joe Qabi was a member of the National Executive of the ANC, he was also chief representative of the ANC in Harare and he was killed in Harare. He was actually to be buried that very same day and therefore the mission was postponed until the following day.

MR MODISE: Okay. Can we go to 14 now?

MR MNISI: The following day we took our material and we were supposed to carry out the operation at round about half past nine, quarter to ten, but there were disturbances where we were supposed to move the material from the base because at the time you see, Rasmere is such that the Police station from the safe house, is less than a kilometre away and our firing point was about 500 metres away from the base.

Lodium between Rasmere and Lodium was supposed to be our firing point, and on leaving the base with our material, we were disturbed by the Police and this is the route that they used to take to work.

The Police came across us and he found us with one missile and he too, did not know what it was. He asked us where we were taking these pipes too and we told him that we had stolen them from Rasmere, we were taking them to Atteridgeville because Atteridgeville is not far from Rasmere.

He enquired as to whether we knew that we would be arrested about, for being found in possession of stolen property. We just gave him R20-00 and he let us go.

One missile is very heavy, I cannot carry it all by myself, and that is why we had to be two. We were forced to go back to the base to tell the comrades that it would not be possible because this was the time for the Police to go to work. We decided that we should take the whole material and drop it at the firing point, and remove the vehicle and parked it around Lodium.

Fortunately Philemon did not know at the time that when the firing was done, the situation became very, very serious.

MR MODISE: Where did you direct the rocket?

MR MNISI: We pointed it towards the Voortrekkerhoogte direction.

MR MODISE: And then when you finished, where was Philemon?

MR MNISI: Philemon had already left when we had finished. When we started shooting actually, people came from the Lodium direction to come and watch, the people from Rasmere also came out to come and watch as we were shooting, and some of these people were sitting on the car.

Philemon realised that it was not safe for him to wait for us, because we were having five missiles.

MR MODISE: What was your actual role, did you actually fire the rocket or were you just assisting the other people who were there, what was your personal role in it apart from being at the scene, what did you do?

MR MNISI: When you shoot with gun, you only use it as one individual, not many people can use one gun at the same time. As we were shooting, we had to be careful because it was dangerous. My duty however was that on finishing, myself and Johnny were to load the missiles after one shot has been fired.

MR MODISE: Now you had no transport to leave the site, what did you do? How did you leave the area?

MR MNISI: We did not have transport and therefore we went to Lodium to look for transport. I was with the late Banni.

MR MODISE: Okay, proceed.

MR MNISI: I was with the late Banni and when we arrived, we found one Indian. I think we were five, there must have been five of us, there must have been Johnny, Sidney and Vix and we said they should wait for us. We went to look for transport ... (tape ends) ... and we asked for a lift from him. He didn't trust us, but we just opened the door and got inside.

But he said he was not in the position of giving us a lift and there came a stage where Banni got angry and he shot him and this man fled into the house. And people started shooting at us, because of the gunshot that Banni had fired.

When people came out, they realised that it was myself and Banni and they started shooting at us, we were forced to retreat. Fortunately these other comrades realised that we were in trouble, and they had to cover us up.

The late Sebepi had a 400 grenade which was to be used as well. We had to destroy one of the guns and we were not able to do that because we were sure that we would get hold of transport to take us away from the place.

We didn't have enough time, the grenade had its pin already removed and we decided to disassemble the gun later. As they were trying to rescue us, the grenade was thrown into the veld. People started shooting and the gang on our side, started shooting in the air as well.

We told them that what we could do now, was to retreat back to the house from which we came, wait there until I came. They went there and I went to Mamelodi to look for Philemon.

MR MODISE: When you say they retreated to the safe house, who are you referring to in particular?

MR MNISI: I am talking about Rasmere.

MR MODISE: Yes, who are you referring to?

MR MNISI: I am referring to Rasmere, people who went back there were Banni, Mulukwani, Sidney Sebepi, Johnny and Vix.

MR MODISE: So they are in Rasmere and now you are on your way to go and look for alternative transport?

You are on your way to Mamelodi?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.


MR VISSER: That is not what he said with respect Mr Chairman, he said he went to look for Philemon.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the position. Do you say that Banni, Sidney and Vix went to the safe house in Rasmere and you went to Mamelodi. Why did you go to Mamelodi?

MR MNISI: I went to Mamelodi to try and get hold of transport, Philemon's transport.

CHAIRPERSON: Where was Philemon?

MR MNISI: Philemon had already gone to Mamelodi.

MR MODISE: Did you find Philemon eventually?

MR MNISI: I did not find him that very same night. I only found him the following day but we could not leave the following day, because there were roadblocks all over the place.

And we had to get hold of people who would reconnoitre the road, our road and we did not have enough information about the road. It then became better after three days, the roadblocks subsided and we had to go and look for the comrades, but he feared that maybe the comrades had been killed already and we decided that we should go and check if they were still there, and we then went.

We did not have guns, we only had only one MK, we went to Rasmere but we could not find anything. I went into the house whilst we were standing a distance away, and called them out of the house to say that we should go now.

I indicated to them that it was safe, we could leave. Everybody was armed and if something happened along the road, they would have to use their rifles. We then went to Mamelodi, we spent three weeks preparing out way back to Swaziland because there were roadblocks at the time.

MR MODISE: So, did you eventually leave the area? You left Swaziland via Maputo or you left Maputo via Swaziland?

MR MNISI: We left Mamelodi for Swaziland and from Swaziland we went to Maputo.

MR MODISE: Do you know if there were any people injured during the attack at Voortrekkerhoogte.

MR MNISI: I don't have any knowledge to that effect, it was indicated that a certain woman was injured.

MR MODISE: Did you see her on the scene?

MR MNISI: No, I did not see her because the target itself was very far from where we were.

MR MODISE: Mr Mnisi, we are going to the next attack, which is the South African Air Force Headquarters, on the 20th of May 1983.

Can you then start with paragraph 16 as to your role and what your involvement was.

MR MNISI: In paragraph 16, I was part and parcel in Church Street in planning the Church Street bomb blast, Headquarters in Pretoria, on the 20th of May 1983.

MR MODISE: Let's go to 17.

MR MNISI: On the 20th of May 1983, the car was given to two comrades.

MR MODISE: You say a car was given to two comrades. Could you name them please.

MR MNISI: Freddi Shongwe and Izekial Masego.

MR MODISE: Okay. How did you know Freddi Shongwe and Izekial Masego?

MR MNISI: They were ANC members, that is the two of them. Izekial was a friend of mine and as well as Freddi was a friend and related to me.

MR MODISE: Who recruited them to do the operation?

MR MNISI: These were MK members, it is not a question of recruiting them, they had to take orders from MK.

MR MODISE: Proceed to paragraph 20.

MR MNISI: The person who called them, was myself. I said they shall come closer to Swaziland, that is Freddi and Izekial.

I phoned them from Swaziland and told them to come over and we briefed them about the operation, myself and Rashid. They were also sent to go and do some reconnaissance especially Rashid was the one who was giving them the briefing to check the Headquarters and Voortrekker Road as well because we were supposed to go back again to Voortrekker, to hit it again.

And we were coming, we were going to employ a different method this time.

MR MODISE: Just before that, were you at any stage involved with the testing of the device that was going to be used?

MR MNISI: Yes. We did test the device with Rashid in Lusaka I think. We tested it for quite some time, maybe a few months or weeks.

MR MODISE: Okay, let's now go to 21.

MR MNISI: The arrangements that we made that Izekial and Freddi should come to Swaziland, where they would be shown every step of how to go about, and the car to use, and to train about the device as well. Rashid did the training.

Freddi came along, the other one did not come. He was also told that he must go back to do the final reconnaissance. He did that twice or three times, if I am not mistaken.

MR MODISE: Do you know who drove the car, how did the car eventually get to Church Street? How did the car come into the country?

MR MNISI: The car was brought by Helen Pastoors. She is the one who drove the car from Swaziland and dropped it at Mamelodi, according to the arrangements. Freddi was supposed to go and fetch the car from that area, but it was not fetched on that very day, it was fetched on the following day in the morning.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that name Helen Pastoors?


MR MODISE: Thank you.

MR MNISI: Yes, it is Helen Pastoors.

MR MODISE: Okay, do you want to, do you have anything further to say regarding your involvement and role on the Church Street bombing, is there anything that you have perhaps, you have not mentioned that you want to mention? If not, we may proceed to the next point.

But before we do so, the Freddi Shongwe and Izekial Masego, it is alleged that they were convicted criminals, do you know that, they were convicted criminals prior to executing the operation, do you have personal knowledge of that?

MR MNISI: It was quite some time I have been apart from them, I don't have any recollection as far as that is concerned. I can't say no or say yes to that.

MR MODISE: It is also alleged that a sum of money was found on their person or at least on the person of one of them as they were laying there on the scene. Do you know anything about money having been given to them?

MR MNISI: Each and every comrade will be given money, transport money whenever they are sent to undertake some operation.

So was the case in those two as well, the money that they had, was given to them by Rashid to take care of the operations or the expenditures.

MR MODISE: Can you now move on ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Molefe, just one short question. Mr Shongwe and Mr Masego, you say that they were members of MK, had they been members of MK for some time prior to the bombing, or could you give an indication as to when in relation to the Church Street bomb, they became members of Umkonto We Sizwe?

MR MNISI: What I know about them is that they were MK members. As to when they joined the ANC, I don't want to commit myself to that because I have no real facts to that, but they were just known as the MK members.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Modise, I see it is almost one o'clock, when you arrive at a convenient stage, we will then take the lunch adjournment. If you want to finish with this point please, please do so.

MR MODISE: Well, Mr Chairperson, I think I have finished the point on Church Street. I am going to move over to the Wits Command which he will only say in one or two sentences, it won't take five minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: If you want to continue now, you may do so.

MR MODISE: Perhaps Mr Chairperson, let's adjourn. There are whispers behind me let's adjourn.

CHAIRPERSON: But you have arrived at a convenient stage in the evidence in chief, and it is now one o'clock so we will now adjourn for lunch until two o'clock, thank you.



CHAIRPERSON: Mr Modise, I see you have now introduced to us during the lunch break, a further legal representative to this matter. I think if he could just interrupt your leading of your witness while Mr Knight places himself on the record.

MR KNIGHT: As the Commission pleases Mr Chairman, if I can just place myself on record, my name is Julian Knight and I am appearing on behalf of applicant Colin de Sousa in this matter. I have just received instructions from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to represent him, and I haven't had the opportunity of perusing the application for amnesty and or any of the other documentation of the proceedings that have proceeded this point in time.

I understand from my learned colleague that they will be proceeding with Mr Molefe's evidence regarding the Wits Command incident which is one of the applications for which Colin de Sousa has made application and I would request the Commission to possibly adjourn the matter after evidence in chief to enable myself to properly consult with the applicant with a view to cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Knight. Mr Van den Berg, initially it was placed on record that, sorry Mr Van den Berg, Mr Pooe, initially it was placed on record that you were to be appearing for the other applicants, save for Mr Aboobaker Ismail. Are you now no longer representing Mr De Sousa?

MR POOE: Chairperson, initially I placed on record that I acted for the other we can say Grösskopf and Pastoors who is not before the Committee at this stage. Mr Ismail, Aboobaker Ismail was led by Mr Trengrove, but we do represent him as an Attorney firm, if I could just make that clear.

The situation that has arise, Mr De Sousa, we had an instruction from the TRC to instruct, he unfortunately only arrived in Pretoria today and during the course of discussions it appeared as if there could be a potential conflict and in order to avoid that situation becoming unturnable at a later stage, we deemed it wise at this stage, to assist him in obtaining separate and independent legal representation, and it is on that basis that Mr Knight has been requested to come and step in on his behalf. We would then as of now, seize to act for him and Mr Knight would be acting for him.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Thank you Mr Knight. I think it would probably in the circumstances be wise to follow the route suggested by Mr Knight, namely that the present witness Mr Molefe complete his evidence in chief, which will include his evidence relating to the Wits Command incident, in which Mr De Sousa also has an application before the Committee and then adjourn after that to enable Mr Knight to consult and acquaint himself with the documentation which is fairly voluminous Mr Knight, although it is not as bad as it looks.

There is quite a lot of repetition in here, and then hopefully we will be in a position then tomorrow morning, to proceed with the cross-questioning, cross-examination of Mr Molefe in the normal way.

I would also just like to mention at this stage, that tomorrow we will only be sitting until lunch time, certain members of the panel and other staff members have to catch flights in the afternoon, so we will go through to lunch time tomorrow, I will just inform you now.

Mr Modise, could you then ...

MR POOE: Chairperson, could I interrupt, for the sake of suggesting maybe something in the middle of what you are suggesting and something else. As I understand it, Mr De Sousa is applying only in respect of the Wits Command. Mr Mnisi and that is subject to my learned friend's attitude as well of course, is testifying on three incidents, two of which Mr De Sousa has got nothing to do with.

For the sake of progress and subject to what Mr Visser has to say, perhaps cross-examination on those two aspects in which Mr De Sousa is not implicated at all, could proceed and the matter of the Wits Command, that matter could stand over to allow Mr Knight to take instructions, proper instructions on that one.

I am making it as a way of a suggestion, it is entirely in your hands of course.

CHAIRPERSON: I reckon on that one Mr Pooe, it might just make things a little bit messy if we start having Mr Visser's cross-examination on a piece meal basis. He will cross-examine and then stop it and then start cross-examination on another point. It is probably, we also in my view and unless there is something that I am missing, I think we are quite far ahead of schedule, the matter has been set down for the three weeks, and we are ahead of schedule, so I think if we miss an hour or so this afternoon, it won't be too drastic. It might be better.

MR VISSER: If I may be allowed to say something after Mr Pooe has called on me to say something, I rather suspect that my learned friend Mr Knight would possibly want to cross-examine Mr Ismail as well having applied for the same incident.

In fact he has mentioned that to me, and from my experience Mr Chairman, he is not going to be ready tomorrow morning. I just want to place that in your midst so to consider. If we start tomorrow, certainly, I can go on with cross-examination, but I can also assure you I won't be until lunch time. I will be finished long before then.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we will probably be in a better situation on that point, after Mr Knight has consulted with his client to see if it is necessary to have Mr A. Ismail recalled for purposes of being cross-examined by Mr Knight, it may turn out that he won't want to cross-examine him, in which event we will just continue with the cross-examination of Mr Molefe.

So I think at this stage we will then just this afternoon conclude the evidence in chief of Mr Molefe. Mr Modise, Mr Van den Berg, do you have anything that you wish to say?

MR VAN DEN BERG: No, I have nothing to add, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp?

MR STEENKAMP: Nothing Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Modise, if you could please then continue with leading the evidence of your client.

EXAMINATION BY MR MODISE: (continued) Thank you Mr Chairperson. Incidentally, his real surname is Mnisi, Molefe is his MK surname.

Mr Mnisi, just before the lunch adjournment you have just concluded your evidence on the Church Street explosion. You are now going to turn to the attack on Wits Command. Can you just tell the Committee your role and involvement in that operation?

MR MNISI: The Wits Command operation was undertaken by Ikino. My role in this operation mainly was to arrange his material from Lusaka.

We packed the material in Lusaka and we sent it to Botswana. In Botswana there was another auxiliary to accept or to receive that material and we already know that Ikino was going to do what on which day.

MR MODISE: Was that your only involvement in this operation?


MR MODISE: After you had prepared the material, you were never involved at any stage again?

MR MNISI: Yes, I was not involved any further.

MR MODISE: Mr Molefe, Mr Mnisi, you have confirmed that you have made an application for amnesty. Do you confirm that whatever is set out in your application is evidence before this Committee?


MR MODISE: Now, let's go to paragraph 26 and 27 of your statement.

Is it correct that you asked me to read paragraph 26, 27, 28 and you will confirm whether what I have read is what you have instructed me to read? Is that correct?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR MODISE: I will start reading it then.

CHAIRPERSON: Where are you reading from Mr Modise?

MR MODISE: From his statement. You don't have that statement before you, Chairperson.

JUDGE PILLAY: Is that statement not now available?

MR MODISE: It may be coming available. Can I bring it tomorrow?


MR MODISE: I regret the deaths of innocent civilians, especially in operations where I was personally involved, either directly or in the planning and preparation of material. The ANC and its military wing, Umkonto We Sizwe never set out deliberately to attack civilian targets.

We followed the political objectives of the ANC in the course of its quest for the liberation of the oppressed masses.

We now go to paragraph 26, however, in the course of a war, lives are lost and the loss of life of innocent civilians sometimes becomes inevitable. We tried at all costs to avoid indiscriminate killing and to focus our attention of enemy Security Forces.

The last paragraph, I regret the loss of life of many cadres of Umkonto We Sizwe at the hands of the South African Security Forces. Many innocent lives also died during indiscriminate cross-border raids.

Their deaths were never justified, and I equally regret it. Do you confirm what I have just read?


MR MODISE: Is there anything that you want to place before the Committee which you believe is necessary to be placed at this stage before we conclude your evidence in chief?

MR MNISI: I am done.

MR MODISE: If at a later stage, the Committee can call upon you to come and clarify on certain aspects which you may or may not have placed before it, will you be willing to do so?


MR MODISE: Do you confirm that whatever evidence you have given, is what is to the best of your recollection true and correct?


MR MODISE: No further questions, Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Modise. Mr Steenkamp, will it be possible to make arrangements for Mr Knight to get the relevant documentation in this matter?

MR STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I have already made certain arrangements, Your Worship, that the documents, the Exhibits at least be received so far which is relevant to (indistinct). I have already made arrangements that at least transcripts of sections, I think at least of Mr Ismail's evidence will also be made available as quickly as possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Knight, will you be consulting almost immediately with your client then?

MR KNIGHT: Yes, I will.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and if you can just link up with Mr Steenkamp in respect of any documentation that you require.

MR KNIGHT: Yes, I will do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, you don't have any objection to us adjourning now?

MR VISSER: No Mr Chairman, it is a terrible thing, but what can I do?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think it will probably be better as I said earlier, to adjourn at this stage and lets follow the usual procedure and then let Mr Knight start by putting any questions to Mr Mnisi and do it rather than chop and change and you start and partially complete your cross-examination and then get interrupted and then carry on thereafter.

In the circumstances then, we will then have to adjourn now to enable Mr Knight to consult with his client, Mr De Sousa so that he can then decide whether he has any questions to ask Mr Mnisi.

You have heard the evidence relating to the Witwatersrand Command attack which Mr Mnisi has given. There has been a statement made by Mr Mnisi which hasn't been placed before the Committee yet, but he has read from it. Perhaps if you could link up with Mr Modise in that regard, that might also help you in your consultation Mr Knight.

We will adjourn then until tomorrow at the same hall, at half past nine in the morning, and then just a reminder that proceedings tomorrow will last until lunch time, thank you.