TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 

AMNESTY HEARINGS

DATE: 11 MAY 1998

HELD AT: JOHANNESBURG

NAME: MR KRUSER

APPLICATION NO: 5542/97

DAY: 1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] on my left, will counsel appearing for the interested parties please place yourselves on record.

MR BIZOS: Members of the Committee together with my learned friend, Mr Karel Tipp SC, Danny Berger and Gomotso Moraka, I, my name is G Bizos, appear on behalf of all the applicants except Mr Neo Potsane who is listed as applicant no 9.

MR CURRIN: Mr Chairman, I have been side-lined here on your left, I feel more like an applicant sitting here. Brian Currin, from Bell Dewar & Hall with Kabelo Negane, we together are representing the ninth applicant, Neo Potsane.

MR VAN WYK: Sir, my name is A van Wyk. My firm is acting for four objectors, first one is Phuthile Zondi, Gezephi Dlamini, Dazeli Nqanjana and Eric Majozi.

MR PRETORIUS: May it please the Commission Mr Chairman, my name is B Pretorius. I appear on behalf seven objectors, the first is Mrs Saraphina Lembede Langa, the second is Mr Alfred Maphanga, the third is Mr Philemon Dlamini, the fourth is Mr Themba Mazibuko, the fifth is Mrs Zani Selina Sokhela, sixth is Mrs Zini Zungu, the last is Bashitshile Mqanti Masikane. That's all thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR P A VAN WYK: I'm sorry, Mr Chairman, my initials are P A, I'm also Van Wyk. I'm acting on behalf of seven objectors, their names being Sesi Ntombela, Agnes Ntombela, then it's Christine Chonco: C-H-O-N-C-O, the next one is Jabulani Langa, then Msolwa: M-S-O-L-W-A Madondo, then Muziwandile Msizazwe: M-S-I-Z-A-Z-W-E and the last one is Amos Ngobese: N-G-O-B-E-S-E. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MS VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Chairman, my is Helena van der Westhuizen. I'm acting on behalf of the following objectors, first one is Simon Mbhele, second one Lucas Nyoko, third one Phoyisa: P-H-O-Y-I-S-A, Gasela: G-A-S-E-L-A fourth is Johan Mikayipheli: M-I-K-A-Y-I-P-H-E-L-I Shlatswayo, the fifth one Lucky Mzuza, the sixth one is Nicholas Ntlobe, the seventh one is Gawetha: G-A-W-E-T-H-A Mbatha, the eighth one is Rista: R-I-S-T-A Buthelezi, the ninth one is Obert Sithole and the last one if Frank Nene.

MR DORFLING: May it please the Committee, Mr Chairman, the name is Danie Dorfling. I'm appearing on behalf of the following nine objectors on instruction of Mosselson & Associates, Mr S Ndwonde, Mr K P Khathi, Mr B Mvelase, Mr M E Mbense, Mr M Ntombela, Mr T K W Mhlongo, Mr M Mpungose, Mr B V Buthelezi and Mr M Ngqulunga: N-G-Q-U-L-U-N-G-A Mr Chair. Thank you.

MR HUMAN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, my name is Dirk Human. I appear on behalf the following seven objectors, Mr R P Buthelezi, Mr F M Majozi, Mr F M Myeza: M-Y-E-Z-A, Mr O Mpanga, Mr K Bangani, Ms M Dombi, Mr J Q Biyera. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: May it please the Committee, Mr Chairman, I am Ramula Patel, leader of evidence for the Amnesty Committee, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman and members of the Committee, you are all aware that a lengthy inquest was held in order to determine what happened in this matter. Mindful of the length and the extent to which the matter was investigated, and in order to avoid a lengthy and expensive hearing, we took the initiative in filing a document which was served on the objectors, except the last one, I am told because there was some lack of clarity in relation to it, and a document was filed which is before you in a file, paginated by counsel for the Commission. May I suggest that that file be marked as file A.

CHAIRPERSON: No further ...(indistinct)

MR BIZOS: No, the other one that was before you, which has the first document, applicant's request for further particulars and admissions.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR BIZOS: Yes, that is the one. Could we call that file A, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR BIZOS: There are additional documents filed by the objectors, which have not yet been paginated. We will take care of it in due course in consultation with counsel for the Commission so that all those facts which really is an attempt to define the issues before you, we will put them all into that file.

Now, Mr Chairman, our approach to this matter is that this is neither an appeal nor a review of the judgment given by his Lordship, Mr Justice Nugent. The Committee has a statutory duty to perform which, or the section in it which deals with what it has to enquire into and make up its mind and give a decision on the facts and circumstances that have been placed before it. Nothing said by Nugent, J is binding on this Committee. We do not have to quote authority for this proposition, because the learned Judge himself on an early page of his judgment clearly states that inquest findings are not bound on anyone, they are made on a prima facie basis and that in any event there is a different test and different legal requirements in this regard. Now, we have attempted by asking a number of questions before to place before you facts by way of admission and for that purpose we served a document on the objectors, which is the document before you, pages 1 to 12 in which various questions were asked. We thought that we would obtain sufficient information about what we believe to be matters which were either common cause or not seriously contested by way of admission. It is with some regret that we wish to place on record that the objectors did not avail themselves of this opportunity of responding to what we believe were facts which ought to be either common cause or not seriously disputed.

The other was that right at the outset on page 2, Mr Chairman, we asked questions in order to identify the objectors and tell us what it is, what harm they have suffered in order that the Committee may decide as to whether their injuries, if any, and precisely where they were injured and whether their injuries really qualify them as objectors proper. I'm not of course speaking in relation to the eight deceased, Mr Chairman. Unfortunately we have not had much joy as a response, but more importantly on page 3 we asked the following questions:

"The objectors are requested to state on what grounds each of them intends to oppose the applications for amnesty;"

Paragraph 3 -

"If it is alleged that the applications do not comply with the requirements of the promotion of national unity and reconciliation, Act no 34 of 1995, the objectors are requested to identify the applications which allegedly do not comply with the requirements of the Act;"

and 3.2 -

"To specify in what respects the said applications allegedly do not comply with the requirements of the Act. If it is alleged that the acts of offences to which the applications relate are not acts associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past in accordance with the provisions of Section 22, 23 of the Act, the objectors are requested. To identify the acts or offences which allegedly are not acts associated with a political objective, committed in the course of the conflicts of the past and in accordance with the provisions of Sections 22 and 23 of the Act;"

and 4.2 -

"To specify in what respect the said acts or offences allegedly are not acts associated with a political objective, committed in the course of the conflicts of the past and in accordance with the provisions of Sections 20.2 and 20.3 of the Act;"

5 -

"If it is alleged that the applicants for amnesty have not made a full disclosure of all relevant facts, each of the objectors is requested to identify the applicants for amnesty who allegedly have not made a full disclosure of all relevant facts, and in respect of each applicant for amnesty to specify in what respect the said applicants for amnesty has allegedly not made a full disclosure of all the relevant facts and to specify all relevant facts which the said applicants for amnesty has allegedly failed to disclose."

Now, we want to indicate to you Mr Chairman, the answers. Unfortunately not all the documents have not all been paginated but the first one has, it is the applicant's request for further particulars and admissions on page 108.

This was a response by Mosselson & Associates in a document dated the 5th of May and Miss van der Westhuizen has associated herself with the answers given, so this is the document of those two objectors, and in relation to paragraph 2 they say on page 111 -

"The applicants are referred to the affidavits by the objectors in this regard."

The affidavits by the objectors in relation to this issue is to be found on page - I'm sorry, we have paginated it for ourselves, and we will try and persuade counsel for the Committee to paginate the same. It's at page 122 -

"I have been advised that the applications of the guards who were injured do not comply with the requirements of the promotion of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act, and state that full legal argument of this point will be advanced before the Commission at the hearing of the matter."

CHAIRPERSON: Where are you reading from?

MR BIZOS: Page 122 Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Of the same document?

MR BIZOS: Of the same.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that paragraph ...[indistinct]?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman. Then, as far as question no 3 is concerned, the answer given on page 112, paragraph 9 is -

"This request is the subject of legal argument which will be advanced at the appropriate time during the course of the proceedings."

Again hardly a helpful response in the circumstances Mr Chairman. The same answer is given on the same page 112, in answer to paragraph 4 on page 3, and paragraph 5 on page 4. So that our attempt to define the issues and possibly save time thereby has failed. It may not be too late, Mr Chairman, because our learned friends may be persuaded that they ought to respond meaningfully to this during the course of the proceedings.

I may say right at the outset, Mr Chairman, that we will object to any court time being sought in order to do this. We are anxious to conclude the matter as soon as possible. What I mean by that is that they may want to make use of the court hours, the time, in order to really try and define the issues before the Committee. They're not obliged to do it, however, Mr Chairman, but we thought that we would draw your attention to that fact.

Now, we ask in paragraph 6 what each of the objectors must specify whether the said objector intends to be present and to testify at the hearing of the applicants for amnesty, what evidence the said objector intends to adduce at the hearing, what article or articles the said objector intends to submit at the hearing to be taken into consideration.

May I indicate, Mr Chairman, that the spirit in which these questions were asked was not to tie the objectors down to anything specific to which they did not want be specific about, but rather we hoped that if the information was given, we may be able to admit if we were given for instance medical records that this person was shot in the thigh or in the knee and if we could go outside court hours investigate this matter, we could make admissions which would may have been unnecessary for witnesses to be called. However, we failed in that endeavour to shorten the proceedings as well.

Now, in relation to part B, on page 5, Mr Chairman, we also asked for admissions. Firstly that the transcripts identified below accurately record the conversation and speeches of referred to therein, noting in certain instances the third transcripts do not cover the entire conversation or speech concerned and that such transcripts can be used at the hearing without further proof.

Firstly, the SAP radio reports, channel 27, on the 28th of March 1994, here we are pleased to inform the Committee that there has been a helpful response by the objectors in that they admit that what is referred to as "channel 27", which is an important document and which was an important document at the inquest but which unfortunately was only produced by those who had possession of it, the police, in July after the inquest had been going on for a number of months but it does contain important information. I am corrected, Mr Chairman, on page 94 of this bundle you will find that Mr Wilsenach who appears for some of the objectors, the firm of attorneys for the objectors, they admitted Mr Chairman, on page 94 in paragraph 1.1.1 - it's particularly Dr van Wyk, Mr Chairman, who's is appearing here, who made that admission. On page 5, that's page 5 of our documents, Mr Mosselson, by way of contrast - or Mosselsons by way of contrast, in paragraph F on page 114, paragraph 15 there says -

"The objectors are not in a position to either deny or admit the documents referred to in paragraph 1.1 to 1.9 of the request."

So that we are in a position that you will see on page 5, 6 up to top of page 7 that Mosselson could not admit or deny any of the matters that we asked for, we therefor have to prove them, Mr Chairman.

In relation to the radio channel 27, again we would urge that the legal representatives in consonance with their duty to the Committee and possibly to their clients, that the matter of the proof of that recording should possibly be admitted as the other matters that we have referred to, so that we can make some progress Mr Chairman.

Then, in paragraph 2 of page 7 of our request -

"That the gathering at Library Gardens on the 28th of March 1994 and the marches associated therewith, took place at the instance of the IFP."

We would have thought Mr Chairman, that that matter could easily have been admitted but it has not. The objectors represented by Dr van Wyk cannot - they deny it outright at page 95, paragraph 1.2 and Mosselson cannot admit or deny it, at page 114, paragraph 16.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR BIZOS: It's 114, paragraph 16.

MR BIZOS: Now, I would like to now introduce, Mr Chairman and members of the Committee, the bundle that we handed in this morning headed "Bundle submitted by the applicants", and I would suggest, with respect, that this should be bundle B.

Let us see what the applicants deny - yes, and it consists of documents from page 1 to page 253. It may become necessary, Mr Chairman, to add documents to it. We will ask that they be numbered consecutively. Now, remember, Mr Chairman, what the question we asked was on page 2 of page 7 - please turn to page 2 of bundle B. The question was -

"That the gathering at the Library Gardens on the 28th of March 1994, and the marches associated therewith took place at the instance of the IFP."

The one says that they deny it, the other says that they have no knowledge. I am going to refer to documents which are, and have been available to the objectors Mr Chairman, at least since the beginning of 1977, 1997 - it only ages me Mr Chairman, or shows my age - sorry, if I'm twenty years out sometimes, please feel free to correct me.

Now, here we have a document which has been in their possession since the beginning of 1997 when the documents were distributed by the Attorney-General from whose possession they came, and they were made available to all the parties. It's on the letterhead of the Inkatha Freedom Party, it is signed by Mr Humphrey Ndlovu, whom I may say one or - I think he had separate counsel for himself but they worked in close co-operation with our learned friends who appear for the objectors:

"I hereby wish to ask for permission for the IFP launch of its anti-election campaign at the Johannesburg Library grounds on Monday the 28th of March 1994. This gathering will be peaceful and will be from 09h00 - 14h00. Approximately 20 000 people will be attending this launch. Your assistance will be highly appreciated. Yours in the continuous search for peace and democracy in our country.

Mr Humphrey Ndlovu - IFP : West Rand - Chairperson."

Now, if we go to page 3, "Name of the Organisation", you will see on the application form:

"To the Magistrate"

in Johannesburg.

"Name of the Organisation - Inkatha Freedom Party - IFP"

and the address of the IFP right on top.

Now, Mr Chairman, the absence of this admission and a fiction which has been created that the IFP had nothing to do with this march, is a deliberate smoke-screen in order to avoid responsibility for what happened on the 28th of March 1994, and we don't intend leading viva voce evidence in relation to whose march it was, unless Mr Chairman, specific evidence is led by the objectors to contradict this documentation that we have put before you. We submit that the section requires you to hear evidence and receive information. We have given the information, we have said where it comes from, we do not want to take up time, through calling the Magistrate or anyone else.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now, then, Mr Chairman, page 4:

"Purpose of the demonstrations, protests, march - Anti-election campaign"

If you could go back to page 3:

"Names of all the organisers - Humphrey Ndlovu"

on page 3 and it will emerge during the course of the evidence that Mr Humphrey Ndlovu is not an Induna or a representative of His Majesty the King of the Zulus, but a member of the IFP and a senior office bearer of what was then known as Transvaal, and particularly the western branch, and that it was in that capacity that he put these matters into motion.

Then, page 4:

"Purpose of the demonstration protest - Anti-election campaign"

not the King's demands, Mr Chairman. Now, the fact that marches and not only a gathering was envisaged by Mr Ndlovu is proved by the answer to the question:

"Route which procession would follow or venue for staging demonstration"

on page 4, towards the bottom, Mr Chairman,

"people will come from different destinations and some will be coming around the town and suburbs of Johannesburg."

So, we submit that this is a clear indication that it was anticipated that there would be marches, and that they would be coming on trains and foot, on page 5:

"And for what purpose"

again:

"the anti-election campaign".

If you would turn, Mr Chairman, to pages 15 and 16 of bundle B, you will observe an indemnity given and entered into by the Inkatha Freedom Party and not His Majesty the King, or anyone else, represented by one Peter B Mangwasa, who says:

"On behalf of and duly authorised to by the Organisation"

and the organisation is defined in the first whereas on page 15 as the Inkatha Freedom Party. They indemnify and hold ...(inaudible) the counsel and others Mr Chairman. It's signed on the 25th of March and it's duly witnessed.

Now, there can be no doubt in our mind as to who organised this and we submit that the evidence clearly, placed before you clearly shows that. We also ask that Mr Humphrey Ndlovu and Mr Themba Nkosa, in their capacities as senior office bearers of the IFP were instrumental in the conception of the gathering at the Library Gardens and the associated marches. The response is the same, the one says "I can't admit or deny" and the other denies. Now, we will place material before the Committee by reading transcripts of telephone conversations on the morning of the 28th of March 1994, again which became available to all our learned friends at or about the beginning of the inquest in April 1997 and our learned friends have had copies of these. They have listened to evidence in relation to the provenance and authenticity of these transcripts and they should have had no difficulty in making an admission in that regard, but - if you could please turn page 101 of bundle B and refer you to the hand-written portion:

"H Ndlovu and Captain Wilken"

Both these persons gave evidence at the inquest. Our learned friends could ascertain quite easily whether they should make an admission or not but the contents clearly show that Captain Wilken, who was identified as the Liaison Officer of the South African Police and the conversation was at 07h45 in the morning. They are apparently on good terms, because the first entry is:

"Humphrey!, good morning and how are you."

"Hi I'm looking for you. I wanted to page you but I'm on my way to the office."

"Humphrey, listen, we have big problems this morning, man."

"Where?"

"You know, in Alexander, at the Hostels. People are throwing stones to the vehicles. They are shooting, shooting at the policemen who have got big chaos in town. I wonder, can you make contact with the people at the Hostels, man, to tell them to discipline and come into town? Either discipline, or we're going to have big problems today."

"I see."

"You know really, we want to give our full support, but the people seems to me, they're getting out of hand now, man. We need your support, but from your side Humphrey as well, you must try your utmost to calm the people down and tell them they must not loot the places or throw stones, etc."

"That is true."

"Otherwise we're gonna have chaos in town this morning. Tell me, Humphrey, another thing, are you going to the election office as well?"

We will ask you to not the election offices, because there was an attempt to occupy the Electoral Commission offices and we will prove that Mr Chairman, as evidence of what these peace loving people were doing on the streets of Johannesburg on that day.

"No, I want to, I hear the statements that they are going."

"I heard it over the radio, you see, that's why I want to ask you from you personally, are you people going there today."

"No, they are not marching."

"You are not going there."

"No, we are just going to our spot where we stay there until disperse."

"At the Library Gardens?"

"At the Library Gardens, that is all."

"And you will also be addressing the people there, and I am asking you to please before we put everything there, to bring the dogs."

"What time are you going to put things together, Humphrey?"

"We are going to start now."

"Okay, I want to do that for the dogs too."

"Okay, I will arrange that. That is no problem, I will arrange that."

"And I will also help you on this side for the people to behave."

"I will be there, but Humphrey, I want you as the leader, to announce to the people there on the ground when you are addressing the people, to behave and to discipline, etc. Please, man."

"Really, I will do it, Sir. Okay, I will do it, Sir."

"Okay, please I would like your co-operation there, Humphrey, man."

"Okay."

"But I will see you on the ground then."

"Alright then."

"Okay, Humphrey, bye."

Now, remember, Mr Chairman, what the question was that the gathering at the Library - I beg your pardon, 3, that Mr Humphrey Ndlovu and Mr Themba Nkosa, in their capacities as senior office bearers of the IFP, were instrumental in the conception of the gathering at the Library Gardens and the associated marches. The one denies it, the other one says they don't know. They can so easily have found out and can so easily make an admission, Mr Chairman.

Let us now deal with Mr Themba Nkosa because the question was concerned with him as well. Could you please turn to page 98 on bundle B, Mr Chairman. I'm sorry, can you just bear one moment, one of our - we'll just find the page, my page is different to Mr Tipp's. On page ...(indistinct) 28th of March '94, this too was produced by the Attorney-General's office and handed to the parties at the commencement of the inquest proceedings and if we look at it, we submit that in the absence of an admission the Committee ought not to have much difficulty in finding as a fact that together with Mr Ndlovu, Mr Nkosa was orchestrating the happenings on the streets of Johannesburg on the day in question.

"Themba your people né, are breaking down the place, man."

We will refer to this later for another purpose, but let us -

"Your people",

says Mr Wilkins, the Senior Police Officer who obviously knows Mr Themba Nkosa quite well, and what is his answer,

"you must expect that"

You must expect that my people will break the place down. Mr Chairman, we are becoming impatient with the attitude of the persons that are opposing these proceedings and who were at the inquest. We asked them a simple question which can be answered truthfully on behalf of their clients, when they have the information. We ...[indistinct] foot to the proof of it, and we are told that this was a peaceful march for a demand of their things.

"No, man, there's people on their way to work now, and they're throwing stones, etc, etc, and I don't want to act, man, is their now way that we can make contact with the people at the hostels and tell them to just don't throw stones and that stuff?

MR NKOSA: "I have a problem"

"Yes?"

"Things have changed now, you know, I don't need to tell you. It looked like Inkatha is not going to be the same all the way now, so it's a question of expect that."

"What area are you referring to?"

"I am referring George Kok, all the hostels, man, and the road from Alexandra. Since this morning, man, they've been throwing stones."

"Yes, people are coming to work now."

"That's our main problem, otherwise, you know, I've been in touch with the Stability Unit, they want to block the people not from coming into town."

The next sentence has great significance we will submit as to what happened that day, and what Mr Themba Nkosa's authority was,

"Tell them not to try that"

Mr Themba Nkosa, a senior IFP official tells a senior policeman who appeals to him to use his good offices to stop intimidation and other crimes being committed, otherwise they may have to stop the people from coming into town, his response tantamounts to a threat:

"Tell them not to try that"

What we're saying is that that is proof absolute by way of admission by Mr Nkosa that he was orchestrating the events, that he was, if not orchestrating, most certainly involved. It was an IFP march ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: ...[indistinct] I understand your position to be that you are saying that these requests were made, there was not justification for them in not responding the way they ought to have responded.

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible]

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think we are not here to weigh the merits of the point you are going to make in that regard at this stage.

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible]

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please.

MR BIZOS:

"No, we won't do that, but Themba listen here, the thing is nè, people are coming to work, now they're throwing stones at them. Now, to block the people they're going to keep them in there but they don't want to do that, they want the people to come into town. There is no problem with that as long as we can just - we don't know who to liaise with on the ground man, that's our main problem now."

"Even in Alexandra?"

"Yes."

"They can speak to Xhoso, Elias Xhoso. I'm not sure if that is right, or Philip Langamandla, okay. Philip Langamandla or Elias Konko or David Khumalo."

"Tell me Themba are you also coming here to town?"

"Yes."

"Tell, me, to address the people here at the library?"

"Yes."

"And tell me, another thing that I want to ask you Themba, are the people going to Pretoria as well?"

"I think so."

"To the IEC?"

"Yes, but we are still going to negotiate with them not to do so."

So, we submit this too proves that he was a person to - there should be no difficulty there.

"Did the ...(inaudible) speak to you last night?"

"No, he didn't speak to me last night."

"We quickly need some sniffer dogs yes, because we have information that the podium there will be, the ANC will do something and the National Party Government Police or agents"

I draw attention to the fact that there was obvious, that it may be inferred that there was consultation between Mr Ndlovu and Mr Themba Nkosa because you will recall that Mr Nkosa ...[indistinct]

Now, the rest, Mr Chairman, we put the document in, but we don't have to read it in, Mr Chairman. That the IFP made no attempt to co-ordinate the activities with the relevant peace structures and the SAP. That again should have been an easy matter for an admission, but it was not made.

"5. That the IFP foresaw that there would be wide public violence committed by many of those attending the gathering or participating in associated marches"

Well, they were not prepared to make any admission in relation to that.

"That groups of marches attending the gathering attacked and killed pedestrians and motorists on their way to the gathering".

They deny those allegations. The one denies and the other one says, no knowledge, does not have any instructions in relation to it.

In view of the evidence that was available, we will submit that it's quite easy to make - they should consider, possibly, before these proceedings get out of hand, that they make a formal admission.

"That a number of groups of marches passed Shell House earlier on the 28th of March 1994, during which they behaved provocatively and launched mock attacks on ANC security guards, but there were not shot at by the said security guards."

Again there are videos, there are - well, let me put it this way, although there may not be videos of these particular marches, there is video material and there is sufficient evidence from persons other than the security guards from whom we appear, for them to be able to ascertain and whether they should make an admission in relation to that remark. Then paragraph 8,

"That the organisers of the gathering and the marchers were at all material times aware that the Shell House was the national headquarters of the ANC and that Lancet Hall was the regional headquarters of the ANC."

There is a denial of that by Dr van Wyk and Mosselson says that they can't admit or deny.

"That the said organisers were at all material times aware that there was an extensive history of conflict

frequently violent between members of the IFP and members of the ANC and that in view of the imminence of the first democratic election, political feelings were running very high as at 28th March 1994."

Again we have in 1.4 page 96, there is an admission of they were aware of the history of conflict, Mr Chairman, but that is Dr van Wyk but Mosselson says that they can't admit or deny it. So we are in this position Mr Chairman, that if one of the parties only admits, we have to prove it.

Then, in relation to paragraph 12:

"That from Park Station the marchers did not move in the direction of Library Gardens"

11, I beg you pardon, I'm reading paragraph 11,

"That from Park Station the marchers did not move in the direction of Library Gardens but split into groups, some moving east along Loot Street and then south down King George Street, and others moving south down Wanderer Street then east along De Villiers Street."

I'm sorry, I omitted paragraph 10,

"That the marchers involved in the shooting incident at Shell House were from the Mansfield Hostel and had travelled from there by train to Park Station."

Now, 10, 11 and 12 are admitted, which I must read,

"That the marches moving into these groups then advanced at the intersection of King George, converged I beg your pardon, and De Villiers Streets being at the north-west corner of Shell House."

Those three paragraphs are admitted by Dr van Wyk in paragraph 1.5 on page 96. Mosselson say that they can't admit or deny it. Again, we would submit that having regard to the evidence that was given and the information that would be easily ascertainable in relation to 11 and 12, Mosselson say that they had not instructions in 11 to 12. May I indicate that this document was served on the 16th of April and no instructions have yet been obtained.

Paragraph 13 on page 9,

"That the portion of King George Street between De Villiers Street and Plein Street, adjacent to Shell House on its western side, had a number of substantial concrete barricades spread across the road both at its northern and its southern points, which barricades rendered the passage by large number of people patently it difficult and unsuitable."

This is partly admitted and partly denied on page 96, paragraph 1.6, they say that,

"The objectors admit that there were some concrete barriers spread across the road in King George Street, at the corner of King George Street and De Villiers Street and at the corner of King George Street and Plein Street but would not admit that these barricades rendered the passage by a large number of people patently difficult and unsuitable."

May I indicate, Mr Chairman, that there is a plan of the area which is being referred to. Copies are available and we will make them available to the Committee. Perhaps I should hand them in at this stage so that - it was one that was handed in at the inquest. My learned friends are familiar with it but we will have them copied.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] Have you finished with that?

MR BIZOS: Yes. No, Mr Chairman, I'm going on, but I'm merely referring to the map so that the question and the answer may be meaningful when you look at them Mr Chairman, but I have no objection to handing it in formally as a piece of evidence later on and we can identify it.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR BIZOS: Perhaps we should merely add it to the bundle, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Will that be bundle B?

MR BIZOS: Bundle B, page 254, Mr Chairman. Because the plan is also germane to the question and answer in paragraph 14 on page 9:

"That King George Street does not continue in a southerly direction beyond Plein Street, and that it is not suitable for the movement of a large number of people."

This is responded to on page 96, paragraph 1.7. The objectors admit that King George Street does not continue in a southerly direction beyond Plein Street, but they deny that it is not suitable for the movement of a large number of people.

In relation to paragraphs 13 and 14 Mosselson's reply is at page 116 and 117, paragraph 21 on 116:

"The position and number of concrete barriers positioned in King George Street between De Villiers and Plein Streets appear from the photographs and video footage depicting the scene of the incident. It is admitted that these documents correctly reflect the position at the time of the shooting. No further admissions are being made by the objectors in this regard."

And in paragraph 14 at page 117, paragraph 22:

"It is admitted that the photographs as well as the video footage depicting the scene of the incident correctly reflect the position with regard to King George Street. No further admissions have been made in regard to the objectors, in this regard by the objectors"

We will, unless an admission is forthcoming, we will have to show the video and produce the photographs, Mr Chairman.

"That the",

Paragraph 15,

"That the number of marchers which converged at the intersection of King George and De Villiers Streets was in the region of 1000 - 1500."

The answer to that is to be found on page 96, paragraph 1.8 by Dr van Wyk:

"The objectors do not admit the number of marchers, but do admit that there was a large number of marchers who converged at the intersection of King George Street and De Villiers Street."

And in paragraph 23 on page 117, Mosselson says:

"The objectors are not in a position to either admit or deny that the number of marchers that converged at the intersection of King George and De Villiers Streets were in the region of 1000 - 1500."

They do not say how many they say there were.

CHAIRPERSON: No, Mr Bizos, fine details as to how many people where there and so on, are they going to be relevant in deciding whether amnesty should be granted or not?

MR BIZOS: Suffice to say that there was a large group of people, but - a large group is a relative term ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) carried out as to how many people there were, so I think that the words "large group" will be adequate for present purposes, isn't it?

MR BIZOS: For whatever purpose it may be, but, Mr Chairman, "large" is an amorphous word. It could be hundred in particular circumstances or a thousand in other circumstances. What we thought was, this is why we put it in an approximate basis, we didn't ask them to count them or to give us precisely how many there were, so that the Committee could get some idea of what sort of group they were involved with.

CHAIRPERSON: You're dealing with an approximation yourself.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And 16, Mr Chairman:

"That the marchers were armed with a variety of dangerous weapons, including some firearms, amongst which were AK 47s"

This is paragraph 16, 1.9 by Dr van Wyk. The objectors deny the contents of this paragraph. They were armed with so-called traditional weapons only.

And on page 117, paragraph 24, Mosselson's says:

"The individual objectors on whose behalf we act, deny that they were armed with any firearms and/or AK47 rifles. It is admitted that a number of the marchers carried a variety of traditional weapons."

Mr Chairman, we will have to prove by viva voce evidence and video material that there were such firearms, including AK47's.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR BIZOS: By the group that we say attacked Shell House Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: The answer given on behalf of some of the objectors is a fair answer. They are saying that on behalf of the people they represent they won't know whether there were people, they didn't say there were some people that carried arms. MR BIZOS: They don't say they were traditional weapons, not arms Mr Chairman. Yes, traditional weapons, not arms.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) to the knowledge of their clients. MR BIZOS: Except Mr Chairman, that the Committee will not only, with respect, be concerned with the knowledge of their clients.

CHAIRPERSON: That's understandable, we are going to be looking at the totality of the evidence.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but what I am saying is this, that evidence is available which doesn't emanate from us, about how some of the persons that were in the immediate vicinity of Shell House at the relevant time were armed.

CHAIRPERSON: We will hear that when the evidence is led.

MR BIZOS: In the absence of an admission that that was so, then we will have to lead the evidence, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Then at paragraph 17, Mr Chairman:

"That as the marchers were leaving Park Station some of them fired shots from heavy calibre weapons."

Now, Mr Chairman, we will also have in due course maps of the whole area in order to show the distance between Park Station and Shell House so that - it's denied by Dr van Wyk, page 97, 1.10 and Mosselson says on page 118, paragraph 25, that they have no instructions.

"that as the marchers moved from Park Station in the direction of Shell House some were knocking over bins, smashing cars, shouting and screaming and making violent gestures."

Page 97, paragraph 111, Dr van Wyk says the objectors admit that they moved from Park Station in the direction of Shell House. They however deny that they were aware of the whereabouts of Shell House and state that they merely marched behind their Indunas. Save ...[indistinct] the objectors deny the contents of this paragraph. Mosselson's say that they have no instructions, on page 118, paragraph 25,

"That these groups of marchers were not accompanied by police escorts of independent monitors."

Paragraph 19 on page 9, Dr van Wyk says that they have no knowledge of page 97, 1.12, and Mosselson say that they have no instructions, at page 118, paragraph 25.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, I've been reminded that we're about to take the customary adjournment, is there very much further that you are going to go along these lines?

MR BIZOS: I'm finishing off with one page on paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 in relation to this matter. There are other matters that I will have, but it will not be inconvenient in any way to just continue after the adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, very well, we will take a short adjournment ...[inaudible] this morning. We'll take a short adjournment and if it is at all possible, let's try and make a short adjournment. We will resume, it's 12h00 now, we will - can we resume in not more that 15 minutes from now. We will resume at 12h15.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

MR BIZOS: Page 10:

"That the presence of armed members of the ANC on the balcony of Shell House in King George Street was claimed invisible to persons in the position of the marchers."

And the answer to that is to be found on page 98. They say that the objectors were not aware of the presence of armed members of the ANC on the balcony of Shell House until the shooting started. We will have to live with that answer for the time being Mr Chairman.

And paragraph 21:

"That after the groups of marchers had converged at the intersection of King George Street and De Villiers Street, they paused for a short while and then charged forward moving south into the portion of King George Street, directly adjacent to Shell House. The objectors denied that they ..."

Page 98, paragraph 114:

"The objectors deny that they charged forward south in the portion of King George Street directly adjacent to Shell House. They merely marched in the direction of aforesaid, ...[indistinct] aforesaid the contents of this paragraph is admitted."

Now, and Mosselson says at page 118, paragraph 26:

"It is admitted that the number of marchers converged at the intersection of King George and De Villiers Streets prior to the shooting incident taken place. The remainder of the contents of this paragraph is however not admitted."

And 22:

"That the marchers ignored the attempt by two uniformed members of the South African Police to stop and/or divert them, and that as they charged forward one of those policemen was struck and injured with a sharp instrument."

Dr van Wyk, page 98, paragraph 1.15:

"The objectors admit that the objectors ignored the attempt by the two members of the South African Police to stop them and/or divert, however, they deny that they charged forward and state that they merely marched forward, ...[indistinct] aforesaid, the objectors deny the contents of this paragraph."

And as far as Mosselsons are concerned, on page 119, paragraph 27:

"It is unknown at this stage whether the individual objectors were aware of the attempts by the persons mentioned in these paragraphs to either stop and/or divert the marchers."

Then in paragraph 23 on page 10:

"That the marchers ignored the attempt by a civilian, being Mr Ralph von Eggedy, to stop them and that as they charged forward he was struck a number of times by the marchers and knocked to the ground."

Now, if you would have a look at page 98, paragraph 1.16:

"The objectors admit that they ignored the attempt by Mr von Eggedy to stop them, however, they deny that they charged forward and state that they merely marched forward, sabres aforesaid, the objectors deny the contents of this paragraph."

And paragraph 24:

"That the marchers fired a number of shots with various firearms, including at least one AK47, in the direction of Shell House, on the security personnel of the ANC. The objectors deny the contents of this paragraph."

Mr Chairman, you will have seen a reference to the evidence of Mr von Eggedy. We have a situation in this instance Mr Chairman, where, and let me refer you Mr Chairman, to a statement made in heads of argument by Mr D F Dorfling, our colleague appearing for the objectors, at page 148 - the document is not before you, we can put the page before you if necessary but I want to read into the record what he said about Mr von Eggedy because we are going to ask you to accept the evidence of Mr von Eggedy and a copy of it has been inserted in the bundle. And the reason why we believe that his evidence is to be treated differently and that it should go in as uncontested facts is because of the following, at page 85 of these arguments before the inquest, it is said,

the evidence of Mr Ralph von Eggedy, 6.1:

"It is submitted that the witness Von Eggedy is an independent witness who, on the evidence, has no motive to lie and/or falsely implicate any person or group. As a result it follows that strong reliance can be placed on the evidence of this witness for purposes of the findings of this Honourable Court."

We agree, Mr Chairman, and because of that, in bundle B we have incorporated - if you have a look at bundle B at 110, you will see a drawing and a statement by Mr von Eggedy going on to page 113 and 114. This statement came into - although made shortly after the event, Mr Chairman, was only brought forth by the police who had it for some time whilst the inquest was in motion. In the evidence led Mr Chairman, there was reference by our witnesses to a white person that tried to stop the marchers but we didn't know his identity. However, the evidence on a video did show a person who did what we had said he had tried to do. The learned Judge then called for this person to be found. This was given publicity, and the person came forward and said: "This is me. I made the statement shortly after the event". The learned Judge then asked the Attorney-General's office to take a statement from him which you find at page 115 - 121, I beg your pardon, 122. This was taken by one of the counsel in the Attorney-General's office Mr Chairman. He was then asked questions by the learned Judge and his evidence is to be found at page 123 right up to 158. Mr Chairman, we consider this evidence to be reliable and we may say Mr Chairman, that he was questioned by the learned Judge. He was not cross-examined in the true sense of the word by any of the persons there. My learned friend Mr Tipp asked a few questions on page 148, 149, 150 and up to the top of page 152. He was then asked questions, by our learned friend, Mr Dorfling, from page 152 - page 156, top of page 156, Mr Chairman.

Now, I want to read at the bottom of page 152.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR BIZOS: It's three lines, Mr Chairman, and I want to be completely accurate because that we believe is its important:

"What you saw was certainly not a gathering for a picnic?"

"Quite correct."

BY THE COURT: "But now, you will tell him what was the gathering for and that is what we are having difficulty with now."

"Yes."

MR DORFLING: "I will move onto that just now, My Lord."

COURT: "Yes."

We will show Mr Chairman, we will lead evidence to show that no, no-one has ever given any credible suggestion as to what this large group of marchers was doing at Shell House once they left the Johannesburg Railway Station, we will show they had to turn eastward in order to go to Library Gardens. We will show that they turned westwards towards - I beg your pardon, westwards to Library Gardens but they turned eastward to go to Shell House. Mr Dorfling promised that the would put to Mr von Eggedy what their purpose was and the record will show that he didn't and we're waiting to this day to hear the reason why this group went to Shell House, out of its way and from which evidence we will ask you to draw certain influences and I do not want to make any further comment in relation to it at this stage, Mr Chairman.

Now, this evidence will also show that there is substantial corroboration of our evidence which will be led that there was an attack, a charge against the guards appointed and having taken a position to guard Shell House, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that statement you've just made, I have no doubt it will form part of your argument after we've heard all the evidence.

MR BIZOS: I'm merely saying Mr Chairman, the reason - we're characterising the nature of the evidence that we'll be able to give but we will go through the evidence at the end together with - now the other matter Mr Chairman, that we want to deal with is this, that the issue of what information there was available to the leadership of the ANC and the guards from the evening of Sunday the 27th right up to shortly before the attack took place at 11h13 at Shell House.

In bundle A you will find from page 13, a summary of what appears and a detailed index of what appears on SAP channel 27. That only starts at 07h38 on the morning of the 28th. However, information as to what might or was likely to happen was available to the ANC leadership from the night before. A number of affidavits were filed at the inquest proceedings including the affidavit of Mr Tokyo Sexwale in bundle B, pages 68 - 74 - there was more than one affidavit, Mr Chairman, from which it appears in point 2.1 that he had information that the ANC and PWB Regional Office in Shell House would come under attack. In paragraph 4 at page 69 he communicated this to General Calitz because there was a query Mr Chairman - you will recall that paragraph 2 says what his information was and what the people were going to do,

"There was a query during the inquest proceedings as to whether I immediately telephoned General Koos Calitz at his home late in the afternoon to inform him of the above that that did not refer to paragraph 2."

We submit that it is a wrong interpretation of paragraph 4 but wanting to make it clear that that is what he meant. On page 73 - 74 you will find a supplementary affidavit in which he spells out what he clearly meant. He considers that he had clearly said in the previous affidavit but in any event the supplementary affidavit puts it beyond any doubt.

There is also on page 75 an affidavit by Nagede Matthews Phosa, who states that he had information which he conveyed to the then President of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela. Mr Mandela's affidavit on page 47 to page 54 deals with the information that he received from Mr Phosa and others and that the steps that he took in order to prevent the widespread violence that the information indicated there was, and the steps that he took. He phoned the then President of South Africa, Mr de Klerk, the Commissioner of Police, Mr van der Merwe. And Mr van der Merwe's statement is also in bundle B, pages 42 - 46. There is a statement of Mr Joe Mtlandla on page 55 - 57, a statement from Mr Maduna on page 58 -62 and a supplementary statement from page 63 - 67.

Mr Chairman, Mr Mandela's statement we will also refer to in due course under another heading because we submit that the picture that he paints in his affidavit informs the Committee of what we may say is recent, if not present history, to the effect that the issue at the time was whether or not there would be a free and fair election or not, and - but we will refer to that. I'm sure that every member of the Committee has lived through that history, it may not even be necessary to have evidence before it but it is there.

Now, that there was going to be difficulty Mr Chairman, that there were going to be difficulties, that is the information in the possession of the ANC, is also evidenced by a confidential report appearing on page 1 of bundle B. The origin of that is from the files of the police, Mr Chairman, which was handed in into the inquest proceedings. Firstly, Mr Chairman, we will draw attention to the fact in the first paragraph, that the information then available was that the IFP Transvaal, would organise originally a march for the 25th but the information then - there will be evidence that there was this information, but then it was changed to the 28th, paragraph 3,

"That the march is intended"

I'm translating to the best of my ability, Mr Chairman, paragraph 3:

"that the march is aimed of bringing about disruption in the city."

The other matter, Mr Chairman, is what happened during the morning from 07h38 on. For this we refer you to page 13 of bundle A to page 76, Mr Chairman. I do not intend reading this out Mr Chairman. May I explain what the document is. The police have a central radio facility to which policemen out in the field report. A particular channel is indicated for particular events, channel 27 was chosen for this. As I indicated earlier it was only disclosed in July when the inquest had been going on for a few months, and what you will see is the time and the report that is made and is recorded on a tape at the centre. This is a summary.

CHAIRPERSON: This is not a transcript of the tape?

MR BIZOS: This is not a - the complete transcript is a very bulky document. What we have done, Mr Chairman, is to make a summary which we have handed in. It will be open of course to our learned friends to go through it and add to it if they so wish but we intend to rely on it and particularly to those events described, that there was generalised public violence, death, injuries and destruction on a large scale. The transcript is available, we have a copy of it in court. We submit that we do not foresee that it will be necessary to burden the Committee with such a lengthy document but our learned friends we know have a copy or copies of this because it was made available at the inquest.

The one explanation that we want to give, Mr Chairman, is that you will see that it is in time sequence but what we want to indicate is that although it is given in hours and minutes, the time given is not necessarily the precise time in which the event occurred, it is the time which the report came in, so that when a police officer reports, he may have had to do something urgent in between, before going to his radio and saying, this is what has happened but we submit that it is a useful piece of evidence which is admissible as evidence as part of the - if we were in a court of law, as part of the ...[indistinct], but certainly is reliable and we submit, vital information for the Committee to have regard to.

Mr Chairman, the inquest held by His Lordship Mr Justice Nugent concerned only 19 of the deaths that occurred on that day. It was established that over 50 people died in greater Johannesburg on that day and not only the 8 that died in the vicinity of Shell House. These dockets and/or inquest records were and are in the possession of the Attorney-General.

We have made a summary of those documents. It was handed in at the inquest. Our learned friends were given copies. We have included it in bundle B from pages 197 - 253 and intend to make use of it as information tending to prove the nature and extent of this violence that this gathering and marches led to, from which we will ask the Committee to draw an inference as to what this large group of people were doing and intended to do at Shell House.

I do not intend, Mr Chairman, taking up anymore time in relation to this document. Our learned friends had an opportunity to check what was - whether it accurately reflects what was in the Attorney-General's files and so on.

Mr Chairman, we have also included in the file two newspaper cuttings, one containing a statement which if need be we will show, that Mr Ndlovu admitted to have been correctly reported. It's to be found on page 85 and a newspaper report appearing on page 86 relating to a finding made public by the Goldstone Commission of Mr Themba Khoza's involvement in third force activities, all be it on a prima facie basis, Mr Chairman. We will draw inferences from that, Mr Chairman.

We will deal with - Mr Chairman, there are also two videos recording Mr Themba Nkosa - I beg your pardon, Mr Humphrey Ndlovu and his attitude to violence and the possession of firearms. There is a transcript of the one of a speech made in Vosloorus outside a hostel. You will find a transcript of both the vernacular and an English translation of what he said, and a video transcript on page 94.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you find out from your clients, if these are your clients, as to what the nature of the complaint is please?

NO SOUND

CHAIRPERSON: May I address my remarks to counsel who are appearing for the victims and the objectors, we can't carry on like this. I'm going to adjourn for a short while to enable you to find out whether you can articulate their problems at the appropriate time or not, because if they have no confidence in you, and wish to do it themselves, then these proceedings will have to take a different turn. I'm now going to adjourn for a short while to enable all of you to find out what precisely it is that is concerning your clients, if they are your clients. If they are not your clients then it's another matter. If they are not your clients, then it may be we have to conduct these proceedings in the absence of people who are preventing us from working properly. I'm going to take a short adjournment. I am just reminded that it is 13h00. We will take the luncheon adjournment now and resume at 14h00.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, may you proceed.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: No.

MR LAX: Just put your mike on, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Each time you read anything out, all this gets transcribed as part of the evidence again, and that's duplication, which one wants to try and avoid.

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, ...(inaudible) to the bundle. I merely wanted to indicate that on page - of this video, it is made clear on page 95 and 96 that no election is going to take place and that violence is going to be used to stop it. That's all I need to say at this stage. You will satisfy yourself in relation to the video and may I indicate that this speech was made at Library Gardens by Mr Ndlovu before the shooting at Shell House.

Mr Chairman, in order to lead a witness that is going to tell you in detail what happened, and although we were going to draw your attention to certain passages in Mr von Eggedy's evidence, we will leave that for the time being because you will have an opportunity to read it and judge the evidence given by the witnesses taken with it.

What the witnesses will tell you, Mr Chairman, is that once these two groups moved to the corner of De Villiers and King George Street, they were without police escort and notwithstanding Von Eggedy's efforts and the fact that the armed men of the ANC were fully visible, the crowds surged forward. Von Eggedy described them as being on a full charge and intent to attack. They were acting with a common purpose and they were in an aggressive, violent and attacking mode. Immediately before they charged forward, the crowd was chanting and jeering in the way that Von Eggedy described as the kind that one would do to charge oneself up when one is charging. Von Eggedy was overrun by a charging crowd, he was struck a number of times, he can be seen on the video material film shortly after the shooting with a good deal of blood running down his head.

The two uniformed and armed policemen had also tried to stop the crowd, they had run up King George Street from where the ANC men were stationed, at the corner of Plein Street. These two policemen were also roughly shoved aside. One of them received a wound with a sharp instrument in the process. May I say that large maps of the area have now become available and whilst the evidence is being led, the witness will indicate to you precisely on those large maps and the small ones that you have, both of the general area and particularly of that corner so that we may follow the evidence, Mr Chairman.

Our clients will say that the charge was accompanied by gunfire from the crowd. In response to this, the ANC men on the parapet fired shots, those on street level also fired, warning shots were fired. And then the first applicant, Gary Kruser, who was in command, gave the order to repel, shots were fired into the crowd. Kruser gave the order to cease fire when it appeared to him that the charge had stopped.

It must be appreciated Mr Chairman, that these events you will be told, took place very rapidly and under circumstances of great stress. Although the applicants believe that they acted in a justifiable manner throughout there are objective indicators that they may not have been so. Forensic evidence was presented in detail towards the end of the inquest, Mr Chairman. This evidence has been, was agreed to by all the parties and you will find that in bundle B, page 156 - I beg your pardon, 159 right up to page 196.

Now, there is a report which is in Afrikaans, if there is any problem in it, the Committee will have to deal with it, we only have it in Afrikaans, Mr Chairman. Then, you will see that from pages 180, 182 - 188 there are diagrams in colour on which the experts agreed shots came from and where they landed. The Lancet Hall ballistics start at 190 - 196, and it's signed by all three experts. This does not require further proof, we submit. The report also refers to medical evidence because the ballistics was married to the medical evidence but the medical evidence itself is not before you, certain assumptions are made in the report, and we will deal with it in due course Mr Chairman, during the course of the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there evidence to it in the inquest, in the judgment that conducted the inquest proceedings?

MR BIZOS: It is, Mr Chairman, but may we say Mr Chairman, right at the outset, that in so far as there are findings of credibility or finds of fact which are in dispute, we submit that you have to make up your own decision in relation to the common cause facts and those portions that are not in dispute, it may be a useful summary for you to have regard to.

Then, it dealt of the course only with the position of those who had died. Seven died as a result of gunshot wounds, one was stabbed with an assegai in the back. It is clear that almost all of them were hit after they had turned away. This is a fact which we accept Mr Chairman. This objective evidence correlates also with the evidence of Von Eggedy that gunfire was continuing while those who had charged forward were retreating. Shots were still ringing out from the direction of the ANC men while these people were running back.

As set out in the supplementary affidavits filed by each of the applicants, the effect of this evidence has been explained to them. They accept it, although each of them maintains that there was indeed an attack and we will try and show that there was in fact an attack, that our clients were telling the truth then and that they are telling the truth now when they tell you that there was an attack.

The applicants also accept the implications of part of ballistics evidence which suggests that the impression that they had at the time of the intensity and direction of the gunfire from the crowd is not objectively corroborated.

The ballistics evidence points also to Khumalo who was armed with an AK47 at the time at the corner of King George and Plein Streets, having fired in a far less controlled way than he would like to think. This too would have contributed to the confusion of the situation.

May I refer you to - if I may indicate by way of illustration, if you have a look at page 183 Mr Chairman, you will see the cluster of red lines from ground level onto the underside of the parapet at SW1, do you see that, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, the ballistics show that 10 of those shots came from Mr Khumalo's AK47. Now, he believed that he actually shot in the direction of the crowd. We will show that he actually was less in control of his firearm than he thought he was and that has certain consequences in relation to the evidence. You can imagine how much dust was kicked up and how much noise and panic this may have incurred, without the people actually around Mr Khumalo knowing where the shots that were kicking up that dust were coming from and we give it as an example of the confusion that was created.

It will also be shown, Mr Chairman, the ballistics will also show that two shots from a pistol were in fact fired into the ceiling in corroboration of Rama's evidence, which was - I beg your pardon, Kruser's evidence, was that he ordered him to fire two warning shots, and the ballistics will show that there were two pistol shots in fact against the under portion of the parapet or the counter-lever slam.

Now, for - what it boils down to is that the applicants accept that their belief and recollection what happened may not be fully correct. They accept that there may have been mis-judgment on their part. In particular they accept that the shooting by them may have continued for too long and that they would therefor have exceeded the bounds of legitimate self-defence. That was one of the findings of the inquest record. Although that finding is not in a way binding on the Amnesty Committee, it has been explained to the applicants that another court, whether it's criminal or civil, may come to the same conclusion. It is on that basis that they seek amnesty.

Each of them has declared that what he did was purely on behalf of the African National Congress, to protect its members and its leaders and ultimately to protect the long cherished dream held by each of them for the truly democratic and non-racial election.

Mr Chairman, the first witness is going to be the first applicant.

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, perhaps before we proceed with the first witness, Mr Bizos has made certain comments with regard to the particulars requested and the particulars supplied. I do not know whether this would be the opportune time, perhaps, before we hear the first witness, for a response to the submissions made by Mr Bizos in this regard.

CHAIRPERSON: My inclinations were that you would cover that ground when you lead the evidence of your witnesses. I thought that we might find ourselves taking up too much time debating issues without really hearing the evidence of witnesses, and if it is at all convenient, you might cover that ground when you are leading evidence or putting your questions to witnesses. If you think that that would not be adequate, then I will afford you an opportunity now to do so but I would like you to understand that we are anxious to get done with the calling of witnesses and without too much time being taken up.

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, I would just like to respond very briefly on three aspects, it wouldn't take longer than three or four minutes. It concerns specifically the responses by the firm Mosselson & Associates on whose behalf I act in these proceedings.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) the calling of the evidence. Yes?

MR DORFLING: Thank you, Mr Chairman. I think Mr Bizos' objections to the particulars supplied could basically be dealt with under three headings which I would very briefly like to deal with. The first being, that Mr Bizos is of the view that the position set out in the answer to a reply for further particulars pertaining to the specific factual situation and the legal grounds on which the objectors oppose the applications were not dealt with. I, with respect, do not agree with that contention.

What was dealt with in the reply to the request for further particulars is merely a referral to the affidavits by the objectors. The affidavits by the objectors sets out the factual position on which they rely. They would, for example, say that, we were not attacking, there was no justification for us being shot at, we were running away at the time when we were being shot at.

Whether this falls within the ambit of the provisions of the act under which this Committee considers amnesty is a matter for legal argument and that has exactly been the response from the objectors. They say, we give the factual evidence, look at the affidavits for that. As far as the legal position is concerned, that's a matter for legal argument, hence the refusal to supply a legal basis for not supplying that particulars.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there no way in which you can formulate the basis on which you are opposing the application for amnesty, beyond saying that there has not been a full disclosure, which of course is a blanket phrase that has been used. If you can be of assistance to us by indicating to us what the grounds are on which you will be opposing this application, now, it would be very convenient for us, because once we know the grounds, then it may be that a lot of the cross-examination of witnesses can be avoided and the issues will then be more focused on what the grounds of which you object are. I can understand the dispute of facts, but I'm talking about the grounds on which you are objecting about from a factual dispute.

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, very basically, the essence of the objection relates to a failure to disclose in full particulars the details of what happened on that day. If I could be more specific, it relates to ...(inaudible) took place and lastly the perceived situation, being the perceived situation that there was an attack whereas factually it wasn't the situation. Now, we are of the view that those grounds have been dealt with fully at the inquest proceedings and that the evidence bears out the findings in this regard and we would seek to put such evidence in front of this Committee that would support the findings by His Lordship Mr Justice Nugent in this regard. So basically those three grounds are basis on which we say there wasn't full disclosure.

Then furthermore it is our contention that the applications as they stand at present, we are present in possession of the applications made by the applicants which contain affidavits and a filled in roneo form, we say that also does not comply with the Act in that it does not show the so-called political objective which the act requires. Basically those are, in essence, the grounds on which we object.

There are the other two points I would like to deal with, Mr Bizos has criticised the objectors for not specifically dealing with the questions pertaining to the injuries, nature of injuries and so forth. With the greatest respect, the objectors of which six of the nine affidavits have been made available to Mr Bizos, indicate what the nature of the injuries are, what the applicant was doing at the time when he sustained the injury, and in the particulars Mr Bizos ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You say applicant, you mean objector?

MR DORFLING: I beg you pardon Mr Chairman, yes indeed, we mean the objector's affidavits. It sets out the detail of the nature of the injury and the circumstances in which it was sustained. In other words, whilst I'm in a jacking mode or running away, shot from behind, shot from the side, those particulars do indeed appear in the objector's affidavits.

Then, Mr Bizos in the request for further particulars seeks the objectors to admit to certain facts, for example speeches of Mr Humphrey Ndlovu, radio transcripts which transpired between policemen and members of the ANC. At present my position is simply this, that I'm appearing on behalf of nine individual objectors. I'm not in a position to admit facts that don't fall within the ambit of the knowledge of those individual objectors. I cannot therefore make admissions that might bind and might have legal consequences on parties on whose behalf I carry no mandate to appear.

Certain suggestions were made that we should be able to admit that the meeting that the meeting took place, for example, at the instance of the IFP. Appearing on behalf of the objectors without knowledge of this fact I'm not in a position to either admit or deny such facts and therefore, their response in the request for further particulars that we're not in a position, it might have a lot of legal consequences and therefor, we're not in a position.

CHAIRPERSON: Now when you saw a letter applying for permission to hold a meeting and giving reasons for the meeting, does that not put you in a position to answer the purpose of that march or the procession?

MR DORFLING: No, Mr Chairman, with the greatest respect, without having a mandate to take specific instructions from the party or entity involved, being the IFP in that instance, I'm not in a position to admit to those facts.

CHAIRPERSON: Will it be some time before you are going to get that information, or is it that you have had not had time to get instructions on that?

MR DORFLING: No, it's simply a question of me not having a mandate to appear on behalf of the IFP. I'm simply appearing on behalf of nine objectors ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I understand.

MR DORFLING: And they don't have any mandate to either admit or deny that on behalf of the IFP. Those are basically the points I wanted to raise, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Anybody else who wishes to make comments at this stage before we start hearing evidence of witnesses?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Mr Chairman, with your permission, the document that Mr Bizos referred to as Dr van Wyk's answers or replies to his question actually is a document with a heading that it is the replies of the legal representatives, jointly myself, my colleague Mr P A van Wyk and Dr van Wyk and therefor on behalf of those objectors.

Secondly, insofar as the objectors we represent, on page 78 and further of the documentation the Committee will find an affidavit of Arm Johannes van Wyk, who is Dr van Wyk. In particular, it answers all the questions raised by Mr Bizos. Insofar as the grounds is concerned, he specifically set out the grounds as it appears from page 80 with reference to paragraph 4 and further. I wish to refer to paragraph 6 where we set out in detail that paragraph 1:

"None of the applicants made a full disclosure of the relevant facts as is required by the section 21 of the relevant act."

Point 2:

"The applicants blatantly lie about their motives why they shot at Zulu marchers on the particular day,"

And that thereafter in full it is set out why we say so, or the objectors say so. Mr Chairman, I do not wish to read out the full affidavit, but it is there for the Committee.

Insofar as the admissions my learned friend sought us to make, I wish to state the following: It is our specific instructions as is set out in affidavits as well as in the affidavit of Dr van Wyk, that the objectors who we appear for were approached by the Indunas, the Zulu Indunas and informed them of a gathering on behalf of the King or in support of the King. They reacted to that request and they wished to attend this meeting on behalf of their King.

They do no, or they are not aware of the applications made by members of the IFP and furthermore, are not aware and were not aware at least, of speeches referred to by my learned friend, Mr Bizos. More in particularly, seeing that they did not even reach Library Gardens, they were not aware of that particular speech and cannot therefore associate therewith.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR PRETORIUS: They were not there. They were not at Vosloorus. I think it's common cause that the objectors which we act for were from Mansfield Hostel, which is not Vosloorus and that therefore, whatever was said by the IFP leaders there, cannot be made part and parcel of the objectors that that is them or that is their attitude Mr Chairman.

They deny that they were ever involved in any attack on Shell House and will state that they were shot by the applicants without any reason. In due course evidence to that effect will be led. Insofar as it answers the questions raised by Mr Bizos, I wish not to deal with everyone as I've indicated to the court, that is it, unless there's further questions, Mr Chairman, or members of the Committee would like me to answer to. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, I'm not going to ask you to reply to what I have heard and I have no doubt that the points that have been raised by you and that have been raised and the answers given are all going to form part of the evidence that will emerge during the hearing of the evidence, so let us just then proceed. Thank you very much.

MR BIZOS: We call the first applicant Mr Chairman, Mr Gary John Kruser and whilst he's being sworn in, may I hand up maps to be attached to the bundle with the next page at 255. This is a map of the general area and reference will be made to the streets. For the Committee's convenience we have highlighted the streets that are of particular relevance, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That's to be page 255 of bundle B?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Currin, I'm sorry, before the evidence of this witness is led, I omitted to ask you whether there was any comment you wish to make on the issues that we've been talking about.

MR CURRIN: I have comment on the issues, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Your full names for the purposes of the record?

GARY JOHN KRUSER: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: What is your present occupation?

MR KRUSER: I'm presently employed by the South African Police Services as a Director and as Head of National Protection Services.

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible]

I'm with the rank of Director and I'm the Head of National Protection Services of the South African Police Services.

MR BIZOS: When were you appointed to this position?

MR KRUSER: About July '95 if I remember correctly.

MR BIZOS: And what was your occupation during March 1994?

MR KRUSER: I was Deputy Head of the African National Congress, Security Department.

MR BIZOS: Who was the Head of the Security Department?

MR KRUSER: The Head was the late Commissioner Gadu.

MR BIZOS: When did he pass away?

MR KRUSER: He passed away in '97.

MR BIZOS: You have applied for amnesty and there's an amnesty application which is to be found on pages 1 - 8. You also made a supplementary affidavit to your application for amnesty which is to be found on page 29(a) of bundle A.

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: You made two affidavits and a statement which are to be found on pages 8 - 29 of bundle A.

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, before we go into any details, could you please tell the Committee, Mr Kruser, when did you become involved in political activity in South Africa for the first time?

MR KRUSER: I grew up in Cape Town on the Cape Flats and grew up in a family which was very politically conscious at the time, but my direct involvement in politics itself came about in 1976 with the uprise in Soweto. I was elected onto a Committee which, a school committee, Spes Bona High in Athlone where we managed the first boycotts which took place in Cape Town.

MR BIZOS: Would you please tell us about your home background, whether you came from a well-off family or not.

MR KRUSER: I was born to a family of five children. My father was a bricklayer. I grew up in a wooden-iron house ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And that your father was what?

MR KRUSER: He was a bricklayer, as they called him then. We grew up in a wooden-iron house with a toilet in the yard, non-flushing toilet, poverty wasn't theory with us, we felt the brunt of poverty in our upbringing.

MR BIZOS: I'd like you to speak up a little and possibly put on the light whenever you speak and speak a little louder so that the members of the Committee and our colleagues don't find it difficult to hear you.

CHAIRPERSON: What kind of education had you had?

MR KRUSER: I completed my matric in 1978 and I preceded to do apprenticeship in fitting and turning and subsequently changed to boilermaking and welding and I did my further studies at Peninsula Technikon. I also started with the my degree in B.Admin while in prison, which I never completed.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you better ...(inaudible) at some stages before getting into prison.

MR BIZOS: I'm sure you were not in a hurry to get there. What did you do in 1982?

MR KRUSER: I was recruited into the ANC underground in 1982 by a cadre who was killed in the Maseru raid later on and worked in the underground in the Western Cape from there till my arrest in 1987.

MR BIZOS: Were you accused of, among other things, high treason in 1987?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, I was in the Tony Yengeni trial with 11 others and the initial charge was high treason. It was later changed to terrorism and I was acquitted in 1990.

MR BIZOS: Did you remain in custody throughout this?

MR KRUSER: I remained in custody throughout my awaiting trial.

MR BIZOS: And did you actually go into exile or did you remain in the country?

MR KRUSER: I operated in a manner where I left the country on occasions to meet leaders like Chris Hani to bring in cadres into the country and also to bring in arms into the country but I never stayed for long periods or I never went to any camps. My training was all done informally by the movement.

MR BIZOS: Did your activities form part of the trial that you were in custody for 3 odd years?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, one of the charges was being a member of the ANC and being a member of uMkhonto weSizwe.

MR BIZOS: You were acquitted on all those charges?

MR KRUSER: Around 1990 we were acquitted.

MR BIZOS: And you don't have to apply for amnesty in relation to those things?

MR KRUSER: I think not.

MR BIZOS: What training have you had in relation to the work that you were doing in 1994 and the work that you are doing now?

MR KRUSER: My initial training in the security field, I previously trained in the military field and in the intelligence field in the underground structures, but in early 1990 I was sent on a training course and I was trained by the Special Forces of Britain and the purpose of the training was to equip myself for the job I am presently holding, which included protection of leadership, protection of installations, doing threat analysis, doing risk management and at the end of the course the recommendation was made by our course leaders that I should be put in the management, and I was then appointed to the Deputy Head of the Security Department in the ANC.

MR BIZOS: You mention that you went to do part of your training in the United Kingdom, was any part of your training nearer home, although not in South Africa?

MR KRUSER: I did a three month course in Zimbabwe on special training around the same work with the Special Forces. It was held in one of the Zimbabwe military camps and it was something that was done with the consent of the present government of that day.

MR BIZOS: What sort of specific training did you have, if any, in relation to the protection of buildings and personnel with the in-buildings during your training?

MR KRUSER: The training I am talking about included specifically around different levels of security, which being immediate security around close protection, you talk about protection of the outer perimeters of buildings, protection of mass events where you deal with crowds, crowd management. I also did a further course with Group 5, which is also a British group around the evaluation and orders of buildings itself where you can look at a building and draw up a security plan to protect that building. It was also a specialised course which I did for three months with Group 5 at a later stage.

MR BIZOS: Did you consider yourself sufficiently trained to be the Deputy Security Officer of Shell House in 1994?

MR KRUSER: I think I had more than adequate training to do the job.

MR BIZOS: In so far some of the evidence that may be led, could you just describe Shell House for us please, because I don't know whether all members of the Committee are familiar with it. Is it a small or a large building?

MR KRUSER: Shell House is the headquarters of the ANC. It's in Plein Street, covered by King George and Plein Street. It's a 22-storey building, it's probably the highest building in that vicinity. It is surrounded by taxi ranks, both the long distance taxi rank and the local - probably the main local taxi rank. It's surrounded by Park Station which is probably the busiest station in the vicinity of Johannesburg. So, it's situated next to Small Street which is the height of activity for hawkers and other things, so it's situated in the area which is I think fairly well-known and frequented by many people.

MR BIZOS: When did the ANC move into Shell House?

MR KRUSER: Sometime in 1991, I don't know the exact date.

MR BIZOS: By 1994, would you say that anyone involved in any sort of political activity or interested in what was happening in 1994 - was this a building that was not known to the general public as the headquarters of the ANC, or was it generally known as the headquarters of the ANC?

MR KRUSER: I think it was a fairly well-known building, I think especially people involved with the political activity of the day within the Gauteng area would have known the building.

MR BIZOS: And how many people worked in Shell House in March 1994?

MR KRUSER: Numbers are difficult to get, but we had 22 floors and they were all occupied by ANC staff.

MR BIZOS: Was there much activity at that time in relation to any particular event that ...(inaudible) after the end of March?

MR KRUSER: The ANC's just generally was a building where there was a lot of activity, and with the election emerging, the ANC set a national election office there which meant even greater activity took place. There was also a process of where cadres was sent out of the country to train for formal military training and go to Wallmansthal. They all departed from that place, so there was a hype of activity at any given stage at Shell House.

MR BIZOS: And what about the ANC leadership, where were their offices?

MR KRUSER: They were all in Shell House, on various different floors in Shell House.

MR BIZOS: Did Mandela have an office there?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, he had an office.

MR BIZOS: Mr Sisulu?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, he had an office.

MR BIZOS: Mr Mbeki?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Mr Madunu?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Mr Matthew Phosa?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Mandela?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Well, is there - are the people who are now leading people in public life and in Government and who were members of the ANC, were they all housed in Shell House?

MR KRUSER: I would say the majority of members who are now cabinet members were housed in Shell House, Trevor Manuel, Gill Marcus, Jacob Zuma, I think majority of the leaders of the ANC were then housed full-time in the ANC office.

MR BIZOS: And what security was there at Shell House?

MR KRUSER: On the normal day there would be about a compliment of 20 people who would work there on a normal basis to do access control and other things.

MR BIZOS: Were they all trained security personnel, or were they all members of the ANC, what was the position?

MR KRUSER: They were all members of the Department of Intelligence and Security and they were all based in the Security Department. Their training varied, some members were members who came from out of the country who had military training out of the country, some members were trained internally, some of the members were inherited from the company which worked there when the ANC took over and thought it would be inhumane to throw to the streets. We then inherited those members and re-trained them to stay on at Shell House.

MR BIZOS: How many entrances were there to Shell House?

MR KRUSER: There were the front entrance which is the formal entrance people use, there was a formal entrance to come in by car at the back and also a formal exit entrance for cars at the back and then there were about three or four other entrances which came via the shops around Shell House itself.

CHAIRPERSON: Well what street was the front entrance?

MR KRUSER: The front entrance was in Plein Street and for the cars, the entrance and exit was in De Villiers Street at the back.

CHAIRPERSON: What street?

MR KRUSER: De Villiers.

MR BIZOS: The garage entry and exit gates in De Villiers Street, were the roller-shutter doors shut on the 28th?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: The main entrance on Plein Street, what control was there to stop, we're not interested about individuals or small groups which I presume the ordinary security apparatus such as there are in this building this morning for us to come in, don't concern yourself with that for the time being, what security was there to prevent any large crowd that would want to attack the building and the leadership, to stop them from doing so?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I took over the deployment of people, which I'll explain in more detail later. We worked on a plan which is commonly used which we call three circles of defence. We had the inner circle which would be the people inside the building with the leadership on various floors, we had the middle circle of security which would be the people in the foyer, should people come through the glass, and then what we call, we have the last line of defence which is the strongest circle, which is the outer circle which under normal circumstances we would have put right around the building but because we were not a statutory force and there was no way to retreat from, we used flanks on the front of the building and a group directly in front of the doors in the foyer.

MR BIZOS: Before we go into any detail, you told us that the election was about the take place. How important was this election to you personally?

MR KRUSER: As someone who grew up under very difficult circumstances and also for someone who grew up in the movement for many years, I grew up in the movement, it's the only thing I've done for many years, and that's the culture I grew up in, election was always the ultimate thing for us as a movement and for me as a person.

For the movement in us, something that I never thought would come in my life although we always had the slogan, and when negotiations took place and this dream, our free and democratic country coming into being, came about through negotiations, it's a feeling which is very difficult to explain and the feeling we had when we went to election because I know where I come from, areas where I have gone to Northern Province where people drink out of waterholes and together with animals, that suddenly we'll have a Government in place which could make a difference to those people's lives. Maybe not immediately, but over a period of time, change the lives of our people.

We'll have a secure - a police system and a Justice system, maybe not immediately but over a period of time we'll have something which represents the aspirations of the majority of people in this country and it's something I hold dearly and it's something I think I was prepared to die for but I was not prepared to lay down my life unnecessarily for that process.

MR BIZOS: You speak about the movement, where you an active member of an organisation other than the African National Congress?

MR KRUSER: I worked within the Mass Democratic Movement in the Youth League from a very early age in Cape Town, part of the UDF, part of church organisations, I worked in NGO's in the poor areas in the African townships in Cape Town, so my involvement in politics was not limited to the ANC but also to Mass Democratic Movements within the country itself.

MR BIZOS: When did you for the first time hear that there would be a meeting, a march organised by the IFP for the end of March?

MR KRUSER: I'm not sure of that but I think this was public knowledge, it was in the newspapers, we spoke about it in the office, but I think at least a week prior to that we were aware of the march that was about to take place in town.

MR BIZOS: Was it going to be in Johannesburg?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Did that give you any apprehension as the Deputy Head of Security or as an individual?

MR KRUSER: Any march by the IFP in town would always be a concern for us. There's been previous marches in town where window panels of ANC headquarters had been broken and cracked. There's been mass destruction in previous marches by IFP through town. I remember specifically around the issue of the signing of the Peace Accord at Carlton Centre, what happened after that event, what happened to the hawkers on the street, what happened to people fleeing down the streets in Johannesburg, so there's always apprehension when the IFP gave a march in town. There would always be concern around that.

MR BIZOS: Have you had any personal knowledge of what happened at Boiphatong?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, Chairman. I was called out early in the morning, me and a colleague of mine, Thabo Khubu went out to Boiphatong, we were phoned by a journalist and we went with two members of our DIP Department, which is the Department of Information and Publicity, people with cameras. When we arrived there we drove through the township and we saw the mass destruction left behind by the IFP people going through with their weapons.

I'm also aware that there were many people charged with that event and I know a few people were convicted of that event from the hostels nearby, but to see people maimed, killed, children, women, I think there was no, just indiscriminately people were killed, and that always sticks in my head when I think of people with dangerous weapons marching through town, what they can leave behind if they really want to.

MR BIZOS: What do you regard as dangerous weapons?

MR KRUSER: Spears, assegais, kierries as they call them, firearms, knives, pangas, things which can cause destruction and kill people.

MR BIZOS: You told us of how important the election was for your personally, can you tell us how important your organisation, the African National Congress regarded the election?

MR KRUSER: I'm not a leader of the ANC but I know when I worked within the ANC, even at negotiations, the ANC was prepared to bend over backwards to ensure there was a democratic election in this country. It went - they made many compromises which I think today, I think many people are very unhappy about it, but the fact that we wanted to have a platform where we could govern this country and give people the basic dignity of just voting for people of their choice, I think the organisation would have gone to any lengths to ensure that that happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Would have gone to any lengths to ensure what?

MR LAX: Just repeat that on the mike.

MR KRUSER: That the democratic election took place.

MR BIZOS: Did the ANC want only a portion, or the whole of the population to take part in the election?

MR KRUSER: I think it was important for the organisation to ensure that we have the largest majority of people and consensus around all the political parties in this country to take part in this election because that I think would ensure that there would be peace in this country.

MR BIZOS: Prior to the 28th of March did you know whether or not the IFP was committed to taking part in a free and fair election or whether they had an anti-election campaign?

MR KRUSER: I think it's common knowledge for anyone who read newspapers at the time in that day, the IFP was opposed to elections at that stage, together with some right-wing political parties.

MR BIZOS: Did you know what the purpose of this march was that was to take place on the 28th of March?

MR KRUSER: It was the launch of the IFP anti-election campaign.

MR BIZOS: Would any disruptive, violent conduct by the ANC at the time, by you or anyone else in the ANC, any public attack against the IFP or anyone else, do you know whether that would have served the interests of the ANC's policy at the time which you told us wanted a free and peaceful election?

MR KRUSER: I think contrary, I think that would have served the aims and objectives of those people opposed to democracy coming about in this country.

MR BIZOS: Not the ANC?

MR KRUSER: Not the ANC.

MR BIZOS: On the Sunday evening, did you get any information about what was to happen or may happen on the Monday morning?

MR KRUSER: On Sunday the 27th I was called, Sunday evening the 27th I was called by the late Commissioner Gadu who informed me that they received information to the effect that the march will be used as a decoy to attack Shell House.

MR BIZOS: Did he tell you anything else?

MR KRUSER: He also informed me, and I just want to say, Chair, I get a bit confused because I had a meeting with him on the Monday morning too, so some of the things I'm not sure whether took place the Sunday or the Monday, but we had a - he phoned me the Sunday and early Monday we also had a meeting, so some of the things become a bit confused, but he also informed me at some stage that the police had been phoned to assist with protecting Shell House and he also informed me at some stage that the President had phoned the late President De Klerk to also inform him about the information that's come to our attention.

MR BIZOS: Let's get the President and former President correctly, were you told that the then President of the ANC telephoned the former President of South Africa?

MR BIZOS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: And you were also told that the police were informed about fears about Shell House?

MR KRUSER: That's correct. I also spoke to a Andrew Sithlabane who's better known as Joe my baby, he's the head of installations of the ANC, he works directly under me on Sunday evenings and we then had a discussion and he agreed that he would phone Captain Wilkins who was the Liaison Officer from the police at that time for the area and he phoned me back to inform me that he has spoken to Captain Wilkins and assurances have been given that the police would assist in securing Shell House.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you told that Captain Wilkins had given such an undertaking?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Did you expect a small - if there was any, if there was going to be an attack against Shell House, did you expect a small or a large group to take part?

MR KRUSER: There were many options but I think the most viable one we thought about was the issue of a big group of marchers storming the Shell House.

MR BIZOS: With so-called traditional weapons or firearms including AK47s and other automatic weapons and hand-guns did you know whether the IFP at the time had access to such a fire arms?

MR KRUSER: I was aware through our intelligence reports and also we were in the toll once, when we were shot on by IFP members with AK47s and based on intelligence reports we were aware they were fairly well armed.

MR BIZOS: Did you think either on the Sunday or Monday morning that your 20 security persons with a fire power that you had would be enough to ward off any attack by the IFP?

MR KRUSER: The first thing, one of the things I told Joe my baby on the Sunday when we spoke about, was to re-enforce the present number of guards with people who were not on duty that day to try to increase the numbers, but the fact that they gave me the assurance and also Commissioner Galie said they spoke to the police, that the police would assist in terms of the protection of Shell House, I had no doubt in my mind because in the future there was no problem with them assisting, but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You're a bit indistinct.

MR KRUSER: As Joe my baby, Andrew Sithlabane ...(intervention)

 

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR KRUSER: The surname?

CHAIRPERSON: Spell the name please.

MR KRUSER: A-N-D-R-E-W. The surname is: S-I-Y-H-L-A-B-A-N-E.

MR LAX: You referred to a name, I can't, is it Joe my baby ...(intervention)

MR KRUSER: He's normally referred to as Joe my baby, we normally called him Joe my baby, his proper name is Andrew Sithlabane.

MR BIZOS: Who did you expect, if there was going to be an attack, who did you expect to have the primary responsibility for the defence of Shell House, your security department or the police?

MR KRUSER: I think the responsibility lied with the statutory force at that stage.

MR BIZOS: Statutory force?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: You mean police and the army?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: What time did you come to work on the Monday morning, the 28th of March?

MR KRUSER: I arrived just before 08h00 on Monday morning.

MR BIZOS: Did you see anything untoward along the way?

MR KRUSER: I stayed in Yeoville which is north of Johannesburg and Shell House, and on driving through Hillbrow and Joubert Park I saw people fleeing from armed groups of marchers.

MR BIZOS: Was there any apparent reason why people were fleeing?

MR KRUSER: I could only draw the conclusion that they were being assaulted or attacked by the marchers.

MR BIZOS: What sort of groups of marchers did you see on the way in early in the morning? ...(inaudible)

MR KRUSER: The marchers were about groups of 50, they were not very big groups of marchers and they were armed with what they would call traditional weapons, pangas, assegai, kierries and that sort of thing.

MR BIZOS: Did I understand you to say that when the marchers came, did only some people run away or did all in front of them run away?

MR KRUSER: I think generally everyone was scattering, people were scattering in all directions to the effect that there has been a shooting at Lancet Hall and I decided to go and see what the situation is at Lancet Hall and I proceeded to Lancet Hall.

MR BIZOS: How far is Lancet Hall away from Shell House?

MR KRUSER: It's two streets up southwards.

MR BIZOS: On what street is the main entrance of Shell House?

MR KRUSER: Plein Street.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon, Lancet Hall.

MR KRUSER: It's Jeppe Street.

MR BIZOS: Is there a garage entrance to Lancet Hall.

MR KRUSER: That's correct, I think it's in Von Willieg Street if I got it correctly, I'm not sure.

MR BIZOS: And what were you told, or what did you see when you got to Lancet Hall?

MR KRUSER: On arriving in Jeppe Street I noticed an ambulance parked a bit east of the entrance into Lancet Hall and went to have a look what was happening there. I saw medical people treating two people, I don't know whether they were injured or they were dead, but they were surrounded by medical people and I then proceeded into Lancet Hall.

MR BIZOS: Did you speak to anyone in Lancet Hall?

MR KRUSER: In the foyer of Lancet Hall I met a few of the Lancet Hall security people and we discussed, and I asked them what had happened there, we had a discussion, and the conclusion we came to that these people were injured in the process of them attacking members in Lancet Hall's entrance.

MR BIZOS: Did what you saw and what you were told affect your state of mind as to what might happen at Shell House?

MR KRUSER: I think it further cemented the intelligence or the information I received, that the IFP was intent on attacking Shell House.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether that attack at approximately 08h00 in the morning was reported to the police?

MR KRUSER: I was not aware then, but ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: The attack on Lancet Hall?

MR BIZOS: Lancet Hall. On Lancet Hall, Mr Chairman.

MR KRUSER: I was not aware then, but I'm aware of it now.

MR BIZOS: Do you now know that it was reported?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: By whom?

MR KRUSER: When we were busy with the inquest it come to light that the police tried to go into Lancet Hall and tried to investigate the matter. I read it, or in discussions when we were doing preparations for the inquest it came to my knowledge.

MR BIZOS: And what did you do when you returned to Shell House?

MR KRUSER: On my return to Shell House I proceeded to brief the Late Commissioner Gadu who was when I came into his office busy on the phone trying to get assistance from the police. We then had a discussion about the information which was available to us from our intelligence organs and he then gave me instructions to try to find members of our Intelligence Department and also arm them and deploy them together with the rest of the security members.

MR BIZOS: Did you have any discussion about any further information that may have come in?

MR KRUSER: We did discuss briefly around that thing, but the urgency was to get more people and firearms down to the bottom.

CHAIRPERSON: The people they were supposed to arm, were they people from the Intelligence Unit of the ANC, or were they people from the Security Unit?

MR KRUSER: Maybe I should just explain, Mr Chairman. Our department was a department of Intelligence Security. It consisted out of four sectors, we had a Security Department which dealt with physical security, VIP protection and vetting and those sort of things. Then we had a Counter-Intelligence who dealt with counter-intelligence as I explained, and then we had the Intelligence which dealt with gathering of information, then we had the Processing Division which processed all the information and did analysis of it. The decision we took was to involve, which was not unusual even at big rallies, we involved everyone from the Department of Intelligence and Security who were all trained in security.

MR BIZOS: Do you know what your Chief, Mr Gadu did, whether he phoned the police?

MR KRUSER: I said he was busy phoning the police when I came into his office and when I spoke to him he also continued to get assistance from the police throughout the day.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether he was given any assurance?

MR KRUSER: I don't recall exactly at this time.

MR BIZOS: Did you issue out firearms?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Where were those firearms?

MR KRUSER: They were held in our armoury on seventh floor in Shell House.

MR BIZOS: When had you obtained most of the weapons in Shell House?

MR KRUSER: The weapons arrived on Friday the 25th, late afternoon, and again on Saturday the 26th, the morning of the 26th most of the weapons arrived from the gun dealer.

MR BIZOS: For what purposed were they ...(inaudible)

MR KRUSER: The weapons were purchased for the purpose of election security for the ...[inaudible

MR BIZOS: And were they going to remain at Shell House or were they going to be sent to the regional offices?

MR KRUSER: The purposes of the weapons was to be distributed to all 14 regions and from there to the sub-regions.

MR BIZOS: Were they locked up at Shell House in safety on Saturday 26th March and Sunday the 27th?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, we had an armoury on the 7th floor.

CHAIRPERSON: When were they supposed to be distributed to all these regions?

MR KRUSER: As soon as possible. As soon we would get firearms in, as soon as we would get licence from the police, we would fetch firearms as they were delivered and we would then contact the regions to come and fetch them to dispatch as soon as possible.

MR BIZOS: Were any steps taken to try and find out what was going on near Shell House?

MR KRUSER: Initially in the morning I sent out small units to do surveillance in and around Shell House, also later on we developed surveillance units and commanded to monitor the events of the marches throughout town so we could get feedback what was happening in town and the direction the marches were moving in.

MR BIZOS: Did you receive any reports from these people that you sent out?

MR KRUSER: One of the reports I remember was that they tried to storm the, I think it was the TEC if I'm correct, building in town and the police shot at the marchers from - I remember that's one of the reports I got. After receiving that reports I then sent people to our election offices which was in the Carlton Centre because we were then getting scared about all the offices in town.

MR BIZOS: Where was the Independent Electoral Commission's office?

MR KRUSER: I know it was close to the Carlton Centre. I don't know the exact address, but I know the building itself, but I don't know the exact address, but it was close to the Carlton Hotel.

MR BIZOS: Did you have any thoughts as to why that particular building or that particular office was attacked and required police intervention?

MR KRUSER: It made sense to me, it was part of the process of transforming this country into a democratic country and that would be one of the things they would do to stop the elections from taking place.

MR BIZOS: If they succeeded in attacking or destroying the Electoral Commission's offices, that would have served their purposes?

MR KRUSER: I think it would have had an effect on the country and the timing of the elections.

MR BIZOS: Did you receive information from other people as to what was happening in the greater Johannesburg during the course of the night before or the morning of the 28th?

MR KRUSER: The only other source of information we received during the day of the 28th was people were monitoring the radio reports. 702 in particular were monitoring and we were getting quite a good update in terms of what was happening, the type of chaos that was happening in town at the hostels, shooting of the police and those sort of things, we were getting feedback on the radio.

MR BIZOS: And what did the situation look like outside Shell House?

MR KRUSER: There were many people who were fleeing, from where they were fleeing we don't know, but from different areas into Shell House to obtain some form of security or shelter from what was happening in town, and it was fairly tense, the guards were fairly tense, as the day was going along as things were happening, as the marchers started to pass by Shell House I think tension began to rise, we began to feel the pressure and were very apprehensive about what might happen.

MR BIZOS: Were people who were fleeing from, whatever they were fleeing from, allowed to come into the foyer of Shell House?

MR KRUSER: We had a screening process at the door where people where people were searched and checked and it was a very difficult decision because one of the theories we had that people might come in as individuals into Shell House and then launch an attack from there, but as an organisation which cares about people we had to make a very difficult decision where we had to allow people in at discretion and take those chances.

MR BIZOS: Were there any policemen at Shell House, when did you see the first policeman there?

MR KRUSER: I saw policemen which were leading the previous marchers past Shell House, and then the next time I saw the policemen was just prior to the main incident when about five members of the police and five members of the SANDF, or SADF at that stage, arrived at Shell House.

MR BIZOS: Please tell the Committee about these police led groups of marchers, how many were there on that morning before the main incident?

MR KRUSER: I recall three, three marches prior to the main incident.

MR BIZOS: Give us more or less the time when they were and what did they look like, and what did they do, and what was your reaction?

MR KRUSER: The first march was, times are very difficult, but it was early in the morning, probably at nine, around there, and the march was going in a westerly direction, from east to west, and they moved in a very provocative manner past Shell House, launching mock attacks, slashing election posters around Shell House, and our guards were very very apprehensive and very tense but we, as I say, we gave consistent orders for the strain and we analysed the situation from second to second the make sure that we didn't have to act with any unnecessary force.

MR BIZOS: You say "we" gave orders, who is the "we"?

MR KRUSER: I gave orders on two different occasions for restraint. I also received orders from Commissioners Gadu and other leaders of the ANC to act with restraint throughout the morning.

MR BIZOS: Which leaders of the ANC were there on that morning?

MR KRUSER: I remember specifically Ntlhantlha speaking to me, I remember speaking to Maduna and he spoke to me about ...[indistinct], but I'm aware that Walter Sisulu was in the building, Gill Marcus was in the building, Pallo Jordan was in the building, Terror Lekota was in the building, that's the names I can think of who were in the building. I think most of the leaders would have been in the building that day.

MR BIZOS: You told us that the one was at about 09h00 and how they behaved, was any action taken against them because of their provocative behaviour?

MR KRUSER: I'm not sure whether it was the first march or the second, I'm not exactly sure about the time periods now, but at one stage the police which were escorting the marchers directed their firearms at the guards on the balcony and also there was a large congregation of marchers in the vicinity and the front of Shell House.

Mr Terror Lekota then came out and went to speak to the police, I think it was a Major, I'm not sure who it was, one of the policemen in charge of those groups of policemen and asked him not to direct the weapons at our guards because they're trying to do their job and he also asked him to move the marchers away from the building which he subsequently did.

CHAIRPERSON: You say that some of the police were directing their firearms towards Shell House?

MR KRUSER: They were directing - our members were on the parapet on the top, and they were directing their weapons, standing in that type of position, pointing towards the guards.

MR BIZOS: Who do you say spoke to this police officer?

MR KRUSER: Mr Terror Lekota spoke to them and then I think he resolved the problem.

CHAIRPERSON: What happened as a result of Mr Lekota telling the police not to point?

MR KRUSER: They ceased pointing and moved the marchers along. The marchers then moved away from Shell House itself. There was then the last march before the big march at roundabout tennish, I remember this quite clearly. I was on top of the parapet at that stage and there were marchers moving in a southerly direction up, down Klein Street from north to south, and the marchers also act in a very similar manner but proceeded past Shell House.

So at that stage I saw from the top position, I had a very clear view what type of weapons I could see amongst them, various dangerous weapons including one AK47 which was hidden in a jacket but I could see the point of the - I'm not sure it was an AK, but it was definitely an automatic rifle's front, coming from the top of the jacket as he was carrying it.

This group proceeded towards Lancet Hall which is the Bree Street side of Lancet Hall, and a heavy exchange of gunfire took place. Whether it was between the marchers and the ANC guards at Lancet Hall, I'm not aware, but there was a heavy exchange of fire and the marchers retreated back in a northerly direction.

This also caused a lot of apprehension for our members and again I called on our members to act with restraint because I think they were very tense because now there was gunshots firing, although not in our direction.

MR BIZOS: When this group passed Shell House, in what direction were they walking?

MR KRUSER: They were moving from north to south towards Lancet Hall.

CHAIRPERSON: Along what road?

MR KRUSER: Klein Street.

MR BIZOS: Did any group march from west to east in front of Shell House?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, there was one group from west to east and one from east to west. There were two other groups besides the third which I recall.

MR BIZOS: The group that moved from west to east, would they be going towards or away from Library Gardens where the gathering was supposed to be?

MR KRUSER: That would be away from Library Gardens.

MR BIZOS: Did you speak to any of the guards after the sound of gunfire from the direction of Lancet Hall?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, Mr Chairman, I leaned over the parapet, some of our guys were standing in the road and I specifically said to them that the gunfire is not directed at us we must act with restraint, we need to act with restraint, and I emphasised that and I think after that I went down myself.

MR BIZOS: Did you go up to the parapet at all?

MR KRUSER: I moved between the parapet and the ground floor on various occasions to get a better view of what was happening.

MR BIZOS: Please tell us what you did and what you saw whilst on the parapet?

MR KRUSER: When on the parapet, as I explained earlier, I saw this one march moving up Plein Street where I saw the concealed firearm and various other dangerous weapons amongst the crowd. On an earlier occasion with one of the other marches I also used the radio which was available on top at that moment.

MR BIZOS: Did you say anything to the people on the parapet?

MR KRUSER: I think the general instruction was for people to act with restraint at all times.

MR BIZOS: Did you know Lieutenant-General Calitz and Brigadier Gouws?

MR KRUSER: I knew them, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Did they come to Shell House?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, they came to Shell House.

MR BIZOS: Do you remember the time more or less?

MR KRUSER: I think it was roundabout elevenish if I get my facts right.

MR BIZOS: You give an approximation?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: And did you meet them or did someone else meet them?

MR KRUSER: I was present when they arrived, but they were met by Mr Maduna and the late Commissioner Gadu, who then took them upstairs into Shell House.

MR BIZOS: At the time that they arrived there were there any policemen present?

MR KRUSER: That's more or less the same time I think when - or just roundabout then when the five members of the police and the SANDF arrived.

MR BIZOS: And what did you see after they were taken up into the Shell House?

MR KRUSER: While I was in the front of Shell House, Eddie Khumalo and Mondle Zuma came running towards me. They seemed quite in a panic and quite stressed and informed me that they'd been shot at in the back of De Villiers Street by oncoming marchers.

MR BIZOS: Where were you when you were told that? Just identify it so that members of the Committee can ...[intervention]

MR KRUSER: I was just in front of Shell House, in the front part of Shell House, outside the doors of Shell House.

MR BIZOS: Did you move away from there?

MR KRUSER: When they came to me and informed me what was happening, because they were part of the people I sent out to do reconnaissance around Shell House, I then took a decision because at the door one of our security members was armed with an AK47. I gave instructions for the AK47 to move with us to the corner. Myself, Eddie Khumalo and Mondle Zuma proceeded to the south-western corner of Shell House.

MR BIZOS: That's on the corner of King George and Plein Streets. To whom did you say you gave the AK47?

MR KRUSER: Eddie Khumalo took the AK47.

MR BIZOS: Did any police officer come onto the scene?

MR KRUSER: While we were there two police officers did come to the scene.

MR BIZOS: Can you name them?

MR KRUSER: One by the name of Van Reenen. I then said to them that they should go down to the crowd and try to divert the crowd away from Shell House because it looks quite dangerous.

MR BIZOS: Which crowd were you referring to?

MR KRUSER: There was a crowd on the corner of King George, coming down King George Street towards the corner of King George and De Villiers streets, and also from what I could see, it seemed like there was a crowd coming down De Villiers Street from west to east, so there were two crowds merging on the corner of ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: The ones coming from west to east, would this have been on the way to the Library Gardens where the meeting was supposed to be held, or away from it?

MR KRUSER: Contrary, to the opposite direction of Library Gardens.

MR BIZOS: You asked them to divert the marchers and what did they do?

MR KRUSER: They ran down to the crowd and they then came running back again telling us to go inside Shell House. I indicated to them that - they told us that the situation was dangerous and then they ran away. Before that I said to them, this was all in a great hurry, that we could not leave our last line of defence, that we had to keep it in place.

MR BIZOS: Could you give us some idea of the size of this crowd that congregated in the intersection of King George and De Villiers Streets?

MR KRUSER: I'm not good with estimates, but I assume about 1000 people.

MR BIZOS: And how did they appear to you, were they armed?

MR KRUSER: This crowd was very different from all the other crowds which came through.

MR BIZOS: What were the differences?

MR KRUSER: The other crowds moved almost consistently in a slow type of march or toyi-toyi as they would call it. This crowd was, as though they were humming up in type of dance at the corner, standing still but they were not moving, they seemed to be constant on the corner, that is my recollection.

I was also informed by Mondle Zuma who was standing next to me at that stage, that this is the type of war-dance they do before they go, because he knows about these things, I don't. There was also a man standing in front of the crowd, a white man with longish hair with his arms stretched out.

MR BIZOS: Stretched out, looking away from the crowd or looking at the crowd?

MR KRUSER: ...[inaudible] He was standing with his arms stretched out like this, his back to me, facing the crowd.

MR BIZOS: You didn't know this man?

MR KRUSER: I have no idea who he is.

MR BIZOS: And what happened to him?

MR KRUSER: I don't know, he just disappeared into the crowd.

MR BIZOS: And you told us that Van Reenen told you that the situation was dangerous, what did he and the other policemen do?

MR KRUSER: They ran away.

MR BIZOS: In what direction?

MR KRUSER: Behind, to the back of me, behind us. We were standing on the corner, here into Plein Street I would assume. I didn't see where they went, they just ran past us.

MR BIZOS: They didn't run towards the crowd?

MR KRUSER: No, they ran to the opposite direction.

MR BIZOS: And what did the crowd do when this white man disappeared into it?

MR KRUSER: Maybe I should just explain what happened. After the policeman came back to us we were placed in the position, myself, Veejay Ramie next to me, Eddie Khumalo was on the ground with the AK and Mondle Zuma also quite close to me. The impression I got, the crowd started moving forward, and that's when this man disappeared into the crowd.

At the same time I heard automatic gunfire emanating from the crowd. I also heard a bullet hit the window to the right of me, into Shell House, one of the shops at Shell House. I then gave the order for Veejay Rama to - I just gave an order, can you shoot the warning shots. I saw Veejay Rama shooting warning shots into the parapet at an angle. This seemed to have the opposite effect on the crowd, because they seemed to search it for it much faster and also the gunfire seemed to be intensified. I then gave the order to repel the marchers.

MR BIZOS: Now, you now know that the bullet that struck the window of Shell House was apparently a ricochet from the AK47 fired by Mr Khumalo.

MR KRUSER: That's the ballistics evidence and I accept that but in my mind I find it very difficult because I still, if I relive the events, that's what I see and what I understand happened but I accept the ballistics evidence put forward.

MR BIZOS: The ballistics evidence also show that the 10 rounds that landed on the underside of the parapet also were fired from the position in which Mr Khumalo was. Do you accept that?

MR KRUSER: I accept it. Without ballistic evidence I would not, but I can see that experts say it happened.

MR BIZOS: At the time that you heard the shots, did you believe that you - well, where did you believe that the shots came from?

MR KRUSER: My impression was that heavy gunfire was emanating from the crowd in our direction.

MR BIZOS: We also know that according to the accepted ballistics evidence there were bullets that struck the parapet, shot from the position that the crowd was in?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, there were gunshots which hit Shell House from the crowd.

MR BIZOS: At the time when this shooting was taking place, what was happening around you, for instance how far would you have been away from the ten shots that struck the underside of the parapet?

MR KRUSER: It's in my immediate vicinity.

MR BIZOS: Did you have any expectation that Mr Khumalo would fire the AK47 into the parapet?

MR KRUSER: No.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether the AK47 has any propensity, whether to go down or to lift when you shoot?

MR KRUSER: If the weapon is not well controlled it normally lifts up when you shoot it and don't control it very well.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible)

MR KRUSER: If it's not properly controlled it tends to lift up when you shoot it.

MR BIZOS: And where you were, was there any dust in the air?

MR KRUSER: There was dust, I don't recall specifically, there was just chaos in my mind. I don't recall all the details which had happened. The only thing that's very pertinent in my mind was the shot that hit the window.

MR BIZOS: At the time that you issued the order to repel, I'm sorry, can I cancel that question. You ordered Mr Rama to fire two warning shots.

MR KRUSER: I gave the order for warning shots to be fired, I never gave them ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: What weapon did Mr Ramie have?

MR KRUSER: He had a 9mm pistol.

MR BIZOS: There is evidence that two of the shots on the underside of the parapet were from a pistol. Have you know any idea as to how those marks may have been made?

MR KRUSER: The only conclusion I can reach is that it's from Mr Rama's firearm, the warning shots he fired.

MR BIZOS: At the time that you ordered the people, the armed people around you to repel, why did you do it?

MR KRUSER: It was a matter of seconds, I had to make a decision in a matter of seconds. What was very clear to me that, if they overran that line of defence ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: If they what?

MR KRUSER: If they overran that line of defence much greater life would have been lost, not only on the side of the marchers but also on the side of the ANC guards and personnel and maybe even the leaders in the office, and I decided, based on that, that the best thing to do was to repel the marchers at the start of the attack and not letting them proceed to a position where they could harm much more people.

MR BIZOS: What were they doing when you gave the order, repel?

MR KRUSER: They were surging forward, running forward and chanting and at the same time lots of gunfire was emanating from the crowd.

MR BIZOS: Was there any information at the time as to whether or not any attempt was being contemplated against the then President of the ANC, Mr Mandela?

MR KRUSER: There was information with our department that, firstly there was an attempt to assassinate him when he was supposed to go to Ulundi which our department motivated very heavily against him not going. And it was also reported that this march might be used to fulfil that, although he was not present in the building on that day.

MR BIZOS: Did Mr Mandela go to Ulundi?

MR KRUSER: He did not go.

MR BIZOS: Was Ulundi and any other area considered a no-go area for the ANC?

MR KRUSER: There were many areas in the Natal region that was very difficult to go in as ANC members.

MR BIZOS: Did you know what the people on the parapet did, the ANC people?

MR KRUSER: They were deployed there, and maybe I should first explain, for the purpose of observation, number 1 and second for the purpose of what we call secondary shooting in the case of an attack to divert the attention of the attackers and also to make the decision to shoot if they thought there was attack where people with firearms were shooting at guards of Shell House.

MR BIZOS: Can you explain what you mean by "they were there for secondary fire"? Firstly can you tell the Committee please, on what portion of the parapet were they posted?

MR KRUSER: They were posted - I posted the late Chrisly Shaba as the Commander of the parapet and he had people in all four corners for observation point. I'm sure when the attack took place most of them or all of them moved to the north-western corner at the time of the attack. I assume most of them or all of them moved to that corner.

MR BIZOS: North-western corner, would that be De Villiers and King George?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Kruser, when you say you assume that most of them moved on the north-western corner, is this the information that you are simply assuming or you were able to establish this as a matter of fact after the shooting?

MR KRUSER: I haven't managed to establish whether they all moved or most of them moved.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: And did you give an order to stop the fire?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: When you gave the order, can you say whether it was responded to immediately or whether it took a second or more?

MR KRUSER: My own observation was, I think people ceased to fire almost immediately after that call, but with the noise and the chaos it's very likely that some people could have shot longer than after the order to cease fire.

CHAIRPERSON: When you gave the order to stop firing, did you make sure that all those whom you wanted to order could hear your order?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I shouted as loud as I could and I put my hand in the air, I shouted "cease fire".

MR BIZOS: Did you see what the result of this firing was?

MR KRUSER: I saw many people lying in the street either injured or dead.

MR BIZOS: Do you know how many may have been injured or killed as a result of your, of the group that you ordered to shoot were injured, or whether and/or how many or who were injured from the people shooting from the parapet?

MR KRUSER: What I know is that 8 people died outside Shell House. How many were injured, I don't have the totals. I'm also told that, I mean, I looked at, the medical evidence that one person was stabbed, one person was shot with a Makarov probably in his side, one person was probably from the front with an AK, the rest of the people were shot with shotguns if I remember correctly in the back, they were shot with shotguns, pellets of shotguns in their backs. That's I think more or less how I recollect it.

MR BIZOS: Did any of the people that you were in charge of have a Makarov?

MR KRUSER: Not to my knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: What you mean by that is, you didn't hand out a Makarov to anybody when you handed out the firearms?

MR KRUSER: No, we did not have any Makarovs in our arsenal.

MR LAX: Did any of your members have a Makarov as their personal weapon maybe? Did you make any enquiries about that?

MR KRUSER: There are quite a few people who owned personal Makarovs licensed in their personal name.

MR LAX: Who were on duty on that day?

MR KRUSER: Possibly who were on duty on that day, I don't recall everyone.

MR LAX: Have you made any efforts to establish who they were or what - I mean subsequently become aware, you become aware of the ballistics evidence? How have you followed that up?

MR KRUSER: During the time of the inquest and prior to that when we had meetings with that department we did try to enquire if there was anyone who was at the corner with a Makarov. We could not establish anyone who was at the corner with a Makarov.

MR BIZOS: Were Makarovs available to people in Johannesburg or in South Africa at the time, not necessarily lawfully acquired?

MR KRUSER: Makarovs, like AK's was a fairly freely available weapon, as we know from our Intelligence Department and from what we know of criminal acts committed in South Africa around that time, they were fairly freely available.

MR BIZOS: And there was also a shotgun was there?

MR KRUSER: Can you explain, shotgun where?

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] shotgun on the corner?

MR KRUSER: On the corner there was no shotgun.

MR BIZOS: Was there a shotgun on the parapet?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, there were shotguns on the parapet.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you armed?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: With what?

MR KRUSER: I was armed with a 9mm parabellum.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you use it?

MR KRUSER: I did not use it.

MR BIZOS: Was there any reason why you did not use it?

MR KRUSER: I felt as the Commander I needed to try and remain as objective as possible and I thought if I do not fire I will have a better control over the situation.

MR BIZOS: Now that the ballistics evidence has become available, you attached to your amnesty application a supplementary affidavit which appears on page 29(b) of bundle A.

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: In paragraph 6 on page 29(c):

"I respectfully disagree with many of the findings of the Inquest Court. It is appropriate here to re-iterate in particular that I did not at any time intend to bring about the unlawful killing of or injury to anyone. I still believe that at the time I gave the order to repel, the marchers were in the process of attacking Shell House with the intention of damaging it and killing and injuring as many of its occupants as possible, including members of the leadership of the ANC. However, I do accept that certain aspects of the objective ballistic and medical evidence presented during the inquest are in conflict with portions of my evidence, in particular, I accept that most of the deceased were shot after they had turned back and that the gunfire which I heard coming from the marchers and which I believed was fired in my direction, was directed elsewhere. I accept further that one or more of the marchers may have been killed or injured as a result of my order to repel. Particulars concerning such persons do not fall within my personal knowledge. I understand that my legal representatives have for some time attempted to obtain particulars about injured persons from their legal representatives, but without success.

9. I believe when I gave the order to repel and when I gave evidence in the joint inquest that the shooting was justified, that it was not excessive and that my order was to cease fire was given timeously. However, I have been advised by my legal representatives that the criminal or civil court may find otherwise and hold that my actions were neither justified nor reasonable in the circumstances. Albeit on a prima facie basis, the Inquest Court has already done so. Accordingly I request that if the Amnesty Committee is satisfied that my acts or omissions constitute an offence and/or the delict of wrongfully and negligently bringing about the death or the injury to on one or more of the marchers, I be granted amnesty in respect thereof."

Do you confirm the correctness of your supplementary affidavit?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, could we give this volume a designation? We have the two volumes that you mention A and B. Is this a continuation of A or is it a continuation of B or what?

MR BIZOS: It's a continuation of A, it's interleaved. We have interleaved ours so that we have the supplementary affidavit of each of the applicants as ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry, is it not in fact an extra part of the original bundle which contains the applications and the affidavits handed in at the inquest and the finding and all that stuff that we got, which is the first document we would have received?

MR BIZOS: Yes, it is the same, I'm sorry, we, in preparing our bundle A we have interleaved these supplementary affidavits so that the Committee has all the documents relating to the particular applicant together. In the index of bundle A it shows the interleaving, Mr Chairman, if you look at the second page of bundle A.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) that A is the application, this document here, and we've not referred to it at all today. It contains the 10 applications, then you've got Lancet Hall incident and the applications of the three applicants.

MR BIZOS: Is that the only one that we have, what is the markings of ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: We've marked bundle A, the documents ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BIZOS: This should be C, this is in bundle C. Make that C1 and we will put the supplementary affidavits together because it's not as easily interleaved in you papers as it is in ours, as bundle C2 and if we could make this supplementary affidavit the first in the bundle that is going to be called C2. Are you able to follow it, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes....[inaudible] was indexed to supplementary affidavits is marked by us as C2.

MR BIZOS: We will arrange our papers accordingly as well so that there is no misunderstanding.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) does this have a key to it or is it supposed to go in without any key?

MR BIZOS: No, we've said Johannesburg city blocks for easy reference Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, it may be easier if we made copies of this plan that we've now got which was the main, which has got the whole city centre including Library Gardens and the various buildings. It may make your task easier Mr Chairman, and at an appropriate time, we have a very big one which we hope to get something to put it one so that both the witness can point and that you can see Mr Chairman. We will put those up and they will be ready for tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, there's a lot of paper here, we would like to take stock and I don't think that we will be very long with Mr Kruser tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand that we are in the position to carry on until you finish with his evidence in chief now?

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) if that suits the Committee, Mr Chairman, yes. If we've left anything out, we may seek leave to just supplement it tomorrow, but let me.

Mr Kruser, it has been suggested we heard, that you did not have any political objective in mind when these events took place. Would you like in your own words, to tell the court why you did what you did and what was the political context in which you did it?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, at the time of the shooting I was a member of the ANC and also an employee of the ANC. Secondly I was also deployed by the ANC, which is different from employment. I worked and was deployed in the position where I had to defend the ANC, its constitution, its leadership and its members, that was my function and my deployment.

The ANC at that stage was preparing itself for the first democratic election in this country. Part of my responsibility over and above my normal responsibilities was to ensure that we have proper security for elections, that's one of the reasons why we purchased the firearms. I was also aware of the immense rivalry between the ANC and the IFP at that stage and the concerted efforts by the IFP to ensure that the elections would not take place.

As I stated earlier, at the time when I gave the order to repel the marchers I had in my mind my political responsibility towards the ANC, its building, its people and its leaders and also the upcoming election which was about to take place. So I had no doubt in my mind, if they invaded the building and killed members of the ANC and leaders of the ANC that the historic election which took place in this country would not have taken place at that time. And therefor I think my political objectives was in line with my political responsibilities to defend the ANC.

MR BIZOS: In your affidavit, the first affidavit that you filed, you say that you regret the loss of life and the injuries. How do you feel about that, how did you feel about it then and how do you feel about it now?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, again I want to say I grew up in the movement, in the ANC as better known as the movement. In the movement they taught us the basics of human rights, a movement which ensures human rights exist in this country exists today and a movement which valued all human life immaterial which political party it came from. Therefor it's been very painful, not only for me, but also for my colleagues. It's something that we unfortunately are going to have to live with till the day we die.

We regret not only the loss of these lives, but the loss of all lives that was lost on that day and I think through the history of the struggle of this country. So, as a movement and as an individual we are very sorry that people died on that day, but till today I'm convinced I had no other option but to give the order to repel.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that concludes the evidence.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: We lost a lot of time this morning and I can understand some of the difficulties. I'd like to know from all of you whether it is convenient for us to make a start a little earlier tomorrow morning. Can we commence at 09h30 tomorrow morning?

MR PRETORIUS: From our point of view, yes, Mr Chairman. May I just ask at the same time, for my own sake, I presently live in the Eastern Cape and have got a flight reservation Friday for 17h15 and if we would sit on Friday later than 16h00, to make arrangements for other flights possibly, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS