DAY: 1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody. I'm Judge Pillay. I'm going to ask my colleagues as well as the various representatives to announce themselves for the purposes of the record.

JUDGE MOTATA: I am Motata from the Transvaal Provincial Division.

MR MALAN: Wynand Malan from the Commission.

MR COETSER: Adv William Coetser representing the applicant Manuel Antonio Olifant.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, Andre Steenkamp. I will be the Evidence Leader. Thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: Wim Cornelius Mr Chairman, representing John Louis McPherson.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, my name is Louis Visser. We have already placed ourselves on record. I don't know whether you've received the record of the previous hearing.

CHAIRPERSON: I haven't bothered to read it.

MR VISSER: Let me do so again Chairperson. I'm instructed by Wagener Miller and we act for Lodewyk de Jager, Johannes Christoffel Meyer, Anton Pretorius, Wilhelm Johannes Coetzee, Philip Roedolf Crause, Christoffel Johannes de Preez Smit, Wikus Johannes Loots and Johannes Albertus Steyn. Chairperson, on the last occasion I also informed you that we also appear for Mr Coetzee and we pointed out that he, that is Gen Coetzee, he is not an applicant in the present application and Stanley Schutte, Chairperson, over the page, it's page 904, his amnesty application was incorrectly bound, you will recall and he's also not an applicant in this present case.

MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. My name is Adv Danny Berger. I am instructed by the firm Dehal Incorporated from Durban. My instructing attorney is Ms Mohamed and we appear on behalf of a number of the deceased and their families. It's quite a lengthy list and let me start. The first deceased, Mr Thami Harry Mnyele, we appear on behalf of his mother, Mamanyena Sarah Mnyele, his father Kotsho David Mnyele, his wife Rhona Segale, his son Sindelo Segale and his brother Happy Mnyele.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's not talk about the law. Won't it be convenient to represent the nearest adult next-of-kin in this case being his wife only in respect of his death?

MR BERGER: Well Chairperson ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We, at the end of the day, are going to have to declare victims. I would imagine only his wife and children would qualify in terms of the Act, not his mother and father.

MR BERGER: So you don't want me to put their names on record?

CHAIRPERSON: I'm just ask here, are you not only representing his wife and child for the purposes of this application, or do you insist on the whole family?

MR BERGER: Well, I represent the whole family. If you just want me to put certain names on record, I'll do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you put on the record what you want to. I just thought I'd point out to you the practical issues, but you carry on then if you want to.

MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. Chairperson as far as Michael Frank Hamlyn is concerned, we represent his mother, Helen Hamlyn and his father Noel Hamlyn. We received those instructions only this morning, a few minutes before we started.

CHAIRPERSON: Are they present?

MR BERGER: No, they are not present. What happened was Mr Gregory Coombes, whom you're familiar with, he placed an advert in the paper.

CHAIRPERSON: I'll take you word for it, I don't recall him, but anyway, carry on.

MR BERGER: He was here on the last occasion Chairperson, when I wasn't and he placed an ad in the newspapers and as a result managed to contact the parents of Michael Hamlyn and it was only this morning that my attorney managed to speak to them.

CHAIRPERSON: For the time being, Mr Berger, I will accept that they have instructed you. I recall the issue now. When we were here last Ms Quin, who was working for the TRC at the time, sent an affidavit indicating that the parents of the unfortunate deceased wanted nothing to do with the TRC process. I don't know whether there's been a change of heart, or whether they've been brought under some impression that they needed to be here, whatever the case may be. If you're satisfied, in view of what I just told you, that they have now had a change of heart and have in fact an interest in the process, a genuine interest, then by all means, but I don't think you knew about what I've just told you. Maybe you can check it up during the course of the day.

MR BERGER: No, Chairperson, I can tell you that Ms Mohammed spoke to Mrs Hamlyn this morning and Mrs Hamlyn said that they will not be able to come up and attend the hearing but that they would like us to represent them.

CHAIRPERSON: To do what? You see, those are issues Mr Berger, I'm not taking you to task, but after you list all these people whom you represent, I'm going to have to ask you on what basis are you here. I assume that you're going to have instruction to oppose the matter and then I'm going to ask you to outline it and therefore these small issues, I'm not trying to be funny, I'm just alerting you to the issues that I foresee as problems.

MR BERGER: If I can just deal with the names, Chairperson, then I'll deal with the other issues after that.

I can just place on record that although he's not - he doesn't qualify as a victim for the purpose of the Act, that Mr Coombes is present again today as an interested person.

Chairperson, the deceased, Mr Cecil George Pahle, we also act on behalf of his family, his daughter Gaberone Pahle and his brother Rose-Innes Pahle. We also act on behalf of Mr Livingstone Pahle who survived the attack. There was some talk about him at the last hearing. He is unable to attend the hearings.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: What I said was obviously problematic.

CHAIRPERSON: It is problematic, but it's for me to ask it. Carry on. Finish the list.

MR BERGER: Then in respect of the deceased Lindiwe Pahle, the wife of Cecil George Pahle, we appear on behalf of her mother, Mamokete Lydia Malaza.

CHAIRPERSON: Spell that please.

MR BERGER: M-A-M-O-K-E-T-E Lydia Malaza.

CHAIRPERSON: She is Lindiwe's mother?

MR BERGER: Correct. Then the deceased, Mr Joseph Malaza, we appear on behalf of his mother, Esther Mthembu, his son Thembe Malaza, his sister Mami Malaza. We also appear on behalf of Whitey Malaza, who is the sister of Lindiwe Malaza Pahle as well as Mandy Malaza who is also the sister of Lindiwe and present today, just for the record, is the aunt of Joseph Malaza and Lindiwe Pahle, Sizakele Tuge. Then the deceased Mr Themba Duke Machobane, his wife Rose Machobane, his daughter Nombulelo Machobane and his brother Mr Strike Gordon Machobane, also his sister, Nombulelo Adelaide Morare. Then the deceased Mr Dick Mtsweni, we appear on behalf of his wife, Emma ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Victims 7, 8, 9 and 10, did I miss you or?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, are you referring to the bundle?


MR BERGER: Seven I'm still coming to, eight, nine and ten, the Zondis, we have no instructions for.

Then 11, Mr Dick Mtsweni, I've already mentioned his wife Emma, his daughter Sanna Mtsweni, another daughter Sarah Mtsweni, another daughter Nora Mtsweni, another daughter Lina Mtsweni, another daughter Freda Tholo, and another daughter New Year Mtsweni and his sister, Makwezi Anna Mahlangu, his grandson Gideon Mtsweni, his son Philemon Mtsweni and his daughter Thandi Mtsweni.

Chairperson, we also appear on behalf of Busisiwe Mokoena. She was injured during the raid and her mother is Girlie Mokoena, her father Elias Mokoena.

Chairperson, we don't appear on behalf of the Somalian, Mr Achmed Geer, who was killed, nor his wife, nor the two Botswana women. We do appear on behalf of Mr Thebogo Gqabi who was injured.

CHAIRPERSON: Where would we find that, Mr Berger? What number would that be on that list?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I'm instructed that his name is not on the list, but his name was on the list of victims that the TRC sent to my instructing attorneys when they were instructed in the matter and also his name is in part of a letter that I'm reading from dated the 8th of August 2000, which was sent to Adv Paddy Prior.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you consulted with him?

MR BERGER: He is present today.

CHAIRPERSON: What is his name?

MR BERGER: Thebogo Gqabi.

CHAIRPERSON: He was injured, you say?

MR BERGER: He was injured. He was a young boy at the time.


MR BERGER; His mother is Nkululego Gqabi.

CHAIRPERSON: Is he an adult now?

MR BERGER: He's an adult yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So he's entitled to be here in his own right?

MR BERGER: He is and for the record his grandmother is Aurelia Gqabi. Then as far as the little Peter, it's Mofoka, is concerned, his mother is Mrs Celia Mofoka and his grandparents are Mr Gabriel Fobo and Sister Bernadine Motinalapi. Chairperson, that completes the list.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you mention Mahlangu? Elinah Mahlangu.

MR BERGER: She's now deceased.


MR BERGER: I mentioned another Mahlangu. Makwezi Anna Mahlangu, who is the sister of Dick Mtsweni.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, but as a victim, Elinah Mahlangu would not constitute a person whose rights you would be representing?


CHAIRPERSON: And Tim Williams?

MR BERGER: Don't represent him.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Mr Berger on what basis - well let me ask you this. Are these people - are your instructions to oppose the application?

MR BERGER: My instructions are to listen to the evidence given by the applicants and to test their evidence and to determine whether or not they've made a full disclosure of all relevant facts at their disposal. If we come to the - if we're of the view at the end of that process that they haven't, then to oppose, so provisionally to oppose, yes, subject to what the applicants have to say.

CHAIRPERSON: So actually your instructions don't include any substantial facts to oppose the application at the moment? I'll tell you why I'm asking all these questions, Mr Berger, the applicants before us at the moment, I think all of them but one, did not even go to Botswana as I understand the application as it is now. These applicants are people who were involved in disseminating information, presumably to the perpetrators.

MR BERGER: Or to people who gave instructions to the perpetrators.

CHAIRPERSON: Whoever, ja. So really these applicants are in no position to say what happened at the scene of the crime. Are we with each other so far?

MR BERGER: Indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: So as I understand it then on the factual issues as occurred in Botswana, do you accept that these applicants are not in a position to comment on this?

MR BERGER: On what happened on the ground?

CHAIRPERSON: At the scene of the crime.

MR BERGER: So they say.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you accept it, or have you information at your disposal that's going to contradict or dispute that?

MR BERGER: Well, some of them were monitoring the operation as it unfolded, they may have information.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, that may be so. All I'm asking you, maybe I'm not expressing myself too well, that do you accept that these people were not there at the commission of the crime?

MR BERGER: I have nothing to suggest otherwise at this point. Chairperson ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on, you want to talk on this point.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, the only basis upon which these applicants can apply for amnesty is if they committed a crime, so it's not just a question, I would submit, of gathering information and disseminating information. What they did must constitute a crime and if they are criminals, then we're entitled to question them to see if they've made a full disclosure of all of their criminal deeds.

CHAIRPERSON: Or at least of the deeds for which they ask amnesty.

MR BERGER: Which must be criminal deeds.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja. I don't think we've got an argument with that. It's not the first time that submission has been made to me. Are you done with that point you wanted to make now?


CHAIRPERSON: Let's get on to the person called - what was his name, the New Yorker, Livingstone. Have you any explanation as to his absence today?

MR BERGER: I do, if I can just check it. It's financial, he's in New York.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, last time, and this matter has a long history in it's preparation and it's ...(indistinct) for the sake of keeping peace not to indulge, but at the last hearing, when and I'm saying this very pointedly, when an application for postponement was made, I understand that is now denied by your attorney who argued the matter then, I asked your attorney whether it was worth postponing the matter then, given the fact that this gentleman is in New York. Will he be here at the next time? And during that bit of conversation, if we can call it that, we were told in response to my question, that he could not make arrangements or suitable arrangements to be at the hearing within a few days, he needed quite a bit of time to make such arrangements. We were unable to say whether he had made musical arrangements in relation to his work at the time and we were given an undertaking that it would not be a fortuitous exercise to postpone the matter because he would be here and bearing in mind that the sole reason for the postponement then was to facilitate an opportunity for him to be here and now we are told he's not here. It rendered that postponement and all the time that has gone by, fruitless and that's why I asked you, is there any explanation as to why. We were given an undertaking by the attorney that he would be here.

MR BERGER: Can I take instruction on that?

MR VISSER: We've just found the reference to which you've been referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I don't need a reference, I know what I'm talking about.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, my instructions are that at the last hearing Ms Gaberone Pahle gave evidence and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Called by the attorney.

MR BERGER: Yes and she gave the undertaking that Mr Livingstone Pahle would come and that undertaking was reiterated.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm asking that as an officer of the court, I'm asking is this application now fruitless, or words to that effect and it was pertinently said no, the substantial postponement was needed in order to secure his attendance in terms of the rights he wished to exercise.

MR BERGER: And then subsequent to that, attempts were made to raise funds for Mr Pahle to attend. Those attempts were unsuccessful. Apparently then the TRC was approached and asked whether it would pay for the ticket for Mr Pahle to come and attend and the TRC said no.

CHAIRPERSON: That may be so, I'm not going to argue about that and whatever efforts were made to raise these funds, it's neither here nor there, the point of the matter is at the time when the application was made, in no uncertain terms was I told that he wished to be here and that he would be here and he couldn't be here within two or three days.

MR BERGER: And Chairperson, he did wish to be here. In fact I'm instructed that since the raid he has been a wreck, so he did wish to be here.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I accept that, but I was told that he would be here, that was the sole reason for the postponement, officially, let me put it that way. I have certain suspicions, but those are mere suspicions.

MR BERGER: Well, Chairperson, perhaps you should articulate the suspicions.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not going to articulate it, the matter was dealt with then and I was told that he would be here and that's the long and short of it and now we are told that he's not here, for whatever reasons. It renders that whole episode fruitless.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I'm also instructed that that wasn't the sole reason that there was a postponement, there were other victims who didn't receive proper notification.

CHAIRPERSON: The application and the testimony given by one of the relatives, centred solely around the exercising of his rights and that's the issue. I'm telling you, I don't need to read the record because I remember exactly what happened. If you care to read the record, you'll see what actually happened there and it's discomforting to know that after all that effort and time wasted, the TRC and nobody else has to explain to the Government authorities why the TRC is still in operation. I'm not saying that this is the only reason, but this is one of the reasons, and yet the whole exercise is rendered fruitless, for nothing and it is discomforting. We've got to face that music, nobody else. But anyway.

MR MALAN: Chairperson, just for the record, Mr Berger, it's not that certain victims weren't given proper notice, it's that certain victims couldn't be traced. We were given the assurance that it's easy to trace them, that addresses were available, that we could be assisted, I'm referring specifically to the Zondi family and to Hamlyn's parents. We were given certain information. Fruitless because those were not the addresses and both of them are still not represented, well except now for Hamlyn this morning, but it's not due to any fault on the part of the TRC. The statement that it was not proper notice, there was no notice at all because they couldn't be traced, for the record.

MR BERGER: Mr Malan, I'm not seeking to apportion blame to the TRC. If there was no notification, then there was no proper notification, in my submission it's the same thing.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, the argument was that it was postponed because of Mr Livingstone Pahle's inability to be here due to short notice. We were assured that he would be here, that he wanted to be here, finances were never mentioned. We were under the impression that it was simply too short a notice for him to be here. The travel arrangements and the distance concerned, finances were never mentioned.

MR BERGER: Well, I'm sure the TRC official responsible, can verify the fact that the TRC was approached for assistance in bringing him here.

MR MALAN: Yes, that's correct, we're aware of that. That was at a late stage, it was at the beginning of last week.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe you missed the point. The point of the matter is at the time we asked if the postponement would not be superfluous. Is there any point in postponing the matter? Everybody else was here, great lengths were gone to to arrange the logistics of that hearing and while our sympathies lay with the person who could exercise his rights, we asked the question, or I asked the question, by postponing this matter, are we not just going through a fruitless exercise and the response was: "No, he will be here" and I made a ruling to grant a substantial postponement.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I've explained now why he's not here. I don't understand why there's this hostility from the Panel towards me, when I'm trying to explain the reason why Mr Pahle is not here.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, don't - you can draw whatever conclusions you want, I'm certainly not being hostile to you. I'm asking for an explanation because we've got to explain why there's been such a substantial postponement that turned out to be for nothing. Isn't that the long and the short of it?

MR BERGER: Well I've explained why Mr Pahle is not here. Chairperson, the Committee was sitting last week, it's not like this matter has dragged out the life of the Committee. The Committee was sitting last week and is going to sit in the future.

CHAIRPERSON: This is not the only one, Mr Berger. Please accept what I'm telling you that we're under tremendous pressure to explain why this process has been so long prolonged, we're under a lot of pressure.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I understand the pressure that the Committee ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) a lot of money that went into it in bringing people long distances last time and having to repeat the process now. It's Government money, it's public money, public funds.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, the only point I'm making is that if there are unarticulated suspicions that are behind an explanation for why this matter hasn't proceeded, then we need to deal with that.

CHAIRPERSON: I would have, if you were involved. You're not involved. Okay. Now let's proceed.

I may just point out Mr Visser and the rest of the representatives, that Mr Coetser approached me in Chambers, his client has experienced a tragedy in the family, he has to make certain arrangements today and because of that tragedy, his time is not his own for the week. I had to make a discretionary ruling at the time and I ruled that he can be on first thing tomorrow morning. I hope it doesn't inconvenience anybody.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, Mr Coetser has spoken to me about it as well and I immediately offered that his client can be called in between my clients. We had a short discussion about it. We are going to start with Mr Wikus Loots, from the Western Transvaal. After him, the other members from the Western Transvaal, we think, should be extremely short and we were hoping that we could finish them today which will leave the way open for Mr Olifant to be called in context with the Soweto crowd, which will come tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: That will be preferable, but if it doesn't work out like that, then Mr Visser, I've allowed him to call his client tomorrow morning, even in between cross-examination of anybody else.

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson, we will fall in with that arrangement. We've been alerted to what the problem was and we certainly sympathise with ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, have you got any problems with that arrangement?

MR BERGER: I have no problem.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, if I may commence then. This is the amnesty application concerning what has become known as the Botswana Raid of the 14th of June 1985. Chairperson there are certain household matters which I need to mention before I call the first witness. This matter was, as you will recall, part of a cluster which was heard at the end of July and the matter was postponed on the 1st of August, Chairperson. The reason why I mention this is that at the time, we handed in various exhibits during that cluster on the understanding that we don't have to reproduce it all the time and we are not unfortunately in the situation that we haven't got all those annexures and exhibits reproduced yet again. I don't believe, Chairperson, with respect, that it will present too much of a problem because of two facts. The one exhibit which we will rely on is one that is well-known to you, Algemene Agtergrond and at this stage you must have many copies lying around, so if you really wish to refer to that.

CHAIRPERSON: I keep one of them.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson and the other reason is that part o the background referring to Botswana by Mr Wikus Loots has been bound into the bundle, fortunately, so it won't be necessary to hand in that exhibit as well. If it becomes necessary to refer back, Chairperson, then obviously we will have to make further copies. You will also recall that we referred you during that cluster to the work of Peter Stiff, Silent War and this led to some extracts from this book being made and also bound into your record and we believe it's the most important parts, so we don't have to refer to the book as well.

There was also lastly, Chairperson, a reference to a work by Gilder, I believe. We don't intend to refer you to that in detail, although it's "The Rift" by Hilda Bernstein and Barry Gilder made some comments in this book, which are related in this book, Chairperson and the only reference why this is relevant was that according to Mr Gilder, the Botswana Raid disrupted the ANC and MK for approximately two years after the Raid and it was really only from that perspective, so we won't burden the record by handing in that exhibit.

JUDGE MOTATA: Mr Visser I suppose when you speak of all these exhibits, everybody who has been involved in this hearing is aware that I am substituting one Committee Members, so I'm not privy to most of the things you are talking about.

MR VISSER: Chairperson it is really with deference to Judge Motata, that this has been mentioned as well as my Learned Friend and that is why I'm taking the trouble now of pointing out that it's not that relevant, but if it does become relevant we will certainly provide you obviously with copies. At this stage we don't foresee, Chairperson, that it will be necessary and perhaps if we may be allowed to continue on that basis and if anything becomes relevant, we will certainly let you have it.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, if I could just add, I'm also new to these hearings, well this batch of hearings, and I'm not quite sure what agreement, if any, has been reached on the evidential value of that book, "The Silent War", by Peter Stiff. I read the paragraph last night and he sounds to me not to be a particularly impartial observer, so I'm just wondering if there is any agreement on that, because I would submit it has none.

CHAIRPERSON: With the Panel?

MR BERGER: Yes, it may well be that there's some agreement as to...

CHAIRPERSON: No, the book is a book and it's been referred to. Whether we accept the contents of it is another matter. There's no agreement that we've accepted the contents of that as the truth.

MR BERGER: And the fact that Hilda Bernstein and Barry Gilder say that the ANC was disrupted for two years in Botswana, I don't know how far that takes it either.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - mike not on) and I mean the applicants can raise whatever issues they think necessary for the purpose of the application. Whether we rely on it or not is another matter and like I say, we've come to no agreement about anything in respect of those bits of information, except that the booklet that Mr Visser refers to, "Die Algemene Agtergrond", I've allowed him to skip that because he was just going to reproduce it. I've heard it so many times before.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, my only point is that if anything is going to be relied on by Peter Stiff, Hilda Bernstein or Barry Gilder then they should be called to give evidence, otherwise whatever is said is worthless.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, you can make those points when the time comes. I've come to no agreement with anybody about the veracity of the contents of those documents.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, there are also newspaper reports and it's on the same basis. Chairperson, if we may continue. Firstly and I do this again for the sake of Judge Motata and my Learned Friend. In the bundle there was a so-called application bound in by Gen Johan Coetzee. I refer you to bundle 1 page 25 and at page 36, Chairperson, under paragraph 3, there are some paragraphs. The explanation for these paragraphs at page 36 of bundle 1 was that it was misunderstood by the staff of the TRC to comprise an amnesty application for the Botswana Raid, while in fact what this document was, was a document presented to the Human Rights Violations Committee at a time when Gen Coetzee was asked to come and give evidence before them and he gave the evidence of what he knew of this and because it is part of the background to the present application, I will read it very briefly, Chairperson, to show the relevance.

In paragraph 3.1 he says:

"The so-called Botswana Raid, plus minus 1985/86, was also discussed ..."

Page 36, Judge Motata,

"was also discussed in principle at SSC (that's State Security Council) level in Cape Town. The trigger for the raid was the attack on a house in Cape Town of a Deputy-Minister of the House of Representa-tives of the South African Parliament."

Chairperson, a cross-reference is to Peter Stiff, which you'll find at volume 2, page 74, where he refers to this issue and he says that there were actually two people who were injured ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, the applicant to whom you refer, is that a person who's an applicant in this matter?

MR VISSER: ...(indistinct - mike not on)

CHAIRPERSON: He's not going to come give evidence?

MR VISSER: Coetzee is not going to come and give evidence, no, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You're cross-referencing what was in that affidavit or statement with the contents of a book written by somebody else.

MR VISSER: Yes, just to show the background. Stiff refers to the issue of Lewellyn Landers from the House of Representa-tives, a hand grenade attack on him, as the so-called last straw, or the proverbial last straw, which led to the Botswana Raid and to make it clear, Chairperson, that in this case the matter was discussed on SSC level and I was just filling in that background. If it's alright with you.

MR BERGER: You see, Chairperson, but with respect, that's exactly the problem. We're accepting ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger I'm quite capable of handling it. Mr Visser you should no better. The objection was raised first and it was questioned as to whether we could accept extracts from those very books. If you are going to have to rely on it, the point has been made by Mr Berger that it isn't likely that he's going to agree to allow this information to come into evidence without any proof, unless - I accept that that's going to be the situation. Yes, carry on.

MR VISSER: Yes but Chairperson may I just say, this is a Commission of Inquiry where you would be interested in finding out all surrounding facts, it doesn't matter whether they're hearsay, it doesn't matter where those facts come from, that is the law on Commissions of Inquiry and Chairperson, what we have always been hard-pressed to do, with great respect, is to place as much information as we could gather before the Commissions of Inquiry, or before the Amnesty Committees in order to place them in the best possible position to decide about the amnesty application. I can't believe that my Learned Friend is reducing this hearing to a court hearing in terms of normal rules of evidence, where we are simply saying this is what gave rise to the Botswana hearing. But Chairperson, I will leave it at that. It is in the bundle, I will leave it at that.

CHAIRPERSON: I want to make a comment here and please don't understand it as being directed at any particular person. I had occasion to, last week, say something similar. This country has gone through trauma, possibly never known elsewhere in the world. One of its intentions of this process is to induce people to reconcile with life and with all the people who live in it. We are now starting an issue again between representatives that doesn't induce that reconciliation amongst the people. Now please let us be mindful of that and bear in mind that while we have all this hate and memories of losing loved ones, part of this Act for which we are sitting here, involves reconciliation and in my view, the representatives of the various parties play an intricate implicit role in attaining that. I don't want to entertain any discussion on what I've just said, I'm just reminding everybody that that is the position. Can we proceed Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, as far as the victims are concerned we are again in a similar position as we've been before, that the applications before you cannot give you any assistance in that regard. We have newspaper reports before you and Chairperson, my Learned Friend has given you a number of names. We also have the August 1996 written presentation of the ANC to the TRC and at page 93 of that presentation, 12 persons were mentioned as people who were, they don't say what they might say - I see my attorney has made copies for you, Chairperson, and ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well, Mr Visser, Mr Berger has indicated that he's representing certain victims. I don't know if it coincides with that list. Now your clients want to make application in respect of all those people mentioned in that list.

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson, but as was the case last week, is that we will also ask you for any other unidentified persons that we aren't aware of.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - mike not on) would be well to consider this not now, but during the course of the hearing. As I said before, from how I understand, or what I understand from the application, that these applicants were involved in the disseminating information about certain people to the actual call it line of perpetrators. Who actually got killed there and who actually got injured in that exercise, may not be on the list of people about whom information was disseminated.

MR VISSER; That's precisely the point, Chairperson, precisely the point. We intended going through the list with the key role players, Mr Wikus Loots and Mr Anton Pretorius in order for them to tell you which of those names they remember and if possible what information they had about that person.

CHAIRPERSON: In respect of those people that they intend to mention that they make the application?

MR VISSER: They make an application for all offences and delicts related to this incident Chairperson, which will include everybody that was either injured or killed and all damage done to the property because all of that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I'd like you to give it some thought, Mr Visser. I speak for myself, but the nature of the application and the facts pertaining to this application, I'm not really with you on that score yet.

MR VISSER: Yes, then we can address it during argument, Chairperson. Chairperson lastly before I call Mr Loots, I mention this now, you mentioned it earlier, but I mention it now because it's going to come up. It will become obvious in the evidence of these applicants that they cannot remember today what information they had and precisely about what person, etc., etc. If there's going to be that kind of examination of the witnesses, then Chairperson, I would just advance one aspect to you and that is that my Learned Friend, I asked my Learned Friend this morning: "On what basis are you objecting?" and he said he doesn't know, he'll find out after he's cross-examined. Now the only basis, Chairperson, with respect, for cross-examination on that kind of "full disclosure" is if there is going to be a denial by anyone here that the victims were in fact associated with the ANC because once that falls away, if that is not a denial before you, then with great respect, Chairperson, we can't understand what cross-examination on that score should be, but I will leave it to you to make a ruling on when the time comes, but it's going to come for sure. So Chairperson, we call Brig Wikus Loots.

WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Loots, you are an applicant in this application?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you request amnesty for all offences or delicts committed by you with regard to the Botswana attack on the 14th of June, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Loots, your application appears in Volume 1 from page 104 and following, is that correct and you deal with this particular incident to which you refer as the wiping out of 10 ANC targets on the 14th of June in Botswana on page 109?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the contents of your amnesty application according to your knowledge and subject to the evidence led here today, would be true according to your knowledge?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have attached to your amnesty application a document, page 117 of bundle 1. Can you tell the Committee what is this document?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, it is a statement that I drew up which covers the period 11th of May 194 up to late in 1988, 16th of August 1988. It covers that period with regard to activities of ANC as well as PAC and other institutions, Qibla, amongst others, their activities in Botswana.

MR VISSER: You were attached to what branch of the Security Branch?

MR LOOTS: I was stationed at Potchefstroom Chairperson and I was tasked with the co-ordinating of ANC activities in Botswana.

MR VISSER: And who was your Commander?

MR LOOTS: During 1985 with the attack it was Gen Steyn Chairperson.

MR VISSER: He's also an applicant in this hearing?

MR LOOTS: Yes, he is, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In this document from page 117 you deal with case studies with people who were arrested, people who were killed and so forth and information which you obtained, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And in the document from page 136, you say there what your attempts were to agree with the authorities in Botswana, that there should be a decrease of the activities to which you have referred in Botswana, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did the Botswana authorities ever come forward with a solution?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no, I can name one instance where we supplied particulars with regard to where a person who would make a telephonic call and they came back within two hours and said that the person had arrived and was arrested, but otherwise very little.

MR VISSER: Is it also true that talks were held at high level between the Government of South Africa and representatives from Botswana on various occasions?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And on one of those occasions, if I look at the documents here, Mr Neil van Heerden was also involved, is that correct? Mr Neil van Heerden from Foreign Affairs.

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And is it correct that Mr Pik Botha made several press statements with regard to the threat from Botswana and the attempts of the Republic's Government, to combat these problems?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, this statement that I drew up with regard to the time period that I have just mentioned now, was relevant to discussions that the Department of Foreign Affairs had with Botswana's Foreign Affairs Head on the 6th of December 1988 in Pretoria.

MR VISSER: Very well. If we can get to the facts of the matter, from how early did it appear that there was a threat from Botswana to the security situation of South Africa?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, according to my personal knowledge, from the middle 70's.

MR VISSER: And from when were you involved personally in this problem of the threat from Botswana?

MR LOOTS: From approximately 78 Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In other words, the 1985 Botswana Raid was not something that happened all of a sudden?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson, there was quite a long run-up to this attack.

MR VISSER: You also have studied Exhibit A, the General Background to amnesty applications?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you study the extract with regard to Botswana on page 14 thereof?

MR LOOTS: Yes, I have Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And does that concur with your knowledge and experience of that time, although it is quite a brief summary?

MR LOOTS: I agree Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was the manner in which the Security Branch Western Transvaal went about trying to combat this problem?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, from time to time we held conferences with various branches or regions of the country, amongst others Natal, the Western Cape, the Easter Cape, Far North Transvaal, Free State, where members of the Security Branch came together and exchanged information. Not only was it people from the Security Branch, but Military Intelligence was also involved, as well as members of the National Intelligence Services and at these meetings information was exchanged with regard to particular individuals.

MR VISSER: And did the Security Branch of Western Transvaal draw up memorandums and keep information with regard to all Intelligence about the building-up of activities of ANC and MK in Botswana?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: These meetings to which you have referred, were these a few meetings or several meetings?

MR LOOTS: There were many of them, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did the South African army have their own reconnaissance abilities in Botswana?

MR LOOTS: Definitely Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you work together, or did you work and collect information independently and compare it later?

MR LOOTS: No, we acted independently and we compared notes later, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Before the 14th of June, you refer to that on page 109, before the 14th of June, were there briefing sessions that you can recall to staff members of the army?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you tell the Committee about them?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson. A meeting was arranged about three weeks before the 14th of June where Gen Steyn, the Commander of Western Transvaal at that stage and Commandant Charl Naude from Special Forces, Gen Constand Viljoen was the Chairperson and there was a meeting like that in Head Office in Pretoria.

MR VISSER: To which Gen Johan Coetzee are you referring to?

MR LOOTS: He was Gen Johan Coetzee the former Commissioner of Police.

MR VISSER: In your application you say Gen JC? I think he's PJ Coetzee, not JC Coetzee.

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots we know what this application is about. Whose idea was it in the first place that Botswana would be attacked in this regard?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, as it would appear from my statement that I drew up which runs up from the time of 85 to 88 ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Were you approached by the Military, or did you go to the Military and tell them this should happen, what is the position?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, with regard to Special Forces and the late Gen Kat Liebenberg on occasion as the activities escalated from Botswana we, under instructions from Head Office, closer and closer worked together with Special Forces. Gen Kat Liebenberg was in command and I say this today in all honesty that there on occasion he said that Western Transvaal was the only division where they naturally gave their co-operation. With regard to Lesotho and other neighbouring states, the co-operation was not so earnest.

MR VISSER: But was the idea, before the Botswana Raid, I think that is what the Honourable Chairperson wants to know from you, was the idea that the Security Branch of the Police who would act there, or what was the position?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson, we supplied the information at several of these meetings and Special Forces and National Intelligence analysed the information.

CHAIRPERSON: All these people, did they get together and discuss it? But who had the first idea that the only thing we could do was to attack? Was it the police or was it the military guys, or who?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, as I recall it, if I can put it as such, that both of us collectively felt that we have done everything in our power to get Botswana to sort out things in their own country and the agreement was that the military, according tot he rules, that they would hit and the South African Police would supply the information, yes.

MR VISSER: And with regard to authorisation and permission, that would lie with Special Forces to get approval?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, Gen Steyn and I, the day before, a submission was made, 29 targets were identified and I want to say that approximately 19, it was reduced to 19 and some instances where there were children, it was disapproved and I left there under the understanding that Gen Coetzee and Gen Viljoen would do the final submission to the State Security Council.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I refer you, as far as the State Security Council is concerned, to Bundle 2, Chairperson it is at page 64, you'll find a Minute of the State Security Council and the reference, the only reference that we could find in that is at page 71 and - sorry, 64 and what it says, Chairperson, is it refers under (d) to Botswana, and it was just prior to the raid Chairperson, the date is at page 61, given as the 10th of September 1984 and at that meeting it is minuted at page 64 of bundle 2 that:

"Following on the sub-item with regard to Lesotho, Botswana comes about, it would appear that Botswana would not be easily convinced to have a security agreement with South Africa. Minister Le Grange says that the issue should be addressed because the insurgence of ANC terrorists through from Botswana is concerning"

And then it says:

"1. If it could be determined where ANC terrorists hide in Botswana, they will be taken out."

MR BERGER: Mr Chairperson, I'm sorry to interrupt my Learned Friend, but the raid was on the 14th of June 1985.

MR VISSER: I'm thankful for my Learned Friend, but I'm aware of that Chairperson. This is prior to the 14th of June 1985.

MR BERGER; Sorry, my Learned Friend said that it was the day before the raid.

CHAIRPERSON: We all understand now it was on the day before the raid.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, so that's just a cross-reference, to make it - to show clearly this was a Raid as Gen Coetzee says in his presentation to the Human Rights Violations Committee, that was approved by the SSC. We haven't got that particular minute before us. That we haven't got, but it seems to be on all fours with the background situation.

Mr Loots, in the ANC's submission and also this morning, my Learned Friend Mr Berger mentioned various names. Would you please tell the Committee, when I mention these names to you, whether you can recall these persons and in which regard. If we may commence with the ANC's submission.

Chairperson, would you like copies of this, for handy purposes, it's available. It's a photocopy of the cover page and then page 93, Chairperson and at the left-hand top column (b), Chairperson, I think from force of habit we've referred to this as Exhibit A again.


MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. And in Exhibit B then, if you look at the bottom of the page there's a page 93. On the top, left-hand column, there are names mentioned Chairperson and that is under the heading which you'll see at page 92, List of ANC members who died in exile and on the right bottom it talks of Botswana assassinations, bombs and raids and then it deals over the page, at page 93, from 1 down to 23, as pertaining to Botswana and if you look in the right-hand column of the left-hand side of the page, you'll see dates and the dates which we are interested in, is obviously the 14th of June and there are some 12 person if I counted correctly, mentioned. Now of those persons, as I understood my Learned Friend, he appears for number 3, 6, 7, 10, 14, 15, 17 and 18, if I'm not mistaken Chairperson, but I'm not sure whether I got it all correct.

Mr Loots, may I mention a few names to you? Here it's spelled Gehr, Ahmed Mohamed, were you aware at that stage of this person?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Hamlyn, Mr Frank Hamlyn?

MR LOOTS: He was known in Botswana Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What - can you recall what was known about him?

MR LOOTS: This was a long time ago. He was not a Western Transvaal suspect. I want to re-iterate that the Eastern Cape, the Western Cape, the Far North Transvaal, Soweto, Johannesburg, they had their own sources and Mike Hamlyn, I can only tell you that from time to time his name appeared on several reports.

MR VISSER: And at meetings Mr Loots?

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question that was decided that action should be taken in Botswana and with regard to certain persons, you as the police, gave that information to the people who would take action?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What I wish to know is which individual persons would you have mentioned to the people who had to launch the action?

MR LOOTS: If I can go through the list Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Please do that.

MR LOOTS: Duke Machobane.

MR VISSER: Mention the number please.

MR LOOTS: Number 6. Once again from other divisions his name was mentioned as a collaborator or member of MK. Joseph Malaza, number 7. Harry Thamsangqa Mnyele. Chairperson, I can only mention that to the best of my knowledge, he became more and more involved in culture and music and so forth. Number 14, Harry Thamsanqa Mnyele, number 14, Mnyele, Harry Thamsanqa. His wife, Rhona Segale's name was also mentioned by Mr Berger, Rhona Segale was regularly mentioned in reports, although her name does not appear here.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

CHAIRPERSON: In her own capacity as a person who would be attacked?

MR LOOTS: She was a member of MK

CHAIRPERSON: Repeat that name.

MR LOOTS: Rhona Segale, Chairperson. She was a suspect from Soweto, if I recall correctly. The following one is number 15, Mtsweni, Dick Nkukwana, regularly mentioned in reports. Vernon Nkadimeng, number 16, he was not involved on 14/6.

MR VISSER: Yes, Vernon Nkadimeng is the subject of an amnesty application.

MR LOOTS: Cecil George Pahle, number 17, regularly mentioned in reports from other divisions, Chairperson. Lindi Pahle, I cannot recall her clearly.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - mike not on)

MR LOOTS: Lindi, Chairperson, this was a long time ago and I wish to reiterate that she was not a suspect from our division, but that her name was supplied by other divisions, that is possible.

MR VISSER: And the last name on that list, number 23, do you know anything about him, Zondi, Basis Amos, 23?

MR LOOTS: No, I do not know him.

MR VISSER: Very well. On the list that Mr Berger supplied, we have once again Mnyele, Thami, does he appear on this list?


MR VISSER: Number 14, is that correct?


MR VISSER: Is that the same person?

MR LOOTS: That is the same person.

MR VISSER: And then Michael Hamlyn and George Pahle and Lindi Pahle, you have already explained about Lindi Pahle. We have Malaza that you have mentioned as somebody who was known to you and then Machobane. Dick you also mentioned. Mtsweni, that is number 15, you mentioned him and there's a Mokoena, Busisiwe, do you know that person? Does that ring a bell?

MR LOOTS: Is that on the list that Mr Berger supplied?

MR VISSER: Yes, that is.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that name ring a bell as a person who was a target?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And there's another name that we have heard, Gqabi Thebogo and if I understand Mr Berger correctly, that would be the person who was shot at a road block in Botswana, I am not certain, that is what I infer. But do you know anything about Gqabi Thebogo?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, not Thebogo, but I know a Joe Gqabi, but his surname is spelled with a Q, he's a well-known figure. I do not know whether this Thebogo is related to him, but I do not know him.

MR VISSER: And there's Peter Mofoka, that was a 6 year old child at that stage, you do not know?

MR LOOTS: No, he was also not a target, no Chairperson.

MR VISSER: With regard to targets Mr Loots did you only indicate people as targets or safe houses and other places that were used by ANC and MK?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, these were persons as well as the ANC Head Office at 206 ...(indistinct) and then there was also an office that I can recall.

MR VISSER: And did the Security Branch Western Transvaal also have information as to where MK members were accommodated in transit?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And was that part of the information that was conveyed?

MR LOOTS: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That must certainly be with regard to the names, where they would be found, is that the information that you have?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And this person, as an MK person, we have information that he will do such and such, he's a target and he could be found there?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You mentioned buildings, the Head Office of ANC, where?

MR LOOTS: 2067, 2068, these were two, it was a double complex and that was their official Head Office.

CHAIRPERSON: Where? In Botswana?

MR LOOTS: Yes, in Gaberone, Chairperson. And the office of Solidarity News Service was in the building, I cannot recall the name of the building any longer.

CHAIRPERSON: Might I just get something else from you? You have supplied six names, Machobane, Mike Hamlyn, then it would be seven, Malaza.

MR VISSER: To make it easier, on Exhibit B it's number 3, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17 and 18.

CHAIRPERSON: Confirmation of what you have given, I do not want to make a mistake, the names of the persons that you supplied to the other people as persons who were targets and could be found in Botswana, were Hamlyn, Machobane.

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.


MR LOOTS: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mnyele Harry.

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it is Rene.

MR LOOTS: Rhona Segale.


MR LOOTS: That is Dick.

CHAIRPERSON: And Cecil George Pahle.

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And then there was information with regard to two buildings that were next to each other.

MR LOOTS: 2067 and 2068, in ...(indistinct) in Gaberone, the ANC official Head Office at that stage.

MR MALAN: Chairperson, I beg your pardon. The Chairperson asked you, I do not know whether you heard him correctly, whether these names that went through, that these names were sent through by Western Transvaal office because when you went through it you said that these were the names that you recalled, but you specifically said that you think that Harry Mnyele, you said you think he was from Soweto, that he was not from Western Transvaal.

MR LOOTS: Thank you Mr Malan. Chairperson the names that were supplied to Generals Coetzee and Viljoen was a consolidated list which was received from Security Branch of the various regions in the RSA collectively with National Intelligence and Military Intelligence.

MR MALAN: But the question was actually and that is what I want to know and I think that is the Chairperson's question, which of these names can you recall that they were specifically people that were targeted by Western Transvaal and that you could recall was monitored by Western Transvaal?

MR LOOTS: The Pahles Chairperson. The fact is that if Soweto supplied the rest, then we, the Western Transvaal, used some of our sources in Botswana to carry out observation of registration of vehicles, people visiting them and so forth, but to summarise, few of these person who are mentioned here came from Western Transvaal.

MR MALAN: But they all at some or other stage went through - were monitored by Western Transvaal?

MR LOOTS: Yes Chairperson.

MR MALAN: So all you are saying is that they were not originally received from Western Transvaal they were given through and at the consolidated meetings and at the various meetings between the different departments, the names were given and then you went and carried out the monitoring work.

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

MR MALAN: So Western Transvaal would have been involved with all of them in some or other manner?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Then I understand it better. Thank you.

MR VISSER: But what you are adding is that it was not only names that were discussed, it was also other targets?

MR LOOTS: Definitely, Chairperson. Safe houses, transit facilities, suspect vehicles, registration numbers.

MR VISSER: And at the end of the day with the 14th of June 1995 raid that, according to your knowledge of what the purpose was and what happened there, other targets besides people were attacked?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson. Amongst others, the offices that were not occupied.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots, it is important for our purposes to find out if you can assist us, where did you fit in with the deceased persons and those persons who were injured? I accept that many people were killed that day and many people were injured. It would appear from the bundles, that various places were attacked and various persons were attacked and it may be that some of those places that were attacked, or people who were attacked by the perpetrators, were not discussed at the meetings which you have referred to, but they were attacked because the attackers found out something about those people at another meeting. We do not know.

MR LOOTS: Not that I am aware of Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that is my point, that is why it is important where you were involved in those meetings, which names were conveyed there as targets?

MR LOOTS: May I just explain Chairperson? The day of the submission we had a complete chart of the city of Gaberone as well as aerial photos that were taken by the South African Defence Force and the targets, the people, the buildings, these were all, right up to in the finest detail, were pointed out by Commandant Charl Naude.

MR MALAN: By whom was it pointed out?

MR LOOTS: Commandant Charl Naude.

CHAIRPERSON: All that I wish to know and please understand me, you were not there when the attack took place?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you cannot comment as to how this attack had taken place?

MR LOOTS: Not at all, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the point. And your contribution in this application, like some of the other applicants, it was confirmed in that meeting and people's names were mentioned as targets along with buildings?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You cannot say whether this group of attackers held meetings at other places, or whether they did things on information that they collected themselves?

MR LOOTS: Not that I am aware of Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That is why it is important for us to know which of those targets you were the source of. You knew that they were to be killed. Is this the list before us now?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, one place where the Western Transvaal focused on was the Head Office and then the Solidarity News Service.

CHAIRPERSON: But names were mentioned, Mr Berger gave names, you gave us seven names, are these the names from the list that we discussed earlier on, where you fitted in and you supplied the information with regard to this list here?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: As well as the two buildings, the Head Quarters of the ANC and the building of Solidarity New Service. Do you recall the address?

MR LOOTS: No Chairperson, unfortunately not, but the computers and other documents were confiscated.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know whether people were killed in those buildings?

MR LOOTS: No, at the Head Office and at News Service, none that I know of.

CHAIRPERSON: So the people that were either killed or injured, it was only these seven people that you know of that you supplied information about?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Or may I put it as such, you group of the applicants.

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, just for a cross-reference, page 82 of bundle 2, Stiff gives the reference to target 8 Alpha and 8 Bravo as this address, which Mr - I'm just looking for the Solidarity Press. Oh, it says on the top of the page on the left-hand side, it's at 20 Cycle Mart, he gives in the Cycle Mart building in Naledi.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got any problem with that Mr Berger, just the address? I'm not saying anything else.

MR BERGER: I can find ...

MR VISSER: Sir you have explained to us the names of persons, places that you can recall the addresses of and you've referred to safe houses and transit facilities. You say that you yourself did not participate in the attack.

MR LOOTS: Definitely not, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Where were you during the attack?

MR LOOTS: There was a Head Office close to Nietverdiendt, it was approximately 10 to 20 kilometres from the Botswana border from where the Commander of the South African Defence Force monitored the activities in Botswana by radio.

MR VISSER: In other words, was there radio contact with the operatives on the ground?

MR LOOTS: Definitely Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Were you allowed in the operational centre?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you hear there what was going on?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is so Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this during the attack?

MR LOOTS: During the attack, yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: After the attack, Mr Loots, what was the situation with regard to what was found there and brought along by the operatives from Botswana?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, a large quantity of documents was brought back by each team, sealed in plastic bags and this was transported by helicopter. I travelled by helicopter as well to Pretoria, where these documents were photostatted amongst others and the originals remained in our possession. It was analysed and we drew up the necessary reports with regard to those documents.

MR VISSER: What you took note of there in Nietverdiendt, as well as with reference to the documents that were confiscated, was it your impression that Special Forces attack other targets, other than ANC targets?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson, we received many names and addresses.

MR VISSER: So if you would tell the Committee you would say that with regard to you, these were all ANC targets?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson. I would just like to mention one thing. A group photo where later arrested persons, identified people that I was not aware of in Botswana as reasonably senior MK members at that stage. Amongst others it was a photo at a party, it was some child's birthday and there were many adults. It was a colour photo and arrested persons, one woman very pertinently, of which I was not aware of, was identified there. Now I cannot recall at which of the targets this photo was found, but that is one instance that I can recall.

MR VISSER: In bundle 2 page 84 reference is made, second last paragraph Chairperson, to the August 85 edition of Setchaba of the ANC and it says this:

"In August 1985 edition of Setchaba, the ANC claimed eight of the victims as their own, saying: 'The time has come when we should revenge our martyrs'"

and then they mention names.

"We dip our revolutionary banner in salute to you Cecil John Pahle, Lindi Mahunde Pahle, Dick Nkunu Mtsweni, Dick Machobane, Mike Hamlyn, Thamsanqa Mnyele, Basi Zondi and not least Peter Mofoka."

So ...(intervention)

JUDGE MOTATA: Before you just proceed Mr Visser, going through these documents, this Mahunde, somewhere it would appear it's Lindi Maude, I just want to establish from Mr Berger whether it would be Maude, let's get her second name correct.


JUDGE MOTATA: Thank you. You may proceed.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, again, I've made the objection but if my Learned Friend wants to rely on that passage, the ANC's claiming as their own and not least Peter Mofoka, it can't seriously be suggested that a six year old boy was involved in MK activities. With respect, the value of that list is nothing.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I'm sure you'd be able to adjudicate on the value of whatever evidence is placed before you, Chairperson. We have not placed any status on it, we are presenting it to you for your consideration.

Mr Loots, with regard to these documents that were brought back, did you have any dealings with those after the attack?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson yes, in totality it must have taken me about six weeks to analyse everything and to refer to the various divisions for identification, names that appeared in documents.

MR VISSER: Were photos taken of deceased persons in Botswana?

MR LOOTS: Not that I know of Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you know exactly which persons were killed there?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no.

MR VISSER: Or which persons were injured during this attack?

MR LOOTS: Not in the finest detail, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Is that all that you can add with regard to evidence with regard to this attack?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson when I came to sit down here yesterday, the first words here were traumatic and I want to tell you this, I want to mention my appreciation to the Chairperson who mentioned trauma earlier on and reconciliation. The only thing I wish to say is that the 14th of June attack is part of our history and for us who were involved, when we look back at it, then one would have seen or thought that it was not necessary and I can assure you that within our limits and within our capabilities we went outside our borders to and I wish to say immediately that the Botswana authorities were also in a difficult position and we tried to do everything in our power that murder and mayhem would not take place and eventually we could not succeed.

MR VISSER: And in the execution of your duties, did you act under instruction from anyone?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson, definitely. I am in possession of a card signed by the State President P W Botha, I have it here with me.

MR VISSER: But under whose instructions did you perform your duties in that regard?

MR LOOTS: The Commanders of the Security Branch.

MR VISSER: And your own Commander, Gen Steyn?


MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me ask in this manner. Your participation in this action in so far as it may be found that you contributed, did you act yourself, or did you act under instruction?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson, we acted under instruction of Head Office and then amongst others, my direct Commander Gen Steyn.

MR VISSER: I notice it's One o'clock Chairperson, I don't know whether you want to take the adjournment now.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the adjournment now, till 2 o'clock.




MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, before we proceed, may I be allowed just to raise one or two issues with the witness that I've neglected to do in his evidence-in-chief? Thank you Chairperson.



Brigadier, unfortunately I omitted to ask you, in 1985 what was your position in the Western Transvaal, in the rank order?

MR LOOTS: I was second in Command.

MR VISSER: Is this under Gen Steyn?

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: The information that you testified about, how did you collect that information? How was it collected?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, by means of sources.

MR VISSER: Sources meaning informers?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you handle your own sources?

MR LOOTS: No, I did not.

MR VISSER: Who handled the informers?

MR LOOTS: The various branches, Zeerust, Rustenburg, Klerksdorp and then as the rest of the RSA, the various divisions.

MR VISSER: And the people under you in the Western Transvaal, did they act on your instructions and the instructions of Gen Steyn as conveyed from Head Office?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: On a question from the Chairperson as to which persons you can recall, will you please just shed some light? What is the position of Western Transvaal with regard to activities of activists in Botswana?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, Western Transvaal, if I may state it as such, was the co-ordinator. It was appointed as Head Office to co-ordinate the activities and in this regard ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon Mr Loots for interrupting you, but you are using the term that you co-ordinated ANC activities, that cannot be correct. You probably monitored the co-ordination thereof.

MR LOOTS: Yes, that's correct. We monitored the various individuals who were attached and who were members to the ANC or PAC and in this regard, from time to time, meetings were held where information was exchanged and had pooled information which led to the submission before the attack on the 14th of June 1985.

MR VISSER: Mr Loots, will you please just go slower? The people who are interpreting find it difficult to keep up with you when you are talking so fast. Yes, the point about the co-ordination, did this have any meaning with regard to bookkeeping and files and such things that were kept? What was the result thereof?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, yes. Where person A's name was mentioned or where they had any dealings with it, a file was opened on that name.

MR VISSER: And was such a file kept at Western Transvaal?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And by 1985, can you give a rough estimation as to how many files you had at the Security Branch?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I would guess not less than 16 000. This would include white, asian, black and coloured.

MR VISSER: So when you give evidence with regard to the names here, that was just the tip of the iceberg?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: After the raid of the 14th of June, you informed the Committee that you went through documents that had been confiscated and according to those documents you surmised that the correct targets were hit, but did you not have briefing sessions after the attack?

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And did you release any press statements?

MR LOOTS: If I can recall correctly, there were newspaper reports where names were given, amongst others.

MR VISSER: The information that Western Transvaal added to the information pool before the attack. Were you satisfied that this only had regard, or was relevant to the threat from Botswana to the RSA as the Government regarded it at that stage?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.


MR COETSER: I have no questions for Mr Loots, thank you.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, can we get to you last? Very well.

MR CORNELIUS: We have no questions, thank you Chair.



MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Mr Loots, what was your rank at the time, 1985?

MR LOOTS: If I remember correctly, I was promoted to Brigadier on the 1st, during 86. It is on record for you Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots, you may speak Afrikaans.

MR LOOTS: Thank you Chairperson. On the 1st of December 1986 I was appointed as a Brigadier, so my rank at that stage would have been Colonel.

MR BERGER: And then did you remain a Brigadier until you retired?

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

MR BERGER: So if anyone would refer to you now, they would refer to you as Brigadier?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You said, you told the Committee that you got your instructions from Gen Steyn, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I want to refer you to page 241 of bundle 1. This is the amnesty application of Gen Steyn and in question 11(b) he is asked to give the name of the person who gave him the order and his answer is:

"As far as I know, the instruction was to eliminate the terrorists, given by Brig Loots"

Bottom of page 241.

MR LOOTS: I see that here Chairperson, but this has regard to another incident, where I was definitely not a Brigadier yet.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, with great respect, if you look at page 236 you'll see that he's dealing with an incident which took place at Silent Valley on the 4th of May 1983 and there Mr Loots did give the instruction.

MR BERGER: Chairperson ...

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, he only commences Steyn on page 242 with the present incident.

MR BERGER: I was under the impression that the first few pages were general for the entire application. Is that my error?

MR MALAN: Yes, that flows from page 236, the incident at Silent Valley, Derdepoort.

MR BERGER: So when - that was in 1983, you weren't a Brigadier then either, were you?

MR LOOTS: No, no, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: But according to Gen Steyn, in 1983 you gave him instructions to use his words: "to eliminate certain so-called terrorists".

MR LOOTS: Chairperson no, I did not give any instruction to Gen Steyn.

MR BERGER: You took a decision in 1983 that certain people should be killed?

MR LOOTS: Necessarily so, yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: But in 1985 you were just acting under instructions?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: What exactly are you applying for amnesty for? What crime do you believe you committed?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the possibility, not the possibility, but the fact of conspiracy with institutions like the Defence Force, who eventually led the attack in Botswana, conspiracy to kill people.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, it may be a bit unfair to ask the witness who's not a trained lawyer, what he may be guilty of. I'm not saying the question is wrong, but it troubles me that he may be under the impression that he's giving you the correct legal position when in fact it may not be so, given all the legal technicalities that can creep into legal argument. I'm just drawing your attention to it.

MR BERGER: Okay, but you believe you were part of a conspiracy to kill certain people in Botswana?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You knew some of them would be killed, is that not so?

MR LOOTS: I accepted Chairperson that the army was prepared.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not speaking of their being prepared, but you were at the meeting where you gave information to people whom you knew would commit murder.

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You were part of the plan to commit murder, is that not so?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So therefore you are guilty of murder, is that not so?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So please answer the question, after I have given you that information. The question is what are you applying for?

MR LOOTS: In my mind, Chairperson, murder and conspiracy.


MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Loots, what was the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You're not continuing with that line ...(indistinct - mike not on)

MR BERGER: No, I'm - well it follows from that but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...indistinct (mike not on). Carry on.

MR BERGER: You say you were part of a conspiracy to murder and that you are guilty of murder. I take it this wasn't an emergency situation, like the 1983 situation?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the way I see it was that it was a systematic build-up of activities from Botswana, which realised in incidents which took place right across the country, Natal, Western Cape, Soweto, Johannesburg, Pretoria and so forth. So it was indeed, following on our discussions with Botswana where we pleaded with them for their co-operation to stop people from using their land for such activities and we would - could not succeed in convincing them and consequently the attack followed.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question is, you do not have any knowledge of a possible attack on South Africa during the time of the attack that we are speaking of, which made it necessary for South Africa to attack the people in Botswana.

MR LOOTS: That ANC launched attacks on us.

CHAIRPERSON: No, that they would come out of Botswana and launch attacks in South Africa.

MR LOOTS: Not specific instances Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Yes, as I understood your evidence, you've said from 1978 when you got involved, there were these ongoing attacks from Botswana and ongoing attempts by the police and the military in South Africa to persuade the Botswana authorities to do something about it.

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So, would it be correct to say that the attack was directed against those members of Umkhonto weSizwe who were involved in carrying out operations in South Africa? Those members of Umkhonto weSizwe based in Botswana, specifically in Gaberone, who were involved in carrying out operations in South Africa.

MR LOOTS: To the best of my knowledge it was indeed so, Chairperson. To the best of my knowledge it was the case, that action would be taken against persons who were involved in the planning and so forth of attacks from Botswana into South Africa, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you certain of that? Is that why this attack which we are hearing here launched, it was aimed at people whom from Botswana, launched attacks on South Africa, inside or outside?

MR LOOTS: That is over a long period Chairperson, there was a run up.

CHAIRPERSON: I am trying to find out who your targets were, not individually, but the group.

MR LOOTS: It was mainly ANC/MK members, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Mr Loots, any ANC/MK member, or ANC/MK members in Gaberone who were involved in carrying out attacks in South Africa.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, the answer was planning and carrying out, not only the operatives coming in, but also involving the planning.

MR BERGER: I'm sorry, I didn't hear that in the translation. So it's MK members living in Gaberone who were involved in the planning and carrying out of attacks in South Africa? Would that be fair?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Now I want to ask you about Mr Dick Mtsweni.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed Mr Berger, what was the gist of the last answer? I thought it was an important question.

MR BERGER: The last answer was that the targets of the raid on Gaberone on that day were those members of MK in Gaberone who were involved in the planning or carrying out of attacks in South Africa over a period. Mr Loots, would that be a fair summary of what you said?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Now, Mr Dick Mtsweni, you said that his name was regularly mentioned in reports as doing what?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson as I have explained, we dealt with a myriad of files on persons, MK members, who used Botswana either as transit facilities or as person in my mind who were unknown as MK members but their houses were pointed out by arrested persons, following on the aerial photos and Dick Mtsweni was not a suspect of Western Transvaal as such, but he was part of the whole picture and information was supplied. I cannot tell you in detail, who reported about Dick Mtsweni, but some of the other applicants involved can give you information there, but I can only draw your attention to your statement, the green document, I have attached five or six statements from members from Western Cape, from Durban, statements of other divisions of what happened there and which were realised from Botswana.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I believe I need to explain what the witness is talking about. The document contained in your bundle 2 from page 107 - bundle 1 from page 117 onwards, is an extract of a larger document which deals with the infiltration of African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress Terrorists to the Republic of South Africa via Botswana and this contains a number of documents. The witness has now referred to it. We didn't think it was necessary to burden the record with all of this for one thing because it didn't all relate to the Western Transvaal, but my Learned Friend is welcome to have a look at it if he wishes to.

MR BERGER: Thank you I would appreciate that.

MR VISSER: We've only got one copy and that's the only copy we've got, unfortunately.

MR BERGER: I promise I won't destroy it. Mr Loots, maybe I could - but I will go through that, but I'd just like to shorten your cross-examination. If you can't give any evidence about a particular person, then rather just say so, because for example I can tell you Mr Dick Mtsweni, I don't know if you know, but he was in his seventies when he was killed. He was an elderly man who was employed as a driver for the ANC in Gaberone. For example, he used to drive people to and from the airport. Now it may be that you're thinking about someone else. It may be that you're thinking about Mr Mtsweni, I don't know, but I want to give you that opportunity. When you say he was mentioned in reports, are you talking about this man, or are you just surmising that he must have been a target?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson the name Dick Mtsweni is quite prominent in my memory as a prominent member of the ANC in Gaberone. The same goes for Themba Duke Machobane, although he was not an exile from Western Transvaal, but his name was mentioned by sources from elsewhere in reports.

MR BERGER: Alright. So your evidence is that Mr Dick Mtsweni was in fact one of the people who was targeted in this raid?

MR LOOTS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: His death, according to you, was not a mistake.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, when the submission was made before the attack, it was done with the knowledge that it would be people who were without a doubt involved in the planning and the execution of possible acts of terror in the Republic and I accepted that the army, if they acted against any of these targets, that persons who would be present there would be killed.

MR BERGER: Yes. When we talk about a target of the raid, you can take it now as shorthand that we're talking about someone who was either involved in the planning or the execution of, as you called it, acts of terror inside South Africa. Those are the people that we are talking about as being targets for the raid and you're saying that you have a recollection that Dick Mtsweni was such a target?

MR LOOTS: The name Dick Mtsweni, I can recall that name quite well. It was mentioned regularly in reports.

MR BERGER: Alright. So he would then have been a person who was either involved in planning or carrying out of operations in South Africa?

MR LOOTS: Probably, Chairperson, I cannot recall everything in detail.

MR MALAN: May I just ask you, is it not possible that Mr Berger is correct, that he was just a driver for the ANC and that you saw his name in this regard?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no, I am honestly convinced that this list that was assembled and which was submitted to Generals Coetzee and Constant Viljoen, were definitely people who were involved in MK activities.

MR MALAN: We accept that. That is the general impression, but my question is, you are saying that you are certain that Dick Mtsweni, and this was your answer to a question, was not a suspect of Western Transvaal as such?

MR LOOTS: No, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: So in other words the name, if you recall it, you would recall it from other submissions from other divisions?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But you still connect the two MK activities actively, he cannot only be a vehicle driver?

MR LOOTS: Definitely so, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Berger.

CHAIRPERSON: But why not? It was a legal organisation in Botswana, they had a Head Office and they did business, political business. It's entirely acceptable that they needed a driver. How would he have been brought in as a target, as you described it?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I believe that some of the other gentlemen who still have to give evidence with regard to the Gaberone set-up, that some of them might have information about Mtsweni that I do not have. Unfortunately I cannot recall everything.

MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. The next person you mentioned now in your cross-examination was Themba Duke Machobane.

MR LOOTS: The same applies to him, Chairperson. He was regularly mentioned in reports. I cannot recall whether it was specifically, whether he was specifically tasked with accommodation or whether he was a driver or whatever, or whether his house was just used as a safe house where people who infiltrated from Zambia over-nighted for a day or two before they came through to the RSA, I cannot supply you with any information there.

MR BERGER: Your evidence was, this morning, that Duke Machobane was an MK member.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I can only repeat that all the persons whose names were supplied at the submission, were busy with MK activities, but I cannot recall the detail of each and every individual there.

MR BERGER: But you see Mr Loots, I'm trying to draw a distinction between the names that you put forward and the people who were killed. If there is no distinction, so be it. That's why I'm asking you specifically if you have knowledge, you've already said yes, Dick Mtsweni, you have knowledge, now Duke Machobane you say you have knowledge from your intelligence reports that he was a member of MK involved in the planning or carrying out of attacks in South Africa. Is that your evidence?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, my evidence is that all the names that were submitted and which I was tasked with before the attack of the 14th of June, were members of MK who were actively involved in some or other way with MK activities, whether it be housing to persons who came from Zambia on their way to the RSA, whether it be the transport of such persons and so forth and so forth. I cannot recall the detail with which every individual busied himself.

MR BERGER: So Mr Loots, are you now broadening the category of legitimate targets of the raid? Because you see now you went from the planning or carrying out of operations in South Africa, you're now saying facilitating, housing, transporting, does it include feeding?

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, with respect, he did say people who were involved in housing, transporting people on the way into South Africa. I'm not listening to the interpretation, people infiltrating for the purposes of attack into South Africa, that was the answer.

MR BERGER: So are we still in the carrying out of operations? I understood, I'm sorry, I understood your answer to be if someone came to - say for example and MK cadre came to stay at the house of Duke Machobane for two nights and he and his wife fed that person and then the person continued on his way, would that constitute the carrying out of an operation, or the planning of an operation?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I cannot recall in detail of such an incident, or the example that Mr Berger gave now.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Loots, the question was for a description, the question was not aimed at obtaining any detail. Mr Berger wants to determine the boundaries of this group that was a target.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, may I say that any person who was involved in the housing of MK members, or APLA members, were regarded as targets.

MR BERGER: So now we are going beyond the carrying out of operations, am I right?

MR VISSER: Who says that's not part of carrying out of operations? If a person comes in from Zambia on route to South Africa to do an operation, how does my Friend distinguish, cut and categorise?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I think let us leave Mr Berger to find that out because in the context in which the answer was given, it was actual carrying out. What we describe of housing and feeding is logistical assistance, maybe. Maybe that is so and it's for the witness to say whether those kinds of people were included in that target group. We can argue about definitions when the time comes.

MR BERGER: Mr Loots, you've now heard the debate. What is your answer?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, once again these persons who were tasked or from where Duke originally came and a man like Dick Mtsweni would be in a better position to answer this question, for the simple reason that we in the Western Transvaal only acted as the co-ordinators and honestly I cannot recall all the details.

MR MALAN: Let me speak to you in Afrikaans. The question is a person that provides housing for one night to two persons who are in transit and once off would such a person be included as a target for the 14th of June's attack, or would the 14th of June's attack, would that not include such a person, that is the question that Mr Berger wants to ask.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, this investigation ran over a long period and these were people to whom regular reference was made as persons who transported people and provided housing to people and participated in the training of using of hand grenades and so forth.

MR MALAN: In other words, I beg your pardon Mr Berger, let me continue. In other words if you recall Duke Machobane's name in such a context, then you would also classify him as a person who did so regularly, who were part of the structures.


MR MALAN: Who were in this planning, it was not just a once off thing.

MR LOOTS: No, it was on a continual basis.

MR MALAN: And then the actual question of Mr Berger is that can you specifically recall what his involvement was?

MR LOOTS: No, I cannot.

MR MALAN: You just recall the name?


MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Berger, now at least I understand what the witness is saying.

MR BERGER: Thank you Mr Malan, that was helpful. You see Mr Loots, do you know that Themba Duke Machobane was a school teacher?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: That he taught English to high school students?

MR LOOTS: No, I did not.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots, something concerns me. You come from Western Transvaal Security Branch. At a certain meeting it was decided that certain people and this includes the last person that was mentioned, did you not know what he was doing and how involved he was? Why was his name mentioned where it was decided that he should be killed, if you did not have the information yourself?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the only answer I have is that I cannot recall the activities of each and every person in finer detail. If I can mention one example to you and I am just relying on my memory here, a man like Thami Mnyele, something about ensemble, and his wife Rhona according to information was involved in the handling of crash courses in the use of hand grenades and I can honestly not recall the activities of each and every person there, I'm sorry.

MR BERGER: When you talk about Thami Mnyele, on route to France where he was going to study. Thami Mnyele was supposed to leave the day after the raid, he was supposed to leave for Zambia on route to France where he was going to study art. He couldn't have been a target of the attack.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the information that was submitted to Generals Viljoen and Coetzee, I can once again say was based on information that was pooled from the various intelligence community components of which the Security Branch was one and the Special Branch of the Security Branch was one, Special Forces, DCI and National Intelligence Service, they all gave their input with regard to the activities of certain individuals and that is how the Generals decided.

MR BERGER: The question that I'm really asking you is was Thami Mnyele's name put on the list because of the information that you had, or not?

MR LOOTS: No, he was also not from Western Transvaal. He was not originally from Western Transvaal, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You said in your evidence-in-chief that Thami Mnyele, you said Harry Mnyele, got involved in music. You said something about that and then I lost your evidence.

MR LOOTS: It was either art works or music, but this was in art direction. It was the physical drawing of paintings. He was a type of an artist as I recall Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So you don't dispute that he was an artist, in the broad sense of the word?

MR LOOTS: No, definitely not.

MR BERGER: But you maintain that he must have been an MK members?

MR LOOTS: That he identified with the struggle, I do not doubt that Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Lots of people identified with the struggle, and they weren't MK members.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, can I just make an announcement to the public please. Would those who have cell phones please switch them off. It interferes with the waves and therefore Mr Berger's not hearing the complete answers.

MR BERGER: That's why I took off the head gear. You said it can't be going even wider, Mr Loots, to say that anyone who identified with the struggle was a target of the attack on the 14th of June 1985.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger with respect, that wasn't his answer. He simply said that he knows he was in some way identified with the attack, but he earlier even said that: "I remember his name, I remember his association with art in some way", but he wasn't one of our people, he wasn't a Western Transvaal person, he also came from somewhere else. He just remembers the name, that was the evidence.

MR LOOTS: The organisation was Meadow Art and Ensemble.

MR BERGER: So you remember his name in what context? His name in the context of this is an artist who sympathises with the ANC living in Botswana, or this is an artist who provides logistical support regularly to MK soldiers?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson on the one hand Thami Mnyele was a well-known person in the arts set-up. On the other side, he was tasked with Rhona Segale, whom, according to information from Soweto and I recall this clearly, she was tasked with the handling of hand grenades of persons and giving persons, one could call it crash courses, if I recall correctly.

MR BERGER: What about Michael Hamlyn? Your evidence was that his name appeared on several reports.

MR LOOTS: The same applies to Michael Hamlyn, Chairperson. I cannot supply you with any detail like in the case of Thami Mnyele where I know he was busy with art, Michael Hamlyn once again, I think the persons from where he came and who handled him as a suspect, would be better able to enlighten the Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: So tell me, when you went to the meeting did you know why you were attending the meeting?

MR LOOTS: At head Office, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Where decisions would be taken as to who would be killed?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson, I knew.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you the only one from your branch?

MR LOOTS: No, Gen Steyn was also there.

CHAIRPERSON: So that makes two of you. Did you have all the information, because important decisions were being taken, people's lives, did you have all the information to decide this man or this person is a target for murder, he has to be killed because he does this, that and the other?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I cannot explain it any other way other than the persons who chaired that meeting, where the meeting took place, could only base their decisions on what was globally by the various branches, the Security branch, Police, National Intelligence, Military Intelligence who collectively made submissions with regard to one individual and I wish to add further that a person like Michael Hamlyn, could, I did not say it is indeed the case, but it could be that he was there with the person who was in the wrong place at the wrong time. I drew Adv Visser's attention to this book of Barry Gilder where in detail he explained that he was in the house right opposite, on the other side of the road and that he in person, to the best of my knowledge, was not one of the targets.

CHAIRPERSON: But you went to that meeting to contribute from Western Transvaal's point, to supply information, to identify persons who would be killed.

MR LOOTS: That is so, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Chairperson. Because once again this meeting where these targets were decided upon, this was on one day?

MR LOOTS: Yes, on one day, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you go there with proposals, or did you go to listen to proposals for targets?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson, memorandums were drawn up with regard to each and every individual who was regarded as a target and those particulars with regard to each and every individual were verbally conveyed and then the Military indicated the various places on the chart and showed the aerial photos.

MR MALAN: So that was a meeting, I just want to understand the set-up, it was not a meeting, because you have just referred to information that came from everywhere and that was collated and was identified and a submission was made.

MR LOOTS: This memorandum with regard to each and every individual, was the result of a long run up of the collection of information with regard to those particular individuals and this was the end result.

MR MALAN: I would assume then that you can give us more information with regard to which of the names that were killed, were names that were submitted by Western Transvaal, because it is not clear.

MR LOOTS: Western Transvaal here, Chairperson, I don't know whether I am pre-empting Mr Berger here, if he would get there eventually.

MR MALAN: If you want him to answer now Mr Berger we can allow it, otherwise I'll leave it at that.

MR BERGER: I was going to come to it, but he can.

MR MALAN: No, then I'll leave you to deal with what other names you have.

CHAIRPERSON: But before that happens, the seven names that you mentioned this morning, what list was that?

MR LOOTS: That is this, but there are many more names in that Exhibit.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm referring to the seven names that you mentioned. I thought that these were the names that you can recall that from Western Transvaal's viewpoint were brought up at that meeting except for one name, Hamlyn's name.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson no.

CHAIRPERSON: Did I misunderstand you?

MR LOOTS: No, this was the global group.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see. And at this meeting, can you recall that these seven names were mentioned as targets that had to be killed?

MR LOOTS: Mike Hamlyn, with regard to that name, as a target Chairperson, I'm not certain about.

CHAIRPERSON: We will find then in your favour that he was identified as a target. Do I understand you correctly that these seven names were the names of people who at that meeting were identified as targets in an attack on Botswana that took place on the 14th of June 1995?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the following question would be, of the seven that you can recall, the decision to kill them, to what extent did Western Transvaal's people contribute to give information with regard to those people, that led to the decision that they should be killed?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, with regard to the seven, may I just explain to you that to the best of my recollection, not one of them came from Western Transvaal, that were in Botswana. They were either from Soweto or any other region in the country.

CHAIRPERSON: So which people who were eventually targets, motivated Western Transvaal?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, Western Transvaal, because of the geographical location, is adjacent to Botswana. That is the primary reason.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm referring to you. You represent Western Transvaal, you and Steyn and between the two of you, was there any information that you gave or he gave of anyone who was regarded at that meeting as a target for that evening?

MR LOOTS: If I can recall one, it was the ANC Head Office, 2067 and 2068.

CHAIRPERSON: Just the buildings?

MR LOOTS: Just the buildings.

CHAIRPERSON: No names of persons?

MR LOOTS: Not that I can recall Chairperson, although I wish to emphasise that Western Transvaal's location adjacent to Botswana led to the fact that Head Office gave instruction that Western Transvaal had to monitor all the activities of the ANC.

CHAIRPERSON: But I would like to know, but you've already given the answer that you only referred to buildings, specifically Head Office. From a Western Transvaal viewpoint, you did not supply information which led to the decision that anyone was a target to be killed?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I rely here on my memory. I think 29 targets were submitted and this was reduced to ten and honestly, I cannot recall, I am not saying that Western Transvaal did not make a contribution in this regard, but I cannot mention a name to you now and say that this was Western Transvaal's contribution.

CHAIRPERSON: Of all the applicants, it is only yourself and Mr Steyn who attended that meeting?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson. And the information was collected by the various branches, Lichtenburg, Zeerust, Potchefstroom and then further, the Cape and Durban, Far North Transvaal, the Free State, Pretoria, Soweto, Botswana. Really Chairperson, after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, Botswana was activated as the chief infiltration route and I am saying this hear today Chairperson, that our experiences there was one of day and night, day and night we struggled, we lost quite a few men since 78. In 78 the first murder was committed. Persons who infiltrated through Derdepoort, if you want further particulars, I can mention that to you.

MR MALAN: No, I do not want further examples, I just want to understand this meeting. You say information came from everywhere and that means that there were representatives from Soweto and Eastern Province?

MR LOOTS: This was at smaller meetings, Northern Cape, Kimberley and Soweto and so fort.

MR MALAN: But the names that were submitted at this meeting, these were proposals that for the first time were brought in on this day as proposals for elimination?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR MALAN: As targets in Botswana. Who brought in proposals? We know Western Transvaal did.

MR LOOTS: Soweto.

MR MALAN: Was Soweto there?

MR LOOTS: At the preliminary meetings.

MR MALAN: So how did the names that they - get to the main meeting?

MR LOOTS: Because Western Transvaal was the co-ordinator Chairperson, various meetings were held in Potchefstroom, meetings were held in Kimberley, meetings were held in Soweto, meetings were held along with Special Forces and eventually this whole view realised in one memorandum concerning each and every individual and Gen Steyn and I went to do submissions at Head Office.

MR MALAN: Did you do this by means of written memorandums?

MR LOOTS: That's correct Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Which you would have received previously from Soweto and all the other branches?

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

MR MALAN: So at this meeting you were the only representatives of the Security Branch?

MR LOOTS: No, Col Crause, Maj Smit, persons who are late.

MR MALAN: In what capacity were Crause and Smith there?

MR LOOTS: Crause was the Commander at Zeerust and Smit was his second in command.

MR MALAN: Were they not part of a sub-branch of the Western Transvaal?

MR LOOTS: Potchefstroom was the headquarters, Zeerust was a sub-branch, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: So there were four person from the Western Transvaal, if we regard Zeerust as a sub-branch of Western Transvaal?

MR LOOTS: At the eventual meeting at Head Office, only Gen Steyn and I were there Chairperson. Crause and members from the other branches, the more junior persons were not there.

MR MALAN: And the eventual meeting at Head Office, is that where 29 names were submitted?

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

MR MALAN: But that is the meeting I'm referring to, that meeting where 29 names were submitted, was this done in writing with motivations?


MR MALAN: And verbal additions were made?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR MALAN: And how many of those 29 names came from you? How many came from Special Forces and how many from DCI?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson no, I cannot recall.

M MALAN: But not all 29 came from you, you did not submit all 29.

MR LOOTS: 29 were submitted but eventually it was reduced to 10.

MR MALAN: No, you're not listening to me. I said did Western Transvaal submit all 29 targets, or did the other branches ...

MR LOOTS: No Western Transvaal on behalf of the other branches, or maybe I can just explain that Western Transvaal was appointed as the co-ordinator by Head Office. Whether a man was involved in Cape Town or in Durban, Western Transvaal, on behalf of Cape Town or Durban.

MR MALAN: Let me understand this target identification. Let us take all 29 original targets. Was this just done by the Security Branch?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson, National Intelligence had input, Military Intelligence.

MR MALAN: But this was in the previous smaller meetings, but at the final meeting at Head Office, did you submit the co-ordinated list of 29 names?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Thank you. Mr Loots, can you give us as many as possible of the 29 targets that you had on your list that day at your meeting at Head Office? You say that there was the ANC Head Quarters, two buildings, which other targets can you remember being on your list of 29?

MR LOOTS: There was a person like Dan Hlume and I cannot recall whether he, at that stage, whether he was still alive, or whether he is still alive today, I do not know.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon Mr Loots, but would you not like to answer the question directly. The question is what can you recall specifically?

MR LOOTS: No, I cannot, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: You cannot recall one specific name on that list?


MR MALAN: These names that are listed here, if I see it, it jogs my memory, but I cannot recall all of them off the top of my head.

JUDGE MOTATA: If I may, Mr Berger, I'm sorry about that, if I may just come in. I understand you, correct me if I'm wrong, that your offices at Western Transvaal were situated specifically because of the geographical situation that you were able to monitor Botswana per se because you would be nearest, did I understand you to say that?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, what I meant by that is that if a source from Cape Town, or an informer from Cape Town, reports with regard to his visit to Gaberone or ...(indistinct), then this is written in report form and it's sent to Western Transvaal and to Head Office and Western Transvaal's responsibility was then to bind the activities of each and every individual and I can tell you that there were thousands of files. One instance the MK named Victor, we had two volumes full and then he was not identified as Jim Tshabalala, or whoever.

JUDGE MOTATA: Is that when you were provided with these names, you were able to monitor what they were doing in Botswana for instance, Gaberone let's say in this instance.

MR LOOTS: As far as was practically possible for us by means of informers, but otherwise we used informers from Durban or from Western Cape or Soweto or Johannesburg and so forth and so forth.

JUDGE MOTATA: Ja, but having these names, you had for instance to have a file that these people we are monitoring from Botswana because we have been given names by the various regions of people who are in Botswana, that's what I'm actually saying.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, that is so. Let us say a name like Koos is mentioned, then it was Western Transvaal's function to open a file on him and then to attempt, by means of our informers, to connect with Koos. In some cases it was impossible and other branches helped us. It was a team effort that realised into the eventual memorandum, which was eventually submitted with regard to the various individuals.

JUDGE MOTATA: Then if that is the case, then there should be a profile of a person. You can't just be given a name and say: "You monitor that person", they give you the profile, if I understand you correctly, please correct me if I'm wrong, that this is X, he's so-and-so, he does X, Y, Z.

MR LOOTS: Correct, Chairperson, but unfortunately our files were all destroyed, not a single file has survived and I cannot and I am telling you honestly, I cannot recall everything.

JUDGE MOTATA: Sorry, Mr Berger, about that.

MR BERGER: No, Judge, it's fine. Mr Loots, I'm having great difficulty accepting that you cannot remember a single name on that list. Bear in mind this raid, this attack had been building up over years and this was an opportunity to strike at the heart of MK in Botswana, to "vernietig" MK in Botswana, at least for the time being. That was the whole purpose of the raid, am I right?

MR LOOTS: That's right.

MR BERGER: And you were sitting with 16 000 files, which have all since been destroyed. Surely you were not looking at 16 000 names? You were looking at key people who you could eliminate so as to render MK useless in Botswana. That was the whole purpose of the raid, am I right?

MR LOOTS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Who were the people that you were targeting? Who were the 29 targets on your list?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, because I am an individual did not deal with every person individually, I am not able to recall all of it. I cannot. I cannot.

CHAIRPERSON: Ultimately I must ask this question now. It's a few questions. It would appear to me that because Western Transvaal was the closest to Botswana, that all the information from the other places went to the offices of Western Transvaal because you handled the co-ordinating and monitoring of those persons.

MR LOOTS: I would not say the monitoring, I would not say the co-ordinating of each and every person that was mentioned, because that was impossible.

CHAIRPERSON: And you were second in command?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And if Steyn was not there, you were in command.

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you not have more or less a good idea of all these people whose names came in, what they actually did? Not in much detail, but more or less a general idea of what they busied themselves with and why the other Security Branches had an interest in them.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I recall one person, Mark Anderson, he was in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: I will give you another opportunity to give us those names, but I do not want us to misunderstand each other. At a stage you and Steyn went to this meeting where it was decided that certain people had to be killed. How many names did you take to that meeting?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, it was approximately 29, 29 is in my memory.

CHAIRPERSON: And who decided whom had to be included in that 29 persons?

MR LOOTS: Gen Steyn was the Commander at that stage. I accept that he definitely took a decision in this regard, as a submission to Head Office, with my support of course, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: These 29 persons, you must have had more than 29 names at your office.

MR LOOTS: That is so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: There were many MK members who were there in Gaberone. Who decided that this list, "when we go to this meeting, these are the people that we will discuss"?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson if I recall correctly and each and every other division had made inputs at the preliminary meetings.

CHAIRPERSON: When were the preliminary meetings held? When were these meetings held?

MR LOOTS: This was over a reasonable time, it builds up.

CHAIRPERSON: What time period?

MR LOOTS: I would say from more or less '83 Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So of the two years you built up this list of 29 people, do I understand you correctly?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you were involved in those two years?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So why were these 29 names chosen from all the other names as people that have to be mentioned at that meeting to decide whether they will be killed or not?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the information to our availability, according to that information, those people were the most prominent person.

CHAIRPERSON: A driver? But one of the people who was killed was a driver, 70 years old, I believe. Was he one of the primary persons?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I say once again that I cannot recall the detail of each and every person.

CHAIRPERSON: But I will get to that point. You were part of a mechanism to chose 29 people from many more names, that at a very important meeting to make submissions and provide their names and to motivate why they should be killed, because when you went there you knew what was to be discussed, whether these people should be killed or not.

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And so over two years this mechanism took place. Can you not assist us to understand, not in so much detail, why certain people's names appeared on that list?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson the only answer that I can give is that they were all identified MK members with the exception of Thami.

CHAIRPERSON: As important people in the mechanism of the ANC's activities?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson. And once again, it was not only Western Transvaal information.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but I understand that, that is why I ask all these questions, because I want to understand properly, because things are not so clear to me here. Western Transvaal collected all this information over a period of time and this list, according to your evidence, was built up over more or less three years.


CHAIRPERSON: And it was then decided there at the offices in Western Transvaal that these 29 names would be submitted at this meeting and you will motivate that these people should be killed. Do I understand you correctly?

MR LOOTS: That's how I recall it, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now I will ask you again, amongst the 29 persons, there was a person who was 70 years old, who was the driver of the ANC, am I correct?

MR LOOTS: I cannot recall that specifically Chairperson, but I will not dispute it.

CHAIRPERSON: Why, if that was so, was he killed, because he wanted to break the mechanism of the ANC's activities.

If you killed the driver, it would have been very easy to find another driver, or they could walk to the airport, so this would not have curbed their activities. How was that type of decision taken?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the only thing I can tell you is that as far as I can recall the names that were on this list were prominent members who were tasked with collaboration.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand you correctly? You and Steyn decided who would make up this list of 29?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, once again, during this run-up various meetings were held at various venues where various members of the intelligence community gave their input.

CHAIRPERSON: This took place over two years.

MR LOOTS: A priority list was drawn up.

CHAIRPERSON: A week or two, or a day or two before that meeting was this list discussed? Is that not so? We get to this meeting where we would decide: "Is this list complete? Do we have to make additions or take names away?"

MR LOOTS: That is so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Who decided that? Were you involved there?

MR LOOTS: Gen Steyn was the Commander and I supported him.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it the two of you? Did you decide it was 29?

MR LOOTS: Special Forces were closely involved, Chairperson and the deceased Gen Kat Liebenberg...

CHAIRPERSON: No, but before we go to that meeting, we are now at Western Transvaal. In case you misunderstood me, am I correct that before you went to the meeting, was it you and Gen Steyn who decided that this two-year list was correct?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us put it in a suitcase and let's take it away to the meeting?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson no, there was close co-operation with Special Forces and the person who was the liaison person in Western Transvaal, was Commander Charl Naude and I cannot tell you in detail here today whether he was present there where we drew up the final list, but he gave important input there.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, Western Transvaal was important in the monitoring of the ANC in Gaberone, in Botswana, to such an extent that all the information came through them.

MR LOOTS: That is so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And months before the attack, a decision was taken that attacks would be launched in Botswana and you yourself say that the attack that took place on the 14th of June was an attack where more or less 29 people would have been attacked as targets and that decision was made at a Special Forces meeting where you and Steyn were present.

MR LOOTS: The meeting, Chairperson, I would just like to mention that the meeting was held on the 10th at Wachthuis, at Police Head Quarters and the co-Chairpersons were Gen Coetzee and Gen Constant Viljoen and if I recall correctly, Dr Neil Barnard from National Intelligence was also there.

CHAIRPERSON: But that list was submitted to that meeting by the Western Transvaal representatives?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And those two representatives were you and Steyn?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Am I correct, before you went to that meeting, you and Steyn discussed the list and you were satisfied that that list was the correct list?

MR LOOTS: Yes, following on inputs that were made.

CHAIRPERSON: But at the end of the day, you decided that those 29 names were the correct names?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you didn't have to add or take away any names?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And those were the 29 names of persons that you would motivate at that meeting that had to be killed?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Chairperson, before you continue, I am not certain that I understand you correctly. You refer to a priority list over these two years. Did that mean that you received the input from all over and from time to time you held meetings, where you said that these were the most important people and then another name came. When you refer to a priority list, was it a type of hierarchy of importance in terms of targets?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson maybe the term priority list is not the correct one, but these were all people who were actively involved and participated in the housing, transporting, training and handling of hand grenades and so forth.

MR MALAN: But those were the most central and important figures?

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

MR MALAN: So in that regard it was priority?

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

MR MALAN: So it was not that you went and consulted minutes and one day you and Steyn sat there at Potchefstroom or Western Transvaal and just chose 29 names?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: That was the culmination of records over a period of time where it was said that this is how we have it and everyone had an input in the determination and choice of the 29, or not? Or let me ask you in this manner. I am not trying to lead you into trouble or anything but you are saying the whole time that the other divisions also gave their input, but it is difficult to understand this concept of input. When you arrived at Head Office you had a list of 29 names, but the final list to whatever you refer to as the Secretariat or the Co-ordinator, you must have drawn it up, did you have a discretion or exercise your discretion with the choice there, or was that a collective input?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, may I just say, may I just draw your attention to the fact that this list changed from time to time, depending on persons who were apprehended, one would say that Mr A lives at facility B and somebody is arrested elsewhere and then he gives us a name of a person who lives in Matsulu, so from time to time it changed.

MR MALAN: I understand that, but what is not clear is who decided on those targets when the list was drawn up? Was it your choice? Your and Gen Steyn's decision, or was that the record of the two-year process?

MR LOOTS: It was the record of the two-year process.

MR MALAN: You did not exercise discretion and go and look at all the 16000 files and decide on 50 or 13 of them and say: "We will recommend these names?"

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: As the Co-ordinator, you took the results of all the meetings to Head Office?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR MALAN: So it was not a surprise? Just one moment before you answer. This was not a surprise to Special Forces for Charl Naude to hear any of the names there, because he's heard many of these names many times. I'm trying to understand the process because when we refer to target identification, there's the other possibilities. You had 16 files, Western Transvaal would draw up a list which they chose from the 16000.

MR LOOTS: No Chairperson, definitely not. Chairperson, this was based on the newest information with regard to the activities of individual A, B and C.

MR MALAN: So there must have been another type of discretion exercised by you?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson. To give you the one example today, I cannot, but discretion was exercised as to why persons A, B and C would be on the list.

MR MALAN: From a list that was continually changed?

MR LOOTS: That is so, Chairperson. Western Transvaal did not decide on the changes but this was depending on things that happened in the rest of the country, for example Chairperson ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: No, but don't tell me things I'm not asking you. If you're saying Western Transvaal did not take the decision solely, if this was done depending on things that happened in the rest of the country, then Western Transvaal was still the sole decision maker, but if this was done depending on small meetings where lists were changed, where everyone sat or participated, then it is something else and I am trying to find out what the process is, because you are saying, your evidence was that it was a priority list, or you used the words priority list, but later you referred to the most important people who were active, whose names were mentioned.

MR LOOTS: Who after a time were involved in acts of terror, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, I'm sorry that I've interrupted your for so long, but I have no clarity. I have more clarity now, I think I have more clarity. I may be finding myself to be mistaken again at some later stage.

MR BERGER: Thank you Mr Malan. Mr Loots, you said at one level you had no discretion, but surely you did have a discretion.


MR BERGER: Because you and Mr Steyn had to go to this meeting at Head Office and you had to motivate the 29 names, isn't that so?

MR LOOTS: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: On what basis did you motivate this? What did these people do that they deserved to die?

MR LOOTS: This was mentioned in the memorandums Chairperson, concerning each and every individual and unfortunately, as I said, everything was destroyed.

CHAIRPERSON: Who drew up the memorandum?

MR LOOTS: My staff members and I at Potchefstroom. The staff who resorted under me at Potchefstroom.

CHAIRPERSON: Not the people who supplied information from all the places?

MR LOOTS: No, their information was in reports which we received and from there we took the necessary information.

CHAIRPERSON: So who actually took the decision that person X was a candidate to be killed?

MR LOOTS: Primarily Western Transvaal.


MR LOOTS: Myself and Gen Steyn and once again Commandant Charl Naude from Special Forces who freely operated in Botswana with their own sources and intelligence capacities.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it only the three of you?

MR LOOTS: If my memory does not fail me, except for the subordinates because things happened very quickly Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I do not want to sound funny, but two years is quite a long time. That is why I'm asking these questions. Was it only the three of you? Was there anybody else who helped you in this decision or who took this decision with you collectively?

MR LOOTS: I have answered Chairperson. I referred you to the preliminary meetings.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the information that you had and from time to time this changed as circumstances allowed, but that is the point I want to get to, the collection of all the information, how did it get to a place where it was decided that all this information that we have now collected concerning Mr X indicates that he was a candidate for murder?


CHAIRPERSON: Did it work in that manner?

MR LOOTS: It worked like that.

CHAIRPERSON: So who would have looked at it and made such a decision?

MR LOOTS: Western Transvaal is the only one.

CHAIRPERSON: So that was you, Steyn and Naude?


CHAIRPERSON: Only the three of you?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson. May I just mention an example? Shortly before the 14th, the ...(indistinct) Soweto, would come and say that this scenario applied to location X.

CHAIRPERSON: So the scenario changed from time to time.


CHAIRPERSON: So the three of you were influenced to take decisions?

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So I will accept that it became worse as the information came in?

MR LOOTS: Absolutely, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Mr Loots, when was this meeting, this final meeting where you motivated the 29 names?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, once again my recollection, it could have been three weeks, it could have been 14 days before the time, but I do not believe it was longer than that.

MR BERGER: Between two and three weeks before the attack?


MR BERGER: And besides you and Mr Steyn and Charl Naude, you said at that meeting there was Gen Johan Coetzee, Gen Constant Viljoen and Dr Neil Barnard.


MR BERGER: And who else was at that meeting?

MR LOOTS: Gen Kat Liebenberg, at stage he was the Commander of Special Forces. Those are the only persons that I can recall Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So it was a relatively small meeting?

MR LOOTS: Not very large, no.

MR BERGER: And the purpose of that meeting was to finalise, in so far as it was possible, give or take last minute changes, the list of people and buildings who were going to be targeted in the attack?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And again, the purpose of this attack was to wipe out for the time being at least, the capacity of MK to launch attacks from Botswana?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And to do that you were going to go for the most important people, so to speak, the highest level people in MK. Would that be fair to say, in Botswana?

MR LOOTS: In Botswana, that we knew of Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Is it your evidence that today you cannot name a single person who was on that list of 29?

MR LOOTS: Someone I am thinking of is Muff Anderson, but once again Chairperson this was 15 years ago, I cannot recall what his part was of the 29. There was Keith Mogoape. I do not know at what stage he left Botswana, I cannot recall.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots, how many times did you embark on similar exercise and attend similar meetings where it was decided that certain persons would be killed in Botswana?

MR LOOTS: It was just this one, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you cannot recall anything about the names on the list that you submitted?

MR LOOTS: I'm thinking Chairperson, but I do not know them off the top of my head. There was a person Snoekie Zikelele, but I think he left earlier and Dan Hlume, Keith Mogoape, Isaac Makopo, MK Hammerkop, Hammerhead, there was Lekotho Pule, there was Two Six, I handled some of these people in 85 Chairperson. Somewhere I have a list of it and these were all persons who visited Botswana. The Late Mr Chris Hani, Lieut-Gen Lambert Moloi is another example.

CHAIRPERSON: Were they all on the list?

MR LOOTS: No not on the list but these were all prominent persons but we could not attach them to a specific target.

CHAIRPERSON: But that was the question, that list.

MR LOOTS: But this list was made up of the most important persons in Botswana.

MR BERGER: What I find surprising is that this can't be the first time you're being asked to recall the names of the people on the list. Surely when you were preparing for this hearing, you thought about the names of the people on the list, the names of the targets. Did it not occur to you to think about it?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the only thing that came to my knowledge were documents from my representatives. From my legal representatives were names mentioned of persons who were killed in Botswana and the dates and so forth, except for instances where I've already appeared before the Amnesty Committee, a man like Naledi where I was personally involved, but no other names were submitted to me, we just did not discuss it, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr Loots the question is another question. The question is, you knew that you would apply for this Botswana raid in 1995. It is probably not the only time that you are thinking about this list of 29 or 28 names, or 18 names, or 13 names or however many it ended up being, it is probably not the first time that you are trying to think which names were on the list, or is it?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, to be honest, I have thought about it but I cannot recall. I have mentioned a few names to you, I said Muff Anderson.

CHAIRPERSON: On the list?

MR LOOTS: I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: But that is why I'm asking. Not one name confirmed on that list ...(intervention)

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, if my memory could be refreshed by people who were involved with me in Botswana, I can react, but honestly I do not remember.

MR BERGER: And the people whose names you were given in Exhibit B, that your legal representatives went through with you, you've given evidence this morning about these people's involvement according to your knowledge in MK, but it would seem as though you have no knowledge of whether they were involved in MK or not, is that being unfair to you?

MR VISSER: That is incorrect. He has no recollection. It doesn't meet he didn't have knowledge at any point in time, Chairperson.

MR LOOTS: The finer details of each individual's activities and involvement, I cannot recall Chairperson, that is my answer.

MR BERGER: I said you have no knowledge. Well then I'll have to go through it and see if any rings a bell. Michael Hamlyn you said wasn't someone you would have had information on, you just remember his name appearing in several reports.

MR LOOTS: If I recall correctly, he was the only white person that was killed there, I'm not sure.

MR BERGER: And what does that mean?

MR LOOTS: Once again, when I saw the name Mike Hamlyn, it came back to me that Mike Hamlyn, and I am not even certain whether he was killed.

MR BERGER: Yes, he was killed in the raid.

MR LOOTS: Very well, but with regard to his specific activities, I cannot comment.

CHAIRPERSON: This is a white man here who was with the ANC.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, we did not even know about the person who was on the other side of the road in a house on that day, I didn't even know that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Hamlyn was a student at the University of Botswana. He was also a South African who was a draft dodger, he was avoiding military service in the SADF. Maybe that was the context in which you heard about him?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson, I cannot recall.

MR BERGER: He wasn't in MK. You don't know?

MR LOOTS: Not that I know of, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But why would his name be a name you recall if you do not know whether he was an MK member?

MR LOOTS: What I do recall of him, Chairperson, was that he was the only white person who was involved in one of the targets. Maybe he was a person who was in the wrong place at the wrong time.

CHAIRPERSON: So he was not on the list?

MR LOOTS: Not that I can recall, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, did he not, in your original cross-examination already say that to the best of his recollection or his knowledge that Hamlyn was not a target? That's my note here on his response to your cross-examination.

MR BERGER: He also said, when I asked him whether he was prepared to concede that anyone was killed by mistake, he's not prepared to say that either, but now it would appear as though at least - well he does make that concession, yes. Joseph Malaza. You said you also remember his name as a collaborator, which I find an odd phrase, but a collaborator or MK member, do you remember that?

MR LOOTS: Where did I say that Chairperson?

MR BERGER: In your evidence this morning.

MR LOOTS: Joseph Malaza is similar, it's a name that I can recall. The name Eugenia Kalal I cannot recall, but Joseph Malaza does ring a bell, but I have no details about him.

CHAIRPERSON: Why does it ring a bell? Is it because you read he died after the incident, or was he a target on the list?

MR LOOTS: It's possible that I heard ...

CHAIRPERSON: So we cannot say that he was also on the list?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: In fact Joseph Malaza worked for Hertz Car Hire here in Johannesburg.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, just before you proceed. I'm just looking at my notes. The only reference I have on his evidence is the names read from the list that you provided by Mr Visser, just going through the names and he asked him whether he has a recollection of the name Malaza and he said yes. I see no other evidence that was given ...(indistinct- speaking simultaneously) now. Stating?

MR BERGER: Mr Malan I have ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: If you can just show me what, or tell me what he indeed did say according to your notes.

MR BERGER: According to my note, before that was Duke Machobane and my note is his name as a collaborator/MK member, Duke Machobane.

MR MALAN: All the names were simply read.

MR BERGER: Then Joseph Malaza and then I've got a ditto. Same response as for Duke Machobane.

MR MALAN: Hamlyn, Pahle and Mtsweni, all the names that were known when read from your list and then he expanded on Hamlyn. You may proceed, I'm sorry.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, please allow me to come in here. A lot of questions are being put to this witness on statements made by my Learned Friend, for example: "Hamlyn was only this and that" and "Machobane, or whoever, was only a driver". Is there going to be evidence to this effect Chairperson, because in fairness to a witness, one would expect that my Learned Friend would say to you: "The wife of so and so will come and say that he was only a driver, he never had anything other than that to do with the MK." This witness is being brought under the impression that its accepted that that is, it's a fact and that must be very unnerving for a witness, Chairperson, to be confronted with something as if it is a fact, because on the same basis we are going to give you evidence that he wasn't just merely a driver and Hamlyn wasn't just merely a musician or an artist. We've got references which show that it wasn't so and with great respect, if my Learned Friend puts statements of fact to the witness which are not accepted common cause statements of fact, he should at least tell him that there will be evidence to this effect, what do you say about that, with great respect, rather than misleading the witness into thinking that it's accepted that it is a fact.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think it's fair to say that he was misleading the witness. We went through a long debate, for want of a better word, this morning and he's indicated that he's got instructions from certain individuals, a long list. One must accept that those are his instructions. It's up to them to decide who they want to call as witnesses and evidence and it's for this Panel to decide what we accept and what we don't accept and if it's a mere proposition to him, not backed up by evidence, then we'd ignore it.

MR VISSER: No, I have an understanding for that Chairperson, the problem which I have and which I'm trying to address is it was put to this witness: "Did you know that Mr Machobane was only a driver - Mtsweni was only a driver to the airport and back?" as a fact. Now Chairperson an advocate says this to a witness, who is he to argue, with great respect, unless he knows that the situation was different, which he doesn't, he says he can't remember. Now all sorts of questions follow from that. Even a question from yourself from the Chair. "Now why kill a man who is only a driver?" And with respect, that's not fair to a witness, Chairperson, because it's not based on evidence, certainly not on anything that we've submitted so far and that's the only point I'm making.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, can you prefix those question with...

MR BERGER: Chairperson, gladly. Chairperson I can, my Learned Friend should know that I won't put a statement of fact unless I intend to lead evidence to that effect. It's not the first time that we've met one another in these hearings, but secondly, it's not for me as an advocate to say: "So and so will come and say X, Y and Z." As long as I put the proposition to the witness and give the witness an opportunity to react to it, it's sufficient.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's not go into a big debate as to how you ought to put the questions. ...(indistinct) if you just said: "Look here, I put it to you that this so and so and so." If that's okay by you.

MR BERGER: That's okay by me, Chairperson. And Chairperson, the reason I'm going through these names is because I don't want it to be argued at the end that I allowed this evidence to go through unchallenged and then all of a sudden I pop up a witness who comes and says the contrary and Mr Loots never had an opportunity to comment and if Peter Stiff is going to be authority for what Michael Hamlyn did, then Peter Stiff will have to come and testify.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - mike not on)

MR BERGER: Mr Loots, Joseph Malaza, what I can put to you is that he arrived on the day, he arrived in Botswana, Gaberone, on the day of the raid. He was visiting his cousin, Lindi Pahle. He was not involved in any activities in Botswana and in fact after he was killed, his body was returned to South Africa for burial, which I take it is something the authorities in South Africa wouldn't have allowed had he been a member of MK, am I right?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I cannot dispute that, I do not know about it, but I shall not dispute it.

MR BERGER: Now George Pahle, you said he was regularly mentioned in reports. In what context?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson the same applies. George Pahle, Dick Mtsweni and Duke Machobane, they fall in the same category. They come from elsewhere, other divisions had informers who supplied information about them and this was in reports which we received and which we co-ordinated at Western Transvaal and then using informers, we tried to amongst others support information with regard to amongst others George Pahle, but with regard to his personal activities, I cannot help you.

MR BERGER: Does it ring any bells that he operated a bus company in Botswana?

MR LOOTS: Yes, I do recall something like that, yes.

MR BERGER: And his wife, Lindi Pahle, she was a social worker who worked for the Botswana Government, I put it to you.

MR LOOTS: Here is the name. I still made a cross next to it. I personally do not know about Lindi Pahle.

MR BERGER: You said it's possible that her name was mentioned by other divisions?

MR LOOTS: It's possible Chairperson, that is my dilemma Chairperson. All these names that are supplied by Natal and Western Cape and right through the whole country, I cannot recall all of them in detail.

JUDGE MOTATA: In his evidence-in-chief he did allude to Lindi Pahle, that it didn't even come from their division, she may have been a suspect, but he knows nothing about her.

MR BERGER: Thank you Judge. So Mr Loots, it's fair to say then that, but for Muff Anderson, you can't recall a single name on the list of 29 and added to that, you can't say that any of the people who were killed, were on that list, would that be correct?

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, just before he replies. My recollection, I can look at my notes again, is that he said he wasn't that sure of Muff Anderson either.

MR LOOTS: I am not.

MR MALAN: But the way you put the question is that as if he has confirmed ...(indistinct) on the list. He did not, according to my notes and recollection.

MR BERGER: No, he mentioned Muff Anderson as a possibility.

MR MALAN: He mentioned quite a number of possibilities.

MR BERGER: No, he said they were not on the list.

MR MALAN: We're talking not about victims, we're talking about a number of names that he mentioned, he said he cannot remember at what time, some of them might have been on the list, he really can't say. Quite a number of names were mentioned.

MR BERGER: I'm sorry, I thought he said, in response to a question from Judge Pillay that, "Were those people on the list?", he said: "No", but that's fine, it doesn't make any difference to me. The bottom line is that you can say who was on the list and you can't say that any of the victims were on the list?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the victims, amongst others, and I refer to Duke Machobane, I refer to Dick Mtsweni, I refer to Harry Mnyele, George Pahle, their names were definitely on that list.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you remember that?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, these were members or persons who figured prominently in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you now recall that their names were on the list?

MR LOOTS: I'm convinced of it, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Please repeat those names.

MR LOOTS: Duke Machobane, Harry Thamsanqa Mnyele, Mtsweni Dick Nkukwana, and Cecil George Pahle.

MR BERGER: Your evidence is that those four people were definitely on the list of targets that you approved of and submitted to Head Office.

MR LOOTS: I have five, I beg your pardon, Nkadimeng not, that's four persons. Yes, that's correct Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And would it then follow that they were on the list of ten targets as well?

MR LOOTS: I am convinced of it, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I see it's four o'clock, can I continue? You've told the Committee that this was a very close - there was close co-operation between the police and the military?

MR LOOTS: As well as National Intelligence, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And was it accepted that the police would carry out the intelligence-gathering, the information- gathering and the military would carry out the operation?

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, his evidence was that everybody fed information into the system, but the military would carry out the operation.

MR BERGER: Do you know why that was so? Why was it left to the Military to carry out the operation?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, according to the law, police could not legally act across the border, the army could indeed do so.

MR BERGER: Is it also your evidence, and maybe I've got it wrong, that amongst the 29 targets that you and Gen Steyn identified there were children living in those target houses?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson once again the preliminary meetings where Soweto, for example, would say that Mr A who lives in facility B would say that there are children and at the final submission it was finally said that that target would not be hit, not where children were involved.

MR BERGER: So it was - when the final decision was taken, at which you were present, it was decided that any targets where there were children close by or living within the target house ...

MR MALAN: No, Mr Berger, the decision was that those where they had information that children were present, would be taken off the list. It was a very specific decision per target, that was the evidence.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, may I just state clearly and I am depending on my recollection here, initially there were 37 that were reduced to 29 in Head Office and eventually the feedback came back that approval was only given for 10 by the State Security Council, but the moment where a child was involved, it was scrapped from the list and that brings about the fact that 29 were submitted, which was eventually reduced to 10, if my memory serves me correctly.

MR BERGER: Yes, that's the way I thought I understood it.

Now, Dick Mtsweni had a daughter staying with him, I beg your pardon, a granddaughter, Busisiwe Mokoena.

MR LOOTS: Unknown to me Chairperson, I was not aware of it.

MR BERGER: Who was responsible for the intelligence gathering on Dick Mtsweni?

MR LOOTS: I'm not sure whether it was Soweto or Johannesburg. I am not sure what his nationality, Mtsweni, is, I do not know where he came from in the RSA.

MR BERGER: Themba Duke Machobane.

MR LOOTS: The same, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Same what?

MR LOOTS: I mean the same applies for him as Dick Mtsweni, I do not know where he is originally from. I beg your pardon, I interrupted you.

MR BERGER: He had 6 year old Peter Mofoka staying with him.

MR LOOTS: Not aware of that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(no translation - transcriber's own translation) It was decided at that meeting that where there were children, they were removed from the list.

MR LOOTS: No action, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The Military, there was Kat Liebenberg

MR LOOTS: And Gen Constant Viljoen also

CHAIRPERSON: And where there were children, there was no intention to kill them?

MR LOOTS: No Chairperson. If a child for some or other reason at the wrong time and at the wrong place found himself there, we had no control over that.

CHAIRPERSON: You see and I do not expect you to answer this question, but please try to answer, when they arrived there, they would have seen that there's a child there.

MR LOOTS: Please repeat the question Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: When they arrived at the house knowing that the policy of that committee that had decided that: "Where there are children, we will not act", but when they arrived there and where children were killed or injured, they should have seen that there were children there.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, firstly I am not aware of any children that would be present there

CHAIRPERSON: I accept that and that is why those houses were taken away from the list, But when they arrived at a certain house where a child was killed or injured, the Military must have seen that there was a child and the policy was that where there were children, no action would be taken.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, those attacks, if I recall correctly, that attack took place at quarter past one in the morning and under these circumstances it is unfortunate, very unfortunate.

MR BERGER: Peter Mofoka was the nephew of Duke Machobane and his wife Rose Machobane. Surely the intelligence gatherers would have picked that up, staying with them, going to school while he was staying with them? Duke Machobane, I take it, was under surveillance for a long time.

MR LOOTS: Once again, Chairperson, I cannot answer there, I was not aware of that.

MR BERGER: And also with Mr Dick Mtsweni was Thebogo Gqabi, 5 years old at the time, also staying in the house.

CHAIRPERSON: I suppose the same answer would - did you know?

MR LOOTS: I did not know, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If there was a policy that action should not be taken where there were children present and then it does happen, what would the attitude of the Committee be?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I do not understand the question entirely.

CHAIRPERSON: At that Committee this list of 29 people was brought there, they went through it and with some of them they found that there were children involved and they were removed from the list.

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Everyone present knows of that policy. If the military went out and had killed children and had acted contrary to the decision at the meeting, what would their position have been with regard to the meeting? Would they have acted incorrectly without instructions or what would have happened?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, their conduct would have been improper but I do not know how they acted at the various targets, the only thing I know is that this took place at quarter past one of the night.

MR MALAN: Why would this have been incorrect? Were the targets where children - was this not done on the basis of target identification?

MR LOOTS: That is how I explained it, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But then they had instruction to attack certain targets.

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR MALAN: So why would you say it was incorrect for them to attack the target?

MR LOOTS: Because of unforeseen circumstances, Chairperson. If they landed in front of a house where there was no information about children, then it is an unfortunate incident.

MR MALAN: But that does not make the Special Forces operatives' conduct incorrect. How was he supposed to know that there were children in there, if the information did not indicate previously.

MR LOOTS: That is why I say it would be unfortunate, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: But according to you, Mr Loots, one of the things that you had, you and the other people who were planning this operation had in mind, was if there was information that there were children at a particular target house, then that target house would be ruled out.

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So surely instructions would have gone out to your information gatherers in the field to find out whether there were any children at the target houses?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, where it was mentioned that children would be at a specific target, it was scrapped.

CHAIRPERSON: But we're talking about 14 or 21 days beforehand.

MR LOOTS: I assume that the army was informed and if there would be children ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But hold on, what would happen when they get there and they see that there's a child lying in the bed?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I cannot recall that in detail, but where children were mentioned, the targets were removed from the list.

CHAIRPERSON: I know that. It was there at the meeting, but when they went out on this operation and they came to a house where there was a target and they saw a child, what were they supposed to do?

MR LOOTS: Gen Liebenberg was in charge of Special Forces, they were responsible for the operation there and what they discussed internally after this list was submitted to them, I do not know, I was not present, but I accept that the decision was conveyed clearly at Head Office with regard to children.

MR MALAN: You did not receive any instructions? That is Mr Berger's question. Did you receive instruction to go and check whether there were children at the houses? Did you receive such an instruction?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Well Mr Loots, my question goes further. What steps did you take to gather intelligence as to whether there were any children present or not?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, the only answer I can give was that at the stage when the submission was made, we conveyed the maximum information that we had and whatever could or would happen, unforeseen, we did not have any control over it.

MR BERGER: But it was never uppermost in your mind, I ask you, when you were gathering the intelligence, when you were compiling this list of 29 targets, it was never uppermost in your mind to check to see whether there were children present?

MR LOOTS: We pay attention to it Chairperson, that is why it was mentioned at the preliminary meeting and that is why it was removed, the targets where children would be present.

MR BERGER: Who was present at Nietverdiendt while the attack was in progress? Remember you said that you were in the Head Quarters there?

MR LOOTS: The Commander there was Col Piet Hills, H-I-L-L-S, he was from Phalaborwa, if I remember correctly.

MR BERGER; Security Branch?

MR LOOTS: ...(no translation - transcriber's own translation) No, Army and the reason therefore was that the SA Army could not foresee what Botswana's reaction would be and they were only on stand-by to act if it was necessary, which wasn't then necessary.

MR BERGER: And who else?

MR LOOTS: Of my subordinates, Col Steyn was there, Maj Crause was there, Col Truter, he has since left the Force, he was there, Truter, he was from Rustenburg.

MR BERGER: Security Branch?

MR LOOTS: Yes and then I think Col du Preez Smit and the late Col Hannes Wheraman.

MR BERGER: I'm sorry, besides Hills, who else from the "Weermag" was there?

MR LOOTS: No one else, no senior above him. There was a Brig Serfontein, that's correct, he was from Special Forces, he was directly under the command of Kat Liebenberg, he was a Brigadier.

MR BERGER; And wasn't Craig Williamson also there?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Were you or anyone else in that control room, were you in communication with the attackers?

MR LOOTS: Col Hills was in radio contact with the attackers and he was the only person who communicated with them, no one else.

MR BERGER: Who was in charge of the attackers on the ground?

MR LOOTS: Another person who was there was Col Charl Naude. He was also there.

MR BERGER: In the control room?

MR LOOTS: He was in the control room with us.

MR BERGER: But who was in charge of the men on the ground? Who was- of the men on the ground, who was in charge?

MR LOOTS: Col Charl Naude.

MR BERGER: But he was part of the operation?

MR LOOTS: But he remained behind in the RSA.

MR BERGER: No, no, I'm asking, of the people who went into Botswana, who was in charge?

MR LOOTS: They used pseudonyms Chairperson, I do not know. I don't even know - the team leader, there was a group of ten, if I recall correctly, had two or three days before the time, they moved in and stayed at hotels and safe houses and so forth, until the night of the 14th and then the teams departed and there they went to the targets.

MR BERGER: And you didn't know the names of those people?

MR LOOTS: Well I can recall one, it was Tim Williams. I do not know whether that was his real name. The reason why I recall him clearly was that at a particular target that was attacked, his own men shot him through his calf or through his upper leg and then he was taken to Pretoria by helicopter.

MR BERGER: And besides him, you don't know the names of anyone else?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Charl Naude would know the names?

MR LOOTS: Charl Naude, yes, he would know the names for sure.

MR BERGER: And he would know the names?

MR LOOTS: For sure.

MR MALAN: If he has a better memory than Mr Loots.

MR LOOTS: We hope so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You said there was a large quantity of documents brought back which took you six weeks to go through.

MR LOOTS: Specifically documents that were confiscated at Solidarity News Service and then at the ANC Head Office.

MR BERGER: The real haul, if I were to call it that, came from the two buildings where no one was killed.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no, at other places documents were also found. Each team had a bag with them in which it was sealed, and upon their return it was handed to us.

MR BERGER: From which targets were documents recovered, can you say?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no, except for the two that I mentioned to you, I cannot recall the others in detail.

MR BERGER: And with the two you mean Solidarity News Service and the ANC Head Office.

MR LOOTS: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So you can't say whether information was gathered from every house that was attacked, from some of the houses, or from any of the houses, you can't really say that, can you?

MR LOOTS: I cannot attach documents to a pertinent target, I cannot recall that far back.

MR BERGER: When you say your impression was that only ANC targets were hit because there were lots of names and addresses, that impression is to a large extent based on documents that were recovered from the ANC's Head Office, isn't it?

MR LOOTS: And at Solidarity News Service as well.

MR BERGER: You said you have a card on you from P W Botha.


MR BERGER: What does that card say?

CHAIRPERSON: What is that about?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson it was on occasion at the end of 1986, the State President and his own person signature, wrote a Christmas message to the members and that is what I kept over the years because we believed what we were doing, whether it was right or wrong.

MR BERGER: It's not like this was a card sent to you after the raid to say: "Well done"?


MR BERGER: And it's just a printed form, with his printed signature on.

MR LOOTS: Sent to each and every person in the Force.

MR BERGER; A message from the State President to the Security Forces.

MR LOOTS: Security Forces

MR BERGER: I take it this is your handwriting?


MR BERGER: Received by you on the 8th of July 1986.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, I don't know whether you perhaps missed it, but he says he referred to that simply to say that he kept that all the years because at that stage they believed in what they were doing. There's no evidential value to this relating to the ...

CHAIRPERSON: So what do you think now?

MR LOOTS: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: Do you still think it was right?

MR LOOTS: Well Chairperson, in hindsight I think that the group of people who believed that they could stand up to a larger force, were very brave, and unfortunately I was one of them. The fact is we believed the cold war between America and Russia was a reality, nobody would have dreamed that the Berlin Wall would fall, no one for that matter. We were loyal and we tried our best, although we were human and in that regard made many mistakes.

MR BERGER: Mr Loots, the reason I asked you about that card from PW Botha was because I thought that in your evidence-in-chief it was a personal card that he sent immediately after the raid, because you also said in your evidence-in-chief that someone had to make a submission to the State Security Council to get authority for the raid.

MR LOOTS: I accept that it was CIC, who was the Co-ordinating Intelligence Committee, comprising the Chief of the Army, the Commissioner of Police and the Director-General of National Intelligence, the three of them.

MR BERGER: Amongst others?

MR LOOTS: Amongst others, yes.

MR BERGER: You don't know for a fact that anyone made a submission to the State Security Council?

MR LOOTS: No, not on my level.

MR BERGER: You see, because you then referred to a minute of the State Security Council.

MR LOOTS: No, it's not mine. It was not me.

MR BERGER: Well it's in your evidence, it was referred to.

MR LOOTS: No, Mr Visser referred to it.

MR BERGER: And that minute of the 10th of September 1984 is not authority for this raid, so I'm asking you whether you are aware of any meeting of the State Security Council where this raid was discussed and approved in advance?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson no, I don't have any personal knowledge of that. What I am saying is, the only thing I can comment on is if the reasonable inference is drawn.

MR BERGER: Your evidence is that you got your instructions from Gen Steyn.

MR LOOTS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr Loots did you not say that after the meeting at Head Office, further submission was made to the State Security Council and then it was reduced to the final amount or number of targets?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, that is why I say that I made the inference that the three gentlemen who did relate the submission to the SSC and that is why I believe that they discussed it with the SSC.

MR MALAN: So when did you hear that it was only 10?

MR LOOTS: It was briefly after the submission.

MR MALAN: Who told you that it was just 10?

MR LOOTS: It was Gen Steyn.

MR MALAN: So he would be able to tell us who reduced it.

MR BERGER: My final question Mr Loots is that you said that not only did you act under instructions from Gen Steyn, but you also acted under instructions from Head Office. Now what did you mean by that? Who at Head Office would have given you instructions in relation to this gathering of information and selecting of targets for the raid?

MR LOOTS: In Gen Steyn's absence, Brig Schoon dealt with the terrorist desk and would then liaise with me as second in command and then give instructions.

MR BERGER: That's the Brig Schoon who was in charge of Vlakplaas?

MR LOOTS: Yes, Sir.

MR BERGER: And that's the Brig Schoon who worked under Gen Coetzee?

MR LOOTS: He was attached to Head Office, that is correct.

MR BERGER: And Gen van der Merwe, and Gen Schutte?

MR LOOTS: That's correct.

MR BERGER: Thank you Mr Loots, I have no further questions. Thank you.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, have you got any question?

MR STEENKAMP: No questions, Chairman, thank you.


MR VISSER: No re-examination thank you Chairman.


MR COETSER: No further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots I understand and I accept that this whole operation as well as the preparation was done secretively.

MR LOOTS: That is so Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And amongst you in the police, was it discussed?

MR LOOTS: Under the police, no.

CHAIRPERSON: In general?

MR LOOTS: No, the Security Branch Chairperson, National Intelligence and then Military Intelligence.

CHAIRPERSON: And in general?

MR LOOTS: No, Chairperson, only certain people.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you tell me, it would have been yourself, Steyn, what was the other man's name, Naude?

MR LOOTS: Charl Naude, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Liebenberg?

MR LOOTS: Yes. Gen Coetzee, the previous Commissioner, Gen Constant Viljoen and Dr Neil Barnard and then the man at ground level, Col James Hills.

CHAIRPERSON: The day of the incident, I'm not concerned about that, because those people would have received instructions as to which house to go to, they would have known what was to happen because they had the weapons.

MR MALAN: What about Crause and Smit?

MR LOOTS: The day of the submission, or the day in general?

MR MALAN: The planned attack?

MR LOOTS: Definitely Col Crause and Smit as well.

MR MALAN: Who else?

MR LOOTS: This was at ground level.

MR MALAN: The inner circle of this circle of this attack, who knew of this?

MR LOOTS: There was a man who is deceased, Col Hannes Wheraman and then the other staff members at Potchefstroom for example W/O Wolfaardt who dealt with our legal system, there was a member of Special Forces, Piet Stanton, he was one of the Senior Members of Col Charl Naude, McGray Brandfield, he was also from Special Forces. The people from DCI, there was a Major Borman, he was from the Directorate of Covert information and then there was a Col Prinsloo from Special Forces, there was Brig Chris Serfontein, he was also from Special Forces.

MR MALAN: Is that all?

MR LOOTS: That's what I can remember.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - microphone not on)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

CHAIRPERSON: They knew what was decided on, what would happen and who would be killed.

MR LOOTS: I am convinced of that, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That was a secret to every other one, except for these people who would go to do the work?

MR LOOTS: Absolutely, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You are excused.

MR COETSER: Arising out of the very detailed cross-examination that has occurred, originally I did have no questions after Mr Loot's evidence in chief, but I have one or two questions which may well be important ...

CHAIRPERSON: Well as long as it's one or two, let's finish it.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR COETSER: Ja, they're very short. Mr Loots in trying to understand this so-called list that is being discussed, would my understanding be that at a certain stage Botswana became the main springboard for infiltration into South Africa by Umkhonto weSizwe.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, yes, that was after the signing of the Nkomati Accord.

MR COETSER: Now, it seems to me, looking at the totality of your evidence, that what would appear to have happened, with the co-operation of all the other Intelligence agencies around the country, a concerted effort was made to keep an updated picture as to what exactly was going on in Botswana and Gaberone and who the personalities were that were involved.

MR LOOTS: Definitely.

MR COETSER: Was this on an ongoing basis?

MR LOOTS: It happened in practice.

MR COETSER: So it was sort of like for example a local New York police office, keeping an up to date family tree of the local Mafia operation type story? In other words, consistently keeping up to date of the movements and going on and ins and outs of who's now involved?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson that was applicable day and night.

MR COETSER: Right. Effectively this picture that you continually updated over the years, concentrating on Botswana and Gaberone in particular, constituted your list of people, constituted the list of major figures that were operating at any given time from Botswana.

MR LOOTS: From Gaberone as such.

MR COETSER: Right. Now within that context, how soon before the Botswana raid actually took place was a decision made to do the raid?

CHAIRPERSON: 21 to 14 days.

MR LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: So it wasn't a question of a decision having been made two years previously to conduct the raid and then draw up a specific list for the purposes thereof?

MR LOOTS: Never.

CHAIRPERSON: The way I understand is that two years prior to that there was a decision made that we have to resort to this type of activity, but this specific attack was decided upon 21 to 14 days prior to ...(indistinct)

MR COETSER: Now would I be correct in saying that given the decision that was made, 14, 21 days before the actual raid took place to conduct this raid, that the information as to who the appropriate targets could be was drawn from this up to date family tree type situation that you were keeping on what was going on in Botswana.

MR LOOTS: Correct.

MR COETSER: And that chopped and changed a lot, I can imagine.

MR LOOTS: Yes, it did change Chairperson.

MR COETSER: People come and go, people fall out the picture, new people come into the picture.

MR LOOTS: Barry Gilder describes it in detail.

MR MALAN: Let us leave Barry Gilder. Let us stay with Wikus Loots.

MR LOOTS: Thank you Chairperson.

MR COETSER: Alright, because I can imagine in just understanding basic revolutionary warfare, you don't stay in one place for too long. Now what I want to ask you is, at the time the decision was made to do the raid, you people the resorted to the most up to date picture you had at that time, of who were the main role playing figures in MK in Botswana, is that right?

MR LOOTS: Correct.

MR COETSER: Okay. And you had to rely on police members or agents who had most recently been in Botswana to tell you who in fact was there.

MR LOOTS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: So it is based on that information, not only who was on the list, but who in fact was there at the time, according to you information, that the targeting structure was arranged.

MR LOOTS: I think I explained that Chairperson, that after arrests, new information came about which changed the whole picture.

MR COETSER: Now just one or two other aspects very quickly. Was it one of your primary goals and instructions to the SADF to try and secure as much documentation, computer equipment, computer information as possible out of the raids?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I would like to answer as follows. That was definitely our priority, so much so that we asked approval from Gen Coetzee at that stage that a member or two from the Security Branch would accompany the teams to, amongst other, the ANC head office and Solidarity News Service and this was not obtained because only the army could act in Botswana.

MR COETSER: And was it also one of the priority goals to destroy the infrastructure of the so-called Headquarters that were there in this other building that you have mentioned?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: So it wasn't simply just a question of killing people?

MR LOOTS: No, it was disruptive action as well.

CHAIRPERSON: It was a simple matter of killing people, Mr Coetser, but in addition to attack buildings.

MR COETSER: This man who was apparently 70 years of age and who was apparently a simple driver for the ANC in Botswana, do you know in what building or house he was at the time that he was killed?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, no, I cannot recall the addresses in detail.

MR COETSER: Do you know whether for example he put up any resistance at the time of the attack?

MR LOOTS: I was not personally at any of the scenes, so I do not know, I cannot comment.

MR COETSER: Alright. Would the constant - my last question is, would the constant change ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Is that a promise?

MR COETSER: Would the constant changing of this list, the decision to raid Botswana having been taken only 14 to 21 days before, having to get the latest updated information at that time as to who exactly was in Botswana and what the picture was there, have contributed to your inability to in fact remember who was on that list at that particular time?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, that is so.

MR COETSER: Thank you.


CHAIRPERSON: So it couldn't have contributed to his lack of memory, 14 or 21 days beforehand, isn't it? It couldn't have affected his memory when the meeting took place to decide who was to be killed. Is that all?

INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not on.

MR VISSER: I didn't hear the time. 9 o'clock is going to be a bit difficult.

CHAIRPERSON: Half past nine tomorrow morning.