CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, when we adjourned yesterday, Mr Visser was still questioning Mr Zeelie. Mr Visser.


JUDGE DE JAGER: Mr Visser, before you start, I believe the evidence was replayed and it was ascertained that in fact Mr Zeelie mentioned both names, Gen Erasmus and Gen du Toit. I wish to apologise, I've been wrong, my note has been wrong, I did not hear it but it's a fact that both names have been mentioned.


MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson. Yes, I was going to remark on that issue. I personally listened to the tape, Chairperson, the reason why Gen du Toit's name wasn't heard was that Mr Zeelie dropped his voice somewhat at that point, after mentioning the name Erasmus, and I do also apologise to Mr Zeelie for having been incorrect in my assertion that he did not mention Gen du Toit.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Visser, do you want to carry on asking questions?


Yes, Chairperson, I have but a few questions left.

Mr Zeelie, we spoke yesterday about what you said on page 10, namely that you incorporated Mr van Heerden's evidence - I beg your pardon, it's on page 9, and that you confirm the contents of his statement, can you recall that?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, I can Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well. I'd just now like to say to you what Mr van Heerden says on page 37 in the annexure to his application in volume 1, concerning this matter. On page 37, paragraph 12.3.2 - at a later stage he made another statement, but I'm now dealing with the first statement, he there refers to the Vanderbijl Square explosion and then he says:

"A few evenings after the second explosion at Vanderbijl, Zeelie came to fetch me at my house"

is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, I went to go and fetch him at his house, Mr Chairperson, after I was with Mr du Toit and Erasmus at the breweries.

MR VISSER: He then said that you said you had work to do, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: I believe that is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: He then said that:

"We have to go and place a bomb at the Why Not Night-club in Hillbrow"

the next sentence:

"He felt that it was an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth"

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, I cannot say that this is the specific words that I expressed.

MR VISSER: Yes, but he said it was your feeling why the Why Not Night-club had to be bombed.

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, as I have said, I cannot say that I did not say these words, I received an instruction from Gen Erasmus and I went to go and pick Mr van Heerden up to go and execute this operation.

MR VISSER: But Mr Zeelie, if you had such an instruction at that stage, why didn't you say this to Mr van Heerden? "Gen du Toit and Erasmus told me that we have to go and bomb the Why Not Club", why did you not say this to him?

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, I wouldn't have gone and picked up Mr van Heerden if I did not tell him that I received an instruction. Can I also - you spoke about the incorporation, I go back Mr Chairperson, where Gen du Toit's amnesty application appears in bundle 1 and where he also stated that he incorporated his statement with that of Gen Erasmus, which then means that every single word that Gen Erasmus said is also applicable for him. There are small words that we are playing with.

MR VISSER: Can we look at page 37, paragraph ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed, Mr Visser, dealing with 12.3.2, the first words there, it says:

"A few evenings after the second explosion at Vanderbijl"

you went to fetch Van Heerden to go on the Why Not operation, I was under the impression that the explosion at the Why Not bar was the same night as Vanderbijl, not a few evenings after the second explosion. What do you say about that?

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, that is why in my evidence, or in my statement I referred to the Wimpy Bar, because it was such a long time ago and I couldn't at that stage recall the dates of the explosions, that is now of the Vanderbijlpark Square and I just based it on what was in the documents. Up to today I do not believe that any of the members here can say exactly, or provide you with the exact date by means of documentation about when the Vanderbijl Square explosion took place.

CHAIRPERSON: But as you sit here now today, do you know whether it was the same night as the Vanderbijl explosion, or are you not sure?

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, I do believe that it was that same evening.


MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

In other words, Mr van Heerden is mistaken if he thought it was a few evenings after the Vanderbijlpark incident.

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, it is a question that Mr Visser can ask Mr van Heerden.

MR VISSER: Well I'm asking you this question.

MR ZEELIE: I cannot answer for Mr van Heerden, but once again, it was a long time ago and at that stage he could have thought that it was a few evenings later.

JUDGE DE JAGER: The question is just, do you think that Mr van Heerden could be mistaken?

MR ZEELIE: As I've said, Mr Chairperson, I believe it was a long time ago and he could have been mistaken, yes.

MR VISSER: Very well. On page 37 of volume 1, paragraph 12.3.4 Mr van Heerden says to the Attorney-General:

"With our arrival there Zeelie made the suggestion or discussed the suggestion with Paul, Snor and Douw"

what is your comment on that sentence?

MR ZEELIE: I accept it is correct.

MR VISSER: So it was your suggestion, it was not a suggestion from somebody else?

MR ZEELIE: I do not understand what you mean by saying whose suggestion it was.

MR VISSER: It was Zeelie's suggestion.

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, I received an instruction and I discussed it with them.

MR VISSER: You see the point I'd like to make is that it does - or if you read Van Heerden's statement to the Attorney-General, one realises that he was under the impression that this was your operation.

MR ZEELIE: Who was under the impression it was my operation?

MR VISSER: Do you have a problem with Afrikaans?

MR ZEELIE: Sir, I'm asking you a question, I do understand Afrikaans.

MR VISSER: It was Van Heerden's impression that it was your suggestion, that it was you who decided to do this.

Is he wrong is that is his impression?

MR ZEELIE: I would just like to go back a little bit, Sir. I do not believe, Mr Chairperson, that he would have thought that I would do such an operation on my own.

MR VISSER: You see in his statement, and I will ask him about this, but in his statement to the Attorney-General on page 37 and the next page, he never mentions an instruction of Gen Erasmus and Du Toit.

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, yes it may sound like that or seem like that, but whatever the case was with Mr van Heerden, I also do take responsibility for Mr van Heerden in that I gave him the instruction to accompany me.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Just a moment. In the same paragraph, Paul van Dyk said he did not want to become involved without an instruction of De Kock.

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Van Dyk and Vermeulen were stationed in the Gauteng area, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: They operated there to an extent but they were from Vlakplaas under the Head Office command.

JUDGE DE JAGER: If they would have received an instruction from Gen Erasmus as General, would they have to execute it or would they be expected to follows these orders?

MR ZEELIE: It's not necessarily that they would follow the instructions, Van Dyk had to do it with his immediate Commander first, but it was not necessary that he would act under the instructions of Erasmus.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Do you know if he took any steps to clear this up with De Kock?

MR ZEELIE: I do not know if he did it directly with him. JUDGE DE JAGER: But they did accompany you in the end.

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Just to add to the question of Judge de Jager, the Amnesty Committee or the sub-Committee of the Amnesty Committee at various opportunities heard evidence that was not denied, that if Vlakplaas operated in a certain area they would be directly under the command of the Commander of that area. Do you agree with that?

MR ZEELIE: If it came from Head Office, Mr Chairperson, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And also our experience in other hearings is that members of Vlakplaas only got involved on invitation or on request by the local division of the Security Branch, then they would operate and then as Mr Visser says, they would have that sort of hierarchy ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Ja, fall under the direct control of the Commander Officer of the area.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. That was from time to time flexible, but they did normally only act on request.

MR VISSER: The point that Judge de Jager is putting to you is that if as a Commander of the Witwatersrand - or if Erasmus would be able to give instructions to these people and they had to follow these instructions.

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, I still say that it was the Commander of the group from Vlakplaas priority to first clear it up with his Commander, except for as the Chairperson said, it was a Head Office instruction and ...

MR VISSER: But the fact of the matter is that Erasmus never gave an instruction that Vlakplaas members had to become involved, is that not so?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And he did not even know that you approached them?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You see Mr van Heerden then made a further statement, a supplementary statement and that he did on the 26th of June, I don't see a year date, on the 26th of June on some year ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what page are you looking at?

MR VISSER: Page 32, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the year doesn't show.

MR VISSER: I'm being told it's 1997, by my learned friend, Mr Rossouw.

... and in that statement on page 30, he says that:

"After the second limpet mine explosion at Vanderbijl bus terminus, Gens Erasmus and Du Toit mentioned to myself and Charles Zeelie that actions had to be taken against the ANC."

That was now the first time that he spoke about Erasmus and Du Toit. He then continues to say that:

"When Charles Zeelie mentioned to me that there was an act of revenge against the ANC, or they were going to launch an act of revenge against the ANC, I believed that that was the purpose of the attack"

and he brought these two incidents together. Will you agree with this in principle?

MR ZEELIE: The way in which I understand it I would then say it falls in with what you asked me before, that I gave an instruction to Mr van Heerden and if you read these two things together, he accepted that it came from Gen Erasmus and Du Toit.

MR VISSER: Just to finalise it or complete it, in all fairness to him, at the bottom of page 30, paragraph 11(b):

"Instructions were received from the Commanders of the Security Branch at John Vorster Square. I was informed about this instruction by Charles Zeelie. I believed that Gens Erasmus and Piet du Toit were involved in this."

Very well, I will ask him about this evidence, but just in all fairness, in his supplementary affidavit he says that you informed him about the instruction, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: I believe I would have done it.

MR VISSER: Very well. The question about the limpet mine is a bit confusing, you spoke in your first statement about one limpet mine and Mr van Heerden mentions two limpet mines, which is it now? How many limpet mines did you place there?

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, by coincidence or coincidentally yesterday I took it up with Mr van Heerden and I was under the impression that there was only one limpet mine, but I would accept that there were two limpet mines. The fact that he carried it into the building, I will not deny it or doubt it if he says there were two limpet mines.

MR VISSER: In the light of your evidence now, what do you say then about the Chairperson's questions to you, why did you have to use two limpet mines in order to achieve the goal that you wanted to achieve, instead of using only one? One would have achieved the same goal.

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, the fact that we used two was to cause more damage to the structure towards the outside.

CHAIRPERSON: But did this not also increase the risk of the loss of life?

MR ZEELIE: Not necessarily, Mr Chairperson, because an explosion works with a detonating direction and that is why I can testify about where a large car bomb exploded and where a person who was 15 metres from the vehicle did not have a scratch on him.

MR VISSER: At the SAB club, did Gen Erasmus tell you: "Look, you have to ensure that there's no serious injuries or deaths"?

MR ZEELIE: It is news.

MR VISSER: I'm asking you if he told you this.

MR ZEELIE: As far as I can recall, I cannot recall that something like this was put to me, because if I look at Gen Erasmus' evidence he said that at that stage at the brewery, according to his evidence, or not at the brewery, at Vanderbijl he told me that I must investigate a place where ANC people gather and I had to report back to him, that is now his evidence, and then at a later stage he would have then told me that there must be no injuries, but he testified earlier on that he was very unhappy and they had to be paid back, because if you want to pay back what was done to you, you do want to injure people.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Did you try to prevent injuries?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, I tried to prevent injuries as far as possible.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Did you do it because Erasmus cautioned you or did you do it on your own?

MR ZEELIE: I did it on my own, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well. You say in your statement on page 16, paragraph 7 of bundle 1, that you placed the landmines where nobody was sitting.

MR ZEELIE: At that stage nobody was sitting there because we were there.

MR VISSER: And then on page 38, paragraph 12.3.6, Mr van Heerden says he placed the limpet where there were people sitting.

MR ZEELIE: I can just testify and say, Sir, there where we sat there wouldn't have been people because otherwise they wouldn't have been able to put the detonator in the limpet mine and place the limpet mine under the bench.

MR VISSER: Mr Zeelie, who placed the limpet mines, was it you or Mr van Heerden?

MR ZEELIE: I have said earlier on that there was some confusion surrounding this and that I was the person who placed the limpet mines.

MR VISSER: So he is wrong if he said he was the one who placed it under the bench?

MR ZEELIE: I think, Mr Chairperson, he will testify that he was also a bit confused and that he did make a mistake in his statement.

CHAIRPERSON: Where are you seeing this? I see here:

"Zeelie het die ontstekers ingesit en die kleefmyne sommer onder 'n banke waarop mense gesit het, ingedruk."

MR VISSER: You are reading from?

CHAIRPERSON: 12.3.6, the second-last sentence, page 38.

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, Mr Chairman.


"Zeelie wou eers die ontsteker vir my gee om die bomb te plant, maar ek het geweier."

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, and then it says:

"Zeelie het die ontstekers ingesit en die kleefmyne sommer onder 'n bankie waarop mense gesit het, ingedruk."

MR VISSER: Yes, you will notice Chairperson, that that is in contradiction to what he had said before, where he had stated that...

CHAIRPERSON: Just give me that reference.

MR VISSER: Page 28, Chairperson.

"Zeelie, wat 'n plofdeskundige is het my gehelp en nadat ... die ontseker korrek geplaas het, het ek die kleefmyne onder 'n sitplek geplaas."

Page 28, just about 9(b).

MR VISSER: Yes, so there is a ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It's a contradiction.

MR VISSER: I was going to take that up with Mr van Heerden, I don't want to take it up with this witness, all that I'm asking him now is what does he say.


MR VISSER: So you say that it was you who placed it?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

JUDGE DE JAGER: You only had one detonator?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, Chairperson.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Was it customary to fit two mines with one detonator?

MR ZEELIE: As I stated earlier in my evidence, it was two limpet mines placed next to each other, then you would need only one detonator.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Yes, I see. So it wasn't something to be inserted into every detonator?

MR ZEELIE: As the detonator would detonate the one limpet mine, the other limpet mine would be directly detonated as well.

MR VISSER: Mr Zeelie, I just want to conclude and put it to you, because you conceded to this yourself yesterday and today, these events took place quite some time ago and it is possible that you and the others possibly cannot recall the facts as clearly, do you agree with me in principle if I were to state that?

MR ZEELIE: That which I gave evidence about is the facts as I can recall them.

MR VISSER: Would you be prepared to concede that you may be mistaken regarding certain facts?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, there are certain cases or facts regarding which errors could be made and then there are other cases, such as, for example, the fact that I was called to SA Breweries. I could not have been mistaken about that, I never knew that Gen du Toit or Gen Erasmus had ever previously visited those premises and why then would I be able to make up such a specific office if I knew that they hadn't visited it before? I could not be mistaken in that regard.

And then I would also like to state, Chairperson, that yesterday when we concluded, Mr Visser told me that I have somewhat of a problem, he did not take it further with me this morning, but this was with regard to the point when Gen du Toit came to Van Heerden who was in the vehicle and it was also when Judge de Jager stated that he could not understand how Gen du Toit could have known that Van Heerden had been involved.

I would just like to refer to their affidavits, Chairperson, and then I would add this to my evidence. If we look firstly at Gen Erasmus' evidence, which is Exhibit B - I'm just looking for the particular paragraph, I think it is paragraph 27 where he states:

"Regarding Gen du Toit, I am uncertain whether I informed him prior regarding the discussion with Capt Zeelie, although I would not have attempted to conceal anything from him as my second-in-command. Therefore, it is entirely possible that I may have mentioned to him during the afternoon of 21 September 1988, that I had requested Zeelie to determine whether or not there was a suitable gathering place of ANC persons in order to cause an explosion there."

This is the point where Gen Erasmus states that it is possible that he may have mentioned that I was supposed to cause an explosion ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: No, Sir, ...

MR ZEELIE: Just let me - I just want to clear this up. It is my right to answer the question. Furthermore he states:

"If I discussed it with Gen du Toit at a point in time before the explosion, I would not have mentioned the Why Not Club."

Then we proceed to Gen du Toit's statement, that's Exhibit C, paragraph 10, there he states:

"It is my recollection that I knew prior to the incident that there was a request from Gen Erasmus to search for a suitable gathering place for ANC persons in order to cause an explosion there. Although I cannot recall it clearly, I accept that Gen Erasmus would have informed me about it."

Now according to their evidence, Gen Erasmus came with this suggestion when the bomb exploded at Vanderbijl Square, thus in that short period of time, from the afternoon of the explosion to the point of the Why Not incident, there may have been this kind of motivation. That is why I say that it is possible that Gen du Toit told Van Heerden to remain in the vehicle and that is because this indeed took place. As I testified, the order was given by both of them to me in the words of Gen Erasmus, and when Gen du Toit saw Van Heerden seated in my vehicle he realised and knew Van Heerden had been involved with me.

MR VISSER: Are you finished, Mr Zeelie?

MR ZEELIE: Yes I am, thank you, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I just want to put it to you that you have missed the point entirely, but I won't take it any further. I want to put it to you that you are mistaken regarding this entire meeting aspect which took place at the SAB club, this is something that you told the Attorney-General in order to drag Gens Erasmus and Du Toit into the whole affair at that point and that you find yourself in the situation now where you have to attempt to justify that statement.

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, if in any way I wanted to innocently implicate Gens du Toit and Erasmus I would have mentioned a place such as that where Mr Visser and his attorney placed a question mark in the affidavit, namely SAP. Why would I have mentioned the SAB club if it had nothing to do with the police?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, thank you, I have no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Cornelius, do you have any questions that you would like to put to the applicant?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Only four, thank you Mr Chair.

Mr Zeelie, you were indeed a Captain and Mr van Heerden was a Constable, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And you would expect of him to carry out all your instructions?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, that is correct Chairperson. As I have stated, he worked below me and if I issued an instruction to him he would have carried it out.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you operate on a need-to-know basis?

MR ZEELIE: Most of the time we operated on a need-to-know basis.

MR CORNELIUS: So you would not have expected him to put a series of questions to you regarding the origin of the instruction?

MR ZEELIE: He wouldn't have asked me.

MR CORNELIUS: Would you agree that Mr van Heerden is not a demolitions expert?

MR ZEELIE: He is not a demolitions expert.

MR CORNELIUS: Is it correct that he refused to insert the detonator because he was too afraid?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, that is a definite fact.

MR CORNELIUS: And indeed as it appears in his supplementary affidavit which was made in Copenhagen, you were the one who placed the device below the bench?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Mr van Heerden will state that in the immediate vicinity there were persons, in the immediate vicinity of the place where the bomb was planted.

MR ZEELIE: Yes, it is possible Chairperson, what I meant was that where we were specifically seated on the bench I could not think that people were seated, but if we look at the plan of the place it can be seen that there may have been people in that vicinity when we were there. At that stage it was rather dark.

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Vermeulen, one of the fellow applicants, refused to participate in the operation, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, he didn't want to go in at all, he waited outside with the vehicle.

MR CORNELIUS: Was it also his reasoning that he would have expected an instruction from his Commander, Eugene de Kock?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, I think that that is the reason why ultimately he did not participate any further and go in with us. I've known Mr Vermeulen for a long time and I know him to be a man who will not bend under any unnecessary pressure and this operation would not have been anything for him, and it may be the reason why ultimately he decided not to enter the building with is.

MR CORNELIUS: That is correct, because Mr Vermeulen is also a demolitions expert.

MR ZEELIE: Yes, that is correct Chairperson, a reasonable number of Vlakplaas staff undertook the demolitions course.

MR CORNELIUS: But according to your knowledge of that evening he disassociated himself with the circumstances, therefore he only knew of the plan to blow up the club.

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Chair.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Nyawuza, do you have questions you'd like to put to Mr Zeelie?


Mr Zeelie, did you do any reconnaissance as regards the Why Not Club?

MR ZEELIE: I beg your pardon, I just need my headphones. Could you please repeat your question and speak up.

MR NYAWUZA: Did you do any reconnaissance regarding the Why Not Club?

MR ZEELIE: Did I do any?

CHAIRPERSON: Reconnaissance, did you go and check it out.

MR ZEELIE: No, we did not do any prior reconnaissance of the club, with the exception of the fact that upon the first occasion we entered the club and had a beer and subsequently we left. I can only state that I knew the owner of the club, he was a white man, so I knew of the club that was there and this emanated from the fact that that person had previously had drinks at Cafe Zurich.

MR NYAWUZA: So were you sure as regards the place being a meeting place ANC members or ANC "ondersteuners", as you state in your affidavit?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, it emanated from previous investigations, particularly the investigation into the Cafe Zurich incident, that indeed ANC members regularly met in that club. It would be as it was with other persons, if the ANC was receiving instructions they would visit or frequent certain places and there was information indicating that the ANC visited that club.

MR NYAWUZA: Would you agree with me if I put it to you that not any of the people that were injured on that particular day were ANC members?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, Chairperson, it is acceptable and it is also something that we accepted prior to the incident, and even with Gen du Toit's approval of the incident he would not be able to say that no members, with the exception of the ANC members, could be injured.

MR NYAWUZA: Were you aware that a 14 year old girl was injured in this attack?

MR ZEELIE: I do not have personal knowledge of that at present, but a 14 year old child does not belong in a licensed place which sells liquor. The club owner therefore would be responsible of children under the age of 18, who are frequenting such a place.

MR NYAWUZA: So would you agree with me if I say to you your choice of a target was wrong?

MR ZEELIE: I don't believe that the choice of target was wrong, because as I've already stated an attack was launched from that club during which people were injured, it was the Cafe Zurich attack and we had information which indicated that the ANC had indeed visited that club.

MR NYAWUZA: Was the information that you are telling us about followed and confirmed?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, Chairperson, there were affidavit which were deposed by ANC members who visited the club.

MR NYAWUZA: Looking back at the incident, Mr Zeelie, what would you say to the people that were injured?

MR ZEELIE: I was simply carrying out an instruction Chairperson. It is my view to this day that when I received an instruction I carried it out, it was part of my work. It is what I believed in at that stage, we were involved in a situation of warfare, so to speak, and if people were injured, then they were in the crossfire.

I feel that I did my job and that I carried out my instructions as it was expected of me to do. And if I were part of this dispensation and I received the same instruction, I would have carried out the same instructions.

MR NYAWUZA: Mr Zeelie, was this instruction the first that you got from Gen Erasmus and Gen du Toit?

MR ZEELIE: Could you repeat that.

MR NYAWUZA: Was this instruction to attack the Why Not Club, the first that you got from the two Generals, or it was the second or the third or the fourth?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, I cannot recall the precise dates, I cannot recall whether it was the first case of planting a bomb at a place. As I've stated, there were other cases such as Khotso House and I cannot state directly which case came first, but in the Security Branch there were counter-attacks where we acted against organisations, so sometimes it wasn't such a drastic instruction but where we did damage places and property and disrupt organisations.

MR NYAWUZA: Mr Zeelie, would instructions be as casual as the two Generals make us to believe? To attack a particular place, would it be as casual as it was, according to their testimony?

MR ZEELIE: I don't really understand what you mean by your choice of word in "casual". I don't really understand what he means, Chairperson.

MR NYAWUZA: Mr Zeelie, the evidence of the two Generals is that - the evidence of Gen Erasmus is that you met at the bombing of the Vanderbijl Square and it's there that he told you that: "Look, I'm sick and tired of these attacks, something has got to be done" and oops, it was done the same night. Would it be like that or you would have to meet at a particular place and sit down an map out as to: "We are going to attack place A and this is how we are going to attack it"?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, as I have already stated, I was called that evening to the SA Breweries and the instruction was given to me that on that very same evening still we had to bomb a place and I carried out the instruction as such.

MR NYAWUZA: In regards to your testimony relating to how you met with the two Generals, was it the same as in the Khotso House?

MR ZEELIE: Do you mean the instructions with regard to Khotso House? Chairperson, Khotso House was not planned extensively before the time in terms of my evidence there which differs from the evidence given by Mr Eugene de Kock, among others, no planning was conducted as in the case of Cosatu House. So this was an order where I was told that it had to be executed on that very same evening and there was no time for prior planning.

MR NYAWUZA: So you'd agree with me that even in the Why Not Club attack there was no proper planning?

MR ZEELIE: There was no prior planning, Chairperson.

MR NYAWUZA: No further questions, thank you.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Nyawuza. Ms Coleridge, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS COLERIDGE: Yes, thank you Chairperson.

You referred to your radio contact, I just want to clarify as to who contacted you, was it Gen Erasmus or someone from the office, from your Head Office?

MR ZEELIE: Do you mean when I was contacted and told where to go?


CHAIRPERSON: Is the contact after the explosion?

MS COLERIDGE: After the explosion, Chairperson, he was supposed to go to the Breweries.

CHAIRPERSON: After the explosion, who contacted you on the radio?

MR ROSSOUW: Sorry Mr Chairman, I think there's some confusion. After which explosion?

CHAIRPERSON: After the Why Not bomb explosion he was told he got a radio call to go to the Breweries. Which one do you want?

MS COLERIDGE: The Breweries, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The first one?

MS COLERIDGE: The first one.

MR ZEELIE: I was contacted by Gen Erasmus to go to SA Breweries.

MS COLERIDGE: And was this usual for him to contact you on radio, was it a normal practise?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, it was normal procedure.

MS COLERIDGE: And who contacted you after the Why Not explosion?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, the regular procedure was that if an explosion took place for example, depending upon who was the first to report it, it could be sent through to Radio Control and Radio Control would have a list of the officers at Security Branch who were on standby and that officer would then contact the various members of the Security Branch.

CHAIRPERSON: So you don't know who it was who actually spoke to you on the radio?

MR ZEELIE: I would not know who it was by name.

CHAIRPERSON: So it was Radio Control.

MR ZEELIE: It was most probably the duty officer who was on standby.

JUDGE DE JAGER: And on that specific evening, Beyers was on standby.

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, Beyers was on demolitions standby but because I was the Commander of the Demolitions Unit and Bomb Disposal, regardless of whether any of the other members were on standby, I would also be contacted.

MS COLERIDGE: Just for my own purposes, Goldfield Security, was this where you met the Vlakplaas members? What is the Goldfield Security?

MR ZEELIE: It is difficult for me to testify about this, I know that at times I gave training to guards at Goldfield Security, but with regard to the specific relation between Vlakplaas and Goldfield, I cannot really comment.

CHAIRPERSON: Goldfield Security, is that a security company, the premises of a company that provides security guards, etcetera?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct. Among others, at Goldfield they also had a training centre and at that training centre they didn't only train their own guards but the guards of other security companies who could also send their guards there for training.

MS COLERIDGE: In relation to the Vlakplaas members, you obviously used Vlakplaas members in your other operations, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: There was a high level of co-operation between me and some of the Vlakplaas members.

MS COLERIDGE: Between yourself and some of the Vlakplaas members?

MR ZEELIE: I have stated myself, Chairperson, but even the various divisions also enjoyed co-operation with Vlakplaas.

MS COLERIDGE: And Gen Erasmus, did he use Vlakplaas members as well?

MR ZEELIE: I believe that upon various occasions he made contact with Vlakplaas members, through the Commander.

MS COLERIDGE: Did you inform Gen Erasmus the following day that Vlakplaas members were involved in the operation?

MR ZEELIE: I believe that I would have informed him that Vlakplaas members would also have been involved.

JUDGE DE JAGER: But Mr Zeelie, they weren't involved, they refused.

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, two of their members were inside, Mr Paul van Dyk and Mr Douw Willemse were together.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Was it only Vermeulen who disassociated himself?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, ultimately it was only Mr Vermeulen who did not enter the premises, he stood back.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he stay back - what was your opinion of him not coming into the premises? Was that because he was disassociating himself from the operation, or was it because it was the wise thing to have somebody on the outside in case there was a problem?

MR ZEELIE: At that point I accepted that he did not want to enter the premises with us because he had not received the order from his Commander.

MS COLERIDGE: And then in relation to the Vlakplaas members, did you inform them that these instructions came from Gen Erasmus?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, yes I definitely would have stated to them that I had an order from Gen Erasmus to carry out an instruction and an operation.

MS COLERIDGE: But surely Mr Zeelie, if you had informed them that you received these instructions from the General, that their participation would actually be okayed, is that not so?

MR ZEELIE: That is why I have stated that individuals would have accepted it, but other members would have had strong feelings about the fact that they were supposed to receive orders only from their own Commanders.

MS COLERIDGE: And then in relation to the limpet mines and so forth, did Gen Erasmus leave this to your own discretion or did he inform you as to what procedure to use and so forth, in relation to the operation?

MR ZEELIE: He left it over to my discretion.

MS COLERIDGE: And then in relation to the Cafe Zurich, was Peter Dlamini charged and sentenced for that offence?

MR ZEELIE: No, Chairperson.

MS COLERIDGE: Why Not? You were so certain that ...(intervention)

MR ZEELIE: I'm still confused about that to this day, I have never seen him, he has never come forward, as far as I know.

MS COLERIDGE: So you can't conclusively say that he actually in fact planted those bombs and that he was ANC then?

MR ZEELIE: There were other members who were indeed arrested and who were sentenced and from their evidence it was clear that it was indeed him.

MS COLERIDGE: And the Vanderbijl bus terminus incident, was anybody charged and sentenced there?

MR ZEELIE: As far as I know persons were arrested, but I cannot say precisely who they were.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Mr Duma and - I can't remember the surname of the other one, applied for amnesty in connection with that one recently.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, I'm indebted to you Judge de Jager.

And then just for operations like this, would you ever receive instructions from Gen du Toit personally or would it always come from Gen Erasmus?

MR ZEELIE: If I had received the same order only from Gen du Toit, I still would have carried it out.

MS COLERIDGE: But my questions was ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But the question was, did you ever receive orders from Gen du Toit?

MS COLERIDGE: In relation to illegal operations like this, for instance.

CHAIRPERSON: Without Gen Erasmus giving an order.

MR ZEELIE: Not with regard to explosions, but with regard to possible more minor incidents such as Stratcom actions and so forth.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Rossouw, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Just one question, Mr Chairman.

Mr Zeelie, I got the impression that there was an aspect regarding which you and Mr Visser misunderstood each other yesterday and that was the evidence regarding a previous incident pertaining to bomb explosions where you gave evidence that Gen Erasmus expressed his dissatisfaction and I think that the words the you used under cross-examination were that no orders were ever given by Gen Erasmus, and I would just like for you to state this clearly for the Committee. Did he previously give you orders to launch revenge attacks or did he simply express his dissatisfaction at the scene of previous bomb explosions when it came to these incidents?

MR ZEELIE: As far as I can recall he expressed his dissatisfaction as it was also the case at the scene at the Vanderbijl explosion. At no scene of any explosion did he give me an order to launch revenge attacks as such.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Chairperson, nothing further.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Judge de Jager, do you have any questions at all? Adv Sigodi?

ADV SIGODI: Just one thing that I'd like to clarify in my mind. The identification of Why Not bar as a target, you said that you had affidavits from certain ANC members who had said that they had visited the Why Not bar, could you perhaps remember who these ANC people were who said that they had visited the Why Not bar?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, at this moment I cannot recall direct names, however, among others, one of the prime suspects who was found guilty during the Cafe Zurich incident was a woman by the name of Sonto Masondo and among others, she also conveyed the information.

ADV SIGODI: Can you remember what the information entailed about the Why Not bar?

MR ZEELIE: She conveyed specific information that prior to the time they had rendezvoused in the Why Not disco and had launched the operation from there and that subsequently, after the bomb had been planted or after the handgrenade had been planted or tossed, they again returned to the Why Not Club until after the explosion had taken place and that upon various other occasions they would rendezvous there.

ADV SIGODI: The picture that I would like you to clarify is, was Why Not bar - did you personally know the Why Not bar?

MR ZEELIE: As I have already testified Chairperson, I did not know the Why Not bar prior to the bomb explosion at Cafe Zurich, so basically I really only heard of Why Not after the explosion and the subsequent investigation.

ADV SIGODI: As a member of the Security Branch were there no other places where the ANC, where you'd find more ANC people involved, I mean gathering together, besides the bar?

MR ZEELIE: You see Chairperson, it is also as I have testified earlier, if I had known of a specific place where ANC members would be at a specific time, then it would have been the regular practice of the Security Police to go to such a place and to arrest the people.

ADV SIGODI: So when you got to Why Not bar on that evening, what measures did you take to establish if the people at the bar were ANC people?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, there was no manner in which to determine this at that point, that is why during my visit to Gen Erasmus and Du Toit at the Breweries, when I mentioned the case of the Why Not, that the attack was launched on Cafe Zurich from within that club and that it appeared from the investigation that sometimes ANC members would go there. He told me that we should then blow up that particular club.

ADV SIGODI: Yes, but what measures were taken to protect innocent people, seeing that your main target were ANC people?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, as I have already testified, I accepted that there could possibly be injuries among other innocent persons as well and the fact was that I also placed the device there in such a way as to which to try to avoid injuries as much as possible.

ADV SIGODI: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Zeelie, could you please turn to page 106 of volume 2, page 106, that's a floor plan of the Why Not bar, do you have it?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you'll see there number 3 is a lounge and that little box with a cross in it is the place where the bomb was put.

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you see there number 5 is the lounge and number 6 is the dance floor.

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And number 4 is the bar.

MR ZEELIE: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now do you see those black lines that sort of enclose number 3, what are those?

MR ZEELIE: They are inside walls.

CHAIRPERSON: How high do they go up? If you're sitting, for instance, where the bomb is and you're looking straight towards where number 4 is, what would you see? Would you see the bar or would that wall go up to the ceiling?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, if you would look in the direction of 4 you would look into a wall, that is why we selected the side of the building.

CHAIRPERSON: But these internal walls, how high did they go?

MR ZEELIE: Ceiling height.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, so it was actually in a room but these doors, these gaps, were those sort of like arch doors, they weren't actually closed?

MR ZEELIE: I cannot say whether they were genuine arches or whether the walls just went straight up to the ceiling, but there were no doors.

CHAIRPERSON: Now at the time that you placed the bomb, can you estimate or can you remember if there were any other people in number 3?

MR ZEELIE: This is as I have stated, as far as I can recall there were no people in number 3, because it would have been very problematic for me to try to arm the limpet mine and place it under the bench.

CHAIRPERSON: And when you went back there after the explosion in your capacity now as an investigator of the explosion, what was the damage, first of all within 3, within that lounge where the bomb was?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, as I've already stated there was reasonable structural damage, however the greatest part of the explosion blew to the outside.

CHAIRPERSON: To the outside.


CHAIRPERSON: And those wall that enclose number 3, were they blown apart or were they still standing after the explosion?

MR ZEELIE: I believe that some of them may have been damaged, I have not yet re-consulted the photos, it's quite some time ago, so I cannot say precisely how much of the walls was damaged.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know whether they were brick walls or this prefab type of stuff.

MR ZEELIE: I think some of the walls were prefabricated and some of the others may have been concrete or brick. If I look at some of the copies of the photographs, I can see that there were indeed arches and it is clear that these were stone arches, or brick arches.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr Rossouw, any questions arising?

MR ROSSOUW: No questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, any questions arising?

MR VISSER: No thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: No thank you, Mr Chair.


MR NYAWUZA: No thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Coleridge?

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS COLERIDGE: Yes thank you, Chairperson, I've got one question.

If you refer to page 30 of bundle 2, there's a statement by Nonhlahla Lushaba, it's in relation to the chair, Chairperson, where the bomb was placed and in her statement she says at paragraph 6 on page 30, bundle 2, she states:

"After approximately 10 minutes, while I was still seated in the passage, I was seated on a bench, a loud explosion occurred under the chair upon which I was seated."

And her injuries as well Chairperson, was her legs and so forth and it seems that the bomb was placed under her chair where she was sitting, in her statement here.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we don't know how long she'd been sitting there. Arising from that Mr Zeelie, what do you say to that?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, after we left the premises she may indeed have sat down there. But you see Chairperson, that is why we placed it in that section because people would be on the dance floor more than anything else and they would also move to the back of the club, people didn't really like being in the front of the club. That was what I knew from my experience.

CHAIRPERSON: She also says in that same statement, paragraph 3, that there were about 150 people there, what's your comment on that?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, I cannot say how many persons could have been there at that stage. If a club had 150 people inside then it was quite full, especially regarding a club this size, it would have been completely full. So I think to a certain extent she might be exaggerating because as you can see the entire was divided by partitions. I don't know how she could have made such an estimation at that point.

MR ROSSOUW: Someone else mentions Chairperson, just on that fact, that there was 120 persons and that was De Zandt, the manager of the club. That's in his statement.

JUDGE DE JAGER: She states here that she was seated in the passage, in paragraph 6. Was the bomb placed in the passage?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, she must mean passage because as you can see the arches facilitate movement through from the one side to the other, so she might have viewed that as a passageway.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it a Friday or Saturday night, do you know?

MR ZEELIE: I cannot recall, Chairperson. I don't believe that it was a Friday, Chairperson, because in that way we would not have been able to have a meeting the following morning.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and I suppose also Hillbrow is busy constantly.

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: ...(inaudible) Chairperson, and it tells us that it was the Tuesday/Wednesday night - sorry, Wednesday/Thursday night.


ADV SIGODI: Just one more aspect. Do you remember how many people were injured in the Wimpy Bar bombing?

MR ZEELIE: As I've already stated in my evidence-in-chief, I think that approximately 13 persons were injured and later it appeared from the investigation that two were more seriously injured than the rest.


MR ZEELIE: Oh was this the Wimpy, I beg your pardon, I did not hear you correctly. I don't know, but I know that quite a number of people were injured in the Wimpy Bar incident, it was quite a serious incident. I cannot tell you precisely how many persons were injured however.

ADV SIGODI: Were there any people who died?

MR ZEELIE: At this point I cannot tell you whether there were any fatalities.

ADV SIGODI: But it was a serious explosion?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, Chairperson, also because it was placed in the place where people would have their meals. Therefore, as I say, it was a very serious explosion.

ADV SIGODI: Now if this was, the Why Not bar incident was a retaliatory attack, why was it important to you to place the bomb in such a way that few people would be injured?

MR ZEELIE: As I have already stated, if one came to explosives one could send the explosion in a certain direction, that is why there are explosive devices such as claymore mines which one could place right behind the mine and one couldn't really suffer any injuries. The projectile would be directed in a specific direction.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Adv Sigodi's asking you is, seeing that the Wimpy bomb was a serious bomb in which people were injured, a number of people were injured, why did you personally take care to reduce the number of casualties in the Why Not explosion? If it was a revenge operation, why not go to have as many injuries as possible?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, it was specifically about those innocent persons who would also be on the premises and that is why I didn't want to cause many injuries, although I had an instruction to place such a device within such a club.

ADV SIGODI: What was your precise instruction? Was your instruction to cause damage to as many people as possible, or was your instruction not to cause damage to people?

MR ZEELIE: As I've testified Chairperson, I did not have a specific instruction to injure as many persons as possible or as few persons as possible, I simply received an order to place a device where ANC persons would be meeting, or would possibly be meeting.

ADV SIGODI: But you still did not take any precaution to find out if there were ANC people at the Why Not bar, did you?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, as I have already stated, the instruction was to be carried out on that very same evening still and there was no way in which to determine this information. I received the order and I carried it out.

ADV SIGODI: Yes, but the target that you sought to attack, what measure did you take to make sure that you actually attacked the target that you were instructed to attack?

MR ZEELIE: As I've already stated, at the Breweries when I mention to Erasmus and Du Toit, when they asked me about different places, the Why Not Club occurred to my mind and I said that this could indeed be the premises from which the attack was launched on the Cafe Zurich and it was my instruction then to blow up that place or at least to place an explosive device in that place.

ADV SIGODI: You see the problem I'm - what I'm trying to establish from you is your instruction, was your instruction to blow up ANC people, was it to blow up Why Not bar, per se?

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, I do understand, that is why I once again say that at the end of the day I executed this instruction after I mentioned to Du Toit and Erasmus that out of that specific premises an attack was launched and the instruction was then given that I must place a device in that specific premises. And as I have stated earlier on, if I knew of any place where ANC members gathered at a specific time, then we would have automatically have arrested those people, but because of Erasmus' dissatisfaction because of previous explosions, I conveyed this information to him at the Breweries and he then decided on that target and I executed it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Any questions arising from the last questions that have been put? Thank you Mr Zeelie, that concludes your testimony.


CHAIRPERSON: I see it's now past eleven, we'll take the tea break at this stage.




MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair, I believe I'm next, I call Mr van Heerden. He will testify in Afrikaans, Mr Chair.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------ANDRIES JOHANNES VAN HEERDEN: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius.


Mr van Heerden, you've applied for amnesty and you've given your full co-operation to the investigative team of the TRC.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Your amnesty application appears on page 18 up to page 41, including the supplementary affidavit.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You confirm your background, your police background as it appears on page 23, 24 and up to the middle of page 25.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: And to shorten your evidence a little bit, you also confirm your political objectives as they appear on page 29.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Before we continue with the merits of this specific application, what was your rank in the Security Police during the Why Not incident?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I was a Constable.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you work under the direct command of Capt Zeelie, the previous applicant?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And he had the rank of a Captain?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: I refer you specifically to the statement that appears on page 34 of the documents, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Just before you proceed Mr Cornelius.

Mr van Heerden you say that you worked under the orders of Capt Zeelie, you were in the Investigation Unit were you, or division?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Investigation Unit.

CHAIRPERSON: And Capt Zeelie was in the explosives unit or whatever it was called.

MR VAN HEERDEN: He was in the explosives but also part of the Investigation Unit.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, so who was your actual Commander of the Investigative Unit?

MR VAN HEERDEN: If I'm not mistaken I think it was Col Victor or Col At van Niekerk.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

The statement that appears on page 34, I see at the end of the statement it states that you signed it on the 26th of April 1994 in Copenhagen in Denmark. This is on page 41.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: So it is not a statement that you made to the Attorney-General?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, yes.

JUDGE DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, did the Attorney-General send somebody to Denmark to take this statement?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Chairperson, as I testified in Col de Kock's application, the person who took the statements was a Eugene van Vuuren, who did not have any knowledge of the taking of statements although it went through as a statement. I also said in court that I see it as a summary of events over this period of time in questions, because it was not in specific detail, specific statements about specific incidents.

MR CORNELIUS: But it is also common cause from all the hearings that Nortje and Kloppers revealed certain evidence and you were also approached to make a statement.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: It's also an evidence statement, as you called it.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: In this statement did you have a lot of time to prepare it?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Chairperson, I had about two hours that evening where I had to write down my whole life history and I had to present it to the Goldstone Commission and according to that then this statement was then taken.

MR CORNELIUS: I see, so is it a shorter, more cryptic statement?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: On page 37 you deal with the Why Not incident.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Can you tell me, did you work on a need-to-know basis as far as your Commanders go?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, most of the operations or the incidents in which I was involved were seen as need-to-know operations.

MR CORNELIUS: Were you an explosives expert?


MR CORNELIUS: I will take you back to your amnesty application that appears on page 27. Why did this attack take place at the Why Not Club?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Chairperson, that was because of two bomb explosions that took place at Vanderbijl Square.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. Can you in short tell the Committee how you became involved in this incident.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Chairperson, that evening of the second explosion I was at the scene together with Capt Zeelie, where he did the bomb disposal at the scene. At the scene was Du Toit and Erasmus. I think Gen Malherbe was also at the scene. During the bomb disposal at the scene, Erasmus then told Zeelie who was with me, he made a comment and said that we had to take action against them. And in the same light I'd also like to say to you Mr Chairperson, it was a general feeling of a lot of members, I do not want to isolate it and say it was a specific feeling that only Erasmus had, it was a general feeling of all the members of the Security Branch that things cannot continue as they did.

MR CORNELIUS: It was a question of an eye for an eye?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, that's how I personally felt as well.

After the disposal of the scene I then went home and later that evening at approximately 9 o'clock, it could be before nine or maybe just after nine, Capt Zeelie arrived at my house and said that he must accompany me and he told me we had work to do.

MR CORNELIUS: Did he say to you what you had to do?

MR VAN HEERDEN: After we drove away he told me that the Generals told him that we had to go and bomb a place.

MR CORNELIUS: Did he then say the Why Not?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, he then mentioned it was the Why Not Club, it was the target because in previous investigations, especially of Peter Dlamini, it showed from this investigation that the Why Not Night-club was visited by him frequently and he was also there during the Zurich Cafe bombing and he also observed the Cafe Zurich from the Why Not Club.

MR CORNELIUS: The Cafe Zurich is opposite the Why Not Club?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you then go and pick up members of Vlakplaas or other police members?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, we then went to Randfontein where Zeelie wanted to go and address the members of Vlakplaas, so that they can act as a backup group for us and to assist us.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. According to your knowledge, who went with?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It was Capt Paul van Dyk, W/O Snor Vermeulen and Douw Willemse who accompanied us.

MR CORNELIUS: You then went to Hillbrow.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, yes. I would just like to add that all three members of Vlakplaas, after Capt Zeelie spoke to them when we arrived there, when he told them what the circumstances were and what we were going to do, all three members said that they're not interested in participating in this exercise because Eugene de Kock did not give personal, or did not have personal knowledge about it or gave the command for it.

MR CORNELIUS: When you went to the night-club, what happened there?

MR VAN HEERDEN: When we arrived there, Capt Zeelie, Paul, Douw Willemse and myself entered the night-club to go and see what it looks like inside.

MR CORNELIUS: Is it correct that Mr Vermeulen then did not associate himself with it?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Right from the beginning he did not associate himself with it and he remained outside.

MR CORNELIUS: You now entered the night-club, what happened then?

MR VAN HEERDEN: We arrived there, we bought a beer, we stood at the counter while we looked around to see what the set-up was inside.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well, and what happened afterwards?

MR VAN HEERDEN: We then went to Capt Zeelie's vehicle that was parked outside, we then took out the two mini limpet mines that were attached to each other with tape and I placed them in the back of my trousers, in my pocket.

MR CORNELIUS: These mini limpet mines have got magnets on them and they were attached to each other.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Were they attached to each other with tape?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, it was masking tape.

MR CORNELIUS: The limpet mine, was it disguised or was the whole thing covered with masking tape?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, the were just attached to each other so that they couldn't be separated.

MR CORNELIUS: What did you do with it?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I placed it in the back of my trousers in my pocket.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you then move into the night-club again?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, Capt Zeelie kept the detonator and we went back to the night-club.

MR CORNELIUS: Do you know where Capt Zeelie got these limpet mines from or were you not with him when he got it?

MR VAN HEERDEN: According to my knowledge and in my experience in working with them, he always had a certain amount of explosives with him or in his vehicle that he used at bomb disposals and he also had explosives in a safe at the John Vorster Square.

MR CORNELIUS: But you were not there when he placed it in the trunk of the vehicle?


MR CORNELIUS: Was there access control at the club?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Who then entered the club again?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It was myself, Paul van Dyk and Douw Willemse.

MR CORNELIUS: Were the others searched?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, they walked behind me and the bouncer approached me to search me, I immediately spoke Tswana to him and just walked past him.

MR CORNELIUS: What happened then?

MR VAN HEERDEN: We entered again and we stood at the counter where we again bought ourselves a beer and we stood around, from there Capt Zeelie handed over the detonator. At a certain stage I went to the toilet in the back to see if I can place the limpet mines there. It did not work, there were people in the toilets. I then came back to Capt Zeelie and told him I cannot place it there and I do not feel comfortable in working with the detonator of the limpet mine.


MR VAN HEERDEN: Because it had two safety pins that had to be pulled and I was unhappy, or to put it this way, I was scared to activate it and that it would explode while I was setting it.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. Now in your amnesty application, on page 28 you say that you struggled to attach the detonator to the two limpet mines, or insert it into the two limpet mines.

MR VAN HEERDEN: What I mean there is that I struggled to pull out the two pins while I was alone.

MR CORNELIUS: And then you say that:

"Zeelie who is an explosives expert assisted me and after the detonator was placed in the correct way I placed the limpet mines under the seat."

MR VAN HEERDEN: This statement that I made, or that I placed the limpet mines under the bench is wrong, Capt Zeelie came to sit next to me and he placed the detonator into the limpet mines and placed it underneath the bench.

MR CORNELIUS: In consultation with me you referred me to page 38 of the statement that you made in Denmark and there I see you say that:

"Zeelie first wanted to give me the detonator to plant the bomb but I refused and handed over the limpet mines to him, in order for him to put the detonator in himself."

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Then you say:

"(I did not trust the detonator)"

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Are those the facts?


MR CORNELIUS: Then you said that:

"Zeelie inserted the detonator and then left the limpet mines under a bench where people were sitting."

MR VAN HEERDEN: If I say people were sitting there, I mean that I was sitting on this side, Zeelie was on my left-hand side, the bench was on his left-hand side, people were walking around, sitting down, getting up towards the dance floor, etcetera.

MR CORNELIUS: You've the evidence earlier on, were the two detonators or one detonator? I see you use the plural on page 38.

MR VAN HEERDEN: There was only one detonator, it had two rings that had to be pulled to activate it.

MR CORNELIUS: And you will be asked why the differences in the statement you made in Denmark in '94 and the amnesty application you made in '97, have you got an answer?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Well in my statement overseas we were under a lot of pressure and it was my version of what had happened that evening, the way in which I could recall it. With out arrival here there were other versions like, "You did that or you did this", and on that version I then changed it that I placed the limpet mine. With my consultation with Mr Cornelius I then told him again that it was the second version in my amnesty application and it was wrong and that my first version was the right one.

MR CORNELIUS: The first version was the Denmark version?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: While we're at the version that you, or the statement that you made in Denmark, on page 37 of the statement under paragraph 12.3.2 you say that:

"A few evenings after the second explosion at Vanderbijl, Zeelie came to pick me up at my house and told me we had work to do."

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is wrong, that was the specific evening after the explosion.

MR CORNELIUS: So you do accept what the Chairperson said, it was the same evening as the Vanderbijl Square second explosion?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: After the limpet mines were activated, what did you do?

MR VAN HEERDEN: We left where we went back to the police station, we went to go and pick up Zeelie's vehicle. I cannot recall the street name but we waited there until the bomb exploded.

MR CORNELIUS: What was the period?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I would say approximately 30 minutes, maybe a little bit more, but approximately 30 minutes.

MR CORNELIUS: Were people injured from what you could see?

MR VAN HEERDEN: What I could see was, and heard, was that there were people who were lightly injured.

MR CORNELIUS: What happened then?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I remained in the vehicle while the other members of the John Vorster Square investigative team and accompanied Zeelie to the scene. A while later Piet du Toit arrived at the vehicle and asked me where Capt Zeelie was, I informed him that he was busy in Cafe Zurich with the other people to take statements and that he was at the scene in the Why Not.

MR CORNELIUS: You've heard the cross-examination around the question of Brig du Toit, did he say anything else to you?

MR VAN HEERDEN: He told me to remain seated in the vehicle.

MR CORNELIUS: Did anybody say that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Just before you proceed Mr Cornelius, I just want to clear up one thing.

You say you left the Why Not and you waited plus-minus 30 minutes for the explosion.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you then go to the police station?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, that was before the explosion. We went back to collect the car and then we came back and then the explosion ...

CHAIRPERSON: So in that 30 minutes ...(intervention)

MR VAN HEERDEN: Ja, we went back to collect Capt Zeelie's car.

CHAIRPERSON: ... you went back to John Vorster Square, then came back.

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, Hillbrow Police Station.

CHAIRPERSON: I mean Hillbrow Police Station, then came back and then the explosion took place and you stayed in the car.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you come back with Mr Zeelie?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Zeelie's car.



CHAIRPERSON: And was there any radio communication at all?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Capt Zeelie had a radio with him. At one stage he got out of the car, I don't know whether it was then when they - immediately after the explosion I then moved away and Capt Zeelie then got out of the car, when we got - no, I'm confused got. When the bomb was planted we went back to the Hillbrow Police Station to take the Vlakplaas members back to their vehicle. We then proceeded back to the premise. During that time they must have contacted Capt Zeelie. I cannot at this stage remember whether he was contacted while we were still ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But when you got back the explosion hadn't taken place yet?


CHAIRPERSON: So then the explosion goes off and you're all sitting in the car, you and Capt Zeelie are sitting in the car?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And you stayed in the car?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I stayed in the car, I remained in the car.

CHAIRPERSON: And this radio what is it?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It's a walkie-talkie radio.

CHAIRPERSON: And how long did Capt Zeelie and you stay there before ...(intervention)

MR VAN HEERDEN: Capt Zeelie then moved out of the car, that's why I say I cannot remember people calling him while he was in my presence. He then moved out of the car after the explosion.

CHAIRPERSON: Because one would imagine that if Capt Zeelie was called to say: "Okay, you're on standby, there's been an explosion at the Why Not bar" and he arrives at the bar 20 seconds after the call, wouldn't that be a bit funny?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I would not say it would have been funny, Mr Chair, because we were always on radio contact and working in certain specific areas, so if it was that we were in the Hillbrow vicinity and that exploded, it would have been accepted.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Cornelius.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

You see on page 39 of your Copenhagen statement you say that:

"Piet du Toit approached me where I was seated in the vehicle and gave me the instruction to remain seated in the vehicle, because he knew who was responsible for the explosion and he wanted to prevent me from being identified by someone at the scene."

Have you got any comment on that?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Chairperson, I can just say that the statement that I made there could be from the fact that Capt Zeelie told us that the instructions came from Erasmus and Du Toit and that we had to do it, and Gen du Toit never told me that he knew that I planted the bomb. I never mentioned it to him that I planted the bomb. It could be interpreted in the wrong way, it was only a perception that I assumed or accepted, that he knew that I planted the bomb.

MR CORNELIUS: Because there's another issue that's bothering me and I'd like to clarify it. On page 30 of your amnesty application you say that:

"After the bomb explosion Gen du Toit was also at the scene and that he personally told me to remain seated in the vehicle, not get out and to immediately grow a beard so that I cannot be identified in any identification parade."

Do you have any comment on that?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, I do. The statement that I made there that Gen du Toit said that I must grow a beard is wrong, the next morning at the office, I think it was Col Victor who told me I had to grow a beard, it was not Gen du Toit who told me that evening, he just told me to remain seated in the vehicle.

MR CORNELIUS: The inference that I can make from this is that because Mr Zeelie was in disguise you just went as you were.

MR VAN HEERDEN: I was not disguised at all, I was just like I am now.

MR CORNELIUS: So it would make sense then to grow a beard?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, yes.

JUDGE DE JAGER: How long does it take for you to grow a beard?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Well within a week.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Depending on when the identification parade would be then, when you had to be prepared for that.

MR VAN HEERDEN: I believe that at the time when the identification parade would take place my beard would have been long enough.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

Did you have any personal feelings of revenge or malice towards the victims?


MR CORNELIUS: Did you receive any remuneration for your act that evening?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, none at all.

MR CORNELIUS: And you also revealed all the facts as far as your recollection goes.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You therefore apply for amnesty for attempted murder, damaging of property, transgression of the Act of Explosives, defeating the ends of justice because you kept quiet and all delicts that may result from the actions that you committed.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Visser, do you have any questions that you would like to put to Mr van Heerden?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: I do Chairperson, thank you.

Mr van Heerden, I've now listened to your evidence and I'd like to ask you, in principle what you say is that your Copenhagen statement is largely correct, with the exception of some amendments that you made to it and that the other statement, the second statement that you made is not right or correct. Is that your evidence? Did I understand you correctly or am I oversimplifying it?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I'm just going to put the earphones on, I cannot hear you.

MR VISSER: Do you have earphones there?

CHAIRPERSON: I think if you can just repeat yourself Mr Visser, he's got the earphones on now, he can hear better.

MR VISSER: If you want to hear the direct language spoken, it would be channel 0, Mr van Heerden. Can you hear me?


MR VISSER: I heard that you said when your legal representative led you in evidence, that after you returned from Copenhagen versions were put to you but you say that the Copenhagen statement, with the exception of certain amendments, are the correct facts. Did I understand you correctly?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, of the events of that evening, that is correct yes.

MR VISSER: Then concerning the second statement on page 30, the top paragraph where you mention Erasmus and Du Toit, where does this fit in? Do you say that this is also correct or do you say this is wrong?

MR VAN HEERDEN: This is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well. Now this section on page 30, is this one of the other versions that you spoke about that came under your attention after you returned from Denmark?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, Mr Chairperson, the version to which I'm referring was the placing of the bomb, if I placed the bomb or if Capt Zeelie placed the bomb.

MR VISSER: The only thing now is that nowhere in your Denmark statement you mentioned Erasmus and Du Toit. Do you agree with me?

MR VAN HEERDEN: With regard to what statement?

MR VISSER: With regard to anything.

MR VAN HEERDEN: On page 39 I did make mention of it.

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, I confused you, I'm now not talking about where you remained seated in the car, I'm talking about the instructions given. Nowhere in your Denmark statement did you talk about an instruction that you received from Erasmus and Du Toit.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, I never said that Erasmus gave me an instruction in any statement.

MR VISSER: Very well. And in the second statement if I understand your evidence correctly, you still do not say that anyone of those two gave you an instruction.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Not to me, no.

MR VISSER: Then I do understand your evidence correctly. Is it your evidence that at the bomb disposal at Vanderbijl Square scene, that you heard there that Gen Erasmus expressed his dissatisfaction concerning the bomb explosion?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I testified about it, yes, and I also testified that various other members had the same dissatisfaction.

MR VISSER: Yes, I do understand that, because if I recall his evidence, Gen Erasmus said that he could not recall you at that scene but that you could have been there, but he had the impression that he spoke to Zeelie alone when he expressed this sentiment.

Now I'd like to put it to you that either he is wrong and that he forgot about you being at the scene, or that you are wrong in that you were not present when this discussion took place and that Zeelie told you. What would you say is the most likely version?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Chairperson, I was at the scene, I was with Capt Zeelie, I was with him when Gen Erasmus made this statement that he's now sick and tired of this whole story. There were also various other members of the Security Police at the specific scene, who were also busy with the disposal.

MR VISSER: Well let us accept for the purposes of this argument that Gen Erasmus was mistaken or is mistaken, it will not take it any further, but now Zeelie arrived at your house that same evening as you stated, and he told you you had work to do, did you then in your own mind connect the statement that Erasmus made with what Zeelie just told you regarding what you were going to do, the attack on the club?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Chairperson, I cannot say with honesty that I linked it, I accepted it as an order from Capt Zeelie that he gave me, I cannot say that on that specific evening I thought about what Gen Erasmus had said. I cannot say that.

MR VISSER: You see, then perhaps I have misread the first paragraph on page 30, because the way that I read it, and please assist me if I am mistaken, you stated that:

"After the second limpet mine explosion at the Vanderbijl bus terminus, Gens Erasmus and Piet du Toit made the remark during the disposal that something had to be done."

and in the next sentence you state:

"When Charles Zeelie told me that a revenge attack had to be launched against the ANC, I believed that this was the objective with the attack."

and I linked this to the first sentence, was I mistaken in that?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That was my objective, I felt precisely the same as Gen Erasmus, so I didn't say that I accepted that this was what they had spoken about.

MR VISSER: So you didn't really attach the two, it was the general sentiment?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I would have done it, if Capt Zeelie had come to me and said that we were supposed to do it without Gen Erasmus having had made this statement, I would have accepted it as a general order.

JUDGE DE JAGER: But then I don't really understand the last paragraph on page 30.

"An order was received from the Commanders of the Security Branch at John Vorster Square."

That is your response to the question regarding who gave you the order.

MR VAN HEERDEN: My immediate Commander, Capt Zeelie.


"I was informed of the order by Charles Zeelie. I believed that Gens Erasmus and Piet du Toit were involved with it."

And then you continue and say:

"I do not have any further information about it."

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is why I stated, Chairperson, that I received the order from Capt Zeelie and that Capt Zeelie told me that the order came from Gens Erasmus and Du Toit.

JUDGE DE JAGER: But then you did have further information because Zeelie told you this and then you didn't just believe it, you heard it from him.

MR VAN HEERDEN: I heard it from him, Chairperson, but it boiled down to the point that further information regarding other persons, in the sense that Gen Erasmus or Gen du Toit never gave me the order directly, I got it from Zeelie. How it arrived at him, how the decision was taken and so forth, I didn't know.

MR VISSER: Very well. You see, the problem that one has when one reads what you have said in your Denmark affidavit - and what did you call the other affidavit, I think it was the Pretoria affidavit. The second affidavit, your legal counsel termed it something.

MR CORNELIUS: The amnesty application.

MR VISSER: The one on page 27, is that the amnesty application?


MR VISSER: And in your amnesty application one comes to the conclusion that something happened in-between the two, and Mr van Heerden, you say that you were confronted by other versions after you returned from Denmark, do you recall that evidence?


MR VISSER: Who put these other versions to you?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It was during the investigations by the members of the A-G's office in Pretoria, where they interrogated us regarding who knew about the explosion, what took place and that is where the matter arose that I wasn't certain whether I planted the bomb or whether Capt Zeelie planted the bomb. But that was during the questioning which was conducted by the investigative team of the A-G.

MR VISSER: Who compiled the affidavit on page 27 for the purposes of your amnesty application?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It was Mr Fanie Rossouw, when he was still my legal representative.

MR VISSER: I see. Were you then told what Mr Zeelie had said regarding the attack?


MR VISSER: Because you see I looked at your affidavit on page 27 and I compared this with the statement given by Mr Zeelie which appears on page 9, and then particularly page 11, and it would appear as if these two statement are actually identical regarding the aspect of why the attack took place at the Why Not Night-club, would you agree?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Chairperson, at the time of my amnesty application I was only with Mr Rossouw, Capt Zeelie was not with Mr Rossouw, I did not discuss it with him, it was version and my application for amnesty.

MR VISSER: Yes, and then naturally in your affidavit for your amnesty application you mentioned for the first time, as Judge de Jager has just pointed out to you, the question of Erasmus and Du Toit. Then I would just like to achieve certainty regarding this, you see Gen du Toit isn't trying to hide anything, in actual fact it has been suggested to him that he hasn't really made himself guilty of anything further than defeating the ends of justice, but he goes further than that and he associates himself with this offence and he requests amnesty for his involvement by association with this explosion. He tells the Committee, and you heard him, that he wasn't at the cleanup of the explosion at the Vanderbijl Square incident. Now is it possible that you may be mistaken in placing him there?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, I may be mistaken. If I could just get back to you regarding my affidavit which was deposed in Denmark and the night with the Goldstone Commission. That evening I was under tremendous pressure which was exerted on me by the Goldstone Commission, and in a question of a few hours I had to list all the offences in which I had been involved, I didn't have any opportunity to consult or to have access to documents or to speak to any of my colleagues regarding what took place on specific days with specific incidents, therefore I may have been mistaken. All that I stated in my affidavits was what I could remember or how I viewed what had taken place.

MR VISSER: Yes I see, but you also repeated this on page 30 of your amnesty application where you also place Piet du Toit at the same scene, is the same explanation applicable for page 30 and for your Denmark statement?

MR VAN HEERDEN: As I've stated, I gave my version of how I viewed the incident, how it took place and so forth. If I am mistaken then so be it and I will accept this before the Commission. I will not fight about any kind of incident that I am not one hundred percent certain of. This is my experience, this is my recollection and I will stand by that.

MR VISSER: You see then there is just one aspect remaining regarding which I will be fighting with you, Mr van Heerden, and that is, Mr du Toit states that he was indeed present at the scene after the explosion of the Why Not Club, but at that stage, according to him, he was not aware that you had been involved in that explosion and Mr Zeelie's evidence corroborates this. Are you perhaps mistaken with the person of Piet du Toit who told you to remain seated in the car there at the Why Not Club?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Chairperson, as I've stated my memory tells me that Gen du Toit was there, if Gen du Toit maintains that he was not there I will accept that, but my recollection tells me that he was there. I will not fight with him.

MR VISSER: I just want us to be clear regarding our dispute with each other. Gen du Toit says that he was there, there is no dispute regarding that, it is simply about your evidence on page 30 and page 38, that he told you to remain seated in the car, apparently with the objective to ensure that you would not be identified. He says that he didn't tell you this because he didn't know of your involvement. Is it possible that you may be mistaken regarding that matter?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It is possible, Chairperson, I cannot argue about that. I was seated in the car, Gen du Toit came to me, my recollection tells me that he told me to remain in the car. I am not saying that Gen du Toit is a liar, I won't say that he never told me that, my recollection however, says that he said that to me.

MR VISSER: Yes, but you see in the light of all his admissions he might as well also have admitted to that and it wouldn't have taken it any further, don't you agree?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, I agree completely, it wouldn't have changed anything about the fact that we planted the bomb.

MR VISSER: Yes, that is entirely correct, but the fact of the matter is that this took place a long time ago. Did anybody else also speak to you that night there at the Why Not Club, while you were seated in the vehicle?


MR VISSER: Well Zeelie is one of the persons who had to have spoken to you.

MR VAN HEERDEN: After the explosion, yes, but not while I was seated in the car and he was busy at the scene. I was alone in the car.

MR VISSER: Why did you remain in the car at that stage, why didn't you traverse the scene with Zeelie?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I was afraid that people would recognise me because I hadn't worn any disguise when I was in the club previously.

MR VISSER: And did Zeelie tell you to remain in the car or did you decide that on your own?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, I think Zeelie told me to stay in the car, or we decided together that I should remain in the car, that that was preferable.

MR VISSER: You see Mr van Heerden, that is what I have been wanting to ask you. You and Mr Zeelie, you drove together from Hillbrow Police Station, is that correct?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Isn't it simply logical if one would have to speculate today, that Zeelie would have said to you: "Listen, I think that you had better stay in the car because you were with me inside when the bomb was planted and you weren't wearing any disguise"? Isn't it logical to accept that?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, I think that I'm big enough to be able to draw that logical inference that I wouldn't be able to go there after I had been on the scene of an incident openly and people had been injured there.

MR VISSER: You see Mr van Heerden, it would not have been necessary for Erasmus or Du Toit or anybody else to come to you and tell you: "Stay in the car", if they had known that you were involved. There would not have been any sense to it because you were in the car anyway, isn't that so?


CHAIRPERSON: Mr van Heerden, whereabouts was the car parked in relation to the Why Not bar when you were sitting in it?

Was it around the corner or was it directly in front or ...?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It was just on the corner ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Was it cordoned off, was the area cordoned off?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Ja, just in front of where the explosion was. I'm not sure if it's to - I think Kotze Street going this way, the Why Not is here and I was standing on this corner - the next street, I was standing on that corner.

CHAIRPERSON: In the next street. And there were a lot of cars around?

MR VAN HEERDEN: There were thousands of people walking around there. I mean, not thousands, hundreds of people going to see what happened at the explosion and people driving up and down.

CHAIRPERSON: And was it an unmarked car or was it a police car with a blue light on top?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, it was an unmarked car.

CHAIRPERSON: So would you have known, or were you surprised - you say Gen du Toit came to the car, how would he have found the vehicle?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I was standing right on the corner.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you mean the car was on the corner?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Parked right on the corner, so I could still see from where I was sitting in the car what was going on.

CHAIRPERSON: But there were hundreds of people all around ...(intervention)

MR VAN HEERDEN: There were people moving around and cars and everything, to see what has happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: I have no further questions, thank you Chairperson.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Rossouw, do you have any questions that you would like to put to the applicant?

MR ROSSOUW: No Mr Chairman, I have no questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nyawuza, do you have any question you would like to put?


Mr van Heerden, when you were approached by Capt Zeelie to go and bomb the Why Not Club, ...(intervention)

MR VAN HEERDEN: Do I understand you right, was I approached by Capt Zeelie?

CHAIRPERSON: When you were approached. This is at 9 o'clock at his home you are talking about?

MR NYAWUZA: Yes, 9 o'clock at his home.


MR NYAWUZA: Did you at any stage know about this Why Not Club before you went there?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct.

MR NYAWUZA: What is it that you knew about this Why Not Club?

MR VAN HEERDEN: The investigation on the Cafe Zurich bombing. Like testified before that members, or family members of Peter Dlamini that was arrested and convicted, gave evidence to the fact that they visited the club frequently and that was also a place where Mr Dlamini frequently used to go.

MR NYAWUZA: So family members of - are you saying family members of Mr Dlamini, or fellow comrades of Mr Dlamini?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Family members that were fellow comrades of him, that assisted him.

MR NYAWUZA: That assisted him in what?

MR VAN HEERDEN: In planting the bomb, the handgrenade at Cafe Zurich. Or they were aware of the fact that he was a trained ANC member and that he was in possession of explosives and that he did place the bomb at Cafe Zurich.

MR NYAWUZA: And how many of these people were they? How many were they?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It was his wife and two sisters or cousins, or whatever you call them, and the waiter at Cafe Zurich.

MR NYAWUZA: So did these people - in fact to rephrase my question, when you went out to attack the Why Not Club, were you attacking Mr Peter Dlamini as a person, or you were attacking everybody that was attending, you know who was a patron at the Why Not Club?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, we attacked the Why Not Club due to the fact that members of the ANC that was planting bombs, made use of the facility at the Why Not Club.

MR NYAWUZA: Irrespective of how many innocent people were to be injured in this bomb, you went ahead with it?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Sir, the very same as what the ANC did in the past, if they believed that the members of the Security Forces made use of a certain restaurant or a place, immaterial of the thousands of innocent civilians, I will regard it as the very same factor, that he made use of that place and that is why we targeted it.

MR NYAWUZA: So you wanted Mr Dlamini?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Not Mr Dlamini, that was a place where he used to visit and made use of his targets, he planned it from there and he watched there while he did an attack.

MR NYAWUZA: Mr van Heerden, isn't it correct that according what the family members of Mr Dlamini told you, wasn't the Cafe Zurich plan that was done from the Why Not Club? In fact, let me rephrase my question. Is it your testimony that you attacked the Why Not Club because Mr Dlamini attacked Cafe Zurich from the Why Not Club?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, Sir, I'll repeat it for you again. Mr Dlamini was a member of the ANC and to our information members of the ANC, they made use of that specific club, which included Mr Dlamini as one of them and that's why the Why Not Club was targeted.

MR NYAWUZA: Made use of it for planning or they went out to have fun?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Socially, or whatever they wanted to do they made use of that club.

MR NYAWUZA: But was it brought to your attention after the attack that only innocent people were injured and no ANC member was attacked?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That I cannot reply on, I'm not aware of that.

ADV SIGODI: Sorry Mr Nyawuza.

Tell me, was this fact that the Why Not Club was used by the ANC, a commonly known fact amongst the members of the Security Branch? Was it a generally known fact?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I cannot reply to other members, Mr Chair, but I can reply to the investigation that we did on the Cafe Zurich bombing, was that members of the ANC did make use, or did go to visit and attend that specific club.

ADV SIGODI: Yes, I understand that you were in the Investigative Unit and most probably would have reported to your seniors, like Mr Zeelie, you would have told him that: "Look this is the information that we have received from the investigation that we are conducting about the Cafe Zurich", is that it?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Zeelie was the senior investigating about the Cafe Zurich, I assisted him in investigations, so he was fully aware of the information that I obtained from people about ANC members going to the club.

ADV SIGODI: So you are not in a position to know who else could have possibly known about the Why Not Club being used as a base by the ANC?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I don't know if Mr Zeelie had reported it higher up, it was not my function to report higher up.


MR NYAWUZA: Mr van Heerden, I believe that you are aware that when Capt Zeelie gave testimony he advised that if he knew that ANC members gathered at the Why Not Club, it would have been much easier for him to go and arrest those people.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Sir, it might be easy for you to say that now, but in real theory it's not so easy as what you're saying it is.

MR NYAWUZA: But isn't it, it was easy for him to say as well?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Easy to say what?

MR NYAWUZA: That if ...(intervention)

MR VAN HEERDEN: If we would have known that Peter Dlamini was in the night-club a specific night, we would have arrested him there, by no chance we would have let him go, but it was common knowledge that he did frequently visit that place.

MR NYAWUZA: And if we take Peter Dlamini out of the picture and say, "Look, your attack was based on the fact that ANC members and their supporters and "ondersteuners" visited the Why Not Club", so in essence what I can infer from what you're saying is that you attacked the Why Not Club because either ANC members, its militants, the MK Commander, as Peter Dlamini, attended thereto and its supporters attended, so you attacked it because it was used mainly by ANC affiliated people. Is that so?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Ja, ANC members did go to that club, Sir.

MR NYAWUZA: Knowing, from your testimony, having known that ANC members attended there, wouldn't it have been easy for you as a member of the Investigative Unit of John Vorster Square, to go there on a particular day and arrest people that you knew were ANC members?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Sir, there's a difference between an ANC supporter, and I'm sure you are fully of it ...(intervention)

MR NYAWUZA: Yes, I am.

MR VAN HEERDEN: ... of an ANC supporter and an ANC member, or a trained MK members, there's a big difference in that. If there was an ANC trained MK member in there and we knew that at a specific night he was in there, we would have arrested him, but it's not so easy to say as to who is an MK member, who is an ANC member and who is an ANC supporter, because in the same light as you want to rephrase it to me now on why not, then we could have just as well have arrested the whole Cosatu, because they were all ANC members.

MR NYAWUZA: So your attack on this night was based on, we hope that an ANC member is there and he gets hurt?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, Sir, the point was, and I stated it before, that the Why Not was frequently visited by ANC members according to our information. The other information was that Mr Peter Dlamini who had planted the bomb did make use of that specific facility and that's why it was targeted.

MR NYAWUZA: Okay, no further questions thank you.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Nyawuza. Ms Coleridge, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS COLERIDGE: Yes thank you, Chairperson.

Mr van Heerden, were you with Mr Zeelie when he consulted with the Vlakplaas members?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct.

MS COLERIDGE: And what did Mr Zeelie inform the Vlakplaas members of?

MR VAN HEERDEN: He informed them that he had received instructions from Gen Erasmus and Du Toit that a night-club in Hillbrow had to be attacked.

MS COLERIDGE: And you can clearly remember that, or ...?


MS COLERIDGE: And then just in relation to Mr Piet du Toit, you were quite consistent in your Denmark statement as well as in your amnesty application that he was the person that came to you whilst you were sitting in the car, is that correct?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct and the same as I've testified now. As far as my memory serves me right and as far as I can remember, Gen du Toit came to the car and told me that.

MS COLERIDGE: Right. Now did Gen du Toit know that you were part of that unit?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That I cannot answer you, I don't know. I've never reported it to him that I was part of the unit or that I participated in the bomb explosion at a specific time.

MS COLERIDGE: So would it be unusual for him to come to you at the car if he didn't know you at all? Did he know you?

MR VAN HEERDEN: He knows me.

MS COLERIDGE: Did he know that you were working with Capt Zeelie at the time?


CHAIRPERSON: When you were sitting in the car, the reason why you were there was because you didn't want to be identified.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: For obvious reasons, because you had just been in the very same place where the bomb went off and you would been a suspect. Because I believe, is it correct, perhaps you can just confirm it, you were the only group of white people there.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct, we were the only four white people in there.

CHAIRPERSON: So you stuck out a bit there and possibly could have been identified. Were you just sitting in the car or were you covering your face up or leaning down to make yourself ...

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, I just sat in the car, I just sat in the car.

CHAIRPERSON: Unrecognisable?


CHAIRPERSON: I mean why not just stand next to the car then?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I think it would have been more obvious standing outside in the street than what the visibility of the lights in the car, you will have some shade in the car.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Ms Coleridge?

MS COLERIDGE: Mr du Toit did he know Mr Zeelie's car, the unmarked car?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I'm sure everybody and most of even the public knew Capt Zeelie's car, because on every bomb explosion you would have seen his blue Sierra XR6 standing there.

MS COLERIDGE: So it wouldn't have been unusual for him to come up to Capt Zeelie's car, is that correct?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I wouldn't say so, it wouldn't have been, yes.

MS COLERIDGE: And if he had seen you sitting in the car, wouldn't his next question to you probably be, that's if we take your version now that he came up to you and said you must grow a beard for instance, okay, that's your consistent version in your Denmark statement and in your amnesty application, I'm just for argument's sake let's just ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: But Chairperson, you can't take an argument on evidence that this witness has retracted, he's retracted the question of the beard, he says ...(inaudible), so you can't use that as an argument any longer. You can use something else, but not that anymore.

MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson, I'm coming to that, I mean he has stated under oath in his amnesty application as well as in his statement in Denmark, that Gen du Toit was the person who came up to him and I'm saying let's take your version and let's just work - I have to question that version, Chairperson, it was taken under oath. I just lost my train of thought there, Chairperson, just let me get back into the swing of it.

MR VISSER: Can I help you, you put it to him that it was consistently his version that he spoke about, Du Toit spoke to him about growing a beard and then I objected, I said he's retracted that.

MS COLERIDGE: My next question to you would have been, if that is your version and Gen du Toit, knowing that you worked with Capt Zeelie, knowing that you're supposed to be on the scene to investigate this matter, was it unusual for you to be sitting in the car instead of being part of the action? Let's put it that way. Wouldn't it be actually unusual for him to come and say to you: "What are you doing sitting in the car?"

CHAIRPERSON: "Get out of the car and go and do your work."

MR VAN HEERDEN: Your Honour, it was most unusual for me to sit in a car after a bomb explosion because ninety nine percent I would have been on the site with Capt Zeelie.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you find it strange that Gen du Toit didn't tell you to get out of the car and go and do your work? After all you are in the investigator.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Your Honour, may I refrain from commenting on that question please?

MS COLERIDGE: So then just to take it a little bit further, so if Mr Zeelie's version is correct that Mr du Toit actually knew about this whole conspiracy and the bomb blast, that it's possible that he was actually the person that came to you and realised that you were working with Capt Zeelie, because he knew the unmarked car, he knew of the whole conspiracy, that it would actually be likely to tell you, just to cover up the unit and not to embarrass the unit, to say: "Wait a minute, stay in the car and grow a beard because of the ID parade, etcetera", wouldn't that be possible?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That could be possible, Mr Chair.

MS COLERIDGE: And then coming back to - we asked you who your Commander was and you said it was Mr Victor or At van Niekerk.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's right.

MS COLERIDGE: Now with your memory you said that it's possible that the person the following day was ...(inaudible) a beard.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct.

MS COLERIDGE: So we can take it that Victor was your Commander at the time.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Ja, he was one of the senior Commanders in the Investigation Unit.

MS COLERIDGE: So did you inform him of the incident?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I never spoke to nobody ever after that incident regarding the incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Just on that - sorry, Ms Coleridge.

If you take a look at Exhibit B, paragraph 18:

"To the best of my recollection (okay that's qualified) Capt Zeelie and Sgt van Heerden visited me on the 23rd in my office to report back to me."

What do you say to that?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I was never in Gen Erasmus' office, I've never ever spoken to Gen Erasmus or Gen du Toit afterwards, due to the fact that I did a job I did not need to go to his office to get a handshake for the job that I had done, and I never expected him neither to do that. My point on Gen Erasmus is that he could have been mistaken that Capt Zeelie had briefed him that morning as it would have been normal procedure for an officer to brief a senior officer and not for a Constable to brief a senior officer.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, because Gen Erasmus does say to the best of his knowledge, he qualifies it, he doesn't say it as a hard fact. But you deny that you were ever in his office?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, I was never in Gen Erasmus' office.

CHAIRPERSON: And you say that he, by mentioning your name there, he's mistaken?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is definitely so.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, Chairperson.

So Mr van Heerden, if you say you never discussed this matter with your Commander, with Erasmus or Du Toit, then it would actually be unlikely for Victor to tell you to grow a beard because he obviously wouldn't know that you were involved in the matter, isn't that so?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct.

MS COLERIDGE: So that possibility we can cancel, that is not even a possibility, is that what you're saying?

MR VAN HEERDEN: How Victor came to it that I must grow a bear, I cannot answer you. It might have come out in the officers meeting that morning, which I was not present and I don't know what was discussed there.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Cornelius, do you have any re-examination?

MR CORNELIUS: I have none, thank you Mr Chair.


CHAIRPERSON: Judge de Jager, any questions?

JUDGE DE JAGER: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Sigodi, any questions?

ADV SIGODI: I have none.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr van Heerden, thank you, that concludes your testimony, you may stand down now.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Thank you, Mr Chair.


MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. I beg leave to call Mr Vermeulen if possible.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------NICOLAAS JOHANNES VERMEULEN: (sworn states)


Mr Vermeulen, you're an applicant in this matter and your application appears on page 65 up until the end of bundle 1, is that correct?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: You've heard the evidence and on page 100 of your application you've said the following:

"The Why Not Night-club. We used a limpet mine and it was exploded in the premises. Brood van Heerden was involved in this and I waited outside of the premises."

Is that correct?


MR CORNELIUS: Were you an explosives expert at this stage?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Were you active in Vlakplaas?


MR CORNELIUS: What was your rank?

MR VERMEULEN: I was a Warrant Officer.

MR CORNELIUS: And your Commander at that stage?

MR VERMEULEN: It was Col de Kock.

MR CORNELIUS: Now I understand that your unit was disposed for acts of terrors in the Witwatersrand.

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you receive any instruction from Col de Kock to become involved in this Why Not operation?

MR VERMEULEN: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you distance yourself from the acts of Mr van Heerden and Zeelie?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Is that why you remained in the vehicle?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: You did not receive instructions to stand guard or to act if something happened?

MR VERMEULEN: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So why did you go with them in the vehicle if you distanced yourself?

MR VERMEULEN: The whole group went there, Mr Chairman, so I just followed, but I said I didn't want to have anything to do with the whole thing.

CHAIRPERSON: And what were Van Dyk and Willemse, what were their ranks?

MR VERMEULEN: Willemse was a Sergeant and if I'm correct, Van Dyk was a Captain or a Major.

CHAIRPERSON: And the senior man was Van Dyk?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius.

MR CORNELIUS: It sounds a bit crass to say it but I got the idea that you went with for the joyride.

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And after the incident no steps were taken against you.


MR CORNELIUS: Did you make a statement concerning this incident?

MR VERMEULEN: Not that I can recall, no.

MR CORNELIUS: And your application in front of this Committee is for amnesty for defeating the ends of justice because of the fact that you remained quiet, that you knew about the facts and you did not disclose it.

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, any questions?


What did Zeelie tell you, Mr Vermeulen, when he arrived there at Goldfields?

MR VERMEULEN: As far as I can recall Mr Chairperson, there was a limpet mine at the Why Not - or that we had to go and place a limpet mine at the Why Not Club.

MR VISSER: If you as Vlakplaas members worked in a different Security Branch, under whose command did you resort?

MR VERMEULEN: It would be the Commander of that specific area.

MR VISSER: If Zeelie approached you that evening and told you: The Section Commander gave instructions that you must assist us in planting a limpet mine", what would your view for it be then?

MR VERMEULEN: I would not execute that instruction, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you say why?

MR VERMEULEN: The reason is that I will follow all instructions that I receive in the normal execution of my duties, but that was a special operation and I would then only follow instructions that came from Col de Kock.

MR VISSER: And no instruction was given?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did Zeelie tell you that evening that there was an instruction from his Section Commander that you had to act, or was it as you just testified, that it was said to you that a limpet mine had to be planted?

MR VERMEULEN: I would say the last version you gave would be the correct one. I cannot recall that he told me that Erasmus told him or instructed him to do this.

MR VISSER: Or Gen du Toit for that matter.

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.


CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Rossouw, before I ask you I just want to ask Mr Vermeulen a question.

What if Capt or Maj van Dyk said: "Okay, we're in, we'll go and afford backup"? Seeing that he was your senior officer within Vlakplaas or GG1 or G10, I don't know what it was.

MR VERMEULEN: I would have queried it, Mr Chair, I wouldn't have done it.

CHAIRPERSON: Did Van Dyk in fact give you any order, did you disobey him at all or did he just sort of leave it up to each man to decide for themselves?

MR VERMEULEN: He didn't give me any orders, I just said I was not prepared to go with.

CHAIRPERSON: And he let it go?

MR VERMEULEN: Ja, he didn't force us to do anything.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Rossouw, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, yes Mr Chairman.

Mr Vermeulen, why did Capt van Dyk accompany you then, as well as Mr Willemse?

MR VERMEULEN: I do not know, Mr Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Do you know if he or Mr Willemse or yourself made any contact with De Kock, to clear this up with him?

MR VERMEULEN: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: If you say that as far as your recollection goes, that Mr Zeelie did not mention to you that this instruction came from Gens Erasmus and Du Toit, is it possible that he did mention it?

MR VERMEULEN: It is possible, yes, but as far as I can recall, I do not know about it.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nyawuza, any questions?

MR NYAWUZA: No questions, Chairperson.


CHAIRPERSON: Ms Coleridge.


Mr Vermeulen, were you in the presence of all your Vlakplaas members all the time when Mr Zeelie had spoken to you?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MS COLERIDGE: So at no stage did you actually do something else, or were you focused on what Mr Zeelie was telling you constantly, or can you give us details about that?

MR VERMEULEN: When I heard that they wanted us to go and help to blow up the Why Not Club, I said no and I was not paying any attention anymore.

MS COLERIDGE: And how long did the conversation last for?

MR VERMEULEN: I don't think it was very long, say 10/15 minutes, I don't know.

MS COLERIDGE: And my last question, are you still in the Force?


MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Cornelius, any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Only one question, thanks Mr Chair.

You worked on a need-to-know basis, is that correct?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that is.

MR CORNELIUS: Was it expected of you to question an officer like Capt Zeelie to ask him where his instructions came from?

MR VERMEULEN: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.


CHAIRPERSON: Judge de Jager, any questions? Advocate Sigodi?

Mr Vermeulen, so all you're asking for amnesty is defeating the ends of justice in not revealing who the perpetrators were of the Why Not bomb?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You're not applying for attempted murder or whatever else, damage to property, etcetera?


CHAIRPERSON: It's just that aspect, because you say that you weren't part of the conspiracy. In fact you disassociated yourself for it actively?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Thank you, that concludes your testimony.


MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chair, I think that concludes the applicants as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Any further witnesses to be called on behalf of the applicants?

MR VISSER: No, Chairperson.


MR NYAWUZA: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Any witnesses?

MR NYAWUZA: We're not going to call any witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Coleridge?

MS COLERIDGE: I have no witnesses, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that then concludes the evidence at this hearing, it's just a question for argument now. I see it's quarter to one, I don't know if you want to start now or do you want to take the lunch break now and start a bit earlier and then carry on with your submissions?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, can I start?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: The sooner I start, the sooner we finish.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you can start Mr Visser, certainly.

MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Chairperson, I don't intend to be long. I would submit to you Chairperson, that the facts of the present matter or similar situations have been dealt with by the original Committee on amnesty. It was already dealt with by Gen van der Merwe in his evidence on the 21st of October 1996, based on his submissions to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is an exhibit which has served before the Amnesty Committee since February 1997, Chairperson. I think it was marked - in fact there is a reference to it in the general background, Chairperson, it was at page 1, P46 and P47. And at Exhibit P46, page 22, Gen van der Merwe dealt with the general background to situations similar to the present one, in paragraph 18, and he refers to prevailing circumstances and he says:

"These prevailing circumstances which I've sketched, were to have a further dimension, perhaps already alluded to, namely both the lowering of moral of the community and the Security Forces and the hardening of attitudes among both groupings. This was accompanied by the belief that the enemy had to be destroyed, no matter what. This outlook was in turn aggravated to a great extent, by speeches and pronouncements by government figures and commanding officers in various sectors of the Security Forces."

And he says:

"It is undoubtedly so that militaristic and politically inspired speeches often made it difficult for the Security Forces, who were becoming more and more emotionally involved, to be able to distinguish between that which was normally justifiable in terms of the law and that which was not. That the status quo led to members of the Security Branch, who had to deal with the most horrendous manifestations of violence on a day to day basis, ultimately becoming equally disillusioned and negatively influenced regarding these matters."

And then he also says what a hotspot the East Rand was and how it continued from the early '80s right through to the '90s, Chairperson. And that is what Gen Erasmus alluded to in his evidence as well.

And then Chairperson, in the original Committee on amnesty's decision in the Cronje matter, at page 4, Chairperson, would you allow me just to read a short extract. Where dealing with the general background, that Committee found, and I read to you at page 4, just the one paragraph in the middle of the page, it deals with the perspectives of the various sides, Chairperson, and then it is stated on page 4:

"On the other hand the police were pressured to maintain law and order, to deal with terrorists and guarantee the safety of ordinary citizens against such incidents as the Church Street bombing, the Magoo's Bar bomb, the St James Church Massacre, the murder of farmers and hundreds of other incidents of terrorism and killings."

We submit to you, if I may pause there Chairperson, that those are the facts which form the backdrop of the present application, which you will be entitled to bear in mind and take into account.

"This pressure did not only come from politicians, but also from the business sector, farmers and ordinary citizens. Words such as 'eliminate them, take them out, pursue them, pay them back in their own coin', 'betaal hulle terug in hulle eie munt', 'do to them what they are doing to you', were used.

According to the evidence of a number of applicants, they understood this to be authorisation to use bombs and handgrenades and in some instances, to eliminate or kill certain people. The fact that incidents did occur which must have been authorised by officers in higher command or in some instances were authorised or condoned by politicians, like the bombing of Cosatu House and Khotso House, led to a growing perception that the deeds met with the approval of the government.

In certain instances, members of the Security Forces were decorated for their actions in combating the total onslaught.

and then the important words, Chairperson:

"In the end the conflict ended in a vicious circle, a gruesome attack would lead to gruesome counter-measures, which would in turn lead to even more gruesome acts of revenge. This, unfortunately, forms part of our history and the conflict of the past."

Enough of that, Chairperson. The reason why we quoted those parts to you is to obviate a long argument, Chairperson, on the political background. We would submit to you that on the evidence before you, particularly that of Gen Erasmus, the operation which took place was clearly associated with a political objective.

We would submit, Chairperson, that it is clear from his evidence that the direct cause of the explosion at the Why Not Club, was a retaliatory action which was directly in proportion to that which they experienced themselves on a frequent basis. Namely, explosions at the Vanderbijl Square, at the Wimpy Bar and at other places, Chairperson. And Zeelie gave evidence here to say that the ones that he himself went to investigate numbered something like 168. It was a hotspot, Chairperson. And with great respect, one can today philosophy about the moral or the morality of such a counter-attack from police who are supposed to be people who should maintain law and order, but all of that, Chairperson, does not come into the picture when one has regard to the provisions of the TRC Act, which makes provision for amnesty to be granted within that spectrum of the conflict of the past, because that is where these things happened, where things went wrong, where offences were committed on both sides, and the morality of the matter, Chairperson, we submit with respect, should play no role. The only issue is whether there was proportionality. We submit that it is directly proportional in this particular case and proportionality would create no problem at all to you and the Members of your Committee in this particular case. Nor, as I have already submitted, will the issue of political objective play any role.

Chairperson, we submit that both Erasmus and Du Toit and the others fall within the purview of Section 20(2)(b) and (f) and (a) as well, Chairperson, of 20(2). And we submit that they have complied, the two applicants for whom we appear, have complied with the formal requirements of the Act and that in that sense, Chairperson, there is nothing standing in your way, all other things being equal, to grant them amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: What about the question - I'm just raising this for purposes of argument, because I'll expect Mr Rossouw and Mr Cornelius to answer it, with regard to full disclosure? We have two versions that don't dovetail entirely into each other, they only meet to a certain extent and then they diverge. Now if we find - must we now make a credibility finding and find that one side is not telling the whole truth, not disclosing all the facts, or is it that maybe there's general mistakes all around and forgetting of facts, that sort of thing? In other words, are the applicants in two schools, the Generals and the others, or are they all in the same boat together?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I was going to deal with that separately under the heading of full disclosure, where I was going to refer you to evidence as well, but it seems that it would be more convenient to leave that for 2 o'clock, because I see it's four minutes to one.

CHAIRPERSON: If we can then take the lunch adjournment now and then we'll proceed with submissions after that. Thank you.




CHAIRPERSON: ... from afterwards, but ...


He knew, he knew broadly speaking, that there would have been. What they said, both of them Chairperson, it's paragraph 10, what both of them said is that they didn't know that the Why Not Club was going to be the target. Now that also doesn't take the matter any further, whether they did or didn't know, but the fact is that this is their evidence, they didn't know, and this is only something they found out later.

Du Toit says in paragraph 10:

"Dit is my herinnering dat ek vooraf geweet het dat daar gesoek word, in opdrag van Gen Erasmus, na a geskikte bymekaarkom plek van ANC mense ten einde 'n ontploffing te bewerkstellig." Although I cannot recall it clearly, I accept that Gen Erasmus would have told me about it."

So he makes no bones about it, that this is his recollection. He may as easily have said: "Well, you know I have no recollection that I knew beforehand and therefore I'm only asking for defeating the ends of justice", but he doesn't do that, Chairperson, he comes to you and he makes a clean breast of it.

CHAIRPERSON: Why should Mr Zeelie come and say that he got a radio call and went to the SAB canteen where he spoke to both the Generals aside and the specific target was mentioned, etcetera, and he got the final instruction?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, it's a good question and we'll probably never know the answer, but what I will suggest to you is that Mr Zeelie was accosted by the Special Investigation team of the Attorney-General and he was confronted and in spite of his denials, he knew at that time that what he was looking at was a prosecution for this matter, because he had already been implicated by Mr van Heerden. That is the evidence which he conceded here. So he's now looking at a prosecution and Van Heerden at that stage, on the evidence, was subservient to Mr Zeelie, Zeelie was a Captain, he was a Constable, the chances were that the Attorney-General would have prosecuted Zeelie on Brood van Heerden's evidence. So what does Zeelie do? He knows that they're looking for the Generals, Chairperson, it's an open secret, that's what the Attorney-General's still doing, they're looking for evidence against Generals, and Zeelie puts two and two together and he starts mentioning all these names.

Why and how he knew about the SAB, my witnesses can't explain to you, Chairperson, because you heard Erasmus saying that he can remember that one or two occasions the senior officers were invited by the SA Breweries for a braai or a function. And we know this happened with - a lot of concerns invited the police and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: There was nothing sinister about that.

MR VISSER: There's nothing sinister about it at all. So it's possible, Chairperson, that he may have heard of that and that this is what he told the Attorney-General, and he finds himself in a position now where he's now got to defend that statement which he made. Because the critical point here, Chairperson, is that statement is made before the amnesty process takes off, it is made before Zeelie could have realised that both Erasmus and Du Toit were going to apply for amnesty. He must have assumed at the time that they would not, because at that time we all remember very well, Chairperson, that there was a blanket denial from everybody about complicity in any offences or delicts. We know that. And it's not unreasonable to assume that Mr Zeelie thought that he would be asked by the State Attorney - not by the State Attorney, by the Attorney-General, to be a State witness against the Generals if they were implicated. And Chairperson, frankly, with great respect, one doesn't really have to look further than that as a motivation for that portion of Zeelie's evidence.

You see the question which must exercise your mind is if Erasmus comes to you as he does and he says: "I gave the order", unless he's forgotten, what possible reason could there be for him to say: "I don't ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there's no particular reason, you know this is the sort of confusing part of all the evidence before us, if somebody comes and says: "Look, I take responsibility, I accept that what I said to him he regarded as an order and carried it out and I accept responsibility and in fact after the bombing I condoned it and in fact I went with it, I had no problems", whether the Why Not was specifically targeted or not, it doesn't materially affect the application, it's not a denial as opposed to an implication.

MR VISSER: Exactly. If Erasmus had come and denied the order, then of course it was a different story.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Why not admit that it was the Why Not?

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, because he says those weren't the facts. And I don't want to fall in going around in circles, but as the Chairman has just put to me, is it a material fact? That's one of the questions. Is it really a material fact whether Erasmus knew beforehand that it was going to be the Why Not Club. That's another matter. And again the submission will be to you that it's not a material fact, the material fact is the fact that there was going to be a bombing of a gathering place.

ADV SIGODI: Is it not material to disclose your target?

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I didn't hear that.

ADV SIGODI: I say, is it not material to disclose your target? If you are saying that you agree that you're going to attack a certain person, isn't it a material fact that you must disclose - if you know the target, is it not material if you sort of conceal or don't disclose that: "Look I knew what the target was or who the target was going to be"?

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson, that's not the case at all here. It's never been denied that the Why Not Club was attacked. Neither Erasmus nor Du Toit has ever disputed the reason or the validity of the reasons for attacking the Why Not Club, all that they said is that they didn't know beforehand. Now your questions to me, Chairperson is, isn't it a material fact which is not disclosed if they didn't say beforehand that it was the Why Not Club? Well it may be in certain circumstances ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you see it would - if the focus of the opposition was on the fact that it was not an appropriate target ...

MR VISSER: Yes, that's a different matter.

CHAIRPERSON: ... then there might be reason to distance yourself from knowledge of the target.

MR VISSER: Yes, yes, correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You say: "Well I didn't know what the target was".

MR VISSER: But those are not the facts here, Chairperson. May I deal immediately, before I forget, with an issue which is directly relevant to that. It was put by Mr Nyawuza to one of the applicants, to Zeelie I think it was, that not a single person who was a member or a supporter of the ANC was in fact affected. Well, Chairperson, we can speculate about that but there's certainly no evidence as to that before you and certainly no evidence upon which you can make ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but we also know that any attack of this method, a bomb, is to a large extent, indiscriminate.

MR VISSER: Oh absolutely.

CHAIRPERSON: I mean you know, if you put a bomb in a public place, the shrapnel's not going to sort out its target, it's not smart shrapnel.

MR VISSER: We only have to think of the Church Street bomb, Chairperson.


MR VISSER: Yes, absolutely.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I mean any bombing it's the same.

MR VISSER: You're quite correct, you're quite correct.

So yes to that extent, and that's perhaps again part of the morality which I referred to earlier, but hopefully we've gone past the question of proportionality and those issues.

But coming to the question of Adv Sigodi. In this particular case, Chairperson, there was no effort by either Erasmus or Du Toit to deny that the Why Not Club would have been a correct target, they simply didn't know beforehand that that was the particular club that was going to be attacked, but they accepted it afterwards.

JUDGE DE JAGER: ...(indistinct - no microphone) is that the type of target was - your submission is that the type of target was identified, that they were ad idem about the type of target, but the name of the target wasn't identified or they ... If it was, they might have had consensus on that, but there's a dispute as to whether the name was in fact mentioned, but the type was mentioned.

MR VISSER: Quite correct, Chairperson, and my submission on the score is that it could have been any one of 12 other places with different names and it would still not have made a difference. As long as that target answered to the requirement that it had to be, as far as the information in the possession of the Security Police were concerned, a gathering place of ANC supporters and sympathisers and/or members, etcetera. That was the requirement, Chairperson. And what makes the Why Not Club, on the evidence before the Committee, perhaps the ideal choice was that there was information that the attack on the Cafe Zurich was orchestrated from the Why Not Club. Now with great respect Chairperson, once that is so, then we submit to you that all relevant facts have been disclosed.

The only issue then remaining is if you look at the evidence of Zeelie, how important is it that he says that the final instruction was given at the SA Breweries, whereas the other two, for whom I appear, say that never happened? And we say, Chairperson, that in the greater scheme of things, having regard to what is relevant and material to the present enquiry, whether that discussion took place at the SA Breweries or not and whether or not Du Toit and Erasmus forgot about that, Chairperson. And I suppose it's possible, it is possible, although they are adamant that it didn't happen, just as adamant as Mr Zeelie is that it did happen. Then we say, Chairperson, the first argument would be that it is not a material fact.

The second argument, Chairperson is, if you feel yourself in a position where you have to make a credibility finding, it is our submission that you would have no difficulty in accepting the evidence of Gens Erasmus and Du Toit before you will accept the evidence of Mr Zeelie. Mr Zeelie's evidence was, to put it euphemistically, unreliable in very many respects. And I'm not going to refer to all of them, Chairperson. But it is quite clear that he has a history of giving evidence in principle against these particular two previous Commanding Officers of his. It happened in the Khotso House, it happened in Cry Freedom, it happened in Stanza Bopape, of which you will recall, and it happened again. And Chairperson, again the simple explanation may be that he made all those statements at a time when he didn't realise that these applicants would also be applicants in the amnesty process and he now finds himself in the position where he's got to defend what he had stated in previous statements. That may be the simple explanation. There may be another explanation, I would be speculating if I had to think of other permutations in that regard.

Would you just allow me a moment, Chairperson. Chairperson, I was going to come to that, but perhaps it is a convenient stage or an appropriate stage to do that at this stage. In the Cosatu House matter there is some precedence for an approach to this kind of dispute. In the Cosatu House, Chairperson, Mr de Kock, Eugene de Kock gave evidence to say that when he was given instructions to take part in the bombing of Cosatu House, he was given the instruction by Brig Schoon and he, if I remember correctly, he said that when Brig Schoon told him about this instruction he asked whether the instruction came from the top and Brig Schoon said to him words to the effect of: "Yes, from the very top", and Mr de Kock's evidence was that he took it that that meant that the State President, Mr P W Botha gave the instructions.

On the other hand, there was evidence Chairperson, by Mr Vlok, Mr van der Merwe and others to say that the instruction did not come from higher up, but that in fact, Vlok and Van der Merwe had decided on this operation on their own. And may I read to you how the Committee in that case and in that case Judge de Jager I believe, was a Member of that Committee, yes it was Judge Wilson, Judge de Jager, Adv Gcabashe and Mr Sibanyoni. They approached it in the following manner, Chairperson:

"The Committee has considered all the evidence presented during this hearing and has come to the following conclusion:

With regard to the issue of full disclosure of the origin of the order to bomb Cosatu House, the versions of Vlok and Van der Merwe and Schoon denying P W Botha's involvement, as opposed to that of De Kock, remain unresolved. Both versions are plausible and it is difficult for the Committee to determine where the truth lies. It must be borne in mind however, that De Kock's evidence involving Botha was purely hearsay, based on information obtained from Schoon that the order came right from the top. De Kock had never met Botha or personally talked to him. This is a material factor (says the Committee) that impacts on whether full disclosure has been made to the Committee, in particular by Vlok, Van der Merwe and Schoon."

balancing it off with De Kock.

"For purposes of deciding the applications for amnesty however, all the other material facts indicate all the applicants clearly promoted a political objective acting in their various capacities. No evidence was presented to gainsay that of the applicants with respect to the issue of full disclosure of all the material facts, bar that of the origin of the order. In the premises, the Committee is satisfied that all the applicants qualify for amnesty on the basis that they have complied with the material facts prescribed by the Act.

The issue of the order to bomb remains undetermined. The Committee however does not consider this single issue to be so material as to be a bar to amnesty for any of the applicants."

Of course it is slightly different there, it is slightly different, it is more material there, if I may put it that way Chairperson, than in the present case, but at the end of the day the principle is clear. How the order was given, and in that case, by whom the order was given isn't that material as long as we know there was an order, there was an execution of the order and all the requirements of the Act had been complied with.

But Chairperson, we submit that it is, on that basis it is not necessary for your Committee and yourself to consider having to make an order of credibility, because it could fit in with both. Because even on Zeelie's own evidence there was an order to attack a premises of a particular description. It was done precisely as it was envisaged by Erasmus, and Chairperson, we know what the results were and we say that that is quite as simple as this application should fall upon.

Chairperson, as far as the injured persons are concerned, we don't know, unfortunately. We've attempted to find information. We went through the Harms Commission, because at the time of the Harms Commission and due to the brief of the Harms Commission, there were lists drawn and statistics drawn up of all violent incidents which could have had something to do with political motivation, and the Why Not Club was mentioned there. And what I found on the record, Chairperson, and I did this myself, was that there was a reference to 19 people that were injured, there was no description of how serious or otherwise it was. We've now heard from Ms Coleridge of 16 people who were injured - well, 16 names were mentioned, but some of those names we saw in bundle 2, said themselves that they weren't injured, they were shocked and they had a headache and some of them weren't even treated. But Chairperson, with respect, if you will follow our submission, with respect, of granting amnesty if you consider favourably to do so, granting amnesty for all offences and delicts committed as part and parcel of this incident, it won't be necessary for you to specify the names of people who were injured.

CHAIRPERSON: Although in that regard we've been specifically, as an Amnesty Committee, requested by the Committee on Reparations and we would certainly take a look at the list that Ms Coleridge has and we would check it against the various statements and all we do is refer the names to that Committee for their consideration and then they make the final decision as to whether the person is in fact a victim or not. And I must say just from my own point of view, if somebody's in a room where a bomb goes off and doesn't get physically injured, I personally would classify that person as a victim because of the shock and the trauma and the psychological trauma.

MR VISSER: As a victim, yes, because there's a psychological trauma as well.

CHAIRPERSON: So we would do that as a matter of course. We'd check it on the papers.

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Chairperson. The only point that I'm making is, by way of apology really, is that we're not in a position to be of any real assistance, although we have attempted, but we will accept whoever is suggested to have been present there and to have been a witness, we will accept that, Chairperson. And all of those persons will then be part and parcel of what we ask for amnesty for.

Chairperson, the only other issue which is also in our submission a non issue, is the question of Du Toit being on the scene at the explosion at Vanderbijl Square and whether or not he spoke to Mr van Heerden and told him to remain in the car. The issue of the beard has now obviously fallen away as far as Mr du Toit is concerned.

JUDGE DE JAGER: He told him to stay in the car at the Why Not Club ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: At the Why Not Club, I'm sorry, did I say Vanderbijl - at the Why Not Club.

Now Chairperson, Du Toit says he wasn't at that scene ...(intervention)

JUDGE DE JAGER: No, Du Toit was at the Why Not scene.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I'm confusing the two scenes, I'm terribly sorry. Du Toit was in fact at the scene, but he has no recollection of speaking to Van Heerden. The question which was put by you, Chairperson, is why would he have spoken to Van Heerden, because on all the evidence, including that of Zeelie, there is no reason to believe that he knew beforehand that Van Heerden was involved in that explosion. So that is the first question mark that arises.

The second is, Van Heerden is sitting in a parked car quite a way from the Why Not Club and if Du Toit had anything to say to him, as you quite correctly put to him, why didn't he say to him: "What are you sitting in the car for, there's work to be done"?

And thirdly, Chairperson, if Du Toit had known that Van Heerden was in fact involved, why would he go to a man who's sitting in a car to say to him: "Sit in the car"? It just doesn't make sense. So there are improbabilities against the version of Mr van Heerden, and he very properly, with respect, said that's the way he remembers it but he may be mistaken, he may be mistaken. And frankly, Chairperson, if one wants to speculate and if one allows oneself a little room of speculation, who would have been the person to say to Van Heerden: "Stay in the car"? It would have been Zeelie, clearly. He's direct Commanding Officer, knowing that he was part of the group of people that went in to place the bomb, knowing that he didn't have a disguise, wasn't wearing a disguise at the time. Clearly it would have been Zeelie who said that to him. And it might just be, if one has to speculate, that if somebody really did say it to him, it wasn't Du Toit but it was Zeelie. But be that as it may, Chairperson.

The last question mark about that evidence which I must mention to you and I say this as a criticism of Mr van Heerden, that it's very strange this question of the beard. He remembers in the one statement that there was a question of growing a beard, it's now withdrawn and it's now brought to the doorstep of Mr Victor, who is not the J J Viktor that have been applicants for amnesty, someone else, who has apparently no real connection here, although Mr van Heerden said that he might have been the Chief of the CID at the time, of the Investigation Unit at the time, but we know it was At van Niekerk. So it's very strange, Chairperson, and what we say is, bearing in mind the probabilities of that version, we say that there is nothing inherently improbable in Du Toit's evidence, because he may as well have admitted it if it were so. But again, Chairperson, it is a long time ago and it's possible that Du Toit might have forgotten about it, and we readily conceded that and I believe that both the applicants for whom I appear have conceded very properly to you that they may be wrong, they have their recollection but they may be wrong. This is more than what Mr Zeelie was prepared to do, as you will recall.

Chairperson, I believe I've addressed most of the important points. If there's anything that arises as a query in your mind, please do ask me again and I'll attempt to address your concerns.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Thank you, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: I then ask Chairperson, for amnesty as we have asked for in Exhibits B and C, we believe that's the proper order. That certainly is the most proper order and we borrowed that from the London Bomb case where the Amnesty Committee heard argument on the issue of what a proper Amnesty Order would be, and very briefly the argument was that if one analyses the Act, what the Act authorises the Amnesty Committee is to grant amnesty for acts, omissions and offences which should be converted to read offences and delicts. Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Rossouw.

MR ROSSOUW IN ARGUMENT: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

I have to say at the outset, Mr Chairman, that I'm in agreement with Mr Visser on the issues as identified by him as the relevant facts to have been made a full disclosure of before this Committee.

Mr Chairman, I do not believe that it in any manner, comes close to a situation where one has to make a credibility finding and on that point, the probabilities for themselves, if you should find that whether the target was identified and conveyed to the Generals by Mr Zeelie, is a material fact which I am in agreement with Mr Visser, is not material, the type of target which was identified and carried out, is the relevant fact which was placed and targeted and on both versions there was full disclosure about.

But Mr Chairman, the probabilities are simply this, that one has to look at both versions and if you have a look at the General's version about the discussion that took place at the bomb scene at Vanderbijl Square, you'll note that his testimony was that he there requested Mr Zeelie if he could not identify a place where ANC members would come together and where they can be targeted in a similar vein as the explosion at Vanderbijl Square. Now the question that was put to Mr Zeelie was: "Why didn't you at that time mention Why Not Night-club, you were investigating this matter, you knew about Peter Dlamini, you knew about this place being frequented by ANC members or supporters or trained MK cadres, why didn't you mention it right there and then, in the heat of the moment when the General is saying to you: 'We must act now, do not wait a month, act now'. Why not?" Sorry, that would be wrong thing to say now, Mr Chairman, but why didn't he mention Why Not exactly at that time? There's a simple answer on the probabilities, that the further aspect of targeting only happened later, as Mr Zeelie testified. That's a probability in his favour.

JUDGE DE JAGER: On the other hand he was given instructions to identify something and come back, that was expected, but he never came back. He was summoned to come again.

MR ROSSOUW: Yes, Mr Chairman, but the probability of that is, you are in the heat of the moment at the scene of the explosion, he was involved in that investigation, he knew about it, Mr Chairman, he could have mentioned it right there. Why didn't he mention it right there? He didn't need to go and do an investigation. We know after the fact now, that there was no investigation carried out, the target was identified in exactly the manner in which I'm suggesting he could have mentioned it right there at the scene at Vanderbijl Square. So Mr Chairman, the fact of the matter is that the probabilities in that sense is something that must be taken into account. But I submit that it's not a material fact, the fact of the matter is that the target was identified and it was carried out there. That's the one aspect, Mr Chairman.

The other aspect is that drawing a credibility finding on previous evidence of Mr Zeelie with regard to differences between him and the two Generals, Mr Chairman would not be relevant in this application and I submit to you that the attack on Mr Zeelie, as far as his consultation and statements to the Attorney-General is concerned, and the suggestion that he tried to implicate the two Generals from the outset, Mr Chairman, loses sight of the simple fact that there is no dispute, he did not wrongly implicate the two Generals. They are here on their own version, admitting to being involved in this matter. So why would he - he didn't fabricate it at that stage, at the stage when he consulted with the Attorney-General. If the two Generals did not apply, then it might have been a relevant attack on his credibility, but exactly what he said in 1995 is what has today been placed before this Committee, by the two Generals. In fact Mr Chairman, dealing with that, Mr Chairman you would have noted from the evidence by Mr Zeelie that, and you would have gathered that there's a distinct feeling between lower ranking policemen that the top brass are not taking the blame for all the incidents. And Mr Chairman, that would have been the distinct feeling one would have gained from the initial applications by the two Generals. On the evidence provided, supplemented here, the order, the structure of the order, the acceptance of responsibility came out, but not initially. So the applications perpetuate that feeling. But Mr Chairman, once again, it was not an improper implication of the two Generals, and I won't take it any further than that. I say nothing turns on it, it can't be a matter of credibility in any sense.

Mr Chairman, about the specific meeting point, the two Generals conceded that they might be mistaken, Mr Zeelie will not concede that he's mistaken. Once again I submit that turning to the probabilities and the specific questions put by the Committee and the answer by Mr Zeelie is, why would he mention the South African Breweries premises? Why mention that premises if he was not even aware that that was a place which was frequented by the Generals, even if to a lesser extent, but in prior times they had been there? He was not aware of that. Probability one, Mr Chairman, he mentioned it because he was at that premises, he came to know about it because he was called to attend there. That's a probability. And that must be weighed against the concession by the Generals.

Mr Chairman, similarly, if Mr Zeelie wanted to mention the two Generals and implicate them, he could have mentioned any place, why this specific place? There's no evidence that he's trying to place the Generals in a bad light, to indicate that this was at a bar where there was a party and we've heard the evidence in other matters where there was a party going on when decisions were taken to eliminate people. There's not a suggestion of that in this instance, it's a, can I call it a neutral ground, Mr Chairman, nothing turns on it. That's my submission.

Mr Chairman, I submit that Mr Zeelie has complied with all the formal aspects of his application, Section 20(1)(a), that I agree with Mr Visser on the aspect of Mr Zeelie also falling under Section 20(2)(b) or (f), as far as his status as an employee of the State is concerned. The political objective, Mr Chairman, it was a counter-attack. That is not in dispute before this Committee. And on proportionality, it was not out of proportion in respect of the Vanderbijl Square bomb explosion and also taking into account the measures taken ...(intervention)

JUDGE DE JAGER: But it shouldn't be measured against the Vanderbijl Square incident, it should be measured against his own political objective.

MR ROSSOUW: Yes. Mr Chairman, but that is exactly the point.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Not against what the other party did, but against what he aimed to achieve, whether it was proportional to that.

MR ROSSOUW: Yes Mr Chairman, you'll remember I'm using the words specifically with reference to the Vanderbijl Square, as the General indicated, Gen Erasmus indicated - I'm using the Afrikaans word "They should be paid back in 'eie munt'". Now Mr Chairman, that's part of the, let's call it the instruction, so the proportionality in carrying out the order must also be taken into view with respect of the specific instance from which the instruction flowed. We know that there was a limpet mine used at Vanderbijl Square, there was a limpet mine used here, there wasn't a bigger device that was used, or a more extreme nature that was used. I'm using it specifically with reference to the instruction, Mr Chairman. But I submit, on proportionality as to what was to be achieved, Mr Chairman, in deterring and giving the message back to the ANC that these attacks cannot continue in the manner that you are continuing, that we will also take drastic measures, Mr Chairman, that was certainly not out of proportion, taking into account ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I suppose also, you know when you have two limpet mines in an enclosed place and there's 130 people, we don't know how many but a lot of people, and there's 13 or 19 people who are injured but not very seriously, one will then have to accept the evidence of Mr Zeelie that the bomb was placed with that in mind.

MR ROSSOUW: I would submit that, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Because otherwise one would have put it near the dance floor and killed maybe dozens of people and injured several dozens more.

MR ROSSOUW: Yes. Mr Chairman, his evidence in that regard is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Because it was room, it was a sort of enclosed room and they said they were the only people there at the time. Okay, as we said earlier, you can't discriminate with that sort thing, but one can infer that if the intention was to kill as many people as possible, it would have probably been put in a place, a different place, if that was possible.

MR ROSSOUW: Yes. I would submit that is exactly correct, Mr Chairman. Page 106 in volume 2, the plan of the layout, the floor plan of the Why Not Club, I think clearly indicates that as well, it backs up Mr Zeelie's evidence as an explosives expert.

Mr Chairman, those are my submissions and I would submit that your Committee can be satisfied that all the formal requirements have been complied with and that a full disclosure of all the material facts has been made and I would request you to consider granting amnesty to Mr Zeelie for the same as Mr Visser has mentioned. I'm stealing his thunder. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Rossouw. Mr Cornelius.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. Following the full legal argument by my colleagues I'm not going to burden the record with ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It's always best to argue third in line, isn't it?

MR CORNELIUS IN ARGUMENT: I will quite enjoy it, thank you Mr Chair.

On behalf of Mr van Heerden, it's clear that he was a footsoldier, he carried out the instruction of Capt Zeelie in all due respects, he complied fully with Section 20 of the Act, he complied with all the other requirements of the Act. His political motive is clearly stated in bundle 1 on page 29, which is basically what the other applicants are also saying. The contradictions that arose were cleared up in leading his evidence-in-chief. It is my submission that the annexed statements which was given to the Goldstone Commission, was drawn in a very brief manner in a short period of time. He cleared up the issue which I still say is not relevant, regarding the beard. And as far as Brig du Toit is concerned, he said: "Look, I can't remember, that's the way I recall the events, I presume it was him, but I might be wrong."

It's furthermore clear that he gained no financial bonus or any financial gain out of his actions. It is also further clear that he was a credible witness. As a matter of fact he quite impressed me. He came over very strongly, he was subjected to cross-examination by my learned colleague, Mr Visser, and I was impressed with his evidence. It is my submission that it is clear if you're going to make a credibility finding, that his evidence may be accepted. We can expect a certain loss of memory following a period of time, that can be expected, but it's also clear it's not of relevance ...(indistinct). And my submission is that he's entitled to be granted amnesty as prayed by my learned colleagues Mr Rossouw and Mr Visser.

As far as Mr Vermeulen is concerned, it's quite clear from all the evidence that he disassociated himself from this, he did not become involved, he did not enter the club ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we need really hear on Vermeulen, he's just asking for amnesty in respect of defeating the ends of justice. I don't think his evidence is in any respect, subject to what Mr Nyawuza might say, I don't think Mr Vermeulen, there's any dispute about his situation at all.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. Well that will then conclude my argument. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Nyawuza.

MR NYAWUZA ADDRESSES: Thank you, Mr Chair.

As I've stated in chambers, Chairperson, my instructions were not to oppose the applications by the applicants.

To some extent I would agree with my learned colleagues regarding their submissions during argument, that the applicants have indeed complied with the requirements of the sections that they're related to and I don't think there's anything that I can gainsay in whatever they've said. I leave it in the hands of the Committee to take the decision relating thereto. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Nyawuza. Ms Coleridge, do you have any submissions you'd like to make?

MS COLERIDGE IN ARGUMENT: Yes, thank you Chairperson.

Chairperson, it is very clear that both Generals memories are lacking in this instance, I don't know whether it's their memories or whether it's selective amnesia, as we sometimes call it, but the Generals basically couldn't give us any facts pertaining to the matter. The only help that Gen Erasmus could give us was at the Vanderbijlpark meeting, that he had made those submissions and Mr Zeelie had inferred that action was to be taken.

Mr Erasmus said he couldn't recall obviously, of the meetings, etcetera, etcetera, but he could recall one meeting that took place after the incident. None of the applicants, that is Zeelie and Van Heerden, could recall that meeting in his office. Van Heerden said it was not practice for subordinates to actually go and discuss something like this with the Generals and so forth, and that it would probably have occurred between Mr Zeelie and Gen Erasmus. So in that instance it seems that Gen Erasmus' memory is failing in that respect as well and that is the meeting in his office.

Mr van Heerden informs us that Gen du Toit as well as Gen Erasmus, as well as Gen Malherbe being at the Vanderbijl bus terminus incident, the second incident, that they were all present there. And it seems Mr van Heerden, his memory, he had quite a good memory in respect of this incident and that it ties in with Mr Zeelie's submissions that there was a subsequent meeting where Du Toit was present, Malherbe and Erasmus, at the Breweries. So it would follow, it seems that after the bus terminus incident, that those persons possibly could have still continued to liaise regarding this whole incident and their plans of action. And Mr Zeelie does also state that Mr Malherbe was also present at the Breweries. So his evidence in that respect, it kind of ties up, Chairperson, with the persons present at the bus terminus and the persons present at the Breweries.

Gen Erasmus couldn't really assist us much in forwarding to us whether there was the target and whether he agreed on the target and so forth. The fact that Mr Zeelie was involved in other incidents with the Generals, as well as in this instance, it seems that for a bomb blast of this kind of nature, it is a very serious attack and at a night-club there's normally a lot of people present ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well Mr Vermeulen classified it as a special operation, it wasn't just a sort of routine type of operation, that's why he disassociated himself from it because of the very nature of a special operation.

MS COLERIDGE: So it would follow Chairperson, that Gen Erasmus would actually take this matter very seriously and that he probably wanted to carry forth with his plan as to revenge or just to get back at the persons that were responsible for the other attacks. So the version of Mr Zeelie, it's quite possible that it could have occurred in that way, Chairperson.

In relation to Gen du Toit, he denied that he was present at the bus terminus, at that bomb explosion, Zeelie and Van Heerden place him there at that instance, Chairperson. He further denies that he knew anything of the bomb explosion, but then in his supplementary affidavit which they furnished to us during the course of yesterday, he says that he could have known about it but he's not sure, but yet he also stated, which is contradictory in terms of his evidence, that he didn't know about the bomb explosion, he didn't know it was the Why Not bomb, that it was that club and so forth. So it's difficult to actually marry the two. I don't know if it's a memory loss or what it could be, or whether he just wants to disassociate himself with the target, or knowing of the target, Chairperson.

And then the fact that he goes to the incident and obviously as Mr van Heerden has stated, Mr Zeelie's car was a well known car and that Van Heerden always worked with Zeelie and that Du Toit was probably aware of that. And it's probable that Mr du Toit actually went up to the car, being strange that someone sitting in the car, maybe he could have been looking for Zeelie or, but strange that Van Heerden would sitting in the car and it would be a natural, as the Commander of that branch, that Security Branch, to say: "You better be under cover" because it could be possible that he knew about the incident. As he well said, he admitted it's possible that he could have known about it. So it's possible that he could have told Van Heerden to grow a beard, for instance, and that he'd known about this incident and ...(intervention)

JUDGE DE JAGER: But on Van Heerden's own evidence we have to accept that Du Toit didn't tell him to grow a beard, otherwise we must say that he committed perjury.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what you're saying is that in normal, as Mr Visser said, in normal circumstances if he didn't know about the explosion or the implication of the police in the explosion, he would have gone to Van Heerden and said: "Now why aren't you investigating, go and investigate, what are you doing sitting in the car?" The mere fact that he didn't say that might indicate that he did know about the bombing before, and he himself says well he may have known about it before.

MS COLERIDGE: This is exactly the point that we have with the problems regarding their memories, Chairperson. And as I have stated, Mr van Heerden in his amnesty applications, in both his submissions to the Commission, he kept on saying that Du Toit was the person and only because of their fading memories he conceded that it's possible that it was somebody else that said: "You have to grow a beard."

JUDGE DE JAGER: He didn't say because of my wrong memory, he said: "I've made a mistake." It's not a question of not remembering. He testified that he's made a mistake, it was in fact not Du Toit, it was in fact Victor who instructed him to grow a beard.

MS COLERIDGE: It's possible. I take your point, Judge de Jager, but that's the only part, the link that in my mind still leaves a problem in a sense. I take your point.

The other fact regarding Gen du Toit is that it seems that he wants his bread buttered on both sides, in the sense that he's saying: "I could have known about the incident", but then he also states: "But I didn't know about it, I didn't know it was the Why Not bomb blast, I didn't know that it was the target" and so forth, Chairperson. It is clear that he never gave instructions to any of the other applicants, as Gen Erasmus has admitted and that has taken responsibility for that. And the fact that Gen Erasmus had spoken to him after the incident and that's when he ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Just on that, if one just confines to the evidence of the Generals, just let's do that just for argument's sake and take Gen Erasmus' evidence, he says: "Look we had a discussion at Vanderbijl Square, I said look it's high time we should take revenge, I'm sick and tired", etcetera, etcetera, "are there any targets?" Then he expects Capt Zeelie to come back to him. He only accepts after he learns of the bombing, that what he said could have been interpreted as an order or an instruction, but in his own mind, before the bombing took place he was expecting Zeelie to come back and say: "Look here, these are the possible targets. Okay, let's go for this one." So if he, with that frame of mind, saying he's expecting Zeelie to come back, he hasn't actually given an order, although he later accepts that it might have been interpreted as being an order. If he spoke to Gen du Toit before the explosion, he wouldn't have said: "Well look, I've ordered that a place be blown up", he would have said: "Look I've asked Zeelie to go and get some info and come back to me." You know what I mean. So there wasn't an expectation, they didn't expect it to happen.

MS COLERIDGE: I take your point, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So any knowledge that Gen du Toit would have had from, on Gen Erasmusí versions ...(intervention)

MS COLERIDGE: Full knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: That's why I'm restricting it to that. ... it wouldn't have been an expectation that a bomb would take place that night.

MS COLERIDGE: I take your point, Chairperson, and I shall leave it at that. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Well we'll reserve our decision in this matter. I'd like to thank all the legal representatives for their assistance in the matter and we'll hand down a decision as soon as possible. The decision will not be along outstanding one because we've got a limited lifespan, which we'll be talking actually weeks, not years and months. We'll reserve the judgment. Yes, thank you.

Should we adjourn now and then reconvene, or ...?

MS COLERIDGE: Can we adjourn for five minutes, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you. All rise.






--------------------------------------------------------------------------ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: We commence with the hearing of the amnesty application of Kimpani Peter Mogoai. Mr Mogoai, before we start, I don't think you were here yesterday when I introduced the Panel, I'll just briefly introduce the Panel. On my right is Judge de Jager, he's an acting Judge, he's a Member of the Amnesty Committee, he comes from Pretoria. On my left is Advocate Sigodi, she's also a Member of the Amnesty Committee, she comes from Port Elizabeth. And I'm Selwyn Miller, I'm a Judge and I come from Umtata, I'm also a member of the Amnesty Committee.

At this stage I'd just like to ask the legal representatives to kindly place themselves on record.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman. My name is Fanie Rossouw from the firm Rooth and Wessels and I'm representing Mr Peter Mogoai. Mr Chairman, I would just like to bring to your attention that in the Formula 1 world, racing world I would be the spare car at this stage, I'm standing in for Mr Lamey who really consulted with Mr Mogoai and I would just like you to take note of that fact as far as the leading of the evidence is concerned.

CHAIRPERSON: We will bear with you, Mr Rossouw, and we thank you for standing in.

MR ROSSOUW: I'm indebted to you.

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you, Chairperson. My name is Brian Koopedi, I appear here on behalf of the victims in this application, one being Jerome Joseph Maake and Sylvie Mavuso.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Koopedi.

MS COLERIDGE: Lynne Coleridge, acting on behalf of the TRC. Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Rossouw.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman. I would then call Mr Mogoai and Mr Chairman, he would like to give his evidence in Tswana. I believe there's an interpreter.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, we have an interpreter.

KIMPANI PETER MOGOAI: (sworn states)

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Chairman, can we make the following arrangement, that I start with the assault of Mr Maake at Tzaneen and thereafter the abduction of MK Bab? Would that be the order?

CHAIRPERSON: I think that sounds reasonable. Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: I agree, Chairperson, that sounds reasonable.



EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Mogoai, you are an applicant for amnesty in this matter and the formal part of your amnesty application is that contained on pages 1, 2 through 5 of the bundle, and is that your signature on page 5?

CHAIRPERSON: The question put to you Mr Mogoai, is pages 1 to 5 in the bundle, is that your amnesty application, and on page 5, is that your signature?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The answer was affirmative to your previous questions.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, I'm indebted to you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Mogoai, then your amnesty application has also been supplemented and the supplementary portion is contained on page 6 through pages 19, and is that your signature on page 19?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, that's my signature.

MR ROSSOUW: Now I want you to - for the background I just want to ask you, do you confirm the background to your involvement with the operations of the Security Branch, as set out on page 12, 13 and to the middle of page 14, paragraph 2.9, do you confirm that?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Basically, Mr Mogoai, what is contained there is that you were a trained MK member and you were recruited to work for the South African Police, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is so, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Now Mr Mogoai, I want you then to deal with the assault on a detainee in Tzaneen in 1983, we know now that it's a person by the name of Mr Maake. Now can you tell this Committee, in 1983, how did it come about that you were working in the Tzaneen, Northern Transvaal area?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, was it '83 or '82? Why I ask is, perhaps we can deal with it at this stage, we were handed an affidavit by the Evidence Leader from one Jacob Badenhorst, do you have a copy of that? I think in that one he says that during 1970 to '82 he was attached to the Security Branch and then he left the police and then he only came back in 1990, but he remembers the incident in Tzaneen. So by implication it would seem - I don't know whether it's '82 or '83, but ...

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I believe it should be '82, if you have regard to page 30 of the bundle, which is the extract of the criminal court case against the applicant, you'll note that the assault took place on 13 September 1982.

CHAIRPERSON: '82, yes, so we'll change that to '82. And then would it be convenient just at this stage to mark this affidavit of Jacob Badenhorst as Exhibit A. Yes thank you. Sorry, Mr Rossouw.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Mogoai, now can you tell the Committee how did it come about that you were working in the Tzaneen area in September 1982.

MR MOGOAI: In short I would say we were a group of three members - I beg your pardon, five members, we were working under Capt Vermeulen.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, who was Capt Vermeulen, which division was he attached to?

MR MOGOAI: He was Sectional Commander in Vlakplaas. We left Vlakplaas and we were deployed in Northern Province, where we were supposed to work there and trace members of MK. On a particular day we were called, Capt Vermeulen told us - it was myself, W/O Letsatsi and Mfalapitsa, that we should go to Tzaneen Police Station. It was in the afternoon. When we arrived there around 7 o'clock to 8 o'clock, though I'm not able to recall, it was dark, we entered into a particular office, a certain person was brought, he was tied. We were requested to interrogate him about his association, his association or his activities in regard to ANC and MK.

We interrogated that person but he denied all. During the interrogation there was a time where we began to assault him. No-one instructed us to assault him ...(intervention)

MR MOGOAI: Can you just repeat that name? Who instructed you to assault him?


CHAIRPERSON: No-one, oh.

INTERPRETER: No-one instructed us to assault him but we just started to.

MR MOGOAI: During that interrogation we started assaulting him.

CHAIRPERSON: And how did you assault him?

MR MOGOAI: With fists and by kicking him.

He denied that he did not have any association with the ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe. We were instructed to leave him. We left Capt Vermeulen there and we went out. The following day, Capt Vermeulen informed us that the Security Commander in Tzaneen was not happy about that assault to that particular person during the interrogation, but that issue was just left that way.

After some time, I don't remember when, we were called to Tzaneen Police Station to come for an identity parade. This person was able to identify us. After that there was a prosecution. In court we were told to dispute that we took part in the assault during the interrogation.

CHAIRPERSON: Who told you that?

MR MOGOAI: That's Capt Vermeulen.

During the court case we were not found guilty. That's how I remember.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Rossouw. Mr Mogoai, this assault - before we proceed, was the person that you assaulted, Mr Maake?

MR MOGOAI: Please repeat the question.

CHAIRPERSON: Was the person you assaulted, Mr Maake?

MR MOGOAI: I did not know his name. I don't know him.

CHAIRPERSON: But when you were charged and he was giving evidence didn't you learn who the Complainant was? In the Magistrate's Court case?

MR MOGOAI: I'm not able to recall Chairperson, the name of the person.

CHAIRPERSON: The assault, was it a serious assault? Was the person injured, did it last long, were there many hits, were they severe, were they hard? Just give us some idea of the nature and the severity of the assault.

MR MOGOAI: I assaulted him just on the stomach, because he's a tall person and others, I saw him taking him on the head.

CHAIRPERSON: Was blood drawn ...(indistinct - no microphone)? Was he knocked unconscious?

MR MOGOAI: He did not faint but he had some blood on the face. And then again what I wanted to explain clearly, it is a little bit difficult to explain as to whether, or to explain the injuries he sustained at that time because I was not able to observe them.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Mogoai, now you say that the assault started spontaneously during the questioning of this person, you didn't receive an instruction from anybody to start to assault the person, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Did you feel that it was expected of you to assault him?

MR MOGOAI: I'd put it this way. During those times Vlakplaas people were regarded as people who should force or to dig the truth out of a person in any other method. So those kinds of assaults were usual or were used, were part of the culture used by Vlakplaas members in interrogating people.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Mogoai, you've also testified before the Amnesty Committee in other applications where you were part of units of Vlakplaas, that assault was used as a method of gaining information and that you partook in these assaults, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Mogoai, the person that you've mentioned who informed you that the person that was arrested, the detainee, was presumably an MK member, can you remember who that was? Who informed you so?

MR MOGOAI: I don't remember that person who informed us, but in many cases if we were told about a particular person, that person would be Capt Vermeulen. Even in this instance I think it's Mr Vermeulen who informed us that that person was regarded, or known as an MK member.

MR ROSSOUW: You then also say in your amnesty application that you were told to question the detainee as to his MK activities, can you remember who told you to question him on that aspect?

MR MOGOAI: It's Capt Vermeulen.

MR ROSSOUW: Was he present throughout the interrogation?

MR MOGOAI: Yes, Chairperson, he was present.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Was Vermeulen in fact the person in charge of the unit, your unit being there, the members of the Security Police? Was he the senior officer amongst you?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Chairperson, he was our Sectional Commander in Vlakplaas. He used to go with us when we are deployed.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Mogoai, then you also testified that during the criminal court case where you were charged with the assault of Mr Maake, you were told to lie, who told you to do that?

MR MOGOAI: It's Capt Vermeulen.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Mogoai, I'm not going to deal with this in a great length, I just want you to have a look at page 17 of your amnesty application setting out the political background, the political aim to be achieved with the questioning and the use of force, assault in this instance. Do you confirm the correctness of what is written there on page 17?

MR MOGOAI: I do, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And you've already testified that you received instructions from Capt Vermeulen. Were you paid a bonus or received any benefit from your participation in this assault?

MR MOGOAI: No, Chairperson, I did not receive any special remuneration.

MR ROSSOUW: Did you act in any personal malice towards Mr Maake, or were you just doing your job?

MR MOGOAI: I was doing my official duties, because I did not know him.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that's ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Just before you move to the next incident, this Exhibit A is an affidavit from Jacob Badenhorst who says that he was an officer at the Tzaneen Police Station and he received notice as an implicated person, he said that he was aware that an assault had taken place, that he was upset about that and that he in fact caused charges to be laid. That's basically what the contents of that affidavit is.

MR ROSSOUW: Yes I think, Mr Chairman, that as far as him being implicated is concerned, that would flow from paragraph 2 on page 15, where I think the specific person that was mentioned by the applicant as the person who informed them that this was an MK member and then flowing from that Mr Chairman, to the instruction to interrogate and I've cleared that up in evidence. The applicant has stated it was Capt Vermeulen.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it came from Vermeulen and not from Badenhorst, yes. Thank you. I think it's probably better to carry on with the next, or do you want to deal with them, compartmentalise them?

MR KOOPEDI: I think it would be appropriate to let him finish first.

CHAIRPERSON: I think carry on with the next incident, then Mr Koopedi and Ms Coleridge can ask questions in respect of both.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you.

Now Mr Mogoai, the next incident that you are applying for amnesty is contained on page 18 and further, 18 and 19 of the bundle and substantial further particulars were also supplied in response to questions by the Investigating Unit of the Amnesty Committee. That is contained in pages 23 to 28. Now Mr Mogoai, can you inform the Committee, as far as the abduction of the MK member Bab is concerned, did you know this person, Mr Bab, before he was abducted from Mozambique?

MR MOGOAI: Chairperson, I knew Bab from 1977 in Botswana. I left with him in Botswana as newly recruits to Angola. I trained with him and I left in Novakateng in Angola. When I returned I was in Botswana when I returned in the Republic of South Africa. I met him again in 1981. Both of us were based in Zeerust under Capt Vermeulen. Then he introduced him to us, then I told them that I knew this person and I was with him in training.

He was cuffed when Capt Vermeulen introduced to us, then he informed us he was abducted from Mozambique. He was captured by the South African Defence Force in Mozambique. I did not know as to whether they've completed his interrogation, but I was informed that I should talk with Bab so that he will be able to cooperate with us, to assist the South African Police to trace MK members in the Republic.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Mogoai, were you involved in the abduction of MK Bab from Mozambique?

MR MOGOAI: I did not know how it came about that he was in South Africa. I did not know who went to Mozambique and I did not know who abducted him, I only saw him inside.

MR ROSSOUW: Now where did you hear, or who informed you that it was in fact the South African Defence Force who abducted him from Mozambique?

MR MOGOAI: It's Bab who told me.

MR ROSSOUW: Now at the place in Western Transvaal, at Zeerust when you discussed this with MK Bab, was he assaulted, was he threatened or was he in any way physically, harm done to him?

MR MOGOAI: When he arrived he was leg-cuffed and handcuffed, but he was not injured, he was normal, without any sign of injuries.

MR ROSSOUW: And what were you supposed to do with him when he arrived there?

MR MOGOAI: I was supposed to recruit him to work with the South African Police.

MR ROSSOUW: And did you - you testified that he was not interested in doing that.

MR MOGOAI: Not at all, Chairperson, he did not have a desire to work with the South African Police.

MR ROSSOUW: Did you report that to anybody that he could not be recruited?

MR MOGOAI: I informed Capt Vermeulen.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Mogoai, just before you go on, just a small point. You keep calling him Capt Vermeulen, I see on page 18 you refer to him as Col Vermeulen, is this Snor Vermeulen we're talking about, who is a Warrant Officer, or a different Vermeulen? Was he a Captain or a Colonel, do you know? Not that it's that important.

MR MOGOAI: I'd respond in this way, I knew him as Koos Vermeulen. Initially in 1980 he was a Lieutenant and after some time he became a Captain, then after some time he became a Major, then after he became a Colonel. I forgot when he was a Captain and when he was a Colonel and when he was a Major.

CHAIRPERSON: Probably, just probably, in 1981 he was then probably still a Captain. Probably not a Colonel.

MR MOGOAI: It is possible, Chairperson, that he was still a Captain.

CHAIRPERSON: But it's Koos Vermeulen.

MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson, if I can just be of assistance here, his full name is Johannes Stephanus Vermeulen.


MS COLERIDGE: Known as Koos Vermeulen.


MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Now Mr Mogoai, during the time that you had to recruit MK Bab, did you also guard him? Where did you keep him, what measures did you take that he could not escape?

MR MOGOAI: We were sleeping together in one bedroom. We were staying at an old farmhouse. In one room Capt Vermeulen was sleeping and in the one room I was sleeping with MK Bab, together with others. I was sleeping with MK Bab in one room and all the time he was cuffed, at all times.

CHAIRPERSON: The whole time that you were ...(inaudible) maltreated at all, other than being cuffed, was he assaulted at all?

MR MOGOAI: No, Chairperson, I do not want to lie, he was not maltreated.

MR ROSSOUW: Now Mr Mogoai, I want you now to deal with what happened to MK Bab, when did you see him for the last time?

MR MOGOAI: I don't remember, Chairperson, I'm not sure as to whether it was after a week or one and a half weeks. After some time Capt Vermeulen took him with, then he returned after two days, but I don't know what happened to him.

MR ROSSOUW: Did Capt Vermeulen return alone, on his own?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Chairperson, he returned alone.

MR ROSSOUW: And did you ask him what happened to MK Bab?

MR MOGOAI: No, Chairperson, I did not.

MR ROSSOUW: Why not?

MR MOGOAI: It was not part of the standing order to ask questions of what happened to a particular person.

CHAIRPERSON: And you never saw Bab again?

MR MOGOAI: Till today, Chairperson, I haven't seen him.

CHAIRPERSON: You never heard of him being in existence again since then?

MR MOGOAI: Recently I learnt from the newspaper that his remains were exhumed by TRC officials. I don't know as to whether that is the person or not.

MR ROSSOUW: Now Mr Mogoai, you are applying for the offence as an accessory after the fact to kidnapping and the illegal detention of this person called MK Bab. Your instructions to guard this person and to try and recruit him, you received that from Captain or Colonel Vermeulen, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: Correct, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And that was your duty as a so-called askari at Vlakplaas, to identify other MK members and to try and recruit them.

MR MOGOAI: I would explain shortly that I did not know the nature of my work, I was just told that we should trace members of the MK whom we knew, then thereafter we were given certain duties like guarding people who were detained and again try to recruit MK members to join the South African Police. But in any way that is the work I was given to do, I had to do it.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Mogoai, did you know that C1, Unit C1, Vlakplaas, was specifically tasked to, as you call it chase(?) MK members and to either eliminate them or to recruit them to work for the Security Force? That was the task of your unit.

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Now in that regard, can you have a look at page 19 at your political objective with your involvement in this matter, the guarding of this person, do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR MOGOAI: I do, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Chairperson, that's the evidence-in-chief.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Rossouw. Mr Koopedi, do you have any questions you'd like to put to the applicant?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Very few questions, Chairperson.

Mr Mogoai, I hear from your evidence and a I also see from your application form that you were at some stage a member of the ANC, now when did you join the ANC and where?

MR MOGOAI: I joined the ANC in Botswana in 1977.

MR KOOPEDI: And why did you join the ANC?

MR MOGOAI: It is because I was against the them government.

MR KOOPEDI: And what made you change your mind, in terms of you being against the then government?

MR MOGOAI: It is because of the conditions at the ANC camps in exile.

MR KOOPEDI: Okay. Now when did you become an askari?

MR MOGOAI: In 1979.

MR KOOPEDI: And for how many years did you work as an askari?

MR MOGOAI: I worked as an askari until 1989.

MR KOOPEDI: Now in that number of years, in 10 years, were you only involved in - I see there are four instances enumerated on page 11, now I want to know if you were only involved in four gross human rights violations for that entire period, or are there any other gross human rights violations that you were involved in?

MR MOGOAI: These are the only ones that I remember.

MR KOOPEDI: Only the four? Now when you were called to the office, the police office in Tzaneen, what were you actually called to come and do? Were you called to come and identify this person or were you called to come and interrogate this person?

MR MOGOAI: I did not know why I was called to the police station, so when we arrived there they told us that there was a person who had been detained and we should interrogate him about his activities and his association with the MK, or his relationship with the ANC.

MR KOOPEDI: Now this interrogation, what does it really entail, does it entail asking of questions, or does it entail asking of questions and assaulting at the same time? What does it entail?

MR MOGOAI: It entailed asking questions so that we could get more information about the other members of MK.

MR KOOPEDI: And when you asked these questions did he answer you?

MR MOGOAI: Yes, he did.

MR KOOPEDI: And why was there a need to assault him if he had answered you?

MR MOGOAI: He was not giving us answers that we wanted out of him.

MR KOOPEDI: So there were specific answers that you wanted from him?

MR MOGOAI: Yes, Chairperson, we wanted to know whether he was the member of the MK.

MR KOOPEDI: What was his response to that?

MR MOGOAI: He denied.

MR KOOPEDI: Did you have any reason to believe that he was a member of MK then?

MR MOGOAI: Well I did not have any reason because I did not know the circumstances surrounding his detention. Those people who arrested him were the people who thought that there were reasons to believe that he was associated or he was a member of the MK or the ANC.

MR KOOPEDI: Okay. Now the people you were with, when last did you see Ephraim Mfalapitsa, W/O Letsatsi and Koos Vermeulen?

MR MOGOAI: I do not remember, it's a long time ago, because I left the Vlakplaas in 1992, so I think the last time I saw them was in 1991. But I think I left C1 in 1988 or 1989, I'm not sure about the exact date. I haven't seen them since.

MR KOOPEDI: Have you ever discussed, perhaps telephonically with them or anyone representing them about this current amnesty application and the fact that you implicate them in your application?

MR MOGOAI: No, Chair. I would explain this way, when they came to fetch one of the people who came to fetch me said that Mr Letsatsi had said that I have mentioned his name in my application form, but personally I haven't spoken to Mr Letsatsi since, together with Capt Vermeulen and Mr Mfalapitsa.

MR KOOPEDI: Do you have any idea why the three did not apply for amnesty in this matter?

MR MOGOAI: No, Chair, I do not know. I did this because I wanted to reveal what I know about this incident, so that I can continue with my normal life. I actually wanted to reveal everything that I took part in. I don't know what they feel about this.

MR KOOPEDI: And perhaps finally on this issue, there's something I need to understand. Your actions when you assaulted Mr Maake, were you actions politically motivated or you were just carrying on with your duties, you were just doing your job?

MR MOGOAI: Chairperson, I would say firstly it was part of my duty and secondly, I was personally against the organisation to which I once belonged. I would these two reasons encouraged me to do what I did.

MR KOOPEDI: Okay. Now on Mr Mavuso, who's been called MK Bab, when he was with you - for what period, for how long were you with him?

MR MOGOAI: Do you mean the first time that I met with him at Zeerust, till the time he was taken away by Capt Vermeulen?

CHAIRPERSON: He's not talking about from when you were with him in Botswana and went to Angola, from after he was captured in Mozambique, yes, that time that you saw him at that farmhouse how long were you with him?

MR MOGOAI: I would say it could be a week or eight days to nine days, I cannot recall.

MR KOOPEDI: During that period, did you ever assault him?

MR MOGOAI: No, I did not, nobody assaulted him. He was never assaulted, Chair. Actually, the difference between myself and him was that I was now a member of the South African Police and he was arrested and he was not yet a member of the SAP, but we still had a very good relationship stemming from the time we were still in exile. There were no hard feelings between ourselves, myself and him.

MR KOOPEDI: Now do you know of any gross human rights violation that occurred to him during that period? It may not be assault, any form of a gross violation of human rights.

MR MOGOAI: Not when he was with me at the farmhouse.

CHAIRPERSON: Save that we know that he was probably, it seems like he was kept there against his will, in that he was handcuffed he was essentially a prisoner and I don't know if it can be classified as lawful detention in those circumstances. But that's the sort of thing that maybe Mr Mogoai would be unaware about, it's a law point.

MR KOOPEDI: I intended to perhaps proceed along those line with Mr Mogoai.

Now do you know who cuffed Mr Mavuso?

MR MOGOAI: No, I don't know, when I arrived there he was already cuffed. He was cuffed from the time he arrived there, he was cuffed with a chain. They used the chain to cuff his hands to his feet with one chain.

MR KOOPEDI: Now you were a member of the police at that stage, you were carrying on your duties and you were guarding an arrested person, you were told and you also have certain proof that this person fought against the government, now what wrong did you do to this person, or by being there when he was arrested, in your own view what wrong did you commit?

MR MOGOAI: I would explain it this way. The only wrong that I did to him, my conscience told me that this person together with other trained MK people, I felt that I was betraying him and other people by leaving them in exile and joining the then government. That his how I felt at that time. That was my conscience then.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, I have no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Koopedi. Ms Coleridge, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MS COLERIDGE: No questions, thank you Chairperson.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Rossouw, do you have any re-examination?

MR ROSSOUW: I have no re-examination, Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Judge de Jager, do you have any questions?

JUDGE DE JAGER: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Sigodi, do you have any questions?

ADV SIGODI: Just a few, Chair.

Whilst you were with MK Bab, I'm just going up on what Mr Koopedi asked you about gross violations of human rights, was he given food regularly?

MR MOGOAI: Yes, when he wanted food we would go and buy for him from the cafe. I would always ask him what he would like to eat and he would tell me and I'd go and buy it. He was also a smoker, we used to smoke together. He was fed regularly and we would remove the chain when he wanted to bathe.

ADV SIGODI: And when he left with Vermeulen, was he in a healthy condition?

MR MOGOAI: Yes, Chairperson, he was healthy. I did not notice anything.

JUDGE DE JAGER: Flowing from that, you said the chain was removed, who removed the chain when he wanted to bath?

MR MOGOAI: I do not remember well, because there was someone in our group whom I have forgotten his name, it could be Capt Letsatsi or someone else, because I did not understand those chains properly.

JUDGE DE JAGER: You didn't have a key for the cuffs?

MR MOGOAI: No, I did not have them, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Just very briefly Mr Mogoai, when Mr Maake was being assaulted, you say Vermeulen was present? In the same room.

MR MOGOAI: Yes, he was present, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he assault as well?

MR MOGOAI: Yes, he's the person who started assaulting him.

CHAIRPERSON: So the assault upon the victim was committed by four people, yourself, the other two askaris plus Vermeulen?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Any questions arising Mr Rossouw?

MR ROSSOUW: No questions, Mr Chairman.


MR KOOPEDI: Nothing thank you.

MR MOGOAI: Mr Chairman, I want to say something.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes certainly Mr Mogoai, if you want to say something, please be free to do so.

MR MOGOAI: I would request that if Mr Maake is present here I would wish to ask him to pardon me for what I did to him, with all my heart. I want him to know that what I did to him was not because I liked what I did. I do not want to put the blame on somebody, I blame myself for what I did, because I think I took a wrong decision by injuring or trying to injure one of my people. So Mr Maake, before this Committee I would ask you to pardon me. I thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mogoai.


CHAIRPERSON: No further witnesses for the applicant?

MR ROSSOUW: I have no further witnesses.


MR KOOPEDI: There will be no evidence led on behalf of the victims.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Koopedi. Ms Coleridge, no further witnesses?

MS COLERIDGE: No, Chairperson.


MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson, just for the record I just want to mention that Mr Mavuso's next-of-kin is Philile Mavuso, P-h-i-l-i-l-e.

CHAIRPERSON: And what relationship is that, do you know? A sister, mother, wife, daughter?

MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson, in the acknowledgement of receipt it says sister and then it's scratched out, so I ...

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, but the next-of-kin.

MS COLERIDGE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Coleridge. Submissions, Mr Rossouw?

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, unless there's anything that the Committee specifically wishes me to address you on, the only ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Let's find out what the attitude of the victims are. Mr Koopedi, is there opposition or what?

MR KOOPEDI ADDRESSES: No, Chairperson, there is no opposition in as far as the one incident is concerned, that is the assault on Maake. Mr Maake is present and he has instructed me not to oppose amnesty but to ask certain questions to be able to understand and know the applicant. I am also not sure what this Committee will be able to do in terms of making any recommendations or anything of the nature with regards to the people who did not apply for amnesty. I indicated to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well we know they of course are exposed to prosecution, but ... yes, although two of them might raise the defence autrefois acqui, but there might be other offences such as perjury.

MR KOOPEDI: That is indeed so Chairperson, I had said to the applicant that I will just raise this matter. And that is it with the first incident.

Now with the second incident, Chairperson, my instructions are not to oppose amnesty, but however I sit in a situation where I believe that this applicant has done no wrong, this applicant has not abducted MK Bab, he has not killed MK Bab, he did not handcuff him, he at all times gave him food, they smoked together.

CHAIRPERSON: There's no offence or delict.

MR KOOPEDI: My submission Chairperson, is that there's no offence and therefore there is no application in that regard.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I think then let us hear Mr Rossouw on that aspect.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I never thought that I would have to convince you of an offence that was committed. Mr Chairman ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No we're in an unusual situation where we've got many occasions at these proceedings with legal representatives arguing that their client did commit an offence, as opposed to them normally fighting for the innocence of their clients.

MR ROSSOUW ADDRESSES: Mr Chairman, my submissions to you in that regard, as far as the being an accessory after the fact is concerned, we know that Mr Bab, Mr Mavuso, informed the applicant that he was abducted. Now stemming from that abduction, Mr Chairman, the technical word or the technical meaning of abduction would be to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well normally, - I don't think we must get too technical, because unless it's changed since I was at university, abduction normally related to the taking away of young children out of the control of their parents without the permission of the parents for some intention. That was abduction, as opposed to kidnapping. The Act talks about abduction, but I'm sure they don't talk about it in that strict definition, criminal definition, they talk about it in - taken against his will.

MR ROSSOUW: Against his will, yes Mr Chairman. Now it's been continued with the detention. The applicant knew about this, because he was informed. To some extent Mr Chairman, I submit that at least there is some evidence to lead you to the conclusion that this was perpetuated, the abduction was perpetuated because the applicant knew about it and his actions would actually perpetuate that. Now Mr Chairman, that brings us to another question, but wouldn't this now technically be the wrongful detention? I submit that there's a grey area here where both offences would be applicable. The simple fact of the matter is Mr Chairman, he was not arrested in the normal sense, he was not charged, he was not held under any security regulations ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And he was captured, if we can use that word, out of the jurisdiction of the police in another country.

MR ROSSOUW: That's correct, Mr Chairman, that would be Ephraim's situation, yes. So I would submit at the very least there's unlawful detention here and it's for those two instances that we are applying. It might be a legal argument and the applicant might not be in a position to fully have explained it.

CHAIRPERSON: It's getting a bit technical now, it's a technical type of ... at bets a very technical type of offence.

MR ROSSOUW: Well lawyers are a little cautious, Mr Chairman. Those are my submissions as far as the incident of Mr Mavuso is concerned. Unless there's anything specific as far as Mr Maake is concerned, I submit that amnesty should be granted Mr Chairman, for those offences detailed in the application, specifically perjury and assault. Mr Chairman, using a clenched fist, that would mean with the intent of doing serious bodily harm, and those would be the offences.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, do you wish to say anything now?

MR KOOPEDI: No, Chairperson, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Coleridge?

MS COLERIDGE: No, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, we'll reserve our decision in this matter and once again I'd like to thank you, Mr Rossouw and Mr Koopedi, Ms Coleridge, for your assistance in this matter. Is that then the end of the roll, Ms Coleridge?

MS COLERIDGE: Unfortunately Chairperson, it is.

CHAIRPERSON: That then brings us to the end of this series of hearings, we'll be resuming in Pretoria on Monday with the next hearings.

I would at this stage just like to thank everybody concerned in these hearings for their assistance, the Interpreters in particular for the work they have done, the cameraman, the sound engineers and the caterers, Mr Japhta, Molly, everybody concerned in making these hearings possible. We've finished three days ahead of schedule, for which we are grateful. We can now carry doing outstanding decisions. Thank you very much indeed.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, Chairperson. All rise.