DAY: 2


MR MOERANE: With the Chairperson's permission I call to the stand Msomi.

AUDWAY QONDA MSOMI: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR MOERANE: Thank you Chairperson.

Mr Msomi, how old are you?

MR MSOMI: I'm 35.

MR MOERANE: And where do you reside?

MR MSOMI: I reside at Lamontville, 57 ...(indistinct) Street.

MR MOERANE: You are applying for amnesty in respect of certain acts. Is it correct that you were one of the accused persons in the matter of State vs Buthelezi?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: In that matter you were accused number 6?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: You were charged with various offences under the Terrorism Provision of Internal Security Act, amongst which were being a member of the African National Congress?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: Right. Chairperson, this will be annexure F, page 50 of bundle 2.

It was also alleged in the indictment that in or about November 1985 you took the following items to Umgababa. Two VZ25 sub-machine guns, ...(indistinct), a remote control device, a block of TNT, a silencer for an AK-47 machine rifle, one electrical detonator, three electronic timing devices, one TM57 land mine and detonator, two books on explosives and other items were removed from a dead letter box which you had established?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: It was also alleged in paragraph 4 ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, when you say that is correct, are you saying it's correct that that was alleged in the indictment or it's correct that that happened?

MR MSOMI: It's correct that it happened.

MR MOERANE: In other words both that it's alleged in the indictment and that it actually happened?


MR MOERANE: Yes and is it correct that it is alleged in the indictment that you were trained by one Stan in the use of the firearms, explosives and explosive devices?


MR MOERANE: And did that happen?

MR MSOMI: Yes it did happen.

MR MOERANE: It's also alleged on page 52, paragraph 9, that in or about November 1985 that at or near Umgababa you established and/or assisted in the establishment of a dead letter box which contain a cache of arms consisting of the following: One VZ25 sub-machine gun, three loaded magazines for the sub-machine gun, one belt, two lamps, detonating fuse, one 200 gram block of TNT, one TM57 land mine, three detonators for a TM57 land mine, one remote control charge, one time switch, 22 electrical detonators?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: And did you in fact establish the dead letter box containing those items?


CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt again? It appears - it may only be superficial this, both these events happened in November 1985, paragraph 3 and 9, and a great many of the arms that you put into the dead letter box appear to be similar to the arms you yourself took to Umgababa, is that correct?

MR MSOMI: That is correct, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: And you got a few more?

MR MSOMI: Yes, some of them were additional to the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Because there were more detonators, for example?


CHAIRPERSON: And one of the sub-machine guns disappeared somewhere?

MR MSOMI: Yes indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: But the others are what you brought?

MR MSOMI: Yes, the others are what I brought.

MR MOERANE: Is it correct that you were convicted of those offences? Is it correct that you were convicted?

MR MSOMI: Yes that is correct.

MR MOERANE: And is it correct that the particulars of your conviction as they appear from page 248 up to 250 of bundle 2 are correct?

MR MSOMI: Yes indeed.

MR MOERANE: What sentence did you receive?

MR MSOMI: A sentence to 9 years imprisonment.

MR MOERANE: And what part of that sentence did you serve?

MR MSOMI: I served 4 years of it and then we were indemnified but all in all I've served six years imprisonment, that is including Section 29 detention.

MR MOERANE: You spent six years in custody?


MR MOERANE: Yes. Is it correct that you are also applying for amnesty in respect of certain incidents which appear in bundle 1? These being incidents number 8?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: That being alleged that on the 27th September 1985 and at O K Bazaars, West Street, two mini-limpet mines exploded?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: You are also applying for indemnity in respect of incident number 9 wherein it is alleged that on the same day in Durban, at Game Discount World a limpet mine was exploded?

MR MSOMI: Yes indeed.

MR MOERANE: Now please tell the Honourable Committee about your involvement in these two incidents?

MR MSOMI: During that period of September I was the commander of the unit which consisted of Thuso Tshika and Bafungu. I was instructed, specifically instructed by Belgium, that we have to carry some operation in solidarity with the workers, that they were fighting for their living wages. During that period there was a dispute between the retained workers and the management. So I called the unit and I conveyed a message that was from Belgium that we're supposed to carry those operations between O K Bazaar and Game and the operation or the instruction were executed as they were ordered to us.

MR MOERANE: Who is or was Belgium?

MR MSOMI: Belgium is also Mduduzi Sithole.

MR MOERANE: What was he in the scheme of things?

MR MSOMI: Belgium I think - Mduduzi Sithole in the evidence that has been given by Dr Ramlakan, he did explain that before the formation of Area Political Military Committee he was one assigned to command the Kwa-Zulu Natal but after some problems we have to be sent back and then the Area Political Military Committee has to be formed and that is why we find that Sihle Mbongwa has to come to lead that Area Political Military Committee.

MR MOERANE: I see, so he was a commander? Your commander at the time? That's Belgium?

MR MSOMI: At the time yes, he was the commander of the unit of KZN.

MR MOERANE: Yes, he was also a member of the ANC, a member of Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: Now what time were these limpet mines timed to explode or detonate?

MR MSOMI: The limpet mines were timed to detonate after the shop had closed. That was after 5 o'clock and we did time them as we were instructed and they did explode as we had intended to explode after the shop had closed.

MR MOERANE: Yes and does the same apply to the limpet mine at Game Discount World?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: Yes. Now ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Were you going on to something else now?


CHAIRPERSON: Is it correct that there was at that time and that there has remained a very close relationship between the ANC and the unions?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And the ANC was determined to do all they could to preserve this, establish it and to assist the unions?

MR MSOMI: Yes indeed.

MR MOERANE: In fact then, as now, was the ANC in alliance with the union movement?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: The so-called tripartite alliance?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: And were you also part of Operation Butterfly?

MR MSOMI: Yes indeed.

MR MOERANE: It was once the objectives of Operation Butterfly to give support, visible support to industrial action, to strike action by workers?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: Now I refer to incident 14. This is an incident that occurred on the 8th December 1985 which involved the placing of a limpet mine and the detonation of a limpet mine at the Mobeni Post Office in Grimsby Road. Were you involved in this?

MR MSOMI: Yes I was also the commander of the unit by that time.

MR MOERANE: Yes. Please tell the Honourable Committee what your involvement was?

MR MSOMI: I called a meeting of the unit, that was between me and Thuso Tshika, and I told them that we have to execute the task of the Area Political Military Committee, that was the general instruction of the Area Political Military Committee. So we selected the target and the target was the Post Office. We surveyed the Post Office and we found that should they do anything on it, it would be better to do it on Sunday because there will be no one moving around that Post Office. So Sunday was the day of the operation and it was after 3 o'clock and we went to the Post Office and we picked up the limpet mine, that was a SZ6 limpet mine with a mechanical detonator, and we went to the Post Office. And when we arrived at the Post Office, our surveillance was in accordance with the operation. We then entered the Post Office because it was open, there were public phones inside, but on that day I wasn't sure whether they were not working but there was no one at the Post Office except the person who was guarding that Post Office, who was sitting right at the corner of the Post Office. We placed the SZ6 and then we disappeared.

MR MOERANE: Yes, why was the Post Office selected as a target?

MR MSOMI: The Post Office was one of the government installations.

MR MOERANE: And you considered a legitimate target?

MR MSOMI: Yes indeed.

MR MOERANE: Unfortunately in this incident civilians happened to be around the place at the time of the explosion and were injured. Do you have anything to say to the injured people?

MR MSOMI: Yes, in fact it will be important for me because the detonation or our placement of that SZ6 was not intended to injure any civilians. It was meant for that government installation. They were just unfortunate to be there at the wrong time where we have already placed that limpet mine. Therefore I would express apology to them.


MR MSOMI: Now let's move on to the last incident, the incident that occurred on the 21st December 1985 at the corner of Pine and Albert Street in Durban and this was an explosion which damaged a VW Kombi?

CHAIRPERSON: At what number is this?

MR MOERANE: At 15 Chairperson.

Were you involved in this operation?

MR MSOMI: I was involved as a commander.

MR MOERANE: Yes, please tell the Honourable Committee about your involvement?

MR MSOMI: I received an instruction from Tall Man, that the Pretoria regime or the apartheid regime have raided Maseru and therefore we were to retaliate in a form of intimidating and showing to the government that there was no point of them going to outside the borders of South Africa to look for Umkhonto weSizwe, Umkhonto weSizwe is within the country. So we executed the tasks or that instruction clearly in our mind that it was not intended to kill anyone. The only message that was sent to the government was that Umkhonto weSizwe was within the country and therefore the international community must reconsider themselves investing in South Africa and also to send a message to the white community that their government they have voted for has failed.

MR MOERANE: Did you do any reconnaissance before placing that explosive device wherever it was placed?

MR MSOMI: Yes the reconnaissance was done and that VW Kombi was surveyed from when it was entering Pine Street, that's right on the corner of Pine and Free Street and the occupants, there were white occupants in the vehicle and we surveyed up until it went for parking next to the corner of Albert Street and Pine Street and all the occupants alighted from the vehicle. And it will also be important for me to explain that the limpet mine that was used or the mechanical device that was used in that operation, we used a limpet device which normally takes five minutes to explode and according to instructions, that detonation was never encouraged to be used because in intent, one way or another, it can also endanger the life of the saboteur. So we were supposed to be as quick as possible when we were using that detonator and that detonator, I instructed my saboteur, that was Thuso Tshika, that he must make sure when, that he pulls out the pin, when he's already on the target and at the same time as to make sure that within a space of time he must be out of that place.

MR MOERANE: Yes. Now do associate yourself with the political motivation that has been outlined by, amongst others, Dr Ramlakan and the other applicants who have testified?

MR MSOMI: That is correct, I do associate myself.

MR MOERANE: And you specifically confirm that what you did was within the context of the policy and aims and objectives of the African National Congress and in the execution of those policies, aims and objectives?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: And were you actuated by the motive to bring about the overthrow of the apartheid regime?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: And establish in its place a democratic State?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: Did you do any of the acts that you did for personal gain?


MR MOERANE: Did you receive any financial or other benefits?


MR MOERANE: Did you do what you did out of malice or ill will or personal spite?


CHAIRPERSON: Well there must have been a certain amount of ill will against the apartheid government wouldn't there?

MR MOERANE: Or any ill will or spite or malice against any individual?


MR MOERANE: So you're asking for amnesty in respect of the acts for which you were convicted?

MR MSOMI: Yes that is correct.

MR MOERANE: And also the acts that you have disclosed in 8, 9, 14 and 15?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: That is the evidence, Chairperson. Oh yes, before we step off, I notice that it is alleged that you are implicated in the Amanzimtoti explosion that occurred on the 23rd December 1985. Were you involved in that matter?


MR MOERANE: Is there anything that you know about that matter?

MR MSOMI: In fact I came to know about the Toti bomb blast on the 23rd.

MR MOERANE: After it had occurred?

MR MSOMI: After it had occurred, that was over the news.


MR MSOMI: And then on the eve, on Christmas Eve, that was early hours of the 24th December, I was arrested by the Special Branch and on that day they took me to the place, that was Amanzimtoti, to show me the place of what had happened. That is how I know about the Toti bomb blast. But as to I was the participant of it or I did conspire with Andrew Zondo, that is not correct.

MR MOERANE: I see. Thank you Chairperson.


CHAIRPERSON: Can I just clear up one point before we go on?

This Volkswagen that you placed a limpet mine under, was it a tourist bus?


CHAIRPERSON: Or sorry, no I'm meaning the wrong thing. It described there a mini-bus?

MR MSOMI: It was a mini-bus.

CHAIRPERSON: You've seen, have you, Tshika's statement where he refers to this incident?

MR MSOMI: Come again, Sir?

CHAIRPERSON: Have you seen the statement that Mr Tshika, Thuso Tshika, has made in which he refers to this incident where I get the words mini-bus from?

MR MSOMI: Yes, Sir.



Mr Msomi, did you have any contact with the applicant, Raymond Lalla, in relation to any of the events for which you seek amnesty?

MR MSOMI: Not at all.

MS CAMBANIS: He will tell the Committee that the concept of Operation Butterfly began before your participation in approximately 1983, do you accept that? 1982, 1983?

MR MSOMI: I will accept that.

MS CAMBANIS: And that Mr Sithole, your commander, was the previous internal commander succeeded by Mr Mbongwa, who has already given evidence. Do you accept that?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you very much.



Mr Msomi, I know in your evidence you've confirmed that Thuso Tshika was a member of your cell and you were in fact his commander. Will it be correct to say that you would support his application for amnesty in these three incidents, that is the explosion at Game Discount World?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: The explosion at the Mobeni Post Office?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: And the explosion on the VW Kombi?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now Mr Msomi, how come that Mr Tshika has been - it is alleged in the summary that has been prepared that he is implicated in certain other bombings, right? Now he went as far as to testify, he will only accept responsibility for these three incidents but not the other incidents?

CHAIRPERSON: When you say Game, is that Game and OK?

MS MOHAMED: No Chairperson, just Game Discount.


MR LAX: So that's number 9?


MR MSOMI: ...(indistinct) when we were arrested that was in December. I was arrested together with the members of the Area Political Military Committee and Thuso Tshika, I cannot explain how he escaped that arrest but he was able to escape that arrest and when he escaped that arrest he manoeuvred and escaped the country and as a result, he did further his training abroad and when he had come back he was instructed to go to Newcastle. In fact that I heard from him when talking in prison. That is what I can say about those. It can only be - he will be able to say about those operation of it, I was present before I was arrested and then of what he did after my arrest.

MS MOHAMED: Yes, no I accept that Mr Msomi, thank you very much but ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry, can I just check something, Peter? Peter, is the incoming through on the transcript because there's a lot of interference. Can you just check if it's recording properly? Will you just talk again, Ms Mohammed?

MS MOHAMED: Thank you Mr Lax.

Mr Msomi, I accept your explanation that you wouldn't be aware of any incidents that Mr Tshika was involved in after your arrest but the incidents I'm particularly drawing your attention to, are those that appear on page 5 of the summary?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, now let me try and explain this to you. Mr Tshika is applying for amnesty amongst other incidents for this explosion at Game Discount World, for the explosion at Mobeni Post Office and for the explosion on that VW Kombi. Did you follow that, Mr Msomi?

MR MSOMI: Yes that is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, now on page 5 you would notice the first incident, incident 8, the first to Mr Tshika as being an implicated party?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, now in court you testified - Mr Tshika is going to say that he didn't personally participate in this attack. He was aware that an attack was going to be carried out but he didn't personally participate?

MR MSOMI: That would be correct because he was a part of the unit, his mission was to go to Game and Bafunuku was supposed to go to OK Bazaar.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, thank you. Now the next incident, incident 10, also implicates Mr Tshika. Now in court you testified, once more he will say that he was not involved in this incident. Now the reason I'm putting this to you is because at that time you were his commander. Do you want to comment on that?

MR MSOMI: In fact incident 10, I wouldn't know about it. That was also if I can also shed light on incident 8. Incident 8 it's mentioned that there were two limpet mines that exploded at OK Bazaar. In fact Bafunuku was only having one limpet mine. That means there was a coincidence of units, that they entered the same shop at the same time.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, so Mr Msomi, if I understand you correctly, with incident 10 your unit was not involved in that at all?

MR MSOMI: Not at all.

MS MOHAMED: Thank you. Now incident 11, this is the incident that involved the Checkers, Smith Street branch.

MR MSOMI: We were not involved.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, thank you very much. Chairperson, I have no further questions, thank you.


CHAIRPERSON: That it would seem that different units were launching attacks on the same day on the same sort of targets, the instructions would have come from above?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: I have no questions, Chairperson, thank you.


MR SIBANYONI: You said the timing was very short because the people have to pull the pin when they are at this place and sometimes it takes only five minutes?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: So it was a great coincidence that the bomb didn't injure the others who were launching the operation at the same time?

MR MSOMI: You mean the OK Bazaars?


MR MSOMI: In fact, this operation, in fact they themselves also received the same instruction that those limpet mines have to explode after the shop had closed.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, the only limpet mine you're talking about that exploded almost immediately was the one under the mini-bus?

MR MSOMI: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: The others there was a time lag?

MR MSOMI: Yes that is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, no further questions.

MR LAX: Can I just clarify, that one under the mini-bus, the reason why you used such a short fuse if I can see it clearly is that that way you'd be sure that there was no one in the vehicle?

MR MSOMI: By that time there was no one in the vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: You waited till the vehicle was empty, you put the limpet mine underneath it and blew it up before the next lot of passengers got in?

MR MSOMI: Yes indeed.


MR MOERANE: No further questions, may the applicant be excused, Chairperson?




MR MOERANE: Chairperson, that is the end of my lot that for obvious reasons we'll have to sit in on the next one or two applicants, that is Tshika and Lalla.

CHAIRPERSON: They seem to be in the same incidents, why they have been separated, I don't understand but I agree that it does seem right that you should participate in the others. I don't know if you want to move your seat?

MR MOERANE: It might not really be necessary.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, if I may sit next to my colleague and then the applicant can sit - Tshika can sit here?

CHAIRPERSON: Right, can we now put on record what application we're dealing with?

MR MAPOMA: For the record, Chairperson, we're dealing with the application of Thuso Tshika and Basil Msibi.

THUSO TSHIKA: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MS MOHAMED: Thank you Chairperson.

MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, I'm sorry. At this stage may I ask for indulgence? It has since come to my notice that the victims in this particular matter have just arrived and I have not had an opportunity to consult with them.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll give you a short adjournment then.

MR MAPOMA: Yes, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us know when you're ready to proceed and let the other parties know.




CHAIRPERSON: Please continue?

MR MAPOMA: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Tshika, you have taken the oath.

THUSO TSHIKA: (s.u.o.)

MS MOHAMED: (cont)

Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Tshika, how old are you?

MR TSHIKA: 36 years.

MS MOHAMED: Where do you reside?

MR TSHIKA: 27 Flatground Road in Pinetown.

MS MOHAMED: Now I'm going to refer you to a bundle of documents. Chairperson, this is the bundle that is headed -this is the bundle that deals specifically with the applications of Tshika and Msibi.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that what it's headed?

MS MOHAMED: Yes. Now Mr Tshika, your amnesty application forms ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Can you just stop for one second? There's no sound.

It's my unit, can you give me another unit please? Thank you.

MS MOHAMED: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

Mr Tshika, your application form is found on pages 1 to 7 of this bundle?


MS MOHAMED: Okay, now in your application form on page 2 where the question is asked that you lists the acts or offences for which you are applying amnesty for, you state "convicted of Terrorism Act 74/1982." Can you see that?


MS MOHAMED: Now would it be correct to say that in referring to that case you are incorporating the acts referred to in the indictment in this matter?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now isn't it also correct that you were convicted of the acts referred to in the indictment?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: What sentence did you receive?

MR TSHIKA: 15 years.

MS MOHAMED: What portion of that sentence did you serve?

MR TSHIKA: Five years.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, now in your application form it's stated that you are applying for amnesty for incidents which occurred in both the Durban area and Newcastle area?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now for sake of convenience I think we'll deal with the Durban incidents first and thereafter move onto the Newcastle incident, okay?


MS MOHAMED: Alright. Now the incidents for which - sorry, before I go on, there's a statement that we have handed in to the Committee. Mr Chairperson, I'm aware that these copies were made available sometime yesterday. I'm not sure, will this then be referred to as Exhibit A?


MS MOHAMED: Thank you, Chairperson.

Now Mr Tshika, you have signed this statement and isn't it correct that you have previously applied for amnesty in respect of two incidents in the Newcastle area and amnesty was in fact granted for those incidents?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: And it was at that hearing that this statement was handed in?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: And isn't it also correct that apart from the dates being changed on the last page of this statement, the statement is substantively - remains the same as that handed in previously?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, thank you. Now I'm going to take you to these incidents in the Durban area for which you apply for amnesty. Chairperson, I'm going to refer you now to bundle 1 and in the summary that has been prepared on page 5.

Mr Tshika, isn't it correct that you are applying for amnesty for incident number 9, that is the incident that occurred in Durban on the 27th September 1985, a limpet mine explosion at Game Discount World between West and Pine Street?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Okay and the next incident for which you seek amnesty for is incident number 14 which is the Mobeni Post Office, Grimsby Road, limpet mine explosion on the 8th December 1985?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: And the next incident is incident number 15, that's the corner of Pine and Albert Street, VW Kombi bomb explosion on the 21st December 1985?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now Mr Tshika, your commander, Mr Msomi, has already testified before the Committee a short while ago and do you associate yourself with the reasons for the selection of these targets?

MR TSHIKA: Yes that is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now I'm going to take you to incident number 9 which is the explosion at Game Discount World. Can you tell the Committee what was your role in this incident?

MR TSHIKA: Msomi, who was the commander, issued an instruction that Game Stores should be bombed in support of the industrial action that was headed by the unions since there was a conflict between them and the management. I had to follow that order. I took a mini-limpet mine and headed for Game, placed it there. Thereafter I left. I then reported to Mr Msomi that I had carried out his instruction.

MS MOHAMED: And it is common cause that that limpet mine did in fact explode?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Yes, thank you. Now going on to incident number 14, which is the explosion at the Mobeni Post Office. Can you tell the Committee what was your involvement in this incident?

MR TSHIKA: With regards to the Mobeni incident, I also received an instruction to the effect that the Post Office should be destroyed. Mr Msomi and myself then went to the Post Office where I placed the limpet. We thereafter left. I later heard on the news that it had in fact exploded.

MS MOHAMED: Yes, thank you very much. Going on to incident number 15, this is the explosion which occurred on the corner of Pine and Albert Streets. Can you tell us about your involvement in this particular incident?

MR TSHIKA: Msomi received an instruction on that morning that we should do something because of the raid that had been carried out in Maseru where the South African Government had attacked ANC members. I then took a limpet mine and we left for the city. We then spotted the mini-bus which we followed, had parked on Pine Street and the occupants alighted. I then placed the limpet mine. We then left and the bomb exploded.

MS MOHAMED: Yes, thank you. Now in respect of these three incidents, at all stages you were acting under the instructions of your commander, Mr Msomi, is that correct?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: And you were seeking to further the aims and objectives of the ANC better?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now, look at this summary - Mr Chairperson, I'm referring to page 5 of that first bundle. Now you are implicated in incident 8 firstly. Would you like to comment on this? This is the explosion at the OK Bazaar on West Street on the 27th September 1985?

MR TSHIKA: Yes, I can comment. We were persons in one cell commanded by Mr Msomi but I did not play any role in that incident.

MS MOHAMED: Okay and look at incident 10 which is an incident which occurred on the 27th September, the Spar Foodliner incident. It also alleges that you are implicated in that incident. Can you comment on that?

MR TSHIKA: I do not know anything about that incident.

MS MOHAMED: Similarly, incident number 11, the one involving Checkers, Smith Street, also implicates you?

MR TSHIKA: I do not bear any knowledge with regards to that one either.

MS MOHAMED: Yes and your commander has in fact confirmed that your unit was not involved in incidents 10 and 11?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Yes, thank you Mr Tshika. Now going on to these incidents for which you seek amnesty for in the Newcastle area, there are two such incidents that we are now going to deal with for the purposes of this hearing and they are the explosion at the Newcastle Magistrate's Court and the explosion at the Newcastle Centre, the Wimpy Bar?

MR TSHIKA: Yes I do know about those.

MS MOHAMED: Now you have previously applied for those two other incidents in this Newcastle area which was the attack on the Osizweni Police Station and the explosion at the Glencoe Railway Station, is that correct?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, now how was it that you came to be in Newcastle at the time? That's around 1986?

MR TSHIKA: After Mr Msomi had been arrested, the Security Branch started harassing my family, looking for me. I realised that I should leave the country. I then went into exile. I underwent further training and returned.

On my arrival in Swaziland I met Tami Zulu and Charles Ndaba who informed me of a problem that existed in Newcastle. They said they required somebody with my experience to go assist there because a colleague who had been based there had died. So there was just one comrade left there whom I had to assist.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that Bafana Ndaba who died?


CHAIRPERSON: You deal with this in paragraph 11 of your affidavit?


MS MOHAMED: Okay, did you know the name of the colleague that you were going to assist in the Newcastle area?

MR TSHIKA: We had never met but I was informed that his name was Stan. Stan did indeed arrive from South Africa. We met at Lodwe near the border then we proceeded to Newcastle. In Newcastle I had to train MK members as well as recruit those persons whom I could identify as being suitable for training.

MS MOHAMED: Okay and who was the person who you reported to at that stage? In other words, did you have a commander?

MR TSHIKA: Yes, it was Stan whom I now know as Msibi. He was my commander and I reported to him.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, now I'm going to take you to particularly to these two incidents for which you apply for amnesty for the Newcastle area. Firstly to the explosion at the Newcastle Magistrate's Court.

MR TSHIKA: We would sometimes hold discussions with Msibi who was my commander. He had direct contact with Swaziland and he would inform me of instructions that filtered from Swaziland. I would pass such instructions to my members. That is how the Newcastle incident came about. As a government institution it was selected as a target. I then passed on the instruction to Themba Nkosi Khosi who was a member of my cell.

MS MOHAMED: Okay and who chose the Newcastle Court as the target?

MR TSHIKA: As I've already mentioned, Msibi was the commander so he is the person who issued instructions on which places to attack. What we had to do was to conduct reconnaissance on that specific target.

MS MOHAMED: What was your role exactly in this explosion, what did you do?

MR TSHIKA: We conducted reconnaissance together with Themba Nkosi. We surveilled it and I was satisfied that it was a suitable target. I then handed over a limpet mine to Themba Nkosi which he was supposed to place there. He did so.

MS MOHAMED: And at what time was this limpet mine expected to go off?

MR TSHIKA: Around the lunch hour when there are no members of the public in the court.

MS MOHAMED: So just to clarify - sorry, it's just to confirm, the reason that you chose the Newcastle Court was because it was a State institution?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now you chose lunch time, you've just said that you didn't expect it to be that crowded. Now did you not foresee the possibility that there would be people present in the court at that time?

MR TSHIKA: Yes, in a state of war there are always casualties.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, now going on to the next incident for which you apply for amnesty for, this is an explosion which occurred at the Newcastle Centre. Who chose this centre as a target?

MR TSHIKA: As I have already stated that I passed on instructions from my commander. It was such an instruction.

MS MOHAMED: So Msibi gave you an instruction that this place should?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now what was your role exactly in this instance?

MR TSHIKA: I had to go conduct reconnaissance first. I was satisfied that there would not be much damage. Basil Sithole was the one who was going to place the limpet mine.

MS MOHAMED: What time did you choose to have this limpet mine go off?

MR TSHIKA: Around lunch time.

MS MOHAMED: And why did you choose this particular time?

MR TSHIKA: It's because that is where the Security Branch members had their lunch.

MS MOHAMED: So at that stage you viewed the targeting of Security Branch members as being a legitimate target?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now Mr Tshika, you must aware by this stage that there were certain victims who were injured in these various explosions which you were directly involved in?


MS MOHAMED: My learned colleague, the Evidence Leader, has stated that some of the victims are present here today. Do you have anything to say to them?

MR TSHIKA: Yes. To those who were affected by those explosions, particularly the civilians, I apologise to them, they were not our target.

MS MOHAMED: And just to confirm once more that at all stages when you so acted you were furthering the aims and objectives of the ANC at the time?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Yes, thank you very much, Chairperson, I have no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Are you going to cross-examine first?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOERANE: Yes, I suppose so. Thank you Chairperson.

Mr Tshika, at the time that you took part in these activities, or shortly before that, what level of education had you attained?

MR TSHIKA: Standard 10.

MR MOERANE: And did you intend advancing you education further?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: What did you intend to become?

MR TSHIKA: When I was still young I had intended to become a doctor. I was doing science subjects together with Mr Msomi but we did not have a laboratory at the time.

MR MOERANE: Yes. Where were you a student?

MR TSHIKA: At Lamontville.

MR MOERANE: Did you have to go through Bantu Education?

MR TSHIKA: That was the only education available, notwithstanding the fact that I was against it but at the time there was no other alternative except to study outside South Africa which was difficult at the time.

MR MOERANE: Did you think that the government of the day were going to change their policies if there hadn't been armed action?

MR TSHIKA: It would not have because if you look at the history of the ANC, it started 1912, but up until the '50's, '60's the government was still adamant in its policies.

MR MOERANE: So if I understand your evidence correctly, all that you did was in the struggle and fight for liberation of the oppressed people?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: You were, to a large extent, a foot soldier?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: You acted by and large on instruction from your commander?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: And you obeyed instructions which you believed were within the framework of the policies and objectives of the African National Congress?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: And I also assume that one of the precepts of that policy was to conduct warfare in as humane a manner as possible?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: To limit and restrict civilian casualties?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: And did you this in this election of targets?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MOERANE: I'm referring in particular to the incidents which you performed or in which you participated under the command and instruction of Mr Msomi in the Durban area.


MR MOERANE: Thank you, Chairperson.



Sir, in relation to the Durban incidents, we now know that they're referred to as the Operation Butterfly incidents, is that correct?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And in relation to those incidents did you have any contact with the applicant, Raymond Lalla?


MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Sir. Thank you Chairperson.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAPOMA: Mr Tshika, on the bombing of the Game Discount in Durban, I see in paragraph 7 of your affidavit, that is Exhibit A, you say on the second sentence:

"I was instructed by Qonda to place bombs at Game just before closure of shops so that there would be minimum injuries."

Do you confirm that?


MR MAPOMA: When you say just before closure of the shops, what did you mean?

MR TSHIKA: I could not have placed the bomb after the shop was closed.

MR MAPOMA: And when you placed that bomb, when did you expect it to explode?

MR TSHIKA: After the shop was closed.


MR TSHIKA: So that nobody would be injured.

MR LAX: Mr Mapoma, while you're just looking may I just interpose here?


MR LAX: You realise that there is a problem here in the sentence that's just been read to you and that is that you refer to bombs in the plural in that sentence whereas we've heard the evidence that there was only one bomb?


MR LAX: Could you clarify that for us please?

MR TSHIKA: As I mentioned before, Mr Msomi called myself and Bafu. That is why I referred to the bombs in plural because those were intended for Game and OK but as I've already mentioned, I did not take part in the incident at OK It's just that when the instruction was issued I was present and therefore I bore the knowledge that OK would also be attacked.

MR LAX: My only problem with that answer is that this talks about bombs at Game, not bombs at Game and OK I'll assume it's just a typographical error.

MR TSHIKA: It is possible that it is a typing error and I was also not very careful when I read it.

MR LAX: Yes, but you're clear you only had a single bomb when you went to Game?

MR TSHIKA: Yes, it was just one.

MR LAX: Thank you. Sorry, Mr Mapoma.

MR MAPOMA: Thank you, Sir.

Now in whose company were you when you placed that bomb at Game?

MR TSHIKA: I was alone.

MR MAPOMA: Now let us deal with the Kombi that was bombed at Pine Street. Actually, who placed that bomb there?


MR MAPOMA: And where was Mr Msomi?

MR TSHIKA: He was a little distance away and he acted as a lookout as to whether there were no Police or Security Branch members around so that if, for instance, I am arrested on the spot he could also report to the commanders, that was his duty. My role was to place the bomb.

MR MAPOMA: Where exactly did you place that bomb? Inside or outside the Kombi?

MR TSHIKA: It was next to the Kombi near the wheels. Now regarding the bombing of the Newcastle Magistrate's Court, if I understand it well at that time you were already from outside the country having received an advanced military training?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: And I suppose you had an advanced understanding of the policies of the movement as well, the ANC?

MR TSHIKA: I would not call it advanced. I had knowledge.

MR MAPOMA: And you're understanding at the time, I suppose, was that whilst it was war you had to minimise the injury to civilians?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: Now, I would like you to explain this, on that day it was a normal working day?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: Now you see, during the bombing at Game you placed that bomb shortly before closure so that you minimise the injuries to civilians, so that it blasts when the civilians have already left. Now in the Magistrate's Court, during the working day, during lunch time, you place a bomb to blast during that time. How do you explain this now?

MR TSHIKA: These were different targets. There was a different objective with regards to Game so they should be treated differently.

MR MAPOMA: What do you mean by that?

MR TSHIKA: Game is a shop and the Magistrate's Court was a government institution. About that time I have already mentioned that the instruction was to the effect it should be placed at that time because at that specific time people would go out to get their lunch. Moreover, there had been a person who had conducted reconnaissance at that place. That is why we took steps to minimise injuries to civilians.

MR MAPOMA: You see, the victims who were injured, will say that the bombing actually took place at about three o'clock, not during lunch hour as you say?

MR TSHIKA: The intention was for it to explode around lunch time and in South African Courts the lunch time is between one and two and even then at about that time when the court reopens, you cannot expect that suddenly a ...(indistinct) will come there.

MR MAPOMA: And they will say that at that time they were inside the court room and the court was in progress?

MR TSHIKA: I have already mentioned that our intention was for that bomb to explode around lunch time. It was not meant to explode when the court was in session.

MR MAPOMA: Are you in a position to dispute at all that the explosion took place at the time when the court was in session, at about three o'clock?

MR TSHIKA: I would not dispute it, I assume that you know about it.

MR SIBANYONI: Can you give a reason why did the bomb explode later than it was intended?

MR TSHIKA: There are slides that are inserted into the detonator, these are responsible for time delays. Unfortunately these were of Russian origin, where the weather is mostly cold and the slides themselves are controlled by the weather and there is a minimum and maximum time at which it will explode so that if perhaps it is too hot, the bomb may go off much earlier.

MR SIBANYONI: Thanks. Mr Mapoma?

MR MAPOMA: And on that day how was the weather? Was it too cold or too hot?

MR TSHIKA: It was mild.

MR MAPOMA: And what affect then did the weather have on the blast of that bomb time wise?

MR TSHIKA: I do not know.

MR MAPOMA: You would not say that it exploded later than it was expected because of the weather, is that what you're saying?

MR TSHIKA: I'm not saying that.

MR MAPOMA: What are you saying?

MR TSHIKA: I am saying that I do not know. I was just explaining how that detonator works and factors that would influence the explosion and there are many other factors that would influence the timing of the device.

MR MAPOMA: You know, Mr Tshika, it's important. It's important that you must be able to explain this. I'm not trying to trap you but I think it's important.


MR MAPOMA: You say the bomb which you placed there was intended to blast at during lunch hour, that was between one and two o'clock?


MR MAPOMA: And now it turns out that the bomb blasted almost an hour later and you are saying that the weather conditions do affect, influence that?


MR MAPOMA: Now what I want to find out from you are you able to explain at all, if at all, that the weather conditions did have an effect on the blast of the bomb at all?

MR TSHIKA: I say it is possible that the weather had an influence.

CHAIRPERSON: Tell me, did you set the timing of the bomb or was there a fixed timing in the detonator?

MR TSHIKA: It's a fixed timing taken from the slides.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, a fixed timing taken from?

MR TSHIKA: The slides, the delayed device which is we insert to the detonator.

CHAIRPERSON: And you don't adjust that?

MR TSHIKA: You don't adjust that, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So if a bomb has been kept in odd weather conditions for six months or a year, the detonator might be affected?


CHAIRPERSON: It wouldn't be?

MR TSHIKA: Yes because before you activate the detonator you have to pull it the pin.


MR TSHIKA: Then from that then ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Then there's a time from there?

MR TSHIKA: Yes. If it is stored there's no time for that. I'm saying if the detonator is stored that means it's not activated, even it can stay for two years or three years. It won't be affected by anything.

CHAIRPERSON: But I thought you said that the Russian weather affected it?

MR TSHIKA: No, I said that the manufacturing from Russia, maybe because there it's cold, it might have some influence when it comes to an hot area which is South Africa.

CHAIRPERSON: It might affect the timing, it is manufactured in a cold climate, when it's in a hot climate it might be different, is that what you're saying?

MR TSHIKA: Maybe. That's why I'm saying I'm not an expert in detonators.

MR LAX: Perhaps you could explain this to us?


MR LAX: This device, the slides that you put in. The reason that you put additional slides in, as I understand it, is this is a corrosive material inside the detonator which then eats up the slides?


MR LAX: And what is impossible to predict is the precise timing in which it will be eaten. You put it in and there are certain parameters which you can expect that more or less between this time and that time it would more or less go off, depending on the number of metal slides that you stick into it?


MR LAX: So you increase the delay at which the detonator will explode?


MR LAX: But it's not predictable within a minute or ten minutes even, it may take longer or less, depending on how the corrosive material in the detonator eats the slides?

MR TSHIKA: The slides have different colours. There's yellow, green and red. Red is for a maximum of 15 minutes.

MR LAX: Yes, we understand that.


MR LAX: The point I'm trying to suggest to you and I'm a bit puzzled at your response but anyway. As we heard evidence earlier that these things are unpredictable, that sometimes people have blown themselves up with these things because the slides go off immediately, for example?


MR LAX: And you've been asked to explain why it only went off an hour later and I'm suggesting to you the reason it went off an hour later is because it's impossible to predict with certainty how long it will take before it goes off?


CHAIRPERSON: When did you place the bomb there?

MR TSHIKA: It was about quarter to one.

MR LAX: And how long did you allow for it to explode?

MR TSHIKA: One hour.

MR LAX: One hour?


MR LAX: Thank you.

MR MAPOMA: Why did you not place it immediately or just a few minutes before the court adjourned?

MR TSHIKA: There were police who were on guard. You will remember that around that time police were on guard as to suspicious looking persons as well as they were on the lookout for bombs. It was placed so that whoever placed that bomb would not be regarded as suspicious.

MR MAPOMA: And you, with reference to the victims who got injured, you're saying that casualties in a war situation are inevitable. You're saying in a state of war there are casualties, that's what you're saying?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: What do you mean by that? What do you mean when you say in a state of war?

MR TSHIKA: We were at war against apartheid. As I have already mentioned, the objective of the ANC was to liberate the oppressed people as well as to fight apartheid in whatever form. I do not believe that any ANC member would not expect that in such a state of war there would not be casualties. I do not mean to say that I disregard those people who were injured.

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Mapoma. Where did you put this limpet mine?

MR TSHIKA: It was placed in a bin against a wall.

MR LAX: That was my recollection from a previous hearing, where it had been placed. I was just making sure that that evidence was right.

MR TSHIKA: Alright.

MR MAPOMA: Inside or outside?

MR TSHIKA: Outside. That was still another way of trying to minimise injuries.

MR MAPOMA: And the Wimpy Bar, you say Security Branch members used to have lunch there?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: But I suppose other ordinary civilians as well would have lunch there?

MR TSHIKA: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: So you - what is it that you did to minimise injury to those unfortunate civilians?

MR TSHIKA: Our target was the Security Branch and we knew that at that time members of the public did not frequent that place. At that time it was mainly the Security Branch.

MR MAPOMA: Why, did they not frequent it, to your knowledge if any?


MR MAPOMA: To your knowledge, why did the ordinary civilians not frequent that place?

MR TSHIKA: We are referring to 1986. When I arrived at Newcastle at that time such places as the Wimpy Bar were not really frequented by black people. The majority of the people were poor and as well as for the fact that at that time people were still under the apartheid regime so they were not free to frequent those places as they wished.

CHAIRPERSON: So when you say civilians, you mean black people did not frequent it?

MR TSHIKA: No, I'm not meaning that. black and white and yellow, as long as they are civilians, it made no difference.

MR MAPOMA: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.


MR LAX: Mr Tshika, did you derive any material benefit for any of these activities?


MR LAX: And did you have any personal interest or personal agendas in the way that you conducted these operations?


MR LAX: Thank you Chair.

MR SIBANYONI: I notice that you often use the phrase to minimise civilian casualties?


MR SIBANYONI: Was the aim to minimise or to avoid civilian casualties?

MR TSHIKA: It's to avoid but that was an impossible dream in urban guerrilla warfare, it's a really impossible dream. That's why I've used minimise.

MR SIBANYONI: In other words in these activities you foresaw that there will be one or two civilians?


MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

MS MOHAMED: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

MR MAPOMA: Excuse me, Chairperson, I'm sorry. At this stage, Chairperson, can I just have a minute to speak to the victims. I just want to find out from them if there's anything that they would want to raise with the applicant?


MR LAX: Do you want us to adjourn or do you want to do it quickly while we sit here?

MR MAPOMA: Not adjourn, just quickly, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Please go ahead.

MR NENE: ...(inaudible)

MR LAX: Yes. Mr Mapoma tells us that you'd like to ask a few questions of Mr Tshika?


MR LAX: Please go ahead.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NENE: I would like to know from Mr Tshika, if he wanted to destroy a government structure when he placed that bomb as well as avoid civilian injury. However, that bomb did not explode during the lunch hour. Why did it explode at three in the afternoon?

MR TSHIKA: I have already answered that question. I was questioned on that.

MR NENE: I did not understand quite clearly. I will request your attorney to explain.

MR LAX: Mr Tshika, we had a little discussion around the issue of the time and the weather and so on. Maybe you could explain it to him in your own words. It will be quite a valuable exercise I think. So although it has already been asked of you, I think in the interests of reconciliation it would be a useful exercise for you to just tell him yourself.

MR TSHIKA: Okay. I explained that detonators have timing devices. They are sometimes affected by the weather so that depending on the weather they may explode earlier or later than expected. With regards to that incident, the device delayed and exploded only later.

MR NENE: I also heard you say that the people who kept guard at the court, could you not go back to check why the bomb had not exploded by that time?

MR TSHIKA: Yes it was guarded.

MR NENE: I will say you are lying, there was no one who kept guard at that court, this only happened after the bomb explosion. The police at the court were just carrying out their normal duties, not guarding the court. If that had been the case you would not have been able to enter the court with the bomb.

MR TSHIKA: I did not know as to your capacity, because when they be engaged in this debate whereas I do not have information about you. Were you a civilian or were you a policeman?

MR NENE: I was a policeman at the time.

MR TSHIKA: Where were you trained?

MR NENE: At Hammanskraal.

MR TSHIKA: In what year?

MR NENE: In 1981.

MR TSHIKA: I hope your training also included being on the lookout for terrorists.

MR NENE: I was not instructed on that.

MR TSHIKA: When you underwent your training I assume you took an oath to protect this country against its enemies?

MR NENE: Please repeat that question?

MR LAX: Sorry, can I just stop you? You're here to answer a few questions by him. Not the other way around. The man was a policeman at the time. I think you're not helping anybody with this line of questioning. I'd request you to be a bit sensitive to the issues here.


MR LAX: Mr Nene, you've heard his explanation. Are there any other questions you may want to ask him about the incident?

MR NENE: I think Mr Mapoma has asked such questions. I just wanted to clarify the issue on the court being guarded. It was not guarded at the time. Therefore he is not being completely honest.


MR LAX: Yes. We hear your answers. Mr Nene, thank you for asking those questions. Mr Mapoma, is that it?

MR MAPOMA: That is all, Chairperson. Thank you for the indulgence.

CHAIRPERSON: Any further re-examination?

MS MOHAMED: No, Chairperson.


MR LAX: Does your client wish to be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: Does he want to be excused now or does he want to hear his colleague perhaps? Mr Msibi?

MS MOHAMED: He will want to hear Mr Msibi, Chairperson, thank you. Chairperson, I now call Mr Basil Fani Msibi.




BASIL FANI MSIBI: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MS MOHAMED: Thank you Chairperson.

Mr Msibi, how old are you?

MR MSIBI: I'm 36.

MS MOHAMED: Where do you reside?

MR MSIBI: Sunnyside, Pretoria.

MS MOHAMED: Now Mr Msibi, you are applying for amnesty for incidents which occurred in Newcastle in 1986 and particularly for the purposes of this hearing you are applying for the explosion at the Newcastle Court and the explosion at Game Centre, is that correct?

MR MSIBI: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now isn't it also correct that you had previously applied for and was granted amnesty for the attack on the Osizweni Police Station and Glencoe Railway Station?

MR MSIBI: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now isn't it also correct that you were never arrested or convicted for your role in ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry, Ms Mohammed, we're going to just stop you for two seconds. Won't you just change your microphone? It's affecting the recording and it will take two seconds literally.

MS MOHAMED: Thank you very much.

MR LAX: Oh yes, that's much, much better.

MS MOHAMED: Thank you. Now Mr Msibi, you were never arrested or convicted for these incidents, is that correct?

MR MSIBI: That is correct.

MS MOHAMED: Now look at this hand drawn statement that's before you, it's a three page statement that you have signed. Chairperson, I'm aware that copies have been made available. I think this would be Exhibit B.

Now Mr Msibi, isn't it correct that this is the same statement that was handed in at your previous hearing and apart from the date being changed on the last page no other substantive alterations have been made to the statement?

MR MSIBI: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Or any alterations have been the additions, haven't they, the fact that evidence was led and amnesty was granted?

MS MOHAMED: Yes Mr Chairperson, thank you.

Now Mr Msibi, can you briefly tell the Committee what was your role in the Northern Natal area at that time? That's around 1986?

MR MSIBI: Around the period in 1986, actually I was from my training and Angola and other countries outside Africa. I came back to Zambia where I was briefed about the situation in Northern Natal. I think basically this was in conjunction with what was happening in the Southern Natal as you had spoken at large around the Operation Butterfly. The issue was that all the activities were concentrated only on the southern part of Natal and nothing was happening in Northern Natal in terms of the ANC impacting on the struggles that were waged by the people of Northern Natal. I did a thorough briefing of what was happening in the area knowing also that I'm from the area in Newcastle.

I then went back to the area, Northern Natal area, sent by the Natal machinery command, basically Tami Zulu, to go first to go look at the area, come up with a thorough analysis of the area, politically, military and social economically, which I did. What came out clear in that analysis was that the Northern Natal area itself was divided into two spheres when it comes to political activity. There was an area of Dundee, Glencoe, which was politically active and there was the area which we could have called a core of apartheid activity which was Newcastle where there was actually nothing and everything was done from the Newcastle side to suppress the people of the Northern Natal.

These are the analyses that I gave back to my commanders when I went to Swaziland and I then received a further instruction to go there and start a structure that was going to be all encompassing. I think yesterday's evidence that was given on the Operation Butterfly around the issue of an all encompassing structure. It was in the same brief which was our ...(indistinct) on the matter. And one other thing was that in the Northern Natal at that time, the pilot programme that was run both by the army and the police which was then called the JMCs was fully operational and the people of Northern Natal felt there was nothing that they could do so we were operating on the same level as the JMCs, getting the people on our side and then launching the armed struggle and political struggle at the same time. This was my brief. Then when I went back there, this was what I was supposed to establish. Then definitely it was difficult to get a person to recruit in Newcastle area so I started by recruiting outside the Newcastle area, then coming back inside Newcastle. As the work grew much larger I requested assistance which was sent to me in the person of Bafana Ndaba which didn't last very long because he was killed in a skirmish with the Kwa-Zulu Police at that time. I was then left alone, I had to go back to get another person who was going to help me to re-establish the structures that I was supposed to do. Then I got that help in the person of Thuso Tshika. We then there started to be fully operational, establishing the political contacts through the trade unions which were very active in the area at that time. We then started to interact with the student movements which were very active at that time whilst at the same time ...(intervention)

MS MOHAMED: Sorry, Mr Msibi, if I could just come in here? If you could go slightly slower because it is being interpreted? Thank you.

MR MSIBI: Whilst at the same time we were interacting with those which I could call an above board structures. We were creating much more effective cells. Those were MK cells and Thuso had the responsibility of training those people and in a situation, because it was very evident I think after three months in my presence in the area that I would not last long in the area. So I needed a replacement, a person who would take over immediately should I be arrested, killed or forced to withdraw to Swaziland. So Thuso had to be immediately engaged in the activities and then I began slightly to draw back in terms of recruiting people and interacting with people and Thuso was basically doing that job. So that's when the time we started the actual planning of the operations and the interactions with the trade union movement, the student movement and the civic organisations in the area.

And it should be noted at that time that the policy had succeeded in one way or another to deal with very effective people who were residing at Sigongele in Dundee and Glencoe. So there was a basic need for firstly show the people that MK is there because after the arrest of those leaders of the civic organisation in Dundee and Glencoe, people felt that if these people get arrested then it means there's nothing we can do to this regime so we had to register a point, that this regime is just pulling a leg on you, something is going to happen, continue struggle. We had to send messages to general people to actually believe in what they were participating on, especially in the area of Glencoe, Dundee and Vryheid.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, now I'm going to take you to paragraph 10 of the statement. Will it be correct to say that in seeking to advance this message you then identified certain targets?

MR MSIBI: That is true.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, can you briefly tell us the targets that were identified?

MR MSIBI: May I gather the question? Targets that I'd identified or targets that we managed to act on them because if you say I identified some of them ...(inaudible)

MS MOHAMED: Sorry, my apologies. Targets that you identified and you subsequently acted upon.

MR MSIBI: Okay. That was Osisweni Police Station, the Newcastle Magistrate's Court, the Glencoe Railway Station and the Wimpy at the Game Centre in Newcastle.

MS MOHAMED: Now Mr Msibi, we did state earlier that this hearing is only confined to the explosion at the Newcastle Court and the explosion at the Game Centre at Newcastle, okay?


MS MOHAMED: So just to concentrate on this right now. When you identified these targets did you engage in any discussions with your superiors at any stage?

MR MSIBI: Definitely yes on the issue of the Newcastle Magistrate's Court. At that time in Newcastle, quite a number of trade union members got arrested and they were being tried in that court. There was a strike that was looming at Iscor, which is a steel industry. There were a number of people who were working Felgate who got arrested that were members of the union. There were a number of people who were arrested who were working at Kabo Chem because of the closure, the possible closure that Kabo Chem was supposed to be closed. Then the trade union was not very of the package that was going to be agreed upon between the company and the workers. So the Special Branch acted swiftly by arresting which they could call leaders in the possible strikes and the go slows that were taking place there.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, thank you. The next target was at Game Centre at Newcastle. Can you tell us why you selected this target?

MR MSIBI: I basically selected this target because I thought that was going to limit the pressure that was on our structure in the sense that all the Special Branch people who were tasked to look after our structure, that is were actually running after me and some of the members were using that Wimpy there. It's a fact because most of them, they were there after the court proceedings. If they had anything at the court, they will just walk to that Wimpy where they had their lunch.

And the second issue is that Wimpy at that time had openly through the Citizen Newspaper, advertised to say they are supporting the Police Force. Police Force members were on patrols and who are doing, they can come in for a cup of tea free and they had preferential treatment in terms of Wimpy. It was an open thing, it was in the newspapers. So also the policemen preferred Wimpy to other restaurants.

MS MOHAMED: Now after you selected these targets, I know you earlier said that you did discuss it with your superiors. Who was your superior at the time?

MR MSIBI: I discussed it directly with Tami Zulu in Swaziland.

MS MOHAMED: Okay now how did this take place, I mean he was in Swaziland and you were in Newcastle and so how did these discussions come about?

MR MSIBI: What happened basically, I was a kind of a person who believed that I had to do things for myself. If there was any ammunition that I had to get I would go to Swaziland personally and ...(indistinct) it, in that way I would spend a week or so getting into discussion with the command structure in Swaziland.

MS MOHAMED: And did they approve your choice of targets?

MR MSIBI: It was approved because I did explain initially when I mentioned Game Centre, Wimpy Bar, it was - they nearly jumped out of their skins because there was the talk of soft targets. Then I explained why that particular Wimpy in Newcastle. It might be different from a Wimpy somewhere else. This one in Newcastle had these connotations which had to look into.

MS MOHAMED: Okay, then on your return to Newcastle how did you act on that approval?

MR MSIBI: I called in Thuso because it was difficult for me to move around at that time. There were posters all over and I called in Thuso, we had a meeting with him. I explained to him thoroughly why the targets, how should it be done and I gave the operational decisions to him as he was the commander of the people who were going to do the operation.

MS MOHAMED: Now you've heard the evidence of Mr Tshika. Do you confirm his evidence insofar as it relates to you?

MR MSIBI: Yes I do.

MS MOHAMED: Now you must also be aware that certain individuals were injured in these explosions?

MR MSIBI: Yes I'm aware.

MS MOHAMED: Do you have any comments to make to them?

MR MSIBI: Basically the comment I want to make is what Mr Tshika has said. I am very sorry whereby civilian population were involved in whatever way, whether they were injured. Fortunately I'm aware that nobody was killed. I'm very sorry to those people and it's very unfortunate that in the kind of war that we were fighting, no matter how we try to avoid such casualties, things of this nature do happen and as I'm saying only to the civilian population, that's where I'm making my apologies.

MS MOHAMED: Mr Msibi, did you derive any personal gain from your involvement in these matters?


MS MOHAMED: And would you say that you acted at all stages with the full concurrence of the ANC structures?

MR MSIBI: That's true.

MS MOHAMED: And in your opinion you were doing - sorry, you were engaging in this type of activity in furthering the policies of the ANC?

MR MSIBI: That is true.

MS MOHAMED: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.


MR MOERANE: No questions.


MS CAMBANIS: No questions, thank you.


MR MAPOMA: I have no questions to this witness, Chairperson.



MS MOHAMED: Thank you Chairperson, may the witness be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: And the previous witness.

MS MOHAMED: Yes Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The two applicants are excused.

MS MOHAMED: Thank you Mr Chairperson.





MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I beg leave to call Mr Raymond Lalla. If I could just have one minute to rearrange seating so that he can be ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Would you like us to leave and we'll just stand outside while you rearrange? Very well.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.

Chairperson, thank you for the indulgence. The next applicant is Mr Raymond Lalla who will testify in English. He has no objection to taking the prescribed oath.

RAYMOND LALLA: (sworn states)

MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, just for the record before we start I beg leave to announce that there are a number of victims in this particular matter. Some of them are behind me and some of them are here. Those who want to ask specific questions, I have asked them to be around here. There are some victims who are seated at the back seat there. Thanks Chairperson.


EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Chairperson.

Mr Lalla, your name appears as the first applicant in the bundle 1, namely Operation Butterfly?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, your application appears under the reference number AM7256/97 at pages 1 to 5 of bundle 1, is that correct?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And if you please turn to page 5 of the bundle, which I'm showing you, on the top is a signature under deponent. Is that in fact your signature?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And do you confirm the contents of the application in the prescribed form?


MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, I notice underneath your signature, it says Commission of Oaths, which has got a signature. Do you see that?


MS CAMBANIS: To the best of your recollection, was this application attested to before a Commission of Oaths on the 10th May as appears on page 5?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And you can't explain why there's no further details relating to the Commission of Oaths?

MR LALLA: That is correct.


MR LALLA: Sir, now if we peruse your prescribed form at page 1, paragraph 7(a), you refer to the fact that you apply as a member of the ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe, is that correct?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And at paragraph 7(b), you state the capacities in which you served at the ANC for the period 1981 to 1990?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, now when we get to page 2 at paragraph 9(a), you were asked to state the acts, omissions or offences for which you applied and without going through the contents of those paragraphs, is that correct that you gave a general description of the acts without specifying specific acts for which you apply?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And can you tell the Committee at that time of filling in you gave such a general description of the acts?

MR LALLA: At that time when the TRC process came into being, there was a lot of confusion about the degrees of responsibility that members of command should accept. After some discussion with the ANC in Shell House, Johannesburg, with Mr Matthew Phosa ...(intervention)

MS CAMBANIS: If I can interrupt? Is that of the ANC, the ANC leader of the party?

MR LALLA: Yes, Mr Phosa of the ANC legal department. The initial recommendation of that stage was that as members of the command, we should apply for amnesty in a very general sense.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes and anything further that was said about a client for amnesty in relation to commanders?

MR LALLA: Oh yes. In regard to commanders is that we were told that we must take responsibility for all operations which were carried out by members of units under our command and basically that's it.

MS CAMBANIS: And in relation to the operatives who acted under your command?

MR LALLA: I was tasked and I was instructed to try and get hold of all people that I considered to have been part of the structures of the ANC and request them to apply for amnesty and I just want to add here, that is why in the applications for Butterfly there was a rush in terms to actually meet the deadline. One of the problems that we had was basically there was a lot of misunderstanding, communication breakdowns in terms of people who had come out from the Island, do they apply for amnesty? What were the levels of responsibility do they take and if you were in a command, if you were not involved in the operation, what responsibility do you take? Those areas were pretty grey at that time.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. But Mr Lalla, as a result subsequent to that there were court cases as so on resulting in so-called blanket amnesty and you were requested by the TRC to give further particularity for the acts for which you apply today?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And you in fact consulted with me regarding this matter and a document found at page 6 and 7 of bundle 1 is the result of that consultation which was forwarded to the TRC?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, you will see that in the bundle, pages 6 and 7 are in fact not signed. You recall that you in fact signed this before a Commissioner of Oaths?

MR LALLA: That is correct, I signed it before a Commissioner of Oaths. I can't remember the date but I did sign it.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I have only a photocopy of the signed further particulars that was commissioned which I will hand in afterwards. I'm not sure how this happened.

MR LAX: Do you in any event confirm the contents before us?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. So when we get to the further particularity, is it correct that today you are asking the Committee to grant you amnesty in respect of three broad categories, namely one, relating to Operation Butterfly in respect of all acts that were carried out by the operatives under the command of Operation Butterfly?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And those are the incidents that are detailed in the summary of bundle 1, incidents 3 to 18? You have had an opportunity to peruse the summary?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And the details of those incidents, you've been present and you've heard the acts that were performed by the various operatives and you accept that that is the modus operandi and the motives of carrying out those operations?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And then secondly, you apply which is stated in the summary at page 1, the car bomb at the Victoria embankment on the 3rd April 1984?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And thirdly you apply for the car bomb in Jacobs on the 12th January 1984?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, if you can start with the car bomb incident one at page 1 of the summary, the Victoria Embankment car bomb. If you could please tell the Committee your involvement in that incident?

Just hold on. Chairperson, I don't know the pagination, it's not paginated. It appears ...(intervention)

MR LAX: It's the first page of the summary.

MS CAMBANIS: That is correct, yes.

MR LAX: Which is in the beginning of the bundle.


MR LALLA: In early 1984 ...(intervention)

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, just hold on?


MR LAX: Okay, please proceed?

MR LALLA: Sometime early in 1984 in Swaziland I was told by the commander of the unit, Tami Zulu, of a special operations unit that will operate within the Natal command.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, I'm going to interrupt you, I'm sorry. You were stationed in Swaziland during the period 1984?


MS CAMBANIS: And as a member of ANC and Umkhonto, what position did you hold in Swaziland at that time?

MR LALLA: In 1984 I was the commander of - not the commander, I was a member of the command but I was the head of military intelligence within our structure.

MS CAMBANIS: Tasked for which area?

MR LALLA: Tasked for the greater Natal area.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes and Mr Tami Zulu that you refer to, what was his position in the Natal machinery?

MR LALLA: He was the overall commander and he was also the representative of the command on the RPMC in Swaziland.

MS CAMBANIS: The RPMC meaning?

MR LALLA: The Regional Political Military Council.

MS CAMBANIS: For the Natal?

MR LALLA: For all forward activities that were responsible, that operated from Swaziland into South Africa.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, sorry just to clarify that and then if you can go back? You met in 1984 with Mr Tami Zulu? Please proceed?

MR LALLA: Yes. I think perhaps let me go a bit earlier. In 1983 I was abroad and I had undergone training. During that period there was an incident that took place which resulted in the death of our Chief of Staff, Zwelie Nyanda, who was the Chief of Staff of Natal Command and why I'm saying this is that I only became aware of the decisions of the structure in early 1984 because I only came back to Swaziland in early 1984. Tami Zulu informed me that there was a structure that will carry out special operations within the Natal Command and that the structure initially was under the command of Zwelie Nyanda and unfortunately, due to the death, of the assassination of Zwelie in Swaziland the project got delayed.

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry to interrupt again, Mr Lalla. The Committee is aware in the submissions by the ANC that there was a part of the ANC that dealt with special operations as such. There's a whole submission on that. Are you referring to something that fell under special operations or are you referring to something different?

MR LALLA: No, this did not fall under special operations. I learnt from Tami Zulu that Zwelie Nyanda was responsible and they had the go ahead from the RPMC - not the RPMC, from the structures in Mozambique at that stage that there will be operations that will be carried out but will be managed directly by Zwelie and may not necessarily fall under the command of Natal Command. There will be very special and very specific operations.

Subsequently, Zwelie unfortunately died and Tami Zulu gave the responsibility for those operations to Ralph who is known as Fear and who was also part of the command. Ralph was also the Chief of Operations in this structure.

MR LAX: His name, just for the record, was Raymond Lawrence.

MR LALLA: I think Raymond Edgar Lawrence, yes.

He was the ...(intervention)

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, I just want to interrupt? In the submissions by the ANC to the TRC, the persons to which you now refer had been set out and the structures and positions they held at page - Chairperson, I thought I knew the bundles better. Chairperson, I will give you that reference later.

Do you recall seeing the structures set out in the submissions?

MR LALLA: I recall seeing the structure and I agree with the structure as drafted by the ANC.

MS CAMBANIS: And the names to which you refer have been set out in the submissions made by the ANC?

MR LALLA: Yes that is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Please proceed?

MR LALLA: And that fear was now going to have the operations but had really done some preliminary work before he had died and one of the candidates that Zwelie had selected to do the operation was a person known as Rabbit and subsequently later on I have come to know his real name as well and that due to Zwelie's circumstances, the operation got delayed and subsequently Fear took over.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, what were the details, what operation? What was supposed to happen, what was the separate operation that was being undertaken?

MR LALLA: The operation was basically to detonate remote control device which is basically a car bomb and the reason why these stringent measures were taking place was basically to, by the command, to identify the suitable person and not to make it public knowledge and not to allow this kind of device to be used randomly.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, if I can just summarise? A decision had already been taken by Mr Nyanda that a separate operation involving car bombs would take place in the Durban area, is that correct?

MR LALLA: That is correct. Subsequently, with Tami Zulu and Rabbit and Fear there were numerous meetings that did take place. When I mean numerous, I mean two or three meetings that did take place and the meetings did not take place in the form of minutes in the conventional sense when we talk about meetings. It's normally discussed in a conspiratorial manner.

MS CAMBANIS: Where did these meetings take place?

MR LALLA: In Swaziland.

MS CAMBANIS: Were you present at these meetings?

MR LALLA: I wasn't present at all the meetings but because of my specialisation as head of intelligence, I was requested to brief him on a range of military targets in the country, in specifically Kwa-Zulu Natal.

MR LAX: Who was him, sorry?

MR LALLA: Rabbit.

MS CAMBANIS: You've just spoken about your specialisation in your structure. To what do you refer?

MR LALLA: As head of intelligence I would have in that process of my capacity have had sufficient information, reports regarding to military, Police structures and also as head of intelligence, I would be able to be in a better position to give advice, technical advice on reconnaissance, on confirmation of movement of target. Not in terms of the operational sense but to tell the operative how to behave and how to understand that environment that he is going into.

MS CAMBANIS: But would you also have gathered information about where the military targets were situated?

MR LALLA: Yes, we had information about where military targets were situated. Yes, I did discuss with him I think a range of about six or seven targets that were based in the Durban, Pietermaritzburg areas and I'm not sure of all the specific targets but some of them I do remember.

MS CAMBANIS: But you were certainly involved in discussing the selection of targets for the car bomb?

MR LALLA: I was involved in giving him a framework to look for a specific target. I was basically telling him these are the military options. The operational requirements in a country in that present situation could not be governed or could not be managed or controlled totally by people on the outside. All we would do was to say these are the options, these are the targets and the operational plan of it, or the implementation of the operational plan would have been done at the localised level and the selection of it, I would not have been involved.

MS CAMBANIS: But the intention was to hit military target?

MR LALLA: The intention was to hit a military target.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes and do you recall which targets were canvassed with Rabbit?

MR LALLA: Yes, the targets were the Natal Command, C R. Swarts, military institution barracks - not barracks, but a military office in Pietermaritzburg, the Bluff Military Base. There was a training college in the Jacobs area. There was also some maintenance depot, which I'm not sure, in the nearby area which was discussed with Rabbit. But there were a few other targets as well.


MR LALLA: And I can't recall some of them.

MS CAMBANIS: And you've just mentioned Jacobs. Is that one of the, in fact the second incident refers to a car bomb in Jacobs?

MR LALLA: Yes, I drew the conclusion that possibly the target that I had suggested was the target that Rabbit had hit.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, is there anything further that you can tell the Committee. You were assisted in the selection of targets, of possible targets? That is your involvement in relation to the car bombs. Is there any other information or facts that you can disclose to the Committee relating to the actualisation of these missions?

MR LALLA: In relation to the actualisation of the missions is not much but I think I should just put on record here that in 1994 or 1995 I was temporarily based in Pretoria and I was working for the PAC. I met Rabbit on occasions at Shell House, two occasions and I told him to apply for amnesty. I don't know why he hasn't applied. He had given me the assurance that he would have applied for amnesty. But what I must say, he was in a state and I think he was intimidated by the process.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, then Mr Lalla, if we can then move on to the operation, what I call the third set of acts for which you apply for amnesty, namely Operation Butterfly. If you would please brief the Committee on the events leading up to the formation?

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps it would be better if you were to do that after the adjournment, in regard to the time. How long do you want the adjournment for?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, we've had many adjournments. As short as possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Did the time yesterday suit you or forty minutes or do you think we could take thirty minutes?

MS CAMBANIS: At the risk of alienating everyone, I'd say thirty minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: Would that suit you?

MR MAPOMA: I would prefer forty five, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Well we'll settle between and say forty minutes. We will adjourn till twenty to two.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chairperson.




MS CAMBANIS: (cont) Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Lalla, previously I couldn't refer the Committee to the pages where the structures to which you refer are set out. During the lunch adjournment we have looked at the ANC's second submission to the TRC and if you look at page 46 of that submission you'll see the structures set out, 83 to 85. Page 46 of the second submission to the TRC and at page 48 of the same second submission, at the bottom of the page "Natal Urban refers to Mr Tami Zulu," is that correct?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And the structures for the period 1985 to 1990 are set out at page 50 of the same submission and at page 53, again the leaders are set out and again Tami Zulu's name appears at that page?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And that is the structures to which you referred in your evidence?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, when the further particulars were prepared there was also an annexure to those particulars referring to the car bomb at the Victoria Embankment which should have been annexed as annexure B to the further particulars and which refers to page 102 of the ANC's second submission to the TRC.

Chairperson, in the third column, it's got the date the 3rd April 1984, where it is listed as the car bomb at Victoria Embankment. It's appendix 5, it reads:

"Arms actions for which target category and/or responsibility is uncertain is listed"

Are you aware of that Mr Lalla?

MR LALLA: I'm aware of that.

MS CAMBANIS: And the bomb referring to Jacobs Street could not be, as far as our perusal, where it was not located in this ANC submissions?

MR LALLA: I'm aware of that.

MS CAMBANIS: Before the adjournment we were turning to the acts in terms of Operation Butterfly, Mr Lalla, and I was asking if you could just brief us on the events leading up to the formation of Butterfly, Operation Butterfly.

MR LALLA: Operation Butterfly started round about 1982/1983. In fact at that stage no conceived it to be as big as what it was eventually. In 1982 a medical student left the country and his name was Charles Ndaba and he met with the chief of staff of our command who was also a former medical student and Natal University.

MS CAMBANIS: To whom do you refer?

MR LALLA: Sorry?

MS CAMBANIS: With whom did he meet?

MR LALLA: He met with Zwelie Nyanda who was also a former medical student at the University of Natal and in the process the name Butterfly emerged because Zwelie passed a remark, "it's time the medical students stopped dissecting butterflies and get involved in political activities". That's how the name emerged to Butterfly. I was present when that discussion was taking place, I was present when we conceptualised the Butterfly process at that time and the Butterfly issue at that time was basically to centre around creating structures, underground cells in the great Durban area but using the Alan Taylor Residence as perhaps some sort of headquarters and in that earlier period Charles met up with various individuals together with Zwelie who had come from the Natal University. I'm not sure of all of them and I think some of them have fallen by the wayside in the sense that they got interested and they later got disinterested. But eventually a corps remained and I think that corps comprised of Vejanand Ramlakan, Vulameni Khate and a few others and because they had set up some embryonic structures or cells in the area, at that stage they had no mandate to carry out military operations, they did not have the infrastructure or the training to have military operations. A decision was taken by the command, that is by the commander Tami Zulu together with all of us. We felt that it would have been suitable to send a trained cadre into the country. The trained cadre that we sent into the country was Mduduzi Sithole.

MS CAMBANIS: That is the person who is also referred to as Belgium?

MR LALLA: Yes, that's the late comrade Belgium. He had gone into the country and he had further developed the structures into a wide range of networks but at this stage I'm not sure whether arms were sent into the country to the infrastructure or not because it was being managed between Charles Ndaba and Zwelie. Subsequently, the structure began getting into some sort of formation. By that I mean is that from the reports, from the verbal communication we were getting is that we had some sort of large grouping of people who have basically followed certain principles, underground working principles and which we could regard as a fully fledged structure.

Belgium, while he went into the country, was also instructed to train and to teach people how to create DLBs, to train people in terms of showing them how to use explosives and on that basis I can say that explosives were sent into the country but I didn't know about it.

MS CAMBANIS: So at that stage, the late Mr Sithole was engaged in training people inside the country?


MS CAMBANIS: And probably explosives and arms were being brought into the Natal area?


MS CAMBANIS: That time as well, yes. Please proceed?

MR LALLA: Subsequently there was a major chain of events in Southern Africa within the ANC itself and internally within the South African environment. When I mean internally, the political situation internally. We found that a mergence of popular and actions that were taking place. These are the formation of the UDF, COSATU, all beginning to take some form of semblance at that stage. Externally we are pressurised by the signing of the Nkomati Accord and the repercussions the Nkomati Accord, on our very presence in Swaziland, in Mozambique and perhaps to other front-line States and on the basis of that, we had to speed up the process of trying to create an environment whereby the leadership that was based in Swaziland and in Mozambique will be located into the country. Subsequently, due to various reasons we felt that due to sometimes unclear responses of target selection, you must take into account that you never had reports coming out on a daily basis, telling us what these operations were about, but we would get reports via the media, via a few weeks later, sometimes months later and what have you and we had to try and clarify. So sometimes, with due respects to my comrades, in the Butterfly project we at that stage didn't have the privilege to know what they have said over here today and yesterday. We at that stage felt that there were some shortcomings within the structure in terms of target selection. On the basis of that, one of our most experienced cadres were sent into the country in the name of Sibosiso Ndlasi who is also known as Sihle and he was sent into the country to try and ...(intervention)

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, if I can just interrupt? In this application he is listed as Mr Mbongwa?



MR LALLA: Okay, I'm sorry about that. He had his briefing and his mandate was clear in terms of the operational command was based - the operational mechanics was this, was that TZ would brief them on aspects of what was required.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, TZ refers to?

MR LALLA: Tami Zulu, sorry. Tami Zulu would brief them on the overall intention of the Butterfly Project. We would come in on certain aspects and I will discuss my aspects. I met with Sihle and I subsequently also met with Vejanand Ramlakan and Lulamele Pate at different periods and different times to discuss with them the whole concept of cells, how cells should operate, what are the security precautions that needed to be taken and also reconnaissance and target selection and that was basically my role with the Butterfly project.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, you confirm the evidence of Dr Ramlakan and Mr Mbongwa that they did meet with you in Swaziland whereas Dr Ramlakan says the theory of targets was discussed with you?

MR LALLA: Yes I concur with that.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. Did you want to follow up on your contact with Mr Mbongwa before I interrupted you?

MR LALLA: No, not really. I think when Mr Mbongwa went in, I can't remember the times and the dates but I would think most probably mid to late 1985. I was present at one meeting where he was briefed about the APMCs and the structures and how the command visualised how the structures should unfold. But right throughout the period I think it would be fair to say that one must not exonerate itself from the responsibilities but we factually couldn't discuss each and every target while we were there. A lot of discussion was left from the individual head to take those target selections but we knew they were going into the country, we knew they were armed and we knew they were going to carry out explosions and we knew they would engage in operational activities and tragically we also in some ways knew that civilians would lose their lives in the process.

MS CAMBANIS: Even although the objective was to avoid and minimise, it was inevitable and you foresaw that deaths and injuries could result from these operations?

MR LALLA: Yes, I think one thing, perhaps my other comrades and colleagues have not raised and which I think should be raised over here, is that we gave our lives. It wasn't just we were involved in operational activities, we are prepared to sacrifice our lives to liberate this country and I salute all of them. They were the most disciplined, organised formation and I'm proud of them. The tragic reality was that we were engaged to remove the apartheid order and unfortunately, we live with people and that's the painful reality.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, from that can we gather that you yourself did not receive any personal material gain as a result of the activities within the ANC and Umkhonto?

MR LALLA: No, we haven't and in this point as well as a member of the command I would also say that to my comrades and to my colleagues who have been part of this structure, that you have sacrificed a lot. Sometimes I cannot imagine the difficulties that you have been through, you'll have left families, some of you, most of you were very young and you got arrested. You went to the Island, you left breadwinners - some of you were breadwinners and I sympathise. I'm saying that while I sympathise with the casualties, I think on the ANC part and the mass liberation part, we had casualties as well.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, you have perused the submissions by the ANC and the further submission submitted in which the ANC set out the political objectives. Do you associate yourself and is that how you understand the political objective of the ANC and MK?

MR LALLA: Totally.

MS CAMBANIS: And in all these, would that be the car bombs or the acts performed in terms of Operation Butterfly, was there any personal agenda on behalf of yourself of the operatives?

MR LALLA: Absolutely no personal agenda.

MS CAMBANIS: No personal malice?

MR LALLA: No personal malice.

MS CAMBANIS: Finally, Sir, we are aware that the families of persons who tragically died in the car bomb explosions at Victoria Embankment and Jacob Streets are present and regarding their pain and loss you've spoken about your comrades' pain and loss. Is there something you would like to address and the other side?

MR LALLA: I think for me to justify the taking of any live and this is my personal opinion. It goes perhaps even slightly beyond the ANC's perception. I cannot justify the taking of anybody's life but I have to contextualise it. I won't find any excuses. All I would say is that I deeply regret your losses and if somewhere perhaps the lives could have been avoided and pain could have been removed, I just don't know what to say but perhaps just plainly sorry.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, if you can inform the Committee that one of the difficulties amongst the families is a personal difficulty with you, that you did not inform them of these operations prior to your applying for amnesty, is that the information that you perceived?

MR LALLA: Yes. I think what you must understand that the structures, I'm accountable to certain structures and I've tried to follow the rule by the law. I also know that there was a lot of enemy penetration but I won't be able to justify it but from the very submissions that have been put at different intervals at the TRC level. But what I can say is that whether at some stage in the future these things are either proven otherwise or one way or the other, I must accept that responsibility at that time and on those facts.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Mr Lalla. That is the evidence of Mr Lalla, thank you Chairperson.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOERANE: Mr Lalla, I will just focus on one issue and that concerns the matter have touched on, that's target selection and target organisation. Now what principles or policies informed target selection?

MR LALLA: I think basically to prevent loss of lives, to look at moments whereby we can create the biggest impact but with minimal damage but what I must clarify over here, I fully appreciate the question that you asked. I am not saying that Butterfly's choice of targets were incorrect but what I was saying, I did not have the privilege to hear the submissions that were made today. Some of the members of Butterfly were able in a very coherent way to justify their own operational circumstances and I can understand the difficulty in operational situations that they made these choice of targets. But at that time when it came out in the media and we didn't have that frequent report back, we viewed certain things as perhaps without not having the full information as something is wrong somewhere along the line and therefore we brought in Sihle into the process.

MR MOERANE: Would I be correct in saying that firstly the target selection would have to fall within the parameters of the policy of the African National Congress?

MR LALLA: Correct.

MR MOERANE: And the starting point would be political?

MR LALLA: Correct.

MR MOERANE: In other words the target would have to be politically justifiable?

MR LALLA: Correct.

MR MOERANE: And now some of the targets were economic targets, so to speak?

MR LALLA: Correct.

MR MOERANE: Now please tell the Honourable Committee here, what the justification for selecting those targets was?

MR LALLA: Basically to try and sabotage the country in economic terms. These are the oil pipelines, the power installations, which had an impact onto the environment at that specific time.

MR MOERANE: Now at the time and subsequently up to the present time, the ANC is in an alliance with the workers' movement?

MR LALLA: Correct.

MR MOERANE: Did some of the targets have anything to do with an expression of solidarity with the workers' movement, the workers' struggle?

MR LALLA: Correct. In fact as I've reflected with the information that has been presented in the past two days that I would say that all the targets fell within the parameters of the policies and guidelines of the ANC and that I must take responsibility thereof.

MR MOERANE: Yes and finally in the area of command and control, for each target did there have to be some person or persons who were charged with the responsibility of authorising the particular target?

MR LALLA: Not necessarily. Although the commanders, in terms of as both Mr Mbongwa and Mr Ramlakan have indicated, although they had as commanders were able to provide the resources, the logistics and even referrals of targets, for example, because of labour action, the choice of the targets were sometimes and other times dependant upon the individual operative who reconnoitred the scene. The specific choice of the target. But they all fell, in this case, within the parameters of the ANC.

MR MOERANE: Yes, do I understand you therefore to be saying that incident number 17, that's the Chatsworth Magistrate's Court explosion, for instance, incident number 18, Minister Rajbansi’s house is damaged by limpet mine, the incident number 8, two mini-limpet mines exploded at OK Bazaars, limpet mine explosion, incident number 9, Game, incident number 10, Spar Foodliner, 27th September, incident number 11, incident at Checkers, incident number 12, Executive Hotel. I'll skip 13 for the time being and incident number 14, the Mobeni Post Office, incident number 15, VW Kombi, that you have heard about. Are you saying that all those were perfectly legitimate targets and they fell within the policy, aims and objectives of the African National Congress?

MR MOERANE: What I'm saying is that in the circumstances in which the individual operatives explained this, you must take into account that I came to know of the operations after it had happened but in the circumstances in which the individual operatives have explained it, I cannot distance myself from those operations because I was in command, I knew that arms were going into the country, I knew that trained personnel were going into the country and I'm saying in those circumstances, I would say they fell within the parameters of the ANC policy.

MR MOERANE: Yes, well as you know the Grosvenor Girls School incident was a bit of a mishap because the people who were going to plant that limpet mine got themselves blown up. In any event it appears that the intention was to disrupt the polling station?


MR MOERANE: Had they succeeded in planting that device there and then at night before the polling would begin the following day, would that have been also within the policy?

MR LALLA: That is correct. I think what I must point out over here is that during my application process I've made specific references to me communicating with the individual commanders and if the individual commanders take responsibility of the operations that took place under their command then I will accept such responsibility. If Dr Ramlakan and Sihle have accepted responsibility and I have communicated with them to carry out operations, I'm saying I will accept that responsibility.

MR MOERANE: Yes, Sihle is also a doctor. No, no, Dr Dlomo, I'm sorry.

MR LALLA: Dr Dlomo, yes.

MR MOERANE: Yes. No further questions, Chairperson.


MS MOHAMED: Chairperson, I have no questions, thank you.


MR LAX: Mr Govansamy, you look as if you are going to ask some questions, do I get it correctly?


MR LAX: Would you just state your full names for the record please?

MR GOVANSAMY: I'm Hugon Adam Gary Govansamy and I'm being assisted by my family friend, Clive Govender.

MR LAX: Just for the record, you are the brother of one of the deceased in incident one, is that correct?


MR LAX: Please continue?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR GOVANSAMY: Raymond Lalla, we want to remind you that you are under oath. Remember there cannot be reconciliation without truth. We urge you to tell us the truth. I've been battling for sixteen years to find the truth. I come to the TRC regularly. I report on it. I speak to all kinds of people from comrades to the enemy to find the truth. If you don't want to tell us the truth we will oppose this application of yours, demand for your suspension from the Police Force where you are a very big man and demand that you be prosecuted and charged for murder.

Mr Lalla, do you know me?

MR LALLA: I've got to know you today.

MR GOVANSAMY: As head of Intelligence in this province, Police Intelligence?

MR LALLA: I don't know you, it's not my job. I mean I think we must not be paranoid to some degree, that expect how the old Police Services worked, we would work that way. But I'm aware of the circumstances around your family, I'm aware and like you are, you are also aware of my background as well.

MR GOVANSAMY: I'm still trying to find out some of your background.


MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Lalla, why are you applying for amnesty?

MR LALLA: I am applying for amnesty - firstly, firstly let me just start off this. I think perhaps I can understand your apprehension, I can understand your anger, I can understand the questioning. I was in the Natal Command until 1985. I left in 1986, 1985, 1986. I left the Natal Command. Then there were a series of other people that were with those structures. When we came back home, unfortunately most members of that command were killed, were killed in one way or another and I had to try and pick up the pieces because I had to ensure that my colleagues, the comrades that I worked with will not be left out of the process of amnesty. I was aware of the incident, I'm not denying it.

MR GOVANSAMY: When did you become aware of this incident?

MR LALLA: I was aware of the incident I would say around about 1987. No, 1984 to I would say '84/'85. '85, early '85. I knew there was an explosion. I did not know the casualties. I was arrested in Swaziland and I was sent to Tanzania.


MR LALLA: When we lived in the front-line State we were all regarded as illegal immigrants. We did not have - you must think of it as we were all regarded as refugees. The pressure on the South African Government on the front-line States to arrest us, detain us, harass us and if you go to track the Swazi Prison records, Police records, you'll be able to notice certain - in that period of time I was in Swazi jail and I was deported to Tanzania. I'm not saying at the time of the operation, I'm saying subsequently after that. I knew Rabbit went into the country. I knew there was going to be an operation. I'm not denying that.

MR GOVANSAMY: When did you decide to apply for amnesty?

MR LALLA: Sorry?

MR GOVANSAMY: When did you decide to apply for amnesty?

MR LALLA: I applied for amnesty in terms of the instructions of the ANC before the amnesty, on the basis of what my role as a commander, I applied for amnesty. I don't have the exact date but I would think it's in ...(intervention)

MR GOVANSAMY: You had the first application?

MR LALLA: The first application, yes.

MR GOVANSAMY: And then subsequently you applied after?

MR LALLA: Yes, which I mentioned in the hearing on the process.

MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Lalla, you mentioned meeting Rabbit on two occasions in Shell House?


MR GOVANSAMY: And both those occasions you tried to get Rabbit to apply for amnesty. Why did it stop at two occasions?

MR LALLA: He told me he had applied for amnesty. What you must take into account, that now we were at home, there was no Umkhonto weSizwe, there was no structures, there was no commanded control. We are now left on our own to pick up the pieces. How do I have responsibility of an individual when the structure legally has folded?

MR GOVANSAMY: No, fair enough. Surely as a commander, as a man from Intelligence, whatever that may mean in your terms, ...(indistinct) people, surely in you have some recourse to finding those people again? Your soldiers, people who you put into place?

MR LALLA: I have said that I went to him, I told him to apply, he told me he had applied. In the process be there a year, two years later or three years later, I learnt he never applied because we were waiting for the process. On numerous occasions, through my lawyer, we tried to pressurise the TRC to bring these hearings as soon as possible. Now I can be held responsible to some extent. Maybe you can ask me the question, is that why didn't I come to you?

MR GOVANSAMY: I will come back to that, I will come to that at some stage.

MR LALLA: But I think it's important that we deal with it here because there are a lot of other people who have suffered and I'm think I'm not taking away the suffering from you and I fully share and I fully appreciate your circumstances. The reality was that do I pick and choose or do I wait for a legal process to take it's course. I took the choice for whatever right reasons, for whatever wrong reasons, to allow the legal process to take its course and that's what I have done.

MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Lalla, we are talking about a process of reconciliation. How on earth do you expect me to believe you want to reconcile with me, which I totally believe in, I believe in the system of reconciliation. How do you tell me that you are waiting for this process to come sixteen years after the death of my brother? Eight years after you came back from exile, five years after we went to the TRC and made an application to say that we're looking for the persons responsible for this atrocious act. How do you tell me you're waiting for a process when Mrs Pillay here says she's got no food in the house to eat? How do you expect me to believe that you want to reconcile when you never cared about us?

MR LALLA: Well let me answer the question and once again I'm saying that I understand your anguish, pain and suffering. I think you must also understand that we have suffered a lot and perhaps nobody can equate the sufferings but everyone has suffered and I think reconciliation is a two way process as well. I think we can't have accusations put on one side and ignore the other. But what I want to explain to you over here, to put your mind at ease. I was released in 1990. I was in detention for about I think six, seven, eight months. I had moved out of the structure, I didn't know where the individuals who were in that former structure were based and I, in the process of time also decided to adopt an approach of say let the facts come out. I was not sure and I was honestly not sure whether by applying for these operations whether I am in fact - whether I should apply for amnesty for this operation. Why was I, I'm not sure. Our command was infiltrated in terms of the ANC submission, that Fear, the chief of operations, worked for the State. I was also aware that both Fear and Rabbit were detained by the ANC but I did not have the privilege of knowing what took place within those interrogations or interviews or whatever. Now what I'm saying to you, you must contextualise. This incident happened in 1984. 1984, I'm not sure?


MR LALLA: 1986 I'm out of the structure, I am now dislocated to Zambia. From Zambia I am tasked to go back into the country, not to go back but to go into the country in 1990 during the time when just for the court purposes of Operation Vula. I had cut off all links because of the way we operated and perhaps, unfortunately, if you were present yesterday, you would have seen how the structures, in fact the principle of need to know, how people would know where they were deployed, what they would know and how they would behave. So I lost contact with Rabbit and the Natal structures effectively from 1986 onwards. And - sorry?

MR GOVANSAMY: You say it's a two way process. You say it's a two way process, you are the perpetrator of the act, you must make that move to go and reconcile with the victims and the victim's family, the next-of-kin?

MR LALLA: I am doing it through this process but I didn't have, subsequently through all the TRC hearings, I wanted to me sure in my own mind. Is it do I apply for amnesty for this? What happened? And I will read here from the ANC's submission, appendix B:

"Armed action for which targets category and/or responsibilities uncertain"

I was not sure and I will read the note on the aspect of car bomb at Victoria Embankment. It's on page 102 of the ANC's second submission to you, I'm not sure whether you're aware of it?

MR GOVANSAMY: I know of it.

MR LALLA: Right and I am saying at this stage I am in the same dilemma as you. I would like to know the truth but the truth to where I am is that I knew there was an operation planned. I did not know the specific targets, I also did not know tragically that your family and other civilians would be present at that scene at that particular time. I cannot explain that. I will not run away from my responsibility, I want to be honest to you and I want to be frank to you and I want you to understand that, that in fact the tragic situation is that both of us and I'm sure all my colleagues over here who worked in Butterfly, all of us want to know the truth about what happened in our command. But for the circumstances I'm saying I was there, I knew the operation and maybe the truth will take two years, maybe the truth will take five years, maybe the truth will take ten years. Maybe the truth is what I say today, I don't know, but what I say today is the truth as how I know it.

MR GOVENDER: Mr Lalla, when did you first become aware that Mr Ramsamy and his wife were killed and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we can have two people questioning him at the same time. You have not been placed on record and I don't think you can interrupt Mr Govansamy as you did. If he has finished his questioning, that's a different matter but at the moment he is the person responsible for the questioning and he was, we were told, being advised by you.

MR GOVANSAMY: Perhaps we should set the record straight, Mr Chairperson. Mr Govender is here to help me in this process and perhaps we should apply to the Committee to allow Mr Govender also to ask questions because my brother needs to ask questions as well.

MR LAX: Mr Govansamy, we don't want to limit you in any way but we also want you to bear in mind that some of the questions you're asking are not pertinent to the process of amnesty. I fully understand they're pertinent to a process of reconciliation and we accept that but we also are a Committee that has huge time limits on our work as you're well aware and I would urge you to try and stick to the issues relevant to the amnesty process as much as possible. I understand that you have your own agenda and I'm not wanting to detract from that but this may not be the appropriate forum.

MR GOVANSAMY: I don't have an agenda as you say, Sir, but I need to find the truth about a matter which is of close concern to me and my family, with a bit of respect.

MR LAX: Yes I understand, I do understand and that's why I'm urging you to couch your questions in a particular way that is germane to this application.

MR GOVANSAMY: Fair enough, thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: Or maybe another thing, if he interrupts you, these proceedings are going to be produced to be typed. Now the people who are producing it are not familiar to your voices, they wouldn't know that it's now the other brother, not the one who started asking. That's why it would be better if you finish and he then comes thereafter and then places himself on record.

MR GOVANSAMY: Thank you, I appreciate that.

Chappies Morabe, do you think we'll be able to find him at some stage?

MR LALLA: I am confident that he is in the Johannesburg area and you'll be able to find him.

MR LAX: Sorry, who is Chappies Morabe?

MR GOVANSAMY: Chappies Morabe, as I understand, is the person ...(intervention)

MR LALLA: Who is known as Rabbit.

MR GOVANSAMY: Better known as Rabbit.

MR LAX: Thank you, that helps us.


MR LAX: I beg your pardon, it is here on page 1 of the summary.


MR GOVANSAMY: How well did you know Fear and Rabbit.

MR LALLA: Relatively quite well. I worked with them from I would say 1981 I worked with Fear, Rabbit I got to know him around about '82/'83, round about that period but fairly well in the sense that I didn't know the background. They came into the ANC and we were told this is your structure, these are your colleagues and we worked and we respected each other. But if you're asking me about the family backgrounds and what have you, ...(intervention)

MR GOVANSAMY: I'm taking about their bona fides, political bona fides.

MR LALLA: Well at that stage, you must also take into account that we were also in a growing phase. It would have been difficult and impossible for me to question anyone bona fides at that stage because they could equally question mine.

MR GOVANSAMY: In terms of the target selections, did you trust them, being chief of intelligence?

MR LALLA: In terms of target selection and in terms of the way we operated in the ANC, I think one thing you must never misunderstand over here is that while we were in exile, in fact the comradeship of the way we got to know each other, even if we didn't know each other from a bar of soap, we had one thing that was uniting us, that one thing that was keeping us alive was to liberate this country and come back home. So the friendship we developed and the comradeship that we developed in those countries wherever we were and under difficult times and under difficult conditions, was something we just didn't look for a spook around every corner. We just, unfortunately the liberation processes, deals with trust, deals with winning over people and sometimes there were shortfalls. We made mistakes in our judgement, in our personal judgement. So if you're asking me did I trust Rabbit? Yes at that stage I did trust Rabbit, I cannot deny that.

MR GOVANSAMY: Sorry, one second Sir?

Do you think there was a shortfall in perhaps the selection of the target at Victoria Embankment?

MR LALLA: I have had subsequently, I tried to follow this thing up. I realise the pain all the families were undergoing and for me to come up over here and say that I'm leaving you an opening to tell the truth, is it that I'm reaching out to you. In relation to the target selection I was informed some years later. I'm saying some years later that the target was a military convoy that was going in both the incidences. In the incident in Victoria Embankment and Jacobs but unfortunately in my briefing and in my preparation for target selection I never did preparation for a moving target. All my preparation was about targets that were physically based at specific locations.

MR GOVANSAMY: Would you have regarded that particular incident as a success?

MR LALLA: No. No, I wouldn't have and I cannot even - it's beyond my wildest imagination if I regard both those incidences as a success. Something was wrong but I was aware of an aspect of it.

MR GOVANSAMY: The ANC wanted to claim responsibility for that particular blast. They told the media we'll issue a statement in a while. When the media contacted them, as I understand, the ANC refused to accept or deny responsibility. Do you know about that?

MR LALLA: I subsequently became aware of the confusion around the incident. But let me tell you how the communication system worked in the ANC, is that for example even if a bomb blast takes place in any place, some chief rep in Tanzania or some chief rep in Nigeria will be phoned and of course, at that stage, the tendency within our structures was that with a little information that you know of this, it was an ANC operation. So if you're asking me did I report to anyone it was an ANC legitimate structure or illegitimate structure, it was the responsibility of the commander at that stage who was Tami Zulu to report to the ANC structures. But what I want to reassure you, is that it would have been too quick if you understand the context of how we worked in the front-line States for us to deliver that message to perhaps the president of the ANC at that stage.

MR GOVANSAMY: You've chosen targets. Now your targets were in many instances soft targets, it was totally contradictory to the ANC policy. How do you explain this?

MR LALLA: I think you must substantiate. I think we went through a process over here where I tried to say how the structure unfolded and I've also tried to give you an understanding that I was at a particular level and that my level where I was I could make certain interventions but I must also appreciate the fact, as the structures, as the underground cell formation evolved, people in those operational situations would be able to explain the specific operations they have done. But for me to just comment on, that they were all wild targets, I think we're far from it. I think my colleagues and my comrades in the ANC have a proud track record of showing that under great pressure, under very, very great pressure that we have resisted that but the tragedy is that like in any war situation, whether it's in Europe, the unfortunate reality is that when Nazi Germany was bombed nobody asked questions. Unfortunately the whole German population were regarded as enemies. I'm not saying for one moment this happened in our case. What I'm trying to make you understand, the tragedy of conflict and the tragedy of war. For me to say to you that this is the ANC and there are clear

boxes and there are clear steps I think will be giving a very simplistic view of how the operational culture worked.

MR GOVANSAMY: Here again I'm talking about the whole reconciliation process. We made that submission at the TRC hearings.


MR GOVANSAMY: When we went there, we said please come along, tell us what happened.


MR GOVANSAMY: You never found the audacity to come to us and say Mr Govansamy, may I speak to your family?

MR LALLA: Mr Govansamy, Mr Govansamy ...(intervention)

MR GOVANSAMY: Hang on a moment, let me speak.

MR LALLA: You're asking three or four questions at the same time.

MR GOVANSAMY: No, no. Okay, answer the questions.

MR LALLA: Yes ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry, what is the question if I may ask because ...(intervention)

MR GOVANSAMY: He's going to answer a question, ask him what he is going to answer.

MR LALLA: He asked me I never found time to visit his family.

MR LAX: What is the point you want to make Mr Govansamy because you've said this to him before already.

MR GOVANSAMY: Yes, I'm emphasising the fact that he didn't come forward. In other words they haven't claimed responsibility as yet for this particular incident.

MR LAX: But that's what this amnesty application is about, it's to claim responsibility for that and I understand that you may have in your own mind and heart a particular timing at which you would have liked that to have happened, but he has given you an answer as to why he didn't do it in the past and it's not going to help to keep asking the same question.

MR GOVANSAMY: It seems like Chappies Morabe, Rabbit, may have to be charged for murder?

MR LALLA: It seems so, yes.

MR GOVANSAMY: What are you going to do as head of Intelligence and this incident happening in your jurisdiction?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I'm very sensitive to the difficulties suffered by the families and I'm reluctant to interfere. Sir, this is an application for amnesty. The family member has indicated that he will oppose my client's application on the basis I assume of not disclosure in that he is lying. I'm not sure what he is supposed to be lying about. That hasn't yet been put, he hasn't told the full truth but I'm objecting to this question because what happens to persons who haven't applied for amnesty is really not within Mr Lalla's knowledge to comment and what his responsibility is to catch non-applicants, Chairperson.

MR LAX: All I can tell you, Mr Govansamy, is that there's a separate section of the National Directorate of Prosecutions based in Pretoria. One of the deputy directors of prosecutions is tasked with following up cases that emanate from this process and that is the appropriate authority to which to put that kind of question. It wouldn't be proper for Mr Lalla to disclose that kind of detail of his workings in his job here in this forum. You can appreciate that surely?

MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Chairperson, I'm talking to you not as a lawyer, I'm talking to as a layman. It's very well to speak about the legal terms and all that goes with it because he's got a legal advisor, perhaps even he's got a senior counsel sitting next to him to advise him on this but I'm talking to you as an ordinary person. Will you help in bringing to book the people who committed this act? That's what I'm saying.


MR GOVANSAMY: Thank you. No questions for the time being, thank you.


MR LAX: Mr Govender, is there anything you may want to ask?


CHAIRPERSON: Will you put yourself on record? Your full names please?

MR GOVENDER: My full name is Clive Govender.

You said in your earlier testimony that this was the most disciplined organised formation and you were proud of them, yet you admit that the Victoria Street Embankment bombing was not a success so is it just possible that ...(intervention)

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, can we just clarify? He was referring to that in relation to Operation Butterfly. That was the evidence, in relation to Operation Butterfly.

MR GOVENDER: Would that include Fear and ...(intervention)

MS CAMBANIS: These are separate incidents that he's testified, the two bomb attacks is not part of Operation Butterfly.

MR GOVENDER: I'm aware of that, what I mean is Fear and Rabbit, would you consider them organised, would you consider them well-disciplined?

MR LALLA: I think at the time, at the time when perhaps without hindsight about information and in our naiveté, I think the answer would be yes.

MR GOVENDER: You were quite young at the time that you were head of military intelligence, you would have been about 24, 25? Is that not an unusual age to become head of military intelligence?

MR LALLA: I can't comment on that.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, sorry, I'm going to have to object again. We're dealing with the South African history which has been repeated ad nauseam, people - we have all seen pictures of eleven year olds and nine year olds who were engaged in the struggle in the '70's who were killed. What the age is ...(intervention)

MR GOVENDER: Ma'am, with due respect, the reason I asked this is, I'm trying to establish whether Mr Lalla perhaps was too young at the time to have made decisions on military targets and that's why there were mistakes made?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, my objection stands.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't have to ask him, you know what his age is. It's on his application, you know what his age would have been at that time? If you wish to argue that someone at that age is too young to have made such decisions you can argue it.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, it was perhaps my fault, I'm one person who didn't ask how old Mr Lalla was.

CHAIRPERSON: Well it's on his application form.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. Well it should be.

MR LAX: Mr Govender, if you want to put to the witness that he was too young to exercise the kind of judgement and authority that someone in that position may have - you can put it to him and then argue it in due course. He may comment on it.

MR GOVENDER: I'd just like a response on whether, with hindsight, do you consider yourself as too young perhaps at that stage to have made such a decision?

MR LALLA: In the struggle for national liberation, people made choices. They were choices at very young age. People died, people were killed, people made sacrifices and I for one moment do not doubt that perhaps in the context of greater military theory that perhaps I would have learnt more. But what I'm saying here is that if you question that, you have to take into account that I gave my life at a very young age to the national liberation of this country and I was prepared to do it at any cost. So I think my age in this matter perhaps to appease you to answer the question that the way you want it answered, I do not think I was too young. I think I made the right choices at a very early age to liberate this country.

CHAIRPERSON: If one compares your age with the other applicants you were by no means a young man, were you?


MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Lalla, just for clarity sake, was it standard operating procedure to send your operatives to bomb ostensibly military targets without you knowing the specifics as a commander?

MR LALLA: As I reflected in both the situation of Butterfly and in this specific incidences, it was very hard for us to advise people on the ground which way to approach the target which we got. You must take into the account we were living outside, thousands of miles away and that the terrain, the operational situation changes and when there are opportunities to do such an operation, we would expect that the cadres that carried out the operation carry out with all the necessary precautions and that's my answer.

MR GOVENDER: You're saying you knew their military backgrounds, you trust their political bona fides. There was no communication between these operatives and yourself at the end of the day? They basically did - the target selection was their own selection?


MR GOVENDER: And there was no come back to you? You had no knowledge they would place this bomb on Victoria Embankment for example?

MR LALLA: I would know it after the fact. That's how all the modus operandis worked, is that in some cases perhaps some people under certain specific conditions could have preplanned certain operations that fell generally within the mandate of the special operations unit. But in the cases where we were developing cells and armed struggles and a lot of the responsibility lied on the individual and on his capacity to actually look at the vulnerable points at a specific target and to take that right decision at that right moment. I do not for a fact know that perhaps 6 o'clock in the morning would have been ideal, I could say in probabilities of generalities of in the sense, in a broad sense, that I would say we try and minimise civilian casualties but the person who will determine that would be the operative that actually does the situation, that carries out the operation.

MR GOVENDER: But you would have advised him or them, nonetheless?


MR GOVENDER: That placing a bomb at 7.30 in the morning would endanger civilians particularly seeing that this was the rush hour, this was community traffic?

MR LALLA: Placing a bomb at any time would cause the loss of lives of civilians. I would say that to them. I would also say to them try and minimise - not minimise, try and avoid the loss of lives. But I have to understand the context and you have to understand the context that we - you can't limit war. War is something that no one can limit and it's something that all of us must hate but the tragic reality, we had to liberate this country and these were the forces that motivated me.

MR GOVENDER: Mr Lalla, when did you first become aware that Mr Ramsamy and his wife were killed and the fact that Mr Ramsamy was a black consciousness activist, a member of the BBC and SASOL?

MR LALLA: I would say round about '85/'86 at the time when he made the submission to the TRC.

MR LAX: Sorry, you said '85/'86, you mean ...(intervention)

MR LALLA: Oh, '95/'96. Sorry, sorry, my apologies.

MR GOVENDER: And according to your testimony you returned in 1990 so you would have - you first became - sorry, I've just lost the dates. When did you first become aware? In '94/'95?

MR LALLA: I knew there was an operation. I did not know the casualties of the operation but I came to know the casualties of the operation in 1995, I'm not sure when you made your submission, and 1996.

MR LAX: It would have been 1996. The Truth Commission only started working in this province from about April 1996.

MR LALLA: I would say 1996.

MR GOVENDER: I think what my colleague, Mr Govansamy, was trying to establish earlier is that you knew about it in '96, you knew about his submission to the TRC and it's taken you four years and you've never made any overtures towards his family, particularly seeing that this was an anti-apartheid activist that was killed by one of your operatives?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I object. He has answered this question at least on two previous occasions.

MR GOVENDER: Just for the sake of clarity?

MR LALLA: I think I've answered it in different ways. I think perhaps if you want to know why didn't I come to you ...(intervention)

MR GOVANSAMY: Particularly in this case, seeing as his brother was an anti-apartheid activist. You know even if he was a torturer, for example, then I'd understand your reluctance in seeking reconciliation, but here was an anti-apartheid activist who was killed, who was an innocent victim of a bomb by one of your operatives. So surely that reconciliation process should have taken place even sooner, the minute you found out for example, that's what I'm trying to establish.

MR LALLA: I understand your grief in this matter but I want to refer to my earlier - I was not sure whether this was a false flag operation, I was not sure whether it was an operation that went accidentally wrong, but what I'm sure is what I know and what I did was that I asked Rabbit to apply and I did not know at that stage his application, he did not send in an application. So what I'm saying is that I tried to pursue the matter about - I'm not sure, I think it's over a year ago, to find out what is happening about the case. I even pursued our lawyers, my lawyer. I also tried to put pressure on the TRC to facilitate in rushing up this thing so that perhaps it would help, but I found it slightly uneasy and hard and difficult to come up and say to one specific family and there are other people who have lost their lives and there are other people whose contributions I may not know about. So I thought the best thing to do was to come open, be truthful and open at a forum like this where everyone has the same sense of understanding as to what happened about the problem because my own experiences show me that sometimes you discuss with one individual here and one individual there and one individual there and there are various interpretations of these things and my own personal background, I thought this was the correct forum to raise it.

MR GOVENDER: Did you at any time send anyone to speak to the Govansamy family? Did you instruct anyone?

MR LALLA: I have approached people to speak to the family.

MR GOVANSAMY: Perhaps you can give the Commission details?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, Chairperson ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: This has nothing to do with his application for amnesty, that is what we are hearing?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, if I can suggest, it's been mentioned that they do not have legal representation. Mr Mapoma is present. Perhaps if we could take an adjournment, Mr Mapoma would be able to instruct the family more fruitfully on how to proceed in opposing this application?

MR LAX: Can I make a subtly different suggestion that it certainly seems to me as a person observing this from a neutral position, for the parties to have a discussion would be a useful thing and to do that privately, perhaps with the other victims being present. I would certainly - and I've seen these processes work in other hearings. If you would all be willing, I would suggest that you do that as soon as we finish our proceedings today. It may be a much more intimate and useful exercise than trying to do it in the glare of the public eye where people find themselves unable to say things that they may be willing to say in private for a whole range of reasons. I would urge you to consider that possibility.

MR GOVENDER: We accept.

MR LAX: You'd be happy with that? Would you like to take a few minutes to discuss any other issues with Mr Mapoma that are material or relevant to the actual amnesty application itself? He may just give you some advice on the legal technical issues that you may want to raise or not raise as opposed to issues of reconciliation?

MR GOVENDER: That is why we said in the very beginning that we are not lawyers, ...(indistinct) reconciliation process.

MR LAX: No, no, we understand that. So I mean would it assist if we took a ten minute adjournment and you spoke to Mr Mapoma about that aspect?




CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAPOMA: Mr Lalla, I understand that these two operations, that is the bombing of the Victoria Embankment and the car bomb in Jacobs are said to be operations of MK?


MR MAPOMA: And from your evidence you said the intended targets that you discussed was Victoria Embankment and a military base in Jacobs, am I correct?

MR LALLA: That's not correct.

MR MAPOMA: What is the correct position?

MR LALLA: I said I discussed fixed targets in and around the Durban and Pietermaritzburg area but I did not discuss any target about the Victoria Embankment.

MR MAPOMA: Okay. There are targets that you did make a list of, now when you were giving evidence in chief that they were discussed. I mean they were talked about. What are those targets if I may remind you?

MR LALLA: I think it was Natal Command, it was CR. Swarts, it was a military office in the Midlands area, it was the Bluff military base, it was the training college, a police training college in the Durban area and it was also some maintenance, army maintenance depot in the Jacobs area.

MR MAPOMA: Now ...(intervention)

MR LALLA: I'm sorry, in the Meerbank area.

MR MAPOMA: Okay. Nothing in the Jacobs area?

MR LALLA: No there were, I recall that we discussed the Police Training Base in the Jacobs area.

MR MAPOMA: Yes and that was agreed to be the target, well the legitimate target so to speak?

MR LALLA: What I will consider that all the targets that we highlighted were military and police targets and they fell within the parameters of legitimate targets within the ANC.

MR MAPOMA: Yes and now this car bomb, how far is it where it took place from the - I'm talking about the car bomb that took place on the 12th July 1984 in Jacobs on Bluff Road. How far was it from the target that was talked about in Jacobs?

MR LALLA: Okay, I wouldn't know offhand but I what I want to say is that I discussed the physical target and the operative subsequently has said that he hit a moving target, but what I'm saying here is that he determined the target itself.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you told us that you did not select any moving targets?


CHAIRPERSON: The targets you selected were fixed?

MR LAX: Perhaps I could correct that? You didn't select any targets, you gave them a range of possible targets and intelligence about some of those targets, you also said there were others that you couldn't even remember that you may have discussed. But you made it clear, as I understood your evidence, that individual selection was to be done on the ground at the appropriate time?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: Yes, you see I'm asking this question because I want to get it. What link is it, that you have, you yourself personally with these particular incidents? What liability can be attached to you?

MR LALLA: I think the liability as I explained earlier on is that I was aware of car bombs that were going to take place in the Durban area. I was aware of the individual who was going to - I discussed with him some targets. My liability stems from the fact that at the end of the day I cannot deny or I cannot lie and state that I was unaware of all these details and therefore I have no liability. I was aware that these operations were going to be conducted.

CHAIRPERSON: Does being aware give you liability?

MR LALLA: I think it's debatable, I won't try and tread onto some legal dynamics, I'm sure that you are more au fait with it, but in this particular situation is that I am also presently a Police officer and when a crime is committed and when you know that you conspired to commit a crime and suddenly half way along the line you say that no, I didn't do this but I did that. If there are three robbers going into a shop and one robber says "oh, it's the others, the three of them robbed the shop", at the end of the day what I'm trying

to put to the Commission is that I consider it in this case being aware, being actively aware of it, knowing the individuals, knowing that these operations did take place,

I consider it as having liability in the circumstances.

MR MAPOMA: And you knew of it only after these incidents took place, not before?

MR LALLA: I knew there was going to be a car bomb. I'm saying I knew beforehand there was going to be a car bomb.

MR MAPOMA: No, no, no, what I'm ...(intervention)

MR LALLA: What I'm not saying or what I concede is that I may not have known that this is the specific target but I knew there was going to be a car bomb or two car bombs.

MR MAPOMA: I see and Fear and Rabbit, were they reporting to you?

MR LALLA: No, Fear reports to Tami Zulu and Rabbit was reporting to Fear because Fear was the Chief of Operations.

MR MAPOMA: And naturally you did not instruct Fear and Rabbit to conduct these operations?

MR LALLA: No, that's not naturally. Well in a way I did not have any powers to instruct them as such but as being part of a grouping that conspired to carry out operations, I accept my share of responsibility in that process.

MR MAPOMA: I see and now from the victims point of view they want to find out that if your intended targets were fixed targets, how come then that moving targets were bombed?

MS CAMBANIS: Surely - sorry, Chairperson, I must object. Surely that is not a question properly put to Mr Lalla. Surely that is a question that can only be answered by the operative that was on the ground as Mr Lalla has explained repeatedly.

CHAIRPERSON: Unless Mr Lalla was told by the operative?

MS CAMBANIS: I think ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lalla, were you told why they decided to choose moving targets?


MR MAPOMA: And if your intended targets were fixed targets, how come that you take responsibility for that which was not intended?

MR LALLA: Because I knew there was a car bomb going into the country and whether the car bomb could have been either at a fixed place or here at mobile place, there could have been casualties.

MR MAPOMA: Can it be fairly put that these targets which were ultimately hit were in fact wrong targets?

MR LALLA: I think it's a bit difficult for me to answer that question. I think the best person to answer the question was Rabbit himself and Rabbit perhaps could provide some explanation as to why and whether the legitimacy of it or not, but in my personal opinion, looking from afar, a lot of civilians lost their lives and personally I'm not sure whether I can call it a legitimate target.

CHAIRPERSON: You say a lot of civilians lost their lives, were more than one cars involved in this car bomb?

MR LALLA: In the cases I'm talking about ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Victoria Embankment?

MR LALLA: And Jacobs. In the Victoria Embankment I think there were three people who lost their lives and in the Jacobs ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well there were three killed and twenty injured according to the summary we have?


CHAIRPERSON: So it would seem that there were a number of vehicles involved?

MR LAX: Sorry. I don't know if there were a number of vehicles involved but the bomb certainly injured a great many people. Do you know the specifics of that bomb? If we take the Victoria Embankment one, do you know how that bomb was manufactured and what went into it and what was actually used?

MR LALLA: All I know is that a remote control device was used to detonate the bomb.

CHAIRPERSON: I think while we're talking about this, we put on record that the Jacobs one killed five people and injured twenty seven?

MR LAX: Yes, what I'm asking is were there more than one car bomb?

MR LALLA: I think ...(intervention)

MR LAX: I mean in each incident?

MR LALLA: No, no, to my knowledge there were two separate car bombs on two separate days and at two separate places. So when I'm sort of responding, I'm unfortunately making the ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Making assumptions about what happened?

MR LALLA: Just giving the ...(indistinct).

CHAIRPERSON: Can you tell me, I may be wrong on this. As I understand car bombs, it means a car filled with explosive devices and a detonator or detonating device of some sort. It is not a simple bomb, the whole vehicle is part of the car bomb, a great deal of explosives can be used?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MR LAX: Mr Lalla, while Mr Mapoma is busy. As I understand it, looking at the generality of what you're applying for, to put it very simply, you were part of a team that briefed an operative or operatives?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MR LAX: You sketched the policy parameters, you sketched some of the detail of potential targets?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MR LAX: And you gave them a general instruction to go in and do what soldiers do?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MR LAX: And for that you're taking responsibility?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, did you go further than that? I also see that arrangements were made to supply the firearms, explosives or whatever was needed?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MR LAX: Yes, when we use the word "you", you and the rest of your command structure?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MR LAX: That's how I understand your application?

MR LALLA: That is correct.

MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, I have no further questions but I would like just to place it on record at this point that when time comes for the case for the victims I have got one of the victims who wants to make a statement before the Committee, addressed to the applicant. Thank you.


MS CAMBANIS: No re-examination, thank you Chairperson.


CHAIRPERSON: I take it that in the light of what we've just been told you are not asking for this applicant to be excused at this stage?

MS CAMBANIS: No. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you leading any more evidence?

MS CAMBANIS: No, that is the entire evidence in relation to this applicant's application, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that concludes all the evidence led on behalf of applicants in connection with what I think should be regarded as one series of applications. Do you agree, Mr Mapoma? Do you agree that we consider all those applications as one, one of a series?


CHAIRPERSON: And that the question now becomes, do the victims or implicated parties wish to give evidence, make

representations or anything of that nature and you have informed that at least one of the victims wishes to give evidence?

MR LAX: Or to make a statement.

CHAIRPERSON: Make a statement or give evidence, which is it.

MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, I'm calling Mrs Pillay to the stand. She's a mother to one of the deceased persons.

MR LAX: Mrs Pillay, do you want to make a statement under oath or do you just want to make a statement from where you sit? It's up to you?

CHAIRPERSON: He said he is calling her.

MR LAX: Your answer please?

MRS PILLAY: I want to speak to Mr Lalla.

MR LAX: You just want to make a statement to Mr Lalla without taking the oath? You've not going to testify as such?


MR LAX: Could we just have your full names for the record please?

MRS PILLAY: Mrs G Pillay.

MR LAX: G for?

MRS PILLAY: Govindamma Pillay.

MR LAX: Would that be G-O-V-I-N-D-A-M-A-H?




MR LAX: Please go ahead, Mrs Pillay?

MRS PILLAY: Mr Lalla, I would like to ask you these questions but I don't want to do it because already Mr Govansamy asked you so it's senseless me asking you the same thing over and over. You know I've lost a son at the age of 18 in a bomb blast. When I saw it over the T.V. I didn't realise that it was my son because I saw him split, not realising that it was my son. But afterwards, after he didn't return home I went looking for him and I couldn't find him but the next thing they said I must go to the mortuary but unfortunately I couldn't go, the members of the family and my husband went. But it was so bad, because I saw it on the T.V. and I knew that when they came back and they told me, I said I saw my son the way he was split because the bomb was so heavily - and after they said okay, they must arrange for the funeral. They arranged for the funeral but my heart was so sore. I don't know what they raked up whether it was my baby, my son or whether it was just stones because it was sealed in a box. In any case we did his funeral. At that point of time I was actually battling, I had to stop my son from school to go and work and support me and there were twin boys. I'm not saying you were blamed for the other boy also. After three years my other son was murdered. That's his twin brother. He was also murdered and up till today I never get the killer and neither for the first one but today only I got to see you after sixteen years. My pain is brought all back, my memories, losing those two boys. I want you to tell me what am I supposed to do because I don't have no sons. Every parent has a hope in their sons. In my case I don't have a son, I don't have a husband that is working. What am I supposed to do? I want you to tell me what am I supposed to do in a case like this.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, with your indulgence if Mr Lalla would like to respond to the family member?


MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Chairperson.

MR LALLA: To both Mr and Mrs Pillay and to the Govansamy family and to others. You'll have experienced tragic loss and tragic set of circumstances in terms of your well being and I wish I could find answers but all I want to say to all of you, I apologise for your personal loss and it's very difficult for me to express it but I'm honestly and deeply sorry. Thanks.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I on behalf of the Committee and I am sure on behalf of every person in this hall extend our deepest sympathies and wish that we could do more to comfort you in your tragic circumstances. You will always be in our thoughts and in our hearts and I wish you to think of that.

MR MAPOMA: There's another next-of-kin who wants to make a statement, Chairperson.

MR CHETTY: Mr Chairperson, my name is Ramsamy Stanley Chetty. I am the brother of the victims of the Victoria Embankment car bomb blast and I wish to make certain comments of what I observed and statements made by my colleague, Director Lalla.

Sir, it is sad, very, very sad to know that I've been a member of the Police Services for the last 23 years. On the day of the incident I had to go to work, pass that point where the explosion took place. On questioning my colleagues who attended that scene, I was informed that it was blacks and a white person that was killed.

I went to work on that particular day. My mother phoned me at work and she told me "son, this is problem, your sister-in-law was killed in a bomb blast". I reckon "no Ma, no Indians are killed in that bomb blast." I asked the whereabouts of my brother and was informed that he was missing. I told her I'll get back to her. I then contacted my brother who was a journalist later in the evening and he confirmed only by identifying the

sandwiches and the tie that my brother had worn, that it was in fact my brother and his wife that were killed.

Mr Lalla, I personally think that you or your comrades had placed the bomb at the Police Station that I was working in which was 150 metres away from that place that you placed the bomb blast. My parents, who have now died because of all the grieving and the loss of my brother and sister-in-law, would have accepted that I was a policeman, I was a target and I worked for the so-called apartheid government of the time.

Furthermore, Mr Lalla, like you say you were a fighter, you wanted a change in this country. You wanted a change in this country with the intention of putting yourself and bettering yourself in the environment that you are working today. Mr Lalla, you've joined an organisation which was an anti-public organisation a so-called black organisation. But Sir, you are now eating the bread and butter of those people that died in this country and put yourself as a director of the South African Police Services, now making decisions for these people, here in front. You are making decisions for the Commissioner and his assistants. Mr Lalla, I am Inspector Chetty of Phoenix Police Station. Sir, tomorrow if I am working in execution of my duties, you are going to come and say charge Inspector Chetty for shooting that man. You are going to give an instruction. But who is now going to instruct that you be charged, your colleagues be charged? You have taken a decision, Sir. You have taken a decision outside the country to now tell your members go and use these targets. You had no control over your men. When I say you had no control over your men, your men did not comply with your instructions. I've spoken to one of your colleagues just now, outside. He asked me who was involved? Well it was my brother and sister-in-law. He asked me what would you have done or how are you going to accept the apology from Director Lalla? I reckon I will not accept his apology. I personally will not accept his apology because he said if my mother was killed - your colleague, your comrade said if his mother was killed or his brother was killed he will never accept their apology or he will never forgive the next person.

Sir, I am absolutely surprised how you are a policeman. You had no respect for the human being. You say in terms of war you expect lives to be lost. In terms of war the people of the country is informed that there is a turmoil in the country. You had no decency. You had no respect. I, myself, in the presence of the Commission, Sir, I don't feel that Mr Lalla should be given amnesty. He knew a long time ago that he is sitting in ...(indistinct) today. He met his friend, his colleague, his comrade on two occasions. He told him he hasn't applied. What was his duty? He was head of the organisation. He gave him instructions then to go and place the bomb at a certain place which he complied with. He has total control of him. The ANC is no more a banned organisation but the ranks still stand. I don't understand how Mr Lalla is going to police the whole of Kwa-Zulu Natal. To me, Sir, I personally say to my brothers, my families, to Mr and Mrs Pillay, my heart goes out to them. I am aware, I accept I was a policeman and I happen to be and I accept it. My brothers have accepted it but not the innocent going on the street.

Mr and Mrs Green's family or the late Mrs Green's family, I sympathise with them as well. But Mr Lalla, with all due respect Sir, even though you're my boss I cannot forgive you for what you have done and let's hope this doesn't have an effect on my job as a policeman. Thank you very much.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I understand that emotions are running high but the last comment was totally uncalled for and I would like this person to consider retracting and apologising for that.

MR LAX: Perhaps let's just leave it in the understanding of the emotional state at the moment?

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you very much.

MR LAX: Perhaps if we could just explain to you, Sir, that the process of amnesty is a voluntary one. Nobody can be forced to apply for amnesty. Everyone who has applied for amnesty have done so in the full will that if they comply with the requirements of our statute, that they may be granted amnesty, so I just want you to understand that.

MR RAMSAMY: Sir, if I can recall? In the opening statements of Director Lalla, he informed the enquiry that it is due to his overseers, his seniors, to come out and claim amnesty for the explosions in the Durban area, that is why he come out. He wouldn't have come out, Sir, on his own free will. It seems because he has been pressurised and failing to lose his seat as a Director in the Police Services, he has come here now to ...(intervention)

MR LAX: That wasn't his evidence, you may have understood it in that way but that wasn't his evidence. But again, on behalf of my colleagues and I, as we've already said we really do convey our deepest sympathies. We can't tell you how to respond. We just hope that you will find peace in your own heart.

MR RAMSAMY: Thank you Sir.

MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Chairperson, it is a difficult situation. I find myself - I'm sure you've seen me at these TRC hearing before, writing stories about other people, how they cry and I had instances where people cried when I wrote stories about other victims. They heard it and they cried. It is sad that in our family, I was left-wing, I had people here, my brother who was a policeman looking for a piece of bread, working, because that's the only job he could have found at the time and they were indoctrinated as well to believe that the ANC cadres or my comrades, as I call them, were fighting a just war, were not fighting a just war, that they were terrorists. I understand that. I supported the liberation struggle personally. I understood that people get killed in the cross-fire. I made those statements before. I made those statements at the time when my brother died. I had the guts to do so. My father worked for the railways earning a pittance and when he died twenty years and six months after my brother because he used to pass that place every day with his bicycle, he was a labourer. He worked for the railways for twenty years. They gave him R2000. I told other comrades, people who, emissaries which Mr Lalla sent to force me to ask me what do I intend doing in this hearing. They did that at the eleventh hour to ask me not to be too harsh on Mr Lalla, Mr Lalla is a comrade. Mr Lalla I've known from the 1970's. His comrades here will vouch for that but he wouldn't because it suits him not to.

Mr Green was sitting here in the morning, he was about the only white man, a victim sitting here. He was so frustrated with the process, he went down. He is a cripple man. He went down. We were going to have a meal. When I saw him standing as a lone ranger. He was standing alone. I went to him, I said "Mr Green, can I give you something to eat?" He said "no, no, I'm fine." He says "I'm so fed up with the situation, I want to go away. I don't want to see. I want to scream" he said to me. We wouldn't have had a situation like that here if people in the hierarchy of the ANC, an organisation which I supported, wouldn't have had a situation today if people like this here went and apologised to the families then. They knew who the victims were. They cannot for the life of me tell me, working in intelligence and they don't know who the victims are. Then you shouldn't be in intelligence. We wouldn't have a situation here where this mother will tell us she's got no food in the house to eat, her breadwinner, her son who she had stopped from working, from schooling, to go to work. You can object as much as you like. Let me say what the people think here. It's okay for you, you've got lawyers on your side. We can't afford lawyers. My mother and father had to borrow money to have the biggest funeral ever in the Indian Community in Phoenix when my brother died and my sister-in-law died. I had to work, I couldn't find a job. I was an activist, nobody would give me a job. But none of you cared because you live in a white area, you earn a fat salary. It's a fact. I'm a journalist, I know.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, unfortunately I have to fulfil these predictions, I am going to object at this stage. I think that it has already been canvassed. Mr Lalla has said what he can about these incidents and the defamatory comments that are going on here is just not acceptable no matter what degree of emotionalism.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think they are relevant to the application.

MR GOVANSAMY: But Sir, if we had solved this problem earlier this wouldn't have happened. Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: I thought we had arranged, my colleague Mr Lax had arranged, that you were going to have a meeting to attempt to solve problems. From what we've heard in the last ten or twenty minutes it seems that would be pointless.

MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, there is no further witness but I think, Chairperson, for the sake of all the victims that are here it's important that I must make mention of this, that there are a number of, a lot of victims who have come here to attend to this hearing. Not all of them as reality allows have come to make statements to Mr Lalla and in any event, Chairperson, I must make it clear, whatever they had to say to him did not have any bearing to his application for amnesty, but they would simply show the Committee how they suffered as a result of that action and for that reason, therefore, I will not be calling them but I want all of them, even those who did not speak, that they must be aware that the Committee is going to have a list of all of them and they are going to be referred to the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee of the TRC for whatever had to be done. Thank you.

MR GOVANSAMY: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, if I may just one moment? My brother's wife's brother, my sister-in-law's brother is here. I'm sure he will understand because his family also suffered greatly in this here and I want you to understand that. I don't think he'll want to say anything more. Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. That concludes the evidence in connection with these applications, does it?

MS CAMBANIS: It does, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The question now arises as to what procedure we should now follow. It is ten to four. I think Mr Moerane will have to kick the ball into play. He started proceedings. Do you wish to start an address now, Mr Moerane?

MR MOERANE: Chairperson, I'd prefer to hand in a written submission tomorrow morning.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, unfortunately I don't think that I have the facility or that time will assist me in my arguments. I don't know if I can now.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I think it would be fair to say after you have seen the written submission you can address argument.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that apply to you?

MS MOHAMED: Yes Chairperson, that suits me as well.

CHAIRPERSON: So we'll hear argument from all of you tomorrow morning, except one of you who will let us have it in writing. What I would like to say though, is as I've said at the beginning of this hearing and I want to repeat. We would require all of you to let us have, in writing, the precise details of what you are seeking amnesty for. That is that if we do grant your application and make an order, we want you to set out precisely what you want stated in that order and you have said you will give us a summary, well a list of all the victims?

MR MAPOMA: Those who turned up, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Those are the ones you've had contact with and they will be set out in regard to the incidents they were involved in?


MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, may Mr Lalla be excused from attending the proceedings further, please?

CHAIRPERSON: If you've got all the information you require from him.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: It would also help if those of you who are not giving written argument could give us a list of the names of people you are going to refer to. We have endeavoured to write all the names down but I'm not sure that I have got them all and that I have spelt them correctly. So if you could just give us the names of people you are going to refer to, we will be obliged. Thank you.

What time tomorrow? 9 o'clock? We will adjourn now till 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.