CHAIRPERSON: Morning everybody. When we adjourned yesterday, General Webb was being questioned by Mr Bizos. EDWARD WEBB: (s.u.o.)


MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, we have put before you a typed script of Exhibit L.


MR BIZOS: Fortunately we didn't have to decipher it, we found the typed copy that was done originally by the person who actually took it or helped to take it, so it's accuracy I think is apparent.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. We'll mark this L then and we'll just substitute it for the hand-written one.

MR BIZOS: Now has a copy of Exhibit L been made available to you?

CHAIRPERSON: It's a two-page typed document. Do you have it? You all have it?


Now please look at paragraph 6:

"The contents of the document are obvious and it means exactly what it says. This document is a very

good example of the fact that there was control over the CCB activities at all times."

Do you agree with that conclusion of Gen Joubert?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, this statement was made, I don't know what the date was, but ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Well it gives a date at the end, 10 July '93.

GEN WEBB: "93. But it relates to a document which was handed in yesterday and which was dated 28 April 1987. So I have no reason not to accept that that was the date and that was the situation in 1987.

MR BIZOS: Yes, what I am asking you is to comment on the contents of paragraph 6. Do you say that - do you accept that the document reads what the General says it means?

GEN WEBB: Certainly during Gen Joubert's tenure at Special Forces.

MR BIZOS: I see. Is your answer that that may have been the position at the time that Gen Joubert was in charge, but not the position whilst you were in charge, is that what you want to say?

GEN WEBB: I want to say that it appears from my period there that it had changed.

MR BIZOS: In what way did it change?

GEN WEBB: The fact that I didn't know about certain operations.

MR BIZOS: Now who do you say - do you say that these were accidental or just simple mismanagement, or do you say on the evidence that you have heard, that there was a decision somewhere to cut you out?

GEN WEBB: What the true reason was, I don't know, but I certainly didn't know about everything that was going on.

MR BIZOS: You didn't of everything. So that - but one thing was clear was it not, that you expected to be informed of everything that was happening?

GEN WEBB: Of course, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: So that in so far as things happened without your knowledge, they were irregular and contrary to their instructions and contrary to the rules in terms of which the CCB was structured?

GEN WEBB: It was according to the rules laid down.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos, if I could just ask a question.

MR BIZOS: Of course, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. General, when you took over from Gen Joubert, did you actually move into his office, physically?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson

CHAIRPERSON: And were there filing cabinets and documents there?

GEN WEBB: Not as far as the CCB was concerned, they had their own files and their own filing cabinets, it wasn't kept at my Head Office.

CHAIRPERSON: But did you have access to those? Surely you must have, being the Chairman.

GEN WEBB: If I wanted to ask for documentation, yes, then I had access to it.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you, seeing that you were coming into a new environment, something that was different from the rest of the Army in that it was unconventional, did you make an effort to acquaint yourself with your new command?

GEN WEBB: I had been properly briefed by Gen Joubert and after that by Col Verster and all the other regiments under my command.

CHAIRPERSON: Because one would imagine a document like the one dated the 28th of April, would have been part of the documentation in the CCB.

GEN WEBB: That document was never shown to me and I was not aware of the contents.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Bizos.

MR LAX: Sorry, before you ...

Were you shown any documents that set out the aims, the objects, the doctrines, the strategies, the concept of the CCB and what it was intended to be?

GEN WEBB: That CCB had its own production plan and they submitted it to me, but it wasn't a document that was actually submitted to me, it was simply a briefing which I received.

MR LAX: Do I take from that that you weren't shown any documents at all?

GEN WEBB: There was no reason for that, Chairperson, it was common practice to make a practical submission. I suppose I could have asked for documentation, but I never did.

MR LAX: But surely as the Commanding General of a unit, and that's really what it was, even though it wasn't formally linked, you would say "Well I want to see the budget, I want to see the organogram of the structure, I want to just make sure that everything that should be in place in terms of the original conception of this entity is there?

GEN WEBB: The budget, that was submitted to myself by the CCB, not the organogram although they told me there were a certain number of regions in existence, but as a result of the objective of the CCB, there was never a personal diagram submitted to me saying we've got so many people in the field and those are their names etcetera, no.

MR LAX: So you were never in a position to check whether the budget was spent properly, to check that people you were told were on the ground were actually on the ground, 'cause you never verified anything yourself?

GEN WEBB: No, I didn't verify it.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

General, did it not strike you as odd that you, a decorated General, was asked to move into a nude area - I don't argue with you whether it was grey or any other colour, but it was certainly an area in which crimes may be committed, such as damage to property, injury to people, even possibly death. Before moving into such a position having regard ...(no microphone) background in the Army, wouldn't you have wanted to see what is the basis of this thing, where are the documents? The Head of the Defence Force, the Head of the Army, have I their authority to do this? Is this authorised by the Minister of Defence and the Cabinet? Where am I being sent to do these unusual things? Wouldn't that be a natural reaction of an honourable General?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, it was a very big compliment for me to be appointed to Special Forces. The CCB was only a small unit of Special Forces as a whole and there were a great many submissions made and briefing sessions in order to get your feet on the ground as far as Special Forces as a whole was concerned, so perhaps later more detail would have been a good thing, but at that stage I was too busy to orientate myself regarding the Special Forces.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but Special Forces was a broader organisation, it wasn't to commit offences against the law of the land, wasn't there a distinction in your mind in relation to the Special Forces and the job that you were now being offered to take over?

GEN WEBB: It was a challenge for me.

MR BIZOS: Yes, a challenge is one thing, what the question which may indicate some state of mind on your part that you thought this as a possible adventure, but what I am asking you is, whether you were not sufficiently concerned to say, "Where did the ultimate authority for the formation of this group of people come from that I am asked to lead?"

GEN WEBB: The organisation had been founded and I accepted it as such. My predecessor caused this unit to be established with the necessary authorisation.

MR BIZOS: But you were to take over, did you think that you had ...(indistinct - no microphone) Army in relation to this, that you had the support of the Head of the Defence Force, that you had the support of the Minister of Defence? Didn't you want to ask this? You know if somebody is offered a job which is of an unusual kind, you say "Well you know, where does this come from, I want to know precisely where do I stand"? You didn't ask yourself that question?

GEN WEBB: I accept it as such, I accepted that it had been approved by the Chief of the Defence Force, Chief of the Army and I just continued.

MR BIZOS: So you say the Head of the Army, to your knowledge, and the Head of the Defence Force knew the purpose for which the CCB was formed?

GEN WEBB: The Chief of the Defence Force had approved it.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well that's fairly clear from Exhibit L as well, is it not?

GEN WEBB: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now I know that Generals want to keep out of politics, but does the Head of the Army go off on a limb such as this to form the CCB, having regard to what it's objectives were, without the authority of the Minister of Defence?

GEN WEBB: I don't know what the channels would be, but the Head of the Defence Force approved it, not the Head of the Army, Head of the Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: Well if you had been the Head of the Army, would you have done a thing like this without the Minister of Defence having authorised you to do this?

GEN WEBB: I was never Chief of the Army, so I don't know.

MR BIZOS: No, but you were in the "binnekring" so to speak, you were a General, you attended staff meetings. You were sufficiently trusted to be given this leadership of this body that was going to commit these acts, would you have committed them if you did not know that the Minister of Defence and indeed the President, were party to the formation of this body? - as a General.

GEN WEBB: I was never placed in that position, I can't answer that question.

MR BIZOS: Well you see what you are saying now is consistent with the decisions of the Generals at the time of the Harms Commission is it not, that you would cut off from the bottom the operatives, that you Generals knew nothing about what they did and that you Generals would keep quiet about the involvement of the Minister of Defence and the President and the Security Council? Was there no decision to that effect before you entered the witness box and misled the Harms Commission?

GEN WEBB: I reject the type of statement Mr Bizos is making at the moment, he's trying to insinuate that there was a conspiracy between the Generals. It's absolute rubbish.

MR BIZOS: Well then is it rubbish when we are told by your General Manager, Mr Verster, that there was a lull in the activities of the CCB and also Mr van Zyl - well, I'm corrected, maybe Mr Verster didn't say it, I seem to remember that he did, but certainly Mr van Zyl said that activities were suspended when Mr FW de Klerk took over as President, because he did not know about the CCB and that you had to lie low until Mr de Klerk was informed of its existence. Is that also "bog", as you describe it?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, yes, it is rubbish, I know of no order being given as a result of the change in presidency and that actions had to be stopped.

MR BIZOS: Well why would one of the operatives of the CCB talk such nonsense?

GEN WEBB: It was the same operative that said that the Minister and the President knew of the actions of the CCB, which is also rubbish.

MR BIZOS: Yes. You feel very strongly that you have to deny that.

GEN WEBB: It's not a question of feeling that, Mr Bizos, it's a question of fact.

MR BIZOS: Oh. But now do you agree that going on a tangent, for the Army to kill in the manner in which the CCB was to do it, according to the Head of the Army, in Exhibit L ...(intervention)


MR BIZOS: The affidavit, Exhibit L. Oh, I'm sorry, yes you're quite right, L1 paragraph 7.

Do you agree that redefining murder for a country in which the law was supposed to be applied, for the Head of the Army to redefine murder had political implications?

GEN WEBB: The Chief of the Army made no such definition, it was the Chief of the Defence Force, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: I'm sorry, but you know what I'm talking about.

GEN WEBB: Yes, but we have to have the facts in front the Committee, and you're starting to confuse me.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well it's in the documents. For some of us, unfortunately, these distinctions are not as clear as they are to you and I ask for your forgiveness. Gen Geldenhuys - shall we refer to him by name? Was it Gen Geldenhuys that was speaking in Exhibit L1?

GEN WEBB: Gen Geldenhuys.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and what was he?

GEN WEBB: He was the Chief of the Defence Force. Chief of the Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: Yes, Chief of the Defence Force. Would the Chief of the Defence Force redefine murder to the other Generals that were present at this meeting without there being a political fallout if it was found out?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I am not prepared to comment on what Gen Geldenhuys said in the document, it wasn't said in my presence. I wasn't there and I saw the document for the first time yesterday.

MR BIZOS: You see I am going to put to you that you as a General, knew when you took this over, that your activities would have had very serious political implications if they came to the fore. Would you agree with that?

GEN WEBB: Depending on which deeds were committed, yes.

MR BIZOS: Well if they were the deeds which we have heard about in this hearing and ...(indistinct) deeds which are contained in Exhibit D, the Report of the Commission.

GEN WEBB: What is the question?

MR BIZOS: Would there be tremendous political fallout for the country if the activities of the CCB, whether under Gen Joubert or under you, came to the fore?

GEN WEBB: If such deeds were committed, yes.

MR BIZOS: And is that why you misled the Harms Commission so that the Harms Commission could not make a finding as to what the true purpose of the CCB was?

GEN WEBB: The Harms Commission was misled by the level of approval, the Harms Commission was misled through allegations of it happening inside the country and that's the only way in which the Harms Commission was misled. The deeds that were committed and for which we received privilege, that was known to the Harms Commission.

MR BIZOS: I'm asking you for the reason why you misled the Commission by being untruthful before it.

GEN WEBB: I answered that question yesterday, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I just thought I would remind you of it. The State Security Council was openly said to have the function of co-ordinating the activities of the Security Forces, do you accept that?

GEN WEBB: In a certain measure yes, I have no knowledge thereof.

MR BIZOS: Well you have heard of the Security Council.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you not hear what its main purpose was, ostensibly?

GEN WEBB: Not that I can recall.

MR BIZOS: May I remind you? That it was to co-ordinate the affairs of the Security Forces.

GEN WEBB: Probably in wide measures, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos, I've just received a note from the Sound Engineer to say that there's a problem and that a five minute adjournment is required to fix the sound system, because we're not sure whether we're losing some of what is being said on the tapes. So if we could take a five minute adjournment for the Sound Engineer to check his system.




EDWARD WEBB: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos. I think when we adjourned, if my note is correct, we were talking about the function of the State Security Council, it's main function.


Do you agree that that was the function of the Security Council, to co-ordinate the activities of the Security Forces?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I never had any knowledge about the State Security Council's actions or what their tasks were. I never received any direct orders in this regard. I accept that they took certain decisions.

MR BIZOS: Yes. At the time - do you now accept that at the time, the late '80s and certainly when you were the Head of the CCB, it has now emerged that the CCB was not the only body that was committing acts of violence, both against property and persons deemed to be the enemy of the State? There was Vlakplaas, there was the Security Police, there was the CCB, there were suggestions that the Special Forces were doing things, there were suggestions that Intelligence Forces were committing similar acts. Did not the Security Council come into being so that it can co-ordinate, amongst other things, the activities of the Police, the Defence Force, the Army and more particularly, the side shoots that were specially established for the purposes of killing people, damaging their property and playing dirty tricks against them? Did an occasion not arise when it was necessary to co-ordinate this band of friends authorised to commit these acts?

GEN WEBB: I repeat, Chairperson, I was not a member of the State Security Council, I had no information about their actions and documents, so I cannot comment on that.

MR BIZOS: The question was, do you now accept that there were these agencies for, not to use an uglier name, committing these acts?

GEN WEBB: What spread from the newspaper, for example Vlakplaas, in my time I was not aware of that.

MR BIZOS: No, leave the newspapers out of it for a moment. There was the Commission, the TRC, which heard much evidence coming from the very operatives - do you remember what I asked you about the CCB, Vlakplaas, the Security Police, the Information Services, do you now accept at that time there were various agencies doing a similar job, committing offences against the people of South Africa considered to be the enemies of the State? Do you now accept that that was so at the time that you were Chairman of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: Apparently there were such organisations.

MR BIZOS: Now at the time - let's deal with '89 when you were the Chairman, were there no discussions how to avoid duplication of acts and the crossing of the wires so to speak, by different agencies pursuing the same or conflicting objectives in relation to a particular individual?

GEN WEBB: No discussions with me, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you aware of any discussion?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Perhaps I could put it subtly differently if I may. Are you aware of any other structure that was designed to prevent this duplication of effort?


MR BIZOS: Now theoretically what you are telling us ...(indistinct)

MR SIBANYONI: Your mike, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Thank you.

Theoretically, if what you are telling us is the truth, you may have authorised the killing of one of the most valuable informers to the Security structure of South Africa, by not knowing how valuable he or she was to the Security Police or to the National Intelligence or to Military Intelligence, you may unwittingly have done a tremendous harm if there was not this co-operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Co-ordination.

MR BIZOS: Co-ordination. Thank you, that was the word I was looking for, Mr Chairman.

GEN WEBB: Theoretically spoken, yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Theoretically. Well was there any step taken by you as Chairman before authorising anything, to determine whether you would not fall into that unfortunate trap?

GEN WEBB: I approved no such operation, so I could not fall into such a trap.

MR BIZOS: Are you saying that as Chairman you didn't authorise any, the commission of any offence against anybody either internally or externally, during your term of office? Is that what you are saying?

GEN WEBB: I'm saying internally, yes.

MR BIZOS: You're not prepared to talk about externally.

GEN WEBB: That we've decided already on.

MR BIZOS: Well we didn't decide, that is what you claim. But for the purposes of my question, for the purposes of my question, if in fact you were to decide that anyone outside should be killed by your organisation, you may have done a tremendous harm to the other agencies.

GEN WEBB: Theoretically, yes, Chairperson.


GEN WEBB: Except, as I said yesterday, if injury or death was foreseen then I would have gone to higher authority for approval. That means that the higher authority may have communicated with another agency, that I don't know.

MR BIZOS: You were kept out of the picture.

GEN WEBB: I was not involved in such a picture, I had no opportunity to be involved in such a picture.

MR BIZOS: I see. Of course if Col Verster spoke the truth before this Committee, your premise would be incorrect.

GEN WEBB: In what regard?

MR BIZOS: In relation to internal killings.

GEN WEBB: There were no internal killings.

MR BIZOS: Or conspiracies or attempts to do so.


MR BIZOS: There were none as far as you were concerned?

GEN WEBB: No, killings, no.

MR BIZOS: Conspiracies or attempts?

GEN WEBB: The conspiracy has been heard before this Committee.

MR LAX: I think the point Mr Bizos is putting to you is that you were not involved in any conspiracies or attempts to kill anybody. That's your evidence.

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR LAX: That's all he's confirming with you.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that your evidence in any way at the Harms Commission, had the effect of misleading the Harms Commission in relation to the CCB?

GEN WEBB: I acknowledged it yesterday, yes.

MR BIZOS: Because I want to refer you to bundle D, pages 58 to 59, where Judge Harms deals with his findings. Now you had the same counsel as Mr Verster, not so?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And Mr Verster told this Committee things about what was happening internally, which he either denied or claimed privilege for before the Commission.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You stood by listening to Col Verster lying to the Commission.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you tell your joint counsel that your fellow client was lying?

GEN WEBB: What joint counsel are you talking about?

MR BIZOS: The advocates that were representing you and Mr Verster, counsel with s-e-l, not c-i-l.

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

GEN WEBB: We drew up our submission apart.

MR BIZOS: False statements were taken and you stood by it and you sat there throughout the proceedings, hearing your subordinate officer, a Colonel, lying and you did nothing about it.

GEN WEBB: That's true, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well knowing that the President of the country had appointed a High Court Judge in order to try and ascertain the truth.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Also it was put to you, was it not in one of the subsequent proceedings, that the Minister had told you to cooperate fully with the Commission, do you remember what your answer was?

GEN WEBB: We had to give our full co-operation with the investigation team, namely Gen Badenhorst and Brig Engelbrecht.

MR BIZOS: Who gave you that advice?

GEN WEBB: That advice, we were asked that by Gen Geldenhuys, to do it.

MR BIZOS: By Gen Geldenhuys who was your superior, because that was your answer, "Not the Minister, General Geldenhuys told us." And did you obey the order of your higher office in order to give full co-operation?

GEN WEBB: To the investigation team, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but the Investigation Unit was inquiring into things which it put before the Commission.

GEN WEBB: And Gen Badenhorst declared everything.

MR BIZOS: Yes, except that he couldn't have made public what you and Verster knew and what the Head of the Army or Defence Force knew, those were kept back from the Commission.

GEN WEBB: Gen Badenhorst made his declaration, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: No, no, but you know, Gen Badenhorst wasn't a party to the CCB conspiracy, he was investigating it and he was attempting to do an honest job and he was thwarted by you, by Verster, the leader of the Army and the leader of the Defence Force, by keeping back information which led to a false conclusion being arrived at by Judge Harms at page 59 of his report.

GEN WEBB: Can we please read page 59, Chairperson?

MR BIZOS: Well what is your answer to my question? But you're entitled to hear it, I would have thought that you would be very interested. Let me read to you paragraph B43, B44, in order for the Commission - have you got the exhibit before you, Mr Chairman?


MR BIZOS: Because it's rather important that this conspiracy to mislead the Judge should come to the fore, because it has not only an affect on the witness's credibility but also the manner in which the other applicants in this case were dealt with by their superiors at the Commission. If you turn to page ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It's page 58.


CHAIRPERSON: Page 62 of the Harms Report, but page 58 of our pages.

MR BIZOS: Paragraph B43:

"An alternative approach by counsel to the question was motivated as follows. The Minister of Defence and the then Chief of the Defence Force, adopted a plan during 1986, which meant that the ANC had to be maximally disrupted abroad and a covert organisation had to be established which was to be divided into regions.

The CCB is the covert organisation that was established in accordance with this plan. Region 6 is an internal region and was envisaged when the plan was adopted. Members of Region 6 perpetrated these deeds within the borders of the country. Members of Region 6 were promised indemnity from prosecution beforehand. Therefore these deeds were authorised by the Minister or the Chief of the South African Defence Force. Once again their argument ignores material facts and is based on false assumptions. The plan was as repeatedly stated, to disrupt the ANC abroad. The policy directive of Special Forces and therefore also of the CCB, contained an express restriction to the effect that offensive action was to take place externally. The command structure of the CCB was aware of the restriction, realising and understanding that it applied to the CCB. According to Gen Webb, and there is nothing to the contrary, no internal operations were submitted to higher authority for authorisation. The allegation by van Zyl and Botha that they were informed that Region 6 had to engage in internal offensive action, cannot in the light of available evidence, be tracked back to higher authority. The allegation by van Zyl and Botha that they were promised indemnity from prosecution was contested and in any case conflicts with the provisions of the Personnel Plan which states in no uncertain terms that CCB members must obey all the laws of the land."

Now, do you agree that your evidence and Verster's evidence whom you listened to telling the untruths, was relied upon by the Judge in order to come to the conclusion and absolve people from what they should have been found responsible for?

GEN WEBB: There was never any indemnity or amnesty promised.

MR BIZOS: That's the detail, what do you say about the fact that the Judge says that there was no evidence? Here was the evidence of Mr Verster, which you knew - you must have known what he knew and what the truth was according to him, some of which we heard here, why didn't you tell the Commission that you knew that Verster was lying, ex post facto, even if you didn't know before.

GEN WEBB: As I testified before the Webster Inquest, I tried to protect Verster at that stage. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR BIZOS: No, no - yes, but you see therefore you have to agree that you assisted in the process of keeping out the Head of the Army, the Head of the Defence Force, yourself, from any culpability before Judge Harms.

GEN WEBB: That is not true, Chairperson. If you read the paragraph on page 63, the third sentence from the top:

"According to Gen Webb, and there's nothing to the contrary, no internal operations were submitted to any higher authority for authorisation."

Because I acknowledged before the Harms Commission that I approved two internal operations. I asked for privilege and at the end of the Harms Commission I was asked questions by the legal representative of the Defence Force and I said both operations were authorised at my level. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just for ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: You didn't submit any of that to Harms.

CHAIRPERSON: Just for the record, page 63 referred to by the General is in fact page 59 of our bundle.

GEN WEBB: Sorry, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You didn't speak about that in the Harms Commission, to use the Americanism, you took the fifth, you said that you would not say anything because if you did say anything you might incriminate yourself and that was the end of - that's where it was cut off.

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, I'm very sorry but Mr Bizos does not know his facts. If you go to the Harms Commission and you look, I think it's Adv Burger, he represented the Defence Force, he asked me in the end for my testimony and I asked for privilege "Who approved it", and I said it was approved on my level. So your facts are not correct.

MR BIZOS: In respect of what incident?

GEN WEBB: Of these two incidents I'm applying for amnesty.

MR BIZOS: Did you not claim privilege for those?

GEN WEBB: Excuse me, I didn't hear the question.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you claim privilege for those before the Commission?

GEN WEBB: Yes, I did.

MR BIZOS: How is that consistent, the claim of privilege, but then that you admitted that you authorised them?

GEN WEBB: It was asked of me - we can look, it's on record, Mr Chairman, if any higher approved orders, I said "No, it was approved on my level."

MR BIZOS: You know I am going to put to you that your evidence doesn't make sense because it's very clear that you're claiming privilege and you claimed it successfully. I will find the passages in a moment, Mr Chairman, it's in bundle F.

Please turn to page 49 ...(intervention)


MR BIZOS: Of bundle F, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It's this very big document.

MR BIZOS: Have you got it ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have it, Mr du Plessis?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I just want to see if we can find the part which Mr Webb referred to in his answer to Mr Bizos, so please grant us a minute.

MR LAX: You'll find it at page 66, that's Burger's cross-examination. If that's what you're looking for. That's our note 66, 2120 of the original. That was where Burger cross-examined Gen Webb. It's almost half a page worth.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think Mr Bizos, if you can get to your question relating to page 49.

MR BIZOS: Yes thank you.

...(indistinct - no microphone) Page 49. Are you with me?

CHAIRPERSON: It's page 2103 of that record. 2103, which is page 49 of bundle F.

MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson, I think Mr Bizos is referring to the typed page 49. It's paginated page 10.

MR BIZOS: The Chairman and I have page 49, it says ...(indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) Bertelsman.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct)

MS COLERIDGE: It's page 10. It's the typed page 49, Chairperson, but it's paginated 10.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct)

MR LAX: Just for our record purposes it's paginated page 10 of that bundle F.

MR BIZOS: And 2120 is page ...(indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: Page 2120 of our ...(indistinct)

MS COLERIDGE: 66, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct)

"MR MCNALLY: The following project I want to treat with you is the project with the name "Apie", meaning the project where the foetus of a baboon be hung at the house of Archbishop Tutu. Do you want to answer on that?"

"I refuse to answer questions about that because it may incriminate me in the future."

"Then we come to the bomb incident in Athlone. You heard the full details this morning, what is your stance on this?"

"Thereon I also refuse to answer questions, it may also incriminate me in the future."

Did you say that, and did you claim privilege?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now you refer to the end of your cross-examination, which I am going to refer to you and then I will ask you a question. I want to read that into the record.

"CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BURGER: (on page 66) Just shortly please, did you during your term of service as Chairman of the CCB, ever get approval from higher authority to carry out deeds of violence internally?"

"During my time the Special Services were - never ever approached me on any such operations." (sic)

"It was insinuated to you that Dr Webster ..."

It doesn't matter. Now do you still want to persist that you did not claim privilege for those things?

GEN WEBB: I never denied it.

MR BIZOS: Very well. That is all for my purposes, if your counsel wants to ask you any more questions about it, he can do so in re-examination.

Now, isn't it a function of a higher officer to take responsibility for the action of his underlings?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: At the Harms Commission, were the operatives in any way let down by you and Mr Verster in relation to their authority?

GEN WEBB: Not by me, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: By Mr Verster to your knowledge, whilst you were sitting there?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well why protect a Colonel and let the other people that were authorised to do the dirty work, hang out so to speak?

GEN WEBB: I didn't know the operatives, it not excuse Chairperson, I tried to protect Joe Verster.

MR BIZOS: Yes, when you tried to protect Verster you knew that Verster had authorised them.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Is that consistent with what is expected of a high-ranking officer in the Army?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: But you did it nevertheless.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now throughout your evidence, including at page 2120, you seem to concede that if there was anything to happen in relation to the murder or serious injury or serious damage to anyone within the country, you would have had to take it to higher authority.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now who told you that, when did he tell you and under what circumstances was that said to you?

GEN WEBB: It was during the briefing given to me by Gen Joubert before I took over.

MR BIZOS: Implicit in that conversation was an indication to you that there was a scenario which might occur that the harm mentioned before would be directed against some individuals internally. Did you ask Gen Joubert, your predecessor, "But what are you talking about, what is this business about death or killing or damage to property that I've got to go to higher authority for? On what basis are you telling me this? Who is going to do it and on whose authority and who will come to me and who will approach me to get authority?" Did you ask any of those questions?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

GEN WEBB: As I testified yesterday, Gen Joubert never spoke to me directly about internal operations.

MR BIZOS: You've already settled that aspect by your answer to the previous question, that Gen Joubert expected someone might come to you for higher authority for internal operations. From one General to the other, one would have expected "What are you talking about, who is going to come and ask me to commit murder or blow up a building or play any other dirty trick against any individual that I have to go to higher authority for? What am I letting myself in for?" Isn't that the natural reaction of one General to another, if what you are saying is true?

GEN WEBB: It should be like that, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Why wasn't it as it ought to be?

GEN WEBB: Because it was left in the air.

MR BIZOS: But how matters of life and death be left in the air, General?

GEN WEBB: As I said yesterday, Gen Joubert never told me, never spoke to me about the fact that I could operate internally.

MR BIZOS: No, we've already settled that, Sir, the question was, how could one General to another leave matters of life and death in the air? Please answer that question. It wasn't asked of you yesterday, it is asked of you for the second time now, please answer it.

GEN WEBB: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well what does that mean, you don't know? Either you are suffering selective amnesia, or you are not telling the truth and that is the reason why you cannot answer that simple question.

GEN WEBB: I have no explanation, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Yes, we'll leave it at that.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, General Webb, this briefing that you had with Gen Joubert, did he make no mention of Region 6?

GEN WEBB: No, he told me, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Because that's an internal - and he told you that's an internal region?

GEN WEBB: Yes, the details I got from the CCB, the detailed briefing.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm just trying to understand your answer saying that he didn't talk about internal operations or he didn't mention ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: Internal operations, no he didn't speak about that. But by insinuation, because we founded this internal section where Special Forces were already operative internally, by insinuation yes, we had the capacity to operate internally.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and then the actual modus between how operatives conducted themselves in Region 9 and Region 6, was there any difference? There was any difference stated, was there?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, except because in Region 6 there were former police officers and it gave them further possibilities.


MR LAX: Sorry, just if I might. Who briefed you together with Verster on the CCB itself?

GEN WEBB: General Joubert ...(intervention)

MR LAX: You said you had a briefing with Verster.


MR LAX: Was Verster present when Joubert briefed you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR LAX: So who was with Verster when he briefed you on the CCB itself?

GEN WEBB: Col Verster briefed me on my own and then also with regard to Region 6. Staal Burger was present and Verster was also present.

MR LAX: So when you were briefed on each region separately, was each Manager of that region present?

GEN WEBB: No, Verster and Hymer briefed me about the rest of the CCB and Staal Burger and Joe Verster were present when he briefed me about Region 6.

MR LAX: Yes, and just one other aspect if you'll allow me. Sorry to intervene Mr Bizos.

You seem to be giving the impression that you were just a conduit for authority, that if there was a decision and it involved a killing, well you would have just passed it up the line, but surely that isn't so, you had to make a qualitative choice yourself?

GEN WEBB: Of course, Chairperson, I would have made a contribution.

MR LAX: And if you thought something was a non-starter you would have refused it?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR LAX: The question then is, on what basis would you at your level then evaluate things? If you were going to refuse something you would have had to evaluate information and you've already told us you never ever evaluated or verified anything yourself, so how could you say no, based on what?

GEN WEBB: I received different inputs by Special Forces Headquarters and if something was submitted by the CCB that I didn't approve of, for whichever reason, it could have been stopped there, or if it was acceptable I could have said, very well, let me - if it was necessary, get further approval. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR LAX: Well you see that's what I asked you yesterday and you specifically said you hadn't actually followed anything up.

GEN WEBB: No, you asked me about the bombing and I didn't take that further.

MR LAX: I also asked you a general question about "What other sources did you use?" Because you spoke about having access to sources and you said in relation to Region 6 you didn't actually even follow any of those things up.

GEN WEBB: Yes the one incident, the bombing incident, it wasn't followed up. But as a result of my position I received several inputs, there were documents that I had to read, there were briefings at Headquarters of Special Forces and when I went to CCB they briefed me about incidents or whatever, or if they wanted to do an operation. So in my position you got different inputs.

MR LAX: You see these briefings at Special Forces, what bearing did they have on the work of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: During my time, none, except it might have happened that Bishop Tutu's name was mentioned in whichever context, that came out of an information report and so forth. But in my time, not really. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR LAX: Well for example, did such briefings entail a prioritisation of targets?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR LAX: So how would you know that person X was a target or person Y was a target? How would you know when Verster came to you and reported on the activities of Region 6 or any other region, that what they were doing was in line with what other people were doing and that ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: But Verster never came to me with a target.

MR LAX: When he came to report on his work and on the work of the CCB, for example, "We're monitoring person X, because in the long term it links in with this or with that project which we've authorised and remember budget X", that's the nature of the report you would have received from him on a monthly basis, not so?

GEN WEBB: Yes, that should have been the report, ja.

MR LAX: Not there should have been, what else would you have spent an hour talking to him about every month?

GEN WEBB: But he never made such a submission to me.

MR LAX: So in all the time that you were head of the CCB, you never got any of that kind of contextual report, where he gave you on-going reports about what work was happening and who was being monitored and what they were doing in Zambia, or what they were doing in Angola? You never got any of that kind of report? I'm not dealing with the details of any specific project.

GEN WEBB: No, I got a lot of feedback, especially about external operations and frequent feedback, but he never came to me to say "We should eliminate such and such a person", or to ask approval for it.

MR LAX: I'm not talking about elimination. You see I'm not talking about elimination, I'm specially not talking about elimination, I'm talking about the kind of detail that you would have had to deal with in a monthly report by Verster to you, with specific reference to Region 6. You see according to what we've heard so far and you've been here the whole time, Region 6 was monitoring people, primarily.


M LAX: And it's inconceivable that that couldn't have been the content of what he would have reported to you about, because that's all they were doing according to him.

GEN WEBB: It now appears from the reports and so on of the Truth Commission, that there were several things in which the CCB were involved, but ...(intervention)

MR LAX: We're talking about Region 6, General.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Region 6.

MR LAX: Don't confuse the issue with all the other stuff.

GEN WEBB: It appears that they weren't particularly effective.

MR LAX: We're not talking about effective, we're talking about how active they were and the little bit that they were doing it appears from what we've heard, that they were monitoring lots of people.

GEN WEBB: So monitoring at that stage was very important for them, that was in the beginning stages. Special operations, with all respect, doesn't take place over night. There are some operations that you plan which could take you up to five months to get everything into place, it simply can't happen overnight. It's not simply a enemy target on the one side and yours on the other side and you launch an attack, it simply doesn't work that way. You have to find out where is the enemy, who is the enemy, all their routines etcetera, etcetera, and only then can you start placing yourself in position, finding out what would be an appropriate time for an attack. So it's a very time consuming thing.

MR LAX: General, I absolutely understand all that, that's precisely why I'm asking you these questions, because you don't just monitor people in isolation, you don't just monitor them for no reason whatever. I mean you've just given us the exact reason why people are monitored, it's to develop a profile, it's to look at the kinds of strategies that are required, it's to look at what your options are tactically and strategically and then you marry all of that with target prioritisation.

GEN WEBB: Yes, correct.

MR LAX: Now that's precisely the kind of stuff that I would have expected Verster and you to have spoken about in that portion of your meeting that you had every month when you dealt with Region 6, but it's been your evidence so far that you didn't talk about that sort of stuff because you don't know anything about it.

GEN WEBB: We didn't only discuss Region 6, we discussed the entire CCB.

MR LAX: Precisely, I know that, but we're focusing on Region 6 because we're not dealing with all your other stuff at this point in time.

GEN WEBB: But Mr Lax, we discussed many things and I can't remember everything now that we discussed, but it wasn't simply just a happy-go-lucky meeting, it was a serious discussion and detail certainly formed part of that discussion, it had to.

MR LAX: You see the reason I'm asking these questions is this, is that up to now every bit of business that's been referred to, and we can only infer from the questions that you've been asked and what you've testified about, you say you know nothing about except Lubowski and his internal monitoring.


MR LAX: The rest you know absolutely nothing about.

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR LAX: So on your version there's nothing else that Verster would have spoken to you about, because they weren't doing anything else, on your version.

GEN WEBB: If you talk about Region 6, that could be the case, but that was not what happened. We were talking about several things.

MR LAX: But you see, then the next question is, well you are the Commanding General and you see that Region 6 is doing precious little, surely the question in your mind is "What work are they doing? They're eating up our budget, what are they doing?"

GEN WEBB: Yes, and they seem to be extremely inefficient, non-effective. But that only formed a very small part of the entire operation which was under my control, it formed a small part of it. And they only became operational on the 1st of January and they still had to find their feet and establish themselves and to recruit non-aware members etcetera, to make them truly effective. As I have tried to explain, it was a protracted process and perhaps in my view at the time they were not that effective because a lot of things still had to be put in place etcetera, before they could act.

MR LAX: Yes, but even eight/nine months later you still weren't getting much production.

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR LAX: One can accept that it will take a few months to get established or you got to develop contacts, but the fact is these weren't people who came in out of the blue, these were people who came in off the ground, they were policemen, that's why you chose them.

GEN WEBB: Yes, but people who first had to be re-orientated according to our methods, to act according to our methods and not like just ordinary policemen and that's also a big adjustment.

MR LAX: But it's not the method, it's the connections that they had.

GEN WEBB: Yes, that was an advantage, but you must also be careful with the connections that it's not revealed for whom he is working. So it was a complicated matter.

MR LAX: But you see that's precisely what they did, because they used the same kind of connections they would have used as policemen.

GEN WEBB: Are we talking about Slang van Zyl, yes.

MR LAX: And some of the others, because the others asked for those very same connections. For example, Gavin Evans in that incident they asked for the very same connections that he had.

MR MARTINI: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, the reason for that was that the other operatives, "bewustelike lede" had not yet recruited their own people, they were - because Mr van Zyl, according to the evidence, had recruited these "onbewustelike lede".

MR LAX: You see I'm aware of that, but the point is that it's the type of people that they wanted to use, not the fact - and that's precisely what you wouldn't have wanted.

GEN WEBB: I'm sure Col Verster would also not have wanted it like that.

MR LAX: Ja. Look, the simple point, and we're getting side-tracked here, is that in terms of what you understood to be your powers and your authorities, the kinds of decision making you would have been required to make would have required of you a very, certainly much more of an extensive knowledge of what was going on than you professed to have had.

GEN WEBB: Are you referring to the information which was given to me?

MR LAX: Yes, you see you weren't a conduit as I said earlier, you weren't just a channel for authority, you actually were a person who made the authority, you weren't the rubber stamp.

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR LAX: And in order to exercise that authority, you were required to have knowledge.


MR LAX: But you say you didn't.

GEN WEBB: No, I was properly briefed in terms of, for instance the bomb incident in Athlone, how can you tell me that I didn't have information about that? To be able to make a decision I got the necessary information relating to that.

MR LAX: Well I don't want to intervene in Mr Bizos' cross-examination, there are a hundred questions I would want to ask you about in due course, I'm talking in general terms though, because it's just that incident that you know about. In one year, only one incident, plus the Tutu one.


MR LAX: But in a whole year and a bit more of your being in command you were only consulted twice. And then yes, you were consulted about Lubowski's monitoring as well.

GEN WEBB: Yes. When I had to take certain decisions I made sure that I got proper and correct information relating to that and if monitoring was still being done and so on, then there wasn't the appropriate flow of information to me because at that stage then there couldn't have been a plan. It's only once a plan had been formulated by Verster, they would submit the plan to me and the information would then be linked with that plan.

MR LAX: Besides the plan and the "voorlegging" which was made to you, what external sources did you yourself use?

GEN WEBB: What was available to me as the Commanding General, it was paperwork, documents from Military Intelligence who sent us intelligence reports that I read, plus then the briefings on a daily basis from Special Forces Head Office, their intelligence staff.

MR LAX: So you used Special Forces intelligence.


MR LAX: Anything else?

GEN WEBB: I think those were the two primary sources.

MR LAX: What would they know about the Early Learning Centre?

GEN WEBB: No, I'm not saying I used them for the Early Learning Centre, you asked me the same question yesterday and I'm saying that in that regard I used only the information which the CCB gave me. I didn't use information from my own Head Office and their intelligence staff. Do you understand how the set-up worked, Mr Lax?

MR LAX: No, no, I hear you, I heard you, I'm just trying to put myself in your shoes and to ascertain what kind of questions one would have asked. Sorry, I've intervened for far too long. Mr Bizos, perhaps you should carry on.

CHAIRPERSON: I think this would probably be an appropriate time to take the tea adjournment. We'll take a 20 minute tea adjournment.




EDWARD WEBB: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Bizos.


In answer to a question by the Chairman yesterday you said that the operatives of District 6 were subject to - I'm sorry, Region 6, were subject to military discipline, is that what you said?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And if they committed any breach of the military code, they were subject to a Court Martial.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well that's - how is that consistent with people whose job was to break every rule in the Military Code?

GEN WEBB: They were remunerated by the Defence Force, appointed by the Defence Force and that's why they resorted under the Regimental Disciplinary Code.

MR BIZOS: Everything that they did was contrary to the Military Code. Does the Military Code authorise anybody in the Army to commit offences?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Or to commit perjury?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Or to employ gangsters to do their work?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well I think I've done enough in relation to that, thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: Maybe can I just ask a question. I'm sorry, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR SIBANYONI: If a person would be brought into a Court Martial, would that not expose his activities in the CCB, because I understand their activities were supposed to be secret?

GEN WEBB: No, that is so, but you can have a Court Martial in camera.

MR SIBANYONI: Okay, thank you. Thanks, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: And you would have expected the person that heard this in camera to break their oath of office if they were Judges and Prosecutors, not to report the crimes that were evidenced before them.

GEN WEBB: The Regiment of Discipline and Military law, I suppose they didn't have the right really to hear somebody on a charge of murder perhaps.

MR BIZOS: No, I don't think that you are coming to terms with my question, you're dealing with an exception possibly, but have you understood the question in general terms?

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question would be, just to give an example, if a person, let's say he's being Court Martialled for failing to obey an order, a military thing, and it comes out in the Court Martial that he failed to obey an order to go and murder somebody ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Or to blow up a building.

CHAIRPERSON: ... or to blow up a building, then there would be some duty in law, a duty in law in the person receiving that information of a crime being committed such as murder, to report that to the police.

GEN WEBB: That's correct, Chairperson, it would be reported to the police.

MR BIZOS: You would also have had to have a compliant lawyer representing the accused, that he would keep quiet about the crimes that were disclosed, and I would hope that there were not too many compliant lawyers around.

GEN WEBB: That is not a question that I can answer. We never had such an example, so were are simply sitting here and speculating actually.

MR BIZOS: Yes. A copy of your evidence in the Webster Inquest was made available to you, have you seen it?

CHAIRPERSON: Is this the document that was placed on the table this morning?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman. Could we have a bundle number for it please, Mr Chairman.


MR BIZOS: No, not exhibit, bundle.


MS COLERIDGE: H, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Bundle H, not exhibit H, but bundle H.

MR BIZOS: Now I don't want to take up time by referring to all the specific contradictions between that evidence, your evidence here and your evidence before the Harms Commission, there are just one or two things that I want to ask you about it. Are you satisfied that this is a correct record of what you said before His Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And in so far as it conflicts with your evidence either here or at the Harms Commission, is there anything further that you want to say about it, or any explanation that you want to offer? Because we are going to refer to the contents of this as a statement of yours made on a previous occasion, during the argument. Do you want to add anything to it, or explain anything?

GEN WEBB: Well I had no opportunity to read it, the document was handed to me this morning.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, sorry it's my fault, but this is an extract of his evidence given where?

MR BIZOS: Before His Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: At the inquest?

MR BIZOS: At the Webster Inquest.

Well we'll proceed on the basis that it's correctly recorded, you'll have an opportunity possibly to read it and you can consult with your counsel, your attorney if there is anything that is wrong or anything else that you want to explain it. Can we proceed on that basis, so that we do not take up time? I see that your legal representative nods, can we proceed?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: There are just two or three things in it that I want to draw attention to, which you might want to deal with. Will you please have a look at pages 1697, where you are asked about Mr van Zyl's evidence in relation to his briefing. Will you read from line 20 please to over the page.


"Ja. General, I just want to put it to you that my instructions from my clients are that they were told that your function would be anything from the disruption or the maximal disruption of the enemy within the Republic of South Africa, anything from the breaking of a window to the killing of a person, that it was conveyed to them as such and that that was their instruction and training."

MR BIZOS: Read your answer, General.


"A person would want to accept and assume that it would also be necessary to motivate the members. If I may make a comparison here between that and a rugby team."

MR BIZOS: Now I just want to ask you there, were you serious in this answer or were you having the Judge on?

GEN WEBB: I was not present at the briefing which the CCB members received and to which this relates, where these things were told to them ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: No, I'm asking you whether you were serious about your answer or whether you were having the Judge and the other people there, on? That the instructions to kill are different - are the same as the briefing of a rugby team?

GEN WEBB: I certainly was not trying to mislead the Judge or to try and be facetious.

MR BIZOS: This was a serious question by the representative of the operatives, perhaps - it must have been Mr du Plessis I take it, acting on behalf of three clients at that time. Was it Mr Burger, Mr van Zyl and ...(intervention)

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, it was Mr van Zyl, Mr Botha and Mr Barnard.

MR BIZOS: Now the question that was put to you that there was an instruction that they must kill and you choose to give, to equate it with a briefing of a rugby team, were you serious or were you having the Judge on?

GEN WEBB: I was not involved in this briefing of these people and in my view it could have been done to motivate the people. To motivate them to commit murder, like you motivated according - well read the rest of your answer, because I think that you have lost sight of reality, General. Just read it.


"I see. Before a rugby team goes onto the field you tell the men for instance, "look guys, we've got to really tackle these guys and we're not going to take any nonsense, we are just going to tackle them right from the beginning."


"But that does not justify any player to go out onto the field and immediately to assault his opponent."

MR BIZOS: And you thought that that was a relevant metaphor or simile.

GEN WEBB: Relevant in respect of the motivation of people, yes.

MR BIZOS: I don't think I'll take up any more of the Committee's time in relation to that.

Could you please turn to page 1704, where you admit that Verster was lying to the Commission on oath at the Harms, about Omar and Evans. Is that correct?

GEN WEBB: From which line do you want me to read?

MR BIZOS: Have a look from line 10 to - well start reading from line 10 and we'll stop you.


"MR BERTELSMAN: On page 1566 it is said, starting at approximately line 7: 'I deal now with the incidents and Gen Badenhorst's statement which has already been mentioned, which is relevant to the Commission's inquiry.'

7B: Bruce White, Gavin Evans, Dullah Omar. Above-mentioned persons were monitored by the CCB as part of the CCB's normal activities to gather intelligence, correct?"


"Did you hear that evidence during the Harms Commission?"


"You knew, General, that that evidence was not the truth, is that not so?"

"Yes, Your Honour"

"You neglected to bring that fact to the attention of your legal representatives, is that not so?"


"You neglected to bring that fact or to correct that fact in your affidavit which you read into the Harms Commission testimony?"


"And you went further, General, when I was cross-examining you regarding this aspect specifically. You confirmed that it was only a monitoring which had taken place, correct?"

"No. Your Worship, may I - I have said that in respect of Omar I have no knowledge of that, in respect of Evans also no knowledge except the Evans/Grosskopf connection."

"Yes, but we're not now talking about that Evans, and in any event you say you are not allowed to talk about that and that is on the instructions of the Minister. We're now talking about Gavin Evans. Now Your Worship, may I refer you to page 2082 of the proceedings before the Harms Commission."

"COURT: Yes, yes, I have it."

"MR BERTELSMAN: Good. Approximately from line 8 onwards, and I put it to you, is it correct that Mr Joe Verster was the only channel which was your contact at the CCB? Your answer was 'Correct.' The fact that Mr Joe Verster did not reveal this to you or submit this to you was a disregard of a standing order and this refers to these projects."

There I was interrupted by Mr Hattingh.

"Mr Chair, that presupposes ..."

and the Chairperson then says to me:

"You ignore Mr Verster's evidence because Mr Verster's evidence was that he had no knowledge of such an elimination, not so?"

"Yes, Your Worship."

"Very well. Whilst this opportunity presented itself you did not say 'But Your Worship, that evidence is false, he did know because he authorised it himself as he admitted to me', not so?"

"Yes, Your Worship."

COURT: ..."


MR BIZOS: Yes, I think that that is enough, thank you. Now at page 1717, please start reading from line 9, 1717.


"Yes, but you see it goes much further, General, your own evidence before the Harms Commission was a repeated attempt to create a smoke screen that the CCB did not operate internally, not so?"

"No, Your Worship, my privilege relates specifically to projects which were operated internally."

"Oh. General, do you deny that you in your evidence before the Harms Commission, said on more than one occasion 'But we do not act internally, we were not allowed to act internally'"?

"The evidence was 'We may not."

"One of those rules, General, which in 1989 was contravened more often than actually honoured by the CCB, correct?"

"According to the evidence, yes."

"Not only according to the evidence, General, but according to your own knowledge, correct?"

"Yes, Your Worship."

"And it is that knowledge, General, which you failed to mention to the Harms Commission, correct?"


"Because you knew, General, that the CCB had been active internally on an ongoing basis."

"No, Your Worship."

MR BIZOS: Thank you. And if you think that you want to refer to any other portion for the purposes of explaining it, I have already indicated what the situation is. Would you say that you were in control or not in control of the situation?

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, are you talking about ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: The CCB at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: Region 6, CCB at the time.


GEN WEBB: Well it seems from the evidence that I wasn't completely in control.

MR BIZOS: I want to turn now to the two specific matters in respect of which you have applied for amnesty. First of all, did you apply for amnesty because these are two matters in which you knew before you entered the witness box in the Harms Commission, that there would be evidence against you of conduct which may have led to your criminal prosecution?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: When did you become aware that there was evidence that may incriminate you in criminal acts in relation to these two matters?

GEN WEBB: By my own evidence which I gave, by requesting a privilege. Thereby I implicated myself.

MR BIZOS: But did the fact that van Zyl had given evidence of this before the Commission ...


MR BIZOS: And Kalla Botha?


MR BIZOS: And others. Didn't you feel that you might be prosecuted on that evidence?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I testified before the Harms Commission and I requested privilege.

MR BIZOS: But one of the reasons why you do ask for privilege is because you are afraid that you may be charged for committing criminal acts.

GEN WEBB: No, I believed bona fide that what I had done was correct or right in those circumstances.

MR BIZOS: Then you had no right to claim privilege. Because if you've got a right to do things you don't need privilege, do you?

GEN WEBB: It wasn't in a court, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Why are you bothering to apply for amnesty?

GEN WEBB: Because now in retrospect I can see that my actions weren't right.

MR BIZOS: And what do you hope to achieve if you get amnesty?

GEN WEBB: What do you mean, what am I trying to achieve?

MR BIZOS: What was your motivation, why did you apply for amnesty? Other than the purpose of possibly avoiding prosecution for criminal acts.

GEN WEBB: That the truth must be revealed now.

MR BIZOS: Now did it occur to you that as a General on top of this structure, that the truth may be that if you told us about everything that you knew, both inside and outside the country, in order to salve your conscience and in order to - you know what it says there, "Truth, the Road to Reconciliation", not just a portion of the truth, did it not occur to you to be open about things that you knew which did not implicate you in criminal activities directly?

GEN WEBB: My conscience is clear, Chairperson, I sleep well at night.

MR BIZOS: Well that may be evidence of something else, General, but we will leave it at that if you're sleeping comfortably at night. Tell me, you told us that your applications for amnesty were the same as previous applications, is that what you said?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You made a similar application on exactly the same facts in 19 - the early '90s, what year did you say it was?

GEN WEBB: 1990.

MR BIZOS: 1990. As soon as the first Indemnity Act was promulgated?


MR BIZOS: And you say that it's exactly the same.

GEN WEBB: As far as I know, yes.

MR BIZOS: And did you have a copy of that application when the present applications were made?

GEN WEBB: I think our legal representatives kept copies.

MR BIZOS: Which legal representative had a copy of your application made in 1990?

GEN WEBB: It was done by Adv Hattingh.

MR BIZOS: And who was the attorney?

GEN WEBB: Adv Hattingh, Adv Wessels and the attorney - well I mentioned him yesterday.

MR BIZOS: Wagener.

GEN WEBB: No, no, ...(intervention)

MR LAX: You said Havenga yesterday.

GEN WEBB: Havenga, yes.

MR BIZOS: Havenga or Wagener?

GEN WEBB: Havenga.

MR BIZOS: Havenga. Is he an attorney? Is he still in practice?

GEN WEBB: As far as I know, yes.

MR BIZOS: It was Wagener, because yesterday I thought it was ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think he did mention the name Havenga yesterday.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I heard Wagener, because of his association with many Generals. Sorry about that.

Now where is he to be found? That's Mr Havenga. Does he practice under his own name or is he a member of a big firm?

GEN WEBB: No, I think he has his own firm, he's in Centurion, Pretoria.

MR BIZOS: In Centurion. Well ...(intervention)

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mr Chairperson, may I just mention I also practice in Centurion and there was a firm Havenga, but I don't think they exist any longer, they no longer in Centurion in any event. I stand to be corrected, but I don't think there is such a firm in Centurion anymore.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)


MR BIZOS: Which attorney did these applications?

GEN WEBB: This last one?


GEN WEBB: It was Adolf Malan.

MR BIZOS: Now if they were the same, because you said that, he must have had a copy of the '90 application in order to copy them into this form.


MR BIZOS: Yes. And where is this Mr Malan?

GEN WEBB: He's in Pretoria.

MR BIZOS: Practising under his own name?

GEN WEBB: As far as I know, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. I see Pretoria counsel nodding his head, so that's very helpful.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Chairperson, if I may help, Mr Adolf Malan is from Adolf Malan and Vermeulen Attorneys, and they're also currently the attorneys of record of Dr Wouter Basson, and he practices in Pretoria.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, your button, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Yes, thank you for that information.

You see we would like to see those applications and - well you have no objection to your attorney handing them over?

GEN WEBB: Of course not, it should be with the Department of Justice. It ought to be there, all these applications were sent through, through the correct channels.

MR BIZOS: Very well, I will find them. Now I want to deal with the first application, that is the one relating to Archbishop Tutu. I want to start with 1.3. You say that a study was done on the superstitions - bundle A198, Mr Chairman, a study was done on the superstitions of the population groups in the Republic of South Africa, who did this study?

GEN WEBB: I don't specifically who did the study, the information was conveyed to me by the CCB.

MR BIZOS: It's sounds a strange study. What relevance was there to the superstitions of the black people of South Africa in relation to the Archbishop of Cape Town or the Anglican Church and one of the foremost Christian religious figures in the country, and one might say with due respect, of the world, what did the superstitions have to do with it? What superstition was referred to you?

GEN WEBB: These superstitions did not relate directly to the Archbishop himself, it related to the people, the labourers working for him.

MR BIZOS: Oh, who was going to be intimidated, the Archbishop or the workers that were working for him, the gardeners and other people?

GEN WEBB: In the first place the purpose was that the gardener or the labourer or whosoever, that he was supposed to see the foetus and then should be led to believe that Bishop Tutu had been placed under some kind of spell or witchcraft and that he would no longer want to work for him and in so doing, to try to reduce his support base.

MR BIZOS: That's a very involved political motivation, let's try and examine it. Did the CCB, on the authority of the General, devise a plan to get rid of a gardener?

GEN WEBB: To get rid of?

MR BIZOS: To get rid of a gardener working for Archbishop Tutu. Is that what you are telling us?

GEN WEBB: In that people ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: No, is that what you said?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, with all due respect, can Mr Bizos please give the witness an opportunity to answer the question please.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR LAX: Sorry, your mike's off again.

MR BIZOS: Have I summarised it correctly so far, then you can add whatever you want. Have I summarised the position correctly up to now?

CHAIRPERSON: The question is, was the plan devised to get rid of the gardener in the employ of the Archbishop?

GEN WEBB: No, that's not correct.

MR BIZOS: That's not correct. Well why did you bring the gardener into it?

GEN WEBB: It was so that the people who worked for him and who were superstitious themselves, that they be influenced.

MR BIZOS: Who were the people that were working for him that you hoped would stop working for him?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: But you know you're a General, here is - you know I think that the Afrikaans word "eienaardig" is a much better word than strange, "'n eienaardige ding" that you must hang up a foetus of a baboon in order to get rid of the Archbishop's staff. Have I now summarised it correctly?


MR BIZOS: Not all the staff, just the black staff.

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR BIZOS: How many black staff worked for the Archbishop at the time?

GEN WEBB: I can't remember, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you ask? Did you ask?

GEN WEBB: Possibly I did yes.

MR BIZOS: Well "dis moontlik" isn't very helpful. Can you please tell us whether it was two or three? I assume there was a gardener or two, there was a cook and there was a cleaner, possibly a driver which may have been white, some of them may have been white, may have been black, but how many people were you going to deprive the Archbishop of their service? How many people and how difficult did you think it would be for the Archbishop to replace them?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: But you know you started a serious plan, I mean surely these questions come to mind, to the mind of a General, never mind an ex-Lieutenant from Brixton Murder and Robbery. Any answer to that question?

GEN WEBB: Maybe I asked those questions, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: I'm sorry, what was your answer?

CHAIRPERSON: He said "Maybe I asked those questions, I don't know."

MR BIZOS: Oh, but you don't remember.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just ...

MR BIZOS: No, please do, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You say a study was done of the various black "bevolkingsgroepe", from which particular group did this superstition come from, this one about knocking in nails in the tree and hanging a baboon foetus?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, I'm assuming that the people who did the study would have determined where it came from.

CHAIRPERSON: But you don't know which one, whether it's Venda or Xhosa or Zulu or Pedi?

GEN WEBB: No, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: But now, did you ask whether these people - there was any information about the people who were working there, whether they were superstitious or they were perhaps devout Christians, free of any of the superstitions of what you thought were the superstitions of the black people?

GEN WEBB: No, I didn't.

MR BIZOS: Now did you give authority ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: Yes, I did.

MR BIZOS: ... that somebody must go and ask Dr Wouter Basson's - sorry, to ask Wouter Basson to go and get a veterinary surgeon to do an operation on a baboon to get a foetus? Did you authorise that?

GEN WEBB: I didn't know who was involved in procuring the foetus.

MR BIZOS: But did you authorise this act?

GEN WEBB: I authorised the act.

MR BIZOS: Yes. But now let us assume that you succeeded in getting rid of a number of people working for the Archbishop, did you hope that that would have deterred the Archbishop from calling for sanctions against South Africa, from supporting the cause of the United Democratic Front, which primarily was a cause of the rest of the establishment of democracy in the country? And even if you were correct in your suspicions that the Archbishop was a member of the ANC, which I'm sure he would have denied, did you think that he was going to give up his lifelong struggle for democracy in South Africa by the means which he chose to employ, just because you managed by some primitive superstitious way which you were not sure whether it would work or not, to stop the committed Archbishop from doing what he had been doing from his days as a student? Is that what you are telling the Committee?

GEN WEBB: We hoped that it would work, that his labourers would leave him, that there would be a rumour going around that he was placed under a spell and that he could not get any labourers and that his support would diminish.

MR BIZOS: Well then were you going to advertise this for everybody living in the Western Cape, so that in this employer-friendly area there would be no-one prepared to work for their Archbishop, is that what you are saying?

GEN WEBB: We hoped that it would work.

MR BIZOS: You know hope must be realistic, you're not a superstitious man yourself are you?


MR BIZOS: So hope must have some realistic prospect of success before you commit what appears on the face to most reasonable people I would suggest, a ridiculous proposal and a ridiculous act.

GEN WEBB: That question only an anthropologist would be able to answer, somebody who knows about the habits of people.

MR BIZOS: Well you know I would like to find out who this expert ethnologist or ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It's an anthropologist.

MR BIZOS: ... anthropologist was that gave the CCB this advice. Please can you help us?

GEN WEBB: No, I can't, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well will you please ask the people involved that came to you for your permission, who was this expert on human behaviour and so knowledgeable about the superstitions of people that he gave this advice?

GEN WEBB: I think Mr Bizos had the opportunity to ask Mr Verster, which he obviously didn't do.

MR BIZOS: I think I did. I think I even had to help with the translation of the word "ethnologist" that I had used, that's why I remember that I did.

GEN WEBB: Well if Mr Verster can't answer the question, neither can I.


CHAIRPERSON: Who instigated this project from within the CCB?

GEN WEBB: It came from the bottom to the top, it came to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but do you know who instigated it?


MR BIZOS: You see - do you agree that now that I have asked you these questions, that if that was all that was to happen, to hang up this foetus and to knock eight nails into the driveway, that in itself doesn't make sense? Would you agree?

GEN WEBB: Because I'm not superstitious.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

GEN WEBB: Because I'm not superstitious now or I wasn't superstitious, but only one person can explain that to us and that's an expert.

MR BIZOS: But you know - do you seriously say that a properly qualified psychologist - anthropologist "sielkundige" is a psychologist, a properly qualified psychologist would have put forward this theory ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: Definitely not a psychologist.

MR BIZOS: ... in order to intimidate Bishop Tutu?

GEN WEBB: Not a psychologist.

MR BIZOS: "Sielkundige" you said.

GEN WEBB: No, you used the word psychologist.

MR BIZOS: I'm sorry, I thought that I heard you use the word "sielkundige".

GEN WEBB: "Volkekundige", anthropologist.

MR BIZOS: Ja, very good, very good. Any serious minded anthropologist would have suggested that this would have had the desired effect in intimidating Bishop Tutu?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now this business about the intimidation was not really against Bishop Tutu, the intimidation would have been on the servants. To use your usual word.

GEN WEBB: Intimidation of Archbishop Tutu through his labourers.

MR BIZOS: That it was through his employees doesn't appear in your application.

GEN WEBB: That's true, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Nor do any of the operatives mention that that was the intention, that the intention was to intimidate the workers.

CHAIRPERSON: Just to get back, was there any research done - we're getting back to this question about a study was done of the "bevolkingsgroepe" and it had come up that driving nails in a driveway and hanging a foetus was an act which would cast superstition and look like a spell has been spun. I must say it's the first time I've heard about such superstition and - I'm certainly unaware of it. Personally, I live in Transkei and I've never come across - I'm not saying it doesn't exist, but I've never heard of it. Now if all the people were working, who were working for the Bishop as labourers, came from a place where the hanging of a foetus and he driving in of nails into the driveway meant nothing to them, let's say for instance they came from Transkei and the superstition applied to people who came from the far north or something like that, then it wouldn't work.

GEN WEBB: Not at all, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So in other words, there must have been some research done as to the origin of the persons who were in the employ of the Bishop who worked at Bishopsgate, in order for it to have worked

GEN WEBB: There must have been.

CHAIRPERSON: And was that told to you, were you told "Look there's 10 people who work here and so many come from such an area", or whatever "and some of them may be open to the desired effect"?

GEN WEBB: It was told to me that there was a study done and by doing this we would get the desired effect, or we should get that effect.

CHAIRPERSON: So you didn't have any details as to what that study entailed?

GEN WEBB: The specific groups that were studied, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: We don't want to take up too much time on this or give it ... Please have a look at page 132 of bundle B. Please read the first paragraph on page 132.


"With my arrival at the City Lodge ..."


MR BIZOS: This is Barnard, Mr Chairman.


"... I saw a white man, Dirk. I found Dirk in the relevant room. I starting talking with Dirk. He told me that Desmond Tutu was a sensitive case and that they wanted to disrupt him in another way. He said that it was a five-point plan and that the foetus was the third step. The foetus had to be hung close to the Tutu home. The nails had to be knocked on either side of the garden path. There was research done about the witchcraft rituals of the group which Tutu belonged to. Dirk said that the fourth step would be a hyena to be hung at Tutu's home. The fifth step was one or other witchcraft poison with which Trevor Tutu would have been poisoned. Dirk also said ..."


MR BIZOS: No, that's enough, that's enough thank you. Now that would have been real intimidation, wouldn't it? Of Bishop Tutu. Wouldn't it?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: A hyena and then the poisoning of his son, Trevor. Now you remember that the Chairman asked you whether there was any study as to what the beliefs of his workers were, if this is true it would appear that if there was any so-called research, it was research done in relation to the Bishop's people to which he belonged. Are you able to comment on it? That there was apparently no research mentioned here about the workers, nor any suggestion that the intimidation was going to be of the workers?

GEN WEBB: This was Barnard's testimony, Chairperson, so I cannot comment on that. It may be the perception he had, I can't comment on that.

MR BIZOS: Leave out the perceptions because you know perception is an easy cop-out when attempts are made to hide the truth. But do you agree that this version is worthy of the CCB's attention, the eventual killing of Trevor Tutu, the son of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, that was CCB stuff, not the frightening of employees?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now in relation to the last portion of this, that the poison to be used to kill Trevor Tutu was going to be a poison used by witch-doctors, according to the statement. We have heard evidence that the CCB had access to the making of poisons, poison pills, poison powder, we know that in relation to the Omar matter, doesn't this make sense in relation to the activities of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: Mr Barnard is here, he will give his evidence. I say once again, it's his perception.

MR BIZOS: What I am saying is that the version that you say you were told doesn't make sense, but what Mr Barnard says makes complete sense, having regard to what the work of the CCB was.

GEN WEBB: I don't agree, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you, or are you aware of any person named Dirk?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Will you bear with me for just one moment please.

I'm informed that in another document, Mr Barnard indicates that the Dirk was Mr van Zyl and I see Mr Barnard's counsel nodding his head in approval. Now I'm merely disclosing this for the sake of completeness, because you say you didn't know Mr van Zyl.

GEN WEBB: No, I didn't say that, I said I don't know Dirk.

MR BIZOS: Did you know Mr van Zyl at that time?

GEN WEBB: Is this Mr Slang van Zyl?


GEN WEBB: Obviously.

MR BIZOS: You knew him then?


MR BIZOS: Oh. Now tell me, did you follow up whether this great idea of the anthropologist that gave you advice, actually worked? Did the Archbishop stop his activities? Was he intimidated as intended?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, it didn't work at all, the gardener found the thing, got rid of it. Archbishop Tutu was not even informed that such a thing happened.


MR LAX: May I just interpose for one second.

Did you know whether the gardener was even a person of African origin or not?

GEN WEBB: No, I didn't know.

MR LAX: But surely the plan had no prospect of success if he wasn't.

GEN WEBB: I had been briefed, so I presumed that the study had been done thoroughly and that the person who would get it would have been superstitious.

MR LAX: Well were you told that he was superstitious, or she?

GEN WEBB: No, it was said that it was about the superstitions and that it could work.

MR LAX: I mean, you were asked this question earlier but you will seriously concede now with the benefit of hindsight, that that plan had no prospect of success.

GEN WEBB: It didn't work at all.

MR LAX: That's not what I put to you, I said it had no prospect of success. With the benefit of hindsight, looking at it now in the cold light of day, knowing what you know now.

GEN WEBB: Based on what I know now it couldn't succeed.

MR BIZOS: Was it intended to discredit the Archbishop by this act, as Archbishop?

GEN WEBB: No, you wouldn't discredit him by doing that.

MR BIZOS: If there was no intention to discredit him, it would rather - if it were to discredit anybody, it would discredit the silly people who went to put it up. It would be no reflection on the Archbishop's standing.

GEN WEBB: No, with this action you couldn't discredit him.

MR BIZOS: And that was not your intention?


MR BIZOS: Please have a look at the bottom of page 199, read it out and go on to the top of page 200 and read it out.

MR LAX: Sorry, which bundle are you referring to, Mr Bizos?

CHAIRPERSON: Bundle B, is it?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)


"State political targets of what was to be achieved.

As mentioned, Archbishop Tutu was identified as a political enemy of the government of the Republic of South Africa and we tried to discredit him and to undermine the prominence he enjoyed during his period ..."


MR BIZOS: Just stop there for one moment please. Do you agree that in the previous question you said that it was not intended to discredit him.

GEN WEBB: You must read this in the right context to ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: No, did you say that you did not intend to discredit him?

GEN WEBB: In front of the greater public, yes. The greater public.

MR BIZOS: That you say is what you meant.

GEN WEBB: No, that's what I'm saying here. This is to place a discredit - it is about is workers.

MR BIZOS: Oh. And then he would have been discredited only in relation to his workers?


MR BIZOS: You're sure about that?

GEN WEBB: That's what we tried.

MR BIZOS: That's what the discrediting was about?

GEN WEBB: That's what we tried, ja.

MR BIZOS: Just read on and tell me whether you want to stick to it.


" And to undermine the prominence enjoyed during his ..."


MR BIZOS: Just stop there for a moment. Is that contradictory to what you have just said, that you wanted to discredit him because of his prominence? When you spoke about prominence, did you only - was he only prominent in the eyes of his half a dozen employees?


MR BIZOS: Or throughout the world?

GEN WEBB: No, world-wide he was prominent.

MR BIZOS: So you see that's why I asked you to stop there, because I could see that you were going to contradict yourself you see, and you contradicted yourself. If you were going to discredit him in his prominence, it must have been the world at large.

GEN WEBB: That was the ultimate aim. Let's go through the steps. Firstly, to discredit him in regard to his employees, that was the aim. That it would go further that he is bewitched and he couldn't get any further employees and to diminish his support. So it was a long process.

MR LAX: That's premised on the notion that he only had people who were superstitious working for him.

GEN WEBB: Yes, or some of them.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, because one would imagine if the intention was to discredit the Archbishop in his prominence world-wide, that there would have been some anonymous phone call links, you know, get somebody from the press to go and see this monkey hanging and the nails in the driveway, just to publicise the incident, because if it was just restricted to the household, if the gardener sees it and even if the Archbishop see it and says "Take it down, through it in the rubbish bin", what's the chances of discrediting him in his prominence world-wide?

GEN WEBB: Let me explain the steps, Chairperson. Firstly, to discredit him with his workers, with the aim that they think he's bewitched, they think that other people do not want to work for him and through that, to try and diminish his support and then ultimately globally when his support has been diminished he would not have the influence he had. So it's a long process, which did not succeed.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) hanging of the foetus and the knocking in of nails. Were you going to buttress it up by taking possibly some more steps in order to discredit His Grace the Archbishop?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You know it would be laughable if it were not so tragic, that you don't see the ridiculous nature of the evidence that you are giving, General. Did you know that there had earlier been a Commission of Inquiry in relation to the South African Council of Churches?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You didn't know that?

GEN WEBB: The South African Council of Churches, no.

MR BIZOS: Whilst Bishop Tutu, because before he was Archbishop, was the main figure before His Lordship Mr Justice Eloff, the Judge President of the Transvaal as it then was?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you know that that was an event which was given the widest possible publicity?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And in which the Archbishop had set forth his opposition to the government, his support for sanctions as a legitimate way of bringing about change for his identification with the United Democratic Front as a democratic organisation?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you bother before you authorised this action, to find out anything about the Archbishop, other than what you tell us some unknown so-called anthropologist had reported to one or other of your underlings?

GEN WEBB: Bishop Tutu was a prominent figure and there were always articles about him in the newspapers and I also got the information through our channels.

MR BIZOS: And this anthropologist was right and the people had, before this ridiculous act was committed in relation to him, thought that he was worthy of the Nobel Prize for Peace. Did you take that into consideration when you authorised this act?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson. I was not aware of it.

MR BIZOS: Superstition is it consistent with the leader of the Church of the Province, to give it its correct name, commonly referred to as the Anglican Church, is that consistent?

GEN WEBB: No, but nobody talked about the superstitions of Archbishop Tutu.

MR SIBANYONI: You see because if we take your statement on its face value, without you adding the ...(indistinct) to influence the employees, it may be interpreted that if this was given publicity, that behold the black Archbishop is indulging in superstitious practices. Was that your intention?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: General, was this the first project that was put to you for approval relating to Region 6?

GEN WEBB: It was the first or the second, I'm not sure.

CHAIRPERSON: Well was it before the Athlone bombing? Because that was the 30th of August.

GEN WEBB: That was the 30th of August.

CHAIRPERSON: I can't recall, I think it was the first.

GEN WEBB: According to my application it only says "middle to end of '89". There's not a specific date, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: I'm just looking for a reference, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Because if it was the first project, what did you think of it at the time? You know, taking into account your military background, fighting wars, training soldiers and now you come across and the first project is about hanging a baboon foetus and driving nails, what did you personally thing, feel? Did you really think it was a serious operation that was destined for success?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, it was a strange suggestion but it was also brilliant in so far as would it work it would have been brilliant.

MR BIZOS: Have you got a clear recollection of Mr Verster coming to you to ask for your approval for this to be done?

GEN WEBB: Reasonably, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes, a sufficiently reasonable memory of it. Did you or he laugh when this proposal was made?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Strange, because Mr Verster said that he thought that this was a joke and I would have thought that either he or you or both of you would have laughed at this brilliant joke.

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: We're trying to find a reference of someone who we remember but we can't find the reference, but I must put it to you. If anyone had said that it was, the purpose was in order to show the superstitions of the Bishop himself, would that be correct or incorrect?

GEN WEBB: Not according the my briefing.

MR BIZOS: Did you watch with interest what the result of this was?

GEN WEBB: I got feedback, yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you get a report-back?

GEN WEBB: I got a report-back, yes.

MR BIZOS: From whom?

GEN WEBB: From Col Verster.

MR BIZOS: What did he say?

GEN WEBB: He said that the labourer found the foetus and he removed it and afterwards we learnt that Bishop Tutu was not even briefed about it.

MR BIZOS: Was intended that the Bishop should be there, when the planning was done?

GEN WEBB: No, but the aim was against the employees.

MR BIZOS: No, but you say that Mr Verster told you that the Archbishop was not even there.

GEN WEBB: Afterwards we heard that the Archbishop did not even know about it because it had been removed by one of his employees and buried and he didn't even brief the Archbishop about it.

MR BIZOS: Was it said to you that it would not only be a foetus but also eight nails, about eight - if I remember correctly, about eight inches or ten inches long, would be driven into the ground? What would that be a symbol for?

GEN WEBB: I have no idea, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Digging nails into the ground.

GEN WEBB: I have no idea.

MR BIZOS: Did you ask?


MR BIZOS: Might have had something to do with some foreboding of death? Digging nails into the ground.

GEN WEBB: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Have you ever tried to find out?


MR BIZOS: Who would know who this anthropologist was?

GEN WEBB: It should be Mr Verster.

CHAIRPERSON: Or the operative from whom the project originated, it might have come from further down.

GEN WEBB: Possibly, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Who was the Head of Region 9?

GEN WEBB: I can't remember just like that.

MR BIZOS: The performance of this act you told the Chairman, was when?

CHAIRPERSON: He didn't know. It's mentioned in the application, it's from mid-1989 to the end of the year but he didn't know and he also didn't know whether it was before or after the Early Learning Centre.

MR BIZOS: It was either the first or second thing that you were asked to approve?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You must have a very clear memory if it was one of the only two things that this complicated organisation did.

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, Region 6 is a small part of the CCB, the CCB had many operations and the Special Services had many projects. It's not a clear recollection, I had a lot of other things to do.

MR BIZOS: Well I'm going to put to you that the only basis upon which this makes any sense is that which has been deposed to by Mr Barnard, which was consistent with the work of the CCB to eliminate people within the Republic of South Africa.

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And if anything was to intimidate Bishop Tutu, it would surely be the death of his son and more particularly if the cause of death was by poison use by what you call witch-doctors.

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, Mr Tutu was not a death target.

MR BIZOS: Not the Bishop, his son.

GEN WEBB: Neither his son.

MR BIZOS: I'm going on to another aspect, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to ask a question before it slips my mind. You say that the CCB was a small section of your command, can you just give us any idea of the size of the Security Forces personnel, how big was it?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, we had our Head Office in Pretoria, about a hundred people working there, then we went to Phalaborwa where there was a ground fighting element available for Special Forces, as well as pseudo capabilities, as well as a small reconnaissance group availability in Phalaborwa in the order of five hundred plus. Then if we go to Durban, we had the parachute specialists with high jump low opening techniques, as well as sharp shooters, plus the hostage release team. In Langebaan we had the sea specialist with regard to, with submarines, fleet ships or on their own capacities to reach targets, as well as all the support elements and there was a civil regiment as well. So with all the support personnel, we're talking a thousand plus people, of which all the groups which I mentioned had different operations.

If we look at the CCB, Region 6 was the latest region, so it was only in the beginning stage. The rest of the CCB was very active externally and they were well founded, well established, they functioned well and the internal part still had to find its feet, if you want.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, ...(indistinct - no microphone) Mr Verster. You will find that he claimed privilege, at page 263 of the record, of the record of these proceedings and did not wish to answer any questions after consultation with my learned friend, Mr Wessels. You'll see that on page 263 to 264. This is why we haven't got from Mr Verster who the anthropologist who reported on this was.


MR BIZOS: I'm going onto another matter, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We'll now take the lunch adjournment until 2 o'clock.



EDWARD WEBB: (s.u.o.)



Let us deal with the Early Learning Centre bomb incident, General. You give us the precise date on which Mr Verster came to you, the 30th of September.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Had you had any indication from him before this - in August was it, 30th of August. Had you had any indication from him in your weekly meetings that this was being prepared?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now did you give you any explanation why you didn't have any forewarning, particularly as a bomb had to be obtained and it had to be doctored in relation to its explosive mechanism? Did he give you any explanation as to why he came to you as a matter of such great urgency?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: What did he say?

GEN WEBB: He told me that the meeting or the members would meet again on the 31st of August and that the information indicated that they would meet on the 31st and we didn't know when after that they would meet again, so we had to act either on the 31st of not at all.

MR BIZOS: Did he explain why if in fact as we understand the other evidence, this was in preparation for some time, he hadn't forewarned you that a bomb was necessary?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Who was your bomb maker, the CCB's bomb maker?

GEN WEBB: We didn't have a bomb maker.

MR BIZOS: Well to whom did you go if you needed a bomb to blow up something?

GEN WEBB: The Special Forces had first and second choice or option in respect of captured armaments and they had their own weaponry.

MR BIZOS: Yes, who was the "Spesiale Magte persoon"? You know we don't want these vague things. People procured bombs to do things, we want to know as part of your duty to make full disclosure, who it was that provided this bomb, please.

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I only arranged for the remote control ignition device, not the limpet mine itself.

MR BIZOS: Well I am sure that you will tell us who gave you the explosive mechanism, the remote.

GEN WEBB: Nobody gave it to me, I went to Col Hekkies van Heerden, he was my Engineering Officer and he therefore had control over the explosives and he then conveyed it to the CCB.

MR BIZOS: So we know that he got the remote.

GEN WEBB: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: What are his full names, what was his rank, where is he now?

GEN WEBB: Unfortunately he died after leaving the Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: Oh. What was his job?

GEN WEBB: He was the Engineering Officer, the Technical Officer, and therefore he was in control of all my engineering capacity. Engineering.

MR BIZOS: Is a bomb an engineering function?

GEN WEBB: Yes. A mine.

MR BIZOS: A mine. Did Mr Verster tell you what sort of explosive device he had prepared for this purpose?

GEN WEBB: No, he told that they would use a limpet mine.

MR BIZOS: In order to do damage to what?

GEN WEBB: To firstly frighten the people away and then also to damage the building.

MR BIZOS: How was he going to frighten them? Did he explain to you?

GEN WEBB: Yes, we would explode the bomb immediately after the meeting, immediately after they'd left the hall and then they would get the message.

MR BIZOS: How would they know that it was you who had put the bomb there in order to be frightened?

GEN WEBB: They needn't know that it was us, Mr Bizos, they simply had to get the message that somebody is after them, that was the important thing.

MR BIZOS: Who other than the Security Forces would have been on their track?

GEN WEBB: They wouldn't have been aware of the CCB.

MR BIZOS: I see, you thought that they may think that it was one of the other sabotage and killing agencies that might have done it?

GEN WEBB: I don't know what they would have thought, the important thing was to get the message home to them, "Somebody is on your track, watch out."

MR BIZOS: Oh, did you ask him who the owner of the building was?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you ask him what purpose will this serve if none of them is injured, because they're going to meet somewhere else, under a tree, in a shebeen, in a cafe, in one's home? Why damage property that didn't belong to them, that belonged to a religious trust that had made provision for the education of - yes, it wasn't a religious trust, it was trust with some religious people on its Board that had made provision for the education of children.

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, the idea was to frighten them off, to give them a severe fright and that's why the bomb had to explode as soon as possible after they'd left the hall. I suppose they could have met again under a tree or in a shebeen or wherever, but some of those people would have said "Look, I'm done with this, I'm not going to take part in this kind of thing." Some of the more hardened people might have said "Yes, I'll continue." But this kind of thing would have had a different effect on different people.

MR BIZOS: Assume that they had their meetings in Sanlam buildings, would you have blown up Sanlam?

GEN WEBB: Sanlam wouldn't have allowed that.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

GEN WEBB: Sanlam would not have allowed such a thing.

MR BIZOS: Well but let's assume that one of their employees had access to the building and was abusing the privilege, let's assume that he was the Sanlam caretaker and an ANC underground worker, would you have blown up Sanlam?

GEN WEBB: It's possible, yes.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

GEN WEBB: It's possible, yes.

MR BIZOS: Wouldn't you have gone to Sanlam and said "Hey, your premises are being abused"?

GEN WEBB: We didn't consider that.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

GEN WEBB: Because it was our plan to carry it out in this way.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I know, but you know if you are telling the truth, which you are attesting here, you must be able to give rational reasons why you did something and why you didn't do other things in order to secure your purpose. You and Mr van Zyl before you, whenever you're asked these questions, follow the same pattern "We did it because we did it, we are not prepared to debate with you why we did it and what other avenues were available to us." Please try, if you want your version to be believed, to tell us why you didn't do the other things that are reasonable that I am suggesting. It's not an answer to say "We did it this way because we did it this way."

GEN WEBB: We received information that it was to be in the Athlone hall and our information indicated that it was at Athlone hall, plus I was told that the source didn't want to reveal his identity and that's why for instance, we couldn't hand the matter over to the Police. That alternative was not an option, and then I decided we were going to act.

MR BIZOS: Now let us just take this step by step. You needn't have told the Police the identity of the information in order to warn them that "These dangerous terrorists that meet over there, we have the names of some of them, we have a letter from one of them admitting it, follow them, search their houses, find explosives." Why didn't you ask whether this was weighed before the proposal was made to you?

GEN WEBB: If a member of the CCB was to approach the Police, the Police would ask you "But who are you, what's your business here?" It would have simply blown the cover of the entire covert operation, so it couldn't work that way. So the member who had the information couldn't even reveal his own identity.

MR BIZOS: Was this information given to the Special Forces Information section in order to check it?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, there was no time.

MR BIZOS: There was no time. So that you are telling us that neither you nor anyone else checked it with the information department of the Special Forces?

GEN WEBB: No, the information came from the CCB and I accepted it as such.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now was it disclosed to you that the information came from a gangster?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Would you have approved it if you were told that the information came from a gangster which wasn't checked by anybody? Would you have approved it?

GEN WEBB: That was not the modus operandi of the CCB to tell me where they got the information from.

MR BIZOS: But were you a mere rubber stamp or did you have to exercise a discretion as to whether an offence would be committed against people or not?

GEN WEBB: I bona fide believed in what I did and I had a bona fide belief that what I approved and authorised was right in the circumstances.

MR BIZOS: Answer the question please.

GEN WEBB: Please repeat it then.

MR BIZOS: Did you consider yourself merely a rubber stamp or did you have to satisfy yourself on the validity of the information that was placed before you and the necessity for it before you authorised crimes to be committed? Were you a rubber stamp or did you have a discretion to exercise?

GEN WEBB: Of course I had a discretion to say yes or no, and I said yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but did it have to be a "somer so nee of ja", or did it have to be an informed and reasoned "nee of ja"?

GEN WEBB: It was an informed and considered yes.

MR BIZOS: I see, right. So it had to be a reasoned decision, a decision on good and valid reasons.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Otherwise you would not have approved it?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Right. Now you know, would you agree that military training or ...(indistinct) training possibly to a lesser extent, would be an inhibiting factor in too easily deciding whether a person or persons were really enemies of the State?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: The opinion of a gangster would of necessity lack that - who lacked that background and training, would be very dangerous to rely on.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And if you had been told that the information came from a gangster, you would not have approved it, you might have wanted to have confirmation of the facts?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson, except I repeat, that was not the way the CCB operated, they didn't tell me where they got their information from.

CHAIRPERSON: If you asked would they have told you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, because names even down to the lower ranks were not known to me, that was the modus operandi of the CCB and we stuck to that very closely.

MR BIZOS: You say it's the work of the CCB, you were the top of the pyramid of the CCB, General.

GEN WEBB: But would I ask ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Why do you distinguish between the CCB and yourself?

GEN WEBB: I'm not making a distinction there, or ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: So you say this had nothing to do with me, the CCB was the - which shows that you distinguish yourself.

GEN WEBB: No, I said I that I approved the operation, so I'm not distancing myself.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but in giving evidence you say this was the CCB's work, not mine.

GEN WEBB: Modus operandi, that's what I said.

MR BIZOS: Now Mr Verster told us that you had channels of communication with the Police, contrary to what you tell us, who is telling us the truth?

GEN WEBB: I had no channels of communication with the Police during my tenure. I was never told of any contact person at the SAP. For some or other reason he didn't exist anymore.

MR BIZOS: I'll repeat the question that the Chairman asked one of the previous witnesses. If there was a letter of an admission that a person was responsible for acts of terror, it would have been an open and shut criminal case. Was that letter shown to you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was any mention made of that letter in the report by Verster to you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now you describe the people that you wanted to frighten as a "bende", is that a gang?

GEN WEBB: A gang.

MR BIZOS: Was the information given to you that the people that this was directed against were gangsters?

GEN WEBB: A gang committing acts of terror, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. But in relation to the Western Cape and the people in the flats, a gang, does that mean that its membership consists of gangsters?

GEN WEBB: I was told that it was a gang committing acts of terror.

CHAIRPERSON: Usually the word "gang" refers to a group of people who commit crimes, not particularly political crimes, people who rob, deal in drugs, assault people, is that how you considered them, but they also participated in acts of a political nature, or did you in your own mind believe that they were a political group of people who committed political crimes?

GEN WEBB: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Well what ...

GEN WEBB: Political, a group who were politically motivated to commit acts of terrorism, but the words were used "a gang" committing acts of terrorism.

CHAIRPERSON: So you didn't consider that they were a bunch of gangsters in the usual sense of the word, but who also indulged in political acts?


MR BIZOS: You see Mr Verster, before he was cross-examined by our colleague, Mr Williams before the Committee and before he asked the people to stand up and identify themselves and whether they look like gangsters to Mr Verster - oh yes, I'm correct, it was Mr Hockey that actually asked them to stand up - before that graphic demonstration took place, Mr Verster referred to them as a gang here in court, in the first sense of the word as used by the Chairman to you, you're not perhaps changing your evidence as a result of the embarrassment of Mr Verster, that these young people appear to be, from their occupations and their progress that they had made in life, as upstanding citizens and could hardly be described as gangsters? You didn't change your evidence as a result of that little incident, did you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, we can look at my application, it's spelt out clearly there.

MR BIZOS: A gang?

GEN WEBB: A gang committing acts of terrorism.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos, I wonder if you could just help me. My documents have only got the Tutu in bundle A, where - I've forgotten the reference? Is it bundle B?

MR BIZOS: It's bundle D19.

CHAIRPERSON: D19, thank you. Sorry to interrupt.

MR BIZOS: Yes, it's on page 19.

You didn't consider referring it to the owner of the building, you didn't consider referring it to the Police, you didn't act for the verification of any information, you didn't ask for an explanation as to why they came so late, is that right?

GEN WEBB: An explanation as to why they came so late? What do you mean?

MR BIZOS: That they hadn't given you notice in order for you to check whether this is so.

GEN WEBB: I was informed of this on the 30th of August. I was told what the circumstances were and that the next meeting would be on the 31st of August, it was confirmed, we didn't know when the next meeting was to take place, were we going to act, yes or no.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you specifically requested for a remote control limpet mine or was that your idea, or how did that come about?

GEN WEBB: No, it was proposed by Col Verster that there should be no casualties and to avoid that we needed this remote control ignition device.

CHAIRPERSON: Because is it correct that remote controlled limpet mines are not standard stock?

GEN WEBB: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: They usually use these lead burn through ...(indistinct) type detonation.

GEN WEBB: Yes, and they're totally unreliable.

CHAIRPERSON: So as it's been said, to get a remote controlled limpet mine there's got to be some doctoring or some adjustments.

GEN WEBB: I organised for the remote control mechanism and something else would have to be added to put into the mine so that it could actually receive the necessary signal.

MR LAX: Can I just ask something quickly while you're busy?

Mr Bizos just put to you that you didn't consider the Police, but actually you did consider the Police and the reason you didn't use the Police was because this person didn't want their identity revealed.

GEN WEBB: Yes, I understood from Mr Bizos that we didn't approach the Police, but I was told that the source did not want his identity revealed and that's whey the Police could not be approached.

MR LAX: But who would you have approached if you had used the Police?

GEN WEBB: I didn't have a contact. Because I was told there would be no casualties, I said go ahead with the operation. If people had died, then I would have had to launch entirely different operations afterwards. But I couldn't pick up the phone and phone somebody of equal rank in the South African Police, I didn't have such a contact.

MR LAX: So why was it even a consideration then?

GEN WEBB: Because that's how it was told to me. In other words, I couldn't even consider such a possibility.

MR LAX: You see we were told that that was a possibility, that you could have approached the Police but this person didn't want their identity revealed. You weren't told that there were letters and all sorts of other evidence?


MR LAX: You weren't told they'd been working on this thing for over a month already?


MR LAX: Nothing?


MR LAX: You didn't get a written presentation?


MR LAX: With a budget?


MR LAX: You didn't even approve a budget for this thing?

GEN WEBB: The paperwork would have followed later.

MR LAX: What budget did you approve? Sorry, Mr Bizos.

GEN WEBB: I can't remember, I have to rely on what was said here, R30 000 or R15 000, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: R30 000 for whom?

GEN WEBB: That I don't know. If I had approved a budget, it would have been a global amount.

MR BIZOS: Now General, the fact that R30 000 was promised to a gangster for placing a bomb in an empty room in order to frighten people that had left, does that sound reasonable or excessive remuneration?

GEN WEBB: It sounds like it was very expensive to me.

MR BIZOS: Now if that fact was disclosed to you, that "We are going to pay a gangster who gave us the information that I'm putting before you, who is merely going to put a bomb in the room", would you have approved the project?

GEN WEBB: I'm sure I would have asked more question.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Would it - once the information came so expensively, would its accuracy have been doubted by you?

GEN WEBB: I do not follow your question.

MR BIZOS: If you were told that this gangster was going to be paid R30 000 for giving the information and for placing the bomb in an empty room after everyone had left, would that have made you doubt the accuracy of the information that was given to you?

GEN WEBB: In the first place, Chairperson, if I was told that it was a gangster I would have had serious questions, but that's not how it happened, that was not the procedure. So you know, we can speculate and mention examples, but that's not what actually happened.

MR BIZOS: For the damage of property in which life might have been lost as a result of unforeseen circumstances, would you require to go above yourself for authorisation?

GEN WEBB: As long as there was to be no loss of life.

MR BIZOS: If there was a possibility of loss of life?

GEN WEBB: Then yes, I would have had to seek higher authorisation.

MR BIZOS: And we know how often bombs placed in various places kill people who were not expected to be there.

GEN WEBB: In this case it did not happen, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I know, but it may be a matter of luck. What I am asking is what you did not know.

GEN WEBB: It could also be a matter of skill.

MR BIZOS: A matter of?

GEN WEBB: Skill.

MR BIZOS: Skill. And truthfulness?


MR BIZOS: And responsibility?


MR BIZOS: Because Mr Burger said that if there was going to be any loss of life, it must be members of the Kewtown Committee. That's what it is said was said to van Zyl. Now if the supervisor of the district Committee thought that there was a possibility of loss of life but if there was it shouldn't be children or shouldn't be other people, but it would be preferable if they were members of the Kewtown Committee. Now if he thought of it, why didn't you? Please turn to page 40 ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR LAX: Sorry, your mike was off there, just repeat that again please, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Bundle B, page 49, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just one question, Mr Bizos. Sorry to keep interrupting.

You said it was the modus operandi of the CCB not to give names etcetera, why would that be so, seeing that you were the Chairman and the boss? Why, if you asked "Who supplied this information", why should somebody refuse that information to you? Was there any reason for that?

GEN WEBB: I think the reason was as a result of the covert nature of the organisation. The names were simply not revealed and pseudonyms were used.


MR BIZOS: You see on page 40 - have you got it in front of you?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I think if we can just get it on record, is this an extract from the Harms Commission Report?

MR BIZOS: No, this is a statement, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it? Because if you go to page - oh, I've got the wrong one, no wonder. Sorry.

MR BIZOS: It's paragraph 78. I don't want to read the first part because it's clear. Just have a look, that:

"Staal Burger then told me that the project had been approved on ELC and that Joe Verster's message to me was that if one more bomb had been activated by the Kewtown Youth Movement, then it would be my fault."

Now leave out the rest but go back to the last two sentences of that paragraph.

"It was said by Staal Burger that the project had provided for the loss of human life as far as members of the Kewtown Youth Movement was concerned. However, this had to be limited to a minimum."

Now assume that to be a statement of fact, deposed to by Mr van Zyl both in his statement and in his evidence here, you can hardly say that it was not foreseen that there would be loss of life when the person, the Manager of Region 6 foresaw it and warned the operative, but he was selective, that it was okay to kill the people that you thought were "'n bende". And that that is authorised.

"provide for the loss of human life"

how can - well there are two possibilities, either that van Zyl is not telling the truth and ...(intervention)

MR MARTINI: Chairperson, just for the record, Mr Bizos is putting to the witness the Section 29 statement and I mentioned yesterday I don't want to keep on objecting to versions that were put because we'll be here for another five weeks and if do remain silent ... That's not what I recall Mr van Zyl's evidence at these hearings was, what is read from the Section 29 statement. But that's what I'm trying to avoid because we're going to have to sit here with the record every day if Mr Bizos wants to put versions. This is the difficulty which we have, 'cause we're not computers and memorising word for word that was said after all these weeks. So as far as I recollect, and that's the furthest I can take it, it was not Mr van Zyl's evidence. He did say that - what I recall was that it was foreseen that there could be a possibility of injury or loss of life, but in terms of the words contained in the Section 29 statement.

The difficulty I'm having, Chairperson, is I don't want to object each time Mr Bizos tries to put a version because we're going to be here for days and I'm sure, Chairperson, you also have a difficulty trying to recollect and say "Well that's not really what the witness said." That's the difficulty we have.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we can always of course check the record. Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Not only does it accord with my recollection, Mr Chairman, but I'm assured by Mr Kahanovitz who was actually doing a planned and careful cross-examination as you will remember, with notes in front of him, that he actually asked him: "Is that what Staal Burger said to you?" And he said "Yes" and I have a very clear recollection I think, of what the reaction of Mr Staal Burger was, sitting behind Mr van Zyl. So Mr Martini will save time if he makes an objection based on facts. But I don't want to take it any further.

MR MARTINI: Chairperson, just for the record again, I don't want to continuously object, so I'm not going to and my failure to do so mustn't be regarded that we accept. The problem which we have is, it's unfair to this witness if Mr Bizos is putting a wrong version. That's the difficulty. I don't want to prolong these proceedings but it's creating - I think it creates an unfairness to a particular witness, because at the end of the day we do have the record when we argue.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we do have a record at the end of the day and I can assure you before we make any findings in respect of anything we will carefully go through the record and also the witness was also present the whole time during which Mr van Zyl was testifying, unlike in a court case, where he might not have been present. So we do have the safety. If the witness feels that that wasn't the situation or can't recall, then he can mention it himself as well. If you feel that you ought to object, you can do so, but I can assure you the fact that you don't object to everything, we're not going to place any weight on the fact that you didn't object.

MR MARTINI: What I'm saying is, my silence mustn't mean I accept that's my client's version.

CHAIRPERSON: No, we're with you there.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) silence that will weigh, Mr Chairman, but the contents of the record. He can be assured of that.

You see this passage here clearly indicates that it was part of the project, that means that it was authorised.

GEN WEBB: The instruction was that there would be no casualties.

MR BIZOS: No, we're talking about what was authorised and was not authorised.

GEN WEBB: But I'm telling you, the order was no casualties.

MR BIZOS: Now you see I am going to suggest to you that the probabilities are overwhelming that there was an intention to wipe out the Kewtown Committee, and let me tell you why. If the information that was given to you was correct, you were dealing with dangerous terrorists, correct?

GEN WEBB: No, not dangerous terrorist, terrorists.

MR BIZOS: Well are there - well I'll leave out the dangerous, I suppose all terrorists are dangerous. Are there any terrorists who are not dangerous?



GEN WEBB: Those who did not participate in the struggle.

MR BIZOS: And who are they? And who are they? Please make your meaning clear.

GEN WEBB: I talk in general, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: What is the "algemeen" mean?

GEN WEBB: That the persons who did not participate in the struggle were not dangerous terrorists.

MR BIZOS: Well they're not terrorists.

GEN WEBB: You get many people who talk but don't do much.

MR BIZOS: Oh I see. Well perhaps your meaning is understood by some, but not by me. But be that as it may, you were dealing with terrorists whom you expected to explode bombs before and during the election, correct?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR BIZOS: They must therefore have had in their possession, on the probabilities, explosives and bombs ready or almost ready to go off.

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR BIZOS: You expected them to use those bombs before or during that election, which was some six days away?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR BIZOS: How would giving them a fright after they had left, have prevented them from carrying on with their acts of terrorism?

GEN WEBB: Some people have different characters, some people took up the armed struggle, others did not. It's the same in this case. When a bomb explodes, when you leave the building some people get the message very clearly and they would not join the organisation and continue with it. Only the hardened people will say "Yes, let's continue." But he would lose some of his people and then you disrupt him.

MR BIZOS: Did you think that these terrorists merely because their meeting place had been blown up in their absence, having gone to the danger of getting bombs, having gone to the danger of having exploded some of theme before, would have given up their purpose and not put up the - not make use of the bombs that they had? Is that the logic in your argument?

GEN WEBB: It is not about blowing up the building, it's about the message the person would get after the explosion.

CHAIRPERSON: But I think, General, we heard evidence that they were believed to have blown up a bomb, I think it was at the Magistrate's Court, the Athlone Magistrate's Court ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: The post office.

CHAIRPERSON: Post office ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: And the Magistrate's Court.

CHAIRPERSON: ... and the Magistrate's Court, so it wasn't only anticipated that they were going to be starting their bombing campaign, they were already bombers, they had done bombs before. One would think that they would have been believed by you to have been hardened. I mean they've done it before, they've been brazen enough to put a bomb at the post office and the Magistrate's Court, now your information is that they're going to bomb again to disrupt the coming elections. Okay so you put a bomb in the hall where they had a meeting and some of the people might leave because they don't want to get involved in this, it's now getting a bit hot and a bit heavy for them and they'll leave, but those ones that are hardened, they'd already done the bombing, that had planned to do the bombing, would carry on and do it.

GEN WEBB: It's possible, but at that time we decided no casualties. You must remember this is my first physical operation that I approved in Region 6.

MR BIZOS: You see put into the scale on the probabilities also that according to Mr van Zyl, Mr Verster said that if another bomb goes off, he will be held responsible, if you believed that they were responsible for letting off bombs, surely the only way in which you could guarantee that they wouldn't let bombs off in the near future for the election, was to wipe them out? That would be the sure way. Wouldn't it?

GEN WEBB: That question you must ask Mr Verster, that's not what we discussed.

MR BIZOS: Well yes, I think you were all in the same boat were you not? You were all concerned, as misguided as some of you may have been, particularly in relation to these people that you were going to blow up, that on your thesis these were dangerous enemies of the State, why would you not want to blow them up?

GEN WEBB: The idea came that there would be no casualties and that's what we went for - no casualties.

MR BIZOS: Yes, the question was, why would you not want to blow them up if they were such - if they were terrorists and you believed that they were about to blow up places and people and candidates in particular?

GEN WEBB: That was the decision ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Why wouldn't you want to blow them up in order to achieve your objectives of the CCB, as evidenced by the evidence of Mr Verster, the evidence of Mr van Zyl, on his briefing, the evidence of Exhibit L? Why would you want to spare them?

GEN WEBB: That's the decision we made.

MR BIZOS: Ja, I know. The question is, when I ask you to give reasons if you really want to motivate your reason, it is no answer to say "This is the decision we made." We call it - you know we lawyers call it the ipse dixit, you know I said so, therefore don't ask me any more questions. Can you give us any reasonable explanation as to why you would want to spare the lives of these terrorists?

GEN WEBB: All I can say, Chairperson, is this was my first approval of an operation of the CCB, possibly that also played a role.

MR LAX: Can I just ask something, Mr Bizos.

Surely if you blew up their place that they met at, weren't you running the risk that you'd get them so angry they'd go and definitely plan more bombs in response, in retaliation?

GEN WEBB: That's also a possibility, it can also happen, but for us the possibility was stronger that they would be frightened.

MR LAX: But they were not the sort of people, they were the sort of people who plant bombs, that implies they're not easily frightened.

GEN WEBB: Well not all of them ...(indistinct) had planted bombs, it must have been some of them.

MR LAX: But you knew they'd planted at least two already, on the information you were given.

GEN WEBB: On the information I was given, yes.

MR LAX: So you know that's not the sort of people who are easily frightened.

GEN WEBB: Well that's the decision we made at that stage.

MR LAX: But you see the - I'm just trying to understand that if you weighed up all the odds and you knew who you were dealing with, why make a decision that's going to have almost no affect, based on what I've just said to you, for example. You concede the likelihood of someone who is a bomb planter to desist from planting bombs just because you blow up his meeting place, it's hell of a small.

GEN WEBB: Once again, people differ. Let's say that the bomb planter is somebody who never felt that the police were watching him, he felt safe and suddenly he doesn't feel safe anymore, it has a great influence on him. He might decide not to plant the bomb because somebody's watching him. Psychologically it's very possible. It's not just about the building, it was also that the bomb had to explode after the meeting so that the people would get the message. If it exploded at 3 o'clock in the morning, there was no message, it was only a destroyed hall, it wouldn't mean anything. If I was in a meeting and I am busy with terrorist acts and an hour or half an hour after I'd been there, there was a bomb, I'd ask myself "Maybe this was aimed against me." It might change my ideas radically.

MR BIZOS: As a General, do you expect your orders or your wishes or your statements to be respected by your underlings?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And did you make it crystal clear to Verster, that every possible step must be taken to avoid the loss of life?

GEN WEBB: All possible steps had to be taken.

MR BIZOS: Now let's discuss the possibilities. If Burger said this to van Zyl, Burger could only have got it from Verster, correct? Because you had no direct contact with Burger.

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR BIZOS: So that we would have had the situation that not only does Verster not take heed of what you said to him, but he communicated to Burger the opposite, who in turn communicated to van Zyl the opposite of what your order or wishes were.

GEN WEBB: Could you show me Col Verster's evidence that you now speak of, that he communicated that? Where you read that there were allegations made by a third/fourth party, not Col Verster's evidence. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR BIZOS: No, this is what ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: No, no, no.

MR BIZOS: Just listen to me please. Burger could only have got it from Verster, if it went down the line, would you agree with that?


MR BIZOS: Otherwise Burger either made it up on his own and told van Zyl.

GEN WEBB: But what you read is a third/fourth party's evidence, that is not Slang van Zyl or Burger's evidence, it's not Joe Verster's evidence, so you start making allegations all the way.

MR BIZOS: No but you see, we are trying to examine the probabilities of how this statement came to be made by Mr van Zyl, attributed it to Mr Burger, but let me put the gravamen of the question. Let us assume that a couple of the Kewtown people were in fact killed, what would you have done about it?

GEN WEBB: I would have gone to higher authority to report this.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon? You would report it to higher authority?

GEN WEBB: I would have gone to higher authority, yes.

MR BIZOS: And what would you have done to Mr van Zyl that pushed the button, on one version, for the bomb to go off?

GEN WEBB: I didn't know that he pushed the button.

MR BIZOS: No, but you surely would have made an enquiry if there was a loss of life ...(indistinct)

GEN WEBB: Afterwards there would have been an investigation, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes, what would you have done if there were a few lives lost and you knew that Mr van Zyl pressed the button? What would you have done in relation to Mr van Zyl?

GEN WEBB: We would have had an investigation and we would have acted according to the order.

MR BIZOS: But what would you have done about the fact that there was a result which you had forbidden?

GEN WEBB: But I am telling you we would started an investigation, we would have acted according to higher orders.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but he didn't carry out your instructions properly, there were loss of lives, what would you have done? We know that people were injured, if people are injured it was just as likely that people may have been killed. What would you have done to van Zyl if there had been a loss of life?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, how many times does Mr Bizos want the General to answer this question? He would have reported it to higher authority, there would have been an investigation and he would have acted according to higher authorities.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I think what Mr Bizos is getting at, if there was an investigation which established that your orders hadn't been properly followed, what would you have done to the operative?

GEN WEBB: It would have shown from the investigation what the circumstances were.

MR BIZOS: You are the Chairman of this body, the CCB, you budgeted for Mr van Zyl's salary, you gave him the motor car in which he went there, you gave him the gun which he carried, you gave him the bomb which he put there, you ...(intervention)

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I seriously object against these assumptions, to tell the witness that "you gave him a gun", where is the evidence that Gen Webb gave a gun to Mr van Zyl?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) is a permissible way of cross-examining. He was the Chairman, he had to authorise the budget, he aided and abetted the procurement of those things.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes you can continue.

MR BIZOS: Thank you.

Would you not have felt some sense of responsibility for a person under your command having caused loss of life?

GEN WEBB: Of course, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: What would you have done about this dereliction of duty on the part of van Zyl if it were not injuries as they were, but deaths?

GEN WEBB: I've answered that question already.

MR BIZOS: What would you have done? What would you have recommended to those above you should happen? As the Head of this organisation what would you recommend should happen to him?

GEN WEBB: The investigation would have determined what the circumstances were, whether he was careful or not. Can he be blamed or not? Plus what the higher authorities would have said, yes or no, plus what their orders were.

MR BIZOS: Would you have not had a say of what higher authority would have said about your operatives? Would you not have had a say?

GEN WEBB: I would have had a say after having seen the facts of the investigation.

MR BIZOS: Let us assume that one of the circumstances that Mr van Zyl placed before this Inquiry which you would have had, was "Well it's bad luck that there was loss of life, after all my District Manager, or Regional Manager told me that the project made provision for the loss of life as far as members of the Kewtown Youth Movement were concerned." Assume that he said that, what would you have done or what would you have recommended should be done?

GEN WEBB: There would have been an investigation ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: No, we're already had the "ondersoek" and ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: Yes, but that's another example for you, Mr Bizos, I'm busy with another investigation because you're ...(intervention)

MR MARTINI: Chairperson, sorry. Chairperson, if I may make a general statement here.


MR MARTINI: I don't want to interfere but I can't see the relevance of this line of questioning. Factually in terms of the Act, the Act says the Commission must consider whether there's been a full disclosure of all the relevant facts, what is the relevance of what would have happened had someone died? Factually we know no-one died. And I make this general statement Chairperson, because I see we're in the third week now and there is a Section in the Act, Section 34, where the Commission may limit cross-examination in order to expedite proceedings.

Now Chairperson, I'm making this statement since most of my learned colleagues here, we are from Johannesburg, we do not have the benefit of returning to chambers to do consultation work and catch up on chamber work and we've been here a long time and I think we should put some limit on the cross-examination, there should be some relevance to the cross-examination. What would have happened to Mr van Zyl and Mr Botha had someone died, what is the relevance when we know? Unless Mr Bizos can produced evidence that someone died with this explosion, then I can't see the relevance of this line of cross-examination. This can take us here for another five weeks Chairperson, if we're going to carry on at this rate. I think, Chairperson, you have the power within Section 34 to limit the cross-examination, really. Otherwise I can see these proceedings continuing for months.

MR BIZOS: May I proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: Well you see I think what's being get at here is with regard to the relevance. We know we're dealing with supposition, we know that somebody didn't die but there is, certainly on the documents and between evidence that has been given here, the possibility of a contradiction relating to what the order was.

MR MARTINI: But Chairperson, that can be argued. This is not a fact. The fact is no-one died, no-one was seriously injured and if Mr Bizos wants to argue that because we haven't come to the Commission - which I find an absurd argument, and stated that our intention was to kill and hence we shouldn't get amnesty, he must argue that. But factually the Commission, the way I understand this Act, the Commission must have reference to relevant facts. Now I would say a relevant fact is, "Did you or did you not blow up the Early Learning Centre?" The General, the way I understand his evidence is, "I accept responsibility, I authorised it." Mr van Zyl says "I pressed the button. Do you want me to say I didn't press it?" That's a relevant fact, but as to what may or may not have happened if someone had died, is totally irrelevant to these proceedings. And this has been going on for a long, long time in these proceedings, we've allowed it with Mr van Zyl, it's now happening to Gen Webb and I'm sure it's going to happen with other witnesses. I'm just trying to find a way to curtail the proceedings and, Chairperson, I do believe you have the power to limit this type of cross-examination. Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Bizos, I'm sure you're aware that time is of the essence and ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Oh absolutely Mr Chairman, but the state of mind of the witness Mr Chairman, in relation to the authority given, is a vital matter for this and once we have the contradictory evidence which - one of the ways of testing whether he is telling the truth or not is to put this hypothesis to him, Mr Chairman. It's a perfectly permissible way of cross-examining. This is how probabilities are established, Mr Chairman. Certainly in our training and in our practice I've had some experience in the running of trials, Mr Chairman.

Now the question was, had there been a death and there was an inquiry and Mr van Zyl said at that inquiry what he said in his statement and in his evidence, that "I was told by Mr Burger that if there were to be deaths, make sure that they are from the Kewtown Youth Movement", what would you have recommended to those above you should happen to Mr Burger or to Mr van Zyl, or both?

GEN WEBB: We would have had to find out whether such orders were given, it would have led to an investigation and it would have emerged, what happened etcetera.

MR BIZOS: But let us assume that this ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: And after investigation, Mr Bizos, then we say that the following would be suggested, either the person would be retrenched or whatever. That would have emerged from the investigation. We did not have such an investigation, so I cannot tell you what we would have done.

MR BIZOS: What would he be charged with?

MR WESSELS: With respect Mr Chairman, I want to associate myself with Mr Martini's objection. We've been asked earlier here to give a date for this matter to proceed later on in the year. We were told that the Commission must finish by October. We've arranged for two weeks to carry on with this inquiry. At the rate we're going on we will not finish in those two weeks and there are no other times available this year. So the matter will then have to be postponed until next year and I don't believe that is in the interest of everybody, whether that can happen, but the speculation that goes on now cannot be relevant in any respect and I object formally to this type of cross-examination being admitted here.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I think we must move on Mr Bizos, we've got the answer for that and we can go on.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) we'll try.

What sort of election was there going to be according to your information, on the 6th of September?

GEN WEBB: It would have been an election, a municipal election if I remember correctly.

MR BIZOS: Not parliamentary?

GEN WEBB: No, as far as I remember it was a municipal election.

MR BIZOS: Now who spoke to you about Khayelitsha?

GEN WEBB: You speak of what is in the application? I had been briefed by Col Verster.

MR BIZOS: He didn't make any mention of it in his motivation.


MR BIZOS: Well it may well be that it didn't happen if there is a contradiction between you and him.

GEN WEBB: Well I say that it did happen, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Mr van Zyl gave evidence ...

GEN WEBB: I beg your pardon?

MR BIZOS: Mr van Zyl gave evidence and he was the primary source of information to the CCB, he didn't mention it.

GEN WEBB: I don't think he was the primary source. In his testimony ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: No, the primary source ...

GEN WEBB: ... he said that he received information through the information channels of the CCB. He was not the primary source.

MR BIZOS: No, the prime source in the CCB. I know that he got his information from Gakkie as a gangster, this is why I qualified it "in the CCB." Mr van Zyl didn't say anything about a fire being started in Khayelitsha.

GEN WEBB: Mr van Zyl is not the only source of information in Region 6. If I heard the evidence correctly, he would have gotten his information, he would have channelled it into the information channels of the CCB. So there could have been input from other sources.

MR BIZOS: Have you forgotten that you said that because of the supposed urgency of this it was not verified through any other channels?

GEN WEBB: Did you forget that Mr Basson witnessed that they had been working on it for more than a month?

MR BIZOS: Yes, so what does that prove?

GEN WEBB: It means that in a month it was in the pipeline.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but all the information came from a gangster and that you say that it was not verified independently of that, because of the urgency.

GEN WEBB: The urgency yes, because the meeting was on the 31st and we had to make a decision on the 30th, do we act, yes or no?

MR BIZOS: Did you ask any questions whatsoever about the background of the "bron", of the source of the information?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you understand that his identity was not even known to operatives of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: That's normal practice in the CCB, that the people do not know their names.

MR BIZOS: So you thought that van Zyl got this from an unknown or unidentified person? Unknown person to him, is that what it meant?

GEN WEBB: No, I say a source would not reveal his identity. That was conveyed to me. Who the source was I do not know, on which level the source was I do not know.

MR BIZOS: The person who is the expert who went there says that it appeared to him that more than one bomb may have been used. The evidence will also be that after the explosion the place was full of scrap of metal, broken and twisted metal all over the place. What sort of limpet mine did you think was being used?

GEN WEBB: According to my knowledge you get only one kind of limpet mine, it's a Russian mine and the aim of a limpet mine is to cause fire and it is used against fuel tanks and maybe also against ships. It's not a shrapnel bomb.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not an expert General, but I've been listening to many, many applications and I know that there's at least two types of limpet mines.

GEN WEBB: A smaller one and a bigger one?


GEN WEBB: Ja, there are two but the limpet mine's objective still remains the same. The main object of a limpet mine is to cause fire.

MR BIZOS: Was this a small one or a bigger one?

GEN WEBB: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you ask what the size was going to be?


MR BIZOS: If the primary purpose of a limpet mine was to start a fire, there was a possibility amounting to a probability that his place would be destroyed by fire.

GEN WEBB: It's a possibility, yes.

MR BIZOS: So this would have been tremendous damage to the owners of this property and the burning of a facility which catered for the community, including nursery school children.

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I had no knowledge that there was a nursery school or what the hall looked like and who all used it, according to me it was about a hall in Athlone.

CHAIRPERSON: It wasn't described to you as the Early Learning Centre, which we know it's called?

GEN WEBB: Not at that stage, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: On the assumption that there will be evidence of these inordinate number of pieces of twisted shrapnel all over the place, you say that it couldn't have been done by an un-doctored, unmodified limpet mine?

GEN WEBB: I don't know anything about the construction of the roof. That could have caused shrapnel. I don't know anything about the construction.

MR MARTINI: Sorry, Chairperson, we were promised originals of the photographs which appear at the back of bundle B, would it be possible to get these original photographs?

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Coleridge, have you got that?

MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson, I have requested for persons to locate it and I haven't received it as such, but I'll attend to ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes will you follow that up please.

MS COLERIDGE: Definitely. Chairperson, we know that the Early Learning Centre's got a lot of pictures there as well. I just want to check whether that would be suitable. I know Mr Martini had seen those pictures at the - whether we could use those pictures as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Well any photographs of the scene would help.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, Chairperson.


MR BIZOS: Was there any plan at any time to your knowledge, that a bomb should be used and that nails should be wrapped around it for the purposes of doing maximum damage?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now I know that it is hearsay, but I must put it to you and you'll say that it's hearsay upon hearsay, but it does not matter for my purposes at this stage but I must put to you what one of the persons associated with the CCB, of which you were the Head, said at bundle B page 131, Mr Chairman. Will you please read the bottom of page 130.


"Shortly after the Dullah investigation, Louie gave me an order to go to Cape Town. I had to look for a Coloured man Isgak, and make contact with him. I found Isgak at the Basement night-club and befriended him. He later gave me a contact number in Woodstock. I gave it to Louie. I was curious about the order and asked Louie about it."

MR BIZOS: Carry on on the next page please.


"He informed me that they knew about the fact that Isgak was good friends with a prominent UDF woman. She was a black woman and had knowledge about secret UDF meetings. They wanted to bribe Isgak with the purpose of him convincing the black woman to take a bomb into one of the meetings. He said a certain Oliver usually attended the meetings and that they wanted him dead. He said that they to destroy the whole meeting hall. He also said that the production teams usually attached bags of nails to the limpet mines for greater efficiency. He further mentioned that the UDF often made use of the Cape Youth Congress hall and that it was there that they wanted to plant the bomb."

MR BIZOS: Now in a subsequent affidavit Mr Barnard says that Louie was van Zyl.

MR MARTINI: That's not correct, Chairperson. Mr Bizos must ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Yes, ..(indistinct) corrected myself. I have a person next to me who gives me the instructions Mr Chairman.

We will correct it, you don't have to get excited. The record will - he didn't tell me, I've just become rather accustomed to ...

In the affidavit Mr Chairman, - we'll find it. I wasn't too far wrong, but let us just put the words of the affidavit rather than explanations.

And you know who is Isgak is ...(end of side A of tape)

GEN WEBB: It's a Coloured man from the Cape.

MR BIZOS: Mr Hardien?

GEN WEBB: I think it's Hardien.

MR BIZOS: The man sitting together with the people applying for amnesty, from time to time, who took this bomb into the Early Learning Centre? That's the man.

GEN WEBB: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: Right. Now what do you say in relation to the policy of the CCB about killing people and mass? The number of people with one bomb?

GEN WEBB: This was the first bomb planted by the CCB, so I don't know what mass bombs you're referring.

MR BIZOS: No, no, not mass bombs, to cause mass damage.

GEN WEBB: This was the first bomb that exploded.

MR BIZOS: That we know of. But the question is, what would have been your attitude if you had a meeting of fifty, say of the UDF leaders in one room and you could get somebody to go in with a doctored ..., would you have authorised it?

GEN WEBB: Once we are starting with ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Hypothetical matters.

GEN WEBB: ... going into the realm of hypothesis, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well let's deal with the facts deposed to by one of the persons associated with the organisation ...(intervention)

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, maybe - it mustn't be described as facts, those are allegations by a certain person, it cannot be described as facts.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) about what this person says, that one of the ways of the CCB killing people, was to wrap nails round a limpet mine?

GEN WEBB: I'm not aware of that at all.

MR BIZOS: Would you agree that it can have a devastating affect on people that happen to be in the room?

GEN WEBB: Our previous enemies use it like that, it's a very effective way to make an ordinary mine an anti-personnel mine.

MR LAX: Sorry, can I just check something?

Did you say it was something that your enemies used?

GEN WEBB: Yes. They have used it before.

MR LAX: I mean it's a fairly well known way of increasing the effectiveness of handgrenades and mines and all sorts of other explosive devices.

GEN WEBB: It is to boost the anti-personnel capacity.

MR LAX: Yes, absolutely, to create more shrapnel basically.



MR P DU PLESSIS(?): Mr Chairman, perhaps just to stop the speculation we should refer to the statement by Mr Pieter Steenkamp in the same bundle, wherein I can find no traces that - he certainly did not state that he found nails etcetera. What he did find he calls "vermoedelik" part of the limpet mine. He doesn't say that he found any nails on the scene.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) what the place looked like, Mr Chairman, by witnesses who will give evidence. Mr Chairman, I don't want to read out the ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, may we hear who those witnesses are, because we are entitled to know what witnesses will give evidence and what the allegations are against us. That is not only what was agreed at the pre-trial meeting, but that it also in terms of the administrative law as I understand it. So if Mr Bizos intends calling witnesses who will say that, let him tell us who that witness is going to be and what he's going to say.

CHAIRPERSON: It's not unfair that.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) some evidence in relation to it, Mr Chairman. I am not prepared to disclose their names or the effect of the evidence of these people, I merely want to put to the witness that this was done and he has given evidence. I am not - it's not a trial where I have to say specifically who is going to do what. We had an inspection in loco, I have had discussions with people who were there shortly after the event and we will take statements and we will submit them in due course.

CHAIRPERSON: What Mr Wessels said was that it was an agreement, a pre-trial agreement that this procedure would be followed, that ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Yes. Mr Chairman, in due course it will be. In due course it will be. The information came to my notice Mr Chairman, at the time of the inspection in loco, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: As long as there's a reasonable notice.

MR BIZOS: Oh yes of course, Mr Chairman, we will not take anybody by surprise. We have had certain consultations, we are not ready to - we have been busy with this, we have completed our work, but they will be the first to know, Mr Chairman.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I'm sure that will be - I suppose that will be the local Athlone bomb expert, because we have a statement by a bomb expert who was at the scene shortly after the explosion, in this bundle B.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) May I proceed please? Mr Chairman, in relation to who Louie was, I merely want to refer to bundle B on pages 93 to 94 in which Mr Barnard indicates - 94 to 95, indicates that Louie was van Zyl, Mr Chairman. No, Mr Chairman what he says is by inference, he says that - well you'd better say what he says, because I'm getting conflicting ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Chairman, can I just clarify the situation? Mr Barnard made an earlier statement and a subsequent statement. In the earlier statement he says:

"I blamed certain things on Louie."

Louie is the codename for someone by the name of Lafras Luitingh, who was his handler. In the subsequent statement at the page reference Mr Bizos referred you to, he says:

"Where I refer to the Early Learning Centre bomb incident I want to tell you I want to correct the situation. The source of the information that I had was not Louie, alias Lafras Luitingh, my source of information was Slang van Zyl."

That's what he says.

CHAIRPERSON: In the statement? This is B94 and 95?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, that is the subsequent statement in which he says he wishes to correct himself.

MR BIZOS: Did you question why the bomb was not put into - what time and at what place it was going to be put in order to avoid any possibility of injury or death?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: If you were told that there was going to be a meeting between seven and nine and that on apparently doubtful information the bomb was let off at 8.30, would you have approved of it?

GEN WEBB: The project had been approved, the people on the ground had the final say as to what happened or not and they made the final decision. I couldn't sit in Pretoria and say "Activate the bomb at a certain time", because the people on the ground could see what was happening and they reacted accordingly.

MR BIZOS: Who reported to you that there were people who were injured?

GEN WEBB: I think it was Col Verster.

MR BIZOS: If my memory serves me correctly, both Mr van Zyl and Mr Verster in their statements said that there was no-one injured. Can you explain that?

GEN WEBB: No, it was reported to me that there were certain injuries.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any further questions, Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I'm looking through my notes. If you would just give me a moment.

MR SIBANYONI: General Webb, was it ever said that the purpose of placing the bomb in the hall was to make it appear that it was by the organisation?


MR LAX: You see we were told that was the reason why it had to go off reasonably soon after the meeting, so that it would point directly at the people who held the meeting and that it could be construed that they were responsible.


MR LAX: That was never part of anything that you ever heard at that time?

GEN WEBB: No, definitely not.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Bizos. Mr Williams.

MR WILLIAMS: Mr Chairman, I've got questions for the witness, but I find myself in the same position where it's twenty to four ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, I think let's try to use as much time available to us as we have, because we will be missing - I'll make the announcement tomorrow, some time on Thursday morning. So I think we should ...


General Webb, do I understand your testimony correct that Mr Verster came to you, he discussed the Early Learning project with you, he wanted your permission for that.


MR WILLIAMS: You could give your permission, you could either say yes or no.

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR WILLIAMS: You authorised this project on the basis of certain information that was supplied to you, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR WILLIAMS: Now you are the only applicant that states in your application that the Kewtown youth were going to start a fire in Khayelitsha.

GEN WEBB: I didn't see the applications of the other applicants.

MR WILLIAMS: Ja, but you've heard the testimony of Mr Slang van Zyl who as Mr Bizos indicated, was the primary source within your organisation who collated this information. Would you accept as a fact that this information was incorrect?

GEN WEBB: Mr Slang van Zyl was not the only source of information. Slang van Zyl gathered intelligence on the ground, conveyed that to the CCB intelligence bodies and there could have been different input into that channel. Must I explain it again?

MR WILLIAMS: General Webb, but if I understand Mr van Zyl's evidence correct, then it is that he never received information that the Kewtown Youth Movement were going to start a fire in Khayelitsha.

GEN WEBB: But I think what the General's saying - correct me if I'm wrong, General, is that Mr van Zyl would get some evidence from the ground, he would relay it through his channels, it would end up with the intelligence people in the CCB, who would then do their own work and there might be sources coming from that side. Is that what you're saying?

GEN WEBB: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Without even Mr van Zyl knowing. Other information. That's what I understood the answer to be.

MR WILLIAMS: Now General Webb, I put it to you that the Kewtown youth never intended to start a fire in Khayelitsha. It sounds ridiculous to us even. Would you accept that?

GEN WEBB: You can put it me, but please bring me the evidence.

MR WILLIAMS: No, but are you prepared to accept if I tell you, or if I put it to you that we had no such intentions?

GEN WEBB: But Mr Williams, you're not testifying. Please. You can't tell me to just accept it. If you are prepared to give evidence then do so. If we get to the end of these proceedings and my information was incorrect, then I will concede that, but there has been no evidence as yet.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that's a situation where it would impossible for the witness to accept it or deny it and he just can't dispute whatever is put to him in that regard. Isn't that the situation?

MR WILLIAMS: Ja okay, let me go onto the next point then.

I think also you are the only applicant who said that:

"We planned attacks on the lives of candidates who stood for the election."

GEN WEBB: I say once again I didn't read the other applications.

MR WILLIAMS: Now my understanding of the other applications is that the Kewtown youth planned to disrupt the elections by planting bombs at the venues etcetera, but not on the lives of candidates.

GEN WEBB: That was the information which I got.

MR WILLIAMS: Now I put it to you that that is also incorrect and that is not the truth. Are you prepared to accept that?

GEN WEBB: Once again, you're not giving evidence ...(intervention)

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, could we please just make a distinction here. Is Mr Williams saying that the Kewtown Youth Movement would not have done it, or is he saying that the information which the General had was incorrect? Please let us just be clear.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it's clear Mr Williams, when you're questioning him that there - the General was in Pretoria and worked on information, so if you put it to him whether the Kewtown youth wouldn't burn, or would he accept that they wouldn't burn Khayelitsha or kill people, what can he say?


Then General, are you saying as a fact that that was the information that you received?

GEN WEBB: That is the information which I received.

MR WILLIAMS: And that is from Mr Verster?


MR WILLIAMS: And also the other information that you received was that we that we planned to - that we were involved in bomb attacks?

GEN WEBB: That's the information which I received.

MR WILLIAMS: Now also that - you've already testified that you have never received information, that you were never informed that gangsters supplied the information to Mr Slang van Zyl.

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR WILLIAMS: Now General I find it strange that you are saying that Mr Verster supplied you with some of the information, whereas Mr Verster never said that in his - that was never his testimony before this Committee. For example he never says that he received information that we planned attacks on the lives of candidates who stood for the elections.

GEN WEBB: That is my evidence, that's the information which I received.

MR WILLIAMS: But can you explain to the Committee why that is not the testimony of Mr Verster?

GEN WEBB: Let's look at Mr Verster's application, let's see what he says about that and what reasons he gives.

MR WILLIAMS: You were here when he testified, you listened to his testimony.


MR WILLIAMS: He never said that we planned attacks on the lives of candidates.

GEN WEBB: I don't know, I can't remember. Bring us the application, let us see what the application states black on white. Let's not rely on our memory.

MR WILLIAMS: We can do that tomorrow morning. General Webb, would you agree with me that if people were to stand up today and say that we were part of the armed struggle, we were part of planting bombs etcetera, and attacking venues and elections, that that type of statement would stand them in good stead in the new South Africa? Would you agree with that statement?

GEN WEBB: No, it wouldn't stand them in good stead.

MR WILLIAMS: In the sense that ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: It will not be a good standing for them.

MR WILLIAMS: In the sense that they can then claim to

have played a significant part in the, or a significant role in contributing to the demise of apartheid.

GEN WEBB: After eleven years it will be somewhat difficult.

MR WILLIAMS: No, but would you just agree with me that if a person says "Look I was involved in the armed struggle", that that could possibly be a window of opportunity to entering the civil service or to obtaining certain ...(intervention)

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, what is the relevance of this line of questioning? We really are wasting a lot of time.

CHAIRPERSON: Whether the General agrees with that proposition or not, it won't affect your argument will it, Mr Williams? I can see what point you're getting at, that ...

MR H DU PLESSIS: And maybe evidence should then be obtained from the government whether in fact that is the criteria these days if a person is appointed to the civil service.

CHAIRPERSON: And you're trying to just extract an opinion from the General on something that he might be wrong about?

MR WILLIAMS: Ja. Mr Chairperson, I must say that most of the things that I've prepared for have initially been covered by my ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well you don't have to cross-examine as long as Mr Bizos did, and we understand that and ...

MR WILLIAMS: I don't intend to do that, Mr Chairperson, but there are certain things that I want to cover without repetition.


MR WILLIAMS: So for that reason I would ask if I'd be allowed to prepare properly and continue tomorrow morning with ...


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hockey, are you in a position to ...?

MR HOCKEY: At this stage I don't have any questions that I want to ask.


CHAIRPERSON: Are you sure you can't continue, because I wouldn't like to lose time? Maybe Ms Coleridge can then - are you going to ask any questions?

MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson, I just want to ask a few questions in relation to Mr Joe Verster.

CHAIRPERSON: Would there be any objection to Ms Coleridge intervening this cross-examination now and then Mr Williams can plan his further questions? Ms Coleridge, we'll intervene now and then you can ask and then we'll go back to Mr Williams.


We know that Mr Verster did not apply for amnesty for the Desmond Tutu incident, you're aware of that?

GEN WEBB: Excuse me?

MS COLERIDGE: Are you aware of the fact that Mr Verster did not apply for amnesty for the Desmond Tutu incident, the Archbishop Desmond Tutu incident?

GEN WEBB: I don't know.

MS COLERIDGE: At page 199 of bundle A, Chairperson, at paragraph 1.5, this is the incident relating to ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: Just a moment please. Page what?

CHAIRPERSON: 199, bundle A, paragraph - what?

MS COLERIDGE: Paragraph 1.5.

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 1.5? I don't have 1.5.

MS COLERIDGE: Page 199. Have you got that General? Can you just read out - this is in relation to the Archbishop Desmond Tutu's ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: In my application?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it's your application.


"I gave the order to Joe Verster who was the Managing Director of the CCB at that stage, and according to my knowledge which I currently have, Mr Staal Burger and Abram Slang van Zyl were also involved in that."

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you General, that's fine. So are you saying that you gave direct instructions to Mr Joe Verster in relation to the Desmond Tutu incident? That's the Apie foetus.

GEN WEBB: I approved it, I approved the project.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question was, did you approve the project to Mr Verster.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MS COLERIDGE: So would Mr Verster not be disclosing the full picture or the full truth of his actions in relation to the Archbishop, to the monkey foetus incident?

GEN WEBB: That you must ask Mr Verster?

MS COLERIDGE: But I'm asking you, General. In your opinion ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: But I am not Mr Verster, please.

MS COLERIDGE: No but in your opinion as his ... you authorised ...(intervention)

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, may I just get clarity here. Ms Coleridge has just said that Mr Verster did not apply for amnesty in respect of the baboon foetus and now it's expected of this witness to comment on something for which there isn't even an application before the Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and the reason why he didn't apply, that's his own reason.

MS COLERIDGE: I take the point, Chairperson.

In relation to the CCB activities, when did it come to a halt?

GEN WEBB: End of '89, early in 1990. I don't have a specific date, Chairperson.

MS COLERIDGE: And when did you leave the CCB?

GEN WEBB: I was put on leave early in 1990.

MS COLERIDGE: And were there discussions relating to the CCB early in 1990 with the Chief of the Defence Force, etcetera, the Army, regarding activities of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: There was an enquiry, an investigation and the results of that enquiry was submitted to higher authority.

MS COLERIDGE: Sir, would you be able to say that the CCB activities definitely came to a stop during 1990?


CHAIRPERSON: Either late '89 or during 1990.


GEN WEBB: All operational activities were halted. That is what I was told, I don't know if it's correct but there were certain businesses and entities which still had to be dissolved, but the operational things all stopped.

CHAIRPERSON: But after you were put on leave in 1990, you didn't go back to your post, did you?

GEN WEBB: For a short period yes, and then I was transferred to another section.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.


MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, may I ask a question as a result of the cross-examination by Mr Bizos, which I want to deal with?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly, Mr Wessels.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: General, you testified that the members of the CCB were subject to military code or the Defence Act, and that they could be arraigned before a Military Court. I want to put it to you that you're wrong in that respect and that all CCB members had to resign, officially resign from the Defence Force and their involvement in the CCB was obtained by means of a contract based on a personnel plan which was drafted. Are you aware of that?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WESSELS: And it is on that basis which the relationship was regulated as between the Defence Force and the authorities and that specific member.

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: So that should a person transgress the code, it wouldn't be necessary to have a or a Court Martial, but he could immediately be dismissed by Mr Verster, as in fact happened in the case of Botes and Mr Burger - not Burger, Barnard.

GEN WEBB: That is true. I was under the impression that they were still under the military regime, but my impression was possibly entirely incorrect as a result of the CCB part. Because there was also for instance, Mr Corrie Meerholtz who was at the CCB, but he went back, now I don't know whether he went through the entire process by resigning his rank etcetera, etcetera, but he was for instance a member of the CCB and then went back to Special Forces. In the case of Mr Verster, I heard last time we were here that he actually resigned his commissioned rank and in that case he would not have been able to resort under military discipline. I thought the CCB fell under this military discipline.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it you didn't resign your rank or anything of that nature?

GEN WEBB: No, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You stayed on as General.

MR WESSELS: I have no further questions, thank you.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Williams, can you proceed now or not?


...(inaudible), Chairperson.

General Webb, if I understand your testimony correctly, then it's that CCB operatives could engage in acts of murder but before they do that they needed authorisation, not so?


MR WILLIAMS: You yourself could not give authorisation for an act of murder, you had to consult with someone higher up before you could do that?


MR WILLIAMS: And by implication Col Verster could also not give authorisation for a conspiracy to murder or an attempt to murder or something in that regard, not so?

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR WILLIAMS: Now you've also testified yesterday that before a person burnt out a vehicle, they need your authorisation and you would also consult higher up, not so?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I don't think so. My understanding was that the only type of operation that didn't need the authority of the general was monitoring, every other operation involving damage to property or killing etcetera, had to go through Gen Webb, but if it was killing, then he himself had to go higher. So to damage a vehicle or throw a stone through a window, that sort of thing could stop at the level of Gen Webb. Is that correct, General?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WILLIAMS: Mr Chairperson, I agree with what you've said now but I think the witness had also testified ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well put it to him.

MR WILLIAMS: At some point you also testified yesterday that before they could burn a vehicle out or something, you would have sought ...(intervention)

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, Mr Williams is a bit confused. You will recall that, I think it was either before the Harms Commission or the Webster Inquest, the General testified that he couldn't even give authorisation for the burning of a vehicle, but he told you here that that was not correct. That he had the powers over things like that. I think that's where Mr Williams got if from, but he's confused. He said that the evidence given before that body was incorrect.

MR LAX: Sorry. The only other gloss on your instructions as I understood it, was that if it was a high profile person the monitoring required your approval as well.

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Well you said they came to you about Lubowski because it was a high profile person.

GEN WEBB: Yes, but it was in the newspapers, it was something which was generally and commonly known, "Lubowski's coming to South Africa, let's monitor him." And in that way Joe and I discussed that, but my approval was not needed and each monitoring action wasn't reported to me. But this was something which was made quite a fuss of in the media.

MR LAX: So the monitoring of other high profile people didn't require your permission?


MR WILLIAMS: Then your evidence is also to the effect that you've never openly discussed these matters with Mr Verster, you've never told him that, for example in the instance where the plan to murder someone, they need your permission or you need to consult with people higher up than yourself? You've never had a formal discussion in this regard with Mr ...(indistinct)? Was that your evidence?

MR LAX: Mr who?


GEN WEBB: I don't follow the question.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you ever have a formal ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: No, my evidence was in relation to Gen Joubert, that the two of us never spoke about assassination. That was what I said, I didn't say anything about Col Verster.

MR WILLIAMS: Ja, but did Col Verster know that he had to consult you or seek your permission before he could, for example, conspire to murder somebody?

GEN WEBB: Col Verster was a founder member of the CCB, he knew the procedure better than I did myself.

MR LAX: Can I just ask something?

Did he know that he had to - did he know that you had to go up to the next level to get permission to kill someone?

GEN WEBB: It's possible that he knew that, possibly not. Look, he was in the CCB for much longer than myself, he knew the procedures very well.

MR LAX: Well you don't know whether he knew it or not?


MR LAX: You didn't even discuss it with him?

GEN WEBB: No, but if such a thing did happen I would have told him "Look I have to seek higher authority", but such a case didn't eventuate.

MR SIBANYONI: Was Gen Joubert also required to go up to seek authority in an event of a mission?

GEN WEBB: Gen Joubert?


GEN WEBB: I don't know exactly what his instructions were but those were mine.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

MR WILLIAMS: Who would you have consulted if someone asked your permission to murder someone?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I have testified about this ...(intervention)

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, the question has already been asked ad nauseam, Mr Williams must please not repeat those questions, we are under time constraint.

MR WILLIAMS: Okay I'll leave it at that.

Were you at the time aware that Mr Lubowski was being monitored?


MR WILLIAMS: Were you - at the time when he was monitored, were you aware at that stage?


MR WILLIAMS: Were you consulted prior to the monitoring of Mr Lubowski?

GEN WEBB: No, I wasn't consulted prior to the monitoring.

MR WILLIAMS: So at what stage did you become aware that he was being monitored?

GEN WEBB: There were newspaper reports which said that Mr Lubowski was coming to visit South Africa and I read it and Mr Verster read it and we then got together and we discussed Mr Lubowski's visit and we then said "Let's monitor him" and I said "Yes, that's fine."

MR WILLIAMS: Now you testified before this Commission that the purpose why he was being monitored was to see what contacts he had inside South Africa.


MR WILLIAMS: Did you follow that up?

GEN WEBB: I said that I got feedback afterwards that there was nothing untoward, nothing could be uncovered which hadn't already been known.

MR WILLIAMS: Can you tell the Committee where he came to in South Africa? Who did he go visit, where did he stay, what did he do?

GEN WEBB: I know he came to Cape Town and Johannesburg.

MR WILLIAMS: Who did he go and see there, do you have an idea?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, I can't remember.

CHAIRPERSON: We don't need all this detail.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, what is the relevance of this?

MR WILLIAMS: Mr Chairperson, I ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you disputing that he was monitored?

MR WILLIAMS: No, no, I'm not disputing that Mr Chairperson. Mr Chairperson, I'm going to ask that we adjourn now and that I be given an opportunity just to reassess my questions, Mr Chairperson. I promise I won't be long tomorrow morning but I do want an opportunity to at least put some questions to this witness and to make some statements to him. It was past four Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, alright. Yes we'll adjourn. Would 9 o'clock tomorrow be a convenient time to start, or not? Would it be possible to start at nine? Alright, we'll adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock at this venue. Thank you.