MARIUS SCHOON: (affirmed)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: (continued) Thank you Mr Commissioner, Mr Chairman rather.

Mr Schoon, when we adjourned yesterday, I requested you to refer to certain pages of Exhibit Q2.

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, would you just give me the pages again please.

MR LEVINE: They were pages 287 and 279 and 280. Did you have an opportunity?

MR SCHOON: I read them through last night Sir.

MR LEVINE: Very well. Now, could you commence at the top of page 287, the Intelligence group and would you be good enough to read that paragraph into the record.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, before I do that, can I come back to one answer that I gave Mr Levin yesterday.

Mr Levin asked me the names of the people in the group that I was working with in Botswana and I could not recall the surname of one of the people. I have just said I knew her as Jenny, her name is actually Jenny Evans Mr Chairperson.



MR LEVINE: That is very good of you Mr Schoon. I assure you that there is no question of making any adverse remarks about your failure to have remembered a name of a person indeed a surname, some 20 years later.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I will read this paragraph, it is on page 287 of this exhibit.

"The Intelligence group expanded over the last four years from a section of five with two sources, to the large groups as indicated above. During this time, a professional observation team was established as a prototype for the Security Branch.

They were handed over as a fully functioning group to the division. Ten ANC/SACP agents of very high standard, chiefly whites, were arrested and found guilty. Various of these cases made legal history and others are still pending.

Only the Allen Fines case which did not succeed in court as a result of a naive Magistrate, while Cedric Mason left the country. Consequently the white ANC/SACP infrastructure within the RSA, has been combatted to a great degree and neutralised."

MR LEVINE: Mr Schoon, in general terms, are you in agreement with what is reported in that paragraph which you have just read?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I would not agree with the comment about a naive Magistrate. My understanding of Allen Fine's acquittal was that in fact the law of the land was followed.

I would agree too Chairperson that the arrests that took place, were extremely disruptive. However, I would not go as far as saying that obstructed to a great degree and neutralised.

I think we suffered a heavy blow with those arrests, we still had intact functioning structures.

MR LEVINE: Yes, but in general terms, save for the comments which you have made, you would agree with that paragraph?

MR SCHOON: I would Sir.

MR LEVINE: And amongst those arrested at the time and sentenced, did the aforementioned Hogan and Burger feature?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: If you would be good enough to turn to page 279.


MR LEVINE: Yes, about 11 pages back.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, I have lent by Q2, you haven't managed to get another one in the meantime. It is okay if you haven't, I will share mine.

MR LEVINE: I wonder if I could again impose on you Mr Schoon, to kindly read from the second paragraph, starting with the words as in many other areas.

MR SCHOON: Do you want me to read that whole paragraph Sir?

MR LEVINE: Up to the top of page 280, the sixth line. Yes, I would. If you would prefer, I am happy to read it for you, but I want to just deal with ...

MR SCHOON: I have no objection to reading it Sir.

MR LEVINE: Thank you very much.

MR SCHOON: As in many other areas, the authorities in the South African context is faced with revolutionary onslaught of Marxistic, Leninistic groups. Out of this fact, the following is clear for anti-strategic movements.

It is not that it is internal or ...

CHAIRPERSON: Can we borrow a volume from someone else?

MR SCHOON: As in many other areas, the authorities in the South African context is faced with revolutionary onslaught of the Marxistic, Leninistic nature. Out of this fact,t he following two implications follow for any successful anti-strategy.

Firstly the South African revolutionary is not that it is indigenous or internal of nature. They have the support of various international forces.

Secondly, South African revolutionaries see revolution as a strategy through which they can attain power. Their strategy includes arms struggle and terrorism. Nonetheless the emphasis is placed on a general political struggle under which the leadership of professional revolutionary cadres, armed struggle, terror together with a political struggle, organisation and infiltration that is used by the cadres in order to develop the revolutionary onslaught on two fronts.

The military and State security front, the political psychological front. It is well known that revolutionary warfare and terrorism specially in the early stages can make a strategy weak.

The revolutionary cadre cannot confront the military or State security system of the political power of the target State openly. It is for this reason that the revolutionaries in cooperation and in clandestine situations, have to go about their work and organise themselves. They are involved in guerilla type warfare in rural areas, terroristic type warfare in urban areas and in political ideological and propaganda struggles through political front organisation and individual conspirators.

The democratic freedom is exploited fully.

MR LEVINE: Mr Schoon, would you indicate whether you are in agreement with that commentary which you have kindly read out or whether you disagree with that?

MR SCHOON: I regard that as an astute analysis Sir.

MR LEVINE: An astute analysis?


MR LEVINE: Do you know who the author was of that?

MR SCHOON: I should imagine the author was Mr Williamson, but I do not know that for a fact?

MR LEVINE: Well, I can confirm that as well as an astute analysis, would it accord with your viewpoint as at that time, which was 1980 - 1984?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, it would. It would Sir, it would also accord with my viewpoint about the weak position that the liberation forces were in in 1961 when a decision was made to move to the armed struggle.

MR LEVINE: As opposed to the ever strengthening position that came about over the next 20 years?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: And you would agree that being an astute analysis as you say, this was indicative of Mr Williamson's own subjective perception of the situation at the time he wrote this document?

MR SCHOON: I would agree Sir.

MR LEVINE: Very well. You told the Committee yesterday about I think you described it as a gift wrapped curly tailed box, against the inside of one of your car's wheels outside the unit in which you were living in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Can you remember what side of the car you referred to as to where the box was?

MR SCHOON: It was on the passenger side of the car Sir, but on the side under the chassis, not the side that the doors open.

MR LEVINE: So, on the left hand side?

MR SCHOON: Well, it depends which way you are looking at the car Sir. If you are looking from the front, it is on the right hand side, if you are looking from the back, it is on the left hand side.

MR LEVINE: Well, on the side opposite the side on which the driver would be sitting?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Very well. You told the Committee that you thought that this may have been a bomb.

MR SCHOON: I did Sir.

MR LEVINE: You also told the Committee that when you and Mr Fitzgerald arrived back at the vehicle with Billy Masetla, the gift wrapped box was gone?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Certainly there was no damage done whatsoever?

MR SCHOON: There was no damage done Sir, but nobody had opened the door of the vehicle.

MR LEVINE: Was it in fact, this box, was it in fact placed in such a manner that it might be detonated by the opening of the vehicle door or is that merely an assumption of yours?

MR SCHOON: Sir, the box was placed touching either the front or the rear wheel of the vehicle. There are various ways in which such a device could have been detonated.

MR LEVINE: Having regard to what you told the Committee, and having regard to what you have told us this morning, was it your perception that the bomb had been placed, the "bomb" as you term it, had been placed in such a way that it would or might have been detonated by the opening of any of the motor car's doors?

MR SCHOON: Sir, either by opening of the motor car's doors, or by moving the vehicle backwards or forwards for the slightest distance.

MR LEVINE: This was a bomb that could have gone off in your assumption, if it was a bomb at all, at the slightest agitation?

MR SCHOON: I think that that is a possibility Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Well, you see, there is another possibility. I want to put it to you because I gain the impression that you are a fair man and as unpleasant as this procedure is, you appear to have cooperated fully with it.

On the basis of fairness, can you exclude the possibility that someone could have dropped an innocent parcel, thereafter returned to collect it and removed it?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I think it highly unlikely that anybody would drop an innocent parcel that it fell right against the inner side of the wheel of a vehicle. I find it unlikely Sir.

MR LEVINE: But it is not something that you can positively exclude? For example let us assume that it was being carried in a carrier device at the back of a motorcycle, and it fell off and it rolled to where you saw it and believed that this was a dangerous bomb. Could that conceivably have happened?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, to say that anything is impossible, is always very difficult. I would say that it is highly unlikely that the scenario being sketched by Mr Levin, actually could have happened given the way that this object was, seemed to be wedged tight against the back or the front wheel of the vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: Where was the vehicle parked?

MR SCHOON: Sir, we lived in a townhouse complex and there was a circular drive around the townhouse complex with parking.

MR LEVINE: The vehicle was then in a public road?

MR SCHOON: Well, it was not really a public road Sir, the access road to the townhouse complex, was not a through road, it was only used by people who lived in the townhouse complex.

MR LEVINE: But it could have been used by someone for example, who had lost their way and was circumnavigating that road?

MR SCHOON: That is possible.

MR LEVINE: So, we cannot positively exclude the situation, that is all I am really seeking to deal with with you?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, unlikely as your scenario is, we cannot say it is impossible.

ADV DE JAGER: Was this road a tarred road or a dirt road or a cement road where the car was parked?

MR SCHOON: My recollection is that it was tar Sir, but it might have been dirt. I think it was tar.

CHAIRPERSON: If one is surmising, could one also surmise that a dog might have been carrying it and left it under the car?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, or it might have been Father Christmas coming early.

MR LEVINE: Only one last question on the matter of surmise. You do not have a tittle of evidence to suggest that the gift wrapped parcel contained a bomb?

MR SCHOON: It is supposition Sir.

MR LEVINE: By you?

MR SCHOON: By me, by Mr Fitzgerald, by Mr Masetla.

MR LEVINE: Well, none of those gentlemen are currently here, but how long was it between the time that you went off with Mr Fitzgerald to visit Mr Masetla and that the three of you came back?

MR SCHOON: Sir, Mr Fitzgerald lived just round the corner from where we were living, it was possibly five minutes' walk to his place. We got into the vehicle immediately and came back, say that was ten minutes. It was possibly ten minutes to go to Mr Masetla's home, and another ten minutes back, we are speaking about something like half an hour at the most, Sir.

MR LEVINE: In the half an hour ...

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, Mr Levin, we had heard evidence about the Security Branch acting on a need to know basis and the left hand wouldn't know what the right hand was doing.

I don't see really the relevance as far as this application is concerned, only as far as it might have happened and it might even have been the Security Police and your client wouldn't even know about it? What are we, nobody is applying for amnesty for this incident, so I don't know why we are wasting such a lot of time on this.

MR LEVINE: With respect Adv De Jager, I didn't introduce this aspect, it was introduced by Mr Bizos, who asked the witness to relate to the Committee the attempts on his life, the attempts to assassinate him.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but it is common cause that there were attempts at that stage.

MR LEVINE: I am entitled with respect, to examine this and to deal with it.

ADV DE JAGER: Carry on, but I only wanted to put my point of view to you.

MR LEVINE: I accept your point of view and I will get on with the next, according to the witness, attempt to assassinate him.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you do, can we go backwards a little bit. You put to the witness that page 279 would reflect Mr Williamson's state of mind at the time that he wrote the report.

MR LEVINE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Are we to presume that he wrote the report some time in February 1985?

MR LEVINE: In and during 1985, I can find out exactly when.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, it was handed in at the conference that started on the 28th of February, according to the index at the front of Q2.

MR LEVINE: I would assume, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't have to be exact, just at that period?

MR LEVINE: That contains I understand, an extract from a document that was published in 1984 and repeated in the document which you have before you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but can we assume he prepared this document in 1985, that that was his state of mind in 1985, the beginning, January, February 1985?

MR LEVINE: I think that is a fair assumption Mr Chairman. Let's get on to the second attempt which you say was to assassinate you.

As I understood your evidence, there was a festival or an event called the Culture and Resistance Show in September or October 1982 in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: No Sir, it was the Culture and Resistance Festival and it took place in July of 1982.

MR LEVINE: Well, your evidence in chief was that it was in September or October 1982, but ...

MR SCHOON: Sir, my recollection of my evidence is that I placed the event which I regarded as an attempted assassination, in that it was two or three months after the Culture and Resistance Festival and it would thus have taken place in September or October of 1982.

MR LEVINE: Well, nothing turns on it so we will leave it. As I understood your evidence, a coloured gentleman made contact with you at that festival?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: I think you said he made contact with us.

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir, I think he spoke both to me and to Mr Fitzgerald. He possibly also spoke to Jenny.

MR LEVINE: Were you together?

MR SCHOON: I cannot remember the exact circumstances in which we met this gentleman, whether he spoke to us individually or together. During the course of the festival, we would have been together and we would have been separate.

MR LEVINE: What was discussed at the time of the meeting with this gentleman?

MR SCHOON: The chief thing that was discussed at the time of the meeting with this gentleman, was his earlier involvement with SANROC, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee.

MR LEVINE: Did you get the gentleman's name?

MR SCHOON: I did Sir, but I no longer have it in my head.

MR LEVINE: Now, what was discussed with this gentleman?

MR SCHOON: On which occasion Sir?

MR LEVINE: On the occasion - did you meet him on two occasions?

MR SCHOON: We met him at the Culture and Resistance Festival Sir. At that brief meeting, I think it was during a social occasion.


MR SCHOON: And then he arrived in Gaberone unexpectedly six week, two months later.


MR SCHOON: Would you like to know what was discussed at that second meeting?

MR LEVINE: Yes, but before that, you do not have the gentleman's name in your head any longer. I have this difficulty, your memory is very good in certain instances, but lacking in others.

MR SCHOON: My memory about names is very weak Sir.

MR LEVINE: Yes, let us hear what happened on the second occasion.

MR SCHOON: On the second occasion Sir, the gentleman arrived unexpectedly from Johannesburg, and he came to the IVS office where Patrick Fitzgerald was staying.

We then had a fairly lengthy meeting with him. I think just Patrick and myself were involved, in which he suggested that he would like to be forming an functional ANC unit in Newclare, drawing in people who were involved in community activities in Newclare outside Johannesburg.

MR LEVINE: So here was a man wanting to expand the membership of the ANC within South Africa, who approaches you. Why do you believe he would have approached you?

MR SCHOON: I do not follow that?

MR LEVINE: Well, I want to put it to you that he approached you because you were regarded as an important ANC operative in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: I think that that is possible Sir.

MR LEVINE: Yes. Just to revert for a moment, sorry, I have given you my undertaking Mr Chairman, that we were finished with the gift wrapped box, but something strikes me. Just to revert to a moment, having regard to your fears of assassination, did you report the matter of the gift wrapped box to the police?


MR LEVINE: Or to anyone else?

MR SCHOON: I reported it to my then superior, Mr Billy Masetla.

MR LEVINE: But you did not think it necessary notwithstanding your apprehensions, to report it to the appropriate criminal authorities?

MR SCHOON: I was not instructed to do so Sir.

MR LEVINE: I would have thought that in a matter concerning your own life, and the safety of your wife, you would have done so of your own accord?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I think it emerged very clearly from Min Maharaj's evidence, that the ANC presence in Botswana was - one might almost say - on sufferance. It would not have been advisable to draw attention of the Botswana Police authorities to things involving people working for the ANC in the country.

MR LEVINE: We were dealing with the visit of this gentleman from, regarding Newclare.

After the second meeting, what was to take place?

MR SCHOON: After the second meeting Sir, he was to come back in a month or six weeks' time to give us indications of how he wanted to be establishing the unit, what he thought they could be doing in Newclare and for us to have discussions about future communications.

MR LEVINE: As I understood your evidence in chief, this gentleman did not in fact return.

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: But two other younger men were sent to visit you, I take it at this gentleman's instance, and they lived or were going to spend a night or two at your home?

MR SCHOON: Not at my home Sir, at the IVS office.

MR LEVINE: At the IVS offices?

MR SCHOON: Where Mr Fitzgerald was living at the time Sir.

MR LEVINE: While they were out, you and or Mr Fitzgerald searched their kitbags?

MR SCHOON: Their bags Sir, I do not think they were kitbags.

MR LEVINE: Their bags. And one of you, found a handgun in the bag?

MR SCHOON: That was Mr Fitzgerald, I was not present in the office at the time.

MR LEVINE: Did Mr Fitzgerald search their bags on your instructions?

MR SCHOON: I cannot recall Sir, if he did it on his own initiative. I think he did it on his own initiative.

MR LEVINE: And when this handgun was found, did Mr Fitzgerald then make contact with you?


MR LEVINE: What did he tell you?

MR SCHOON: He told me that he had been through the bags of these two young men and that he had found a pistol in one of the bags.

He had the pistol in his vehicle.

MR LEVINE: Did you ask him why he had seen fit to go through the bags?

MR SCHOON: It did not surprise me Sir, we had been suspicious about these young men virtually from the time they arrived. They appeared to be very shifty, they had gone into town, they had not kept an appointment for eight o'clock and by the time Mr Fitzgerald came around to speak to me, it was round about half past ten or eleven o'clock, and they had still not returned to the office.

MR LEVINE: So, you had the legitimate belief that because a handgun was found in a bag, or in a case, left at the IVS by one of the men, that this was for the purpose of assassinating you?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I will say that we had a strong suspicion, whether it was legitimate belief or not, is difficult to say. But we had a very strong suspicion.

MR LEVINE: And your suspicion was founded upon the fact that you say that the gentlemen did not keep an appointment, and they appeared to be shifty?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, the gentlemen had come up specifically to have discussions with us on behalf of the coloured gentleman who had come up to the festival and then come again.

We felt that their behaviour was very suspicious indeed, because in fact, that evening might well have been the only opportunity for us to have discussion with them.

MR LEVINE: Did you ever see them again?

MR SCHOON: We reported this matter Sir, to Mr Masetla, who reported it to ANC Security and I am told by Mr Fitzgerald that when they came back very late that night, they were taken away by ANC Security. I didn't see them again.

MR LEVINE: Do you know what happened to these gentlemen?

MR SCHOON: I do not Sir.

MR LEVINE: Did you ever enquire as to what became of these gentlemen?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, one doesn't make too many enquiries of Security personnel.

MR LEVINE: But these were gentlemen whom you suspected were there to assassinate you?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir. The matter was now out of my hands, it had moved to another structure.

CHAIRPERSON: But surely Mr Schoon, you would have wanted to know if investigations had proved that they were there to assassinate you?

MR SCHOON: Sir I think I said yesterday, that my recollection is that I was subsequently informed that information had been obtained from these two young men, that they had in fact been sent from Johannesburg to kill me.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you know whether they were taken to a camp or what happened to them, whether they are still alive today?

MR SCHOON: I do not know what happened to them Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: Weren't you interested in how they were punished, or what happened to them?

MR SCHOON: No Sir, it was not my business.

ADV DE JAGER: But surely, a possible murderer of yourself, would be your business?

MR SCHOON: Sir, the matter was now out of my hands, it was being handled by another structure.

MR LEVINE: As to what your evidence was yesterday, the record will speak for itself.

Let us turn for a moment to the establishment of what is termed to be dead letter boxes.

CHAIRPERSON: No before we do that, did you enquire as to whether any steps had been taken about the coloured man who had first approached you, who had set you up so to speak and who had sent these men to kill you?

MR SCHOON: We reported it to Lusaka Sir and we were informed that investigations would be made internally about this person.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you enquire as to what the result was, whether this person was still a danger to you?



MR SCHOON: Because Sir, I had made a report, I had been assured that something was going to be done.

CHAIRPERSON: Surely Mr Schoon, with you, your wife and your childrens' lives at stake, you would have wanted to know, you wouldn't just brush it aside, something is going to be done.

Surely you would want to know what has been done?

MR SCHOON: Sir, as far as I was concerned, it was being handled by other structures of the ANC, who were going to be making internal enquiries.

MR LEVINE: May I proceed, thank you Sir. Do you know what a DLB is?

MR SCHOON: I do Sir.

MR LEVINE: Were you charged with the establishment of DLB's, was this one of your functions?

MR SCHOON: It was not my function to establish DLB's Sir, it was my function to instruct operatives inside the country, to establish dead letter boxes.

MR LEVINE: Explain precisely what this entailed?

MR SCHOON: The concept of a DLB Sir?


MR SCHOON: A dead letter box is a place where communications can both be left and collected. Hopefully in such a way that they do not, that the communication channel does not come to the notice of the authority.

MR LEVINE: In other words without using the machinery of the postal services?

MR SCHOON: Without using the normal machinery of the postal services, yes.

MR LEVINE: And this was a box in which messages or correspondence would be left to be collected by an addressee or by the courier for an addressee, which correspondence and or messages had been dropped there for collection?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Would you have a look at Exhibit RR, please.


MR LEVINE: Pages 24 to 28.


MR LEVINE: And you need not be concerned Mr Schoon, I am not going to ask you to read all of those pages. Have a look at page 27. Firstly, is this a letter which you wrote to Molly Anderson?

MR SCHOON: Sir, this letter on page 26 is headed as a letter from Molly Anderson to me.

MR LEVINE: No page 24 Sir.

MR SCHOON: Page 24 seems to be the sketch map of a DLB in Cecil Avenue in Melrose Sir.

MR LEVINE: We've got a numbering problem here.

ADV DE JAGER: About three pages before that, there is a letter heading Dear Molly, and the date is the 19th of January 1978.

MR SCHOON: That is page 21 in my volume Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: It is, unfortunate it is page 24 in my bundle too, but we've got the letter now.

MR LEVINE: Yes Sir, that was a letter written by you to Molly Anderson which has been retyped, because it was in what is termed to be your untidy handwriting. I have seen your handwriting, and I don't find it more untidy than the usual.

MR SCHOON: Thank you for that.

MR LEVINE: However, do you concede that your page 21 and certainly Adv De Jager's and my 24, constitute the same, the beginning of the same document?

MR SCHOON: This is a letter that I wrote to Molly Sir, it was intercepted.

MR LEVINE: Yes. Was Molly Anderson the lady's real name?


MR LEVINE: Who was Nimrod?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I cannot recall, but it might have been the name that I was using in correspondence with Molly.

MR LEVINE: Are you saying that it might have been you?

MR SCHOON: It might well have been me, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Who was Sherish?

MR SCHOON: That is Mr Sherish Nanabi Sir.

MR LEVINE: Squire, we know who that gentleman is.

MR SCHOON: That is Mr Henry Mahoti Sir.

MR LEVINE: Yes. Who is Prima?

MR SCHOON: Mr Prima Naidoo Sir, who is the Chief Executive of the Southern Council in greater Johannesburg.

MR LEVINE: Who is comrade Maleka?

MR SCHOON: Comrade Maleka?

MR LEVINE: Maleka?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I know two people called Maleka. One of them was the Chief Representative in Angola, whom I have not yet met at that time, the other was the daughter of the Chief Representative in Angola, who was a woman who served a long time in prison in Kroonstad. I don't know who that refers to Sir.

MR LEVINE: And then you go on to, on the next page to deal with various examples. How you use the first letter of the name of people for certain messages to be passed.

MR SCHOON: Where are you looking please, Sir?

MR LEVINE: I am looking at the section of Fred Tonkin's being a better ...(indistinct) player and Julius Shapiro thanks friends for their assistance.


MR LEVINE: Then several pages on, it is at page I would think page 23 of your letter.

MR SCHOON: Is that the page that begins with please start servicing?

MR LEVINE: Yes. Towards the end, at the end of that page you say the addresses of the two post boxes are shown in the maps of the next page.

The post boxes are what we have referred to as DLB's.


MR LEVINE: And then you deal with box A, 87 Houghton Drive.


MR LEVINE: Behind an electrical power box?


MR LEVINE: And you deal with box B, 18 Cecil Avenue, Melrose.


MR LEVINE: And I take it the words slash of Slasto should read in fact, slab of Slasto, leaning against the wall?

MR SCHOON: I am sure it should read slab Sir.

MR LEVINE: What was Molly Anderson's function in all of this?

MR SCHOON: Sir, when first we were in Botswana, we were using Molly to attempt to set up networks inside the country. She was not active as a part of our network for very long.

In fact once we became aware that our communications channels were in fact being controlled by Mr Carl Edwards, I think we stopped having any contact with Molly.

MR LEVINE: So it was really a short lived relationship?

MR SCHOON: It was a short lived relationship at that time, it is a relationship which on my part, goes back many years, since to the late 1950's.

MR LEVINE: Let me refer you to what would be your page 25. On Friday, the 4th of February, a note will be left for Mrs Mary Trengrove.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Levin, I wish you will also put when you are giving pages, the pages that you have, which I have and Mr De Jager has, rather than keep referring to Mr Schoon's page numbers.

MR LEVINE: I am just deducting three, but page 25 of your pages, and page 28 of what appears to be the majority of the numbered pages. Do you see that there Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: I see it Sir.

MR LEVINE: Now, firstly Trengrove, is that correctly spelt or should there not be a second "r"?

MR SCHOON: I have no idea Sir, it is a made up name.

MR LEVINE: A made up name?


MR LEVINE: So there was no such person?

MR SCHOON: Not to my knowledge Sir.

MR LEVINE: As Mary Trengrove?

MR SCHOON: Not to my knowledge Sir.

MR LEVINE: And John Arnold?

MR SCHOON: Another made up name Sir.

MR LEVINE: A genuine person?

MR SCHOON: Not a genuine person Sir.

MR LEVINE: You say not a made up name?

MR SCHOON: I say not a genuine person Sir, a made up name.

MR LEVINE: Oh, I thought you said not a made up name, but it is in the same category as Mary Trengrove?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Now, this was a very responsible task with which you were seized?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: When was it when you went to a dam, ...(indistinct) the taking of photographs?

MR SCHOON: I did not go Sir, Mr Fitzgerald and Mr Heinz Klugg went.

I would say Sir, that it was shortly after Heinz arrived in Botswana. He arrived in Botswana in June or July of 1979. So it would have been some time very shortly after that.

MR LEVINE: How did you come to know of this incident?

MR SCHOON: It was reported to me by Heinz Klugg and Patrick Fitzgerald, and in fact they reported their suspicions about Mr Carl Edwards and discussed it with Jenny and me, and we suggested that this was the way that they should handle it.

MR LEVINE: So you knew about it, but you didn't accompany them on the visit to the dam?

MR SCHOON: I did not accompany them, no Sir.

MR LEVINE: When did you first meet Mr Williamson?

MR SCHOON: Sir, it was some time while Chris Wood and Julian Sturgeon was still running the SANA office in Botswana and it was definitely before Heinz and Patrick arrived in Botswana.

I can't put an exact date on it Sir, it could have been even anytime from latish - in fact my recollection is that the first time I met Mr Williamson, we were still living in Gaberone, so it would have been some time in 1977. But I am not absolutely certain about that.

MR LEVINE: You are a little bit unsure of dates?

MR SCHOON: I am unsure of dates.

MR LEVINE: You see if I understood your evidence in chief correctly, whilst Jeanette knew Mr Williamson from before, you only knew of him?

MR SCHOON: I only knew of him, and I met him in Botswana Sir.

MR LEVINE: If I further understood your evidence in chief correctly, both Messrs Erickson and Williamson paid at least one visit to Gaberone and after you and Jeanette moved to I think Molopolole, Mr Williamson came to Botswana some time and stayed in your home for two nights?

MR SCHOON: My recollection that it was for two nights Sir, it might have been only for one night.

MR LEVINE: And when would you place that time?

MR SCHOON: I would place that time, and I cannot do it exactly Sir, I would place that time as some time possibly a few months before Mr Fitzgerald arrived in Botswana, while Mr Julian Sturgeon was possibly, in fact I think Mr Julian Sturgeon was still there. I would say it was some time either late in 1978 or early 1979.


MR SCHOON: But I am trying to reconstruct it, I do not have any landmark to guide me to that date.

MR LEVINE: I think your evidence in chief was to the effect that it was early in 1979.

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, it could have been late in 1978.

MR LEVINE: When Mr Williamson came to Botswana, on that occasion, were there allegations that he was working for the South African Police?

MR SCHOON: There were such allegations Sir. We were continually receiving reports from home indicating increasing suspicion.

MR LEVINE: And you mentioned that you sent Heinz Klugg to South Africa, the words you used were we sent Heinz Klugg to South Africa.

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Who is we?

MR SCHOON: Sir, the actual planning of Heinz' mission to South Africa, was done definitely by myself and Jenny, possibly with Patrick Fitzgerald's making an input into it, it was discussed very thoroughly with Mr Henry Mahoti.

MR LEVINE: Now, was this the unit for which you were working at the time?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Of precisely what persons did such unit comprise?

MR SCHOON: At that time Sir, we were reporting to Mr Mahoti. Jenny and myself were in the unit and Patrick and at that time Heinz was working in our unit, he was subsequently transferred to another unit.

I am not certain if Jenny Evans had been incorporated into our unit at that time.

MR LEVINE: But she subsequently was?

MR SCHOON: She subsequently was and she might have been already then.

MR LEVINE: Now, what was such unit known as?

MR SCHOON: I do not recall that it had a particular name Sir.

MR LEVINE: But it catered for certain functions?

MR SCHOON: It catered for certain functions, that is correct.


MR SCHOON: Of the ANC, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Both in so far as South Africa was concerned and in so far as Botswana was concerned?

MR SCHOON: In so far as Botswana was concerned, in what respect Sir?

MR LEVINE: In regard to organisation, giving of directions, the very issue of deciding to send Mr Klugg back to South Africa?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I would accept that Sir.

MR LEVINE: Now, I take it that when Mr Klugg returned to Botswana from South Africa, he provided a report of his dealings and findings?

MR SCHOON: He did so Sir.

MR LEVINE: What was this report?

MR SCHOON: In the report Sir, he indicated those people that he had been able to see at home. He also indicated that he had not been able to make contact with one or two people.

MR LEVINE: Can you remember whom he had been able, according to him, to see at home?

MR SCHOON: Sir, the people that he was seeing, were all unknown to me. Most of them were unknown to Jenny, because they came from a younger generation of the white left. I recall only one name with whom Mr Klugg was going to make contact on his mission into South Africa, and that is Ms Jenny Schreiner and I cannot recall whether he actually saw Jenny or whether she was one of the people that he was not able to make contact with.

MR LEVINE: You mentioned Jenny Schreiner.

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: What happened to her according to your knowledge?

MR SCHOON: According to my knowledge Sir, she was mistreated by the South African Police in the most unimaginable way. She was in fact raped in detention Sir.

MR LEVINE: You mean she was arrested?

MR SCHOON: And raped Sir.

MR LEVINE: Yes, well she was arrested then?

MR SCHOON: She was, but that was some considerable time later.

MR LEVINE: I see. Now, in your evidence in chief, I believe you to have said that arising from Mr Klugg's report, you were warned not to have dealings with Williamson?

MR SCHOON: No Sir, that was not my evidence. My evidence was that part of the instructions given to Mr Klugg when he went on his mission inside the country, was to warn his contacts inside the country, not to have contact with Mr Williamson.

MR LEVINE: Thank you for correcting me. Now, in cross-examination of Mr Williamson, and I think you were present at all times, Adv Bizos said that it was you and Jeanette who broke Williamson's cover.

MR SCHOON: I would suggest Sir that the reports that we were replying, the reports that we were supplying to Mr Mac Maharaj in Lusaka and to Mr Mahoti, Mr Dan Hlume in fact played a considerable part in convincing the leadership in Lusaka that Mr Williamson was in fact working for the police.

MR LEVINE: How would Mr Williamson know about any of those reports of which you now speak?

MR SCHOON: Sir, Mr Williamson was a trained Intelligence agent and I think he had his ear close enough to the ground, and access to certain sources, that I think it is unlikely that he would not have known about it.

MR LEVINE: This is again an assumption by you?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, I do not have a letter from Mr Williamson saying I know you are the one who has put the finger on.

MR LEVINE: So, this could fall into the same category as the gift wrapped box and the pistol in the bag of one of the gentlemen at the IVS?

MR SCHOON: Sir, we were living in a world where you had to use your mind to make logical assumptions.

MR LEVINE: Logical or assumptions governed by a form of paranoia?

MR SCHOON: I would not say so Sir. I would say that we attempted very stringently, to be logical about any assumptions that we made.

MR LEVINE: And this also would include the scene of skeletons in a cupboard which didn't exist?

MR SCHOON: Well Sir, our assumptions about Mr Williamson proved to be correct?

MR LEVINE: Well, is it not correct that Mr Williamson's cover was broken because of an interview which Mr McGiven gave to a British newspaper when he left South Africa?

MR SCHOON: I think that was the reason for the withdrawal of Mr Williamson from Geneva. I think his cover at a decision making level in the ANC, had been broken considerably before that.

From what I understand from the partial evidence that Mr Maharaj gave, he was in fact attempting to use Mr Williamson for the ends of the ANC.

MR LEVINE: We will come to deal with Mr Maharaj more fully on that, but this is really supposition again on your part.

MR SCHOON: Sorry, what is the supposition that I have now?

MR LEVINE: As to what you believe was the situation that Mr Williamson's decision making powers on behalf of the ANC, were terminated and he was being used by the ANC for its own ends?

MR SCHOON: No Sir, this is not pure supposition, this is an opinion I have after conversations with a large number of people.

MR LEVINE: A large number?

MR SCHOON: Mr Maharaj for one Sir.

MR LEVINE: You see the only point I am getting at is that Mr Williamson, despite what you say, didn't know of these decisions that were being made by the ANC.

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, that is an assertion.

MR LEVINE: An assertion?


MR LEVINE: You were asked by Mr Bizos about a fake SANA Bulletin and who was responsible for this publication. Do you remember the question?

MR SCHOON: I remember the question Sir.

MR LEVINE: Do you remember your answer?

MR SCHOON: I should image Sir that my answer was it is highly likely that it was produced by Mr Williamson.

MR LEVINE: Your answer was we thought without a doubt, that it was Williamson.


MR LEVINE: Would you please tell the Committee what you did to satisfy yourself in regard to coming to the conclusion without a doubt?

MR SCHOON: The indications to us were absolutely clear, that given Mr Williamson's former involvement in SANA, given his expressed unhappiness about the direction that SANA was taking, that it was improbable in the extreme, that he was not responsible for the fake SANA Bulletin.

MR LEVINE: But not impossible?

MR SCHOON: No Sir, the impossibility is something which one must never bet on.

MR LEVINE: Something which one?

MR SCHOON: Should never bet on Sir.

MR LEVINE: And should never reject?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, one comes towards rejecting it when you have a preponderance of probabilities pointing the other way.

MR LEVINE: And you said in your answer we thought without a doubt, that it was Williamson. Again you refer to the word as we. Who is the "we" in this instance?

MR SCHOON: I should imagine Sir, that it was myself and Jenny and the two comrades involved in SANA.

MR LEVINE: Mr Fitzgerald and Mr Klugg?

MR SCHOON: I imagine Sir, I cannot remember that we discussed it with anybody else.

MR LEVINE: So you cannot say with certainty as to whom we related to?


MR LEVINE: Mr Schoon, you mentioned that Mr Williamson made an attempt to entrap you?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Could you venture a thought as to why you believed this?

MR SCHOON: Can you expand that a little bit please.

MR LEVINE: Yes, why did you come to the conclusion that Mr Williamson was endeavouring to entrap you?

MR SCHOON: Well Sir, I was given what at the time was a considerable amount of money. I was advised not to touch that money.

MR LEVINE: You were advised by?

MR SCHOON: By Mr Maharaj.

MR LEVINE: By Mr Maharaj after the event, not to touch that money?

MR SCHOON: If you mean by the event, Mr Williamson handing me what I think it was actually a cheque, not cash, for the money.


MR SCHOON: I discussed it with Mr Maharaj, Mr Maharaj advised me not to touch the money and I subsequently received an extremely aggressive letter from the IUEF and again, a supposition, which I think has a strong probability factor in its favour, I think Mr Williamson was hoping that I would in fact have used this money and that he could embarrass me about that.

MR LEVINE: When was this attempt at entrapment to use your phraseology?

MR SCHOON: It was when Mr Williamson stayed with us in Molopolole.

MR LEVINE: When was that?

MR SCHOON: Sir, we have gone through that just now, I am not certain of the date. It was either late 1978 or early 1979. In my recollection Sir, but it is very difficult to put dates together.

MR LEVINE: Did you ever acknowledge to Mr Williamson the receipt of the monies?

MR SCHOON: I cannot recall Sir.

MR LEVINE: Could you for example have written a letter acknowledging receipt of the monies?

MR SCHOON: I might well have done so Sir, but I do not recall.

MR LEVINE: You do not recall? Did you receive any correspondence from Mr Williamson regarding this money?

MR SCHOON: I have a vague recollection of receiving a letter from Mr Williamson, but again I do not recall what was in the letter.

MR LEVINE: What was the money for?

MR SCHOON: My recollection is Sir, that it was to be used for any expenses I might have in representing SANA in the rest of Southern Africa, and it was also indicated to me that it could be used for personal expenses if necessary.

MR LEVINE: Would it be possibly for the rent of the house where SANA was operating?

MR SCHOON: That is not my recollection Sir.

MR LEVINE: Do you dispute it?

MR SCHOON: The money that was given to me was not intended for the rent for the SANA house.

MR LEVINE: What was it intended for, are you suggesting some form of a bribe?

MR SCHOON: It was intended for expenses that I might incur in representing SANA in Southern Africa and it was also indicated to me that it could be used for personal expenses.

MR LEVINE: Would you bear with me a moment please. Was this money then given to you for a rainy day?

MR SCHOON: It might well have been Sir. I don't know what it was, what Mr Williamson's intentions were in giving me the money.

MR LEVINE: Or for emergency expenses?

MR SCHOON: I think that is what he indicated.

MR LEVINE: For emergency expenses?

MR SCHOON: I think that is what he indicated Sir.


MR SCHOON: No Sir, oh for SANA as far as I was going to be doing work for SANA.

MR LEVINE: So then if it was meant for SANA, how could this constitute an attempt at entrapment?

CHAIRPERSON: He has said time and time again Mr Levin, that he was told it was for SANA expenses or for his personal expenses. So you cannot now just put half of it to him. That is not what he has said.

MR LEVINE: His answer Mr Chairman, now was it was for emergency expenses for SANA.

CHAIRPERSON: No, he did not say for SANA.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, the record ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, did you say this was for SANA's emergency? I understood you to say it was for the ordinary expenses incurred for SANA all over Africa?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, what I have been trying to say and I think I have said it three or four times, is that my recollection of what happened is that Mr Williamson said to me this money was for expenses that I might have in doing work for SANA in Southern Africa, and that it was also for personal expenses.

MR LEVINE: Well Mr Chairman, naturally the record will give the answer to that. I am not going to deal any further with that aspect of the matter.

You gave evidence of coming back from Funda and being hospitalised with severe Hepatitis?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Do you remember when that was?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I went to Funda during the school holidays of 1978, which would have been over the period of whenever Easter was that year. I would have come back from Funda towards the end of April, towards the beginning of May when the school reopened, 1978 Sir.

MR LEVINE: 1978? And at that stage, you were hospitalised?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I was extremely ill Sir.

MR LEVINE: And while you were in hospital, Jeanette's parents arrived unexpectedly?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: And her father said to you, words to the effect I just had to see you?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: What was the reason for this visit?

MR SCHOON: I was informed Sir that they had received a phone call which purported to come from the police in Molopolole, very early that morning to inform them that I had died in the hospital.

MR LEVINE: Was this a call from South African Police?

MR SCHOON: I do not know who made the call Sir. My assumption is that it was made by my enemies, who are the South African Police, who were the South African Police.

MR LEVINE: In Molopolole?

MR SCHOON: Why in Molopolole Sir?

MR LEVINE: You said you got a call, or you were told that Jenny's parents received a call from the police in Molopolole.

MR SCHOON: No Sir, I said which purported to come from the police in Molopolole. It could have been made from the tickey box around the corner.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, and her father told you I just had to see you?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir. He had arrived at the house and the first words he said to Jenny when he arrived at the house were, so when did he die. And Jenny said, what do you mean? She was then told the story by her father, and he immediately said let's get into the car, I want to go to the hospital to see him.

MR LEVINE: Now, you referred to this in your evidence in chief as a dirty trick by the South African Police.

MR SCHOON: I would say it was by the South African Police yes, Sir.

MR LEVINE: A dirty trick by the South African Police?

MR SCHOON: Who else in the world would want to torment me and my family in that way Sir?

MR LEVINE: Well, can you point to any factual evidence no matter how tenuous, to link this alleged telephone call?

MR SCHOON: I can point to no evidence to link it to anybody else, except the people who regarded me as an enemy Sir.

MR LEVINE: What evidence can you point to, to link it to those people who regarded you as an enemy?

MR SCHOON: It is supposition Sir, but I think it is again supposition backed by a very strong probability.

MR LEVINE: On what basis was this piece of evidence tendered to the Committee?

MR SCHOON: I do not understand your question Sir?

MR LEVINE: What persuaded you to give this evidence of a dirty trick to use your words, by the South African Police?

MR SCHOON: My reason for raising this Sir, was to indicate to this Committee that in fact, there had been a lengthy persecution of myself and my family from virtually the time we got to Botswana.

MR LEVINE: That is what you believed?

MR SCHOON: And what I still believe.

MR LEVINE: And to which in this regard of the dirty trick, you can ascribe no factual foundation?

MR SCHOON: It happened.

MR LEVINE: It may have happened, but there is no link whatsoever that you can point to on a factual basis?

MR SCHOON: Except for balance of probabilities.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Schoon, is that on the balance of probabilities, you expected them to persecute you because you considered yourself at that stage, to be a legitimate target for the South African Police?

MR SCHOON: Mr Commissioner, that is not what I am trying to say. What I am saying, when something of the nature of the incident that I am speaking about now, occurred, as far as I am concerned, the balance of probabilities was that that whole incident was engineered by some part of the South African Security Forces.

ADV DE JAGER: I am only asking because yesterday you told us that while you were in Botswana, you - well, I won't say conceded, but I think in fact you said so - that you conceded that you would have been a legitimate target for the police?

MR SCHOON: I think that is possibly so, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: And if that is the position, if they considered you to be the enemy, they would probably do something to harass you?

MR SCHOON: It is highly likely, yes Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: Was that part of the basis for your suspicion that they initiated this call?


MR LEVINE: Mr Schoon, you mentioned that in June 1981, you obtained a new job.

MR SCHOON: Yes, it was actually August of 1981 that we started the new job Sir.

MR LEVINE: What job was this?

MR SCHOON: It was working for the International Voluntary Service which is a British development organisation and Jenny and I were Joint Field Officers for the job.

MR LEVINE: (Microphone not on) carried on with propagating the views and objectives of the ANC?

MR SCHOON: Sir, as I think I indicated in my evidence in chief, when a structure which I knew as the elephant was dissolved, I think in 1982, early 1982, my involvement in the internal work, within South Africa was very much less than it had been in the past.

MR LEVINE: But it still continued?

MR SCHOON: It continued but not merely at the level it had previously.

MR LEVINE: Now, you mentioned in your evidence in chief that questions about your security and the security of your family, were raised at a certain stage.

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: When was that?

MR SCHOON: Sir, Mr Nigel Watt, the Secretary General of the International Voluntary Service, flew out unexpectedly to Botswana and Gaberone and he told us that he had been informed by the Overseas Development Administration, ODA, which was part of the British government that they regarded our continued presence in the IVS programme as putting British citizens at risk.

MR LEVINE: Could you answer the question now, when was this?

MR SCHOON: I said it was in May of 1983.

MR LEVINE: May of 1982?

MR SCHOON: No, May of 1983.

MR LEVINE: Because my recollection is that this Mr Bizos referred to it as being May 1983, but in your answer to him, you said it was in 1982 when you got a call from Lester.

MR SCHOON: If that is so, it was inadvertent Sir, I know it was May of 1983.

MR LEVINE: After such call from Lester, Mr Watt arrived in Gaberone and advised that his people in Lester?

MR SCHOON: Would you repeat please.

MR LEVINE: Mr Watt arrived in Gaberone.

MR SCHOON: He did.

MR LEVINE: And advised that the ODA through a very senior person, was concerned that your continued presence in Gaberone could be endangering the lives of other people?

MR SCHOON: Not of other people Sir, of British volunteers in the programme.

MR LEVINE: British volunteers? And was the purpose of Mr Watt's visit, to achieve termination of your and Jenny's contracts?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: And as I understand you, you came to some sort of financial arrangements regarding your contracts?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Do you recall what these financial arrangements were?

MR SCHOON: Sir, we had a three year contract with IVS of which we had served approximately a year and a half. I cannot remember what the exact arrangements were, I think that the arrangements were that we had another 18 months of our contract to run, and we were in fact paid out for one year of that, but I am not absolutely certain, I cannot recall the details.

MR LEVINE: I think your evidence went on to state that in mid June, I would assume that was in 1983, you were called to a meeting with the British High Commissioner in Gaberone, who had given you some sort of a warning?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Precisely what was this warning?

MR SCHOON: The High Commissioner told us Sir, that he had what he regarded as good intelligence information, that I was to be shot in Botswana and he advised us to leave the country.

MR LEVINE: Failing which?

MR SCHOON: The British High Commissioner had no authority over me whatsoever, he couldn't say failing which.

MR LEVINE: Was there not a threat of your being declared prohibited immigrants?

MR SCHOON: Not by the British High Commissioner Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: The evidence was that he was taken to Brigadier Hersfield, the Head of the Security Police in Botswana Mr Levin.

MR LEVINE: Did Brigadier Hersfield threaten you with being PI'd?

MR SCHOON: I wouldn't say threatened Sir. He indicated that that would happen.

MR LEVINE: And that persuaded you to speak to the ANC Chief Representative?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: In Botswana?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: And you were advised that the Chief Representative would be going to Lusaka and would be returning with instructions?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: And did he return with the instructions?

MR SCHOON: Within a few days, yes Sir.

MR LEVINE: And what were these instructions?

MR SCHOON: The instructions that were passed on to us by Isaac Makopo, the Chief Representative, were that we were to leave immediately for Lusaka.

We were in fact being redeployed to Lusaka.

MR LEVINE: I understand from your evidence in chief, that you flew to Lusaka and that Jeanette and the children travelled by car?


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Levin, is it necessary just to repeat all the evidence he gave yesterday?

MR LEVINE: I am coming to my next question Mr Commissioner. From where did you fly?

MR SCHOON: From Francistown, Sir.

MR LEVINE: And what work did you undertake in Lusaka?

MR SCHOON: We worked with the Department of Education and the Department of Arts and Culture at our ANC Headquarters in Lusaka.

MR LEVINE: And when you say we, you here refer to Jeanette and yourself?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, it was very difficult for us both to be at the office at the same time, as we had small children to look after.

MR LEVINE: So you still carried on with your ANC work?

MR SCHOON: In a different capacity, yes.

MR LEVINE: But still affiliated to the ANC?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: At all times?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: If you, your wife and children were in danger in Botswana, why should the position have been different in Lusaka?

MR SCHOON: We were in danger in Lusaka Sir.

MR LEVINE: You were?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir. As was any ANC member living in Lusaka.

MR LEVINE: Because they were supporters and or members of the ANC?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: And that situation never ceased as far as you were concerned, or until her death, as far as Jeanette was concerned?

MR SCHOON: We did not feel that we were in danger in Lubango Sir.

MR LEVINE: Well, we will test that shortly. In any event, in December 1983, you flew to Lubango?

MR SCHOON: No Sir. We flew to Luanda.

MR LEVINE: You flew to Luanda and went on to Lubango.

MR SCHOON: After a month Sir.

MR LEVINE: And reached Lubango early in 1984?

MR SCHOON: I think it was towards the middle of January 1984, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Yes, as I say early in 1984.

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: For the ostensible purpose of teaching English at the Lubango satellite campus of the University of Angola?

MR SCHOON: I would not accept that Sir.

MR LEVINE: Would you explain why?

CHAIRPERSON: Because you said for the ostensible purpose Mr Levin.

MR SCHOON: I do not like the word ostensible, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: You were trying to trick the witness.

MR LEVINE: Mr Commissioner, Mr Chairman, if I tried to trick the witness, I would be a lot more subtle than that.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you can get on with something, you have just repeated and repeated, we have spent all morning listening to your repetitive questioning.

MR LEVINE: Mr Commissioner, if you wish to accuse me of trying to trick the witness, please say so.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it was a trick question, you know perfectly well he had said in his evidence that he went there for that purpose, he did not say it was for the ostensible purpose.

MR LEVINE: Well, with respect I think the remark was less than appropriate, but we will leave it at that. It will appear from the record.

CHAIRPERSON: It will Mr Levin, let us now continue and not waste any more time.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, this is in very sharp contra distinction to the leniency afforded to other examiners, but let me continue.

Would the South African Police and its Intelligence Department have been able to receive accurate information as to what you were doing and what Jeanette was doing in Lubango?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, given the capabilities of Mr Williamson which were commented on earlier when I was asked to read out the paragraph, it would surprise me in the extreme if Mr Williamson's Intelligence Division, was not able to access information from what had been shown to be one of the key cities in Angola.

It would surprise me in the extreme Chairperson. I have nothing to bear that out but again I think that it is probable that he would have been able to.

MR LEVINE: Would you have a look at Exhibit N please.

MR SCHOON: Exhibit?


MR SCHOON: I have Exhibit N, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Would you be good enough to look at page 40, 3.9.1.


MR LEVINE: And page 43, 4.6.2.

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir, I agree with point 3.9.1. I do not agree with point 4.6.2. I know I never served on the senior organ in Botswana. I know Jenny never served on the senior organ in Botswana. In discussion with Mr Patrick Fitzgerald and Hassen Ebrahim, they have assured me that they also never served on the senior organ in Botswana.

MR LEVINE: Be that as it may, you were highly placed in the ANC network in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: I was highly placed in the junior structure, yes, Sir.

MR LEVINE: And as Mr de Jager put to you, you believed and in fact you were targeted by the South African Security Forces when you were living in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Now, Lubango was a highly militarised area?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir.

MR LEVINE: And almost coincidentally one of the largest battles took place fairly near to Lubango, at or about the time of your arrival there?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir.

MR LEVINE: The battle of "Que Valla", "Quivelai"? You've heard of that yesterday.

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir.

MR LEVINE: And in that battle hundreds of soldiers on various sides lost their lives.

MR SCHOON: I'm aware of that, Sir.

MR LEVINE: What was there to persuade the South African Security Forces that you and Jeanette were teaching Simpliciter in Lubango, given the fact that firstly, neither you or nor Jeanette spoke any Portuguese, yet would have people believe that you were teaching Angolans to speak English?

MR SCHOON: I would like to comment on your last statement first. Chairperson, it is one of the givens of language teaching that the language of instruction that is used is the language that is being learnt. Those of us who have children at school being taught either Afrikaans or English as a second language will know that the medium of instruction is the language that is being taught. There is no difficulty about that whatsoever, Sir.

And in fact I want to make the same comment that I did yesterday, in response to Mr du Plessis. I would have had no value whatsoever, Sir, as an intelligence officer in Lubango when I could speak neither Spanish nor Portuguese.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you tell me, the pupils you were teaching were now at university?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Had they studied English at school?

MR SCHOON: They had studied English at school but they had been very badly taught, so their English was not good.

CHAIRPERSON: They had some knowledge of English?

MR SCHOON: They had some knowledge of English, and in fact two of my students spoke reasonably fluent English.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand and accept what you say because I went through the same myself, that the language of instruction is the language that is being learnt but I have some difficulty in understanding how if you knew no Portuguese, you could teach people when you were not able to explain to them where they should go and get their books from for example, or matters of that nature.

MR SCHOON: Sir, two of my students, one of whom worked for the university administration, spoke exceptionally fluent English and any instructions that I was not able to get over in English, one of my students would interpret into Portuguese.

CHAIRPERSON: So interpretation was necessary?

MR SCHOON: It was very occasionally necessary. It was sometimes necessary when people did not understand instructions. I would say again that given the strength of South African Intelligence Services, the section that Major Williamson worked, Mr Williamson worked for, of Military Intelligence, I would be highly surprised if regular intelligence reports on Lubango were not being made to the South African Security Services. We lived a completely open life.

We went to work at the university, we came back to the flat, we fetched my boy from the creche, we fetched my daughter from the school that she was attending. And because of the language difficulties we did not have contact with more than five or six people in Lubango, and that was the two other South Africans and perhaps another four people who were working there who spoke reasonable English.

MR LEVINE: Coming back to the pupils who acted as interpreters, I think you said two spoke extremely good English?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir.

MR LEVINE: So what was the purpose in their undergoing English tuition?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I speak reasonably good English but I also have a degree in it. They wanted to get a degree with English as a major language.

MR LEVINE: And the second leg of my question which was, what was there to persuade the South African Security Forces that you and Jeanette were teaching Simpliciter, given the facts that - and we've dealt with the first one, secondly you and Jeanette were actively serving the ANC in Angola and in particular in Luanda where you were at the date of the tragic death in assisting for some, I think you said either two to three days a month or three to four days a month, with ANC projects in Angola and where you carried out your ANC functions?

MR SCHOON: I will answer that, Sir, by saying that whatever assumptions the Security Police might have made, they had no evidence that we were doing anything except teach.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)


CHAIRPERSON: What was the last word you said? What was the last word, I'm afraid I didn't catch it?

MR SCHOON: Sir, what I say is that whatever assumptions the Security Police made, there was no evidence that we were doing anything except teaching at the university.

CHAIRPERSON: Well there was, Mr Levine has just put to you there was evidence that once a month, one or other of you were going up to Luanda and assisting the ANC in their functions there, wasn't there?

MR SCHOON: If the Security Police had such evidence, yes, we were doing that as well, Sir.

MR LEVINE: I don't understand the rationale, Mr Schoon, but we'll leave it at that. You have said that you did not believe that what Mr Bizos termed to be the instrument of death came from Botswana?

MR SCHOON: No, Sir, what I was saying to Mr Bizos is that I do not believe that it came from Botswana from any of the people that I worked with. It might well have been posted in Botswana. We've already heard evidence here that Mr Williamson was sending people to Botswana to post letters.

MR LEVINE: Can you positively exclude this?

MR SCHOON: Sir, one can possibly exclude nothing in the world. I find it highly improbable that the people who are possibly amongst my closest friends in the world, would not have come to speak to me in deep remorse to say: "Marius, we sent you and Jenny that letter." I find it highly improbable, Mr Commissioner.

MR LEVINE: Yes. One of the reasons you gave was that in the 14 years since the tragedy no-one of your friends in Botswana has said to you any words of regret.

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: Or having sent what is termed "the instrument of death", to you from Botswana.

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: And that's all that you rely upon for that assumption?

MR SCHOON: Ja, Sir, I ...(indistinct) my life on the basis of not having hard evidence for everything. It's very difficult to obtain that hard evidence.

MR LEVINE: Very difficult?

MR SCHOON: To obtain hard evidence for every incident in your life.

MR LEVINE: Very difficult but not impossible?

ADV DE JAGER: But the fact we're dealing with here, the facts are, you didn't know what was in the envelope, you didn't see the envelope at all.

MR SCHOON: I didn't see the envelope, Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: The evidence was that they used an envelope addressed to you, which was posted in Botswana.

MR SCHOON: I accept that as a possibility ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: And it happened about six months after something was sent, was supposed to be sent to you from Botswana.

MR SCHOON: Sir, I accept the possibility that the bomb was in an envelope posted in Botswana.


MR SCHOON: What I am suggesting is that I find it highly suspect that that envelope was in fact posted by anybody that I worked with in Botswana.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes. So it might even have been posted by an agent of South Africa there?

MR SCHOON: It might well have been, Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: But they used this envelope and it was some stage posted or conveyed to Lubango?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: And you're not denying that the envelope that was opened was an envelope addressed to either you or Jenny or whoever?

MR SCHOON: I cannot have an opinion on that, I didn't see it. Mr Harold Marushula who walked down from the university with Jenny did not see the address on the envelope. I accept it is perfectly possible and in fact probable, that the envelope was in fact addressed to the two of us.

ADV DE JAGER: And how did your ordinary post, ordinary letters arriving at Lubango addressed to you were addressed to you at the university or where did you physically get the letters from?

MR SCHOON: Sir, we got very little post in Lubango. To begin with we got it through the university, we subsequently opened a postbox at the post office and got it through the post office and with, in fact I can't think of any exceptions.

The mail that we received in Lubango was from Jenny's sister in England who was also forwarding mail from her parents in Johannesburg to us. Communications with the ANC structures would all have gone through the ANC office in Luanda, and we would collect it when we went up there.

ADV DE JAGER: It wouldn't be sent by the ANC for instance, to Lubango to your post ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: No, Sir, no Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: So on the probabilities, the parcel or the letter was either handed to Jenny at the university or she took it from the postbox?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I note it is five past eleven, would this be a convenient time?

CHAIRPERSON: I make it eleven, we started early. Very well, we'll take the short adjournment now.




MR LEVINE: Mr du Plessis has returned, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: (continued) Mr Schoon, you made mention in your evidence in chief as to two South African comrades who were also teaching at the University of Lubango, are you able to give us their names of these two persons?

MR SCHOON: Sir, one of the comrades I knew only as Jamie, except at the funeral I had no subsequent contact with him, I don't know what his name is. The other comrade I knew as Harold Marushula. He is now living in Germany, and I have the name that he is using in Germany but I do not have that address book here.

MR LEVINE: Well I'm not going to ask you about that.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the name you gave please, Harold?

MR SCHOON: Marushula, Sir. M-A-R-U-S-H-U-L-A.

MR LEVINE: The name, Marushula, was that a nom de guerre?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir.

MR LEVINE: You didn't know his real name?

MR SCHOON: At the time I did not know his real name. I have had contact with him subsequently and I now have his real name but I don't have it in my head.

ADV DE JAGER: Was he also lecturing there?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir, both Jamie and Harold were lecturing there.

ADV DE JAGER: Were you lecturing under your own name?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: But he used another name?

MR SCHOON: He was using another name.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know where he was from?

MR SCHOON: From somewhere in the Northern Province, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Mr Schoon, my client has requested me to clear up a possible misconception which may have developed as a result of names which have been mentioned during your evidence. He has asked me to assure you that neither Mr Chris Wood or Mr Julian Sturgeon were agents of the South African Security Forces ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: Personally Sir, I never thought they were.

MR LEVINE: So you accept that?

MR SCHOON: I accept that.

MR LEVINE: They purely reported to him in his capacity as Deputy Director of the IUEF in Geneva or in his capacity as Newman, running an ANC unit into the republic controlled by London ANC structures, do you accept that?

MR SCHOON: I think where the confusion arises in not in my mind Sir, I think that in, is it Exhibit RR, there is a reference to:

"Chris Wood reported that"

And I think it's an unfortunate reference Sir.

MR LEVINE: And the reason why he has asked me to clarify this issue is important as I understand that Mr Chris Wood was the particular friend of Jeanette's.

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir, and both Mr Chris Wood and Mr Julian Sturgeon became friends of mine, and I have never suspected that they were agents of the South African regime.

MR LEVINE: Now Mr Schoon, if I can summarise your evidence, it is as follows: At all times from 1964 and possibly from a few years earlier you were a staunch opponent of the South African regime, up to and until April 1994?

MR SCHOON: I would say from 1959, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Yes. I think you mentioned, in fairness, '61 but 1959 is something I will not quibble with. Secondly, during the period of your incarceration, from 1964 to 1977, your staunch ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: 1976, Sir.

MR LEVINE: 1976, but you were under house-arrest in '77?

MR SCHOON: I was placed under house - I was served with banning order and a house-arrest order a few days before my release in September of 1976.

MR LEVINE: Well during the period of your incarceration your staunch opposition to the South African regime increased in intensity and from 1977 onwards you became an active ANC organiser, together with your wife, Jeanette?

MR SCHOON: I think Sir, I became an active ANC organiser within a few days of coming out of prison in 1976.

MR LEVINE: Amongst your ANC tasks was organisation of routes from South Africa to Botswana and that of recruiting members for the ANC for the purpose of the struggle?

MR SCHOON: No, Sir. I was never charged while in South Africa, with establishing routes from South Africa to Botswana.

MR LEVINE: Whilst you were in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Whilst I - but it was the other way around then, Sir, from Botswana to South Africa.

MR LEVINE: From Botswana to South Africa?

MR SCHOON: It was a very small part of my work to which I gave very little attention.

MR LEVINE: But you had much more aspects of your work for the ANC to attend to and administer?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: In your view, the four pillars of the - in the regard to the four pillars of the struggle, the military was subservient to the politicians whose view was paramount?

MR SCHOON: At the most senior level in the organisation, yes, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Yes. You carried out your ANC functions in Botswana whilst being a teacher?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Both you and Jeanette were regarded as senior, I know you played that down somewhat, and highly valuable members of the ANC, receiving recognition inter alia in the ANC submissions to the Truth Commission as appears from Exhibit N?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I would say we were trusted members of the ANC. I do not think that we were particularly senior. For instance, Sir, I did not attend any of the ANC's conferences as a delegate during the time that we were in exile.

MR LEVINE: That may well have been through choice on your part?

MR SCHOON: No, Sir, I was never invited, I would have been delighted to go.

MR LEVINE: After realising your lives were in danger in Botswana, you were deployed to Lusaka where you continued with your ANC work and some six months later you and your family went to Lubango which was regarded as a place of safety, correct?

MR SCHOON: I want to deal with Lusaka first.


MR SCHOON: We were re-deployed to Lusaka but we were involved in completely different work. We were then deployed to Lubango. I don't know if it was regarded as a place of safety, it clearly wasn't.

MR LEVINE: Well, I thought you ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: I was - let me put it differently, Chairperson. I was never informed that we were going to Lubango because it was a place of safety.

MR LEVINE: Certainly not when there was gunfire every night and military helicopters were flying around everywhere at balcony level.

MR SCHOON: Sir, there was gunfire in Lusaka virtually every night as well.

MR LEVINE: But no helicopters?

MR SCHOON: Less frequently.

MR LEVINE: Yes. And whilst you and Jeanette were in Lubango, you would alternatively travel once a month to Luanda to deal with ANC matters?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir, that began either towards the end of February or towards the end of March.

MR LEVINE: And at all times you've remained a staunch ANC member and supporter, and this also applied to Jeanette until the time of her death?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir, I'm a member of my branch executive of the ANC.

MR LEVINE: Yes. Now Mr Schoon, you have agreed with me at the beginning of this cross-examination, that one of the most sobering and horrific byproducts of the type of war being waged are the very many Katryns on both sides of the warring factions, who have been regrettably and most sadly lost their lives as innocent victims in the flower of their youths, for which Mr Williamson has tendered his unconditional and genuine apologies?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I would accept what you say, I'm not convinced that Mr Williamson's apology was genuine.

MR LEVINE: And this is something that has lived with him for the last 14 years and will doubtless live with him until his death?

MR SCHOON: That is what he and you say, Sir.

MR LEVINE: He says it, I act on instructions. Now in conclusion, Mr Schoon, let us talk about the truth and reconciliation process.

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir.

MR LEVINE: We all know fully the meaning of truth.

MR SCHOON: We do indeed, Sir.

MR LEVINE: What about reconciliation? Mr Schoon, I've essayed an attempt at the definition of reconciliation with the help of Webster's International Dictionary, reconciling means according to that dictionary, and I think the same would appear in other dictionaries, firstly the restoration to harmony and friendship, would you agree with that?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I would accept that.

MR LEVINE: Secondly, the removal of inconsistency.

MR SCHOON: I'm not quite certain that I know what that means.

MR LEVINE: Have I perhaps left any descriptive terms for reconciliation out which you can think of which I omitted?

MR SCHOON: Sir, before I do that, I would like to make a general comment on what you are saying. I would like to refer you, Sir, to the banner behind the Honourable Commissioners, where it says: "Truth, the road to reconciliation." I remain to be convinced personally Sir, that we have heard truth in all aspects of what has happened in this room.

As regards the definitions of reconciliation, Sir, perhaps it is also useful to look at the Afrikaans word, which is "versoening" ...(intervention)

MR LEVINE: Forgiveness.

MR SCHOON: Well literally it is a bringing together to kiss.

MR LEVINE: It depends on the individuals.

MR SCHOON: I agree with your definition, Sir, I do not know what you, how you want me to comment on them.

MR LEVINE: I'm asking you whether I've omitted any other basic descriptive terms for reconciliation?

MR SCHOON: Well to refer you to the banner again, reconciliation without truth is very, very difficult.

MR LEVINE: But you believe the truth has been forthcoming?


MR LEVINE: What are your reservations in that regard?

MR SCHOON: I have felt, and you're going to ask me if I have evidence for this, I do not have evidence, this is what I have felt in this room, I have felt that we have heard the presentation of a series of stories which conveniently jell together, which conveniently gloss over certain things.

I have not come away from this process feeling cleansed by truth. And I cannot give you concrete hard evidence for that, that is my feeling.

MR LEVINE: That's a personal perception?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Now since learning of Mr Williamson's part in your personal tragedy, for which he has come froward to seek amnesty ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, could I kindly interrupt? Our function here is to look at amnesty. I don't say that reconciliation is not part of the Commission's functioning but that's another leg of the Commission. And if two people want to reconcile, I'll be very happy about it but that wouldn't fall within the ambit of my task here. And for that sake, if they want to reconcile they could meet each other and see whether they could agree with each other. But really, we can't go on and on, acting in spheres that's not our task today.

MR LEVINE: I've been precisely two minutes on this aspect, Advocate de Jager and I don't expect to be much longer.

Since Mr Williamson's part in your personal tragedy for which he has come forward to seek amnesty, have you spoken to him?

MR SCHOON: I have no intention of speaking to Mr Williamson ever in my life, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Mr Schoon, I would like to refer you to an article where I think you said that the only time you wish to see Mr Williamson is down the sights of an A4 rifle.

MR SCHOON: Sir, I said over the sights of an AK47.

MR LEVINE: AK47, right. I don't want to debate this alleged remark with you.

MR SCHOON: It's a remark I made, Sir.

MR LEVINE: But what I do wish to debate with you is that because of efforts of many like you, there is a new nation arising and growing up in South Africa. If you will, the rainbow nation, the hate and atrocities of the violent past are being buried even by those in your position, who have lost so much so violently, so cruelly and so swiftly because of the ravages of war fought so meaninglessly by both sides.

Mr Schoon, I tender Mr Williamson to you at the next adjournment of these proceedings, in the spirit of reconciliation, do you accept this tender?

MR SCHOON: No, Sir. No.

MR LEVINE: I have no further questions.


MR SCHOON: Chairperson, may I make a comment here? I heard Advocate de Jager's intervention. I would like to suggest, Sir, that for a legal person to be placing me in a position where I have to publicly say that I do not intend to be reconciled with Mr Williamson, I think it is both embarrassing and unfair, if I may have an opinion, Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: I hope you're not referring to me, that I was the one asking you to ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: I thought you were doing exactly the opposite, Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, I've tried to prevent that.

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir, and I appreciate your intervention, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all you wish to say at this stage, Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: That is all I wish to say, I felt I was being badgered, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen, have you any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman, just a few.

Mr Schoon, am I correct in saying that you would have come to know the person called Joe Mamasela, in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Not to my knowledge, Sir.


MR SCHOON: I might have known him under another name but Joe Mamasela has been a completely new name to me which has just come out of Vlakplaas.

MR JANSEN: Okay. Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have not further questions.


MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius for McPherson, I don't have any questions, thank you, Mr Chair.


MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson, I have no questions for Mr Schoon.


CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: We're hoping that some of those who weren't first might be last, Mr Chairman.

Mr Schoon, firstly you don't have to move for me, you can stay in your seat.

MR SCHOON: I can move there, it's more convenient.

MR VISSER: No, I say you don't have to. Secondly Mr Schoon, we make common cause with the questions that have been put to you by my learned friend, Mr du Plessis and he has covered mostly what we were going to ask you and therefore I will be brief with you. If you will allow me just a few brief questions. But before I do so, we also make common cause with my learned friends, Mr du Plessis and Mr Levine in their expression of their abhorrence of the killing of innocent children during the struggle, the years of the struggle and it is one of the effects and ravages of the war which I suppose is inescapable but is still regrettable.

We listened to your evidence, Mr Schoon, of how passionately you were involved and committed to the struggle, and I'm certainly not going to repeat all of that. Your evidence was also clear to us, and please stop me if I'm incorrect in anything that I say, that your participation in the struggle also included violent acts? It started off with the attempted sabotage of the Hospital Hill Police Station Communication Centre, I think it was.

MR SCHOON: I think, Sir, that is perhaps the only violent act I've been involved in personally.

MR VISSER: Yes. But you said, Mr Schoon, you replied to a question of Commissioner de Jager that you followed orders from higher up in the ANC, do you remember that?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: And you would have gone anywhere where you were ordered to go?

MR SCHOON: Sir, if I'd been sent for military training to Odessa(?), I would have gone.

MR VISSER: Yes, such was your support and your commitment?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir, it was not for me to arrange my own deployment.

MR VISSER: Yes. And if you were ordered to become an MK soldier and to commit acts of violence within the Republic of South Africa, you would have done so?

MR SCHOON: I would have done so, Sir, if I had been trained to do that.

MR VISSER: Yes. Speaking of your training, which is the next point, is it fair to say that you have a fair knowledge of explosives?


MR VISSER: Is that not fair?

MR SCHOON: No, Sir, I have a remarkably limited knowledge of explosives. The incident at the Hospital Hill Police Station, the explosives were supplied, ready primed by the South African Police. My very limited knowledge of explosives obtained in Funda for creating devices to spread letter-bombs is really not extensive at all, Sir.

MR VISSER: Are you referring to what you also apparently stated at the trial and that is that one of your comrades who were supposed to be your comrades in arms was in fact a police informer?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: Alright. Have you ever heard of - he was a white man, wasn't he?

MR SCHOON: His name was Edround, Sir.

MR VISSER: Yes. Have you ever heard of or seen him ever again after that incident?

MR SCHOON: I believe, Sir, that he was involved in other trials as well in the '60's but that is hearsay.

MR VISSER: Yes, well ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: I have not heard of him since, Sir.

MR VISSER: Well, I don't want to get into that because it's really sidetracking the procedure, but the fact of the matter is, you went to Camp Funda where, if I remember your evidence correctly, you at least received some training in explosives so far as pamphlet bombs were concerned?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir, but it was minimal training.

MR VISSER: Well what did that consist of?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I was introduced to the packages which came ready made, which one could put in a container, and those are in fact chiefly what we used at home. I was also taught how to make an explosive device out of stuff that one could buy on the supermarket shelves.

MR VISSER: Yes. And were you taught anything in the two weeks that you were there, two or three weeks, about triggering devices?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: Yes. Now pray tell, Mr Schoon, this woolly, what my learned friend, Mr Bizos referred to as "toy with a woolly tail" and that you referred to as "a box with a woolly tail sticking out of" ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: I referred to it as a gift-wrapped something with a woolly tail sticking out.

MR VISSER: In fact yes, I think Mr Levine referred to it as a box, I beg your pardon. How would you surmise was the triggering device of that set up?

MR SCHOON: Sir, it would either have been a trembler device or there would have been an attachment to the wheel which as soon as the wheel moved, would have struck the detonator.

MR VISSER: Opening a door wouldn't have set it off, not on that evidence?

MR SCHOON: No, I think it's possibly doubtful that opening a door would have set it off.

MR VISSER: Yes, so that reply of yours is not applicable at all to the situation?

MR SCHOON: No, no, no, the reply that I'm giving you, Sir, is I don't know how that device would have been set off.

MR VISSER: Yes. But if it had a trembling device which appears to be the only possibility here, how do you suggest it was removed?

MR SCHOON: Well it was removed, Sir.

MR VISSER: Yes, but how without exploding it?

MR SCHOON: It might have been that in fact it was an attachment to the wheel which could also be disconnected.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Schoon.

MR SCHOON: A magnetic attachment to the wheel.

MR VISSER: Just to come to the second attempt, and I don't want to dwell on this, the gentleman from New Clair contacts you and apparently and/or Mr Fitzgerald and/or Mrs Jenny Schoon ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: I do not think Jenny was involved with him at all, Sir.

MR VISSER: In Botswana, was that the normal thing for a person who wished to join the ANC? He would leave South Africa and go and get in touch with you?

MR SCHOON: That was one of our functions yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: Would you under those circumstances discuss with him who he knew were ANC members lived in his area or he knew in South Africa and inter alia, would you have discussed that with him?

MR SCHOON: Sir, we would have discussed that with him at a later stage. The second time when he was supposed to come up to Botswana, one of the things we would have done is that we would have taken, we would have got him to write a complete biography. And from this, this biography would have been passed on to Lusaka, who would have checked it against whatever files they had about the area and a decision would then have been made whether we were actually going to be working with him or not.

MR VISSER: On that first occasion ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: ... did you not attempt to set up a line of communication with this gentleman?

MR SCHOON: No, Sir, we were going to do that at the second meeting.

MR VISSER: Well that really answers my next question and it would have been this, just so that you know that I wasn't trying to waste time. It would explain then that after this "plot" against your life was uncovered by Mr Fitzgerald, that you would not have attempted to get in touch with this gentleman again for the simple reason that you wouldn't have known how to get in touch with him?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: But I'm concerned, with respect to you Mr Schoon, about your answers concerning why you became so thoroughly disinterested in the other two actual doers, if you like, the assassins, the would-be assassins, after the firearm was discovered in the luggage.

MR SCHOON: Sir, I will repeat what I said earlier, those people were no longer my business.

MR VISSER: But - I think someone has put it to you, the very fact that they were there according to your suspicions, to murder you or your family, made it precisely your business.

MR SCHOON: I'm afraid I don't see that. Those people had been reported by Pat, by Mr Billy Masetla to ANC security, they were being dealt with by ANC security, there was nothing further I could do about it.

MR VISSER: Did you not expect that this was now a plot and if at first it wasn't going to succeed there might be tried and tried again?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir, we were constantly aware of the possibility of real, no not of the possibility, that there was real danger living in Botswana.

MR VISSER: Yes, you said so. But here you have two people who have been sent according to you, surely this is the way to find out, to gain intelligence on where they came from and whether there weren't other people that might be sent to come and assassinate you and/or your family members.

MR SCHOON: That intelligence was not passed onto me by the ANC structures.

MR VISSER: No, but that's not the point you see, the point is, weren't you interested? There was nothing stopping you from making enquiries, Mr Schoon, surely? Anyway, you ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: Sir, I cannot remember if I made enquiries or not. If I did I got no response.

MR VISSER: Right. So you don't have anything to add to the answer you answer you've ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: I do not have anything to add the answer, Sir.

MR VISSER: Alright. Yesterday - well, let me say this first of all, before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and indeed before Members of the Amnesty Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the past, I don't believe I'm wrong if I say that the expression DLB's have become identified with and associated with a place where inter alia, arms ammunition and explosives were kept.

MR SCHOON: You could use a DLB for arms, ammunition and explosives. Our DLB's were used for communications.



MR VISSER: So what you're saying, Mr Schoon, is that this network which Mr Maharaj said was substantially larger, more extensive than what appears from Exhibit RR1 and which you today confirmed, was never used at all for the importation into the country of firearms, explosives and ammunition which MK so dearly wanted and needed?

MR SCHOON: It was never used by us for that purpose and the location of DLB's was, I think, only known to people who were working in the unit.

MR VISSER: In fairness to you, I'm going to argue that on the probabilities it would seem logical, that once you have a network you would utilise that network for all purposes of advancing the struggle and not selectively only as you now explain, to pass communications.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I think the movement made a very clear distinction between military structures and political structures. Perhaps that distinction became blurred later on but it was very definite distinction that was made in the early '80's. Our communication structures used DLB's - in fact, Mr Visser, Chairperson, I beg your pardon, in fact Chairperson, I can tell you that the bulk of our DLB's were in fact post office boxes to which we had two keys, one of which was used by the courier, one of which was used by the recipient. It would have been extremely difficult to put an AK into a post office box.

MR VISSER: Yes, I didn't suggest that. Mr Schoon, are you saying yes or no to the proposition that your network was indeed used to smuggle people in and out of the Republic of South Africa?

MR SCHOON: I have no recollection of it being used to smuggle people into South Africa. It was on a number - not a number of occasions, on certain occasions it was used to smuggle people out.

MR VISSER: Alright.

MR SCHOON: To my knowledge it was never, except for us sending Mr Heinz Klugg in and for us sending couriers in, the network was never used for instance to bring some, somebody from Cairo or Lusaka or wherever into the country.

MR VISSER: Please, and perhaps I should have been plain when I started my questioning, I'm only confining myself to the time when you were in Botswana, I'm not interested in the rest.

MR SCHOON: Sure, sure, sure.

MR VISSER: You took that for granted?

MR SCHOON: I take that for granted, Sir.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

MR SCHOON: I can have no knowledge of what happened in Botswana when I was not there, Sir.

MR VISSER: Will you please tell the Committee, if facts should prove that MK cadres were in fact infiltrated into the RSA from Botswana during the years 1979 to 1983, how would you explain that happened?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I know that MK cadres were infiltrated into South Africa from Botswana. That is not what I am saying, I saying that to my knowledge our structure in Botswana was not involved in taking those people in, we were not there in a military capacity.

MR VISSER: Yes, we heard that but my question now is, how do you suggest, from your knowledge, did this happen? Did they simply start walking from Angola to ...(intervention)?

MR SCHOON: Sir, they would have been brought to Botswana, either openly or covertly by the military structures and they would have been either guided over the border or taken over the border by the military structures. This would not have been a function of the structure that I was involved in.

MR VISSER: So it would have been an operation of military structures which would have been which structure?

MR SCHOON: Sir, there were military structures in Botswana. I'm not certain who was involved in them, I can guess about a few people's names.

MR VISSER: Alright. You say there were military structures in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: I have no doubt there were military structures in Botswana.

MR VISSER: And in Lubango?

MR SCHOON: In Lubango?

MR VISSER: I'm asking.

MR SCHOON: ANC military structures?

MR VISSER: Well that's what we're talking about.

MR SCHOON: There was no ANC military structure in Lubango.

MR VISSER: I'm just asking. If you'll allow me to jump back because there's something I forgot. This complex where you lived in Lubango, ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: The block of flats?



MR VISSER: Well I thought you said it was townhouses.

MR SCHOON: No, that's when we lived ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I'm terribly sorry, I'm referring to Botswana.

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir?

MR VISSER: You were asked about the road etc., etc., what I want to ask you is this, were the residents' vehicles in fact all parked in a communal area?

MR SCHOON: Those people who had vehicles would have parked their vehicles in the communal area.

MR VISSER: Communal area. And ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: Now wait, wait a minute, Sir. I think some of the townhouses had garages but we did not have a garage.

MR VISSER: Alright. But your car wouldn't have been the only car sleeping outside in that ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: It would not have been the only car sleeping outside.

MR VISSER: And did your children have friends of their own age in the complex?


MR VISSER: Not one?

MR SCHOON: But our children did sometimes play outside in the area where the cars were parked because there was very little traffic.

MR VISSER: My question is really this, were there other people with children in that complex?

MR SCHOON: No, Sir, we had friends just around the corner who had children but to my recollection there were no children in the complex.

MR VISSER: If somebody were to say that Lubango was - in the 1980's, that Lubango was a university town and nothing else, would he be mistaken?

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

MR SCHOON: In addition to being a university town, Lubango was a garrison town.

MR VISSER: A garrison town?


MR VISSER: Yes, well that's exactly the point, yes.

Mr Chairman, would you allow me a moment? Mr Schoon, thank you for your co-operation. You might be pleased to know that I have no further questions for you.


MR SCHOON: Thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Bizos.

I want to start off with something that you referred to at the end of your evidence, Mr Schoon. In the ANC, were there people who did what the ANC called political work, who were staunch members of the ANC but did not take part in the military struggle?

MR SCHOON: There were such people.

MR BIZOS: Because you were asked about it, Barbara Hogan, do you know whether she was charged under the Terrorism Act or was she charged with furthering the objects of the ANC because there was evidence available to the state that she specifically dissociated herself from the military struggle, did you know that?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, my recollection is that Barbara was charged with furthering the aims of the ANC, that she was not charged under the Terrorism Act, but the Terrorism Act was so wide that perhaps they used that as well.

MR BIZOS: Ja, but in her case not even the wide terms of terrorism were used against her, but we will deal with that later.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, if I could continue on that. Of the eight or nine people who were involved with us in Botswana and subsequently convicted in South African courts, to my recollection in only one instance which I am able to explain was there any mention of possible military activity.

MR BIZOS: Explain the one exception.

MR SCHOON: Assist me with the surname please. Carl?

MR BIZOS: Niehaus.

MR SCHOON: Carl Niehaus. Now Carl Niehaus at his trial it came out that he had been taking photographs both of the Johannesburg Gas Works and of the SADF Recruiting Station in the Carlton Centre. He had not been instructed to do that by us and in fact in subsequent conversations with Carl I found that he had been for some time reporting both through his present wife to us, we never actually met Carl, and to a military structure which I think was based in Swaziland. The instructions that we had given Carl were purely to form ANC units amongst Afrikaner intellectuals. Those two sets of photographs were not taken under our instructions.

MR BIZOS: Now you told the Committee that you were living in fear in Botswana, what I want to know from you is this, did you know on what basis the Security Police chose their targets for murdering them during the '80's? Did you know on what basis they worked and how they distinguished between people?

MR SCHOON: I would say one of the basees on which they worked was the assassination of very senior ANC people, people who were actually working as ANC chief representatives in neighbouring countries. How they selected other targets I do not know but I would assume that the targets that they were most interested in were those that they saw as key military decision makers in a particular area.

MR BIZOS: And would the chief ANC representatives in a neighbouring country be divorced from military activity or ...

MR SCHOON: The bulk of them would have been trained by MK.

MR BIZOS: Now, in view of what was described as a possible concession by you, I want to ask you this, have you heard the evidence of General Coetzee, that in his opinion, and after all he was the head of the Security Police, would not have regarded you as a target and that if he had known about it he would actually have prevented it or have disciplined the people that tried to kill you, did you hear that evidence?

MR SCHOON: I heard that evidence, Sir.

MR BIZOS: And did you hear the evidence of Brigadier Schoon, that you were a target in his mind because he says there was a summary which claimed that you facilitated "the passage, trained terrorists from Botswana into South Africa"? That was the basis on which you were a target in his opinion.

MR SCHOON: Sir, I heard Brigadier Schoon say that. I also heard with great interest that when Mr Berger questioned Brigadier Schoon about what specific acts of terror he knew I had been involved in, he was unable to give a reply, Sir.

MR BIZOS: You have persistently said that you had nothing to do with the military struggle. Now ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: I have said that I was not involved in the military struggle but I saw the necessity of the military struggle.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well so did many other people, without being involved. Well I will leave it at that and argue your possible concession that was mentioned, for us to argue, Mr Schoon, but I want to go onto another point. In Mr Levine's style of cross-examination you were asked whether you had any evidence for various propositions.


MR BIZOS: And a number of them - in a number of instances, I only want to deal with two of them or two topics. You say you considered the statement to your parents-in-law that you died as dirty trick of the South African Police.

MR SCHOON: I did indeed, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Now do you know whether the police - the Security Police have admitted, although it may have been a little later than this incident, I am not sure, that they actually had a department of dirty tricks?

MR SCHOON: I know that that is so, Sir. Could I expand on that too please?

MR BIZOS: Please.

MR SCHOON: After Jenny and Katryn were killed in Lubango, in media interviews on public platforms I said that I had no doubt whatsoever that they had been killed by South African Security Forces. At the time I had no hard evidence for that, however we are sitting in this room because people are saying they were involved in their deaths.

MR BIZOS: You were also asked on a number of occasions by Mr Levine, and you described it as badgering, but be that as it may, as to whether you had any evidence which persuaded you that Mr Williamson cistercians of regret were not genuine.

Now I know that you said that you had no evidence but I want to remind you and this is what we are here for, to bring matters to the court's attention, to page 109 of Mr Raven's application. We will deal with some of the egg-dancing that the two sides have made during the course of this hearing, but let's read from his affidavit which was handed in to the Commission, where he says:

"I did not know who the letters were intended for. It was only after the death of Jeanette Schoon and her child and the congratulations from Mr Williamson, that I realised that they had been the targets for one of the devices I had manufactured. On questioning Williamson about the Schoon incident he said that the letter had been intended for Marius Schoon but it served the right. He alleged that the Schoons had always used their daughter as their bomb disposal expert. On requesting clarification he said that whenever they received suspicious parcels they would throw them in the back yard and let the child play with them until such time they deemed it fit to open them."

Now did you consider that as valid evidence to take into account in refusing to accept the regret that Mr Williamson allows his counsel to read out to you?

MR SCHOON: Sir, Mr Commissioner, I remember that affidavit extremely well. I regard it - and it has a ring of truth about to me, again something for which I have no evidence but it has a ring of truth, I regard it as one of the most insulting things that could possibly have been said about Jenny or myself. I have that in my mind when I say that I find it difficult to accept Mr Williamson's remorse.

MR BIZOS: But even on the amended version that we suggest has been cooked up between Mr Williamson and Mr Raven in order to assist one another, it was common cause because Mr Williamson admitted that he actually congratulated Mr Raven for making a good bomb when he knew that your child was killed. He admitted that, Mr Williamson did. Did that have any effect on your mind as to why you cannot bring yourself to speak to Mr Williamson?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, it's not something that I would congratulate a subordinate for.

MR BIZOS: Now you spoke to the Commission about what you considered highly improbable evidence given by both Mr Williamson and Mr Raven. Do you believe either one or both of them when they say that they did not know precisely to whom the bomb was addressed?

MR SCHOON: Are you speaking about the bomb that went to Ruth First?

MR BIZOS: Well firstly to Ruth First, and do you consider that a completely separate thing to your own grief, Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: No, Sir, I consider that we are dealing with a pattern. Am I allowed to express an opinion about that evidence?

MR BIZOS: Nom because you were asked - yes, I think that you are in the circumstances because you say that you are not prepared to forgive him or speak to him because he and his colleagues in crime have not told the truth, so please tell us.

MR SCHOON: Sir, the story about the package that was sent to Ruth First, if I may express an opinion, I thought it was a complete fabrication. As regards the other envelope, clearly Mr Williamson knew that or claims that it was addressed to us. I cannot believe that Mr Raven didn't know who it was addressed to.

MR BIZOS: Do you believe that the decision to kill your, to send a bomb which had the effect of killing your wife and child, as far as Mr Williamson and Mr Raven are concerned, were nothing more than fleeting little statements and not conversations, in passages rather than a deliberate plan ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I come in here? I'm getting the idea that my learned friend is asking leading questions and I'm going to object to that Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well let me - did you believe that the killing of your wife and child, the participation of Mr Williamson and Mr Raven, was confined to fleeting conversations in a passage of the Security Police headquarters without involvement of others to authorise it and plan it?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, in my mind I make a distinction between Mr Raven and Mr Williamson. Mr Raven's position in the Security Police headquarters I think was very much that of a flunky. They said to him, do this and he did it, they said to him do that and he did it.

Mr Williamson however was in a completely different position. Mr Williamson seemingly was regarded by his superiors as having been remarkably successful as a South African spy outside the country, he had been promoted, he had been entrusted to head an extremely important section. Mr Williamson clearly had access, and I would think immediate access to the great and the powerful in those police structures. I find it very difficult to believe that killing of South African citizens in countries outside the Republic of South Africa, were things that were decided at the level of Brigadier.

I find it highly improbable, Chairperson, when Brigadier Schoon says: "Ja, I sent somebody to kill him but in this one instance I did not consult my superiors." Similarly I do not think that at the level at which Brigadier Goosen was working, Mr Williamson claims that it was discussed with Brigadier Goosen, that it would not at least have been mentioned at a higher level. And in fact my own feeling is that decisions to kill South Africans in foreign countries are taken possibly at a political decision making level.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. May I be allowed to interrupt? You will recall, Mr Chairman, if I remember correctly, that Brigadier Schoon gave his evidence, he was cross-examined and then Mr Marius Schoon thereafter went into the witness box. The evidence which has just been tendered to you was never tendered in his evidence in chief, nor did it arise from any questions which I asked on behalf of Brigadier Schoon in cross-examination. It's new evidence that is now being introduced, prompted by my learned friend if I may so with respect, which is unfair, Mr Chairman, no cross-examination has been directed, this goes much further now, Mr Chairman. And ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Visser, this isn't evidence at all is it, this is an opinion based on the evidence that he's heard. Mr Bizos could have introduced exactly the same thing in argument without asking the witness about it.

What is the purpose of asking he witness to express opinions on evidence which is a subject which we have to decide after argument, Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: I would agree fully with my learned friend, Mr Visser. The question that I asked, Mr Chairman, was in order to rebut what would otherwise not have been admissible opinion evidence as a result of the cross-examination of Mr Levine as to why he is not prepared to forgive Mr Williamson. I didn't ask him about Mr Schoon but it did come out, Mr Chairman, and if my learned friend thinks that he can take any remedial action he is obviously entitled to it but I submit that in his case it is a matter for argument only and I did not ask the question and I have no more questions to ask anyway, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: I accept that, Mr Chairman.


MR SIBANYONI: Mr Schoon, there is just one issue I want to clarify from you. Regarding the two coloured young men who were taken over by the ANC security people, did you expect to be called for example, to any inquiry of any sort or at the stage when they were taken over by the security forces of the ANC, you regarded the matter as closed?

MR SCHOON: I thought I would be called - no, I thought I might be called to an inquiry, Sir, but in fact I wasn't.

MR SIBANYONI: You were not. Did you expect that those people should be handed over to the Botswana Police?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I expected those people would have been taken to Zambia.


MR SCHOON: Or somewhere else in Zambia.

MR SIBANYONI: Okay, thank you. No further questions, Mr Chairperson.

MR SCHOON: Mr Commissioner, I did not expect them to be handed over to the Botswana Police, for the reasons that I gave when I was asked about not reporting incidents to the Botswana Police ourselves. It would not have been politic for the ANC to be making use of the Botswana Police about internal things.

MR SIBANYONI: Because the presence of the ANC members there were ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: And because our position in Botswana was very tenuous.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if you can help me with this, Mr Schoon. You remember you were asked about some newspaper cuttings ...(intervention)

MR SCHOON: Those were the cuttings I was given yesterday, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Exhibit WW at page 13.

MR SCHOON: I have it in front of me, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: In the third column towards the top the following appears:

"In an official statement a senior member of the Security Branch, Brigadier Herman Stadler said: 'We have taken notice of this terrible deed which boils down to terrorism. We know that terrorism cannot be met with terrorism. The South African Police denounces these killings'."

MR SCHOON: Yes, Sir?

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know if such an official statement was in fact made by the South African Police?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I was in Lubango at the time and I had no access to - I was in Luanda at the time and had no access to South African newspapers. To my recollection I did not hear an official statement being read on the BBC's world service.


MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) to go to the back of the room. I understand that the next witness ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Will somebody help him ...(inaudible).

MR SCHOON: I'm okay, Sir, thank you.



MR BIZOS: The next witness is not going to be led by us, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Thank you. Mr Chairman, the next witness it was agreed, will be Mr Dirk Coetzee. He was subpoenaed by the representatives for the Schoon and the First families. It was for practical reasons agreed that I would lead his evidence, his background evidence briefly.

Mr Chairman, just for the sake of the interpreters and the people doing the language channel, Mr Coetzee will be doing his chief evidence in Afrikaans but will then answer questions in either Afrikaans or English depending on the cross-examiner's choice.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR JANSEN: Thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names, Mr Coetzee?


EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Coetzee, you testified in front of an Amnesty Commission in your own application during November of '96 and February '97, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: And in that amnesty application a manuscript that you wrote was submitted as Evidence Book Number Two.

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Jansen, could you give us the amnesty application number for record purposes?

MR JANSEN: That's a good question, Chairperson. There were three applications, it was 63, 64 and 65 of '96, Mr Chairperson. It was Tshikalanga, Nofamela and Coetzee applications. Precisely which was which I am not sure.

I think it is also common cause, and I think everybody has got a copy of that manuscript in their possession ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: That's my problem, Mr Chairman, I have never had this manuscript. We have asked for it before though.

MR JANSEN: I must say, Mr Chairman, it comes to me as a great surprise that my learned friend does not have a ...

MR VISSER: I've asked my learned friend, at chambers I asked him for a copy, Mr Chairman, I don't know how he can be surprised.

MR JANSEN: No, that's utter nonsense, Mr Chairman. With the greatest respect, my learned friend asked me once for a reference, where was there reference to the Schoon incident. I did not understand that as meaning that he wanted a copy of the manuscript. In any event, Mr Chairman, I don't want to get involved in that. I will ensure that Mr Visser has a complete copy of the entire manuscript as soon as it is possible for me to do so.

CHAIRPERSON: What is Evidence Book Two?

MR JANSEN: That was the manuscript, his manuscript which he prepared leading up to the Harms Commission. It was a document that he initially intended, if you would recall, Mr Chairman, that he initially intended handing to the Harms Commission but it was not complete at the time that he testified before the ...

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the document which starts:

"Hit Squads - Testimony of a South African Security Policeman - The Full Story."

MR JANSEN: Yes, that's the document.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR JANSEN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR JANSEN: Sorry, Mr Chairman, then I must be mistaken, it must then be "Evidence Book Number One. Sorry, it could be, Mr Chairman, I apologise. It must then be Evidence Book Number One.

CHAIRPERSON: So it is that book anyway?


ADV DE JAGER: The one he reserved copyright on?



MR COETZEE: As a good writer would do, yes.

MR JANSEN: Despite that, I'll give Mr Visser a copy at no charge.

Mr Coetzee, that documents deals with your background, more specifically the years that you spent in the Security Police from 1977 up until 1981.

MR COETZEE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: And that document, did you receive any assistance of other documentation or maybe your colleagues that could help you remember certain things when you wrote that document?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson, that was when I was in exile. I received no documentation, or there were no other people whom I could consult in order to find out dates or to remember or to refer to specific incidents.

MR JANSEN: But the contents of that document, does that represent your best approach or version of what you could remember?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Just for purposes of the record, I'd just like to highlight the most important points. You were a uniformed policeman up until the end of 1976 and in January 1977 you started or you served in the Security Police?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: But before January 1977 you were the commander of the Oshoek border post with Swaziland?

MR COETZEE: No, in January 1977 I took over that post and that falls below the Security Branch Middelburg, so then I officially went over to the Security Branch.

MR JANSEN: You then became part of the head office of the Security Branch in August 1980 as commander of C1, so-called Vlakplaas?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: And your service there came to an end at the end of December 1981?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Initially you were transferred at the end of '81, could you just tell us where would you initially be transferred to at the end of '81?

MR COETZEE: I was transferred to the West Rand Security Branch and Jan Coetzee of this branch was transferred to Vlakplaas as commander in my place.

MR JANSEN: You did not take up that post, could you just quickly give us an explanation?

MR COETZEE: I could not take up this post because it was in August 1980 and I was transferred to Pretoria because of my youngest child who was then a diabetic and we had to be close to the original specialist who looked after the child, and if you go to the West Rand you have to take your whole household with you.

MR JANSEN: You then asked them if you could remain in Pretoria, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I did ask them.

MR JANSEN: They denied it?

MR COETZEE: Yes, they denied it.

MR JANSEN: And then from there you went to the Drug Section in the Security Branch?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Then there was a disciplinary hearing at the end of '85?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Once again, evidence was given that you were fired from your job?

MR COETZEE: I was medically boarded from the police force due to diabetes and went on early retirement in 31 December 1986 and up till today, my rank and my medical aid and my police pension I get until today.

MR JANSEN: The findings of the disciplinary hearing was that you had to be demoted in rank, or that was the recommendation of the disciplinary ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: In salary scale.

MR JANSEN: Or in salary scale.

MR COETZEE: In salary scale, that's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Shortly before you left the country in October 1989, a former junior colleague of yours who was under your command, Almond Nofamela, started making certain statements about activities of Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that was in October 1989.

MR JANSEN: You were then a civilian person?

MR COETZEE: I was a civilian, Mr Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: And you were directly implicated by him?

MR COETZEE: I was directly implicated by him as his former commanding officer, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: And your first reaction was to go to your previous senior colleague with whom you had a close relationship, Mr Jan du Preez, to hear what you should do and what would the police's official line be?

MR COETZEE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: What was his advice to you at that stage?

MR COETZEE: Make Nofamela a liar and any successor who would wish to support him, make him a liar as well. In other words, just deny everything.

MR JANSEN: So he indicated to you that the police will support you in your denials of this?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Did anything happen which led you to believe that they wouldn't do it?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, yes, my previous experience with them during my departmental hearing it was very clear that if you don't play the game with them then you will be on the shortest side and you will be made a black sheep.

MR JANSEN: Yes, but we know - you eventually followed a different route, you went to another friend of yours, Mr Jacques Pauw, the journalist.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, on later stage to Jacques Pauw and Andre Saayman of Idasa.

MR JANSEN: Yes, moved you to make you do that?

MR COETZEE: I wanted to bring out the truth, I wanted to prevent the fact that I would become the black sheep and stand alone and carry all the blame, and I wanted to make contact with the ANC in order to reveal my story and because I did not see my clear to do it in South Africa, I then went into exile.

MR JANSEN: I think that is also a question of record. In November 1989 it was organised or certain arrangements were made that you could go to Mauritius?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: So it would be fair to say that your initial motives to go to the ANC camp and that, was for self preservation?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is true.

MR JANSEN: And later you did become a member of the ANC and became part of their Intelligence Section?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: And you are today serving in the National Intelligence Service?


MR JANSEN: Just as background, you listened to Brigadier Schoon's version concerning an incident where there was a conspiracy to kill Mr Schoon?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I did listen to that.

MR JANSEN: It is correct that you do not agree with the essence of his version?

MR COETZEE: No, I do not agree with it at all, we are talking about two different incidents.

MR JANSEN: Just a few questions. Were you at any stage involved in more than one incident to murder Mr Marius Schoon?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson, I was only involved once in the preparation of an incident.

MR JANSEN: That is the one which you describe in your manuscript?

MR COETZEE: That is the one I describe in my manuscript, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Now where would you - no, let me put it this way, did you know who Mr Marius Schoon was at that stage and with what his activities were?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all, Mr Chairperson, I did not have any personal knowledge of names of people in the ANC structures, I was in the operational side or section of the field workers of the police, and that is the Security Police.

MR JANSEN: Where would you - let us say in such an operation in Botswana, where would you receive your operational information? In other words, where was the house where you would go, who are the people there, what did they look like etc?

MR COETZEE: As with a previous incident also in Botswana a person would go to Zeerust. In those years it was Zeerust where a Captain Truter and a Captain Rudi Crause were involved or worked there. Botswana would fall under them in co-operation with Jan Coetzee of the West Rand Security Branch.

MR JANSEN: Then the other information regarding such a target, the identifying of it and the legitimising of it, where would that information come from or where would you get it?

MR COETZEE: That information did not concern me, Mr Chairperson. I only received an instruction from my superiors and in this case it was Brigadier Schoon.

MR JANSEN: Do you know where in head office that information would be held and who would primarily work with it?

MR COETZEE: No, I do not know. Originally, when you take the gathering of information, Section A, it would be Major Williamson's section or Colonel Williamson.

ADV DE JAGER: The period that we are talking about now, where you were involved in an incident or preparation of an incident with regard to Mr Marius Schoon, when was this precisely?

MR COETZEE: I would say it was '81, the middle/end of that year.

ADV DE JAGER: Were you still at Vlakplaas?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: I think we could just place this on record, I think it's a question of record that except for two or three of the incidents, Vlakplaas incidents, all of them took place from the 13th of September onwards?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is in '81.

MR JANSEN: From 1981.

MR COETZEE: For approximately four months I think, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: You said 13 December '81 for approximately four months?

MR JANSEN: No, 13 September, that was the audi(?) in Port Elizabeth.

MR COETZEE: September.

ADV DE JAGER: ...(inaudible)

MR JANSEN: No, September, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: I said the end of December you left Vlakplaas?

MR COETZEE: I left Vlakplaas, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: You would be asked for more detail concerning this, but I would just like you to confirm that you knew what you said in the manuscript about this incident?


MR JANSEN: And do you confirm the truth in that?


MR JANSEN: When Brigadier Schoon's version was brought under your attention, when his amnesty application became available, what was your comment on that and what is your comment now?

MR COETZEE: My comment now is that there is definitely another incident in which Jan Coetzee and Joe Mamasela, a person who worked for him as an informant, a source, were involved, and an incident where I was also involved and where I with the help or the assistance of Coetzee took part in this operation.

MR JANSEN: Could you just explain it again, were you involved the Jan Coetzee/Mamasela attempt to murder Marius Schoon?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all.

MR JANSEN: How did you get to know about this operation?

MR COETZEE: If I can remember correctly, it was from Jan Coetzee directly who informed me about this incident.

MR JANSEN: Just the following point, when you left the country in 1989, it would not be wrong to say you had a personal argument with General Johan Coetzee that has been going on for quite a few years?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: And one could also accept that you were personally dissatisfied and you felt dissatisfaction towards your previous friend, Craig Williamson?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Because he testified against you in the disciplinary hearing?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Now except for these two people, did you have any feelings of malice or feel any feelings of malice or revenge against people like Brigadier du Preez, Schoon and of the other people like Brigadier van der Hoven? Did you have feelings against them?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.


ADV DE JAGER: Just for the sake of the record, the reference in this book of evidence, the paragraph is referring to paragraphs, could you give us that please?

MR JANSEN: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: Of the murder, aborted murder of Marius Schoon?



MR JANSEN: on page?


MR JANSEN: 94, thank you, Mr Chairman. I have also checked his own evidence at the amnesty hearing in Johannesburg, it was merely a confirmation of what is here and in his amnesty application, it's just a short summary of what is here as well. So this really is the most complete version of those events, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, have you regained your position?

MR VISSER: Yes. Mr Chairman, I'm going to suggest to you, Mr Chairman, that if my learned friend, Mr Bizos wishes to ask any elucidatory questions seeing that he has subpoenaed him, I believe it's proper for him to go first. Secondly, as regards to the manuscript, Mr Chairman, I have page 94 in my possession, is there anything, an other place in that document, Mr Chairman, may I ask through the Chair, where reference is made to Marius Schoon?


MR VISSER: Well if that is so, Mr Chairman, then obviously I'll have to get the document.

CHAIRPERSON: No, you won't. I'll read you the paragraph.

MR VISSER: If you would please, Mr Chairman.


"In 1984, Marius's wife, Jeanette and her child were killed in a bomb blast in Angola. When I met Craig sometime after that incident, he smugly enquired whether I had seen about Jeanette Schoon. His manner in our very devious way of talking, (to quote Craig himself, see section, and with our very intimate report with each other, (to quote Craig again see the same section), made me understand very well what was going on, (to quote Craig yet again, see the same section.) Unless Craig overestimated me in such reference to conversations between us, I was justified in taking this to mean that his Section A claimed credit for the murder."

And that's the ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) paragraph before then there is a reference to his having been, Marius Schoon being warned by the British High Commissioner that he was on the hit list.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, we agree with our learned friend, we are going to ask him questions which are relevant to the issue beyond to what our learned friends have stated and it would be, we would suggest, more convenient for us to ask him now so that the cross-examiners can follow on on everything that the witness has said. And my learned friend, Mr Berger ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) otherwise as I understand the position, it would probably mean that persons who cross-examine now would want to ask more questions after you have asked yours.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: So if nobody has any objection ...(inaudible). Do you want to start now?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, it's five to one, perhaps we should take the adjournment and I, Danny Berger, will start at 2 o'clock.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we'll adjourn.



MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, before my learned friend, Mr Berger, continues, may I just place on record, I think for future reference in these hearings, Mr Visser and I had a discussion about our little altercation before lunch and I think we've agreed that there was some misunderstanding there. I understood him to say that he had asked me for a manuscript, the whole of the manuscript and I hadn't given it to him, where I think he was actually saying that I should not have made the assumption that he had it because he had asked me for a portion of it. In any event, Mr Chairman, I have apologised to him to the extent that me using the word "nonsense" may have been a bit of a sharp reaction at the time. I was just a bit surprised that a colleague of mine - I had thought he was implying that he had asked me for something and I hadn't given it to him, Mr Chairman. And I think in that regard we've made our peace and will hopefully not be involved in such altercations in future, thanks.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Does that mean that if a colleague asks for you something, you will always give it?

MR JANSEN: Well when it relates to a public document of this kind, certainly, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on, Mr Berger.


Mr Coetzee, could you please go through the mission that you were given to go up to Botswana and kill Marius Schoon, could you start at the beginning and take us through exactly how you became involved and what happened.

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, I was called in 1981 sometime, I can't remember whether, I think it was towards the middle/end of the year, by Brigadier Schoon, who told me that I must go and assist the Zeerust guys in the elimination of Marius Schoon ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: I'm sorry to interrupt, that's Brigadier Willem Schoon who was the head of C Section at the time?

MR COETZEE: That was Brigadier Willem Schoon who was the head of C Section.

CHAIRPERSON: You must assist who?

MR COETZEE: The Zeerust Security Branch, together with - where I will get my instructions from Rudi Crause, together with Captain Jan Coetzee of West Rand Security Branch.

For the purpose of the operation I obtained a black briefcase from our Technical Division, Captain Wal du Toit, with a 9mm machine pistol built into it, with a silencer on and a trigger mechanism at the bottom of the case. In other words, if you pick it up and put it under your armpit, the handle, you would feel the trigger at the bottom. So if one's knocking at a front door and someone might open it, then you would just pull the trigger at the bottom of ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Who sent you to du Toit, who told you to go there, did you organise out of your own initiative? Who gave you instructions, who instructed Wal du Toit?

MR COETZEE: I organised with Wal personally, without Brigadier Schoon's instructions.

ADV DE JAGER: So he left it to you?

MR COETZEE: He left it to me.

ADV DE JAGER: To do all the detailed planning?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, together with the Zeerust Security Branch and Captain Jan Coetzee of West Rand Security.

ADV DE JAGER: And did you do the planning before you got in touch with Zeerust or after you got in touch with Zeerust?

MR COETZEE: Before I could get to the point of leaving Security Police headquarters for Zeerust, I was again called in by Brigadier Schoon and in the presence of Brigadier Jan du Preez in Brigadier Willem Schoon's office, Brigadier Jan Coetzee instructed that the mission is to be called off on instructions of General Johan Coetzee. When I asked for a reason, Brigadier Jan du Preez just said no reason was given by General Coetzee.

So I just had obtained the briefcase at that stage but as yet not met up with the Western Transvaal Security Branch, Captain Rudi Crause, and/or Captain Jan Coetzee.

MR BERGER: In what you've just said, at one point you said Brigadier Jan Coetzee and then later you said Brigadier Jan du Preez.

MR COETZEE: Jan du Preez, Brigadier Jan du Preez was the second-in-charge of Security Branch headquarters and it was he that was present, Brigadier Jan du Preez, that was present in the office of Brigadier Willem Schoon when I was asked to call off the planning.

MR BERGER: Where were you ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And was Brigadier Schoon there?

MR COETZEE: Brigadier Schoon was present, Mr Chairperson, it was in Brigadier Schoon's office.

MR BERGER: Where were you going to be briefed on the nuts and bolts of the mission?

MR COETZEE: The briefing would have taken place at Zeerust Security Branch, by Captain Rudi Crause and Captain Jan Coetzee, who were already informed of my coming.

MR BERGER: Once you were given the order to call off the mission, did you take any further action in regard to assassination attempts of Mr Marius Schoon?

MR COETZEE: Nothing at all, I just dropped the whole matter there and went on with my usual daily routine.

MR BERGER: Did you have any idea why General Johan Coetzee had called off the mission?

MR COETZEE: I have no idea and Brigadier Jan du Preez could also not give me any idea. I only thought in my own mind that it must be an operation, and that's only an assumption, that would interfere with an operation that might already be in planning of Section A. That is the idea I got.

MR BERGER: Section A was led by whom?

MR COETZEE: Section A was led by Brigadier Piet Goosen.

MR BERGER: And at that time, was Section A5 the Intelligence Section led by Captain Craig Williamson at the time?

MR COETZEE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Coetzee, what happened to the briefcase?

MR COETZEE: I kept it with me and when I left Vlakplaas on the 31st of December 1981, it was handed over to my predecessor, Captain Jan Coetzee, together with a whole arsenal of weapons, registered and unregistered that was carried in the back of my boot on a permanent basis, of the official car.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

MR BERGER: Now you know that in the amnesty application of Brigadier Willem Schoon he says that you came to him with an idea, you told him that you had a way in which you could take out or kill Mr Marius Schoon.

MR COETZEE: No, that is not true, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: He also says in his amnesty application, that he provided you with a .38 revolver and ammunition and said that you could go ahead with this plan.

MR COETZEE: Never in his life whilst I was in Security Headquarters at Section C, did Brigadier Schoon hand me a .38 revolver or any other 9mm, or pistol, any other pistol or revolver.

MR BERGER: Mr Coetzee, what was your relationship with Brigadier Piet Goosen?

MR COETZEE: A very friendly close relationship to the extent that I assisted on my own from Section C, for them to build or for him to build lecture halls and on their farm, Daisy Farm, I did all the arrangements with the Prison Departments, I arranged all the transport for months on end for the prisoners and all the sand, bricks, stones, woodwork etc.

MR BERGER: Was this at Brigadier Piet Goosen's request?

MR COETZEE: At his request. I asked him whether I could assist them, after I'd learnt that they had trouble in building a lecture hall on the farm, Daisy Farm, and Brigadier Piet Goosen also on occasions came to Vlakplaas for braais and drinking with us on the farm, him and Louis Koekemoer, he's one of his right-hand men.

MR BERGER: Your relationship with Brigadier Piet Goosen, did it ever deteriorate?

MR COETZEE: No, never, it was a very personal relationship, very friendly too, very close.

MR BERGER: And what about your relationship with Craig Williamson?

MR COETZEE: We had a very close relationship and we got on very very well.

MR BERGER: And when was it that your relationship with him deteriorated?

MR COETZEE: Well actually in June '85, when to my surprise at my departmental hearing, he came walking into the hearing after I'd been ploughing with the pompous clan, Johan Coetzee and company, in their building up a case against me. They flew - he flew up personally, General Johan Coetzee, to convince Craig Williamson on the second night of my hearing, to turn against me. And that was where my relationship ended with him.

MR BERGER: And that you say was in June of '85?

MR COETZEE: June 1985, that's correct.

ADV BOSMAN: Prior to that you had a very close relationship with Craig Williamson?

MR COETZEE: Very well and very, a very intimate and close relationship, to put it that way.

MR BERGER: Do you have any knowledge about the relationship prior to June 1985, between Craig Williamson and Johan Coetzee?

MR COETZEE: Well, General Johan Coetzee was like a father to him and Craig wouldn't have done anything to upset Johan Coetzee, General Johan Coetzee at all, or risk any operation without consulting General Johan Coetzee.

MR BERGER: Brigadier Piet Goosen was well-known for his role in the death of Mr Steve Biko.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Do you have any knowledge of what happened after the death of Steve Biko, in relation to Brigadier Piet Goosen?

MR COETZEE: Brigadier Piet Goosen was transferred to headquarters where he was so-called, you can call it hidden away or worked under supervision because of the Biko incident.

MR BERGER: And when he was brought up to headquarters, was he promoted or did anything happen as far as his rank was concerned?

MR COETZEE: He came up as a Colonel and was to be promoted in early '81, which eventually happened but after General Johan Coetzee had kept back his promotion because of the Biko incident, and Brigadier Goosen was in tears as a result of this, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: When was that roughly, do you know?

MR COETZEE: If I must guess it's '81, during the first half roughly of '81, I would say.

MR BERGER: You've told the Committee that Craig Williamson would never have acted without securing the okay from General Johan Coetzee, what was the position in relation to Brigadier Piet Goosen and General Johan Coetzee, particularly in relation to acts like the death of Ruth First and Jeanette and Katryn Schoon?

MR COETZEE: Brigadier Piet Goosen was very subservient and he wouldn't have done anything to upset General Johan Coetzee further, in doing any operations or planning operations without the personal knowledge of General Johan Coetzee.

MR BERGER: Was General Johan Coetzee aware of any of the actions in which you had been involved?

MR COETZEE: Yes, he was, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Do you know that for a fact, did he indicate that to you in any way?

MR COETZEE: I know that for a fact. On the Joe Pillay incident, before it turned out to be a mess-up, he congratulated me after the Sanhedrin on the next morning after the Joe Pillay abduction, he personally congratulated me. And he, General Johan Coetzee also informed me first when I first learnt about the London bombing of the ANC offices, he came from General Johan Coetzee to me personally.

MR BERGER: These Sanhedrin meetings, very briefly, what was your understanding of them?

MR COETZEE: Well my understanding was that at half past seven in the mornings our section heads, Section A, B, C, D, the different sectional heads, will meet with their respective officers. We were five in Section C altogether. And then at 8 o'clock the section leaders or the section heads, that's now people like Brigadier Piet Goosen, Brigadier Schoon, Brigadier Ampie Kotze etc., would then meet together with Brigadier Jan du Preez and General Coetzee in General Johan Coetzee's office and that morning meeting was well-known all over as the Sanhedrin, at 8 o'clock every single day of the week.

MR BERGER: Would anyone other than a section head, for example would you attend a Sanhedrin meeting?

MR COETZEE: I believe - not me, Mr Chairperson, but I believe there were lower ranking officers that at occasions attended the Sanhedrin meetings when their section heads were not available or otherwise when the section head would want this junior office to brief the Sanhedrin in person on some issue.

MR BERGER: So it's possible that for example, Mr Williamson could attend the Sanhedrin meeting at the time when Brigadier Goosen was there?

MR COETZEE: It could have been, I won't know of it but it could have been, yes.

MR BERGER: And in those instances your understanding was that it would be so that for example, Mr Williamson would be there to impart some specific information?

MR COETZEE: To make some specific input on request of the Sanhedrin, that's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Now in 1992, Ruth First was killed by - I beg your pardon, in 1982, Ruth First was killed by a bomb and you came to know that, or you came to know who was responsible for sending that bomb, am I correct?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson. In those days it was Major Williamson, Craig Williamson.

MR BERGER: And how did it come about?

MR COETZEE: He personally in our way of communication, admitted to me that it was he that was responsible for the operation.

MR BERGER: Now when was that?

MR COETZEE: It's difficult to say, there were two occasions, the 1982 bombing was that of Ruth First and then the 1984 bombing of Jeanette Schoon and her child Katryn.

MR BERGER: Yes, the killing of Ruth First was in August of 1982, where would you have been at that time?

MR COETZEE: I, in August 1982 was at recruiting headquarters adjacent to Security Branch headquarters.

MR BERGER: And how did it come about that Mr Williamson informed you?

MR COETZEE: If my mind serves me right, Mr Chairperson, I was called by Brigadier Schoon to submit a statement on the disappearance of Peter, ag, Vusi - Peter and Vusi were two ANC guys that we eliminated and burnt, and their attorneys were inquiring about their whereabouts and I was called over by Brigadier Schoon to come and put in a report as to the whereabouts of Vusi. I think it was during that occasion, but I'm not 100% sure.

MR BERGER: So you were at headquarters where Mr Williamson's office was situated?

MR COETZEE: Yes, they were next to us. I was actually in Uniform Branch headquarters and they were in Security Branch headquarters.

MR BERGER: Was this in an office or where was it that Mr Williamson spoke to you?

MR COETZEE: No, not in the office, just in the bypass in the passage, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And what did he say?

MR COETZEE: In short, something to the extent that: "Have you heard ...", referring to the news, and then walking away and I say: "Yes, I knew it was you, you so and so", and then he walked off laughing and happy I mean, that it was a successful operation.

MR BERGER: And that was enough for you to put two and two together and know that he was referring to the murder of Ruth First?

MR COETZEE: 100%, and in our words of communication, yes.

MR BERGER: Would you say that he was very proud of what he had done?

MR COETZEE: He was like we all were during operations, after operations, he was very proud of himself, yes.

MR BERGER: Now the second incident that I was going to ask you about refers to the murder in June of 1984 of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon. Now where were you at that time?

MR COETZEE: In 1984 I was at Flying Squad, Mr Chairperson, Duty Officer at Pretoria Flying Squad but I went to Mr Craig Williamson's house or flat, townhouse, to see him about a friend, Peter Casselton when I heard about the operation as far as the 1984 bombing is concerned.

MR BERGER: And what did Mr Williamson say to you on that occasion?

MR COETZEE: In the same way, it's very difficult to remember, I can't remember exact words, we had our way of communicating but he left me with no illusion whatsoever that he was responsible for that operation too.

MR BERGER: In your manuscript, at page 118, you say in paragraph

"In 1984, Marius' wife, Jeanette ..."


ADV DE JAGER: Could you kindly repeat the long reference please.

MR BERGER: Advocate de Jager, it's page 118 and it's paragraph

Mr Coetzee you say:

"In 1984 Marius' wife, Jeanette and her child were killed in a bomb blast in Angola. When I met Craig some time after that incident he smugly enquired whether I had seen about Jeanette Schoon."

And you go on to say:

"His manner in our very devious way of talking ..."

I'm leaving out the things in brackets.

"... and with our very intimate rapport with each other, made me understand very well what is going on. Unless Craig overestimated me in such references to conversations between us, I was justified in taking this to mean that his Section A claimed credit for the murder."

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You talk about him smugly enquiring, can you elaborate on that?

MR COETZEE: Gloating, bloating, I mean, have you seen this, sort of happy with himself, very happy.

MR BERGER: Did you get the impression at that meeting, that he was very proud of what he had done in relation to the death of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson, as we all were after operations.

MR BERGER: Did it ever happen that Craig Williamson congratulated you about an operation?

MR COETZEE: After the Mxenge murder, Mr Chairperson, we crossed passage again and he said: "Nice work", and I said: "What do you mean"?, and he walked off laughing, and he knew and I knew and we knew what he was talking about, that he congratulated me on the successful elimination of Mr Mxenge.

MR BERGER: How would Craig Williamson have known that you were involved in the murder of Mr Mxenge?

MR COETZEE: It's part of the culture of the small, the personal intimate rapport that there exists in the security structures, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You never told Mr Williamson or even intimated to him?

MR COETZEE: Never hinted or intimated or told him anything no, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Would the Intelligence Section of the Security Police have known about the plans to murder Mr Mxenge?

MR COETZEE: I wouldn't be able - I don't know, Mr Chairperson, I was what I always explained, a hit link in a need-to-know chain. So I was never asking - if I was instructed to an operation I never asked who knows about it, where does it come from, who discussed it, so I wouldn't be able to indicate whether he knew about it or not.

MR BERGER: All the information that you would have got about Mr Mxenge, where would that have come from?

MR COETZEE: I received my instructions in that specific case, and information, from Brigadier van der Hoven, the Divisional Commander of Security Headquarters Port Natal in Durban.

MR BERGER: So you don't know how Mr Williamson knew about your involvement, all you know is that he knew?

MR COETZEE: He knew exactly but I don't know how he got to know it.

MR BERGER: Your manuscript which has been referred to, when did you start writing it?

MR COETZEE: Whilst in exile. I left the country in November 1989 and I've started writing it round about April, the first week in April 1990 and completed it on the 13th of May 1990.

MR BERGER: 1990?


MR BERGER: Was there any subsequent additions to the manuscript after that date?

MR COETZEE: Nothing at all, Mr Chairperson, just corrections. We had a very primitive - if I say "we", my brother assisted me in documenting my thoughts because he could handle a wordprocessor and I couldn't type. We just made corrections as far as spelling, headings in boldness etc., but nothing to the contents and the facts of the manuscript was changed at all.

MR BERGER: And the facts, do they come from you or from your brother?

MR COETZEE: No, the facts are my personal knowledge, my brother had no knowledge at all of my operations.

MR BERGER: And do you confirm that truth of the contents of that manuscript?

MR COETZEE: I do, Mr Chairperson, I confirm it.

MR BERGER: You had a meeting did you not, with Miss Gillian Slovo at some stage?

MR COETZEE: I did, Mr Chairperson, in the lawyers for Human Right's offices some year or three ago I think, four years ago maybe.

MR BERGER: You say four years ago?

MR COETZEE: Ja, I think so.

MR BERGER: What did Miss Slovo ask you?

MR COETZEE: She just enquired about the explosive which killed her mother and I conveyed my knowledge to her, exactly what I've mentioned to the Commission now. I said to her who I think was responsible, who admitted that he was responsible for the explosion but I could not give her details as to how it was prepared, the bomb was prepared.

MR BERGER: You're referring to - you gave her the name of Craig Williamson?

MR COETZEE: I did give her the name of Craig Williamson, that's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And was that before or after Craig Williamson had gone public about his involvement?

MR COETZEE: It was before as far as I can remember, because at that stage she was still searching for the truth, there was no admission as yet publicly as to who was responsible for her mother's death.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Mr Coetzee, I have no further questions.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Visser on record.

Mr Coetzee, we meet again.

MR COETZEE: Pleased to meet again.

MR VISSER: Did you consult with anybody recently before you gave your evidence here today?

MR COETZEE: I did consult, I think it was last week Wednesday if my memory serves me right, with Mr Rudolf Jansen and with Mr Berger.

MR VISSER: With Mr Berger. Did you consult with him prior to the last occasion when this hearing was held, that was September I believe, Mr Chairman, the first week in September. Did you consult with Mr Berger or Mr Bizos or his attorney prior to the beginning of September this year?

MR COETZEE: I can't remember when it was, they might be able to help me correctly, we met in the House of Coffees with Mr Berger and Miss Corine Norval or Mrs Corine Norval in the House of Coffees in Hatfield for a short meeting, that's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Alright. Did you at any time during the consultations tell my learned friends, either Mr Bizos or Mr Berger, that you ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: He didn't say he met me, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, yes, I stand correct, he said Mr Berger.

Did you tell Mr Berger that you believe that there were two attempts on the life of Mr Marius Schoon?

MR COETZEE: No, I did not, I did not.

MR VISSER: Alright, well come back to that ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: Except on the last occasion when they mentioned it, when they mentioned the details of it or they, or I saw Brigadier Schoon's amnesty application where it was mentioned of a black person and a revolver, that's it.

MR VISSER: Was it then that it came to your mind that there must be two incidents?

MR COETZEE: That there was two incidents, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Yes, well we'll come to that. Mr Coetzee, I'm putting this to you merely because it was put to Brigadier Schoon, you have lied before under oath, have you not?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I have.


MR COETZEE: Yes, with the culture, in line with the security culture as I was brought up, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And not the least during your hearing, your Section 29 Hearing? You admitted this much in London, in your evidence in London.

MR COETZEE: Can you just refresh my memory because ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: There was an administrative inquiry ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, which Section 29 Hearing, we have two Section 29 ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Oh I see, yes of course. Section 29 of the Police Act.

I'm sorry Mr Coetzee, I didn't intend to confuse you. The hearing I'm referring to was, if I may call it, the "Police Inquiry" into your conduct.

MR COETZEE: Departmental hearing, yes.

MR VISSER: Departmental hearing. You lied there too didn't you?

MR COETZEE: If you can just refresh my memory, I ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Well didn't you lie about your diabetes condition, didn't you call Dr Marquard de Villiers to give evidence, didn't you mislead him and that Board?

MR COETZEE: No, not misleading, just exaggerating facts that could happen if you have an overdose of insulin, Mr Chairperson.


MR COETZEE: Because I was up against the same pompous clan that Mr Visser represented at the Harms Commission and who mislead the Harms Commission, the same lot was involved in my departmental trialy and was trying to get me out, dishonourably discharged, so I had to fight for my life according to the rules of the game.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, let's be civil about it and not refer to people as pompous clans etc., let's just ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: That's what they are, Mr Chairperson. How can you, eight years ago mislead the Honourable Judge and Chairperson by the nose? Through you, Mr Visser, they misled the whole Harms Commission disgracefully and now you're representing them here and now they are talking the truth and now I'm still lying.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, I'm not going to engage with you in an argument, just answer the questions please. In your manuscript at page 94, have you now finally decided and settled that this is the evidence in regard to the incident of the attempt on Mr Marius Schoon in Botswana, that you were involved in?

MR COETZEE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Alright. Let's take this step by step. You first of all start in the sub-sub-sub-paragraph to say:

"Schoon called me ..."

That's Brigadier Schoon.

"... called me one day and said I must report to Captains Rudi Crause and Jan Coetzee at Zeerust. He said that the mission would be to take out Marius Schoon, whom he said was a white ANC member in Botswana. Captains Crowse and Coetzee would brief me on the mission."

Now you've also told us today that this was during the middle of 1981, had you known Mr Joe Mamasela at the time?

MR COETZEE: Shortly after his attempt, more towards the end, August/September, I've met Mr Joe Mamasela. He was officially transferred to Vlakplaas with Captain Jan Coetzee on the 2nd of February 1982, a month after I've left but I did know of him.

MR VISSER: And in September to December, did he not according to your version, participate with you in the commission of various crimes?

MR COETZEE: The Mxenge murder, that's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Yes, and others.

MR COETZEE: Well, just refresh my memory please, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: When did you first meet Mr Mamasela?

MR COETZEE: Round about June/July/August 1981.

MR VISSER: Approximately the same time as that to which you are testifying in your manuscript, is it about that time?

MR COETZEE: If it's that time yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Well you're giving the evidence, I'm asking you.

MR COETZEE: Towards the second half of 1981, that's correct.

MR VISSER: June/July, is that the second half, alright.

MR COETZEE: Ja, we actually officially started with operations on the 13th September 1981 but it could have been a month or two earlier that I met him.

MR VISSER: Now you then go on to say this don't you? You say you:

"were ready to depart when Schoon called me to his office."

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now depart from where?

MR COETZEE: From headquarters, Mr Chairperson. My office was just opposite Brigadier Schoon's office in the passageway, one office to the right.

MR VISSER: Okay. Would the impression that one would get from that, that the calling in to send you and the calling back to the office to tell you that the operation has been called off, was not a long passage of time inbetween, would that be ...

MR COETZEE: Not very long, that's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: How would you remember it today, would it have been a matter of minutes or hours or what?

MR COETZEE: No, not minutes or hours, a few days I would say, a week.

MR VISSER: A few days?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Oh I see, so the picture is that you were told to go but you were not going to leave immediately?

MR COETZEE: No, I first had to get the necessary operational tools, Mr Chairperson, link up with or arrange meetings with Rudi Crause and Captain Jan Coetzee.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright. Now in sub-sub-sub-paragraph 4 of paragraph 5, you say for your mission:

"I was going to use a black briefcase that was fitted with a 9mm pistol and a silencer."

That is the same as you said here today?

MR COETZEE: That's 100% correct.

MR VISSER: Yes, and that it was prepared by Captain Wal du Toit of the Security Technical Division at head office - which was incidentally not put to him when he was giving evidence here in the London bomb incident but be that as it may, long before this mission. So what you're saying here is:

"the briefcase was prepared by Captain Wal du Toit of the Security Technical Division at head office long before this mission."

This mission referring to the attempt on Mr Marius Schoon?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Are those the facts, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I would have been wrong to get the impression from your evidence this morning, that after you got the instructions from Brigadier Schoon you went to Mr Wal du Toit and you asked him to provide you with a weapon, that would have been the wrong impression?

MR COETZEE: No, it would have been fairly right because that briefcase wasn't specially prepared for this specific operation, Mr Chairperson, it was prepared in general as operational tools of Security Branch headquarters. We also had for instance five HMK automatic arms with canvass bags catching up empty shells ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I didn't ask you about that, Mr Coetzee.

MR COETZEE: Well I'm just ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I'm not interested.

MR COETZEE: I just want to inform the Committee.

MR VISSER: Please let's stick to the questions. Was it directly after you received instructions from Brigadier Schoon, that you went to Wal du Toit to say I need a weapon?

MR COETZEE: Shortly thereafter, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Within that space of week, a few days to a week?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Because then I don't understand the rest of that sentence in your manuscript because it goes on to say:

"And it had been part of my arsenal for some time."

Surely meaning to say prior to this incident?

MR COETZEE: No, that is wrong, Mr Chairperson, it only became part of my arsenal during that time.

MR VISSER: I see. Now you remember that after you as you say, went into exile, you at Mauritius made a statement which has become known and referred to as the: "Mauritius Statement".

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now I'm not certain, Mr Chairman, because I don't know whether the Committee has ever received that full statement, the Mauritius Statement. I'm not going to refer to the whole of it.

ADV DE JAGER: I think you've referred to it down in Cape Town, Mr Jansen, isn't that correct?

MR JANSEN: Again subject to correction, as far as I know the entire statement, the handwritten statement was handed in at the Amnesty Hearings but I'm subject to correction and that it has been referred to subsequently.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, I would with your leave in cross-examining this witness, just refer to a few pages of which we have made photocopies, it's an extract from the Mauritius Statement. Let me immediately say that the typing will not be the same as the Mauritius Statement because obviously this is a print-out.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: ZZ, XX, ZZ. I think it's ZZ.

ADV DE JAGER: ...(inaudible) YY.

MR VISSER: YY, it may be YY. I thought we had a YY, Mr Chairman, I may be mistaken. I thought we had a YY.

My attorney has a list, Mr Chairman, perhaps he could help. Mr de Jager is correct, XX was the last, it's now YY.


MR VISSER: YY. This is YY.

CHAIRPERSON: Has your attorney got a list of all the exhibits up till now?

MR VISSER: I think he's been keeping up a list, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Could you make a copy available to my secretary who has been away for a couple of days ...(inaudible).

MR VISSER: He's nodding affirmatively, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, we have marked the page numbers, so we don't have to refer to the typed page numbers of Exhibit YY.

Now in the Mauritius Statement it transpired that you made reference to Mr Marius Schoon and I'm going to suggest to you, to the incident about which you are giving evidence here today, and you also made reference to Ruth First and Mrs Jeanette Schoon. Can I refer you - perhaps to keep the sequence right so that you know what we're talking about, page 2, the last paragraph, well perhaps a little before that, you're referring to Craig Williamson telling you about a letter-bomb and you say, you're asked by Mr Jacques Pauw:

"She was blown up by an envelope, an envelope from which a letter-bomb was made. Craig told me this personally."

I'm not going to read the rest of that, that's just to pick up the line. At the bottom you are asked by Jacques Pauw:

"What did he fix your attention on?"

COETZEE: On Ruth First's letter-bomb death."

And then you go on to say the body language etc., and I want you to turn over the page to page 3. Then the question is:

"Where did he tell you this"?

And your reply is this:

"Just remember Marius Schoon's wife was also involved. The one was brought to my attention by Craig on the morning of the incident or just after the incident. I had to go and beat up Schoon and his wife in Botswana according to the order given by Brigadier du Preez and then Johan Coetzee prevented it."

Now how do you explain those words?

MR COETZEE: To just read it in context, Mr Chairperson ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Just read it whichever way you like, you've got it in front of you.

MR COETZEE: Ja, I've read it, I understand it, I can't see what you can't understand of it.

MR VISSER: Well when were you - is this correct, to start with? Are you saying these words are correct?

MR COETZEE: Well Brigadier Schoon's name is not in here as Brigadier du Preez was the senior guy in the office present.

MR VISSER: Just tell me this, Mr Coetzee, are you saying this evidence is correct? While it was fresh in your memory in 1980, I'm sorry in 1990 when you were at Mauritius, you were under no pressure, you were sitting in Mauritius and you made a statement, are you saying that this evidence is correct or do you say it's wrong?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson, - Mr Visser, don't get carried away, this statement was made on Mauritius on my way into exile out of the country. I had just left my wife and kids behind in South Africa, not knowing when I'm going to see them again.

With no facts fresh in my memory or time to think

about facts fresh in my memory, the intention of the Mauritian stopover was to give Jacques Pauw at least the story as far as I could remember it at that stage before going on to the ANC because I didn't know what was going to happen with me once I meet with the ANC, because I was sure that they would also make a plan with me if it comes to the push. So this was the reason, but it wasn't done in an easy-chair, in comfort with my kids playing around, wife with me, proceeding on a holiday, it was just on my way out into exile and I can assure you it wasn't an experience that I want to have over again.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Coetzee, could you now tell us after you've told us about your wife staying in South Africa, was this the truth or not?

MR COETZEE: It was, Schoon's name is just not in here, Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: The rest is the truth?

MR COETZEE: The rest is the truth.

ADV DE JAGER: So your instructions were in fact to kill Marius and his wife?

MR COETZEE: No, it was just Marius.

ADV DE JAGER: No, you've just told me it's the truth.

MR COETZEE: Okay, this - I can't remember Marius' wife, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: But you remembered it then?

MR COETZEE: I said it then, yes.

MR VISSER: And what is quite clear from a reading of page 3 of your Mauritius Statement is that the instructions came from Brigadier du Preez:

"upon the order of Brigadier du Preez"

MR COETZEE: Through Brigadier Schoon. I received these from Brigadier Schoon and it's obvious, when Brigadier du Preez walked in to stop the operation, it was obvious that it was stopped from higher up where the original orders came from.

MR VISSER: Yes, but let's just go on.

"Wait, we'll get to that in a minute. Okay wait, I want to sort this thing out for you. -Why? And then Johan Coetzee prevented it."

And now you're going to give the reason as you saw it then.

MR COETZEE: This translation doesn't sound right.


"Then it came to light that he, Johan Coetzee and Craig were busy with the letter-bomb or a bomb operation on Ruth First in Lusaka."

Did you say that?

MR COETZEE: I did say that, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Yes, as the reason apparently why Johan Coetzee would have called off the operation of Mr Marius Schoon and Mrs Jeanette Schoon.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now where did you come to that evidence?

MR COETZEE: An assumption that I made which was proved correct in the end, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was proved correct in the end?


MR VISSER: It was proved absolutely incorrect.

MR COETZEE: It was ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: When was Ruth First killed, Mr Coetzee?

MR COETZEE: Ruth First killed?


MR COETZEE: In 1984, I think.

MR VISSER: But how could it ever have been a reason in 1981, middle of 1981, for Johan Coetzee calling off the mission on Mr Marius Schoon and/or his wife?

MR COETZEE: No, I don't understand you? How did he call - he called off the mission in 1981 on Marius Schoon, that's it.


"And then it would appear that he and Craig were busy with a letter-bomb or a bomb operation on Ruth First in Lusaka."

MR COETZEE: That was with hindsight, that's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Ja, and today you told this Committee that you think, you surmise that it was because Section A was busy with an operation and they feared that the operation which you were intending to undertake against Mr Marius Schoon would interfere with that, isn't that so?

MR COETZEE: Which proved correct, that's correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Well, that's your opinion.

MR COETZEE: That was what was said here in front of this Committee, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You know there's another interesting part of your evidence and it's not strictly relevant but I'm going to ask you about that anyway.

You know that in this present amnesty application session there is an application for amnesty by certain applicants for the death of Ruth First, you know that.

ADV DE JAGER: But didn't you gain this information from Brigadier Nick van Rensburg, about the envelope and the killing?

MR COETZEE: No, I think the next question is going to be the United Nations High Commission for Refugees envelope that I stole in Swaziland that was according to Nick van Rensburg, used by Mr Craig Williamson for the blowing up of Ruth First but if, I later learnt with or with hindsight I now think or know that it was another explosion that happened at the university and not for the Ruth First one, according to what I've read in the newspapers. But it was said by Nick van Rensburg, that it was used for an explosion by Section A.

MR VISSER: Alright, so in that regard you do admit that you were wrong. Let's go to page 4 of your Mauritius Statement. Mr de Jager has now just put the question to you which I was going to put to you because it seems that you heard this through the then Brigadier Nick van Rensburg etc., and it goes over the page to page 4 and the question is:

"Oh, that is the Major van Rensburg?" -

"Yes, naturally."

"It was said to him ..."

I think it must be "him".

"... that it was with such an envelope?"

And then the answer comes:

"With such an envelope, Ruth's."

Which you now say is wrong.

"And that was later, if I wasn't there yet, the incident was later confirmed to me by Craig and the Marius Schoon and Craig brought my attention to it, and I also know about her because I know that we were supposed to go and eliminate her and her husband in Botswana."

Is there anything wrong with what you said there?



The "her" there.

MR VISSER: And who was the "ons" that had to go and eliminate?

MR COETZEE: Well it was my - it was me and the team I would have made up. It would have been some white member or two that I would have taken with me for the operation.

MR VISSER: Now at page 5 there's a further reference to the Schoons. Top of the page.

"COETZEE: ..."

Oh, I'm sorry, I better read the previous page, that's 4, question:

"Oh, it is definitely Williamson and them?"

Referring to the Ruth First incident. And then you say this:

"COETZEE: Yes, but these words are more of application to Marius Schoon as far as I ..."

Then the question is:

"But it was also confirmed to you by Brigadier Nick van Rensburg?"

"COETZEE: The First story, that the letter-bomb of her ..."

You're interrupted, question:

"That it came from that envelope from the United Nations High Commission."

"COETZEE: That's it."

Now it's one thing to say today, Mr Coetzee. "I accept that I was wrong about the question of the envelope", but you see there's another aspect to this and Commissioner de Jager has already put this partly to you, and that is that you didn't hear, you heard all of this from Brigadier Nick van Rensburg, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: No, I heard of the death of Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon from Craig Williamson personally.

MR VISSER: Alright.

MR COETZEE: And the rest is as explained in this piece.

MR VISSER: What do the words at page 5, the second paragraph then mean? Did you make a mistake there?

MR COETZEE: It refers to the United Nations envelope that was used by Section A for an explosion at the University of Mozambique, but apparently it was not the Ruth First incident.

MR VISSER: I'm talking about what ...(intervention)

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, if I may interrupt. If my learned friend refers to the second paragraph on page 5, is he referring to the second paragraph quoting Mr Coetzee or is he quoting the second paragraph which is a question by Jacques Pauw?

MR VISSER: I believe my learned friend may be correct, Mr Chairman. Let me just read this.

CHAIRPERSON: It's wrong?

MR VISSER: Yes, it's a question, and I withdraw that question to you, Mr Coetzee, I was clearly wrong. Thank you to my learned friend.

And then it goes on:

"And the Schoon incident of Marius Schoon's wife."


"COETZEE: Look we were sent, we would work with Rudi Crause, Captain Rudi Crause from Zeerust and the others in Botswana." -

"Rudi Craus?"

"Rudi Craus or Crause, it will be in that book. You can look in that green book, Western Transvaal, Zeerust."

Now the obvious statement which I want to make to you is that Jan Coetzee is not mentioned here.

MR COETZEE: Jan Coetzee is not mentioned here. He was specifically involved or would have been involved, and he was also involved in the Botswana raid on the house of Joyce and Rola du Pale(?) in November that year. So Jan Coetzee was always involved in the Western Transvaal operations, but his name is not mentioned here, I agree.

MR VISSER: Thank you. You then in fact go on to the Joyce du Pale matter and then Mr Coetzee, I wish you to turn to page 7 where at the bottom of that page, you have now finished with Joyce du Pale and the question is:

"Okay. And the Marius Schoon thing."

"COETZEE: Just wait a minute. Oh yes, and then we were sent for the Marius Schoon thing, to go and give Marius Schoon a hiding."

MR COETZEE: And I don't mention his wife, that is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Then of course you don't mention his wife. Over the page:

"Who gave the orders?" -

"Schoon gave the order and Brigadier Jan called it off."

MR COETZEE: Exactly.

MR VISSER: Now that's in line with what you're now saying in your manuscript.

MR COETZEE: You see, Mr Chairperson, you must read my Mauritius thing in context, not line for line out of context. Here it comes in very clear that Schoon is not excluded, that I didn't wait 5 months and then brought his name in, his name was mentioned.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Coetzee, perhaps I should ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: So I would like you to read the whole Mauritius thing in context and then you might understand it better.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, let me make myself clear. I'm going to suggest to you that the incident about which you are testifying today took place some 17 years ago. I'm going to suggest to you that if there is any truth in what you told and what Doctor de Villiers told your departmental inquiry, that you could be forgiven if your memory on certain detail might be incorrect.

MR COETZEE: No, Mr ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Just give me an opportunity please.


MR VISSER: I'm also going to suggest to you, Mr Coetzee, that on what we have in front of us here, your amnesty application read together with your manuscript, read together with your Mauritius Statement, and if one looks at the amnesty application of Mr Willem Schoon one thing is clear or should be clear to the feeblest of minds, and that is that both those versions cannot possibly coexist with each other.

MR COETZEE: They do not coexist, it's two separate incidents, two completely separate incidents.

MR VISSER: Well then it doesn't solve our problem you see.

MR COETZEE: It does solve, Schoon is still lying like he did in 1989 before Judge Harms.

MR VISSER: That's your easy answer, Mr Coetzee.

MR COETZEE: That's why they all ran to you, 80 of them. First to General Johan van der Merwe and then to their advocate and their attorney who assisted them in the Harms Commission, Mr Wagener there next to you and your, and you, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you are entirely incorrect, I never appeared for them before the Harms Commission.

MR COETZEE: You did appear for the pompous clan in the Harms Commission or for their Minister.

MR VISSER: It doesn't matter, I said I wasn't going to argue with you, the record speaks for itself.

MR COETZEE: I agree, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The fact of the matter is it doesn't solve our problem ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: It solves the problem.

MR VISSER: Because those two incidents cannot, if they're two separate incidents, we still have the problem that you are involved in the same incident as Mr Schoon refers to and Mr Schoon is involved in the same incident that you refer to.

MR COETZEE: Not at all possible, not at all true. I'm 100% sure we're speaking of two complete different incidents, the one that I was not at first aware of even, later learnt of, and the one that I would have been involved in without Joe Mamasela and a .38 revolver of Brigadier Schoon, I don't shoot with revolvers.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Coetzee, with the exception of Rudi Crause, who would have accompanied you and would have assisted you with this operation?

MR COETZEE: I accepted that as with later events when we entered Botswana, it was Jan Coetzee from West Rand, that is Captain Jan Coetzee and Captain Rudi Crause, who upon a later occasion followed me until the border post where he showed the house to us, we did reconnaissance around the house and later on we went into the house alone and undertook the operation while they waited on the other side of the fence, Captain Coetzee and Crause.

ADV DE JAGER: So you relied on the fact that they were going to go and help you, you didn't involve anybody else in this plan?

MR COETZEE: No, I would only have used white guys from my group because it was a white area and a white guy that we would have to take out.

ADV DE JAGER: Who would you have taken along?

MR COETZEE: Someone to drive the vehicle such as Captain Vermeulen or Sergeant Louis Olivier or Warrant Officer van Dyk.

ADV DE JAGER: Well in this document it says:

"We were on our way, we were on our way to Rudie and them who were waiting, we wanted to go and give him a hiding. Then Brigadier Jan said the General said no. Later on it became clear to me that Johan Coetzee and Craig Williamson were already busy with planning for a letter-bomb story."

Just before we come to that, on page 7:

"Who was supposed to have done this?" -

"Well me and Koos Vermeulen and Paul van Dyk and whoever else in the group. We were on our way then they called it off."

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: So Paul van Dyk and Koos Vermeulen and you were on your way but then it was called off?

MR COETZEE: No, we weren't, we were still in Brigadier Schoon's office, we were about to leave. When I say we were on our way what I mean is we were ready to go.

ADV DE JAGER: So now you have Koos Vermeulen and Paul van Dyk?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I could have involved Paul van Dyk if we were going, if we were on our way. We couldn't leave because we were prevented from going before we did so. I was on my way, I was ready to go.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, so you already had them organised?

MR COETZEE: Most probably, yes, I can't say specifically.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Yes, and of course the rest of that page 10 is also relevant. I'm not going to go through it in detail, it speaks for itself, Mr Coetzee.

MR COETZEE: Ja, if you read it in context it does.

MR VISSER: Yes. Mr Coetzee, let's just investigate the theory that we're really talking about more than one incident here, two or more.

MR COETZEE: Two, only two.

MR VISSER: Only two, alright. Now let's just analyze this. You say Brigadier Schoon calls you to his office and he tells you to go the Western Transvaal, to Zeerust, to talk to Rudi Crause and Jan Coetzee where you will receive your instructions and he adds, if I understand your evidence correctly, that it concerns the elimination of Mr Marius Schoon, am I correct?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now you're either under way or you're not under way, I'm not entirely certain ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: It's clear that I was not yet moving but I was on my way.

MR VISSER: After a week you're not under way yet and you are now called and it's cancelled?

MR COETZEE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: In the meantime you've arranged with Koos Vermeulen and Paul van Dyk, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Most likely, yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: No, well you say so.


MR VISSER: And have you spoken to Rudi Crause and Jan Coetzee on the telephone?

MR COETZEE: I have spoken to them.

MR VISSER: And they know that they are now involved in an attempted murder on Mr Marius Schoon?

MR COETZEE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Would it surprise you - I suppose not you will say, but would it surprise you if they deny that they know anything about this?

MR COETZEE: Not at all after attending the Harms Commission and my departmental trial, no not. And seeing you acting for the 80 of them again, no, not at all, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Alright. Let me make ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: And there's an easy way out because Brigadier Schoon said a statement to the loss of the firearm was submitted by me, they've got access to the files in headquarters, get that statement and you'll see it's Jan Coetzee who signed it.

MR VISSER: Who is the person that has access to headquarters are you suggesting?

MR COETZEE: Your people, General Johan Coetzee, General van der Merwe, General, General, General, all the pompous clan.

MR VISSER: I see, alright. Well we'll ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, you say this statement about the lost weapon was signed by Jan Coetzee?

MR COETZEE: Schoon said something was submitted like that, so if it was then you will see, Mr Chairperson, if you draw that statement it will be Jan Coetzee's signature on it and not Dirk Coetzee's signature on it. So that's the easy way out, get that statement and you will clearly see we're talking about two incidents. Get Wal du Toit back and ask him about that specific piece of art that he made, a machine pistol built into a, it's not a thing that he made a hundred times, he will remember it. It's as easy as that.

MR VISSER: I just want to for the record, make it plain, I appear in these proceedings also for Mr Rudi Crause and Mr Jan Coetzee.

MR COETZEE: It doesn't surprise me at all, I expected them to be there.


MR COETZEE: It's been going on for eight years now, nine years.

MR VISSER: Their instruction is that they were not involved ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: And we're three-quarters to the truth. Hopefully after another nine years and another Truth Commission they will admit that too.

MR VISSER: Their instructions to me is that they were never involved in any attempt on the life of Mr Marius Schoon.

MR COETZEE: To use your words, it doesn't surprise me at all.

MR VISSER: Yes. We're going with the question of the two incidents theory and contrary to what might obviously be thinking, is that we are seriously considering whether there isn't some sort of truth in this.

MR COETZEE: Whether there isn't some sort of truth in it?


MR COETZEE: Like in 1990, then everything - Judge Harms was misled to the extreme that he talked, and I quote: "How must I believe this crap you're talking?", and today if we look at it, at all this nonsense, it's all true. Just they would not admit and say: "Give Dirk Coetzee what he deserves, what he said in 1989 from day one was the truth and that's it. Let's come out with the truth, let's make peace with our history and get on with our lives." That's it. What do you think is in it for me to sit here and ...(indistinct) day after day, coming to listen to your face, look into your face every time since 1990? I'm getting fedup with it, fedup. ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We are getting fedup with you continuing with a personal attack on Mr Visser.

MR COETZEE: But Mr Chairperson, it's been going ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We are not here to hear that.

MR COETZEE: It's going on for eight, nine years, I'm really, I'm ...

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, would you like a brief adjournment?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all. I'm the same, I'm Dirk Coetzee.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, I'm trying as best I can to make you understand that I'm trying to discuss with you how it can be possible that there might have been two or more incidents on the life of Mr Marius Schoon, which is what you're saying because it would make a lot of sense if we could just arrive at a point logically where we could say: "Yes, that's the answer". And I'm trying to put to you my difficulties in arriving there, Mr Coetzee. And if - please, for the record, and I'm going to argue this and I'm going to concede this, just as well as you might be confused as we already have an inkling about, having read this ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: In context ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Please just give me an opportunity. Just as well Brigadier Schoon might be confused today. We're talking about an incident which took place 17 years ago, Mr Coetzee. Please, nobody's memory is so perfect that he can't perhaps fail on memories ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: Mine is in this incident, it serves me well, I tell you. It doesn't fail me.

MR VISSER: Well I think we've illustrated that your memory isn't perfect.

MR COETZEE: No, you didn't ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: But that doesn't matter, we're not, I'm not attacking you, Mr Coetzee. Please let's just try to get on with this. I'm trying to discuss with you the possibility that there ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: Look at how that man is laughing next to you, Mr Wagener, shaking his head and laughing and making ... knowing I'm not happy with you - keep on laughing, Mr Wagener, keep on laughing.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, please just look past Mr Wagener at me please, if you don't mind.

Let's just knock this theory around. Brigadier Schoon calls you to the office, he says: "Marius Schoon, white man in the ANC in Botswana, go and take him out." He says you approach him and you say: "Listen here, I believe that I have the capacity to take out Marius Schoon." Now thusfar it really doesn't matter all that much, it is a conflict but it doesn't matter all that much, but now we come to the problem, he says to you: "Here's a .38 revolver", you say you went and you fetched the automatic firearm built into a briefcase from Wal du Toit. Please help me. If we assume two incidents, one in which you are certain that Brigadier Schoon gives you instructions and you use an automatic firearm build into a briefcase, the other scenario is where Brigadier Schoon is clear that he gives you instructions and he gives you a .38 special or not a special, .38 revolver. Can you please help us from your recollection, if they were two incidents how do we marry them with each other?

MR COETZEE: They are not to marry because they are two incidents, separate incidents, the one I was involved in, Mr Chairperson, and the other one Jan Coetzee and Joe Mamasela were involved in without my knowledge.

MR VISSER: Alright. So what you're saying is that Brigadier Schoon must be confusing you with Jan Coetzee?

MR COETZEE: That's what I say, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Alright, that's a feasible answer, but that doesn't solve the problem entirely because you remember that Brigadier Schoon was the one, as you sit here today, that gave you the instruction when you used the automatic firearm. You see if today you said: "Hang on, it might have been Jan du Preez", then the problem is solved because then we know exactly what happened here: Schoon confuses you with Jan du Preez, you confuse Schoon with Brigadier, I'm sorry, Jan Coetzee and you confuse Schoon with Jan du Preez. Which would logically, Mr Coetzee don't you agree, then present us with some sort of answer to this dilemma?

MR COETZEE: It's not a logic answer, I'm not confusing Brigadier Jan du Preez with Brigadier Schoon.

MR VISSER: Alright. Mr Chairman, would you allow me a moment, I believe I'm finished.

ADV DE JAGER: The automatic weapon which was in the briefcase which was to be used, under whose control was that?

MR COETZEE: After it was handed over to me it was under my control but while it was being manufactured it would be under the control of Wal du Toit, the head of the Technical Division.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you receive it from Wal or did you receive it at a certain stage from Schoon? Who gave you this weapon?

MR COETZEE: I obtained it from Wal du Toit personally.

ADV DE JAGER: And he would have received instructions from somebody to give it to you?

MR COETZEE: His head would have cleared it with my head, I'm sure of that or visa-versa.

ADV DE JAGER: I mean you couldn't give Wal du Toit instructions to hand things over to you, could you?

MR COETZEE: I could have if we were aware that it had been cleared up between the two divisional heads.

ADV DE JAGER: And who was his divisional head?

MR COETZEE: At first it was Colonel Koos Benade but he went on pension and then it was Adam Helberg, a Colonel I think or a Major Adam Helberg.

ADV DE JAGER: And when you were transferred, who did you give the control of this weapon to?

MR COETZEE: Captain Jan Coetzee from the Western Transvaal who took over from me on the 31st of December 1981. I might just mention perhaps, I don't know if this would assist you in any way, in a newspaper report later on I read that Nofamela often walked around with this briefcase and he was called Sipho and he said that there was an AK47 weapon or gun which had been built into the briefcase. So I think the thing might have ended up with him later on because remained on Vlakplaas for a long time after me.

ADV DE JAGER: Nofamela that is?


MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you have just referred once again to General Johan Coetzee, and if anybody had been wondering whether or not you like him, we definitely know today that it is definitely not so?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you have referred to the Joe Pillay matter?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: That's when you went into Swaziland to abduct somebody, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: No, that's not correct, I went into Swaziland - may I just sketch the background for you because I see that Brigadier has once again confused his facts completely?

MR VISSER: No, let's leave him out of it, I'm asking you?

MR COETZEE: I went into Swaziland, I didn't abduct anybody.

MR VISSER: What happened to Joe Pillay?

MR COETZEE: I was called in by Brigadier Schoon after I had done observation for a week in Swaziland on various ANC houses with my black people. On the evening while I was sleeping in my bed in Pretoria the Askaris got out of hand and Joe Pillay was abducted by them, they brought him over the fence back to Pretoria and somebody had assume the responsibility for it, and General Johan Coetzee's words were, with specific reference to this Pillay incident: "Success has many fathers, failure is an orphan." I had to take the rap even though Brigadier Schoon had called me in and I was in Pretoria upon his order and he had given the order, and that the Askaris had to remain in Swaziland on their own under Ermelo's control and I was simply ignored.

MR VISSER: And were you reprimanded regarding this Joe Pillay incident?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all, I was congratulated on the morning before they'd heard that it was actually a mess-up and later on in haste negotiations were entered into with the Swaziland Government and Joe Pillay was detained for approximately a month at a police station, I think it was actually 14 days, before he was taken over at night in the boot of a car to Swaziland.

MR VISSER: Coincidentally I know because I spoke to General Johan Coetzee about this incident by coincidence and he told me that this was the first step in the removal of you out of the Security Forces.

MR COETZEE: No, they don't take any accidents, somebody had to take blame. Actually they had to replace Brigadier Schoon because he had taken me away from my people but in General Coetzee's words: "Success has many fathers, failure is an orphan."

MR VISSER: Yes, and did he make enquiries from Brigadier Schoon and tell him that he thought that you should rather be placed in a position where you would be under observation or supervision and control?

MR COETZEE: That is a blatant lie, I was transferred to West Rand Security and Captain Jan Coetzee was transferred from Western Transvaal where I would have taken over his position and operated in Botswana. Jan Coetzee would have taken over at Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: All that I'm trying to say, Mr Coetzee is that General Johan Coetzee says that he would not have congratulated you with the Pillay incident which caused so much drama.

MR COETZEE: When it became known that Joe Pillay had been abducted, he said: "Well done, good work". And at 10 o'clock that morning the Swazi Government Police and Army confronted the Askaris and one Mozambican civilian where they attacked them with teargas and later on that afternoon it became known that Joe Pillay's abduction had been a failure. However I would expect that from General Coetzee because he is a liar.

MR VISSER: Yes, and you are the one telling the truth?

MR COETZEE: From 1989 already, yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: No further questions, thank you.


ADV DE JAGER: Before we go the Narcotics Bureau, when you went to the West Rand because of your health problems you got an appointment at Narcotics?

MR COETZEE: Yes, because of my son's diabetes.

ADV DE JAGER: And this was here in Pretoria?

MR COETZEE: Yes, it was in Pretoria.

ADV DE JAGER: And where was your office then?

MR COETZEE: It was by the old Bantu Commissioner's offices next to Paul Kruger's house, right opposite President Building in Church Street.

ADV DE JAGER: So you were not together with the security guys in the same building?

MR COETZEE: No, no, Mr Chairperson, no.

ADV DE JAGER: And General Coetzee, was he with the security guys in the same building?

MR COETZEE: He was but shortly after that he became Commissioner but he was, our offices were on the same floor, I think I was about the fourth office away from him, Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: And that was now in 1980/81?

MR COETZEE: '80/'81, that's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I have been requested to take a short adjournment at three thirty, it's almost that now so we will take an adjournment for a few minutes.




CHAIRPERSON: Mr Levine, are you ready to take on? Mr Visser had finished, hadn't he? Yes.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: Mr Coetzee, as far as you knew of Mr Williamson, was he a good officer?

MR COETZEE: A very good officer.

MR LEVINE: Did he obey orders?

MR COETZEE: He did, Mr Chairman, to the point.

MR LEVINE: And did he follow the line of command?

MR COETZEE: He did, Mr Chairperson, as far as I know.

MR LEVINE: And did you follow the line of command?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I did, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: And of course you subscribed to the principle of need-to-know?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: You said that you were happy, or rather you said that Mr Williamson was happy after the operations against Ruth First in the same as all of you as officers were happy after operations with which you were involved in were successful.

MR COETZEE: That was absolutely normal, Mr Chairperson, yes.

MR LEVINE: And were you happy at the time that operations in which you were involved had been successfully carried out?

MR COETZEE: I beg your pardon, Mr Chairperson?

MR LEVINE: At the time, were you happy that operations, when operations in which you were involved had been successfully carried out?

MR COETZEE: Not all of them, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: And I take it that you have different thoughts and viewpoints now than what you had some 15 years ago?

MR COETZEE: Absolutely, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: And did you - I think you said you did consult certainly with Mr Berger and his attorney prior to the hearings that started in September.

MR COETZEE: On two occasions, that's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: Yes. Now ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Did you have consultations on two occasions prior to September?

MR COETZEE: Oh shucks, I'm not sure which dates it was, maybe they will be able to assist me but it was in past ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Because I had an understanding and I may be wrong, I'm trying to clear my mind, I thought you had one recently before this December hearing.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, last week, Mr Chairperson and the other one a few weeks before that. I can't remember exactly, Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: So one might have been prior to September and one was prior to December?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson, prior to this meeting.

ADV DE JAGER: November you said ...(inaudible)

MR LEVINE: It's quite in order.

Mr Coetzee, in your earlier meeting, do you recollect having discussed the Ruth First incident with Mr Berger and his attorney?

MR COETZEE: In the recent meeting?

MR LEVINE: In the previous meeting.

MR COETZEE: Yes, we did.

MR LEVINE: In the first meeting?

MR COETZEE: I can't remember, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: If you can't remember it's unfortunate and we'll get on. I don't want you to speculate or to say anything that you cannot remember.

MR COETZEE: If you just give me time, they made notes, no I have, I have.

MR LEVINE: You have.

MR COETZEE: I have, that's right, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: And did you discuss in the same vein the Schoon operation with Mr Berger and his attorney?

MR COETZEE: I did in the last meeting last week. If my memory serves me right, after the meeting broke up kind of we had a discussion on ...(intervention)

MR LEVINE: And not prior to then, in September?

MR COETZEE: Not - no, no, I did.

MR LEVINE: You did?

MR COETZEE: I did, yes.

MR LEVINE: You see my recollection is that whereas the First issue, that is the Ruth First issue was squarely put to Mr Williamson in cross-examination, no similar issue in regard to the Schoons was put to him in respect of what it is alleged was discussed with you.

MR COETZEE: I don't understand 100% the question, sorry.

MR LEVINE: The corridor discussion in regard to Ruth First was put to Mr Williamson, there was no similar discussion in regard to Schoon, Mrs Schoon and Katryn which was also put to him insofar as it related to


MR COETZEE: I accept that, I wasn't here, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: Yes. It's merely an observation. Now insofar as Mxenge was concerned, did you perhaps not put to Mr Williamson in the language in which you conversed, the fact of what took place with Mxenge rather than Mr Williamson putting it to you?

MR COETZEE: No, it was him putting it to me just saying congratulations on the good job and I just asked: "What do you mean?" and he just walked on and laughed, looked over his shoulder and looked back and he laughed and I knew that he was referring to ...(intervention)

MR LEVINE: You knew in your manner of speaking what you believed he was getting at?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: I am instructed that in fact there was some discussion with you, between you and Mr Williamson about the motor vehicle involved, having been sent either to Mozambique or to Swaziland where it had been burnt out.

MR COETZEE: The motor vehicle was burnt next to the Swazi border that same night or two, three nights after the murder but I can't remember discussing that with Mr Williamson, I can't remember that, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: Well you don't dispute it, you just cannot remember it?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: Yes. And you acted as you've already said, on a need-to-know basis, was Mr Williamson the same?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: And as far as you were concerned he was an exemplary officer who followed instructions from his superior officers?

MR COETZEE: Absolutely, Mr Chairperson.

MR LEVINE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: But you thought he was a dishonest man?

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, with the greatest of respect, he never said that he was dishonest man, certainly not in respect of that time.

CHAIRPERSON: In his manuscript he accuses Mr Williamson of theft, of abusing money.

MR JANSEN: Yes, but then just with - with the greatest of respect, Mr Chairman, just put the question in its factual context.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you regard him as a dishonest man who had stolen money from the International University Fund?

MR COETZEE: With hindsight and speaking I did, yes, but not whilst in the security setup and him doing the job for the security, no, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And him using security funds to build a yacht?

MR COETZEE: Ja, that's common purpose in the security sort of family but ...(intervention)


MR COETZEE: Yes, now with hindsight, yes, Mr Chairperson, but not during those days of course.

CHAIRPERSON: But during those days you knew him and Mr Casselton very well.


CHAIRPERSON: And it's then that you found out about it, isn't it?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That's what you said in your manuscript.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you did know in those days?

MR COETZEE: I did yes, Mr Chairperson.



Mr Coetzee, you and I have never really crossed swords in a public forum where these things were discusses.

MR COETZEE: No, we haven't.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you know for whom I'm appearing on behalf of?

MR COETZEE: No, I don't have an idea.

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm appearing on behalv of a very wide variety of Security Policeman, among others Mr Britz and I have appeared for Brigadier Jack Cronje, for Hechter, for Paul van Vuuren and for a variety of other persons and in these proceedings I'm appearing for Jerry Raven. Do you know any of these people?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I know Jerry Raven and Jack Cronje.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Coetzee, I don't think that there can be any dispute regarding the things that you were involved in and what you are applying for amnesty for.

MR COETZEE: No, I don't believe that there is.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. You've already been granted amnesty for the Mxenge murder, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, only for that murder.

MR DU PLESSIS: And with the result that the Amnesty Committee which heard your application has already found that with regard to that operation you acted with a political motive.

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Where do you work nowadays?

MR COETZEE: At the National Intelligence Agency.

MR DU PLESSIS: And for how long were you in the Security Police, how many years?

MR COETZEE: In the Security Police I served from January '77 to December 1981.

MR DU PLESSIS: Okay. Let's just discuss that. Most people here know the history but I'm not very familiar with it. In 1977, where did you go?

MR COETZEE: To the Narcotics Bureau in Pretoria Central.

MR DU PLESSIS: And after that?

MR COETZEE: In August 1981 or 1982 at least, I went to head office for approximately a year and four months after which in December 1983, no, yes, it was December 1983, I went to Division West Transvaal. I was transferred there on the staff of Brigadier Dirk van Lill in West Transvaal, until June 1984 when I was transferred to Radio Control as a service officer and then in December 1984 I was dispelled due to misconduct or at least I had been part of conduct which was not appropriate for my rank and then after a long stretched out trial and proceedings I was discharged from the police on pension in 1986.

MR DU PLESSIS: In other words the reason why you left the Police Force had nothing to do with your actions during your time in the Security Police?

MR COETZEE: No, it didn't. My medical council was under way when it was stopped in 1984, due to the departmental trial.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Coetzee, you testified that you knew the Security Police culture and the way in which they conducted themselves and everything surrounding that.

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you were also aware of the, should I say fanatical manner in which the Security Police were motivated to fight against communism and against the liberation movements.

MR COETZEE: It was more than that, it was fanatical and even worse.

MR DU PLESSIS: And everyone who was in that system believed it as if their lives depended on it, they believed in this struggle against the liberation movements and the communist onslaught.

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct, they believed it and they worked 24 hours a day at it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and that would include yourself?


MR DU PLESSIS: And you had no reason to believe that it should have changed from 1989 right through?

MR COETZEE: No, it wouldn't have changed.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if I were to put it to you with regard to the death of Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon and Katryn Schoon, your evidence and the evidence of the applicants, they genuinely believed that what they were doing they did to support this battle of theirs. Would you in yourself have any reason to doubt this?


MR DU PLESSIS: Would have thought that it fitted into the culture which these people were part of?

MR COETZEE: Yes, it fitted in 100% with this culture.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you wouldn't have found it strange that they saw Ruth First as an objective?

MR COETZEE: No, under no circumstances.

MR DU PLESSIS: You wouldn't find it strange at all?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you know anything about Jeanette Schoon?

MR COETZEE: No, I didn't know anything about her then, I only heard later that she had passed away.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you have found it strange that she was regarded as an objective or her husband?

MR COETZEE: No, I wouldn't have. We had the unfortunate attitude that if a child were to be injured in the crossfire - unfortunately in Swaziland I was involved in such an incident where a 10 year old child died in a bomb explosion, that would be regarded as merely part of the whole story. That was unfortunately the approach which we adopted.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that it is how it was regarded by the Security Forces?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct, that is how it was regarded.

MR DU PLESSIS: If it were to happen in a situation it would be something that would happen as part of a warfare situation?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the same approach existed on the other side?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: If we just take the Church Street bombing for example?

MR COETZEE: Yes, it was give and take.

MR DU PLESSIS: The objective of the Church Street bomb was a military objective but if civilians were to be injured then unfortunately that would be part of it all?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Your own view of the struggle which was under way, this was 1981 when you left and that was still very much at the beginning of the very serious phase, would you agree with the description of other applicants who have appeared before the Amnesty Committee, that it in actuality was a war situation?

MR COETZEE: Yes, it was a war. I always quote Major Williamson, where he very clearly expresses it in an article called "Why Spy" and he says that war is a situation of give and take and everything goes through as legal.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you have contact with anybody in the police who expressed criticism regarding the death of Jeanette Schoon and her daughter and Ruth First?

MR COETZEE: No, never, up until now in the newspaper reports of General Johan Coetzee which I found rather strange.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I'd just like to tell you and I wanted to tell you this at the beginning, I'm only appearing for one General and that would be Martiens Ras, I'm not appearing for any other Generals. Just to clarify my situation in these proceedings.

Very well. Mr Coetzee, and part of this culture was also if one had knowledge of determined actions to cover it up?

MR COETZEE: Yes, to cover it up and one would be isolated. After one left that situation there would be no way to make it public and that is why I left the country but coverup was number one, it was at the order of the day.

MR DU PLESSIS: And much has been said about the so-called need-to-know principle, do you know anything about that?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I do know about it.

MR DU PLESSIS: How was it applied according to you?

MR COETZEE: There was a formation, a chain formation with links in it, General Lothar Neethling would have been the poison link in the chain and I myself would have been the so-called hit-man, the hit-man link in the need-to-know chain. So in that way the one hand wouldn't know what the other was doing. That was in order to protect individuals as well as information.

MR DU PLESSIS: So if there were to be evidence before the Committee regarding that need-to-know principle by, among others, Mr Raven, who testified that it was not even necessary for him to know who these letter-bombs that he was manufacturing were aimed at, you wouldn't find it strange?

MR COETZEE: No, I wouldn't find it strange because it wouldn't have had anything to do with him for who it was being manufactured.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you have regarded that as normal behaviour in the Security Police?

MR COETZEE: Yes, the fact that the one hand wouldn't know what the other one was doing was normal.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Coetzee, let me understand your evidence correctly. How do you connect Mr Williamson, or how did you connect Mr Williamson to the Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon incidents, could you please explain?

MR COETZEE: It was a very close knit family where there was a special culture and a way of speaking and a way of communicating, where one word would speak volumes. For example as he had said to me with the Mxenge incident he had seen something in that environment, in the Durban environment, he knew that Dirk Coetzee and his people were in that environment and then he would know it could only be the work of one person and upon my return he would say: "Congratulations, good work", and he would walk on and he would know and I would know what the situation was. In a similar case with the Ruth First incident he simply enquired with words such as: "Did you hear?" and I would answer him: "Yes, I knew it was you you bugger" and then he would have laughed and walked on.

So there was a certain method communication which made use of very few words and these few words would speak volumes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the Ruth First incident?

MR COETZEE: Also similar. There would be no discussion with me with regard to how a package bomb had been made. What I heard on the news and that which he merely just mm and ah, would be sufficient for me to know what was going on.

MR DU PLESSIS: So in other words there was a discussion between the two of you, is that what you're saying?

MR COETZEE: No, just very brief and body language as a method of communication instead of words.

MR DU PLESSIS: But Ruth First you say that there was in fact an exchange of words?

MR COETZEE: But in all cases it would have been something like - I can't remember the exact wording, it would have been something like: "Have you heard?" or "Have you seen?" and my answer to that and his attitude which followed that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Are you saying that there were words in both cases, with Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon?

MR COETZEE: Very brief, "Have you heard?" and I would have answered for example: "I knew it was you you bugger" and then we would just walk on. Then the entire incident would have been discussed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you confirm the correctness of Exhibit YY?

MR COETZEE: Which one is that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's the document which was submitted, the Mauritius document and at the back there are two pages of the London evidence.

MR COETZEE: Yes, in context. If one reads it in context of what happened on that day, that period, my frame of mind, my family situation, yes, then I would confirm the correctness, within that context.

MR DU PLESSIS: You testified during your evidence in chief when Mr Berger was questioning you, you did not testify that any words were exchanged between you and Mr Williamson with regard to the Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon incidents. That evidence of your only emerged after this document was presented to you.

MR COETZEE: I accepted that it wasn't necessary, I read in the papers that Mr Williamson had admitted we discussed it. My legal representative informed me of this.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, with respect, the proposition that was put to Mr Coetzee now is not correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman, I made my notes 100%. I'm 100% sure of my notes in respect of that and ...(intervention)

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, if I may come in here. My recollection is the following and I may say, I may be saying this because I've heard this version so many times but I think I can sincerely say that I actually heard it here today again and that was that that was a passage talk, Mr Coetzee was at security headquarters for something although he wasn't stationed there at that stage he went in there for some or other report or something and that's where the Ruth First little passage discussion took place.

Then at a later stage in reference to the Schoon incident, the Jeanette and Katryn Schoon incident, he was at the house, at the residence of Mr Williamson, and that is also again where a short discussion took place, and that's the one that he describes in his manuscript as being glibly saying something or something to that effect.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I must say I was mistaken in respect of the Ruth First incident there was evidence that the words were said: "Have you heard?". In respect of the Schoon incident there was no evidence that there were any words spoken.

MR BERGER: My learned friend is wrong again.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chair, I will leave that point if I'm not 100% sure and I'm told that I am wrong then I will leave the point.

Mr Coetzee, with regard to your evidence regarding Brigadier Goosen and General Coetzee, do you think that Brigadier Goosen would have issued such an order? I understand your evidence that it is not probable.

MR COETZEE: I don't believe so, it's possible but I don't believe so.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, but if Brigadier Goosen had received an order like that from somebody else you wouldn't have found it strange that he would give this order to Major Williamson?

MR COETZEE: No, I wouldn't have found that strange, that would have been the normal procedure.

MR DU PLESSIS: And such an order did not necessarily have to come from General Coetzee, it could have come from somebody else?

MR COETZEE: All senior officers in the head office was du Preez and Coetzee and it could only have come from one of those people.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well if you had to follow the line function, we've heard a lot of evidence that the line function wasn't always followed with regard to orders. In other words, I'm putting it to you that this order may have come from somebody else other than Brigadier Goosen.

MR COETZEE: With the knowledge that I have of Major Williamson and Brigadier Piet Goosen, my personal experience and friendship with them, I don't really think that they would have received it from somebody else but it is possible.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well if the order had come directly from the Minister? Let's just work at the proposition.

MR COETZEE: Then under normal circumstances - I wouldn't say it isn't like that, but under normal circumstances it would have gone through the Police Commissioner to General Johan Coetzee, to Brigadier Piet Goosen ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, we know what the normal circumstances were but what I'm asking you is whether Brigadier Piet Goosen, if he had received such an order from the Minister or the Deputy Minister, you wouldn't have found that strange, that he had carried out such an order?

MR COETZEE: If he had received it and carried it out, no.

MR DU PLESSIS: But you don't have any personal knowledge whether he received an order from anybody higher?

MR COETZEE: No, I don't know.

MR DU PLESSIS: You cannot give any evidence?

MR COETZEE: No, I can't.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr du Plessis, I found the notes. I think in both cases, the one was in the home of Mr Williamson where he spoke of the Schoon incident and the other one was in a passage. So in both cases he mentioned that there was a conversation of gestures.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then I apologise if I created the wrong perception, I apologise.

MR COETZEE: It's fine.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Coetzee, what I will ultimately argue in this case and I might as well put it to you because you have testified and you have knowledge of these persons, I will argue that there is a very good possibility or probability that an order was given by somebody high up directly to Brigadier Goosen.

MR COETZEE: That would be more probable.

MR DU PLESSIS: To act in both cases?

MR COETZEE: That would be more probable, Mr Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: You would also not have found it strange if Brigadier Goosen had been involved in something like this, he was involved in the Biko incident, he was involved with Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon incident, you wouldn't have found that strange?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all, especially if the order had come from above.

MR DU PLESSIS: He was the type of guy that would have done something like this?

MR COETZEE: Well he had to monitor it, that would have been part of his daily task or his weekly task or monthly task.

MR DU PLESSIS: And between the two, between him and General Coetzee, would you not have thought that Brigadier Goosen would have been a better candidate for such an operation than General Coetzee? Would General Coetzee not have hesitated with something like this?

MR COETZEE: No, he wouldn't have carried it out, he would have handed it over to the bottom levels. With the London bombing incident as well in which he was involved I assume, he would have been involved with the orders but not with the actual execution of that order.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but let me put it to you like this. Would you say that Brigadier Goosen would have been much more willing to participate in such an operation than General Coetzee?

MR COETZEE: I wouldn't say that, I didn't really know General Coetzee in his young days but it would have enjoyed his absolute approval. Brigadier Goosen would have invested more enthusiasm and a desire to please the boss and General Coetzee would have sat back and waited for the results.

MR DU PLESSIS: So you don't find it strange at all that Major Williamson executed Brigadier Goosen's orders?

MR COETZEE: Not at all, that is how it worked.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the same goes for Mr Raven?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now Mr Coetzee, when you put this discussion, Exhibit YY on tape, did you ever discuss the Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon incidents with anybody else after that?

MR COETZEE: Yes, with thousands of journalists, legal representatives and people worldwide over the years.

MR DU PLESSIS: Before this interview with Jacques Pauw in Mauritius?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is this the first time that you spoke to a journalist?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that was the first time that I spoke with a journalist. In 1986 I did speak to Melvin Walsh in very flat and superficial terms regarding our work, without any specific mention to incidents or names.

MR DU PLESSIS: And between the time that you had the contact with Mr Williamson and your discussion with Jacques Pauw in Mauritius, did you speak to anybody else in the Security Police with regard to the two incidents, Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon?

MR COETZEE: No, not after I left. With people and individuals, yes, I did discuss it.

MR DU PLESSIS: You did not discuss it?

MR COETZEE: No, I did discuss it with various - do you mean after I left the country? Oh, before then?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, let's just get the time period here. Until 1984 you had to do with Mr Williamson on two separate occasions in which he indicated to you in very few words that he had been involved in the Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon incidents and then we have the date of the Mauritius interview, I don't know when that was.

MR COETZEE: That was in November 1989.

MR DU PLESSIS: Between 1984 and 1989 did you speak to anybody in the Security Police regarding those two incidents?

MR COETZEE: No, not as far as I can remember.

MR DU PLESSIS: Could you explain to us how you knew - Mr Chairman, if you'll just bear with me please.

How did you know - or let me put it to you like this, on the first page of Exhibit YY reference is made to an envelope which was stolen from the United Nations Offices, do you see that? It's the fourth sentence from the bottom.


MR DU PLESSIS: That's the envelope with which Ruth First was blown up, that is what you are referring to, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now when did you find out about this envelope?

MR COETZEE: I myself stole it in 19, I think it was late in the '70's when I broken into the United Nations High Commission for Refugees offices in Swaziland, I stole cassettes, files, typewriters, many things which I carried out of there.

MR DU PLESSIS: So are you saying that that's where the envelope came from?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct. Brigadier later told me and I later heard that she was not specifically blown up with this envelope but that it was another explosion which had taken place in Maputo, for which one of these envelopes had been used.

MR DU PLESSIS: In other words, the envelope which is mentioned here on page 1 is actually not the envelope which you are talking about on page 2, with regard to Ruth First?

MR COETZEE: No, apparently not. Craig Williamson could be a bit more specific regarding this.

MR DU PLESSIS: When did you speak to Brigadier van Rensburg regarding this specific incident?

MR COETZEE: During the years we hadn't had contact again. It was up to and until 1981, perhaps a year or so after that as well.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but do I understand you correctly, what did you discuss with Brigadier van Rensburg?

MR COETZEE: I can't remember. We were very good friends. He was the head of the Eastern Transvaal, Ermelo Branch, the Security Branch and worked in Swaziland regularly and visited me at my home and stayed over there. I would go with him to Swaziland. We were much more than just colleagues.

MR DU PLESSIS: But if you'll just page to page 5. There you say, the third sentence:

"The First story, the letter-bomb for her, that it came from that envelope from the United Nations High Commission."

And then you:

"That's correct."

And just before that is the question:

"But it was also confirmed to you by Nick van Rensburg?"

MR COETZEE: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now I don't understand your evidence because it says that Brigadier Nick van Rensburg told you that the envelope came from the United Nations High Commission, the envelope that had been used in the first incident.

MR COETZEE: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but as I understood your evidence a moment ago it was not the envelope which Brigadier Nick van Rensburg had discussed with you until 1981 which you stole from the United Nations High Commission, it was actually another envelope?

MR COETZEE: No, it was only up until recently, during the '90's when Colonel Williamson began to talk about it. He said that my story wasn't right regarding that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Mr Coetzee, and then did I understand you correctly regarding that which you have given evidence about today, you discussed this with Mr Berger before today, last week, before today's evidence and also before the previous hearing or before the commencement of the hearing in August.

MR COETZEE: I cannot say specifically when the previous time was. I didn't keep up with the hearing dates. I can't remember whether or not the hearing had already started.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, there's Mr Berger, we could ask him?

MR COETZEE: Well that's up to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may we enquire from Mr Berger when that happened?

CHAIRPERSON: He's not a witness.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, but certainly he has a duty, Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Mr Chairman, without testifying, the date I have is the 29th of August 1998.

MR DU PLESSIS: I think, Mr Chairman just for the record, that was before the hearing started previously.

Mr Coetzee, you discussed your evidence here today before?

MR COETZEE: Yes, as far as I can remember that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: If you could explain to us please why your evidence today was not put to any of the other witnesses during these hearings?

MR COETZEE: I can't say, I wasn't present.

MR DU PLESSIS: And I'm making the point, Mr Coetzee, and this is for the purposes of the record, that I will ultimately argue that this is an essential aspect of these hearings, that certain things have not been put and that I find it strange that your version was not put.

MR COETZEE: I would accept that, I can't comment regarding that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, just bear with me, my attorney thinks that I have left something out.

Mr Coetzee, ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Chairperson, my learned friend has asked questions, has asked me to give certain evidence about when a meeting took place and he's now asked Mr Coetzee about why certain things weren't put to certain witnesses. I don't know if it's my duty now to place on record what things were discussed and what things were not discussed during my consultation with Mr Coetzee. It was a short - well, I don't want to give evidence but the difficulty that I'm, the difficult position that I'm now in is that my learned friend has asked me to give some information ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Would counsel like a few minutes adjournment for them to discuss this amongst themselves, if there is evidence or information that can be supplied? You don't really want ...(inaudible)

ADV DE JAGER: I think there's a difference about asking about the date of a consultation and asking about the contents of a consultation. So I don't think you've given evidence about a date, you confirmed an objective fact, it wasn't the contents of a consultation. I don't know what the relationship between you and Mr Coetzee was, if it's a consultation between an attorney or counsel and I don't know whether you considered him a client or what it was and what the position in that connection would be.

MR BERGER: No, Advocate de Jager, he was represented by an attorney at that consultation and he was not being interviewed as my client.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just place on record that the reason why I'm making this point has got nothing to do with Mr Berger or Mr Bizos or anything with them. I have to make this point as is the usual practice in respect of this kind of thing, so that I am able to argue at the end of the day the relevance of this whole issue. And I want to stress that Mr Chairman, in the light of what happened yesterday for instance. It has got nothing to do with Mr Berger or Mr Bizos at all. I stress that Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Chairperson ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: Now in respect of this, Mr Chairman, if Mr Berger doesn't agree with the evidence of Mr Coetzee, that what he testified here was told to Mr Berger, Mr Chairman, then there is a disputer fact between Mr Berger and Mr Coetzee and then Mr Berger must deal with that the way he deems fit, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: The problem is as I understand it, you're raising the question why something wasn't put. Well it's not Mr Berger's client, Mr Berger is not obliged to put it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well that is something that we will have to argue, I realise that, Mr Chairman, and that is something that we will have to address in argument. But Mr Chairman, if Mr Berger wants to place that on record before the Committee, Mr Chairman, in my view that is not something that can happen from the bar.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, my learned friend doesn't want the information, I'm not going to give the information and I never understood that he was attacking me in any particular way, but just in all fairness to Mr Coetzee if anything is going to be argued as an inference from him then perhaps my learned friend needs to ask me some questions.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, may I also just completeness lest some accusation be thrown at me at some stage or at Mr Coetzee, just say that as far as my approach to cross-examination in this entire hearing right from the start has been that I placed in dispute issues for which the notice was issued relating to the Marius Schoon incident and I got involved in the squabbles relating to those factual disputes and nothing else.

I mean there are obviously a myriad of factual disputes relating to General Coetzee, some relating to hearsay and other incidents, there are a myriad of other disputes between Brigadier Schoon and Mr Coetzee. And for what it's worth I assume that you would agree with me on that basis, that I simply did not touch on any of those issues and simply didn't make statements in that regard.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, my contribution is merely to say that I have nothing to do with this little dispute.

CHAIRPERSON: That's very wise.


MR BIZOS: ... about this, Mr Chairman. One of the reasons why one asks a witness why are you saying so when something was not put, is in order to suggest to the witness that he has recently introduced this evidence and didn't speak about it before. That is negative in this case, Mr Chairman, by the document which was put in and the document which was referred to as his story long before these matters were ... the manuscript and also what was put in this morning in Exhibit YY. So that we are concerned with the witness now, Mr Chairman, can we proceed on the basis that there is no suggestion that the witness has recently fabricated anything because he is on record in two documents as having said substantially the same thing? We can look after ourselves in argument with whatever my learned friend wants to argue, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I'm not going to argue this issue. I may just say this one thing, Mr Chairman, and that is that it influences the weight of Mr Coetzee's evidence if Mr Williamson for instance or my client was not presented with a certain version and didn't have the chance of answering that version in evidence. That's the reason why things are put, but that is for argument, Mr Chairman.

Now Mr Chairman, I have one further question which my attorney has drawn my attention to, if I'm allowed please.

Mr Coetzee, you testified that you believed that Mr Williamson amongst others acted in the furthering of the struggle and like you, in the case where you apply for amnesty, acted with a political motive.

MR COETZEE: Of course, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: You don't have a problem with that?

MR COETZEE: No, I don't have any problem.

MR DU PLESSIS: And are you aware of any facts or reasons in terms of which any allegations can be made that Mr Williamson or Mr Raven acted with any personal motive or ill-will, if I can use the English words, ill-will or malice against Ruth First or Jeanette Schoon?

MR COETZEE: No, it would not have happened if they would have acted in their personal capacities, it was done for the State, for the police, for the government of the day, Mr Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.


MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chairman, Cornelius for McPherson, I'm known for my brevity. I've got four questions for Mr Coetzee.

Mr Coetzee, is it true that in covert actions or operations nothing would be put in writing?

MR COETZEE: That is 100% correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And it would be dangerous to write memorandums if it was an illegal operation, especially if it was outside the country?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is true.

MR CORNELIUS: And there would be a memorandum to get certain financing for the informants etc., they had to write a memorandum for that in order to satisfy the Auditor-General?

MR COETZEE: A very short memorandum and it wouldn't be a long story.

MR CORNELIUS: But usually that memorandum would differ in that it would be a cover story just in order to get the finance?

MR COETZEE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Do you have personal knowledge that only the Commissioner could give or could approve of 20 000 and more?

MR COETZEE: No, I do not know. I only know that Louis Koekemoer dealt with the finance and that he had to get authorization for it. I never asked for or requested such big amounts of money.

MR CORNELIUS: Do you know McPherson?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I do.

MR CORNELIUS: Would you find it strange if he decided to bomb the Lusaka offices himself or to injure Joe Slovo?

MR COETZEE: No, I do not think it is possible, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Would you accept that he acted on instructions?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I would accept that.

MR CORNELIUS: That is a reasonably big international operation with certain repercussions?

MR COETZEE: Yes, it would probably need a lot of finance as well.

MR CORNELIUS: I've depleted my time, thank you, Mr Chairman.


MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, before re-examination, with your indulgence may I ask Mr Coetzee a further question?

Thank you.

Mr Coetzee, I'm informed that in the break which we took a little while ago you made a death threat to my attorney and myself, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: I was absolutely furious and I did say: "It looks in the end that the only way out is shooting, bullets flying" because things just never come to an end. Human beings can't talk the truth, can't, I didn't say I'll shoot you as a person.

MR JANSEN: Ag Mr Chairman, with the greatest of respect, there was a certain amount of animosity going on here, it was said in jest. No reasonable person can possibly have interpreted that as being serious. He said: "It's better I don't speak to you people because you don't listen. I think it's just better we all shoot each other", something to that effect. It was clearly a joke.

MR DU PLESSIS: I unfortunately was a witness to it, he in fact said: "If I had a gun I would have shot you", there was no threat mode, Mr Chairman.

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, may I just say that I want to apologise for my behaviour in front of the Commission and to Mr Visser and to Mr Wagener, I just hooked out and I'm sorry for that unconditionally.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

MR JANSEN: I have no re-examination, thank you, Mr Chairman.


MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, you have been so quiet.


Mr Coetzee, I'll be very brief with you. When Brigadier Schoon instructed you to get involved in the attempt on ...(intervention)


MS PATEL: Okay sorry, I'll start again. When Brigadier Schoon instructed you to get involved in the assassination on the life of Marius Schoon, did he motivate this instruction to you?


MS PATEL: I have to repeat this for the record again. When Brigadier Schoon instructed you to get involved in the assassination on the life of Marius Schoon, did he motivate this instruction to you?

MR COETZEE: Not at all and I think that is where the need-to-know chain comes in. I was just the hit link in the need-to-know chain.

ADV BOSMAN: Alright. Who did he say would be in charge of this plan?

MR COETZEE: I would have been in charge of it.

MS PATEL: Alright. So there wouldn't have been any need for you to liaise with Rudi Crause and Jan Coetzee before you decided on involving Koos Vermeulen and Paul van Dyk in the operation?

MR COETZEE: No, the last two worked for me, under me, and Rudi Crause and Jan Coetzee would have known, I told them that it comes from headquarters, from Brigadier Schoon. So they were there to assist me in the layout of the house and the building and the streets and the area. And the two men working under me were just there for my use whenever I needed them.

MS PATEL: So would you have gone into Botswana alone with your two men?

MR COETZEE: Yes, as we did with four men or five men later on in the year on a hit on a house in Botswana, Mr Chairperson.


ADV DE JAGER: When you planned this, did you plan to use the gun yourself and to shoot Schoon yourself?

MR COETZEE: At that stage yes, Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Have you ever shot a man?

MR COETZEE: No, I have not.

ADV DE JAGER: Have you ever killed anybody?

MR COETZEE: No, I have not.

ADV DE JAGER: Didn't you always order your underlings to do it?

MR COETZEE: No, it was never necessary to order them, it was junior officers that were always available and eager to please, to please you as a superior and to do the shooting as I would always be there to please my superiors in the same way. So it wasn't a question of instructing a specific person and say: "You take the gun and you shoot him", a volunteer would just come out and do the shooting. That is how it happened, Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: And in this case, did you expect there to be a volunteer or would you have carried out the assassination yourself?

MR COETZEE: I would have carried it out with the help of drivers with vehicles ready to get away after the shooting incident, Mr Chairperson.

MS PATEL: If my memory serves me correctly, Mr Coetzee, did you not say earlier on in your evidence that you were instructed by Brigadier Schoon to assist Rudi Crause and Jan Coetzee and not the other way around?

MR COETZEE: To assist them in a problem that they had in Botswana with Marius Schoon.

MS PATEL: Are you saying then by implication that the request would have come from Jan Coetzee and Rudi Crause to Brigadier Schoon?

MR COETZEE: I don't know how it happened, Mr Chairperson, I just received an instruction to go and assist. In that I mean to do the job for them.


CHAIRPERSON: Because what you said in your manuscript was:

"To report to them"

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Doesn't that indicate that they were to be in command, if you report to someone?

MR COETZEE: Yes, strictly spoken yes, but it ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And it goes on to say:

"Captain Crowse and Coetzee would brief me on the mission"

MR COETZEE: Would brief me on the layout of the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That's not what it says, I'm reading what you wrote.

MR COETZEE: Well that's what I meant, Mr Chairperson.

MS PATEL: And then just finally, Mr Coetzee, the instruction to Wal du Toit to assist you, in giving you the weapon, from whom would that instruction have come?

MR COETZEE: It would have been sorted out by the divisional chiefs, heads, Section C and I don't know the Technical Division what division they exactly were but it would have been sorted between them before Wal du Toit would have handed me the briefcase with the built-in firearm.

MS PATEL: Would Brigadier Schoon have had some hand in this?

MR COETZEE: He would - it would have come specifically from him, no-one else.

MS PATEL: Alright, thank you, I don't have any further questions.


RE-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, just one issue on re-examination and that flowed a question from Mr de Jager, if I could.

Mr Coetzee, there was another incident, the Depale attack on the house in Botswana. You participated in the shooting there but it was quite a wild shootout.

MR COETZEE: Yes, there was shrapnel and things like that strewn all over.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR JANSEN: Yes, that's all, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetzee, we have seen that you can be a somewhat emotional person and get worked up.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You have no doubt read Jacques Pauw's book: "Into the Heart of Darkness"?

MR COETZEE: No, I have not, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No. Well in that book he explains how you were shocked on the Friday when Nofamela went public.

MR COETZEE: I was upset, that's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: He described you as being ashen-faced.

MR COETZEE: Yes, that would be correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And it was then arranged that you would leave the country quickly.

MR COETZEE: No, it was not that easy, it was on the 20th of the morning ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You left on the Sunday.

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson. It happened - Nofamela spoke on the 20th of October 1989, the Friday morning and we left the country the Sunday morning, 5 November 1989 so nearly three weeks later.

CHAIRPERSON: Three weeks was it. He explains how emotional you were at leaving various members of your family, your wife and things of that nature.

MR COETZEE: Absolutely.

CHAIRPERSON: That you were under terrific stress.

MR COETZEE: I was under terrific stress, that's correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And also that you took a certain amount of refreshment on the plane.

MR COETZEE: I did, I was drinking heavily.

CHAIRPERSON: And it was in those conditions that you went to Mauritius and made this statement.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We have been given merely 11 pages.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: There were considerably more weren't there?

MR COETZEE: I think 12 hours of recordings, Mr Chairperson and I couldn't even remember simple stupid straightforward names of Askaris and people from the white people that worked for me.

CHAIRPERSON: That's the point I wanted to make. You sat down with him and just were questioned for 12 hours.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that is what we have recorded now.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It's not something that you carefully thought, that you checked, that you corrected each sentence.

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.


MR COETZEE: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It is now four thirty. I don't think there would be much future in starting a new witness now if we are having Mr Mac Maharaj flying up here to appear at this hearing tomorrow morning. But before we decide finally on that, I would like an indication from you gentlemen how long you think you're going to be with him.

MR VISSER: I think I was finished with him, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, maybe an hour, an hour and a half.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, may I also ...(inaudible) myself tomorrow, I have other things to attend to?

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR JANSEN: My attorney will be here but we don't have any questions to Mr Maharaj.

MR CORNELIUS: Very short, it any.

MR LEVINE: ...(inaudible) barring injury, Mr Chairman, probably about one hour.

CHAIRPERSON: So we can finish him tomorrow. What I was seeking to avoid is bringing him up here and then not being able to conclude his evidence and having to recall him on another occasion, but from what you gentlemen have - sorry, I didn't ask you.

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, not you, I'm asking the one other person whom I've regularly overlooked. You wouldn't be very long I take it?

MS PATEL: The chances are not longer than 10 minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: So I think it's quite safe to ask him, and we'll adjourn till 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

MR BIZOS: May we enquire Mr Chairman, whether if we do finish shortly before lunch, judging by the estimates that were given here, we don't want to put in another witness that's going to be in, because an attorney is involved and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think it would be right to start a witness for an hour because I propose to adjourn at the latest at 3 o'clock to suit the convenience of certain of us who have to get away, there may be others here too. I don't think it would be right to have someone in the witness box and then have to adjourn to the last week of February. So I would propose, subject to anything you have to say, that when we have finished with Mr Mac Maharaj we will adjourn. Does that suit you, Mr Levine?

MR LEVINE: I wouldn't complain about it, Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I imagine you've all got other things you'd like to tidy up before the week is over, so we'll do that.

MR LEVINE: A small amount of work.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we'll adjourn till 9 o'clock tomorrow morning and trust that he's here by then but if not we will await his arrival.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: Tonight? Oh well that's alright then. 9 o'clock tomorrow morning then.