CHAIRPERSON: Mr Motlaung, you can proceed.


Mr Prinsloo, the statement that was earlier on made by Mr Johan Smit, that these bombs were targeted at blacks, you don't seem to agree with that statement do you?

MR PRINSLOO: You see I don't agree with that entirely. I'd like to express myself a little better by saying that at the stage of the attacks when we were waging the war, we felt that the overwhelming majority of the enemy or the supporters of the ANC in that respect as well as the SACP alliance with the ANC were black people. That is how we saw it and that is how we had been socialised.

MR MOTLAUNG: No, I understand, but effectively it seems to me what you are saying is that there was never an instruction from the "generale staf" to the effect that black persons have to be attacked. Was there ever such an instruction?

MR PRINSLOO: You must understand that at that stage it was pertinently put to everybody, everybody was aware of it, as well as the generals in staff, and this had been communicated to the various levels of command that it should only be black people who would be attacked because that is where the overwhelming majority of support lay for the government or for the ANC and the SACP alliance. That is how it had been communicated during public meetings, in the media, in the press.

MR MOTLAUNG: Mr Prinsloo, I ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Would you agree Mr Prinsloo, that that would have been a very convenient explanation to avoid an allegation of racism against the AWB?

MR PRINSLOO: I hear what you're saying, but we felt the same way towards white ANC supporters, but because they constituted such a minority they were therefore very difficult to reach. We wouldn't have had the same creation of a psychology of fear if we had pursued specifically those persons.

We had to chose soft targets and more specifically soft targets of another colour and in this case ...[intervention]

MR MOTLAUNG: Mr Prinsloo, what I seem to understand and perhaps accept, is that most of the ANC/SACP alliance supporters are black, or were black but my question is actually whether there was a specific instruction that black people as such have to be attacked, by the "generale staf"

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, it had always been communicated that way. It was specifically and pertinently stated as such on numerous occasions.

CHAIRPERSON: That the attacks should be aimed at black people?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Despite the fact that the ANC/SACP alliance comprised mostly black people?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct, because of the fact that black people constituted the major portion of the support for the ANC.

CHAIRPERSON: The greatest amount of people?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that's correct.

MR MALAN: Might I just follow up on that please.

We've heard evidence that the AWB was positive towards Inkatha, Mangope and Bophuthatswana and probably other institutions of groups as well. Weren't their supporters exclusively or even more exclusively black than the ANC/SACP support basis?

MR PRINSLOO: I understand what you are saying but the fact of the matter remains that it would have been very difficult for us to, for example, determine in Germiston or in Johannesburg who would be which supporters. We had narrow contact with certain other groups of other colour, we had to create that psychology of fear by hitting on soft targets.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] create this psychology of fear?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: What did the alliance have to do with it? Why didn't you set off a bomb on a rugby field during a rugby match for example, or a cricket match or a soccer match?

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, lives had to be taken pertinently.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well I'm speaking of a supposed incident that could take place during a sports match.

MR PRINSLOO: Well at that stage we had to be very cautious because we couldn't afford to be caught out. At least the people who were to commit the acts were not to be caught out and this public gathering or any public gathering would have been very closely guarded.

MR MOTLAUNG: Mr Prinsloo, at some stage you were asked the question regarding the supporters of, for example, the Democratic Party that were in the election or participating in the election, and you gave the answer that they were rather too safe in the suburbs there, like Lower Houghton it seems. Were you in fact giving the impression that were they not so safe you would have attacked them, despite the fact that they were white?

MR PRINSLOO: I don't understand, could you just rephrase that please.

MR MOTLAUNG: I'm saying, at some stage when you were answering a question regarding the Democratic Party, and apparently within the context that one of your big aims was to stop the elections from proceeding.

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MOTLAUNG: You were then asked a question: "What about the Democratic Party supporters because they had declared that they were going to participate in the elections, why didn't direct your bombs at them"? And it seems to me your answer was: "They were too safe. The police concentration in their area was so high that they were too safe there". I'm then asking you, are you then intending to create the impression that if they were not safe because there were too many police there, you would still have attacked them?

MR PRINSLOO: If they weren't safe?


MR PRINSLOO: I can't answer that question because I don't know what the circumstances would have been and the circumstances would have determined the modus operandi at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I think that the aim of the question was to ask, had it not been for the protection which they would have had during the incidents, would you have considered planting bombs among them as well?

MR PRINSLOO: I believe that it would have been a consideration.

MR MOTLAUNG: You say that you believe it would have been considered, but it seems to me the "generale staf" was very clear in its instruction that black people were to be attacked and therefore the DP supporters wouldn't be involved, do you agree with me? Inasfar as the attacks went.

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct, because at that stage the necessary information which was available to us had been tabled and it would have been senseless or futile to us to move into such a well protected area.

MR MOTLAUNG: And one of the big aims too of this whole bomb trend was to twist the arm of the government isn't it, to stop the elections from proceeding?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MOTLAUNG: And by the government you mean the government of the National Party which was essentially white, correct?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MOTLAUNG: Would you agree with me that it would have made more impact on the government - and maybe if I pose this question, did you believe that the government of the day could stop the elections if it wanted to? Assuming somehow you persuaded it to stop the elections from proceeding.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, it could have.

MR MOTLAUNG: Would you then agree with me that if you had to bomb white suburbs for example, that would necessarily have had more impact on the government, in terms of persuading them from not proceeding with their actions?

MR PRINSLOO: Right-wing groupings had a number of national offices in the Western Transvaal and elsewhere.

MR MOTLAUNG: Yes, but it seems to me you had learnt from history that by attacking things like offices or strictly military targets, the impact was not as efficient as on civilians? Hadn't you learnt that lesson?

MR PRINSLOO: In order to create the psychology of fear and the anxiety around the election, in order to force people, not only the government but also the broader public, to stay away from the ballot boxes soft targets had to be attacked.

This had been proven to us by history that this type of modus operandi was very successful in the past. The only MK's proved it, it worked.

CHAIRPERSON: When you decided to use black people as targets, did you not think that black people at the first democratic elections would be afraid to go and vote? Why did you have the impression that black people would be afraid of the right-wingers?

MR PRINSLOO: It's not as much the fact that they would be afraid of the right-wingers but we had to create the psychology of fear and the government had to take notice of it. Whether we were successful in our purpose is something that I'm not very sure of, however the anxiety had been created at a certain stage by attacking soft targets. We believed at a certain point during these bombings that it would be successful.

CHAIRPERSON: That the black people would stay away from the ballot boxes?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Why, why did you think that?

MR PRINSLOO: We had hoped that somebody else would also stand up from other ranks and say: "Listen to these people, these people have to be accommodated somewhere within this new dispensation". Well that was our hope.

MR MOTLAUNG: Mr Prinsloo, would you agree with me that there were certain innocent civilians that were killed or maimed during your explosions?


MR MOTLAUNG: I want to submit to you that you would sleep better if you have killed, through these explosives, innocent black civilians than if you were to kill innocent white civilians. What do you say to that?

MR PRINSLOO: We were in a process of warfare, whites were killed indeed. As it has been put, by means of attacks on soft targets we aimed to create the psychology of fear whether or not whites were involved, but the fact ...[intervention]

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

MR PRINSLOO: The fact that I would slept easier or not was not the major idea behind this for me, and I don't believe that that's the same with fellow members and accused. I don't think that that is what it was about.

CHAIRPERSON: You had the hope that somebody would stand up and say: "We must listen to the right-wingers"?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct. At that point we had hoped that it would be a prominent figure from within the current government who would stand up and say: "Okay, let's sit down and discuss it".

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

CHAIRPERSON: There has been evidence before us that at that stage there was an undertaking by the leader of the ANC at that time, he was also the leader of the alliance, he is the current State President, there was an undertaking that was given at that stage that he would appoint a committee to investigate this matter. Do you remember that?

MR PRINSLOO: I remember that.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't it enough?

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, that was after the Johannesburg bomb if I remember correctly.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm talking about the undertaking. After the elections he passed the law and the committee was appointed. I don't know about the level of progress that they had reached, but before the election an undertaking was given.

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, whether or not the undertaking was given I would believe what you say, I accept that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well that has been the evidence of some of your fellow applicants.

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, you must realise that at that stage the right-wingers, and specifically the AWB, in its alliance with the CP and other parties was not or at least I don't believe that they would have accepted something like that permanently from the committee. Somebody would have had to do something effectively with immediacy, especially because of the fact that CODESA didn't work. They had very little confident at that stage in any committee or in any group which had been compiled in order to deal with such an issue.

ADV GCABASHE: I'm sorry Mr Motlaung, because there's a bit of a delay on this I'd just like to follow up on that.

As a member of the generals staff, are you saying that you did not discuss a possible undertaking or the possibility of further talks just before the election, and I'm talking about your group as the general staff?

MR PRINSLOO: No, not at all.

ADV GCABASHE: So you are saying, in all the strategic planning forums you had as the general staff and knowing that you wanted your Volkstaat, and from what you are saying you wanted to disrupt the elections, you did not consider the overtures or the approaches from the other side at all, however weak they may have been?

MR PRINSLOO: Well that would only have been a decision of the generals in staff and it would have been up to the political participants at that stage, Mr Terreblanche and his fellow political speakers. They would have had to sit down and discuss it, which at that stage according to my information was never done. Whether they did it or not would be impossible for me to answer, but my specific instructions were from the staff and I was to proceed.

MR MALAN: Just in terms of the structure I would just like to achieve some more clarity. With regard to your final answer it would appear to me that the generals in staff didn't discuss politics but that Mr Terreblanche and others were responsible for politics, is that what you are saying?

MR PRINSLOO: No, that's not what I'm saying at all.

MR MALAN: Then why do you say: "I mean that Mr Terreblanche was the political stage persona"?

MR PRINSLOO: He was the person who held political discussions with other groups or other interested parties. It wasn't the generals in staff who, for example, would enter the stage in order to make political statements. It was discussed with the generals in staff beforehand in certain cases.

MR MALAN: But the entire issue of the Volkstaat Council, do you know whether or not that was discussed at generals and staff level?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, it was.

MR MALAN: And were any decisions made?


MR MALAN: What were the decisions?

MR PRINSLOO: With respect to the Volkstaat?

MR MALAN: No, the Volkstaat Council. The Chairperson has just said to you that overtures were made by Mr Mandela and at that stage the Volkstaat Council had already been written into law, and that is why General Viljoen moved over in order to participate.

The idea of the Volkstaat Council, which would be a committee which would have meetings in order to investigate the possibilities of establishing a Volkstaat. Do you remember anything about that?

MR PRINSLOO: No, not at all because that was after the elections.

MR MALAN: Yes, it was compiled after the election but before then it had been written into law.

MR PRINSLOO: At the time of the bomb explosions and approximately one to two weeks before the time there had been absolutely no mention that we might be accommodated on a Volkstaat Council, it was only mentioned after the election. We were invited to participate after the elections.

MR MALAN: That's entirely correct that the invitation came after the elections but Mr Viljoen's participation in this was on the basis that part of the constitution would include the establishment of a Volkstaat Council which would begin to operate in terms of the constitution after the election. Can't you remember anything about that?

MR PRINSLOO: I can't remember that specifically.

MR MALAN: Why did you think General Viljoen participated in the elections then?


MR MALAN: Could you just repeat that?

MR PRINSLOO: In order to occupy a position of power, that is why he participated.

MR MALAN: Did you still regard him as someone who was on your side or someone who was now against you?

MR PRINSLOO: Well at least a day or two before the elections or the evening before the elections we would determine that he was definitely going to participate and at that stage we hoped that this was only political talk but I personally - unfortunately I cannot speak on behalf of the applicants, but I personally viewed this as strictly some sort of trick which he was playing in order to occupy a position of power within the new dispensation which was to follow.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you agree with that tactic?

MR PRINSLOO: General Viljoen's tactic?


MR PRINSLOO: No, not at all.

CHAIRPERSON: As they saw it, that it was simply a ploy in order to occupy a position of power within the new dispensation, however he didn't really sell the right-wingers out.

MR PRINSLOO: I don't really understand what you mean.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, you thought that he was still right-wing oriented, however he participated in the elections simply to occupy a position of power in the new dispensation so that he could continue with his right-wing politics.

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you believe him, did you think that that was the right thing to do?

MR PRINSLOO: Well it was too late by them. There were those who believed, those who worked narrowly with him.

CHAIRPERSON: But when you realised that this was a possibility - let me put it to you this way, did you accept this as a tactic which was something that you could live with?

MR PRINSLOO: At that stage nobody who I knew trusted him. The right-wingers on ground level at that stage didn't trust any right-wing leader anymore.

CHAIRPERSON: So could he have been killed during the elections and if he had, would that have affected you at all?

MR PRINSLOO: He still enjoyed quite a bit of support and popularity amongst his army command members and large areas in the rural areas. I don't know what the consequences of such an occurrence would have been.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, I just want to follow this up.

At that stage you said, if I heard you correctly, that the right-wingers on grassroots level didn't trust any right-wing leader anymore, is that correct?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, on that evening.

MR MALAN: Before the election?

MR PRINSLOO: That evening. Well that is my personal view and that is what I picked from within the field.

MR MALAN: Was Mr Terreblanche one of those right-wing leaders who the right-wingers on grassroots level couldn't trust anymore?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, to a certain extent.

MR MALAN: Were the generals in staff part of the right-wingers on grassroots level?

MR PRINSLOO: The generals in staff were definitely members of the right-wing.

MR MALAN: On grassroots level?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, at that stage.

MR MALAN: Are you trying to tell me or am I inferring that there was a split between the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche, that there were tensions?

MR PRINSLOO: There was tension indeed.

MR MALAN: Did the generals in staff determine the police of the AWB or attempt to determine the policy of the AWB from time to time, against Mr Terreblanche or what was the nature of the tension?

MR PRINSLOO: Not in all cases. Regarding the military it remained external. What I mean by tensions is that there were political tensions, should attempts be made to negotiate or shouldn't there be attempts to negotiate, should we contact other groups or not.

MR MALAN: Let's just take the issue of negotiation or not, you said that that was part of the political tensions between the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche, who took up which opinion?

MR PRINSLOO: Specifically with regard to negotiation, Constand Viljoen and Ferdie Hartzenberg.

MR MALAN: No, I'm speaking about the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche. You said that there were tensions between the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche and you said that these were political tensions.

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MALAN: And then I asked you about the nature thereof and you said that one of the issues was to negotiate or not.

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MALAN: Did the generals in staff have a different position to Mr Terreblanche regarding this issue?

MR PRINSLOO: When I mentioned negotiation I meant that at that stage we were reassured by General Viljoen that large numbers of his army command or former army command supporters in the rural areas, and more specifically in Western Transvaal, would have wholeheartedly supported us and the other means which were promised to us, it was assured to us.

At that stage during the elections or the day before that or the evening before that, it was no longer certain, the certainty wasn't there anymore, whether we could still rely on his promises. That is where the tension was.

MR MALAN: Were you angry at Mr Terreblanche because he wasn't sure? What was the nature of the tension between the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche? Did you blame him because you were not certain about the support of Viljoen?

MR PRINSLOO: No, ...[end of tape]

MR MALAN: ...[inaudible] the tensions between the generals in staff, leave Viljoen out of this, what was the differences between the generals in staff and the leader, Mr Terreblanche that created this tension?

MR PRINSLOO: You must realise that at that stage I just moved in and out between the game farm, the members, ...[intervention]

MR MALAN: No, no, Mr Prinsloo, you are talking about tension between the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche and you had knowledge of this otherwise you would not have mentioned this. What was the reason for this tension?

MR PRINSLOO: Sometimes there were small things, for example, if a person would co-operate with a leader of another group or the availability of logistics and equipment, then he would deny it or disapprove, then it had to be discussed by the generals in staff, and that is where the tension was created at certain times.

The right-wing was also afraid because they knew that some of the members and the applicants, the people were scared. They knew that there were arrests to come ...[intervention]

MR MALAN: At that stage did the generals in staff not trust Mr Terreblanche anymore? Were they not satisfies with his judgement, is that what you're saying?

MR PRINSLOO: No, not at all, it's not that. I believe that in any para-military movement there would always be tension in a war situation.

MR NEL: Between the head of the military unit and its soldiers?


MR MALAN: Do you honestly believe it?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, I was in the Defence Force.

MR MALAN: Was there tension between you and General Viljoen or General Meiring or whoever?

MR PRINSLOO: One cannot always agree with a general or commander or brigadier's viewpoint, with regards to an instruction or an operation that had to be executed.

MR MALAN: i'm going to ask the last question concerning this and then I'm going to leave it there. What you are talking about now, about men that do not agree is not, you cannot compare this, we are talking about the top structure in this para-military unit, the AWB. Where there was tension between the leader and this top-level structure. That is what you've told us. In other words the tension is amongst the generals in staff as a body and the leader.

For the last time, would you like to try and explain to us what the nature of this tension was? It means that the generals in staff had a view of something and where the leader had a different view. This is how I read you, otherwise I'm reading you completely incorrectly.

MR PRINSLOO: It was just that - let us state an example, if we wanted Mr Terreblanche to make contact with Mr Hartzenberg or Viljoen and he said no, he is not interested in it, then some people in the generals in staff would then have said: "But why, what is the reason, let us discuss this". I am talking about that tension that sometimes appeared.

MR MALAN: I would like to make a last statement and then ask for your comment. The three, four days before the elections the generals in staff decided to create this psychosis of fear, Mr Terreblanche was not part of that decision, he did not know about it. Your comment on that?

MR PRINSLOO: That is not the truth.

MR MOTLAUNG: Mr Prinsloo, it is your evidence that you were a generals in staff member of equal standing as any other member thereof, correct?

MR PRINSLOO: Another member of the generals in staff? I was in the same rank structure as the other members of the generals in staff. Was that a question?

MR MOTLAUNG: Yes, that is correct. There was no-one above you in the "generale staf"?

MR PRINSLOO: No, there was kommandant general.

MR MOTLAUNG: Yes, but the kommandant general was not a member of the, he was a member of the general's staff but he actually acquired that title from the wen kommando, correct?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, he comes from the ranks of the wen kommando.

MR MOTLAUNG: So as far as the generale staf itself was concerned, he didn't assume any higher position than all the other members of the generale staf, correct?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MOTLAUNG: So in terms of your para-military structuring, why would you have to take instructions, not from the general "generale staf" but from a member, only one member of the generale staf, like General Ackerman?

CHAIRPERSON: He's already testified because Ackerman was a kommandant general.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct Mr Chairman, but it seems to me what Mr Nico Prinsloo is saying is that despite the fact that he had this better title in respect of the wen kommando, that was not necessarily the case that he had a better title in the generale staf, correct? In the generale staf he was one of the generals, that's the bottom line.

MR PRINSLOO: Me myself?


MR PRINSLOO: Mr Ackerman?

MR MOTLAUNG: That's correct.

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MOTLAUNG: Let me put it this way, would you take instructions from the wen kommando, you as a member of the ystergarde?

MR PRINSLOO: No, I was from the wen kommando, I was a member of the wen kommando.

MR MOTLAUNG: Were you a member of the wen kommando?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MOTLAUNG: And the instructions relating to the bombings, did they come from the wen kommando or from the ystergarde?

MR PRINSLOO: From the generals in staff of the wen kommando on which members of the ystergarde also served.

MR MOTLAUNG: So the generale staf was actually a level within the wen kommando and not within the ystergarde?

MR PRINSLOO: They were in charge of the ystergarde, that is now the generals in staff as well as the wen kommando and all other sections or sub-sections of the AWB.

MR MALAN: The generale staf is the overarching authority of the whole movement under which the two legs moved out.

MR MOTLAUNG: I see, thank you.

Now tell me, did the generale staf at any stage take a decision that there will be trailer bombs used?


MR MOTLAUNG: Did it ever agree that the pipe bombs will be used?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, they did have knowledge about that.

MR MOTLAUNG: But they never knew that anybody intended to plant trailer bombs, that's what you are saying?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, but then I would like to correct it. In the construction and the building of what the bomb would look like, that was left to the discretion of the person who actually built it.

MR MOTLAUNG: Let's talk about the Germiston bomb. Do you still stand by what you said yesterday, that you can't remember where it was discussed?

MR PRINSLOO: I never said that I could not remember where it was specifically. Can you just take me back to that piece of evidence?

MR MOTLAUNG: Yes. You were asked where was this discussed, was in the "geslote vergadering of in die openbare vergadering", and you then you said you could not remember. Can you remember that?

MR PRINSLOO: The closed meeting was in the cubicles, the open or public meeting that you are talking about, where was that?

MR MOTLAUNG: I don't know but I understood that there was two types of meetings, the closed one and the open one, is it not so?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, I spoke or took it up with Mr Barnard, the fact concerning the trailer. I then asked Mr de Wet if he would be willing to make his vehicle available with the towbar because it will be able to tow this trailer. I sent him on a mission that he at that stage did not know what it was about. I sent him to Koesterfontein.

MR MOTLAUNG: But you can't say whether this was one of those closed meetings or not, where the discussion about the Germiston bomb took place?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, I discussed it with Mr Barnard.

MR MOTLAUNG: It was only the two of you?

MR PRINSLOO: There were other members present as well.

MR MOTLAUNG: Was it a closed meeting this?


MR MOTLAUNG: How many people ...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, if you call it that it was a close meeting because it wasn't discussed with everybody, that is why it was a closed meeting.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was present when this was discussed?

MR PRINSLOO: If I remember correctly it was myself, Mr Barnard, I speak under correction but I think, Mr van der Merwe, Leon van der Merwe, Mr Myburgh, I think that was it but I speak under correction, I'm not quite sure.

MR MOTLAUNG: Was there a specific commander for that mission, or were you the commander?

MR PRINSLOO: What mission?

MR MOTLAUNG: The Germiston trailer mission.


MR MOTLAUNG: There was no commander for that mission?

MR PRINSLOO: Well, Mr Barnard was in charge of the building of the bomb and Mr Koekemoer and Mr Myburgh, the Koesterfontein people.

MR MOTLAUNG: Yes, for the construction of the bomb. I'm talking about the implementation, the execution of the mission. Was there a commander for that?

MR PRINSLOO: That would have been Mr de Wet.

MR MOTLAUNG: Did you tell him exactly where to go and plant the bomb, yourself?

MR PRINSLOO: It was up to the discretion of the person who was sent to a certain area. The person would have been chosen to go and plant a bomb in a town. He had to know the area, the town, he had to know all the exit and entrance routes or then familiarise himself with them. A person would never go to a place, to a town, which he or she doesn't know.

I gave Mr de Wet the instruction to go to Koesterfontein where he then further would be informed about what the next steps would be in the execution of this instruction.

MR MOTLAUNG: And who was to give him further instructions?


MR MOTLAUNG: Who was to give him further instructions at Koesterfontein?

MR PRINSLOO: He would then be schooled there in what to do further.


MR PRINSLOO: I wasn't at Koesterfontein, I do not know.

MR MOTLAUNG: According to your expectations.

MR PRINSLOO: It might have been Mr Myburgh or Mr Barnard or Mr Koekemoer. You must realise it had to be detonated by the occupants of the vehicle and he had to be informed as to how to do this.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was the person who sat a map table and organised this whole war? Without planting a bomb, to look on a map and say this is what happened, this is the next step, who was that person?

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairperson, there wasn't such a specific person, the whole generals in staff had to give the instructions that there would be a countrywide attack. They would never allow one person to run this war or to give all the instructions.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, history shows us that in any war many things do not go according to plan.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: There are things that people do not foresee and then certain decisions had to be taken to rectify this.

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: As far as I know history there is always a general or someone who was in contact with grassroots level to see that everything was going according to plan or a change of plan or whatever, and you say that as far as your knowledge goes in this war there was not such a person.

MR PRINSLOO: No, what I meant by that was that the general who was in charge of his area had to, in consultation with his commanders, ensure that the instructions of the generals in staff are executed. For example, in Koesterfontein, according to my discretion, Mr Barnard, Cliff Barnard would have been in control. A that specific moment or the period when Mr de Wet arrived there, I say that I assume that Mr Barnard would take the lead or command or then inform him or school him into as to what he must do.

MR MOTLAUNG: Tell me, these bomb explosions, were they planned for execution only from the Western Transvaal or countrywide?

MR PRINSLOO: Countrywide.

MR MOTLAUNG: Did any take place?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, there were explosions in the Free State, in Natal and members were arrested who were on a mission to plant a bomb in the Eastern Cape.

MR MOTLAUNG: And as far as the generale staf members who visited you after the Germiston, not the Germiston, the Johannesburg bomb went off, why were they specifically there, why did they visit?

MR PRINSLOO: Because I did not have communication with the other areas.

MR MOTLAUNG: Didn't they visit you so that they could say whether they support what happened in Johannesburg or they don't?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, amongst others but I sent a message through that I do not receive any communication and my communication was cut down with the other areas. At that stage I realised that they had communication with each other and that is why I had to drive to and fro in order to get messages and I left a message telling them that they must come and see me.

MR MOTLAUNG: You see because it's a bit strange for me. If it was part of the plan to the knowledge of the general staf, that bomb would go off like the one in Johannesburg, why would they have to say whether they agree with what happened or they don't?

MR PRINSLOO: Well the generals in staff operated in that fashion.

MR MOTLAUNG: Okay. And as far as the Johannesburg bomb, you were specifically told by General Ackerman to go and plant that one?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MOTLAUNG: The Germiston one, were you specifically told by anyone to do that?

MR PRINSLOO: No, it was explained in our briefings with our different commanders that a bomb had to go out but not specifically a trailer bomb.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they say where that bomb had to be planted?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, it was in Germiston but it was not specifically said but they said it had to be a soft target.

CHAIRPERSON: Who made the decision that the bomb had to be planted in Germiston close to or in a taxi rank?

MR PRINSLOO: It was done, the decisions were made by the generals in staff.

CHAIRPERSON: No, the generals in staff did not say that it had to go to a taxi rank, who decided that?

MR PRINSLOO: It was explained that soft targets had to be targeted, amongst others, taxi ranks, restaurants, everywhere where large groups of people would be gathered.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there a restaurant that was blown up?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, Chairperson.


MR PRINSLOO: That was in Pretoria.

MR MOTLAUNG: And lastly, tell me ...[intervention]

ADV GCABASHE: Sorry, Mr Motlaung, just to follow up on that point.

I understood the question to relate to orders or discussions at general staff level about all the other bombs, not the first bomb, the Johannesburg bomb. And this is probably where I have a difficulty because I don't quite understand your answer.

Your answer says you discussed the Germiston bomb with your commanders, now am I correct to think that your commanders were your chaps who were on the farm with you, is that right?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Right. Now let's go back above those commanders, yourself and those commanders, to the general staff. My difficulty remains, the discussion on all the other bombs that went off, because I understood you to say in your evidence in chief, that you were instructed by Ackerman to prepare one bomb that was going to go off in Johannesburg, where the instruction or the discussion on all the other bombs fits into the general staff's general ideas to what was going to happen, I'm not too sure. Can you help me there?


ADV GCABASHE: You seem to have operated on your own, this is why I'd like clarity, viz-a-viz all the other bombs barr the Bree Street bomb, am I wrong?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, you are wrong.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you. Help me with that.

MR PRINSLOO: The specific area for which we were responsible was indicated to us as well as to all the other generals in staff. My area of operation would be the PWV area. We had to create chaos and a psychosis of fear in this area.

Concerning the Germiston bomb, we had to get one person from the members or a volunteer who knew the area and who would then go and plant this bomb and detonate it.

There was not specifically discussed in generals in staff meetings that it had to go to Germiston in this street at the taxi rank. I was just said that it had to be in the East Rand/West Rand areas.

ADV GCABASHE: When did they say this, the generals in staff?

MR PRINSLOO: That was before I left for the game farm, in that period, that week or so, it could have been a week or two weeks. We always had long discussions, we always discussed this at the staff meetings, in this period that went before the elections.

ADV GCABASHE: Why then did Ackerman have to specifically talk to you about the Johannesburg bomb if nobody else specifically talked to you about all the other bombings and these were decisions that had been taken at that general staff level? Just help me on that.

MR PRINSLOO: That had to be the trigger to everything else, this one big bomb that had to go off first. That is how I see it.

ADV GCABASHE: But that doesn't answer my question about the distinction between that one bomb and all the others, because you were given a specific instruction on one particular bomb, why not with all the others? Why didn't you then wait for somebody to come and say: "Right, let's go with the rest"? I don't quite understand why they singled out the Johannesburg bomb and gave you a specific instruction and didn't single out all the other incidents with similar specific instructions.

MR PRINSLOO: You see like I said earlier on, we had our area. This Johannesburg bomb had to be the trigger which started everything off. The people who were sent out - I had my instructions that the West Rand and East Rand areas had to be attacked, what towns had to be chosen we discussed, myself and the commanders and we agreed that a person had to be sent to, for example Germiston or Pretoria.

During the visits of the generals in staff, it always had their approval as well as my reports at Ventersdorp.

MR MOTLAUNG: Mr Prinsloo, the last point. Can you tell me, did you want the citizens of this country and the international community to know that it was you people, particularly from the AWB, who were busy with these bombs and why you were busy with these bombs?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, at that stage we felt that we are acting on behalf of all other right-wing whites in South Africa because we also had the support of them.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you never after the bombs make public statements, taking responsibility for them?

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairperson, at that stage, or history taught us that not even the Boere Kommandos could stand together. We thought that history would never repeat itself but it was then proved that it will repeat because whites cannot stand together.

It was proved again, these people never had the support of any right-wing group, right-wing leaders only did this later on in order to create a perfect platform for themselves.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us continue then. How would Mandela have known or FW de Klerk have known that they had to do something about the Volkstaat of no-one told him that these bombs were detonated for this reason?

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Mandela told him that he must establish such a council.

CHAIRPERSON: But the government who had to announce this Volkstaat for the right-wing, who would have told the government that: "We are detonating these bombs because we are looking for a Volkstaat"?

MR PRINSLOO: Well it had to be our right-wing leaders who had to do this, it was their responsibility.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you not say why it was never done?

MR PRINSLOO: They were scared that they would then ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Prinsloo, then it doesn't make sense to me. The end of this plan was to create this fear and to plant these bombs and to take the lives of people, the goal had to be that someone must tell the government that this is the reason otherwise it is useless in taking people's lives.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now who according to the plan had to go and tell the government that this is the reason and: "Give us a Volkstaat, otherwise something else would happen"?

MR PRINSLOO: That would be Mr Terreblanche.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that according to plan?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes and Dr Ferdie Hartzenberg had to make the announcements nationally and internationally according to secession.

CHAIRPERSON: Therefore I assume that both leaders whom you've just mentioned knew what was going on, is that correct?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, with General Constand Viljoen.


MR PRINSLOO: Together with General Constand Viljoen.

CHAIRPERSON: And Constand Viljoen knew on the day of the elections, who it was and what was going on?

MR PRINSLOO: He knew who it was, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did the generals in staff not go to Mr Terreblanch and tell him: "Make your public announcement that we did it and this is our reason"?

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairperson, according to my perception and my co-commanders, they were too scared to do it.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm now talking of the generals in staff.

MR PRINSLOO: Then they would ...[end of tape]

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] or did the planning. You knew that this was a risk.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes. That is what we could not understand, why he did not do it.

CHAIRPERSON: And you knew that you were going to plant and that lives may be lost and that there will be a lot of noise. "Because we are looking for a Volkstaat and at the end of the day the leader certainly had to, whoever it was, make a public statement and say; This is the reason and give us a Volkstaat." And that is the most important, the goal of the whole operation was the most important aspect. Is that not true?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is true.

CHAIRPERSON: Now can you then tell us why the most important point of this whole operation, people sold their houses, left their jobs for this Volkstaat and the most important item of the whole agenda was not executed. Why not? All those things that the people did taking their families with them, selling their stuff, took the lives of other people it was all useless. How so?

MR PRINSLOO: That is how we saw it as well.

CHAIRPERSON: I ask again. The Generals in staff according to the evidence that we have heard were a very powerful body.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't they go to Terreblanch and say: "Look now the goal of this plan go and execute it" Or why wasn't it executed?

MR PRINSLOO: I believe that requests were directed at him.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Prinsloo you were the secretary, you have to know.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairperson I was then in Protea prison in Soweto. At that stage we did not have any contact with the outside world.

CHAIRPERSON: You were arrested on the day after the elections. That was the 28th.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes that is correct. On the day.

CHAIRPERSON: On the day. The first bomb in Bree Street was on the 25th or the 24th.

MR PRINSLOO: The Sunday.

CHAIRPERSON: Why on that day didn't you go to Terreblanch or the on the 26th and say: "Go and tell the people that is part of our plan. They must know why we are detonating these bombs. Why people lost their lives. Go and talk to them."

MR PRINSLOO: They had to do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I know that they had to do this and that they didn't do it. Why?

MR PRINSLOO: Well it is my view that they were afraid prosecutions.

CHAIRPERSON: But they were aware before the first bomb that this was a possibility and part of the plan was that a public statement was supposed to be made. That was before the first bomb.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And lives were taken, buildings were blown up. So isn't there any reason that we can determine as to why this wasn't done?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I can't say why Mr Terreblanche didn't do it. He was supposed to have done it.

CHAIRPERSON: Look I can understand that you can't say but could you perhaps tell us why the Generals in staff didn't go and tell him: "Look go and talk to the people"?

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, sorry, I don't want to interpose. Mr Chairman, Exhibit F was handed in to the Committee and that certainly possibly the Chairman would like to just to refresh your memory.

CHAIRPERSON: No I am aware of that. I want to find out what the inner workings of this Generale staf was and what their reasons were for not asking at least why it hadn't been done.

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson it could be possible that members of the staff approached Mr Terreblanche and directed such a request at him. I think that it is highly possible. I don't know about it.

CHAIRPERSON: But how could you not know? You were his secretary. You were very close to him. Why didn't you yourself ask him: "Mr Terreblanche why don't you speak out so that the whole world can hear if bombs are going off and claiming the lives of people, blowing up cars and buildings?"

MR PRINSLOO: I can understand what you are saying but at that stage I was no longer involved with the secretariat or administration component. It was a very difficult time.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let's just forget about the position of secretary. You were next to Terreblanche. In other words you could have gone to him. Isn't that true? It was during your career and the construction of the entire operation that you were the secretary.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So you could have gone to him at least on a friendly basis and said to him. So that last point is the most important point and it is your duty to carry out your tasks. Why didn't you do that?

MR PRINSLOO: He was supposed to have done it out of his own.

CHAIRPERSON: But he didn't and why didn't you go and ask him: "Why not? " Or "When are you going to do it?" Or "Are you going to do it?"

MR PRINSLOO: We assumed that he would. We have always believed that.

CHAIRPERSON: After the first bomb he didn't do it. After the second, after the pipe bombs he didn't do it.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: After a trailer bomb in Germiston he didn't do it.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Well at that stage a lot of bombs had gone off, peoples' lives had been lost, buildings had been affected, why not then? Most of the operations had been completed.

MR PRINSLOO: In my opinion Mr Terreblanche wanted to prove that the right-wingers and specifically the AWB could achieve precisely the same as for example the ANC soldiers of that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo I am not asking why Terreblanche didn't do it or why he didn't perform his duties. He can come and tell us that himself if he wanted to and I am not expecting of you to give evidence regarding that. I am asking why the Generals in staff or you yourself who was close to him didn't ask him or remind him that he was supposed to do this.

MR PRINSLOO: I can't say with certainty whether or not I discussed it with him. If I had to say that I indeed did discuss something like this with him such as going to the press and specifically mentioning that.

CHAIRPERSON: But that would have been the most important aspect of the entire operation. Why are you saying that you can't remember whether or not you discussed it with him?

MR PRINSLOO: There were hundreds of people from the press on a daily basis in Ventersdorp and perhaps he did do this to a certain extent but I can't remember anything.

MR MOTLAUNG: Look in conclusion I put it to you that particularly because as you say there were hundreds of press people there - I put it to you that it was never done because what happened about these bombs was a frolic by a small grouping apparently including yourself which knew that these were pure acts of criminality which you didn't have the blessing of the AWB.

MR PRINSLOO: You are entirely incorrect.


MR MALAN: Chairperson I would just like to follow this up. I find it difficult and I will be direct with you regarding this. I know that you are aware of what you need to convince me in order for me to believe your evidence that Mr Terreblanche has to accept responsibility on behalf of the AWB, the entire history and all the exhibits also points to a different pattern. It points to a series of bomb explosions - whether these be explosions during which people are killed, injured or maimed or at industrial places, offices and other such buildings and then we have the political speeches of Mr Terreblanche in which he makes direct or indirect threats and he says: "If there is no Volkstaat (and I am referring specifically to exhibit c) then this pattern will continue." Exhibit f, sorry. In the last paragraph of that exhibit there is a short article and in that he says: "All hell will break loose," and not he or Dr Hartenzenberg will be able to prevent it. In other words the policy was to achieve actual distance from that which was happening while the entire perception was that the right-wingers were actually the ones who were busy with it and your evidence now that you want the AWB to stand up like a man and be counted - if you will excuse my archaic language, is evidence which I cannot believe. The AWB did not want to stand up like a man and directly accept the responsibility for their actions. They did not even want to in an anonymous or indirect fashion tell the media that the AWB was responsible for these actions. It just wasn't their style. Actually the AWB was a bunch of sissies who could not accept responsibility for their deeds and their policy. What is your commentary regarding that?

MR PRINSLOO: The perception had been created I believe after the Bophutatswana incident that the media would have alleged that the right-wingers had fled.

MR MALAN: No, I am not talking of that. I am talking about responsibility for actions. Taking responsibility in public for deeds which is what according to you was expected and history has proven exactly the opposite.

MR PRINSLOO: They definitely should have taken responsibility for the actions.

MR MALAN: Yes, but "they" is you. This is ambivalent. Couldn't you have stood up and said: "I, Prinsloo, accept responsibility for all these actions on behalf of the AWB. I am on the second level of command."

MR PRINSLOO: Those were not my duties Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr Bracher have you got any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BRACHER: Mr Prinsloo what is your present occupation?

MR PRINSLOO: I work for myself.

MR BRACHER: Are you a farmer?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes I also farm.

MR BRACHER: Where do you work?

MR PRINSLOO: I beg your pardon?

MR BRACHER: Where do you work?

MR PRINSLOO: I worked for the AWB and I work for myself.

MR BRACHER: What do you do?

MR PRINSLOO: I sell insurance.

MR BRACHER: In what town?

MR PRINSLOO: And I farm.

MR BRACHER: Yesterday you were asked by the Chairman whether you would be prepared to participate in the reconciliation process and try and do something for the victims and you indicated that you would. Do you remember that?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

MR BRACHER: Would you be prepared in civil proceedings to give evidence on their behalf to the effect that these bombs were under the command of the leaders of the AWB?

MR PRINSLOO: I was consulted by my legal counsel to accept no sentences or participate in that. It should be taken up with them. I can't respond to that.

MR BRACHER: Okay. Now I want to go to the structures in the General staff. We watched yesterday a video which had something if I recall the spirit of Majuba where it was proudly said you were going to fight battles over the barrel of a gun in the spirit of Majuba. Now when did the principles of the AWB or the policy of the AWB change from that to soft targets and killing innocent civilians?

MR PRINSLOO: That was the order that went out to attack soft targets. As I have previously given evidence history taught us that it was sufficient to create a psychology of fear and angst amongst the public.

MR BRACHER: Yes I understand that but I want to know when. You see the 2nd of April you have got marching soldiers, barrel of a gun, Majuba, Israelites fighting wars and in between that and the election there is a change of policy. You are now soft targets, innocent civilians, hiding away behind denials. At what meeting did the AWB General staff decide to change their policy?

MR PRINSLOO: It had always been the objective or the modus operandi of the various instructors to establish special units which could wage war because we knew that at a certain point in time the ANC/SACP alliance would lodge an attempt to take over the country and to become the new government.

CHAIRPERSON: But the question is aimed at asking you when the policy of the AWB changed into terrorism?

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson I can't say with certainty on which day or during which month this specific event took place but I believe that it has always been that way. The fact that they mentioned the barrel of a gun was more by means of speech, metaphorically speaking. That idea had always been there.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, at least it sounds like bravery.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: Let me put it more specifically. When was the meeting at which it was decided that you would plant bombs at taxi ranks and restaurants and other targets where there would be a majority of black people?

MR PRINSLOO: Do you want to know when this took place?


MR PRINSLOO: Well that was quite some time before the election and this was discussed at certain occasions. I can't tell you that this took place during a specific meeting. All I know is that it took place over a period of time.

MR BRACHER: When was it decided that generals will go out to their regions and tell people to actually plant bombs at taxi ranks at restaurants? Decided by the General staff?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: When was that decision made?

MR PRINSLOO: It was in the period of time preceding the elections. I can't say specifically during which meeting this took place. What was done at the Trimpark meeting and before that - this was the final stage, we were in the final stage of preparation and the medical corps, the logistic corps and the air wing, all of them had to be in place at the time of the Trimpark conference and at that stage the Generals in staff as well as their 2 IV's pertinently knew what was expected of them.

MR BRACHER: You see I am not talking about preparation, I am not talking about planning. I am talking about implementation. Presumably when you got an order to go and plant bombs in taxi ranks and restaurants and other black targets you would have gone out and done it immediately. Was it within the week before the election that, that decision was made by the General staff at head-office?

MR PRINSLOO: The person on the ground level who would have received such an order would have received that order from the Generals in staff via his commanders on a specific and given point in time.

CHAIRPERSON: How old was that decision before it was carried out?

MR PRINSLOO: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: How old was the decision to plant bombs at restaurants and taxi ranks before it was actually executed?

MR PRINSLOO: Approximately a week or two.

MR BRACHER: So it is during April of the election?


MR BRACHER: Now at that stage you were in battle mode if I can put it that way?


MR BRACHER: You had been promoted from secretary general to general in the fighting corps.

MR PRINSLOO: No, I was not promoted. It was just another term for it. Well in our system or hierarchy it worked that way. Your duties simply shifted from secretary of the AWB to operational and combat general of the AWB.

MR BRACHER: When were you appointed a general in the AWB then?

MR PRINSLOO: November 1992.

MR BRACHER: And when your functions were changed was that at the same meeting in April about two weeks before the elections?

MR PRINSLOO: No it could have been at least a week or two before that still.

MR BRACHER: Now the meeting where it was decided to plant bombs, about two weeks before the election, who was the chairperson of that meeting?

MR PRINSLOO: Well, there wasn't a specific chairperson of such a staff meeting. The chair would be occupied in some instances by Mr Terreblanche or General Ackerman or the person with the greatest length of service.

MR BRACHER: Don't give me "some instances". I am talking about that actual meeting.

MR PRINSLOO: I can't remember.

MR BRACHER: Who was at that actual meeting?

MR PRINSLOO: Who was the chairperson?

MR BRACHER: No, just tell me who was at the meeting? Is that the names you gave us yesterday?

MR PRINSLOO: Is that the Trimpark meeting?

MR BRACHER: The General staff meeting about two weeks before the election at which the General staff decided to plant bombs at taxi ranks, restaurants and other black targets. That meeting.

MR PRINSLOO: That was at Fyndoorings, outside Ventersdorp.

MR BRACHER: Am I correct? I have got Kiewiet Roodt, Cruywagen, Eugene Terreblanche, Jaco Oelofse, Dirk Ackerman, his brother Ackerman, the other Terreblanche and yourself.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: Are those the people who decided to bomb soft targets?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: Who when you were in the war mode was the commander in chief of the war that you were now going to fight?

MR PRINSLOO: Well every general had his own region in which he was supposed to act.

CHAIRPERSON: Well who was the overall chief commander of the entire war effort?

MR PRINSLOO: At the end of the day that would have been Eugene Terreblanche.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he in control?


MR BRACHER: Now you have been asked this morning about why you didn't claim the success of the Johannesburg bomb. You said after the Johannesburg bomb someone said: "Well it looks good," you considered it to be a success and then two things happened that I find surprising. First of all Mr Rundel who is said to be AWB spokesman. Rundel said: "The recent bombings ( I am reading from a report of the 25th of April, Business Day). Rundel said: "Recent bombings could have been carried out by any number of right-wing groups operating outside usual right-wing structures and denied the AWB was involved in any of the incidents." It is not just that you had said nothing. Your structure actually denied that you set the bombs. Now why would that be?

MR PRINSLOO: I can only tell you that Mr Rundel was not at all and never has been a military official or part of a Wencommando of the AWB. If he had made any statements at that stage that he himself would then expose himself to prosecution.

MR BRACHER: Because he gave the same evidence in mitigation at the criminal proceedings. He said: "that it wasn't upon the instructions of the AWB," or something to that effect. That is not correct?

MR PRINSLOO: I don't know about that.

MR BRACHER: The other thing that is very surprising to me, forget about public announcements, but all the people who were at the wildsplaas and none of them knew about it, nobody said: "We have had our first success in our war." Nobody told them that it was an AWB bomb. Why would that be?

MR PRINSLOO: Why didn't anybody know about it?

MR BRACHER: Well, you knew about it and you were there. Couldn't you call a meeting and say: "We have had a - things look good," as you put it. "We have killed 7 innocent people, we have injured 13 innocent people and we have blown up the shops and cars of other innocent people"?

MR PRINSLOO: No, I didn't communicate the successes which had been achieved.

MR BRACHER: You see the impression that we got the last time is that by that stage the ordinary members were becoming demoralised. They were happy to go back to their families by then. Wouldn't the proper thing to do would be to announce a successful mission, if that is what you thought it was?

MR PRINSLOO: No, I think that the morale of everybody at any stage was very high. The fact that members would return to their homes was not because the fact that they had low morale, it was simply to visit their family members or their families. It was not because they had to boost their morale.

MR BRACHER: But you asking other people to go out and plant bombs, wouldn't you expect the leadership to say: "We have already had a success. You are one of a great team here"?

MR PRINSLOO: No, I think that at all times by various commanders it was communicated to their subordinates that success had been achieved.

MR BRACHER: But you didn't do it with your region?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I am speaking about my region.

MR BRACHER: Why didn't you do it in your region if it was an AWB event?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct. Perhaps through the commanders it was communicated that certain successes had been achieved but I personally at a certain stage did not call the people together and say: "You have done well."

MR BRACHER: But you had a meeting there to talk about pipe bombs by which time the Jo'burg bomb had already gone off, not so?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: You didn't have to call a meeting. You just had to say: "This is an AWB bomb. We have done it, we are going to do some more."

MR PRINSLOO: Where was this meeting?

MR BRACHER: Wildsplaas.

MR PRINSLOO: No, I didn't address any public gathering.

MR MALAN: The question is not that. The question is that everybody was busy with the execution of their duties as you had determined it and others in terms of their own discretion and they would implement the plans and achieve success. They would know about the Germiston, Randfontein, Jo'burg and other bombs but you don't tell anybody: "Look at how successful we are." Why not? Just answer me regarding that. Why didn't you announce your successes?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I simply didn't do it.

MR MALAN: You asked de Wet to make his vehicle with the towbar available. He receives his orders from Myburg and Barnard, he goes out, they carry out their orders, a terrible bomb, he returns and he is on the same terrain where you are -you don't even thank him.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes I would have done that but I wouldn't have called everybody together.

MR MALAN: But that wasn't the question. The question was why you didn't inform your people. You said you would have done it but the question is did you do it?

MR PRINSLOO: I did tell certain people such as among others Mr de Wet that it had been successful. But what I mean is that I didn't call everybody together and announce to them: "Well, well done."

MR MALAN: Well why not because that is Mr Bracher's question.

MR PRINSLOO: That simply wasn't my style of operation.

MR BRACHER: The next question is this; ...(indistinct) step is not taken to announce it publicly and to claim responsibility that it is part of your strategy to get a Volkstaat, why then do you proceed with the Germiston bomb when the plan is simply not being put into operation by Mr Terreblanche?

MR PRINSLOO: It was not my duty at that stage to make such a statement.

MR BRACHER: But couldn't you get into the car as you seem to have done on a few occasions and gone to head-office and say: "What has gone wrong with our plan? We have killed 7 people and nobody has claimed responsibility." Why do you bomb more innocent people when the plan is not working?

MR PRINSLOO: That was the instructions from the Generals in staff that we must continue. At that stage I believed that they will still do it.

CHAIRPERSON: Then I think you did not understand the question. The question was why didn't you accept responsibility?

MR PRINSLOO: They were supposed to accept responsibility.

CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you do it?

MR PRINSLOO: It was not my duty.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it discussed at the Generals in staff who must take responsibility?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes. The AWB had to take responsibility but as I testified earlier on at that stage they had to know that there would be problems later on. There would be arrests and so on. At least a possibility of it. It seemed to me that they decided to take another direction.

CHAIRPERSON: In this whole operation did you at least or you had at least three generals visiting you?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you not discuss this with them and tell them or say to them: "When will the AWB make this announcement? This is part of a plan. How else must the government know why this bomb was detonated?"

MR PRINSLOO: We did discuss this at one stage. Somebody will have to make a press release. That was during the visit of the three generals at the game farm. They would have discussed this with Mr Terreblanche and other commanders. I did not receive any feedback from them again concerning this. They did not pertinently tell me who will do this.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me ask another question. The purpose of the whole operation was to prevent people from voting.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: How would the ordinary person on grassroots level know this? That they must get away from the voting polls.

MR PRINSLOO: Through the media.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that true? Why weren't the people then told? This is fair play, give them a warning.

MR PRINSLOO: Those bombings had to serve as a warning for the rest of the country.

CHAIRPERSON: How must they know then?

MR PRINSLOO: Through the media. Everybody knew it was the right-wing who did it. Or we assumed that everybody knew that it was the right-wing who planted this bomb.

CHAIRPERSON: The first thing that was written about the bombs and the right-wing the AWB denied it.

MR PRINSLOO: I understand now that it was Mr Rundel who denied this.

ADV BOSMAN: Where was Mr Terreblanche when this meeting was held at Fyndoorings where they talked about the bombs? Mr Eugene Terreblanche, where was he?

MR PRINSLOO: He was also there at Fyndoorings.

ADV BOSMAN: You did not mention his name on the question on who was there. If I can remember it correctly. I may make a mistake. You said now for the first time that he was there.

MR PRINSLOO: But he was not part of the Generals of staff, he was not a general.

ADV BOSMAN: Did he not attend this meeting?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, he did.

ADV BOSMAN: But at this stage when you decided or you said I am confused, you said that you could not remember who took the chair but you said that Mr Terreblanche as leader sometimes would take the chair.

MR PRINSLOO: In some circumstances yes.

ADV BOSMAN: Can you remember if he was present when the decision was made concerning the bombs?

MR PRINSLOO: He was always present if a decision had to be made concerning the bombs.

ADV BOSMAN: Could you therefore say that he was present when the bombings were discussed at Fyndoorings and he knew about it, he was well informed about this?


ADV BOSMAN: Another thing that confuses me while we are there. This Generals in staff they came from all over the country. Is this impression right?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is.

ADV BOSMAN: So where did General Roodt come from?

MR PRINSLOO: Roodt was from the Free State.

ADV BOSMAN: Cruywagen?

MR PRINSLOO: Eastern Transvaal.

ADV BOSMAN: And Prinsloo?

MR PRINSLOO: That is myself.

ADV BOSMAN: I am sorry. Oelofse?

MR PRINSLOO: Witwatersrand.

ADV BOSMAN: Dirk Ackerman?

MR PRINSLOO: He was from the Free State.

ADV BOSMAN: And the other Ackerman?

MR PRINSLOO: Also from the Free State.

ADV BOSMAN: And Terreblanche, Andries Terreblanche?

MR PRINSLOO: He was from the Western Transvaal.

ADV BOSMAN: How often did you come together?

MR PRINSLOO: Sometimes once a week but on a regular basis.

ADV BOSMAN: And at that stage when you sent a message that you communication lines were down and the Generals in staff must come and see you, where were all these generals? Were they in Ventersdorp? Because only 4 came to see you.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, at that stage - I was not in Ventersdorp myself when I met the people.

ADV BOSMAN: But you sent the message. Where did you think they were?

MR PRINSLOO: The map that was compiled of Western Transvaal or of this area that would be announced, every general received an area on this map that he had to protect.

ADV BOSMAN: In the Western Transvaal?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes. So all these people were gathered together in the Western Transvaal.

ADV BOSMAN: So at that stage no incidents occurred then in the Free State, Natal and the other areas?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, they did.

ADV BOSMAN: Under whose command did this happen?

MR PRINSLOO: It was under the commander who fell under the general.

ADV BOSMAN: But who did the coordination then?

MR PRINSLOO: It was through communication.

ADV BOSMAN: Certainly there had to or General Ackerman was the Free State's general, he certainly commanded what was going on there or was in charge of what was going on there but now he is in the Western Transvaal.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct but his commandos would serve there and then there were also members under his command from the Free State who for example Welkom who would serve here in the Western Transvaal.

ADV BOSMAN: According to you in expectation all the generals were in the Western Transvaal when you asked them to come and see you. What exactly did you want to discuss with them, because you now received your instructions and your discretion in to work out the finer details yourself.

MR PRINSLOO: Amongst others the communication. They had to provide me with a system in which I could communicate.

ADV BOSMAN: So you didn't want to discuss the matter of the bombs?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, amongst others I would definitely have discussed it with them. But I just notified Ventersdorp that I wanted to see them.

ADV BOSMAN: What was your primary problem? The communication?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, the communication was my primary problem.

ADV BOSMAN: Did you at that stage identify any specific problems concerning the bombs that you wanted to discuss with them?


ADV BOSMAN: So the bombs was an extra matter?

MR PRINSLOO: No I did not have any problems with them. I did not think that there would be any problems in sending out the bombs.

ADV BOSMAN: But no, my question is that when you told the generals that they must come and see you, your primary purpose was to discuss the communication problems with them. You were actually there to discuss the bomb planting with your men. Was this a problem that you wanted to discuss with them or would you just discuss the communication and then the bombs?

MR PRINSLOO: We would have discussed it, yes. It is logically.

ADV BOSMAN: Was this on the agenda? You wanted to talk to them about the communication and the bombing?

MR PRINSLOO: Well everything that I would convey to them if I had a radio system concerning the logistics and the workings of the camp. Everything I would have communicated for them.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you

ADV GCABASHE: Yes now I am interested in that. That communication, you know you use the word communication. You didn't want to talk to them about a radio that wouldn't work. That is not why you wanted to talk to them. You would deal with your technician on that aspect. You wanted to talk to them about the substance of what you were doing there. That is what you wanted to communicate with them over the radio. So they came across physically so that you could communicate whatever that was to them and get their feedback. You had a long meeting. What is it that you were communicating to them? What were those discussions?

MR PRINSLOO: It was about everything that happened in the camp. The actions that were executed at that stage. It was about communication and various other aspects, logistics.

MR BRACHER: Mr Prinsloo in this hearing we are talking about 4 bombs, the Johannesburg bomb, the Germiston bomb, the Jan Smuts bomb and I want to group them together - the pipe bombs. Now in order to decided to those bombings how many General staff decisions and meetings were held?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I cannot remember. There were various meetings.

MR BRACHER: Did you have a special meeting at which it was decided you now want an international incident and you must bomb Jan Smuts airport?

MR PRINSLOO: No, there was not a specific meeting for that. It was conveyed to us that we had to make international news.

MR BRACHER: How was that decision taken by the AWB?

MR PRINSLOO: It had the approval of the Generals in staff because they visited me and during their visit I conveyed this to them and we discussed this.

MR BRACHER: Now that is the point I am getting to. We have now got two meetings. One two weeks before and one with that visit. Now who was on that visit? Just give me the names of the people who came on that visit.

MR PRINSLOO: The people who came to visit me at the game farm?


MR PRINSLOO: It was General Roodt, Cruywagen, General Ackerman, Dirk Ackerman. Under correction now General Ackerman. There were at least three members.

MR BRACHER: You said to us now that when decisions are taken Mr Eugene Terreblanche was always present. Was he there?

MR PRINSLOO: At the game farm?



MR BRACHER: Were they conveying to you a decision taken by the General staff or did you have a meeting there which decided you wanted an international incident?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I accepted that it was generally discussed.

CHAIRPERSON: If it was discussed in general would you have been part of that meeting?

MR PRINSLOO: No, they wouldn't have called me in.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you not part of the Generals in staff?


CHAIRPERSON: So in other words where would this have been discussed then before it came to you?

MR PRINSLOO: In Ventersdorp at a certain stage.

CHAIRPERSON: But who would have attended this meeting?

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairperson it would have been members who was in Ventersdorp who was close to Ventersdorp. It could have been at a member or two or three did not attend this meeting.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you not make those decisions there at that stage, the 4 of you?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, at the game farm but with approval.

CHAIRPERSON: Whose approval?

MR PRINSLOO: It would have received approval of the whole Generals in staff and Terreblanche.

CHAIRPERSON: You said that you thought, you are not sure?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I can with certainty say.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you as a member of the Generals in staff, were you present at a meeting where it was decided that it is necessary that an international incident must take place at possibly the airport?

MR PRINSLOO: I was at such a meeting, yes at the game farm.

CHAIRPERSON: And who was present there?

MR PRINSLOO: The generals that came to visit me.

CHAIRPERSON: So you do not know if there was another meeting where that decision was made?

MR PRINSLOO: We would never have come up with a proposal if it did not carry the approval of the rest of the Generals in staff.

CHAIRPERSON: But if it was discussed before and you had to be at that meeting or at least being invited to that meeting because you are a member of the Generals in staff.

MR PRINSLOO: They would have notified me, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So, they did not.

MR PRINSLOO: Well these people did come and give me a message, answers

CHAIRPERSON: You accepted it was a message. You did not know it was a message.

MR PRINSLOO: I cannot with certainty say, no.

MR MALAN: The visit that you are referring to am I right when I say that you said it was a Generals in staff meeting?

MR PRINSLOO: You can call it that.

MR MALAN: No, that is what you said. Were you present at such a meeting where the question regarding the international incident was discussed? You answered - it is not me who said it, you answered: "Yes I was at such a meeting during that visit they again asked who was present. You said Roodt, Cruywagen and under correction you think Ackerman and yourself.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR MALAN: That is your definition of a Generals in staff meeting.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: So the Generals in staff did not have a quorum - not at that stage, at any stage?

MR PRINSLOO: At previous meetings there was or there had to be a quorum but at that stage we were in a process of warfare and we just saw that it was not necessary to have a quorum.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you say that the leader of the AWB was aware of that decision when it was taken?

MR PRINSLOO: It would definitely be conveyed to him after the decision was made but I cannot say that at that specific moment knew about it.

MR MALAN: How can you say that it definitely be conveyed to him? Were you not even then or didn't you even convey information to him?

MR PRINSLOO: What didn't I convey to him?

MR MALAN: The pipe bombs, the Johannesburg bomb you did not report back to him. Why do you expect others to do it then?

MR PRINSLOO: When did I not report back?

MR MALAN: Did you go and tell the leader that: "We implemented the Johannesburg bomb"?

MR PRINSLOO: At various opportunities I drove through and I reported back to the Generals in staff and Eugene Terreblanche.

MR MALAN: And did you do this between the Sunday and the Wednesday?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes at various opportunities. That is why I needed these people to rectify my communication because General Cruywagen was in charge or put in charge by the Generals in staff.

CHAIRPERSON: When was the first time that you went through to Mr Terreblanche and spoke to him after the Bree Street bomb?

MR PRINSLOO: It was the Sunday and then.

CHAIRPERSON: Was the first time the Sunday after the Bree Street bomb?

MR PRINSLOO: The Sunday was the 24th it had to be after the Bree Street bombs.

CHAIRPERSON: Now I am asking when was the first time after the Bree Street bomb?

MR PRINSLOO: That was the Sunday when I went through.

CHAIRPERSON: And what time did that bomb go off?

MR PRINSLOO: It was early the morning.

CHAIRPERSON: So on that day you went back to Terreblanche?



MR PRINSLOO: Under correction, it was not too late.

CHAIRPERSON: And what did you say to him or why did you go to him?

MR PRINSLOO: I especially went to Ventersdorp because I wanted the people on the farm to work out my communication system and General Cruywagen was in charge or placed in charge of amongst others the communication network throughout the whole area as well as the other areas.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you see Terreblanche on that day?


CHAIRPERSON: And what did you discuss with him?

MR PRINSLOO: I discussed the bomb.

CHAIRPERSON: The Bree Street bomb?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you tell him?

MR PRINSLOO: I just said or I asked him did he know what happened or what time it happened. At that stage I did not specifically know when it happened. I did not have the details.

CHAIRPERSON: So you went to Mr Terreblanche to get information?

MR PRINSLOO: That is what was on the television.

CHAIRPERSON: Not to report back to him but to get information from him?

MR PRINSLOO: Also to get information and to report back.

CHAIRPERSON: About what did you want to report back?

MR PRINSLOO: That the bomb was sent out.

CHAIRPERSON: But if you go and ask Terreblanche when did this go off then what could you have told him then?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes but there were specific times and groups. I did not see Mr Barnard them during the rest of that day.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo we have to accept that if you went to go and ask Terreblanche what time the bomb went off how could you then assume that he did not know.

MR PRINSLOO: He definitely knew about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Then why did you then go through to Ventersdorp to go and tell him that there was a bomb attack and that we did it in Bree Street if he knew about it?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And you realised that he knew about it you were going to ask him when the bomb went off.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct. We would have discussed this.

MR MALAN: And you said that you saw General Cruywagen there?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Why did Cruywagen and Roodt go back to the game farm?

MR PRINSLOO: I did not see them in Ventersdorp.

MR MALAN: No you were asked if I heard you correctly but I will look at my notes but if I heard you correctly you said the Sunday that you went in to Ventersdorp you amongst others saw General Cruywagen and then it was also asked did you see Mr Terreblanche and you said - I would just like you to remind me but I would just like to construct what I have got in mind and what I heard you say. You said amongst others on the Sunday you wanted to go and speak with Cruywagen because he was in charge of communication for the area as well as a larger area and you had a problem and you went to go and discuss this with him and then you were asked if you saw the leader and then you said yes. Did you see him or did you not see him?

MR PRINSLOO: No, I didn't see him. They came to visit me on the game farm.

MR MALAN: Who else did you see there? The leader and?

MR PRINSLOO: There were various other leaders or members in Ventersdorp.

MR MALAN: Was this of the Generals in staff?

MR PRINSLOO: No I cannot remember if I saw any one of the Generals in staff.

MR MALAN: Then why did you go there then?

MR PRINSLOO: To get the people who could establish a communication system for me so in order for us to communicate with the other areas. I am sorry?


MR PRINSLOO: With the people who would come to visit me on the farm.

CHAIRPERSON: So did you discuss it with them?

MR PRINSLOO: With the people who came to visit me?

CHAIRPERSON: No that morning when you went to Ventersdorp.

MR PRINSLOO: Well that was in the afternoon.

CHAIRPERSON: Well then the afternoon in Ventersdorp.

MR PRINSLOO: I did convey the message to the people in Ventersdorp. To specifically send a communication person to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you also tell this to the leader?

MR PRINSLOO: I could have mentioned it to him, I am not sure that I did. It is possible that I could have done it. I cannot specifically say I did.

MR BRACHER: The evidence of the previous witness and I think your evidence is that over those few days when the bombings were taking place you drove backwards and forwards to and from Ventersdorp and you said just now that was two or three occasions. Is that correct?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes it could be so, two or three times. I cannot specifically remember how many times.

MR BRACHER: Well a few occasions. It was two or three a fair guess?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, I would say approximately.

MR BRACHER: When you went back to head-office who did you phone there on those occasions? Who was in charge of the head-office?

MR PRINSLOO: Sometimes it would be Generals in staff, members of the Generals in staff. Terreblanche was always present.

MR BRACHER: Mr Eugene Terreblanche was always present?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: Can you remember who else was present when you went back?

MR PRINSLOO: A person or if someone or if Mr Terreblanche was not in his office I would find him on his farm or somewhere in town. Ventersdorp is not a big place and at that stage there were hundreds of members in Ventersdorp.

MR BRACHER: Now we are not talking about members. I am talking about leadership.

MR PRINSLOO: There were various commanders there.

MR BRACHER: Except to go back to sort out your communication problems what else did you go back to do at head-office?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I went to go and visit my farm.

MR BRACHER: No, no, no at head-office. You see you were the go-between between Wildsplaas and head-office conveying orders backwards and forwards.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: What were those orders.

MR PRINSLOO: My orders? I went to go and report back at Ventersdorp and at one opportunity I went to go and try and find a person who would be responsible for communication between the game farm and the other areas in the district.

MR BRACHER: Did you go back to head-office to report about the Germiston bomb?

MR PRINSLOO: Amongst others yes because at that stage there were various bombs that went off at different places as well as people who were arrested with explosives.

MR BRACHER: Did you go and report those events to head-office?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I had to do it at some stage. The times and dates I cannot specifically say.

CHAIRPERSON: Who did you report to?

MR PRINSLOO: I did to co-members of the Generals in staff.

MR BRACHER: Do you remember who those were though, which members of the General staff?

MR PRINSLOO: Well at one stage or at stages it could have been General Oelofse, General Ackerman, General Terreblanche.

MR BRACHER: Eugene Terreblanche?

MR PRINSLOO: No, General Terreblanche.

MR BRACHER: What is his first name?


MR BRACHER: Ackerman, is that Dirk Ackerman?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct they are also two brothers.

MR BRACHER: What is the brother's name.

MR PRINSLOO: Well I cannot remember.

MR BRACHER: You don't remember who you reported about the bombings then?

MR PRINSLOO: Well it was a members of the Generals in staff but I cannot specifically say that Pretoria was reported back to 4 of these members or 5 of these Generals in staff. I cannot remember their names or cannot say.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you not report back to the leader because he is at head of the war?

MR PRINSLOO: We always reported back to him.


MR PRINSLOO: Yes and by Brigadier Leon van der Merwe.

CHAIRPERSON: No I am not talking about other people. I am talking about you. Every time that you went to Ventersdorp and you reported back did you report back to the leader? Is that correct?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes that is correct. At one stage during that visit to Ventersdorp I would see him.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you certainly with the Germiston bomb and the pipe bombs reported back to the leader and that is after the meeting with the three other generals or it had to be after the meeting with the other generals?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you never discuss with the leader when you reported back about Germiston that you understand that there also must be an international incident?

MR PRINSLOO: I cannot remember that, no -if he mentioned it to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you discuss this with him because you were not present at a meeting where it according to you had to be discussed?

MR PRINSLOO: That afternoon after the people left to the shooting range I left the shooting range and went back to Ventersdorp. If I mentioned it there to him I do not know. I definitely saw him and members of the Generals in staff. There was members of the Generals in staff who visited the shooting range when I left. I cannot remember who it was.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo let us keep to the international incident. You were now informed, according to your evidence, that you must execute or begin an international incident. You receive an opportunity after you were informed about this to go and talk to the leader. An international incident during the elections in South Africa at that stage would have been a big thing. Is that not true?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is true.

CHAIRPERSON: And part of the planning was that the leader would then announce who would be responsible for it.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: How can you not remember if you discussed this with him or not?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I would have had to have discussed it with him.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you remember or not? It is an exception. It is important. It is not something out of the ordinary.

MR PRINSLOO: Well at that stage all explosions were important to us. I can't remember that I would specifically only have mentioned that to him. It is logical that I would have mentioned it to him but I can't say with certainty whether or not I did so at that stage.

MR BRACHER: Mr Prinsloo there is another mystery that I want you to clear up. You told us that the Bree Street, Johannesburg bomb was a sneller, it was one of the important bombs in the whole campaign, it was the start of everything. You also told us that you had set up all your structures and your supply lines. Why did you not supply to Koesterfontein from the AWB the things that they needed to make the bomb? We have heard that they had to scratch around in the grass the get an old grass roller and bits of metal and this and that, borrow a trailer without telling the owner in advance they were borrowing it. That doesn't show any kind of organisation at all. Now why is that?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I can assure you that everything was very well organised and planned within the organisation. The fact that they scratched around looking for explosives [intervention]

MR BRACHER: Bits of metal to put on top of it to make it worse.

MS VAN DER WALT: Could I just intervene at this point. I don't wish to make an objection. I know that during other amnesty applications this sort of thing was never allowed. I don't wish to object but the idea which is being created here by Mr Bracher is that there was an unorganised manufacturing of bombs taking place and that in essence people scratched around for the parts for bombs.

With all respect it was a bomb that was being manufactured. They were looking for scraps of metal in order to have shrapnel. They had the equipment. We heard evidence from Mr Venter who went to fetch the explosives in Welkom and it was a very powerful bomb that went off as a result of the shrapnel. It is not that it was an unorganised scratching around on the farm. It was just that they went to go and look for the metal to put onto the bomb. It is such an unnecessary patronage of this person's evidence.

MR BRACHER: Mr Prinsloo what did you supply for the bomb? You told us at the beginning of your evidence in chief that you were in charge of supplies I think.

MR PRINSLOO: I beg your pardon? I was in command of supplies?

MR BRACHER: Supplies.

MR PRINSLOO: Well that is the logistics. Supplies don't have anything to do with the explosives.

MR BRACHER: Who organised that?

MR PRINSLOO: That would have been the various commanders or the special officers who were involved with that.

MR BRACHER: Who would be the person supplying equipment or explosives for that bomb to Koesterfontein?

MR PRINSLOO: Which bomb would that be?

MR BRACHER: Any one of the Koesterfontein bombs.

MR PRINSLOO: From all over as I understood it explosives were collected. Who specifically did this is unknown to me.

MR BRACHER: Was none of this organised from headquarters?

MR PRINSLOO: Well there were explosives which were stored in head-office. Whether that specific store of explosives were used in Koesterfontein or on the game farm is not possible for me to say with certainty. It is possible.

MR BRACHER: Can I put it differently. Is the short answer that you simply don't know who supplied anything to Koesterfontein? You personally don't know.

MR PRINSLOO: Personally I don't know but what I can tell you is that I know that explosives were taken from head-office as well as parachutes and these were transported to Koesterfontein, explosives. However, whether it was that specific charge of explosives from head-office is unknown to me. I don't know if it was that explosives which was used in the Pretoria bomb or the Germiston bomb or the Bree Street bomb.

MR BRACHER: The other mystery is this. You are the General staff commander of that area in which the bombs are being made, why did you never go to Koesterfontein?

MR PRINSLOO: Because I did not regard that as my duty.

MR BRACHER: But it was your duty. You were the commander of that region where the great sneller of your whole campaign was going to begin.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes there were other members under my command who were in charge of such tasks.

MR BRACHER: Who were they?

MR PRINSLOO: There were various persons; Mr Johan Smit.

MR BRACHER: I am talking about General staff members.

MR PRINSLOO: No, Generals in staff wouldn't have reached that. Except for Leon van der Merwe who was also a member of Generals in staff. He might have been there. But I never specifically inspected Koesterfontein the farm.

MR BRACHER: Why do you say it isn't your duty? Why do you say that?

MR PRINSLOO: Because I delegated some of my tasks and duties to members under my command.

MR BRACHER: Okay now who did you delegate that function to, to go and check up on the happenings in Koesterfontein?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I can't remember that I delegated that task to anyone specific but Mr Cliff Barnard at a certain point reported to me. I think it was approximately two or three occasions. He reported to me regarding what they were busy with.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it not your task to go and inspect what was going on there? Is that how you saw it?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I believe if there had been time.

CHAIRPERSON: No, this is the big bomb. This is the beginning of the great war. It was manufactured in your jurisdiction and you say that it wasn't your duty because it wouldn't have been your duty because you would have delegated it to someone.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it your duty before you delegated it?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I should be believe that it was my duty and the fact that Mr Barnard was entrusted with that order was enough reason for me to believe that he was the right person for the job. Specifically with regard to the Johannesburg bomb then.

MR BRACHER: What was Mr Barnard's rank?

MR PRINSLOO: He was a captain in the Ystergarde but he was also a specialist in his own field. He didn't wear a uniform in order to make it more specific. He didn't serve in any specific group or group of members of the Ystergarde or the Wencommando. He was the confidante of Mr Terreblanche. He was a specialist in his field and he was a very well highly trained person.

MR BRACHER: After the Johannesburg, Bree Street bomb who reported back to you about the events?

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Barnard and Myburg.

MR BRACHER: Did they come to you on the game farm?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes I must have seen them there at a certain point but I can't remember exactly what time. It must have been on the Sunday.

MR BRACHER: It must have been after the bomb and before you went to head-office.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: What is your evidence about whether the radio on the farm was working or not?

MR PRINSLOO: On the game farm? Whether or not I had a radio?

MR BRACHER: Some witnesses have said there was a radio masted up and there was a radio communication with the outside world.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: Mr Smit said yesterday the radio wasn't working.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: Which is correct?

MR PRINSLOO: There was communication between the mast and vehicles who were moving around in the area, in the immediate area. There was also communication between the sleeping quarters or the barracks and the main entrance and then there was also communication between the mast, the ops and patrolling guards in the area.

MR BRACHER: And between the mast and head-office?

MR PRINSLOO: There was no communication. Well at least when I requested communication we had no communication. It could be that at a certain point we had communication at an earlier stage but I myself didn't have any communication.

MR BRACHER: Now when the bombers were sent out to go and bomb targets it seemed to me that the decision where to place those bombs was entirely left to the prejudices of the individual bomber. That there was no order from above as to where to place a bomb.

MR PRINSLOO: Do you mean specifically in which street or in which premises if that is what you are trying to determine? Because there was no such order.

MR BRACHER: What was the order for the Johannesburg bomb?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bracher I am sure you are referring to above in a political sense, not in the accurate sense.

MR BRACHER: Yes. What was the order for the Johannesburg bomb?

MR PRINSLOO: With regard to what? Which premises it should be?

MR BRACHER: Where did they have to plant that bomb?

MR PRINSLOO: There was no specific premises or name of premises, street address.

CHAIRPERSON: Which bomb are you talking about?

MR BRACHER: The Johannesburg, Bree Street bomb.

CHAIRPERSON: The general thing was that it was supposed to be in an area where the most victims would be black. Is that correct?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

MR BRACHER: Was the order to go to Johannesburg or go to the CBD in Johannesburg or to go to a main street in Johannesburg or what was the order from the General staff?

MR PRINSLOO: The city centre of Johannesburg.

MR BRACHER: Did you give that order?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, I gave that order.

MR BRACHER: Was that an order that came from a decision of the General staff meeting?


MR BRACHER: And the Germiston bomb.

MR PRINSLOO: What about that?

MR BRACHER: Was the order to bomb the central area of Germiston?

MR PRINSLOO: Well that would have been the logical place to do it.


MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR BRACHER: And would that have come from the General staff decision?

MR PRINSLOO: Naturally that is correct because as I have testified earlier an area was assigned to me which incorporated different towns and everybody in Staff knew Germiston, Boksburg, Springs, Benoni.

MR BRACHER: Let's go back to the Johannesburg, Bree Street bomb. Is it correct then that the General staff didn't care where the individual bomber placed that bomb as long as it was somewhere in the CBD?

MR PRINSLOO: Johannesburg specifically had to be somewhere in the inner city. That was the discretion of the person who would be driving the vehicle.

MR BRACHER: And if he put that bomb outside an Inkatha hostel that was just too bad. Were there no ANC people?

MR PRINSLOO: No these people knew what they were doing. They did their homework.

MR BRACHER: Well you see it was a very funny thing. They didn't do any homework. They found one man that knew Johannesburg and it seems all he knew was where the massage parlours were.


MR BRACHER: That is not fair. It wasn't the only thing.

MR PRINSLOO: That is not fair.

MR BRACHER: Can you go back. I want to know about that map. I couldn't see it on the TV screen. What was on that map at the beginning of the TV programme?

MR PRINSLOO: The area.

MR BRACHER: What area? What were the boundaries of that area?

MR PRINSLOO: Well the area which we had cordoned off. Earlier in my evidence I stated to you that this was the area of which the borders had been determined by the granting of the freedom of the towns to the various right-wing groups amongst others the BKA, the CP and the AWB.

MR BRACHER: Mr Prinsloo don't make it difficult for me. Just give me the east, west, north and south boundaries.

MR PRINSLOO: I am explaining so that you can understand precisely how it operated.

MR BRACHER: What is the southern (...indistinct)

MR PRINSLOO: Where the southernmost tip of such a freedom of a town would be granted and the northernmost point and the easternmost point and westernmost point, that area which incorporated these towns or that region or those borders, the borders of these towns would determine the borders of the area and it has been indicated as such on the map.

MR BRACHER: What were the boundaries? Just tell me what was the southern boundary?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I can't answer you regarding that right now.

ADV GCABASHE: If I might just interrupt. Which town was at each point? I understand that you say it was the border of that town. Which town therefore was at each point?

MR PRINSLOO: Well the southernmost point I would assume would be Koster.

MR BRACHER: And the westernmost point?

MR PRINSLOO: I would estimate that this would be the Brandvlei environment.

MR BRACHER: The easternmost point?

MR PRINSLOO: Rustenburg.

MR BRACHER: Northernmost point?

MR PRINSLOO: Schweizer-Reneke and Hoopstad.

CHAIRPERSON: Sir, have you got any questions left?


MR MALAN: I would just like to ask you something about this because I can't understand it. On my map Hoopstad is definitely much more south from Koster and from Rustenburg and you have given that as the northernmost point. I think that you should draw a map for us.

MR PRINSLOO: No, the southernmost point - well let me put it this way, the southernmost point was Schweizer-Reneke.

MS VAN DER WALT: I beg your pardon but the video which we showed yesterday, the one about the Trimpark meeting upon which the map is clearly indicated perhaps we could watch that video if we could just have a short adjournment to prepare and then we could all have clarity on this.

CHAIRPERSON: But why can't the witness tell us?

MS VAN DER WALT: Well it appears that he has some problems with his directions. I beg your pardon Chairperson but this is with regard to what Mr Malan said that he should draw a map and I simply feel that in order to save time we could use the video.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let's ask him. What would you say is the southernmost point?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I would say that the southernmost tip would be more east from Ventersdorp. Let's say the Koster area.

CHAIRPERSON: And the westernmost point?

MR PRINSLOO: Rustenburg.


MR PRINSLOO: The Brandvlei environment.

CHAIRPERSON: And northernmost point?

MR PRINSLOO: I am speaking under correction but I can't remember which towns were in that specific area but I would say that it would be approximately in the vicinity of Schweizer-Reneke. The map would stipulate it.

ADV GCABASHE: Just for clarity. You drew that map. That is what you said to us yesterday. Am I right?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, in cooperation with members and information which we received.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MR MALAN: Chairperson I would just like to ask one more question. I don't know if this witness will be of any more assistance to us. You had orders for operations in PWV area. In other words the Witwatersrand incorporating Pretoria and the Vaal Triangle. In Generals in staff you had a colleague who was your senior in years and experience and in military training and his name was General Japie Oelofse. Other evidence which has been placed before us indicates that he is by nature a military person. So why didn't he receive the orders to carry out these important tasks?

MR PRINSLOO: Because I was at head-office and I had to do it. I am older than General Japie Oelofse.

MR MALAN: I am not asking whether or not you are older. I am speaking about his seniority with regard to military expertise and his involvement in operations as well because you were acting as a secretary, as an administrative person and in two weeks all of a sudden your duties are redefined and you receive different tasks. In a short matter of two weeks and it was because of an important issue of preventing the elections and sowing the psychology of fear. Well in terms of experience Japie Oelofse had, had much more experience with this. So why didn't he receive the tasks?

MR PRINSLOO: Because he had his own region and therefore his own tasks and duties which he had to carry out.

MR MALAN: I would also like to ask you, according to other evidence which was placed before us Japie Oelofse was arrested in the beginning of 1994 after a number of bomb explosions. Do you remember that? Do you know anything about that?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: When was he released from prison?

MR PRINSLOO: I think in December 1994 or 1993 he was arrested.

MR MALAN: And for how long was he in detention?

MR PRINSLOO: I can't remember.

MR MALAN: Was he still in detention when this matter took place?

MR PRINSLOO: He spent quite some time in detention and at that point in time he was in detention. I don't know whether or not he was released during that period.

MR MALAN: But he has given evidence of his being present during this period of time. Are you sure that he was present at Fynbos?

MR PRINSLOO: I have said that I am speaking under correction. That these members who were present there, whether or not they were definitely there such as amongst others Japie Oelofse would be uncertain for me to give a definite answer about. I know that he spent time in detention with regard to bomb explosions.

MR MALAN: Why do you say that he had his own region that he was responsible for if he was in detention?

MR PRINSLOO: He was in command of Witwatersrand area.

MR MALAN: But that is my question exactly. Because your area of task was the Witwatersrand area. You would place all your bombs in the Witwatersrand area apart from the one in Pretoria.

MR PRINSLOO: We had to operate in the Witwatersrand.

MR MALAN: In Japie Oelofse's area?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: But you were in command in his area?

MR PRINSLOO: No, I was in command in my area.

MR MALAN: To go and operate in his area?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct. Those were the orders to operate on the East and West Rand.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. So let us assume for purpose of this question that this was an AWB operation and that the decision to go on indiscriminate killing was taken a couple of weeks before the election. Could you please inform this Committee the decision to go to that form of warfare, when was that decision retracted or has it been retracted by the AWB?

MR PRINSLOO: Well that has always been the viewpoint or the discussion point among others at the staff meetings that members and supporters of the ANC/SACP alliance would be attacked.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, does that decision to carry on this form of warfare to attain this Volkstaat still exist?

MR PRINSLOO: At this stage?


MR PRINSLOO: No, not at all.

MS CAMBANIS: When was that decision - when was it decided to cease hostility so to speak?

MR PRINSLOO: On the day of the election.

MS CAMBANIS: When on the day of the election?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I can't remember exactly at what time this took place.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you part of that decision?

MR PRINSLOO: To cease everything?

CHAIRPERSON: No, to cease the policy.

MR PRINSLOO: To cessation of the policy of attacking the ANC?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well that as well.

MR PRINSLOO: The policy of attacking black people? Well that all formed part of the same thing.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let us call it the terrorism then. Were you part of a meeting during which this decision was made on that day, that day of the election?

MR PRINSLOO: Well this kind of meeting was never held, at least where I was present.

CHAIRPERSON: Then how do you know that it was ceased?

MR PRINSLOO: I am speaking under correction but the night before we received communication from a person who was working at head-office. I can't remember exactly what time on the day before the election.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that person credible?

MR PRINSLOO: Well he was a member of the administrative staff.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he reliable?

MR PRINSLOO: I believe so, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you believe him?

MR PRINSLOO: At that stage I received a report or information that members at the shooting range were arrested or some of them had been arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: When was that?

MR PRINSLOO: On the day of the election.

CHAIRPERSON: I understood you that you received the message the night before the elections that everything is going to be stopped.

MR PRINSLOO: Well on the day of the election, the last bomb that went out, that was the Johannesburg.

CHAIRPERSON: No, when did you receive the message?

MR PRINSLOO: That evening.

CHAIRPERSON: The night before the election? Are we talking about that night?

MR PRINSLOO: No, it was the Monday, the Tuesday we heard about what happened at the shooting range. If you could just help me there.

CHAIRPERSON: No, let us talk in relation to the elections. As I understood your evidence the evening before the elections a message was sent and it was brought by a person who you trusted.

MR PRINSLOO: I was in Ventersdorp when I received this message.

CHAIRPERSON: And you believed it and everything was stopped officially. But why the bomb at the airport then?

MR PRINSLOO: The persons still went out.

CHAIRPERSON: Why, if everything was stopped under your charge or command?

MR PRINSLOO: I had not arrived at the shooting range yet ... to the shooting range and that was where Mr Smit them were already arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: From where did the men go when they planted the bomb at the airport?

MR PRINSLOO: It had to be from the shooting range in the Rustenburg area.

CHAIRPERSON: The bomb at the airport was planted the day of the elections.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Then why weren't those people stopped then? Because everything was stopped.

MR PRINSLOO: Because they left early that morning to the airport.

CHAIRPERSON: But you knew it the previous night and you are in charge of the whole operation. You certainly know where these people are or the men are. Why didn't you tell them to stop and wait?

MR PRINSLOO: There was a stage or time as with the members at Koesterfontein that we did not exactly know 24 hours a day where all the members were. The same with the people who would be responsible for the airport.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you try and get hold of them?

MR PRINSLOO: No I cannot remember that, that I tried to get hold of them.

MR MALAN: Is your answer no?

MR PRINSLOO: My answer is no.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I ask you. Is this the first time the applicants hear of this decision or have they heard about that decision prior to today? It is the first time this Committee hears of that decision.

MR PRINSLOO: What decision?

CHAIRPERSON: That everything must be stopped. Well at least the evening before the elections.

MR PRINSLOO: The evening before the Johannesburg airport incident there was talk that everything must be stopped because there will be arrests.

CHAIRPERSON: No it wasn't just talk. Everything was stopped. You knew about this.

MR PRINSLOO: That was the order yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The question that my colleague asked was the applicants did they know about this?

MR PRINSLOO: I believe that a very few of them knew.

CHAIRPERSON: They fall under your command. Why didn't they know?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct, yes. Brigadier Leon van der Merwe and co-commanders would have done this task and then convey it to the different groups. Amongst others the Ystergaarde at the game farm or shooting range.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo we are not playing rugby now. This is important. Peoples' lives are at stake here. Including the applicants' lives. You are the boss of a certain area, applicants fall under your command in your area. Why wasn't any attempts made to inform them about the fact that you are going to stop fighting this war?

MR PRINSLOO: I personally did not do it.

CHAIRPERSON: I know but why?

MR PRINSLOO: It was [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Or did you want them to continue with this war irrespective of this decision.


MR MALAN: Can I just come in here. I heard the witness said that they must stop everything because they will be arrested because the reason why he stopped everything it was not to prevent any further loss of life but not to be caught or arrested.

MR PRINSLOO: It could be.

MR MALAN: No I am asking you. You must decide. You said that the message came through; "Stop everything, people will be arrested." In other words: "Do not continue with the operations, we are in dangerous grounds now." Is that true.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes that is correct.

MR MALAN: But you must decide stop everything as the chairman understand what you said. "Do not go further and kill people, it is not the right thing any more. The elections will continue, we can do nothing about it." Or was the decision; "Stop everything, get away, the police will arrest us, look after yourself." What was the message that you received that evening?

MR PRINSLOO: Well it was not that clear or pertinent. "Stop everything because you will be locked up." The main reason was obviously that there will be arrests but that the people must break up and go and hide in that area.

MALAN: That was now the end of the operation in the

interests of the people who took part in this operation.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is correct.

MALAN: It wasn't a humane decision. "We must now stop killing innocent people."

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MALAN: So much more then the Chairperson asked you and the way he understand it and I still do not know what is the truth. If the instruction was to stop everything in order not to take further lives why didn't you convey this message: "Tell these people that we must not continue killing innocent people"? But I will put it to you differently. If you understood it in that it would be in the interests of the men who will be arrested why didn't you immediately drive from the farm and tell them? I do not know what this afrikaans term means but why didn't you tell them: "Get away from here, the police are onto you."

MR PRINSLOO: Most of the members were then already - they weren't at the shooting range any more. There were some members there and I am talking under correction. Mr van der Merwe made contact to us by phone in the Rustenburg area. I know some of the people phoned us during that night and said people were already arrested in the Rustenburg area and Koster area but specifically on the farm I cannot say. I know that it was at least four or five 'o clock in the morning when the people were or would have been arrested and that was from the previous evening.

MR MALAN: Mr Prinsloo I will undertake not to ask further questions to you but the picture in my head is that you suddenly became a combat general with responsibilities in this position. You have never done this before in your whole life. You get an area, certain things had to be done. You say that you delegate some of your powers. Myburg and Barnard clearly takes initiative for which you did not give them instructions but they started it and you are satisfied. You said Barnard is an expert, he will do the work and you are satisfied that the work is in good hands. I would put it to you that you were only in charge in name and you had no control of what was going on. I would like to hear your comment then I will stop asking questions.

MR PRINSLOO: I did have definite control and command over these people amongst others a person Koper Myburg and Cliff Barnard, the members at Koesterfontein who was also present there would under no circumstances make use of their own agenda without myself, Brigadier Leon van der Merwe and the other co-commanders and the Generals in Staff and Eugene Terreblanche's permission.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Prinsloo what is the military background of these generals? What military training did you receive?

MR PRINSLOO: I was in South West. I acted operationally.

ADV BOSMAN: What was your rank in the defence force?


ADV BOSMAN: What is a KO?

MR PRINSLOO: Warrant officer. I was Katima Malibu based, stationed or stationed there.

ADV BOSMAN: And what was General Roodt's rank when he was involved?

MR PRINSLOO: I can't answer that.

ADV BOSMAN: Cruywagen?

MR PRINSLOO: I do not know.

ADV BOSMAN: Oelofse?

MR PRINSLOO: I do not know.

ADV BOSMAN: Ackerman, Dirk Ackerman?


ADV BOSMAN: You see what worries me is that if these generals were not really generals but you said that you cannot help us with this. How well trained were they? Military trained.

MR PRINSLOO: The generals were well trained. They were also warrant officers or one of them was also a warrant officer in the police. They were well trained. If there was a shortage the generals would make use of specialised people in the South African Police or then South African Defence Force.

ADV BOSMAN: Just one more question then I will stop. On what basis were generals appointed?

MR PRINSLOO: Well according to the members he had under his command. He had to move through specific structures in the AWB.

ADV BOSMAN: In other words not for his military background and expertise?

MR PRINSLOO: No, not in all cases but we did have generals who was in charge of the culture and recreation and these type of things.

MS CAMBANIS: Can you please assist us with details. It is 4 years down the line, who and when did they decide to cease hostilities in this form of indiscriminate killing of civilians? You have had 4 years to find this out.

MR PRINSLOO: No, it was definitely not 4 years for me to find this out. The day we stopped all action with warfare was when we saw that it served no purpose. No financial gain but we remained where we were and where we did not want to be. When we realised that the ANC did or will win the elections and it can be proven we stopped all actions.

CHAIRPERSON: But you knew months before that the ANC will win. You even said so.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But why do you say now that just when you found out that the ANC will win you stopped?

MR PRINSLOO: We always hoped that somewhere we would be accommodated.

MS CAMBANIS: But Sir as you know Mr Barnard and Mr Myburg did not cease any hostilities.

MR PRINSLOO: Well these two people were driven by circumstances. The fact that they just like the other applicants they did not do it for their own personal gain but they did it for something that they believed in. These people escaped from detention. They sent an urgent message to the Minister of Justice where they requested or asked him that amnesty will be given as well as not these specific applicants but other applicants across the country. That amnesty will be given to them and at that stage there was no talk of amnesty and they acted out of anger against the system and then acted again in the Worcester area. Not that I am agreeing with what they did or then the AWB but they were forced into those circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON: They were forced to detonate a bomb in a shopping centre?


CHAIRPERSON: Didn't they do that?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, they did it.

CHAIRPERSON: And you say the circumstances forced them to do it.

MR PRINSLOO: Well I am not saying or when I give evidence that it wasn't the right thing to do. We already lost the war.

MS CAMBANIS: And when they carried out with exactly the same modus operandi at Worcester that was not in the name of the AWB. Is that correct?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And in fact there is nothing, they have not appeared before this Committee, there is nothing to suggest to this Committee that when they acted at Koesterfontein it also was not in the name of the AWB.


MR PRINSLOO: It was in the name of the AWB.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LANDMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman, just a few questions. Mr Prinsloo wouldn't you say that Mr Barnard was the best trained person in the AWB what do you mean? What training did he have?

MR PRINSLOO: What was given to me or the information I received was that he indicated that he was a highly trained person. Whether it was in the defence force and South African Police.

MR LANDMAN: What training did he have? What sort of training did he have?

MR PRINSLOO: It was specialised training that he received in explosives amongst others sniper work, self-defence and so forth. I cannot specifically say what courses he completed during his training.

MR LANDMAN: So as far as you were concerned he was able to assemble a bomb. Is that right?

MR PRINSLOO: I believe so. I believe he could do it.

MR LANDMAN: As far as you were concerned could he assemble a car bomb?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is possible.

MR LANDMAN: Well did he ever say that he couldn't do that?

MR PRINSLOO: No, he never said that he cannot do it.

MR LANDMAN: Can you explain why he had to get Mr Koekermoer to come assist him in assembling the car bomb?

MR PRINSLOO: There are finer details that went before this because after the building of such a bomb there are certain details that have to be adhered to for example the placing of the fuses, what type of fuses to use, delaying fuses or whatever mechanisms had to be used and if Mr Barnard knew about the latest technology I do not know.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Prinsloo where were you when you gave Mr Barnard the instruction to explode the first bomb on the Saturday in Johannesburg, sorry on the Sunday in Johannesburg?

MR PRINSLOO: I was in the Ventersdorp district.

MR LANDMAN: Were you at headquarters or where were you?

MR PRINSLOO: Well we were in the town area. I cannot say specifically that I was at head-office. It was in that area, in that immediate area of the head-office.

MR LANDMAN: Was your instructions to him that he should plant a car bomb or merely a bomb of some sort?

MR PRINSLOO: Well I can remember that we discussed that the bomb should be placed. It was also a proposal from his side that it should be a vehicle bomb. But as I have said we discussed it. General Ackerman also suggested that it should not be easy for the security police to detect it. If not anything else other than specifically a vehicle bomb.

MR LANDMAN: What I want to know from you, your instruction to Barnard was it to place a car bomb in Johannesburg?

MR PRINSLOO: As I have said to you I received the order that it should be a motor bomb. However, if it should not be realistically feasible for Mr Barnard we would have to devise another plan. As I have said we did discuss it and he then acquired a vehicle with which or wherein which he built a car bomb.

MR LANDMAN: Did he tell that he had found a car?


MR LANDMAN: When did he tell you that?

MR PRINSLOO: I can't remember specifically. I am trying but I can't recall specifically.

MR LANDMAN: Did he tell you who was going to be part of his group who would carry out this car bomb attack?

MR PRINSLOO: He mentioned that a person by the name of Myburg would be with him.

MR LANDMAN: Do you remember when that discussion took place?

MR PRINSLOO: No. I can't.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just very quickly take you back to the vehicle. Now you were supposed to supply those vehicles, yes? For the bombs, for bombs to be made in?

MR PRINSLOO: No, negative.

ADV GCABASHE: Unless I don't understand this very well. You know page 60 of Volume 1, Mr Le Roux again if I am not wrong, says that he assumes that you would make sure that cars would be provided so that bombs could be built in it but this was not realised. It is page 60. I am just paraphrasing it. It is a very short sentence. So he was part of the Johannesburg bomb group. You know nothing about that paragraph 21? Just read it.

MR PRINSLOO: No I have read it.

ADV GCABASHE: So you saying you knew nothing about it?

MR PRINSLOO: No, it could be that he intended that the patrols be carried out in four by four vehicles. Is that not what he could have been referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: So what he heard was wrong then?

MR PRINSLOO: Definitely.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MR LANDMAN: Thank you and apart from planting a bomb in Johannesburg on the Sunday did you give him any other instructions at the same time?

MR PRINSLOO: At that stage I don't believe that I received any other instructions.

MR LANDMAN: As far as he was concerned he had only one task and that was to plant the bomb in Johannesburg?

MR PRINSLOO: At that stage, yes.

MR LANDMAN: Did you give him [intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: Naturally I did inform him that more things had to happen but I don't recall that we specifically discussed that there in terms of who had to go where and what still had to be carried out.

MR LANDMAN: When you say further things what - did you tell him what sort of things had to happen?

MR PRINSLOO: No. As I have just said to you I can't remember specifically what I would have said to him with regard to specific things which still had to take place. I definitely told him or informed him about the fact that he had to plant a car bomb in Johannesburg. We discussed that. If he had said: "Yes but a car bomb isn't going to work let's rather use a limpet mine." We would have discussed it and I would have taken this up with the Generals in Staff.

MR LANDMAN: Now when did you tell him or give him instructions to plant the bomb in Germiston?

MR PRINSLOO: Well, he didn't plant the bomb in Germiston.

MR LANDMAN: Did you not ask him to prepare that bomb?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, he was informed that he should or that he was responsible for the checking of the bomb and that would include the pipe bombs as well.

MR LANDMAN: Did you give him instructions that after the bomb exploded in Johannesburg that he was to ensure that bombs exploded on a regular basis thereafter?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, we discussed it at a certain stage but when I said this to him I informed him that this must continue. The Staff had said it was good, we should just continue like that. I didn't specifically say: "Okay now you are going on that specific day and you are going to do something similar."

MR LANDMAN: I want to put it to you that the bomb in Bree Street was not planted in an attempt to stop the elections and that is apparent from the fact that the AWB never demanded that the elections be stopped after that bomb took place, after that explosion occurred.


MR LANDMAN: It wasn't connected with a demand that: "You have now seen what we can do. You must now stop these elections." You never made that demand and I want to put it to you it is clear from that that, that bomb wasn't planted in order to stop the elections.

MR PRINSLOO: Then why would we have done it? For which reason? I don't understand what you are getting at.

MR LANDMAN: Isn't it so that for months before that you were planning a war and you were planning to succeed from the rest of South Africa and form your Volkstaat in the Western Transvaal. Isn't that so?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR LANDMAN: So you were planning for a war. Not to stop the election. Weren't you?

MR PRINSLOO: But then why would we want to wage a war? What would we want to achieve then?

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Not to stop the elections?

MR PRINSLOO: No, that is not entirely correct. We wanted to thwart the elections. We wanted them to accommodate us in a certain way and we would commit succession in the Volkstaat if Dr Ferdie Hartzenberg were to announce it.

MR LANDMAN: Mr Prinsloo surely you realised by the middle of April 1994 that these elections were going to take place no matter what.

MR PRINSLOO: No we had not yet realised that.

CHAIRPERSON: Why? I mean you are all grown men.

MR PRINSLOO: We still believed Chairperson that a compromise could be arrived at.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you believe that you could win a war in this country?

MR PRINSLOO: Definitely yes.


MR PRINSLOO: Because we had the means to do so.

CHAIRPERSON: And when you discovered that Viljoen had left and that things wouldn't be as easy as what you thought they would be, what then?

MR PRINSLOO: Well Chairperson his soldiers were still extremely positive about everything. The army and its staff personally invited me, Mr Terreblanche and a large group of right-wingers to the Cape where we visited the air force base at Ysterplaat where we visited the Naval Bases. We visited Oudtshoorn. I was lead through the Western Transvaal with Mr Terreblanche to investigate stockpiling locations which had been established.

CHAIRPERSON: And this never realised?


CHAIRPERSON: And we can say it now, I think you could have said it then a few days before the election you could have seen that this was not going to work out.

MR PRINSLOO: We still believed that it would.

CHAIRPERSON: All of you?

MR PRINSLOO: All of us.

ADV BOSMAN: How long before the election did these visits to the bases take place?

MR PRINSLOO: I am speaking under correction but probably within a period of 5 to 6 months or 4 months.

ADV BOSMAN: That was before Viljoen left?

MR PRINSLOO: Long before he left.

ADV GCABASHE: I would like to ask a question. If you believed you could win this war why did you give up so quickly as soon as the first two or three people were arrested? Just put those two things together for me?

MR PRINSLOO: Everyone was arrested without - well many of the men's rights were not read to them and people were arrested without really having had anything to do with the bomb explosion.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo apart from the fact that judges rules were not read to those who were arrested what did that have to do with the fact that you withdrew from a war which you believed in after two or three arrests? If you commit war or if you make war then the possibility exists of ...[inaudible]

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, that day at the shooting range all members who were present were arrested in a question of half an hour or let's say 50 people were arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: Why would you withdraw if only 50 people had been arrested? You were busy with a big war with which you would take over the country?

MR PRINSLOO: It was then that we saw that no demands had been put forward by our leaders. General Constand Viljoen had participated in the election, Dr Ferdie Hartzenberg said that he should be accommodated within the new dispensation and there was nothing left for us to continue with.

CHAIRPERSON: But then, Mr Prinsloo, I'm rather confused or one of us is confused because earlier you testified that the reason why the withdrawal took place was the arrests and you wanted to assist most of the men. Is that correct?


CHAIRPERSON: It had nothing to do with the leadership or what they did or what they didn't do?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So what's the truth?

MR PRINSLOO: The fact that people were locked up, men were anxious, there was chaos everywhere throughout the entire country. People began to flee.

CHAIRPERSON: Who told you that?

MR PRINSLOO: It was that way. Many right-wingers fled, some of them are still gone.

CHAIRPERSON: Right-wingers?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, right-wingers.


MR LANDMAN: You see, Mr Prinsloo, I want to put it to you that at the end of your evidence, it's still unclear as to why the bomb was planted in Bree Street. You still haven't given a satisfactory explanation. Mr Chairman, in the light of the need for full disclosure, I would have hoped but I've lost hope. Yes that was to be my last question.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KRIEL: Mr Prinsloo, there is one aspect and I promised you this morning in chambers that there would be one aspect. Fyndooring - there was Generals in Staff meeting at Fyndooring. If I understand it correctly it was decided at Fyndooring that these bombs would be planted. Is that correct?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct, more specifically the Johannesburg bombing.

MR KRIEL: Mr Terreblanche the leader was present at that Generals in Staff meeting?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR KRIEL: During which it was decided to plant bombs and he expressed his approval for this?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR KRIEL: And you also gave your approval?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR KRIEL: Therefore I accept that you would be prepared to accept responsibility for the bombs which exploded thereafter?

MR PRINSLOO: What do you mean?

MR KRIEL: Sir, you were part of a decision making mechanism and it was decided to plant bombs and I'm asking you whether or not you accept responsibility for those bombs which you did explode afterwards?


MR KRIEL: And Mr Terreblanche was directly involved in that and he also expressed his approval for those bombs which were to go off?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR KRIEL: And therefore he was directly responsible for the bombs which exploded?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MR KRIEL: Then finally, I would like to read something to you and ask for your commentary regarding Mr Terreblanche's affidavit, it's the last paragraph:

"As political head of the AWB I accept political and moral responsibility for deeds which were committed. I accept that during a stormy period before the elections I made many public speeches and the content of my speeches was interpreted by the AWB and it could have been interpreted as orders."

Now I'm asking for your commentary regarding this paragraph from Mr Terreblanche's affidavit and you have just testified that there was a specific meeting which took place, a meeting of the Generals in Staff, during which he gave his specific approval. Your commentary please?

MR PRINSLOO: Well what can you say? It was a great pity to us that all commanders could not have stood up and accepted responsibility including Mr Terreblanche. The fact that he would have said that it could have been interpreted as an order from him in his public speeches is in my opinion merely an attempt ...[intervention]

MR KRIEL: I'm sorry for interrupting you but do you agree that what Mr Terreblanche has written here is not the truth?


MR KRIEL: Thank you.

MR MALAN: Why would we not argue that that is also the truth, not relating to this incident but I mean generally? Could be?

MR KRIEL: Thank you Chair.



Mr Prinsloo, the trailer which was used during the Germiston bomb incident, was the trailer fetched from your home?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: And do you know whether Mr Terreblanche at any stage was informed that his trailer was used?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes he was.

ADV PRIOR: What was his reaction?

MR PRINSLOO: I can't say definitely.

ADV PRIOR: Well was he angry?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes he was angry.

ADV PRIOR: Did he scold those who were involved?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes he would definitely have scolded them.

ADV PRIOR: Just a final aspect. Yesterday you gave evidence that the AWB from time to time at various groups provided advice?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Specifically in the Cape you went to see a number of people and explained the AWB structures to them?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Who were those people?

MR PRINSLOO: Those were members of the Coloured Corps.

ADV PRIOR: In the army?

MR PRINSLOO: No, they were civilians. Members of the former District Six, these were coloured people, people like you and me.

ADV PRIOR: You refer to the Coloured Corps. Was that an organisation?

MR PRINSLOO: Well that's what they called themselves.

ADV PRIOR: Does it still exist as an organisation?


ADV PRIOR: In Cape Town?


ADV PRIOR: And did you also explain to them the manners of warfare?


ADV PRIOR: And everything that went along with it?


ADV PRIOR: The logistics, the supply of weapons and so forth?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Chairperson.


RE-EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT: Just one further aspect. The message that you received that everything had to be ceased, did I understand you correctly that this took place after persons had been arrested?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MS VAN DER WALT: And you yourself, when on the day of the election were you arrested?

MR PRINSLOO: It was during the morning hours.

MS VAN DER WALT: Was that during the early morning hours?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes that is correct.

MS VAN DER WALT: And Leon van der Merwe, was he also arrested during the early morning hours?


MS VAN DER WALT: And according to the evidence which was delivered in the court case with regard to the bomb which went out to Jan Smuts, you were present when that evidence was delivered?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes that is correct.

MS VAN DER WALT: Can you still remember when the bomb went out?

MR PRINSLOO: No, not specifically at what time.

MS VAN DER WALT: According to the evidence it was during the early morning hours, approximately just after two o'clock.

MR PRINSLOO: I'll accept that.

MS VAN DER WALT: You also said that discussions were held with regards to a report which you gave to Ventersdorp regarding members who had been arrested in possession of explosives. Are you referring to those who went to Benoni?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MS VAN DER WALT: It was also put to you whether or not you know about the agreement which would have been embodied in the constitution. It wasn't really a thorough agreement but it would be embodied in the constitution with regard to the Volkstaat. However, an ultimatum was also issued by the AWB, an ultimatum of six months. You testified to that yesterday?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MS VAN DER WALT: And it was not complied with?

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

MS VAN DER WALT: No further questions, thank you.


ADV GCABASHE: Just one or two questions. If you go to page 134 of Volume 1, Mr Abie Fourie's statement and I'm looking here at paragraph 24. Paragraph 24 page 134 and he talks about a meeting that you attended along with some of your other colleagues. Was this meeting before the generals - the visiting generals arrived or after they had left?

MR PRINSLOO: The meeting in the cubicle?

ADV GCABASHE: Well I was hoping you could tell me, I don't know whether it was a cubicle meeting or at a different venue but the one Mr Fourie refers to here. Was it before the visiting generals came or after they had left this meeting?

MR PRINSLOO: No that was before their arrival. Well we were actually still busy with the meeting when some of the persons arrived there.

ADV GCABASHE: You see what ...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: I beg your pardon. Some of the generals also spoke to Mr Barnard and I assume also with Mr Myburgh but I can't say precisely.

ADV GCABASHE: You see what interests me here is the "kwesie van die gooi van die pypbomme is bespreek", he says here. Now was that when the generals were there?


ADV GCABASHE: Was that before the generals arrived?


ADV GCABASHE: Was the decision that you then took about the pipe bombs communicated to the generals?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, always.

ADV GCABASHE: No, no, no, don't tell me about always. The specific generals who were there on that day, I want to confine it to that.

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: And that's when you got your "goedkeuring", they approved?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes it was discussed with them.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you obtain the approval or not?

MR PRINSLOO: We had the approval to continue.

ADV GCABASHE: Now that approval, was this the first time they had heard of the pipe bombs plan, the plan to set these bombs off or had they known about these issues before they came to the farm?

MR PRINSLOO: No they had known about it for quite some time before because Mr Andre Smit, the explosives General, Andre Smit, made some of the explosives available.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MR PRINSLOO: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you are excused.


MS VAN DER WALT: Those are the only witnesses which I wish to present.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR MOTLAUNG: I didn't understand your question?

CHAIRPERSON: I say have you got any witnesses to call?

MR MOTLAUNG: No I don't, thank you.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes I do Sir, thank you. If I can just ascertain the order ...[indistinct]

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just get that name again?

MS CAMBANIS: It is Freda Ngwenya. I have prepared statements which I'll hand up as soon as I get up to the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Ngwenya, what language would you prefer to use?


SIFISO FREDA NGWENYA: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Mr Chair. Mrs Ngwenya, is it correct that after consultation with myself and Mr ...[indistinct] we've prepared a statement which you read on - I think on Friday and attested and which I've now handed in to the Commission?

MRS NGWENYA: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And the first three paragraphs thereof relate just to details of reference numbers for the purposes of Reparation Committee, is that correct?

MRS NGWENYA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Could we just receive copies of the statement we did not receive yet?

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Mr Chair.

Now you were present in Bree Street on the 24th April, I see there's a typing error, 1998. Should be 1994 the day of the explosion in Bree Street, is that correct?

MRS NGWENYA: Yes that is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Please will you tell the Committee in your own words what you remember and what happened as a result of that explosion?

MRS NGWENYA: It was in the morning on Sunday on the 24th April 1994. I left my home, I went to work in the corner Bree and King George Street. Early in the morning at about past nine we were waiting there at the corner of Bree and Wanderers. There were policemen there and they were searching people. After that, it didn't take long, the bomb exploded in Bree Street.

MS CAMBANIS: And what is the next thing you remember Mrs Ngwenya?

MRS NGWENYA: After the explosion I was taken to hospital. I couldn't see much.

MS CAMBANIS: And is it correct that as a result of this explosion you sustained injuries to your jaw and to your leg?

MRS NGWENYA: Yes it's correct, I even have letters from hospital. I can't eat nicely, I'm being injured, I can't even walk nicely, I can't work for my children.

MS CAMBANIS: And that you've had a series of operations all of which have been unsuccessful?

MRS NGWENYA: Yes I had a series of operations and I also underwent an operation where a bone in my hip was removed and another bone was put in my jaw - it didn't work. I have an iron and I'm going to die like this.

MS CAMBANIS: And ma'am on Monday of this hearing, you were unable to attend this hearing because you once again had to be admitted to hospital for treatment to your jaw. Is that correct? Yesterday?

MRS NGWENYA: Yes that is correct. There's a possibility that on Friday I'll be admitted in hospital because they're still trying. There's part of my flesh which has been removed.

MS CAMBANIS: Mrs Ngwenya, we've annexed for the Committee copies of a letter from the Department of Justice dated 1994 which is the time at which you began enquiring about opposing any applications for amnesty in this connection, is that correct?

MRS NGWENYA: Yes that is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Would you please tell the Committee in your own words why it is that you are opposing amnesty for these applicants?

MRS NGWENYA: First of all they've realised that they've injured people in Bree Street. They continued doing these acts, they don't have a conscience. They liked doing this and they enjoyed seeing us suffering for being black. They were fighting blacks, like they said they were targeting blacks at the taxi ranks. There's no taxi rank in Bree Street, there's no taxi rank there.

MS CAMBANIS: Mrs Ngwenya, finally - is there anything further you would like to tell or ask the Committee?

MRS NGWENYA: Bree Street is far from ANC offices. There's nothing that anyone can come and fight or politicians in Bree Street are very far. They just looked for blacks and they were fighting blacks, that's all they were looking for.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Mr Chair, there's nothing further.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr van Zyl have you got any questions?

MR VAN ZYL: I've got no questions.


MR MOTLAUNG: I've got no questions Mr Chairman.


MR LANDMAN: No questions.



MR KRIEL: No questions.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT: This statement of yours that was handed over to us - in paragraph 11 you say that you oppose this application and then you say "I do not believe the applicants have told the truth about who was involved in the bombing." Is that correct?

MRS NGWENYA: ...[inaudible]

MS VAN DER WALT: In your statement you say that you oppose this application and then I'm going to read to you what it says there:

"I do not believe that the applicants have told the truth about who was involved in the bombing."

MRS NGWENYA: There is no truth about whatever they have said. I can't tell their truth even if I'm trying to follow up their statements, I can't tell the truth there.

MS VAN DER WALT: I read from your statement. You say that they do not tell the truth about who was involved in the bombing?

MRS NGWENYA: That's what I'm saying. That's what I'm saying that they aren't telling the truth.

MS VAN DER WALT: You said they do not know who was responsible for it or did your attorney insert that?

MRS NGWENYA: I'm hearing this on my own, I can tell it's not the truth.

MS VAN DER WALT: Why do you say that they are not talking the truth and that they are saying that they are not involved or not responsible?

MRS NGWENYA: Because they said their targets were the taxi ranks and Bree is far from a taxi rank. Bree Street is far from the taxi rank and it's not the centre of the city.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't the statement saying that she alleges that the applicants were not involved?

MS VAN DER WALT: The way I see it is ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: The word "all" does not have to be there but if you take the word "all" in the second line and you change it to "who" then it makes sense. "Who all" were involved.

MS VAN DER WALT: You oppose this application. I understand that you were injured and I do sympathise with you but if I understand your evidence then you do not want to reconcile either. Is that correct?

MRS NGWENYA: Yes that is correct. I've suffered a lot and I'm going to go to my grave like this. I also want them to suffer the same. I will suffer like this until I die. I want them to remain in prison.

MS VAN DER WALT: You are not willing like the parents of Amy Biehl who also suffered and where Amy Biehl was killed because she was a white woman, you are not willing to, like those parents, reconcile yourself with what happened. Is that true?

MRS NGWENYA: I cannot force myself to forgive them. I'm still hurting.

MS VAN DER WALT: Thank you, no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, you're excused.


MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. Mr Archie Khumalo please.

Sorry, Mr Chair before we proceed - in fact I only made copies for the Members of the Committee. I don't know if we should take a short adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: No, it's okay they can have one of ours.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Khumalo, what language would you prefer to use?


ARCHIE KHUMALO: (sworn states)


Mr Khumalo you similarly consulted and prepared a statement, first paragraphs of which disclose details, reference numbers for the purposes of the TRC, is that correct?

MR KHUMALO: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: On the 24th April 1994 you were in your motor vehicle parked in Bree Street when the bomb exploded, is that correct?

MR KHUMALO: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Please will you tell the Committee what you saw prior or noticed prior to the explosion of the bomb in Bree Street?

MR KHUMALO: Yes I can.

MS CAMBANIS: Please proceed.

MR KHUMALO: I parked my car at Bree Street. It was cold. I went to Morkels. I saw a car coming and there was smoke coming from this car. I can't remember whether there were two people but they started waving their hands. After that or after two minutes a bomb exploded.

MS CAMBANIS: Were you injured as a result of that explosion?

MR KHUMALO: Yes, I had head injuries, my legs and my foot.

MS CAMBANIS: And there was also damage to your vehicle, is that correct?

MR KHUMALO: Yes there was damage.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Chair, I see in paragraph 8 the last two lines, that I've coined a new term which I apologise for - it's "reason."

Mr Khumalo, your instructions are that you oppose the applications of these applicants. Is that correct?

MR KHUMALO: Yes that's correct. I can't forgive these people because even my car was not insured. I don't have a car today.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Khumalo, is there anything further you would like to tell the Committee?

MR KHUMALO: No, except to tell the Committee that I cannot forgive these men.

MS CAMBANIS: That is all, thank you Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Has anybody got any questions? Wynand?

MR MALAN: Yes thank you. Mr Chair, if you'll allow me, just a question to Mrs Cambanis before Mrs Siako gives evidence?

Do you have any knowledge whether any of these witnesses that have applied or made statements to the Human Rights Violations Committee?

MS CAMBANIS: I haven't taken specific instructions but I will do so. I doubt that they have.


CHAIRPERSON: Ms Seako, what language would you prefer to use?



YALISWA RITA SEAKO: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Mrs Seako, your statement has been prepared, signed by you under oath and submitted disclosing details sufficient for the purposes of reparation. It is correct that your family member, the late Ms Fani, was killed in the bomb blast that took place in Bree Street.

Is that correct?

MRS SEAKO: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And Mrs Seako, there was certain views that you have regarding the applications for amnesty, why you are opposing the applications. Would you please tell the Committee what those are?

MRS SEAKO: Yes I can. One thing that makes me not so forgiving is that in whatever they have said so far there is no truth. Thokosile, the one who died, caused her mother's death as well and General Hospital lost - she was a radiographer.

Secondly, they planted this bomb deliberately with hatred because they hate a black person. The truth is that I would love to see the person who actually planted the bomb there and the reason that made him to hate people like this, to hate blacks and claim the land to be theirs as AWB members. Why would they fight like the Russians?

Thirdly, what made them go to the hotel and ask them if they were open and whatever hatred they have even when two kids told him that "Mr, that car that you've parked outside there, it's burning" - he answered them and said to them "that car is not burning but there's a bomb inside that car" and these kids have no one who can come here to talk on behalf of them because they were street kids. At least some, we are here, to represent them but those kids were street kids, they died there and no one is here to speak on their behalf.

I lost my job. Those kids were suffering and these kids asked them, in fact they were trying to help them. They said "your car was burning" and he actually answered them back and said "it's not burning, but there's a bomb inside." You ask yourself if such a person has a conscience. You don't even know why those street kids are on the street. They are not belonging in any party with the ANC or whatsoever. I would ask for forgiveness from the Lord because I don't have forgiveness to give to these people because I still feel for those kids who died on those streets and they were not buried decently because they were street kids.

MS CAMBANIS: Mrs Seako, is it correct that you attended a large part of the criminal proceedings against these applicants?

MRS SEAKO: Yes I was attending, it's true.

MS CAMBANIS: And what - how did you find the attitude of the applicants at that trial?

MRS SEAKO: They were feeling happy, they didn't show any remorse and it was like a joke to them. I remember the first day I wanted to pray before the court. They asked to pray before the court proceedings and I was amazed that people like them, people with no conscience, know how to pray. We were a joke in the court. I remember one nice gentleman. He was tall and if I'm not mistaken, that guy his name is Koekemoer and I think that guy had a bit of a conscience. The rest were very cold and they were very happy, they were laughing at us. I remember one day I sat in one chair, I think the third or the second chair behind the magistrate. They kicked me out, they said they didn't want to sit next to me until one policeman said "this is a court, it's not belonging to the AWB." Even that made me feel that these people show no remorse and they are so cold.

MS CAMBANIS: And Mrs Seako, during the proceedings before this Committee was it your experience that they had a similar attitude?

MR PRINSLOO: With respect, Mr Chairman, it's a leading question she's putting the answer in front of the witness.

MS CAMBANIS: Well, I at the time raised it, I place it on record that I had instructions from clients about attitude in this hall and that is why I put it that way.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let's put it this way.

Mrs Seako, do you think their attitude has changed since?

MRS SEAKO: Some of them according to my view have changed except the ones who are here, who are testifying here, I don't see any change.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Mrs Seako, is there anything finally that you would like to say to the Committee?

MRS SEAKO: I would like to add that these men who are here they planned to bomb and whatever they are saying here it's not true. The driver of the house was kicked out from the Shell House where he wanted to bomb and then he left there and he wasn't alone, there were two cars, one was escorting. After you left the hotel you went to another car. After you left the car with the bomb so there were two cars. Shell House is the place where ANC people are. You realised that you're failing to bomb Shell House and then you decided to bomb Bree Street and you've bombed or you had too many bombs in so many areas. One lady came from Supreme Court and she told people that there was a bomb at Sanlam Building and this lady was looking for policemen to tell them. Her name is Anna and Anna couldn't reach to any policemen but we showed her soldiers because we've already kicked policemen out of that area because we were suspecting that policemen were working with the AWB so that's why we kicked policemen. We didn't want policemen to guard that area. We realised that policemen themselves were stealing stocks from shops that's why I couldn't leave my shop, I was sleeping there. I lost some of my stock and some was still there. There were bombs in that area on that night.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Cambanis, how relevant is all this? Is it relevant?

MS CAMBANIS: No, your worship, it's not.

ADV GCABASHE: I would like to ask one thing. You're talking about the police. You had a shop in Bree Street, were you there on that Sunday when the bomb exploded?

MRS SEAKO: I came there. My telephone numbers are kept by prostitutes, white prostitutes so whenever there's something near the shop they call me. They called me on that specific day so I came down.

ADV GCABASHE: They called you? When? When exactly?

MRS SEAKO: Immediately after the bomb exploded.

ADV GCABASHE: That's why I'm asking whether you were there when the bomb exploded?

MRS SEAKO: No, I wasn't there, I was called.

ADV GCABASHE: When you arrived there what time was it?

MRS SEAKO: We were not allowed to enter the place when I came there. I went to Freda's shop first and I cleaned the place because Freda had died. I cleaned her blood. After I finished cleaning Freda's blood I went to my shop where I'm working, that's where I also discovered that Thokozile who was on her way to church. Thokozile is my cousin, she was on her way to a Methodist Church. She died on her way but when I arrived there she was no longer there, her body had been removed. I went to the shop, I asked Yvonne the owner of the shop where the one that I was using and I also asked the prostitutes as to what happened so they explained to me. I couldn't go back because my stock was already outside. The shop had been damaged. I slept there.

ADV GCABASHE: I would like to ask one thing here. You also talked about Shell House, that they started at Shell House. Where do you get this information?

MRS SEAKO: One guy who was working at a hotel said so. They came, these men came and asked the man what time do they open at the hotel.

ADV GCABASHE: And now you talked about street kids. Where did you get this news as well?

MRS SEAKO: These kids were sleeping outside the shop. Two of them were working for a coloured lady, they were selling her stuff in corner Brooklyn and Bree. These two kids were the ones who told the man who parked the car that his car was on fire and he answered them and said it wasn't it on fire but there was a bomb in that car. When I arrived there they were there, they were injured, these boys.

ADV GCABASHE: Did you talk to them?

MRS SEAKO: Yes I did.

ADV GCABASHE: Did they told you this?

MRS SEAKO: Yes they told me, they said the white man who parked the car was wearing a Russian uniform and they also told me that they've spoken to a guy who is working in a hotel, you can ask the guy as to what they've said to him.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Any other questions?

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you very much, none.


CHAIRPERSON: Anybody else have questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT: So therefore you say that these two children who gave you the version of what you have told us here that these persons were wearing Russian uniforms, is that correct?

MRS SEAKO: He was wearing a Russian hat, not uniform, not the full uniform.

MS VAN DER WALT: But did these two street children that you have referred to tell you this?


INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please repeat what she said?

MS VAN DER WALT: When did these two young boys pass away?

MRS SEAKO: When they were in hospital. I'm not talking about these other ones who were injured outside the shop, I'm talking about these two they died in hospital.

MS VAN DER WALT: But your evidence has been and I want to put it to you, Advocate Gcabashe did actually retrieve this from you, but I'm putting it to you that this is all based on hearsay and you told the Honourable Advocate that these two children who spoke to these people were the two that were injured, is that correct?

MRS SEAKO: Yes that is correct. These two children who were selling at the corner are the ones who told me that a white man parked the car and they told the white man that your car was burning and he said that the car wasn't burning but there was a bomb in it. Besides those two there were other two who were sleeping outside my shop.

MS VAN DER WALT: And which ones passed away?

MRS SEAKO: Four of them died. When I arrived there two of them were injured and the other two had been taken to hospital.

MS VAN DER WALT: There was no such evidence before the Supreme Court before Judge Flemming that street children had died or that had spoken to the people who had planted the bomb and who were told that the car was not on fire but that there was a bomb in the car.

MRS SEAKO: That's why I find it very hard to forgive these men because the truth is not heard, not the whole truth has been heard about this matter.

MS VAN DER WALT: Why didn't you make a statement to the police and tell the truth in that statement?

MRS SEAKO: I personally, I don't have any trust on policemen.

MS VAN DER WALT: No further questions thank you.


MS CAMBANIS: Sorry Mr Chair ...[intervention]

MR MALAN: Mrs Seako, may I just ask you, did you tell Ms Cambanis what you've told us now, earlier?

MRS SEAKO: No I didn't tell her before, I only told her about Thokozile who is my cousin.

MR MALAN: While you are talking her, in which way are you related? How is she your cousin?

MRS SEAKO: She's my cousin.

MR MALAN: Are your mothers sisters or are your fathers brothers or in which way is she your cousin? How is she related to you?

MRS SEAKO: We are both Maduna. Our last names are Maduna.

MR MALAN: Are her parents still alive?

MRS SEAKO: Thokozile's mother died after the incident. After we buried Thokozile, Thokozile's mother got ill and she died.

MR MALAN: And her father?

MRS SEAKO: He died a long time ago.

MR MALAN: Was she married?


MR MALAN: Does she have children?


MR MALAN: Can you help us with the addresses there. Will you please just to one of our people give us the information as to exactly where her direct relatives could be traced. But let me take you back to this other thing. Why did you not tell your lawyer about the street children?

MRS SEAKO: Like I said before that those were street kids and no one was taking care of them and no one actually came on their behalf even to the court, no one ever stood for them.

CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you tell your lawyer that before today?

MRS SEAKO: I met this lawyer and I didn't have money, I didn't have money to pay for a lawyer, I don't even know even now who paid her. So I didn't want to complicate my case, that's why I didn't say anything about the street kids.

MR MALAN: Did she not ask you about any - about your knowledge of this bombing, of this incident. Were you not asked anything about your knowledge of the bombing?

MRS SEAKO: She did ask me.

MR MALAN: What did she ask you?

MRS SEAKO: She asked me of the victims of Bree Street and if there were people that I know in Bree Street. I only mentioned those who were alive and Thokozile was the only one who was late whom I've mentioned.

MR MALAN: And the street kids, are they not late?

MRS SEAKO: I didn't know who paid the lawyer and I didn't know if I was supposed to pay for the street kids as well so I was just representing Thokozile.

MR MALAN: Thank you Chair.

ADV BOSMAN: Did you tell your lawyer about the fact that Ms Fani was married and that she has children?

MRS SEAKO: No I didn't.

ADV BOSMAN: The children - how old are they?

MRS SEAKO: I am not sure. I can find out and I'll give it to my lawyer.

CHAIRPERSON: Who are they staying with now?

MRS SEAKO: Hershel, with their father.

ADV BOSMAN: Did you tell the father that you were coming to this hearing? The children's father?

MRS SEAKO: Yes I've told the father. He is in Natal and he's not working but he said I must come and I must report back to him.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.


CHAIRPERSON: Ms Cambanis, is Mrs Skosana or both of them, Mr and Mrs, do they want to give evidence? Oh, okay fine. Are you done Ms Cambanis?

MS CAMBANIS: Mrs Joan Keane would like to make a short statement to the Committee. She is present. I have a client, Joan Fubbs, who is hospitalised. I don't have a statement prepared for her but will undertake to pass that on to Mr Prior but Mrs Keane is present.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the name?

MS CAMBANIS: Joan Keane. I'm advised if we could please take an adjournment because we've been here since 9 o'clock and perhaps finish up. It's not a long statement. My client is not feeling well.

CHAIRPERSON: Well she can take a break, we'll hear Mr Kriel's - you're not calling anyone?

MR KRIEL: ...[inaudible]

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Keane can take a break if she wants.

Mr Prior have you got any witnesses?

ADV PRIOR: I'll call Mrs Gumbi.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Chairman, may I also be excused for a few minutes?

CHAIRPERSON: Okay we'll take a break. A short one.



CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Gumbi, which language would you prefer to use?

NOKWAZI GUMBI: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mrs Gumbi you are a victim of the bomb attack that occurred in Bree Street, Johannesburg, on the 24th April 1994, is that correct?

MRS GUMBI: Yes that is true.

ADV PRIOR: At the time you were living in the vicinity of Bree Street. Could you give the Committee the address where you were staying at that time?

MRS GUMBI: I resided at Maxwell Hall, Flat No. 35, right next to the car where the bomb exploded. There was store but today it's Joshua Doore furniture shop.

ADV PRIOR: What floor were you on, your flat? Was it the third floor?

MRS GUMBI: Third floor yes, you're correct.

ADV PRIOR: And was your flat facing the street, that is Bree Street?

MRS GUMBI: It was facing the street.

ADV PRIOR: Will you tell the Committee briefly about what happened during the morning of that day when the bomb exploded?

MRS GUMBI: At the time we were preparing for the elections and that was exciting to us because it was the first time the blacks will be voting. Myself and my son - when the bomb exploded I did not know as to what was happening. My son by the name of Umfundo was in the living room and I was in the bathroom. I got severely injured, my son as well. He came to rescue me from the bathroom as I could not walk properly and he was injured as well. Both doors - one could not open but they were blast open as a result of the bomb that exploded. I had no clothes at all that I could wear and we had to leave the apartment. It was dark, we left and we went outside. I had a towel around me, in other words I wrapped a towel around me and I met others outside who were injured as well approaching from Small Street. I was helped by people I did not know at all who enlisted some help to me and crossed the street and I met other women who gave me clothes to put on because I only had a towel around me. I could not even think properly, my vision was failing me especially my right eye.

I was taken to the hospital and I did not get enough help. When they dressed us, they dressed us on top of the wounds that already broken pieces of glasses.

ADV PRIOR: Mrs Gumbi can you possibly tell the Committee the extent of your injuries and the injuries to your son?

MRS GUMBI: I cannot use my right arm, this is far it can go up. My eye as well, the vision is not clear.

ADV PRIOR: Your right - your arm, is it your left arm? And was that cut, the glass or whatever penetrate your body?

MRS GUMBI: It's my right arm - it's my left arm yes, it doesn't work properly and my left eye has well has been affected. This is how I used to look.

ADV PRIOR: You're referring to a photograph of you in the Star newspaper 25th April 1994 is that correct? Mr Chairman, bundle A, page 16. Under the title "Teacher grabs son and ran naked from her shattered flat" is that correct?

What injuries did your son have?

MRS GUMBI: Umfundo was injured at the back and severely sore and they are still trying to extract the pieces of glass from his back and in 1994 it was not easy for him at school and 1995 had to repeat the same standard because the results were disastrous.

ADV PRIOR: Mrs Gumbi you have indicated that you have still problems with your eye and your arm, is that correct?


ADV PRIOR: Are you under any medical treatment or do you receive any medical treatment for that?

MRS GUMBI: Yes I do but for the past three years I was not able - in other words I could not work. I only started in 1997. I was employed, I went to Saint Theresa at a Roman Catholic School, that's where I was working.

ADV PRIOR: Is it correct also that you have submitted a statement which has been referred to the Reparations Committee of the TRC, in other words your particulars have been obtained?

MRS GUMBI: That is true.

ADV PRIOR: Mrs Gumbi just a final aspect. You've been present at the last set of hearings in June and you were here yesterday listening to the evidence. What is your attitude regarding the amnesty applications of the various applicants?

MRS GUMBI: I know my Government is sensitive, the Government is going to sympathise with them. It is not within me to decide whether or not they will be granted amnesty but I know very well, they know themselves that today I'm a victim.

ADV PRIOR: Is that all you wish to say, Mrs Gumbi, about the applications?

MRS GUMBI: Whatever they are saying they're telling a blatant lie, they are lying through their teeth. There is nothing absolutely that they have said which is true. I know they'll be granted amnesty but one thing I know for sure is that they are lying through their teeth. That's a blatant lie, they refer this and that and that and you cannot find any correlation in their evidence and the prison is where they belong, must be their home.


CHAIRPERSON: Are there any questions anybody?

ADV GCABASHE: Mrs Gumbi I have a question for you. Please explain to us that area, the vicinity of where you used to reside, was it an apartment flat type of residence or who were residing there?

MRS GUMBI: Blacks were dominant in that area and it's quite a number of apartments in that area. There is Bree Street - Bree Street alone there are apartments on the left side and on the right hand side starting from Eloff down and we were residing just a block away from Shell House. I think they intended - the whole thing was designated for Shell House but we happened to be victims. The impact of all this could have even touched the Shell House as well. That's where the other car which was parked got effected.

ADV GCABASHE: On Sundays this place is quite busy? Or how is this place especially on Sundays - is there any tranquillity at all or not?

MRS GUMBI: No on Sunday it's quite calm, there is no traffic whatsoever, it's just quiet. Everybody is at home, my son was at home as well. Around ten on a Sunday, just imagine where could you wake up to be going to? Fortunately I had not left for my shift at seven because if I had done that I would have died on the street.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Gumbi, how do you feel about life in South Africa today?

MRS GUMBI: Maybe I will put this badly, my lord, but I must say it - I must divulge and tell you whatever I feel. Our Government of National Unity, the current Government, we are being taken as barbarians or people who are not at all literate. As a teacher I will be teaching a white child and that white child would not be looking at you as a teacher, he will be looking at you as a maid and will even pose a question to you and say "are you really a teacher?" because all what we are known to be are thieves and domestic maids as well, our place is in the kitchen and they don't see us as blacks with proper state of mind. It's not like we're in some kind of rivalry with them or competition with them, but that's how it's appearing that we're in competition, some kind of competition with them.

CHAIRPERSON: I've also been asked in the past whether I'm really a Judge. Now how has this effected your life?

MRS GUMBI: This coming Thursday, my advocate knows very well, I'll be teaching in another school. I won't even hide that school - can I tell you, disclose the name of the school? I was at Waverley Girls. When they heard that I came and appeared, to this school, in June, they fired me and I know that is not proper in as far as labour law is concerned. They spoke ill of me to other schools plus the former Roman School that I used to teach at. Right now, I don't have any job, I'm not working but fortunately my God provided with me with some job but I'm afraid of telling them my former or my records because I'm afraid they will gather such information negative about me and fire me as well. The state in which I am today is not appealing at all.

CHAIRPERSON: You seem to understand better than some others the processes with which we are busy with in this country, am I correct?

MRS GUMBI: Yes that's very true.

CHAIRPERSON: And I can't ask you to forget but is it not possible with the passage of time for you to forgive? I don't know if you can answer it today.

MRS GUMBI: That's a very difficult question because when I recall the very first time we had this hearing on the 17th you were here and there was one who shot at our people in Pretoria, innocently, innocent people and Mandela forgave him with all his heart.

CHAIRPERSON: I quite understand that.

MRS GUMBI: He displayed a state of being unsatisfied but us who were victims we did nothing to them, we just looked at them.

CHAIRPERSON: I can only hope that with time that that type of attitude towards our people will cease and that during that same period that we can go towards living with each other irrespective of the colour of our skin and I hope with time you are able to come to terms with your unfortunate experience. I thank you for coming to give evidence.

MRS GUMBI: Thank you. I'm sorry to waste your time.

CHAIRPERSON: You're not wasting my time.

MRS GUMBI: Okay fine. During that time when I was injured I was able to write three books that will be published. It's a pity because some of them are in Zulu. When I no problem to translate those books in English but I do have and I had even the latest poem that I have written in Zulu as well, a very painful one that goes "A person is a book that you cannot read" referring to the people who still continue fighting with us because you cannot summarise a person and think his abilities are up to this extent.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior, have you got any other witnesses?

ADV PRIOR: I have no other witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Ms Cambanis?

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Mr Chair. I call Joan Keane who shall be accompanied by her husband. They both - they each have a short statement they wish to submit.

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Keane which language would you prefer to use?

JOAN KEANE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Mrs Keane is it correct that your details have been submitted by myself to the TRC regarding the address and your whereabout for the purposes of reparation?

MRS KEANE: Do I have to give my address in public?

MS CAMBANIS: No, I have already - it's been given.

MRS KEANE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it will be better, you will pick up what she says if you put the headphones on.

MS CAMBANIS: Now Mrs Keane, you have a statement you wish to read, this is in regard to your daughter Susan who was killed in a car in the Bree Street incident. Would you please continue?

MRS KEANE: Mr Chair, as a mother and victim and having considered all the facts, I consider it is only God that can forgive these people for their cowardly acts of terrorism and treason. By their own admission they were prepared to put this country to flames with callous disregard for human life. On the 24th April 1994 in Bree Street they murdered our only child, Susan Ann Keane who was in the prime of her life and had made the most of the privileges this country had given her which unfortunately so obviously others had wasted. She had a B.Soc. Science degree, a higher diploma in Third World Development and Planning and a masters degree in Town Planning. She had so much to offer her beloved South Africa. Susan worked tirelessly in pursuit of justice and democracy for all and extended her hand of friendship to everyone regardless of race or religion. Her warmth and kindness touched many lives. We thank God for giving us such a wonderful and caring daughter and we return her to Him with love. May she rest in peace knowing that she has made her contribution to the land God gave all South Africans to cherish and preserve. Our deepest regret is that we never had time to say goodbye. Although we tried to help others in Susan's memory, our lives have deteriorated to a mere existence and now in our retirement years we have to face a future of loneliness without her to comfort or care for us. The atrocities they committed have caused untold misery and tragedy for the families who lost their loved ones and who are not able to be here to speak for themselves. Their breadwinners, the children and for those who are maimed and injured, you had no right in the name of God to decide whose lives were expendable. We actually pity you for having to beg for amnesty and live the rest of your lives with these deplorable deeds on your conscience as at the end, you will have to meet your Maker whose commandment was thou shalt not kill. As self professed christians and adults, the final decision was yours and you chose to commit a barbaric criminal act, the murder of one human being by another. Your attempts to equate your heinous act with other political acts is preposterous. You had freedom and the vote which these people were denied during the 40 years of apartheid rule. You knew you were free to negotiate right up to the last moment. At this point I would like to say to you and I will look at you while I say this - love your children with all your heart and all your soul because God forbid they would be taken from you by murderers like yourselves.

Finally, if you were sincere in offering your sympathy, this Commission would not have had to ask if you were remorseful. You were unmoved, you would have offered it of your own free will long before now. God bless all the victims and comfort them. God bless the new South Africa and it's leaders. Thank you.

MS CAMBANIS: Mrs Keane, I would just like you to inform the Honourable Chairperson, you attended the criminal proceedings at which the applicants appeared and an incident took place regarding an apology. If you could just please enlighten the Chairperson about the circumstances that happened at the criminal court?

MRS KEANE: A member of the press approached me and said - some lady, I don't know who she was - had offered her apologies and I said does that include the blacks? She went away and came back and said no. I said then I don't accept her apology.

MS CAMBANIS: ...[inaudible] Mrs Keane?

MRS KEANE: No, but I think my husband would like some statement, thank you.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.



MR KEANE: Mr Chair, I have followed the trial I fail to understand why Koekemoer has not been summonsed to appear before this Commission?

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry Mr Keane? He hasn't been sworn in Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is he going to give evidence?

MS CAMBANIS: He has a statement that he wishes to submit to this Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you Mr Keane? Is this Mr Keane?

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Keane, yes Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Keane do you prefer to use the English language as well?

MR KEANE: English, yes.

JOHN KEANE: (sworn states)

I will begin again. I have followed the trial and the proceedings and fail to understand why Koekemoer has not been summonsed to appear before this Commission. Apparently he has not been granted indemnity from prosecution, nor has he applied for amnesty. I consider the Commission had a mandate to extract the whole truth and will fail in it's duty if he is not called. I'm not entirely satisfied with the investigation and totally disillusioned that they failed to uplift Koekemoer's report back file which seems to me to be of the utmost importance and highly relevant to these proceedings.

Furthermore, they failed to point out that there were two policemen present who co-operated with the accused. With regard to the Bree Street bomb, police complicity was apparent to many witnesses and having been informed that the car contained a bomb they failed in their duty to issue a warning while smoke was pouring from the car. According to three newspaper reports, the police stopped a car with three blacks in it and spread-eagled them on the road and released them moments before the bomb exploded. And something else I fail to see is why they placed the bomb in Bree Street, it didn't seem to come out in the evidence. Why they selected that spot

or why they put it there at all, there didn't seem to be any reason for it.

Our loss has been so great that we will never in our few remaining years be able to come to terms with my daughter's murder.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you very much Mr Keane. Thank you Mr Chair.


CHAIRPERSON: Are there any questions of Mr Keane?

Thank you.


MS CAMBANIS: Mr Chair I've already indicated that the

remaining person that I represent is not available and a statement will be submitted to Mr Prior. Thank you.

None other.


MS VAN DER WALT: There was a document which I forgot to hand in, I don't have copies for the other members of the panel but it is Mr Abie Fourie, Abraham Christoffel Fourie's affidavit which is aimed at rectifying his sentence of guilt. If you will remember, Chairperson, he was under the impression that he was found guilty on all charges whilst he was actually only found guilty on the charges of the pipe bomb. I thought that this should be placed in an affidavit form in order to place it on record correctly. As it pleases you chair. At a later stage it was put to him that he was found guilty only with regard to the pipe bombs. I would appreciate if I would be allowed to submit this along with copies as an exhibit and that is all which I have left.

ADV PRIOR: ...[inaudible] the Committee to an affidavit of Theunis Louis Pretorius which regards the Koekemoer matter and I think the affidavit is self-explanatory and possibly, I don't know if the Committee wishes to hear me on why Koekemoer wasn't called? I could briefly, possibly in a few...


ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, as evidence leader, the situation was assessed and Koekemoer who, it was common cause at the trial, was a police informer and common cause that he built or assisted in building the bombs that went off in the various places. It was on record - he had not applied for amnesty, he was informed, as I understand, as an implicated person. He chose not to appear at these proceedings. The question of him or his activities in so far as his information to the police is concerned was raised by the applicants. In as much as Koekemoer's activities with the police was unknown to the applicants, it could not have effected the facts upon which the applications are based. The fact that Koekemoer may have been in complicity with the police or the police in complicity with Koekemoer would not have taken the applications any further.

Furthermore, I understood from the witness protection department of the TRC, Advocate McAdam, that Koekemoer had been relocated in terms of a justice witness programme, he received a new identity and there was also a very strong possibility that he was either assisting the Attorney General in other prosecutions and for that reason the Attorney General was not prepared in terms of Section, I think, 31 of the Act to allow or permit Koekemoer to give evidence, in other words to his prejudice. That situation being the case, the likelihood that Koekemoer's legal representative would have then consented to him to have given evidence was regarded and viewed as being remote and all those facts taken together, I was satisfied that the matter not be pursued and for that reason Koekemoer - I did not insist that Koekemoer be brought. I'm also - there's obviously Koekemoer ....[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think even if you insisted you could have succeeded.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, obviously the intrigues behind and whoever was handling him is contained in the affidavit of Superintendent Pretorius and in particular paragraph 8, he indicates that the police were unaware that he in fact was manufacturing the bombs. This only came out after his arrest. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well that seems to be the end of the evidence. The issue of making a decision falls into our lap. It is customary for us to be favoured with argument by representatives before we do so. It seems appropriate in this matter to allow the legal representatives, because it has been a longish hearing, until next Wednesday - what will be the date? 23rd of this month, September, to submit any heads of argument if they wish to do so to our head office in Cape Town. In dealing with the issues the panel is particularly interested in the following and we ask all parties who choose to submit heads to deal with it:

To whatever extent the question of racism is relevant, whether the policy of the AWB was objectively racist or subjectively racist and how we should approach the matter. To whatever extent the question of racism is relevant - whether the policy of the AWB was objectively racist or subjectively racist and how should we approach the matter.

Secondly whether whatever was committed was committed by a splinter group or whether it was committed by the AWB through it's various military organs.

In each of the two issues, we would like the matter to be dealt with applicant by applicant. If in the event of us finding that it was a racist activity, how would that fact impact of the applications in itself?

Next - whether generally the applications complied with the act. We wish you also to deal with the matter of credibility of each applicant and witness for the purpose of this application I don't think we include victims. We don't need the victims evidence to be dealt with.

And lastly, we wish you to deal - no not lastly - the aspect of proportionality, that is a factor that is included in the Act and lastly, to what extent the rank of each of the applicants is relevant. That's all.

Before I close this hearing, I wish to express our gratitude to all those who arranged for this hearing and all that goes with arranging the hearing, for the work of the security officials and also the interpreters. I know the last two days they've input and stretched, I thank them for their work. I thank also all the representatives for the patience and the way they conducted the hearing and in particular I wish to thank those victims or suffered or sustained injuries or suffered the loss of family members. It must be an extremely difficult time to have to experience those events all over again and I am not in a position from where I sit to comfort you, neither am I in a position to say to you forgive and forget but within the context of this whole process and I think I speak on behalf of the Commission, one can only hope that the hurt and the emotional distress that you as victims experience will diminish with time and that one can only hope also that you come to terms with life in South Africa despite those grave losses. Having said that I close the hearing.