MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, before I proceed I just want to put on record that we have copies of the affidavits that were handed in during the Cosatu and Khotso House, the affidavits made by Minister Vlok or the former Minister Vlok and General van der Merwe and we have also furnished the respective legal teams with copies of those affidavits.

CHAIRPERSON: Could we give them a number now?

MR HUGO: ...[inaudible]

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but that was that hearing and not this hearing. So they should be Exhibits PP(a) and PP(b), PP(a), being Mr Vlok's.

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman.


EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: (continued) Very well Mr de Kock, yesterday we reached the decorations which were awarded and I mentioned that there were just a couple of final loose aspects which needed to be addressed.

You will recall that during cross-examination by my learned friend, Mr George Bizos, it was put to General Coetzee that you were involved in an operation in Swaziland and simultaneously I handed in a document, Exhibit E which is an extract from your book.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Have you had the opportunity to study Exhibit E?


MR HUGO: Are you satisfied that the content thereof is true and correct and that the facts are correctly reflected?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HUGO: Then during cross-examination it was also put to you that you were also involved in an operation in Swaziland where a Mr McFadden and Nyanda were killed and that this was also a part of a Vlakplaas operation of which you were part.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HUGO: And was that also essentially put correctly during cross-examination?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HUGO: Once again with regard to the decorations, did you receive any similar decoration at any other stage, a similar decoration to the one which we referred

to yesterday, the one which was awarded to you by Mr Louis le Grange?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that was actually for the operation during which Zwelibanzi Nyanda was killed. He was the head of the Natal machinery in Swaziland and it has to do with the McFadden incident to which we have referred.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock, you will also recall that Mr Craig Williamson during his evidence in chief submitted a document, Exhibit V(1) regarding the attack on Gaberone and various other neighbouring states, do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HUGO: And if I understood Mr Williamson's evidence correctly, he said that the first portion of this video was a recording which was made of the crown scene in Gaberone, that was in 1985, can you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that may be correct, however, I have no information and I cannot offer any evidence regarding the crowds during this attack which took place in Gaberone.

MR HUGO: You were not personally involved in those attacks in Botswana?

MR DE KOCK: No, not with those attacks but with others.

MR HUGO: The weapon stockpiling location which we saw on the video, would you tell us where that came from and how it came about that it became important?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a meeting held at Vlakplaas. Brigadier Schoon was in attendance and I was there as well as members of C2, Martin Naude, General Martin Naude, Captain Jan Coetzee from Krugersdorp, from the Security Branch there which was involved with terrorism and the investigation into terrorism. General Joubert from Special Forces was also there. There were two other officers in attendance who were from Special Forces but I can't remember their surnames and I wouldn't like to implicate anybody randomly.

An instruction was given to me to prepare an amount of weapons and spring-charges and that would have to be of Russian or Eastern Block origin. I think that we used between 36 and 37 AKM's, that is another version of the AK47, because the ANC was exclusively using AKM's with regard to their internal operations. The landmines and the ammunition also had to be checked by me in order to ensure that it was not manufactured in South Africa and that it would be of Russian origin.

After that we also had to clean these weapons, clean the landmines and ensure that there wouldn't be any traces of sand from Ovamboland. We wiped the landmines with paraffin in order to remove fingerprints. Some of the landmines still had blood on them and we had to remove that.

Furthermore, we also serviced the weapons to make them look as if they had been used in service. These weapons were handed over by me to Colonel Naude and I was not aware of where the weapons were going. I later heard that these weapons were planted in the mine heaps in Krugersdorp. The following morning however, there was a light storm, storm troop - that is where you make use of helicopters and soldiers to launch an operation quickly in and out, and later on I saw on the news that this weapon stockpiling location or this find led to the attacks which, it was the catalyst for the attacks in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Lusaka. However, when the equipment appeared on television, I identified it as that equipment which we had handed over.

MR HUGO: Very well. Then with regard to the political objectives, you have already addressed the political objectives, but would you just look at Volume 4 on page 36 of the paginated documents, paragraph 37 on page 36.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I accord with that.

MR HUGO: Is that what you attempted to achieve with this operation against the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And then on page 38 there is a summary of the execution of instructions.

MR DE KOCK: And I am in accordance with that as well.

MR HUGO: The orders which you received in this case were orders which were by-and-large given by Mr Williamson?


MR HUGO: And did you have any reason to doubt his bona fides to the extent that he would have conducted the proper research and would have ensured that the action would be aimed against political enemies?

MR DE KOCK: I knew him as someone who was thorough in that aspect and also a perfectionist. I'm not saying that to place him at any disadvantage.

MR HUGO: And you did not find it necessary at all to question his orders or his motives?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at all.

MR HUGO: And then finally, would you turn to page 44 of the same set of documents in which discuss the cross-border operations. Is that also a correct version of how you experienced it?


MR HUGO: You will notice in that paragraph, that's paragraph 58, reference is made to neighbouring states but is it correct that that is also of application to operations such as those which were carried out in London?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is of application to any place where the enemy found themselves, the enemy or the opposition.

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, perhaps just one question.

Mr de Kock, Mr Taylor for whom I am appearing says that he did not know exactly what the purpose of the operation and the content thereof was before he arrived in London, would that according to and your knowledge of the need to know principle be correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, logic would also tell me, and I'm not saying anything about you, but logic tells me that it would be irrational for any security policeman to go from South Africa to London during that time without knowing what he was going to go and do there. He might as well just have been given over if Mr Williamson would have been a double agent. There would have been questions. Mr Taylor was a very sober and experienced Security Branch policeman and he attended the lectures at Daisy Farm. There could be no idea that he would not have known.

MR VISSER: Are you saying in other words, that if he tells this Committee that he knew that the operation had to do with something against the enemy but that he didn't know what the entire extent of it was, that he would be lying?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. During the lectures he passed his officer's course but during the lectures at Daisy Farm it was very clear that we didn't have anything to do here with the destruction of spring-charges, we were working with anti-terrorism. There is no way in which he could have questioned it. And by attitude and conduct all of us felt that we had been selected and we were proud of that.

MR VISSER: Well I think we're actually missing each other here Mr de Kock, because the point that I'm trying to make to you is that he says that when he left South Africa he did indeed know that this was an action most probably against the ANC in foreign territory but he didn't know that he was going to blow up the ANC offices in London, that is his story.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, let's just accept that version.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Are you accepting it because you feel that he was one of your colleagues or are you accepting it as being the truth?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we were given the addresses here in South Africa, the addresses of the SACP offices and the ANC offices in London, and that is all I have to say.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, perhaps then I should ask a follow-up question.

That is not denied by Mr Taylor, but he says to me that he didn't know whether or not you were going to commit a robbery at those offices or what you were going to do. He didn't know that the purpose of the operation was to cause damage with spring-charges to any one of those two buildings.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I knew and all of us were collectively informed at Daisy Farm regarding this situation.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr de Kock, you were not present when Mr Raven manufactured the bomb?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Did you ever inspect the bomb in the bag?


MR DU PLESSIS: In other words, you would agree with me then that the only person who can testify regarding the time for which the bomb was to go off would be Mr Raven?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the only person who can tell this Committee exactly what mass the bomb was is Mr Raven because he's the only person who had personal knowledge thereof?

MR DE KOCK: At this stage I would like to qualify. Every since 1989 when Section C1 had to do with the welfare of Peter Castleton who is now deceased, he spent quite a length of time at Vlakplaas and he and I had various discussions and he told me, because I asked him one morning, how large the charge had been and he said 12 pounds. So therefore that concurred with what my opinion had been.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that is what he told you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, and as I understand it, he was the person who fetched the spring-charge, as Mr Raven said. This is actually jogging my memory even further now that you you've mentioned it. Mr Castleton during this discussion told me that not far from where this spring-charge had been buried there was a .22 gun with a silences and a telescope which had also been buried there. I never followed it up. I asked him to draw me a sketch of it because possibly the British could go and look for it in case it should fall into the wrong hands, but that is all I have to say.

MR DU PLESSIS: You did not testify regarding what Mr Castleton said to you, during your evidence in chief. I was not present yesterday.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: This is the first time that you are testifying about it?


MR DU PLESSIS: Then Mr de Kock, you would also not dispute Mr Raven's evidence that Mr Castleton was not present when the bomb was manufactured?

MR DE KOCK: I have a very clear recollection of a discussion between Mr Raven and Mr Williamson during which Mr Williamson requested, or it all boiled down to: "Is the place clean"? And Mr Raven explained how the floors and the walls had been covered with plastic and then with newspaper for the purposes of forensic prevention for any kind of evidence which could be left behind. I remember something like that.

MR DU PLESSIS: I think you're misunderstanding me. All that I want to know from you is whether you would dispute Mr Raven's evidence in any way, that he was the person who set the time and that he was the only person who manufactured the bomb?

MR DE KOCK: No, I don't dispute that at all, regarding the manufacturing of the bomb and the time mechanism and the mass.

MR DU PLESSIS: We will discuss the mass shortly. But the only person who had personal knowledge thereof and who can testify regarding his personal knowledge of it, who saw the bomb, who manufactured the bomb and who set the time, was Mr Raven?


CHAIRPERSON: You were not here yesterday, Mr du Plessis. The question is the size of the bomb. This witness, as I recollect it he gave evidence yesterday as to his estimate of the weight of the bomb when he carried it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I understand the evidence having been exactly that Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, that would have been my following question. Your testimony was that you carried the bomb?

MR DE KOCK: Well I climbed up over a gate and took it from Mr McPherson and in going over the gate I could feel that there was a reasonable amount of tension, which was caused by the mass of this object on the shoulders. My first impression was that this was quite a charge.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you will concede then that your evidence regarding the charge is an estimation, it's merely your opinion?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. At that stage I would have said that this was a rather exact estimation. At that stage in Ovamboland I planted explosives below vehicles. Some of them went off, others didn't and I worked on a daily basis with spring-charges and landmines and especially the Eastern Block type, and I will stand by that which I said yesterday.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, you've said it now, but we have the situation that Mr Raven gave evidence that the mass of the spring-charge was one kilogram and he was not cross-examined regarding what else was in the bag, he was not questioned regarding that, and it was not put by your legal representative to him.

That places my client and I in a very precarious position, unless I'm incorrect in my assumption that it was not put.

MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, it was said by Mr Raven, and I think under cross-examination as well, that the containers were also put in this particular bag and that could have made a difference. That is why I didn't put it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well that is actually what I'm heading at. Thank you Mr Hugo.

Mr de Kock, let's just get to the point. It wasn't only the spring-charge which was in the bag, the canisters were also in the bag, the so-called containers?

MR DE KOCK: Well if you're saying that, I will have to accept it because I didn't expect it.

MR DU PLESSIS: So you can't dispute it?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And your legal representative did not dispute this during cross-examination, so will you concede that with regard to the charge, Mr Raven would be the only person who would have personal knowledge thereof and that he would probably be correct regarding the charge, that it was a one kilogram charge.

MR DE KOCK: I will concede that he is the only person who knows and I wouldn't be able to say that is was a one kilogram charge.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Let me ask you this, is there any reason that you may be aware of why Mr Raven would not sketch the true picture of the charge to the Committee?

MR DE KOCK: No, I'm not here to attack Mr Raven, I'm simply giving evidence regarding my own perceptions and that which I experienced on the scene. I have nothing to do with Mr Raven or anybody else at this point.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.


MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Jansen on record on behalf of John Adam.

Mr de Kock, just two aspects. The first one is, the information regarding when the bomb was to go off, who gave you that information, can you recall?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the date or the day I was informed of during our first visit to the apartment where Mr McPherson and the others were staying, that is my recollection thereof.

MR JANSEN: The apartment in London?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR JANSEN: And who would have conveyed the information regarding the times at which the bomb was to be planted, for how long it was supposed to be set and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: Well, my recollection is that Brigadier Goosen gave us this information because I can still remember that Adam and I were concerned about the surveillance and Brigadier Goosen told all of us that we were selected to be there because of our perseverance and now was the time to hold on.

MR JANSEN: And just based upon logic and experience, Goosen is the most logical person to have taken those important operational decisions regarding: "What time are we going to plant the bomb, for what time will we set it the next day"?

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't be able to say that. Brigadier Goosen, with all respect and compassion, was there, he was the operational commander but according to my opinion he didn't have the knowledge and the brain power to manage an operation such as an operation in Britain. He simply didn't have the background for it. I'm not saying this to place any person at a disadvantage. I think he was informed with regard to knowledge and advice by Mr Williamson. That is what I'm basing my evidence on.

MR JANSEN: Well the other alternative is that because of Mr Williamson's knowledge he would have relied heavily on Mr Williamson or whoever had the knowledge or the local knowledge.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. If it is put later there will be reason for this and you will understand why I am saying this.

MR JANSEN: When you departed from London you said that you went to Brussels. I don't think that there's really anything very important there, there's just a minor difference. Someone else said that you went to Frankfurt, he can't really remember. Do you have any commentary regarding that?

MR DE KOCK: We landed as Schipol in Amsterdam. The reason why I can remember that and the Brussels aspect, is that it was the first time that I was in a country where there was no terrorism and two fully armed guards walked past with sub-machine guns. It was ironic that we didn't find anything like that at Jan Smuts Airport where we actually did deal with terrorism. This is something which I noticed.

MR JANSEN: Something which I might have missed, later at the medal parade in 1982, can you recall that General Geldenhuys was present?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I can recall that.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius on behalf of McPherson.

Mr de Kock, you will recall that Mr McPherson drove the getaway car or he was at least part of the getaway team, along with Jimmy Taylor?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was part of the getaway team.

MR CORNELIUS: And the additional aspect that he had to sit like a drunk person on the pavement, was that also an additional aspect to his tasks?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And my client's recollection is that after the operation you left London and you went to Frankfurt.

MR DE KOCK: I can't dispute that. I know that we weren't on the same flights when we left London, and I can remember that Adam still took my ticket and after that we sought out a second venue, so to speak.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Booyens.

Mr de Kock, just one aspect. The cameras which you mentioned, which you purchased, that was simply part of your disguise as a tourist?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And Mr du Toit tells me that he does not know about it but that you would most have withdrawn it from the supply section of the Technical Division. That was another component of the Technical Division.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, I hadn't met Mr du Toit there at all. It was arranged that we would go and fetch it there.

MR BOOYENS: So you can't be of any further assistance regarding that?


MR BOOYENS: Thank you.


MR LEVINE: Alan Levine on record. I have not cross-examination, Mr Chairman.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Bizos. I have a number of questions, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, I'd like to deal with your understanding of this need to know rule and how it operated in the system as you knew it. I want to take as an example the Cosatu House bombing in which you took part. Who told you to do that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it came from Brigadier Schoon and after that he and I and Captain Jan Meyer went to Johannesburg where we met General Gerrit Erasmus. I understood that this order came from the above. This is the understanding which Schoon and I had. I asked from what level this order came and he said from the most high and when I asked whether or not this was the President, he said yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you feel reluctant to ask those questions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. Brigadier Schoon and I had a reasonably open relationship in that regard. However, I was concerned because this was the first operation of such an extent which was going to be carried out internally.

I think I have mentioned this earlier, but in 1982 we bombed the ANC in London and in 1987/1988 we bombed them in Johannesburg. In other words the borders had moved, not only tactically but also strategically. We actually regressed ...[end of tape]

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] because of the relationship, did he have any difficulty in informing you as to where the order actually came from?

MR DE KOCK: No, only until I asked him whether or not it was the President. It was as if he was a bit hesitant but he then conceded this and he informed me.

CHAIRPERSON: Who precisely was this?

MR DE KOCK: That was Brigadier Schoon who was the Commander of Section C under which C1 fell.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever hear about the Target Identification Committee?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. A group like that originated, I think in 1985 or shortly before then. I understood that the creator thereof was General Buchner as well as members of Military Intelligence Services as well as National Intelligence Services. Their task was to determine target. And upon enquiring from Mr Naude he said it was also to prevent that we shoot one another's sources because the police had their own sources and the military had their own sources. This was to prevent any kind of neutralisation and ultimately any kind of disadvantage, so there had to be a greater level of co-ordination of the internal Intelligence Services before such an operation could be launched.

MR BIZOS: Before there was this formal committee which you say was some time before 1985, how important would it have been for anybody to go and kill people without proper consultation with the Head of Intelligence of the Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, one would never be able to out of oneself and blow someone up or conduct a cross-border operation or any operation of that sort, there had to be clearance from above. When I say that, according to me it had to be from the Security Head all the way to Commissioner level, there was no other way to do that.

I once risked going over the borders when the information was fresh, in other words about an hour old, and I was severely reprimanded for that and I very nearly destroyed my career through that.

MR BIZOS: Let us just take an example outside the First and Schoon killings and take an example like Joe Gwabe. You've heard that he was the Head of the ANC office in Zimbabwe and we know that he was killed. And if I understood at least Mr Williamson, that that would likely to have been an operation by the Security Forces even though General Coetzee washed his hands of any operation being on behalf of the Security Forces.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, not an objection or anything, but Mr Bizos is not speaking at his normal decibels. Could I just perhaps through you ask that he perhaps give us a few more decibels. I've got a bit of a problem hearing him.

CHAIRPERSON: I've been using this here.

MR DU PLESSIS: I haven't got one here Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, you will please remember you're at the far end of the table.

MR BIZOS: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman, I'm sorry. I find it difficult to speak to someone who is so nearby at the decibels I'm now using. I will change the button Mr Chairman.

Let us take Mr Gwabe's case. Assume for the moment that it was done by one or other of the Security Forces or combined operation by the Security Forces, if you had been asked to go and kill Mr Gwabe in Harare, what would you have wanted, in the system in which you were working, what would you have been asking in relation to the authority to do this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Well the first question which I would have asked would be: "Who said so, who's requesting this, where does this come from"? That would have been the very first question which I would have asked and by nature of the situation there are a number of reasons for this. But the very first question would have been: "Who said so"?

MR BIZOS: You say that there are reasons for that, what would the reason be, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the first place there would be political implications and by nature of the situation in the Security Branch, it was basically a political or politically formulated and oriented unit.

Secondly, it was a cross-border operation so there could be foreign implications.

Thirdly, one would require manpower and equipment, finances and it was impossible to carry this out alone. There is no way that you can just disappear with vehicles, personnel and equipment and weapons and execute an operation just like that.

MR BIZOS: What about your own protection? Sometimes operations go wrong, what might the consequences have been if the thing went wrong and the people at the top were able to say that they didn't know about it and you were on your own? How would you have felt about that?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I believe that one would have felt, firstly if one had done it alone, they would have cut your career short right there and then, there can be no doubt about that. And even though you might have had the approval of the Generals and the Ministers on the upper levels and you had been caught, they would in either event have washed their hands of any involvement. It was a question that you would be alone if something were to go wrong.

MR BIZOS: Would you not have expected those at the top to take steps, either to have you released or to negotiate with someone from the other side that had been caught in a similar situation? Wouldn't you have wanted to be satisfied that you would have whatever support you could get from the top?

MR DE KOCK: Well one would have expected, even though it would take time, even up to three years, but that on a daily basis your welfare would be attended to and that there would be negotiations which would free you from your situation. I think we can use the example of Wynand du Toit in this particular case. That's just to give you an example.

MR BIZOS: To stay with Mr Gwabe's death as an example, would you have expected that the Head of Intelligence of the Security Police would not have known anything about the death or the planning and execution of the death of Joe Gwabe in Zimbabwe?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. It is hardly possible that any Minister or any Head of the National Intelligence Services, the Military or the Police would not have made any queries or that this would not have emerged in any discussion. We had three of the best Intelligence Services in Africa, and also in comparison with certain countries in Europe and America. If it wasn't one of the two then it was the other.

There was no way in which the Head of Intelligence would let information like that slip away. He could not do that, he could not afford to do that. If he was not informed then members below him did not do their work properly and he would have addressed them.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether Mr Williamson knew or participated in Mr Gwabe's death?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I can't say that. In discussions, and many of us were present, the name of this person emerged at various occasions and the inference which I drew from that was that within the Security Forces there was a group which was operating but I can't give any evidence regarding that because it would incorrect of me to do that.

MR BIZOS: Who was - at the time of Mr Gwabe's death, who was the best informed intelligence person in relation to the workings of the ANC outside the country, in your opinion?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe that that would have been the Head of the Security Branch and the Security Police. There can be no doubts surrounding that. The death of such a high profile person would automatically draw attention.

MR BIZOS: You have heard responses of General Coetzee to the questions put to him about your early morning visit after the deaths of three people in Swaziland. What do you say, from what was said there, from the conversation that you and others had of him, did he or did he not know what the purpose of your visit and the reason why the people were killed in Swaziland?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by behaviour, conduct and approach that morning, he knew why we were there. It wasn't a question of surprise, it wasn't a question: "Only two of you come in", such as Brigadier Schoon and Colonel Visser, the entire group went in. The English word is animated. He was excited in a way about it and I had no doubt that he knew precisely what it was about.

MR BIZOS: How did you interpret his remark that your hands were full of blood? Did he refer to the blood spilt only on this occasion or did you believe that he knew of other things that you had done?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was naive enough to look down at my hands to see if there was indeed blood on my hands because I thought that I might have made a mistake somewhere, and that there may be stains, blood stains on my hands.

It didn't really upset me but it did agitate me ever so slightly. And after that when Brigadier Schoon and I drove away from General Coetzee's home, I was driving the vehicle, Brigadier Schoon asked why General Coetzee had said something like that and then he said that General Coetzee had been joking. I then asked: "Well why wasn't anybody laughing"? The discussion ended there.

This is something which has been embellished in my mind and later reflected to me his attitude towards people regarding the more unsavoury aspects of the execution of tasks with regard to terrorism or counter-terrorism.

MR BIZOS: You told us yesterday that General Coetzee was the ultimate authority in Koevoet.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did Koevoet enjoy a high regard for lawful or lawful and unlawful activity in Ovamboland and in the Ovamboland/Angolan border, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Koevoet was well-known for its successful counter-insurgency operations. A small group of people probably participated then in small counter-insurgency programmes and one of them was me. With regard to the number of SWAPO soldiers which died there one can then infer that it was one of the most successful units. However 32 Battalion was miles ahead of us.

Something which I can mention and General Coetzee will know about this, I must mention that the first three years where the files and photographs of those persons who'd be captured have been burnt. We captured 86 members of SWAPO's Intelligence Services. They were highly trained, very well trained and these persons who were responsible for the bombs in a bread shop in Swakopmund in Walvis Bay, as well as the explosion of a train track near Mariental, murders and so forth. And none of those 86 appeared in court.

Some of them later worked as Askaris. Some of them disappeared one by one and nothing was ever heard of them later. It was a sort of a tit-for-tat kind of war situation at that stage. And General Coetzee visited Koevoet numerous times during that stage.

I found it rather interesting when he said to 11 of us young men who were there that it was a pity that people like us who were so unsophisticated had to be exposed to this sort of life and life experience.

The inherent establishment of Koevoet was a joint operation between the Army and the South African Police, the Security Police and than also the Special Forces which was 5 Reconnaissance Command.

It had to establish a unit which was similar to Renamo, which could operate internally in Ovamboland under the code-name: "Operation Vanguard". And for that clothing and weapons were obtained from Rhodesia, of Eastern Block origin, most probably originating from the Rhodesian Intelligence Services, as I understood it.

I believe that the political reasons within Ovambo were not suitable for such a type of Renamo action. After a number of successes, the Counter-insurgency Unit of which I was a member slotted that group over to counter-insurgency as well. In other words, if General Coetzee says that there is or was no co-operation between the police and the army, he is lying.

MR BIZOS: You say that some of the 78 disappeared. What happened to them Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: They died.

MR BIZOS: Would you ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with respect. We are busy here with applications in regard to an explosion which took place in London at the ANC offices. My learned friend is presently asking questions of this witness relating to a witness who has given evidence before you, who was never confronted with any of what you hear now regarding incidents in Ovamboland and Koevoet etc., and people who may or may not have disappeared there. And he is now being called a liar by de Kock when none of this was put to him. With great respect Mr Chairman, my learned friend ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that one of the problems Mr Visser, when we are inquiring into the activities of a force in the past, that you cannot expect people from outside to know those facts. Mr Bizos' clients were not part of these activities, Mr de Kock was. Is Mr Bizos not entitled to seek to get information from other members? He should in all fairness then permit General Coetzee to respond to it if he wishes to put this to and have it accept as evidence against General Coetzee, because at the moment I agree with you entirely. General Coetzee has been given no opportunity to deal with this and it may have no weight against him. What Mr Bizos is doing as I understand it, is seeking to dig up information about the manner in which the Security Police behaved in those years.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, but one has to ask the question: "What has that got to do with the incidents of Ms Ruth First and the Schoons"?, because there doesn't seem to be any connection between the questions being asked now and those incidents. And with respect Mr Chairman, it couldn't possibly be the intention that hearings of this Committee should be used in order to dig up matter which are totally irrelevant to the present ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Are they irrelevant to the credibility of your client?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, credibility, that's a collateral issue. My learned friend has ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: If we find he is to be, I'm not saying for a moment we do, a witness on whom we can place no reliance whatsoever, it is surely a very important issue in deciding whether he should succeed in his application.

MR VISSER: Yes. But Mr Chairman, when the credibility of a witness, and it's trite law, is being attacked and the collateral issue is advanced in order to do so, then Mr Chairman, our rule of evidence and procedure says that the answer of that person, and I again hasten to say that he hasn't been asked Mr Chairman, is final and ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: As I have explained Mr Visser, this is not the normal courts of this land. We are investigating here the activities of the Security Police in the past, where one would not expect people outside the Security Police to know of it. Are you saying that they can burn their records, shut their mouths and sit and say: "You don't know and you're not going to find out"?

MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairman, but what I am submitting to you Mr Chairman, is that the facts relevant to a particular incident are those which are relevant. The moment it goes beyond that Mr Chairman, it could only relate to credibility.

What our objection is Mr Chairman, is that the credibility of a witness who has spent two or three days before you, is now attacked on this basis that my learned friend is doing at present.

CHAIRPERSON: He has indicated he is trying to get information that he didn't have. If he doesn't use it, it cannot be used against your client. Your client has not had the opportunity, I think that is entirely obvious. And I certainly would attach no value to any argument by Mr Bizos that we should accept something said now which was not put to your client and our client has been given no opportunity to answer, as a reason for disbelieving your client. But if Mr Bizos wants to get information which he subsequently wants to use, I don't think it would be proper to stop him at the present time.

You must bear in mind that your client was the officer in charge of these, in all these incidents he was the officer in charge, either of the Security Police or he was the Commissioner of Police.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, may I by the way of personal explanation, was that I was surprised to hear yesterday afternoon that Mr Coetzee was in charge of Koevoet. Had I known that fact before Mr Chairman, I would have put the questions that I am now putting to him, if I had the information from anyone. But in due course we will consider, we will ask you to consider an application for the recall of Mr Coetzee to deal with these matters Mr Chairman.

May I say that the manner in which the Security Police worked during this period is not a collateral matter in these proceedings, Mr Chairman. May I proceed please?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I will ask you, Mr Bizos to confine yourself to matters that will directly involve the General.

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman. I will try and do that Mr Chairman, but you will realise that this is not a person with whom I'm privy to and I ask a question and information comes out which will have to be adjudged and adjudicated upon at the end.

MR JANSEN: Sorry Mr Chairman, if I may interject just to remind you Mr Chairman, that I did ask the question to General Coetzee, under whose command Koevoet fell. If you can recall he was fairly evasive about the answer, making a distinction as to its commands and its functions. I was subsequently compelled to ask the question on the basis of who paid their salaries. I don't know if you can remember those questions. So the issue of Koevoet's command was canvassed with him very, very tangentially.

CHAIRPERSON: As I recollect it, we've heard a great deal of evidence, there was no evidence before yesterday that he was in direct command. And certainly I didn't ...[intervention]

MR JANSEN: No, certainly because he didn't want to say it, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I didn't receive the impression when you were questioning him, that he regularly visited them in the field of conflict.

MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman, it must have been so tangentially dealt with that I missed it altogether. May I just proceed Mr Chairman. This happens after these interjections Mr Chairman, I don't remember what the question was.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, my learned friend has misconstrued my objection for an interjection, with respect.

MR BIZOS: Can I proceed?

You told us that the people who disappeared were killed and I think the question that was objected to was: "Who killed them"?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I myself shot about four or five of them.

CHAIRPERSON: I didn't hear that, could you repeat?

MR DE KOCK: I myself shot four or five of the Intelligence Agents and in time others also disappeared. From discussions with the small group of us who were involved there, one could surmise where the rest of them had gone. Not many of them were left. I believe that if I had kept the photo album of this specific group very few, indeed if any of them, would have been found in Ovamboland.

MR BIZOS: Were there records kept of the people detained?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the first three years worth of files were the original files with the original documents. All of this was sent by telex to head office, to the South West desk where there was a certain Colonel in charge and it was brought to the personal attention of General Coetzee.

It was heard with great joy after the arrest of such agents, that we had acted with a lot of effectivity. I know that the Colonel went to the RSA for additional funds, that he spoke directly to General Coetzee about this issue and the doors were basically open with us with regard to equipment, the purchasing and obtaining of equipment as a result of our successful actions.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr de Kock, you previously said that if somebody had to be killed an order would be given and you would be sure that this would come from above.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I will sketch it for you. General Dreyer usually came to me and specifically in this instance he came to me, he said that some people had to go. That had only one connotation, there was no misinterpretation of any sort.

I know that a Captain Sakkie van der Merwe came to me on a certain morning and said: "There are three people who have to go". I asked him why he didn't take them and make them go and see if he could sleep easily that night. I told him that he should rather work through the appropriate channels even though he was my senior by a year. But that is just to sketch it.

ADV DE JAGER: General Dreyer, was he a member of the police or the army?

MR DE KOCK: No, he was South African Police.

MR BIZOS: You say he was a General, was he a Deputy Commissioner?

MR DE KOCK: Upon his arrival in Ovamboland he was a fully fledged Colonel and after that a Brigadier and ultimately he became a Deputy Commissioner.

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] these, and the reason will become pertinent, depending on your answer, were these persons purportedly held in detention under 6 of the Terrorism Act?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they were held at 5 Reconnaissance base. They all lay on the ground on cement. Their feet were chained together and their hands were cuffed behind their backs and there were bags over their heads.

For some of these people it took five to six months of being detained in such a fashion to the extent that some of them eventually achieved a kind of a blue sheen on their face. I don't know if it was some form of fungus. I know that some of their eyes became very light sensitive. I managed to get some of them to work for me and they always had to wear dark glasses.

MR BIZOS: Could these things have happened without the knowledge of the Head of the Security Police and/or the Commissioner of Police?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, General Dreyer definitely knew. I don't know whether General Coetzee knew. He definitely didn't ask any questions. He didn't ask why there hadn't been any court cases, why any evidence hadn't been given. It was a question of: "We're paying you back with your own medicine".

CHAIRPERSON: This base, was it police or army?

MR DE KOCK: It was 5 Reconnaissance Commandos base which was built completely away from the rest of the base next to the tarmac for the aeroplanes. Koevoet and the unit which I had functioned on an assistance level as well and we were also in a capacity as a fire force operational unit. If there had to be problems with any other unit we would be prepared to go in with helicopters. I lived at this base for a few years.

The detainees were not held in police cells, they were held in a type of a wooden hut structure. They lay next to each other side by side, there was nothing such as privacy or anything like that.

CHAIRPERSON: Who administered this, that's the point of my question. Who fed them, who was responsible for their daily maintenance?

MR DE KOCK: 5 Reconnaissance Command base was responsible for feeding them as well as for medical attention. I don't believe that their detention - and this is not very easy for me to say this, but their detention did not differ much from the detention of those in Quatro.

MR BIZOS: There was - we have heard that there was a war on, would you have treated prisoners of war in this way, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: I must describe the war to you like this. The Defence Force described it as a low intensity war. That may be so if you go and look at the definition of strategy but for those people who were being shot, it was high intensity.

Not many prisoners were taken, not on either side. It was cold-blooded, point-blank and later I heard that I had taken the most prisoners. I know that that's not really very honourable but I took the most prisoners and that wasn't many.

MR BIZOS: Would you have done any of those things if you felt that your advancement in the Police Force or possible danger of being prosecuted would have followed if the Commissioner of Police or the Head of the Security Police found out? Did you have that fear at any time when that happened, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Not if the Head of Security or the Commissioner had known. He would not have withdrawn us. We were regarded as the best in our field.

MR BIZOS: Now we've heard that Mr Joe Slovo was enemy number one. Did you do anything in relation to Mr Joe Slovo whilst you were in London?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not at all.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether any of your colleagues did anything in relation to Mr Slovo whilst they were in London?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, and I didn't receive any such information later.

MR BIZOS: In relation to who was in charge, how urbane or how much of a sort of a city slicker was Mr Goosen whilst you were in London?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think he experienced a number of unqualified problems surrounding that personally. I know that before we left the country here we were specifically warned that we should guard against pickpockets. I understand that he was pickpocketed and I know that this was a British speciality of British pickpockets to clean you out completely. Furthermore we were instructed not buy anything in the line of a weapon, such as a sharp knife or a sword or anything like that because at Heathrow Airport one would pick up problems.

The morning when Adam and I arrived at the airport I was quite stressed because I saw that next to me on the table three of the customs and excise officials were busy with Goosen. He had bought himself a number of axes. He was quite fond of woodwork. Apart from myself, I think he and I were on an equal level, we were both equally like country bumpkins in that regard.

MR BIZOS: So who called the shots so to speak, in London?

MR DE KOCK: Mercifully, and this is not to place him at a disadvantage, this is simply with respect to his capabilities, I would say that it was Major Williamson. He was the only person who was streetwise. Please excuse my language us but he was the only person who could lead us within the European context in that regard.

MR BIZOS: Do you have any knowledge of Mr Coetzee, General Coetzee coming to Vlakplaas to get any AK47's from you?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not personally but Brigadier Schoon contacted me on more than one occasion telling me that Coetzee was looking for ammunition and that he had a certain weapon registered on his name and by the first opportunity in that context, I gave him a hundred to two hundred rounds. I was later told not to be greedy with my rounds and later I gave him a thousand four hundred rounds. It happened on a regular basis.

MR BIZOS: What were they to be used for?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I accept that he himself had a gun like that, that he himself would shoot with it and that possibly he had friends or acquaintances who had similar weapons registered on their names, but that's simply an inference, I'm speculating. The ammunition was sent to him personally.

MR BIZOS: Did Mr Raven ever tell you how the envelope that found it's way to Maputo and killed Ruth First was sent?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the conversation - and I can't remember the exact date or time or whether it was during the day or during the evening, our mutual trust was very good and during this conversation he mentioned to me that there was an envelope and I'm assuming that the inference to be made there was that the bomb was Mozambique.

They had opened the locks of the mail bags at Jan Smuts and the envelope had been replaced into the mail bag to be sent to Maputo. I was aware that Mr Raven was very good at picking locks. That was part of a course which had been presented when the Task Force fell under the Security Police.

I would have joined the Task Force as well if it had not been for the fact that I was to go on an officer's course. I was one of the founding members of the Task Force.

MR BIZOS: Have you ever heard the expression of the appointment of a sweeper after crimes were committed by the Security Police, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not during the Harms Commission. I was only later informed of the terminology of sweepers. What I did notice with the Harms Commission was that things could be arranged, that the law could be obstructed and that things could be construed in order to mean nothing, it could also open doors for you.

For the sake of thoroughness I can mention that General Coetzee, although he was, or at least when he was on pension I met him on two occasions at General van Rensburg's officer where he was very concerned, firstly about Dirk Coetzee who would swear at his elderly mother over the phone because he knew that his phone was tapped and he was highly upset about this. By nature of the situation I suppose anybody would have been.

Secondly, in a discussion in General van Rensburg's office, he asked me: "Will you be able to hold the fort? You must stand firm". And then the whole thing about: "We're right behind you men".

Upon a third occasion I found him in the building next door near the Commissioner's office. I was on my way to a unit. He asked me again: "Will you be able to hold the fort? Can you stand firm? Can you take this thing through the Harms Commission?" And once again the attitude of: "Stand firm men, we're right behind you", and all that sort of nonsense.

Personally I can testify to this. I know it and he knows it. So he was very much aware of what was going on in the Harms Commission. He could have gone to the Harms Commission if he was innocent, and said that he didn't know anything about the Swaziland border operation, that he didn't know what had happened there. He could also have said that he didn't know about London. Once again I will reiterate that General Coetzee is a liar.

MR BIZOS: If you'll bear with me for a moment, Mr Chairman. Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.


FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, is it possible that I may ask one or two questions flowing from this? I know I'm always doing that and I promise you it will be, you can count Mr Chairman, two.

Mr de Kock, I'd just like to find out the following from you. You gave evidence at a stage and you said that you would not have conducted an operation if you were not certain that the order came from above. Was this evidence of application to cross-border operations as well?

MR DE KOCK: That would have included internal operations but by nature of the seriousness thereof, if I recall correctly, I said in Port Elizabeth that there were certain occasions where you had to make operational decisions in the field, that you didn't have the opportunity to make enquiries or to consult and you take to take responsibility for your decision.

MR DU PLESSIS: But what I'm trying to find out is that it wasn't a rule that you had to make sure all the time that this came from the highest level in government, because the way I understand it, this was not the situation with regard to a number of operations.

MR DE KOCK: The more senior became in rank, the more responsibility one carried and the more responsibility one had to assume. And by nature of the situation a lot more authority was devolved to you once you occupied a higher rank.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Those who were under your command and who carried out orders, you didn't expect of them with regard to an order which you had given for an operation to eliminate someone, to come to you all the time and ask you: "Who gave permission, was it the Commissioner, was it the Head of the Security Police, was it the President"? You didn't expect that from them?

MR DE KOCK: No, but from my view of matters, I would always tell them where it came from. I would tell them that it came from Brigadier Schoon or from head office and in my case I would always tell people that: "This would be the nature of the operation and those who don't want to go, tell me so that I can replace you with someone else because I don't want someone who acts a second too soon or a second too late because that could lead to loss of life".

MR DU PLESSIS: But you didn't give them all the particulars?

MR DE KOCK: No, I didn't.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if you didn't say anything to them or that which you said to them was satisfactory, they wouldn't have come to you, you wouldn't have expected of them to come to you for more information in order to ensure that this had been cleared and so on and so forth?


MR DU PLESSIS: Did it ever happen that anybody questioned your orders and asked: "But are you sure that this is coming from the highest level in government"?

MR DE KOCK: No, not once.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then finally. The actions of Koevoet up in South West Africa, you have just given evidence that General Coetzee was aware of that and that there was knowledge of Koevoet's actions, and I'm sure we all know what Koevoet did up there. The police had knowledge in South Africa, the structures so to say. Would you say with regard to yourself and other persons within the Security Police scenario, the impression entrenched that those sort of actions such as that which you have given evidence about regarding the SWAPO operatives which you caught and so forth, did that firmly entrench the idea that it was allowed and that it was permitted and that that is what you could do?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, well I would venture as far as to say that this was a controlled practice and that it had been devolved and that would not necessarily have filtered through to people who were involved with Koevoet but the entire Security Police.

In the Security Police it was a well-known inwoven idea within the Security Police fabric, with the exception of a number of aspects here and there.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I'm indebted to you.


MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I don't want to ask any questions at the moment but I do have to place something on record. Insofar as it is necessary, we have to give fair notice that at the continuation of this hearing we will bring evidence, we will have to bring evidence to address the issues that have been raised here today. Mr Chairman, we trust that you won't stop us at that stage on the basis of irrelevancy.

It is clear that we will have to address these issues fully and at that stage we would ask for Mr de Kock to be recalled to face further cross-examination from us. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that the end of your one or two questions, Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, but they sort of flowed into each other, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, can I clarify something in my own mind? I can understand if you are stationed here in Pretoria and you are ordered to a cross-border operation, that you would enquire where the instructions came from, what level they came from.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But when you were in the field with the Koevoet unit, I take it you then did what had to be done?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: When you were in Okavango, you didn't turn round and expect instructions from Pretoria every morning?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, and I will give you an example. I'm not going to name any names however. And I would say that it was just about general practice that one would hear over the radio that there had been a contact. I'm trying to give a broader picture here because otherwise we'll never to able to understand exactly what happened.

You'd hear that there was a contact and then the commander would come through and say: "Three have been killed, I've caught two and they are wounded". Then three hours later you'd hear that these detainees had died as a result of their injuries, but these were not the injuries that they had sustained during the conflict, these were new injuries. So those who were detaining them had finished them off.

It was that sort of war. No questions were asked on either side and ultimately it could have created that understanding among people, that this is how guerrilla warfare was to be conducted if you wanted to win.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr de Kock, who was the commander of Koevoet?

MR DE KOCK: General Hags Dreyer.

ADV DE JAGER: And what was or how long did you serve in Koevoet?

MR DE KOCK: Koevoet was established on the 1st of January 1979 and I began there. I worked there for three and a half years, during the formative years, during the initial problematic years with adjustments and the implementation of techniques and methods.

ADV DE JAGER: So when did you leave there?

MR DE KOCK: I left at the end of May 1983.

ADV DE JAGER: Just something about the London bomb. In your evidence in chief yesterday you said that the information which you received at Daisy Farm was very scarce and that nothing specific was said. This morning questions were put to you in that regard and could you just explain what you meant when you said that the information was scarce?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I would have wanted to see things like aerial photos. I wanted information regarding guards. I would have wanted information about whether or not there were private companies who were performing guard duties there. I wanted to know whether or not there were lights in the backyard, whether or not there were alarm systems which could possibly go off, should you enter an infra-red area or come within infra-red distance such the current alarm systems which are in use today. That is the sort of information which I wanted but we had to go and find out that information for ourselves on ground level. And as I remember correctly, we only saw the photos. That's basically what I meant.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: There was just one aspect I wanted to clarify, Mr de Kock. At Daisy Farm, who was in charge of preparing the members to go over to London? Was it Craig Williamson solely or was he assisted by other people?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, for Adam and I there was Derek Broon but the information which he gave us regarding England and the aspects surrounding that was in direct contradiction with the information which Mr Williamson had given us. I picked up feelings of jealousy towards Mr Williamson from Mr Broon and we stated that we did not want any further information from Mr Broon and that we would only take information from Mr Williamson.

MS PATEL: Are you saying that yourself and Adam were briefed alone and not with the rest of the members of the operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, with regard to Mr Broon we asked questions because it was a foreign experience and one would try as much as possible to gain information. Upon later interviews when we were informed and briefed at Daisy and photos were shown to us, it became evident that Mr Broon either didn't know what he was talking about or he purposely tried to mislead us.

MS PATEL: Right, so then the sole person in charge of briefing you must have been Craig Williamson?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Okay. Now just one minor aspect I wanted clarity on. You remember you testified about the canister that was given to you, which you said wasn't really teargas but was a substance that would immobilise the person that it was used against. Mr Adam in his application says clearly that it was teargas. Where would you have got your information from that it wasn't teargas?

MR DE KOCK: No, it was probably teargas. I'm not a chemical expert. And I'm sure that one can vary the components in the composition of teargas. It wasn't the type of teargas which we used in unrest control, which would make people cough and splutter. This was a gas which brought about a disorientation effect which would immobilise a person for approximately 10 seconds to the extent which would allow me for example, to get away or to overwhelm you. It was something in that line. It had the teargas effect, the burning sensation and so forth but I wasn't sure whether or not one or more of the components had been added to that chemical composition.

MS PATEL: Alright. Then just one final aspect. I'm not sure whether you testified about this yesterday or not but, Mr Adam says somewhere in his application that at some stage he suggested to Mr Williamson that you both be withdrawn from the operation. I believe that that was after the time that you were approached by certain men at the hotel, that you got the feeling that you were being followed. What is your comment on this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Adam was a highly intelligent person, as I'd already seen in Ovamboland and politically he was extremely mature. For me it didn't really matter whether or not I was working in Ovamboland or in Brussels or in London and it didn't matter to me if I was shot there or anywhere for that matter because that's what I was there for.

Mr Adam had certain reservations which he didn't want to express at that stage and upon various occasions we were having conversations during which he appeared to be cautious and he was rather reticent but apart from that he still had the courage to still go ahead. And that is where I will conclude.

MS PATEL: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.


ADV DE JAGER: Let us put this in quotation marks: "the teargas", you kept the canister with its contents when you came back, you didn't hand it back in?

MR DE KOCK: No, it was said to us here that this is what we could use, this is what we had at our disposal and the overall situation was that no British policeman was to be injured if a confrontation should occur. In no way should a British police person be injured, it would be better to be placed under arrest.

It wasn't my intention to take any such teargas canister. I would have relied on my bare hands for my specific task together with Mr Raven, in order to protect him. I want to just tell the

Committee that there was a second aspect ...[end of tape] ...[inaudible] in explosives, and I was the only other person other than Mr Raven who was qualified in explosives.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, are you aware or do you have any information whether these ammunitions which were requested from Vlakplaas were ever used for Stratcom purposes, like to parade them as it was done in the case of the, where they were paraded before the raid into Botswana?

Or let me just be specific to say, in the past there used to be instances where a trained terrorist will infiltrate the country, he will be arrested and there will some allegations that there were a lot of arms found in his possession but families of those people will deny, that the arms came with the police. I'm asking you in relation to that, whether you have any knowledge with regard to that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I know no such case or incident during which additional ammunition or weapons were planted on people. There was an incident at Piet Retief, a shooting incident during which the information was indeed correct but the operational group didn't come over and weapons were put down during that incident. However I don't want to quote that incident right here. I think in the future it will be clarified completely. But I don't know of any operational MK member regarding who additional arms or ammunition or explosives were handed in during court proceedings. It could have happened but I don't know about it.

MR SIBANYONI: Were these arms and ammunition found from either the ANC or PAC, all of them kept at Vlakplaas or are there any other places where they were kept?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, later, and when I say later I'm referring to 1987 or 1988 here, a written order was issued by head office that all Russian explosives and Russian explosive devices as well as weapons should be brought to Vlakplaas. On the contrary a written order was given by head office with regard to this and I remember that I was busy with training of former ANC operatives as well as other members. But with regard to all types of weapons from East and Western Block origin.

I ensured that 10 to 15 years after we could act conventionally and I was beginning to instruct members with regard to parachuting and other techniques.

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination?

MR HUGO: I have no re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: The time has come for the short adjournment. We will adjourn till 11 o'clock.









DAY: 15

--------------------------------------------------------------------------ON RESUMPTION


EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson. The witness will give his evidence in Afrikaans.

Mr du Toit, you are applying for amnesty with regard to your involvement in what has generally been called here: The London Bomb, is that correct?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And your application appears on page 189 of bundle number 3 and further.

MR DU TOIT: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: If we could just quickly study your application. Page 189, is there anything that you wish to add?

MR DU TOIT: Negative.

MR BOOYENS: Regarding paragraph 7(a), were you a supporter of any political party? Here it says:

"Not applicable"

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I was a supporter of the National Party.

MR BOOYENS: An ordinary member?


MR BOOYENS: On page 190 you sketch by beginning with your career in the police, is that correct?


MR BOOYENS: Is there anything that you wish to add?


MR BOOYENS: Page 191, you discuss your career history further.

MR DU TOIT: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Anything to add?


MR BOOYENS: 192, it's still the same?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: 193, the same?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And 194 until the middle of the page, you discuss your career history and to a certain extent how the structure was composed, the structure in which you worked, is that correct?


MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the correctness of what is stated here?


MR BOOYENS: Let's look at paragraph 9(a), 9(a)1. This application of yours, who compiled it?

MR DU TOIT: It was compiled by me.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have any assistance from legal representation?

MR DU TOIT: Without any assistance of legal representation.

MR BOOYENS: 9(a)1, the deed, omission or offence for which you are applying, do you request that it be added to this if there's any other offence or delict which may emanate from my involvement in this incident.

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: But just insofar as it is covered by the facts which have been given here?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, absolutely Chairperson. The only reason why I'm adding this is because this was not compiled by a legal person and there may be certain complications, there could be certain contravention of an the Explosives Act, there could be a contravention of the Airline Law and so forth. Any other statutory implications which should be covered by this and not only the common offences which are listed here.

Mr du Toit, if we can turn to page 195 where you sketch your involvement. You said in the early '80 years you received a request, just proceed from there and tell us how you remember this occurring.

MR DU TOIT: Upon a certain day I was approached by Major Craig Williamson.

MR BOOYENS: Directly or indirectly?

MR DU TOIT: Indirectly. I have a suspicion that Mr Raven was sent to me with the request. I've given three here but I've heard from other witnesses that there were only two metal containers.

I was requested to manufacture two containers with fake surfaces and the purpose of that was to contain documentation, films or any other information which would be sent over the borders of the country from time to time.

MR BOOYENS: The fake surfaces of these containers, how were they supposed to look?

MR DU TOIT: Well no definite description was given to me, this was left to my own discretion, to make it look as if it was a electronic testing device and it did indeed appear as such.

MR BOOYENS: Are you speaking of buttons and switches and other such devices?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: You then manufactured these containers?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I did.

MR BOOYENS: How big were these containers as far as you can remember? You could indicate it to us or you could give us measurements, according to your recollection.

MR DU TOIT: I would say it was about 350 long, 100 high and 200 wide.

MR BOOYENS: This request which you received from Mr Williamson, possibly via Mr Raven, was there anything strange about this sort of request which was given to your Technical Division?

MR DU TOIT: No, not at all. That was a standard request which we would receive from time to time, to manufacture items or objects such as this.

MR BOOYENS: We know that you could not remember the date but we've heard that it was in 1982.

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

And what was your rank at that stage, can you remember?

MR DU TOIT: I would estimate that I was a Captain. The other members, all of us were approximately in the same time frame, so I'm assuming that I was a Captain.

MR BOOYENS: Can you tell me whether after you had manufactured these containers you determined what the content of the containers would be, what would be packed into these containers?

MR DU TOIT: Once again I was approached by Mr Raven. After that he showed me the content and I noticed that it was among others, Eastern Block explosives and there were also other forms of apparatus such as wires and a clock and other similar items which went along with it.

MR BOOYENS: When you refer to wires and such and explosives, as I understand it there had to have been silencers?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, there would have been switches, which would have been the normal practice. The explosives would be in the one container and the other equipment would be in the other container.

MR BOOYENS: And you also said it was rationed TNT. Mr Raven said that it was plastic explosives, how sure are you of the nature of the explosives?

MR DU TOIT: Well I can't dispute this with him, that is simply my recollection and I wasn't very experienced at that stage. So I don't think I'd be able to give a better expert opinion than Mr Raven.

MR BOOYENS: Did you then these items into the containers?

MR DU TOIT: I sealed it lightly into a plastic container and after that I placed it into the container and ensured that it could not shaken about in transit.

MR BOOYENS: Were the explosives placed separately from the other equipment?


MR BOOYENS: In order to minimalise any kind of risk?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, it would have been fatal to do it in any other way.

MR BOOYENS: What were these containers made of, was it metal, wood or what?

MR DU TOIT: It was made of sheet metal.

MR BOOYENS: When you saw that these items were used to pack explosives, what kind of inference did you draw?

MR DU TOIT: The first inference that I drew was that this would be used for an offensive action and secondly, that this would be used in a cross-border operation because of the great deal of trouble that went into the packing of these items.

MR BOOYENS: Was anything ever said to you about the express purpose behind these objects?


MR BOOYENS: So you just drew your inferences?


MR BOOYENS: Mr du Toit, at that stage, as it appears from your background, you had been connected with the Technical Division of the Security Branch for quite some time?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And your division, did you ever have anything to do with input or the determination of who or what would be targets?

MR DU TOIT: No, not at all. We were purely in a supportive capacity in order to assist the Security Branch.

MR BOOYENS: And these requests, we're just going to deal with this specific request which you received, this came from Mr Williamson, according to your knowledge. Did you have any reason to believe - let's just speak of confidence or trust, what was your trust situation with regard to your fellow members at the branch and in terms of the legitimacy of operations, however unlawful they may have been, but with regard to the authorisation that was given for these operations.

MR DU TOIT: During those days, and I believe that this was the spirit which ruled over a long period of time, there was a great deal of confidence among all security members, especially when a request such as this came from the security head.

MR BOOYENS: Let's discuss this specific incident. This came from Mr Williamson, and you knew him, is that correct?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I knew him.

MR BOOYENS: And you knew that he was Head of Intelligence?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I knew that.

MR BOOYENS: And did you at any stage think in any way that this would be applied in a different way or in a different situation other than the struggle that was taking place between the liberation movements on the one side and the South African Government on the other side?

MR DU TOIT: No, I had no reason to believe anything else.

MR BOOYENS: And did you ask any questions of Mr Raven or Mr Williamson regarding these objects or why they were going to be used?

MR DU TOIT: We didn't ask any questions. If you received information you kept it to yourself. But if it wasn't given to you then you didn't ask any questions.

MR BOOYENS: Later, did you draw any inferences at a later stage regarding the ultimate destination of these explosives or a component of these explosives which you packed?

MR DU TOIT: I simply thought that it was going to be applied for the chief purpose.

MR BOOYENS: And by that you're implying that this would be for an explosion at the ANC's offices?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Regarding your personal and political objectives, it could be rather broad, but regarding your personal objectives on page 197 of your application, do you confirm that which is declared there?


MR BOOYENS: Did you regard yourself as a technical person who was connected to the Security Branch and therefore part of the struggle?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: In the same position as Denel's weapons manufacturing section or Armscor's weapons manufacturing section?

MR DU TOIT: Well not on such a high profile level but I felt that I also participated in the attempt or the effort to combat the revolutionary struggle.

MR BOOYENS: So then you confirm the rest of your application as well?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Until page 200?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Anything else which you wish to add?


MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson.


MR VISSER: Visser on record Mr Chairman. No questions, thank you.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, Levine on record.

Mr du Toit, I have one question. If you would turn to page 195 of your affidavit, the first paragraph. Do you have that?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I have it.

MR LEVINE: You will see on the third line:

"Three metal containers"

I think or I'd like to know whether it was three metal containers or two metal containers, according to your recollection?

MR DU TOIT: As I've reflected here my recollection is that it was three but I will agree that I could be mistaken because it is quite some time since this incident took place and I can't remember it all that clearly, so I can't really dispute it.

MR LEVINE: Thank you Mr Chairperson.


MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. I'm sorry that I wasn't here, there was something urgent that I had to deal with and which may mean that I may not be here this afternoon, Mr Chairman. I have not questions to Mr du Toit.


MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, Jansen on record. I have no questions, thank you.


MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman, Cornelius for the applicant, McPherson. I have not questions, thank you.


MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hugo no record. I have no questions.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: I have a few questions Mr Chairman.

What was your unit called, Mr du Toit?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, the unit was referred to as the Technical Division of the Security Branch.

MR BIZOS: Did you know Mr Reeve?

MR DU TOIT: Not, at all.

MR BIZOS: Or Mr Freeman?

MR DU TOIT: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Have you ever heard the initials: EMLC?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I have heard that before.

MR BIZOS: Other than in this hearing. What does EMLC stand for?

MR DU TOIT: I don't know. I think somebody here did give an explanation of that, Electro Mechanic - he didn't really expand on it.

MR BIZOS: What do you know about this body?

MR DU TOIT: Not much, I simply knew that it was a unit of the army which served certain needs of Special Forces, but furthermore I can't say much about them.

MR BIZOS: I do not want to touch upon a matter in which you were otherwise involved, save in relation to a very limited thing. I don't want to jeopardise your application for amnesty in the Motherwell matter nor the appeal that is pending if your application is not successful. What I do want to ask you is, were you a bomb maker in 1982?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson at that stage I was not yet a bomb manufacturer.

MR BIZOS: Did you have knowledge of explosives in 1982?

MR DU TOIT: Well during the second half of '82 I did. In the winter of 1982 I was trained.

MR BIZOS: Before or after the London bombing?

MR DU TOIT: I have an idea that it took place after that incident. I heard here that the London bomb incident took place in March 1982 and my training was completed somewhere in June.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Did you have anything to do with the making of the bomb at Motherwell?

MR DU TOIT: I was definitely involved in that.

MR BIZOS: How much explosives, what quantity of explosives did you use in Motherwell?

MR DU TOIT: My recollection is not very good regarding that but I estimate that it would have been approximately 4 to 6 kilograms.

MR BIZOS: And the amount of explosives that you packed into the two or three cases, how much was that?

MR DU TOIT: I heard here that it was four or six blocks but my recollection is that it was somewhat more, although I don't know whether or not my perception or my memory has been influenced by the fact that I read what the British bomb experts had estimated. However, my recollection was that is was somewhat more.

MR BIZOS: A bit more than Motherwell?

MR DU TOIT: No, no, a bit more than was testified here.

MR BIZOS: I see. Well in relation to the Motherwell, was it bigger or smaller, or if it did vary, by how much?

MR DU TOIT: It was definitely less. I would say that it was approximately the half of it.

MR BIZOS: Between two and a half and three kilograms?

MR DU TOIT: Two and a half kilograms? I could go along with that.

MR BIZOS: And you do recall do you that the quantity in Motherwell was established by experiments by the army to have been a minimum of four kilograms?

MR DU TOIT: I am aware of that.

MR BIZOS: Although the "dekstorie" was that is was an ANC "kleef bomb".

MR DU TOIT: Six demolition charge.

MR BIZOS: It was a limpet mine, an ANC limpet mine with approximately - how much does that have, very little? How much does a limpet that ...

MR DU TOIT: Approximately a kilogram, Chairperson.


ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, I didn't hear your answer. How much explosives does a limpet mine have?

MR DU TOIT: One kilogram. I'm speaking under correction but I would say that it's approximately a kilogram.

MR BIZOS: There are different sizes are there not and I think the smallest is about half a kilogram.

MR DU TOIT: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: And that was said was used there by the ANC to blow up your colleagues?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, but the real cover-up was that it was not only a limpet mine, that it was also an NZ6 demolition charge which was used in conjunction with this.

MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I have one question flowing from this. There was not evidence pertaining to the weight and if I may be allowed to ask one


questions. Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr du Toit, you were not present when Mr Raven compiled the bomb?

MR DU TOIT: No, I was not present.

MR DU PLESSIS: So there is no basis upon which you could dispute that that which he used in the bomb was the mass which he described when he gave evidence?


MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Well, against that Mr du Plessis, didn't Mr Raven say he used all the explosives?

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm not 100% sure if he committed himself to that Mr Chairman, it may be. I was wondering about that myself. And if it becomes an issue it may be appropriate to take it up with him, but I don't think it is much of an issue, Mr Chairman.

If you feel that it is important I will take it up with him. I think that was the gist of his evidence, I think so.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson, I have not questions for this witness.


MR SIBANYONI: I've got no questions, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Anyone else?

MR BOOYENS: No re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.










DAY : 15

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. I believe it's my turn. I call the witness, Colonel James Brough Taylor. Second names spelt: B-R-O-U-G-H. He will give his evidence in English if it pleases you Mr Chairman.

JAMES BROUGH TAYLOR: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the applicant's application appears at Volume 3, from page 168 onwards.

Mr Taylor, is it correct that your identify number is 471006 5002 008?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And that you are applying for amnesty for any unlawful acts, omission or offence perpetrated by you by the issue of instructions, conspiracy, planning, preparatory steps arranged and taken and any other offence or delict committed by you in regard to, first of all, the damaging of the ANC offices situated at 28 Penton Street, Pentonville, London, by explosive detonation on or about the 14th March 1982 and the planning of the damaging of the SACP offices situated at 39 Goodge Street: G-O-O-D-G-E, London, United Kingdom, by explosive detonation during or about March 1982, as well as any act, omission or offence perpetrated by you in regard to the above after the events, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: If we may refer to your ...[end of tape] your address, paragraph 3, has changed to 392 Milner Street, Eldoraigne Extension 9, Centurion, Pretoria, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 7(a) where the question is posed whether you were a supporter of any political organisation, to state the name thereof and:

"Not Applicable"

has been inserted there. Is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: It should read National Party, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: National Party. And 7(b) should read: "Supporter"

is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Taylor, you have taken note of the contents of certain exhibits which serve before this Committee, Exhibits P45, P46, P47 and you wish the contents of those exhibits to be incorporated in your application?

MR TAYLOR: I do indeed.

MR VISSER: You have also been informed of the evidence which was given by Mr Adriaan Johannes Vlok and General Johannes Veld van der Merwe, presented to this Committee, well to the Amnesty Committee in the amnesty hearings regarding the Cosatu House, the Khotso House and the Cry Freedom incidents, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you make common cause with that evidence and you also ask for that evidence to be incorporated in your evidence here?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Lastly, you have referred in your application to the application of General Petrus Johannes Coetzee at Volume 3, page 182 to 188. That is with reference to Annexure which was attached to General Coetzee's amnesty application and you ask for that also to be incorporated, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Will you tell the Committee something about your personal particulars, Mr Taylor?

MR TAYLOR: I was on the 6th of October 1947 in Blackpool, County Lancashire, United Kingdom, where I lived with my parents until the age of five. We the immigrated to South Africa in the course of 1962, I think it was November of that year, and settled in Cape Town where I then later became a citizen of the Republic by virtue of naturalisation.

During my youth I attended the Parow East Primary Schoon and subsequently the Bellville High School in Bellville. I left Bellville High School at the end of 1963 with a standard eight certificate and proceeded to the South African Police College in Pretoria, in 1964, where I completed the National Matric Certificate at the end of that year.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us something about your parents, your father?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, my father was person who grew up in Lancashire. He was a qualified production engineer, in terms of coach building and metal work. He served in the Royal Airforce during the Second World War, in Bomber Command.

Both my parents, thinking back, were not politically active or politically motivated in any way. Both my father and mother came from a reasonably conservative background. I would just add that in terms of his own possible political outlook on life, my father was a supporter of the Trade Union movement concept and I suppose his political inclination, if any, could be typified as perhaps labour right ...[indistinct]

Any political influences that may have emanated from my family background were largely neutral to a large degree. Once we settled in South Africa, both my father and mother were totally A-political and were unaffected by politics or the political life in South Africa. They never participated in terms of active support of any political party. Politics in the country as it were, just wasn't there fight.

As I've mentioned, I became a policeman in 1964 and during my career obviously there were strong influences in terms of my own personal political outlook and ultimately I became convinced thereof that I would have to, have no other option but to participate in fighting a revolutionary onslaught which was raging in the country.

MR VISSER: Mr Taylor, with reference to page 171 of Volume 3, you have stated a summary of your police career, under paragraph 8(b), is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: In that summary you mentioned that you were stationed at Bellville, and you also refer in the third line there under that, you became a Section Sergeant. When were you promoted to the rank of Sergeant?

MR TAYLOR: During the year of 1970.

MR VISSER: 1970. And would you agree that what is stated at page 171 over to 172 of Volume 3, is correct insofar as it refers to your police background and your police service?

MR TAYLOR: It's entirely correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Is it correct, just to round that off, that in November 1993 to March 1994, you were on sick leave, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, I was on sick leave pending my medical discharge at the end of March of 1994.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright. You referred in paragraph 9(a)(1), where the questions relates to the acts, omissions or offences for which you apply for amnesty, you did not refer to the SACP offices in London. Was that because you were unaware of the planning thereof but you accept now having come to your notice, that there was possibility that there might be an attack on those offices, that in view of your participation at the time, that you may also be held criminally liable as far as that is concerned?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, Mr Chairman. This is an admission. I drew up this application myself and although I make mention of, in the body of my application, I make mentioned of the South African Communist Party offices at Goodge Street, I failed to insert it in this particular sub-paragraph.

MR VISSER: And for the sake of completeness, in paragraph 9(a)(III), the address: 39 Goodge Street, London, UK, should also be added, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: For the very same reason, yes.

MR VISSER: May we turn perhaps first of all to the political background against which the London bomb attack is to be seen. Can you give the Committee a perspective of how you saw things at the time in 1982?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, in order to do that, Mr Chairman, I must perhaps go back a period of six years, to 1976 where at the end of 1976 upon completion of the Candidate Officer's course in the police college with the rank of Lieutenant, I was transferred from the uniform branch to the Security Branch of the South African Police.

In a very short space of time I was exposed to another sort of policing in terms of the political slant with which most of the investigations took. I also had to make a study of organisations, individuals and the political background of especially revolutionary organisations which were engaged in the onslaught in South Africa.

This study was of an informal nature, based on reading up on reports and on dockets and on filed and engaging in long drawn out conversations with many of my colleagues to extract knowledge dating back to especially the early '60's, late '50's, early '60's, where my interests also lay in terms of, for instance, the Treason Trial, both the Treason Trial, the Rivonia Trial, and that which ensued therefrom. In this manner I was able to build up a reasonably sound working knowledge of especially organisations like the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party, the Congress of Democrats, Anti-Apartheid Movements and that sort of thing.

I became aware of the fact that over many years the ANC/SACP Alliance had propagated the idea for instance, that every patriot was a combatant or was regarded as a combatant and therefore it was taken for granted that every black person in the country was a potential soldier for Umkhonto weSizwe or MK, as it was also known.

As it has occurred and has been stated in the evidence given by Mr Vlok and General van der Merwe, in this process it became clear that the government and the government forces were at a certain stage losing the war and as this process continued the pressure that was exerted upon the top, from the top downwards for especially senior members of the Security Branch to perform better, became more intense.

I may just add that prior to actually being transferred to the Security Branch during the years of 1979/1982, I beg your pardon, 1969 to 1972, I was called upon to serve on the South African border, in terms of the Eastern Caprivi Zipvel(?) and also on two tours in the then Rhodesia as it was.

It was during these three operational tours that that which one considered the norm in terms of normal policing with reference to intelligence gathering, pursuing, tracking down of criminals and bringing them before court, that sort of approach went by the board. First of all you were trained as a soldier or to act as a soldier in a sense.

I was exposed to counter-insurgency training both in South Africa and externally in Rhodesia. I had the opportunity of serving operationally with units like the British/South African Police and especially the Partu units as it was known, the Police Anti-tracking Unit, the Rhodesian African Rifles, the Rhodesian Light Infantry.

And as I say, that is in which were engaged upon was basically and ...[indistinct] seek and destroy missions. There was never a question of trying to apprehend the enemy so to speak.

MR VISSER: What were your emotions when every time after a tour you returned to the Republic, can you tell the Committee something about you experience in that regard?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, Mr Chairman. These tours of duty usually varied between three to six months. Your total period of absence could exceed that in terms of normally a training course or a refresher course which took place before proceeding to the operational area.

Subsequently, after being away from home and half for, as I say anything up to six months on any one tour and having been exposed to the situations which I've tried to highlight, one returned with a particular sort of mind-set and you experienced a great amount of difficulty in readjusting to normal citizen type life or even that of normal policing duties, and one had to make a positive effort to readjust in terms of your mental mind-set in this regard.

I'm also aware of the fact, and I've taken cognisance over many years of the fact that many of my colleagues were exposed to, for instance, far longer and far more operational tours of this nature and were exposed to far more trauma than perhaps I was. And in terms of that which they experienced upon their return to the Republic, I can relate exactly to that.

MR VISSER: Now you told the Committee that after your transfer to the Security Branch of the South African Police, you were subjected to an entirely new line of thinking in the sense that you were obliged to approach your duties from a political perspective rather than from a purely policing perspective, isn't that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: We have heard from various organisations and people that they regarded that which was going on in this country during the struggle was a war situation, would you agree with that?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, indeed. If not a properly declared conventional war then at the very least an undeclared unconventional war.

MR VISSER: And General van der Merwe stated to this Committee that it was in fact somewhat worse than a conventional war because the normal rules and assistance which one would have from martial law, were not available to the Security Police, would you agree with that as well?

MR TAYLOR: I would indeed.

MR VISSER: During your period of policing as a Security Branch member, were you exposed to certain incidents which affected you and which affected the way you looked at matters and your political perspectives, Mr Taylor?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, Mr Chairman, I certainly was. In the period of service or initial period of service in the Security Branch, mainly from 1976 to 1987, a period of 11 years, I was stationed at the Security Branch, the divisional offices in Port Natal, as it was then known, Durban.

And during this period I was exposed to bomb attacks, assassination attempts on members of the South African Police. Many of my colleagues being killed and/or injured in their homes during the course of performing their duties. Where they'd been targeted as the so-called "legitimate war targets" and because they were seen to represent and uphold the interests of the government of the day.

In this very regard, on of the very first occurred during 1997, and it has been made mention of, where I too was within a short space of time on the scene of a loyal and capable black member of the Security Branch, Sergeant Liddon(?) Nkosi, who had been a former commander in MK. And because of that which he was exposed to he found his way, after the Wankie incursion in Rhodesia, he found his way to the Security Branch and served very loyally indeed. Also that night I was one of the very first on the scene of his murder, where he had been shot in his bed.

MR VISSER: And being a target in the liberation struggle yourself as a policeman, did that motivate you to do all in your power to confront and attempt to neutralise those attacks being levelled at the State and at you personally?

MR TAYLOR: It most certainly did, Mr Chairman. And I can add to that in the sense that during the year for instance of 1981, if I recall correctly, Durban was subjected to approximately 12 sabotage of attacks of one kind or another, mainly civilian targets, including normal motorcar showrooms, banks and shops.

I can clearly recall, at a certain stage later on we had thought then that this was quite something, those 10 or 12 attacks in one year were simply nothing in comparison with that which lay ahead. And what struck me was reading in one of the publications of either the ANC or the Communist Party, when approached for comment in this regard, why it was that Durban was being targeted to such an extent. The person, like Mr Ronnie Kasrils, answered to the fact that Durban was always regarded to be the centre of resistance from their perspective.

MR VISSER: You told me that some of the examples of scenes of political violence which you personally attended, especially from 1980 onwards in Durban, in the Durban area, included numerous sabotage attacks of which you have told the Committee. Were there people killed in those scenes which you visited?

MR TAYLOR: Most certainly Mr Chairman. These scenes included explosions of limpet mines, demolition mines and car bombs.

MR VISSER: Were you also involved in the infamous car bomb attack by Robert McBride on the Durban beachfront where three woman were killed and 96 people were injured?


MR VISSER: And there were others. But you approach, your perspective was affected and formed by these experiences which you had, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And amid all this, your sense of duty as a policeman having to protect the public, did you still retain that?

MR TAYLOR: Most certainly. It was so - it did transpire that when visiting scenes of this nature, and especially where innocent civilians, including women and children that had been killed or injured, one also felt a certain level of frustration in not having succeeded in preventing that which had happened. In not having succeeded in preventing a loss of life.

MR VISSER: And apart from not having succeeded in preventative action, what was your emotional experience with regard to investigating crime as a result of what was going on?

MR TAYLOR: It often occurred that one was part of an investigation team and that during the course of that investigation, for instance, various suspects were arrested and detained. ...[indistinct] which we were exposed to, I had almost empathy for and could understand and comprehend why certain members of, especially the Security Branch, and/or other parts of the South African Police, sections of the South African Police, where they themselves, in terms of their frustration and desperation to perhaps extract information, went beyond the normal and accepted levels of proper police interrogation methods.

MR VISSER: This Committee has often heard policemen telling the Committee that part of the frustration which they experienced was in regard intimidation of witnesses, which caused them not to successfully be able to prosecute. Did you also actively experience that phenomenon

MR TAYLOR: Very much so, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Can we go onto the attack on the ANC offices in London. You refer to the incident, from page 173 onwards, second paragraph. Perhaps you could take us through your recollection as to how you became involved and what your part in this operation was.

MR TAYLOR: Very well, Mr Chairman. It was during February of 1982 while I was stationed at the Security Branch in Durban, that I was called in by my commanding officer who was then Brigadier J R van der Hoven. He instructed me to make arrangements to proceed to Pretoria and to report to Brigadier Goosen at Security Branch headquarters in Pretoria. And that all he knew was that I had been selected for some kind of special duties.

I thereafter travelled to Pretoria, the following day I think by air, and in fact did report to Brigadier Goosen. He briefly informed me that together with a number of others I had been selected or chosen for a special operation. I think that he indicated that it was outside the borders of South Africa, but other than that he merely said that I would be fully briefed on a later occasion in this regard.

He said that I should utilise the next, or the following few days in terms of making certain preparations and that in this regard I should link up with the rest of the designated task team at Daisy Farm.

MR VISSER: And you mentioned them to be, Major Craig Williamson, Captain McPherson, Captain Eugene de Kock, Captain John Adam, Warrant Officer Jerry Raven and Mr P Castleton. Now Castleton wasn't in South Africa at the time, am I correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: So did you meet up with the rest of the persons whom you mentioned on page 173, at Daisy Farm thereafter?

MR TAYLOR: Most certainly most of them. I have reservations about Mr Raven, in that he may only have linked up with us for a day or two at Daisy Farm right at the start and obviously he had been given another task of another kind and instructions and he left at an early juncture. And as later transpired he left for Europe.

MR VISSER: Yes. This took place, as far as you can recall, on the 20th of February until the 1st of March, when you departed for London in the UK.

MR TAYLOR: That is more or less correct, as far as one's recollection of dates are concerned. Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: You told me, and this has been denied by Mr de Kock, that before you left the shores of South Africa for London, you did not know precisely what the operation entailed, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: What were you aware of, what did you think at the time, and what were you told?

MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, in terms of the planning and preparation, all the members of the team were compartmentalised into groups of two in terms of their designated or contemplated designated tasks in the United Kingdom.

MR VISSER: And you were grouped with?

MR TAYLOR: Excuse me?

MR VISSER: You were ...[intervention]

MR TAYLOR: I was grouped with the then Captain McPherson.

MR VISSER: Alright.

MR TAYLOR: A major portion of the time was spent not only at Daisy but even in Pretoria, in terms of obtaining documentation including passports, airline tickets, medical certificates, traveller's cheques, etc., etc.

MR VISSER: Were you given a legend, Mr Taylor?

MR TAYLOR: Yes. Mr McPherson and myself shared a particular legend in terms of a rather thin cover in terms of the particular operation one was going on, in that we were going to attend a book fair and that we had documentation at our disposal, including letterheads, including letters of introduction, and I think business cards, where we purported to be people or businessmen engaged in the book buying business.

MR VISSER: Alright. And you say all of this took up the time from the 20th of February to the 1st of March when you left for London. And what were your tasks allocated to you in London?

MR TAYLOR: Before I ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Oh, I'm sorry, I've just been reminded that you were busy telling us what precisely you knew of the operation while you were in South Africa.

MR TAYLOR: Yes, Mr Chairman. The planning and briefing at Daisy Farm included the study of maps, especially road maps, and photographs of especially the ANC office in Penton Street, rather large black and white photographs. Some were blown up and showing both the front and the rear sections of the building. There may or may not be, I can't recollect properly, there may have ...[end of tape] the SACP offices in Goodge Street. I stand to correction in that regard.

I clearly remember being told to note or make mental note of the doors, entrances, windows, of the building. There was in fact one blown-up or close-up photograph of, I think, a burglar alarm type of apparatus in the corner of the building.

Although it was mentioned to us that our final briefing would take place in London, the general impression that I had then was that this was going to be an operation aimed at either or both the ANC/SACP and would probably be of an intelligence gathering nature which could involved an actual break-in to one of their offices or both.

MR VISSER: When did you hear for the first time that explosives would be used to damage one of the buildings?

MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, I think it was the day of the final briefing which was held at our apartment in Queensgate Road in South Kensington. My recollection is that this took place on the Wednesday before the weekend.

I cannot recall if it was something which was imparted to me by Mr Williamson or Brigadier Goosen, Colonel Goosen as he was at the time, or if at some juncture during the course of that day, prior to the meeting, somebody like Mr McPherson had finally told me that which was contemplated.

I can recall that although I had not been surprised at the fact that things had been so compartmentalised and that the need to know basis was in operation, the rule was in operation, that I was slightly disappointed in that Mr McPherson hadn't taken me into his confidence. But I comprehended the reason behind it, in terms of both myself and what I then thought at the time, Mr de Kock and Mr Adam, the three of us being outsiders so to speak and not at that stage permanent members of the Intelligence Unit at head office, that the need to know rule would have applied to the three of us especially, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: So in fact you heard in London that there was going to be an explosive, there was going to be an attack on the ANC offices with explosives.

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Will you continue please, your tasks in London?

MR VISSER: Our designated tasks, and that's referring to those of Mr McPherson and myself, were amongst other things to obtain transport in the form of a hired car ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: And that car broke down and you had to change it. You don't have to go into that detail. But did you also do reconnaissance at the ANC building?

MR TAYLOR: Very intensely, Mr Chairman, virtually every day or night, either by car or on foot. We would proceed to the offices, do reconnaissance, make observations as to movement of people at various times of the day, various days of the week. And this sort of activity continued from virtually the day of our arrival until the night of the 13th of March.

MR VISSER: That was the Saturday night. Did you also do reconnaissance at the South African Communist Party's building at 39 Goodge Street?

MR TAYLOR: We did, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: What was your finding in your reconnaissance about that building?

MR TAYLOR: Well at the end of the day, at the final briefing session in our apartment when the idea was mooted of a possible attack on the SACP offices, all the individual teams were of the opinion that this was not a possibility in terms the very strict order and in juncture to do, take the utmost steps to prevent bodily harm to any person, and that in terms of the SACP office, because of its location and all the other aspects pertaining to it, there was just absolutely no way that we could guarantee the safety of any person.

MR VISSER: Mr McPherson told this Committee that he, he didn't say you and he, but that he went to look at the house or apartment where Mr Joe Slovo stayed. It was later put to him in cross-examination that it was actually a home belonging to Mr Wolpe(?). I'm not certain. The fact of the matter is, did you have anything to do with any reconnaissance, either in regard to Mr Joe Slovo or Mr Wolpe?

MR TAYLOR: Most emphatically not, Mr Chairman. In terms of anything other than our designated task having occurred, the only things that I can recall are visits to the normal tourist attractions in and around London and then two trips further afield, one to Luton which is about 50 miles to the North of London, and this was just for purposes of sightseeing, and one trip down to the sea at Brighton, again for the same purpose. Other than those I cannot recall anything else having taken place other that that activity surrounding the ANC and SACP offices.

MR VISSER: Were you yourself ever in the backyard behind the, the rear portion of the ANC offices in that string of buildings where it is situated? Were you ever in the backyard?

MR TAYLOR: Not to any particular degree, Mr Chairman. The furthest I think I ever entered the premises was in the fist week and a half that we were there. The double gate was always open and that I in any event probably sort of peered in or took a step or two inside the gates, just to peer in and look at the rear of building, examine the grounds in front of me.

I can recall for instance, having seen a number of taxis, four or five taxis, being parked there after hours, but to actually move into the premises, I don't recall ever having done that.

MR VISSER: Now at this briefing, you said at page 174, you were finally briefed on what was actually intended. That is with reference to the fact that there would be an explosion, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And you recall this to be on the Wednesday evening. Some of the applicants seem to recall that it might have been on the Friday evening. Do you have any firm recollection as to when precisely that may have been?

MR TAYLOR: I don't ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Or were there more occasion on which you all got together?

MR TAYLOR: I have heard the evidence given that we did get together in that second week at a pub in London. I've completely forgotten about that. And likewise, in terms of the dates, Wednesday the 10th or whatever it may have been, this was my recollection, that it was actually two maybe three days before the Saturday night, and that after that, subsequent to that we had, on the Thursday and the Friday, we had to do follow-up reconnaissance and carry out some more surveillance, and that the final instruction or go-ahead would only come during the course of either the Friday night or the Saturday during the day itself. That's the way I recall it.

MR VISSER: Yes, but in fairness, given the passage of time and the frailty of one's recollection, are you prepared to conceded that what you referred to you as a meeting at the flat on the 11th of March, may be referring to a meeting at Dirty Dicks Pub?

MR TAYLOR: No, the meeting at the apartment - or, I'm sorry, I'm with you now. Yes, the get together at the Dirty Dicks Pub could have taken place on the Wednesday?

MR VISSER: On that evening.

MR TAYLOR: I concede that.

MR VISSER: Well it's not important. Let's got on. You were then specifically told, and you've already alluded to that, that under no circumstances was there to any danger to any lives.

You were then told at that meeting or at a subsequent meeting, whichever, that the instructions had come from the very highest level, is how you put it. You went on to say that that included the Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, the then Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha. Now why did you include those names in your application, can you tell us?

MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, for the simple reason that at that time of drawing up my application and thinking back, this is what I recollected in terms of that which was imparted to me, either by Mr Williamson perhaps or Brigadier Goosen. And most probably that this was imparted to me at the meeting in our apartment when we were told what the actual operation was going to be.

MR VISSER: Yes, but you told me also, and please stop me if I'm wrong, that what was imparted to you was simply that the instructions had come from the very top, is that correct? And you drew inferences as to whom that might include.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you giving evidence in this regard or is he, Mr Visser? He has told us why he put it there. You are now seeking to change his evidence.

MR VISSER: Well I'm sorry if that's the effect of what I'm doing, Mr Chairman. I'm trying to lead the witness on what he told me.

But what precisely were you told?

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, it's not as simple as that. I am really surprised that a person of the seniority and the experience of my learned can put a question like that, contracting a statement under oath by a witness. Is he going to make available, Mr Chairman, everything that the witness has told us?

MR VISSER: But Mr Chairman, with great respect, I'm sorry if there's anything contradictory but certainly I don't see anything contradictory, Mr Chairman. He said something in his application form and I'm asking him to ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: He said something in his application form, you asked him and he said: "I included them because this is what I recollect as having been imparted to me by Goosen and others". You then chipped in and said: "But that's not what you told me, you told me that you could only remember it as coming from the top. Did you put the names in as a result of reconstruction"?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: That's coming straight from you, Mr Visser, not from your witness.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I apologise if it came out wrongly. May I put the question then in a proper form to the witness.

What precisely were you told by either Mr Craig Williamson or Mr Goosen a the time?

MR TAYLOR: I cannot for the life of me recall the exact words or wording that was used, Mr Chairman, and in fact whether it was Mr Williamson or Brigadier Goosen that uttered them. But as I indicated, at the time of drawing up this application form, whether by inference or by direct notification in terms of the names of the individuals involved, this is what I recalled. It may just have been an inference that I made from words to the effect that: "The order had come from the very top". This could indeed have been my own deduction or my own thoughts on the matter. But at that time I was definitely under the impression that people of this stature not only knew but had actually authorised the operation.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may say in my own defence, this is precisely what was put to the witness in this, to the witnesses in cross-examination in this regard, Mr Chairman. I wasn't trying to mislead anybody, with respect.

Alright, will you please continue? What happened after the last meeting, if we can call it that?

MR TAYLOR: Well on the day in question, I'm referring to Saturday the 13th of March, I cannot recall exactly how or in what manner but probably flowing from that which was discussed and planned at the meeting, obviously arrangements had been made in terms of who would be doing what, the timing, who would arrive on the scene and exactly the role of each individual on the scene itself was spelt out.

In this regard and having access to a motor vehicle, it was my task to drive part of the team to the premises in Penton Street.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, with reference to page 175, is the reference to the 14th of March, Saturday the 14th of March, is that correct there? From your knowledge as it is at the moment?

MR TAYLOR: I would contend, Mr Chairman, that should actually be Saturday the 13th of March.

MR VISSER: 13th of March.

MR TAYLOR: Sunday being the 14th, the following day.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright.

MR TAYLOR: I then drove the hired car containing myself, Captains McPherson, de Kock and Adam, to the scene. I cannot recall if Captains de Kock and Adam actually came to our apartment or if we'd picked them up at some pre-arranged spot, I can't recall that at all, but in any event we eventually arrived late that evening.

I parked the car below Pentonville Road, close to a small reservoir as I recall, grassed-in reservoir in a little back street. We then proceeded individually to the scene which was only a block or two away.

MR VISSER: At the scene, what was your particular function, Mr Taylor?

MR TAYLOR: I had the task, amongst other things, of then acting as a surveillant close to where it had been decided the gate and/or fence would be crossed. I took up a position more or less on the corner of Penton Street and White Chapel. The time of evening would have been, as I recall, in the region of about eleven thirty. There was very little movement on the streets.

I had to vary my position from time to time, in terms of not being seen to be too obvious, not having to be seen to maintain a static position but in general I sort of manoeuvred around the four different corners of Penton and White Chapel.

MR VISSER: And the purpose would have been what, Mr Taylor?

MR TAYLOR: The purpose would have been to act as a warning for the team crossing the fence, in the event of somebody approaching. And then secondly if any person, either a member of the public or for instance a police officer did approach, was then to try and stall them in the sense of engaging them in conversation and allowing the team sufficient time to make a getaway.

MR VISSER: Yes. You said the corner of Pentonville Road and White Chapel Road ...[intervention]

MR TAYLOR: Penton Street and White Chapel, yes.

MR VISSER: Yes. Well at the risk of leading you, the road next to the building is White Lion.

MR TAYLOR: White Lion, I'm sorry. There is a Chapel Street in the vicinity. White Lion is correct. There's a pub of that name on the corner too.

MR VISSER: Now as far as you knew an explosive device was being placed on the inside of the yard, by whom was that done?

MR TAYLOR: It had been pre-arranged that in terms of helping them to scale the fence, and when I say them I referring to Captain de Kock and Warrant Officer Raven, Captain McPherson would approach them as they moved up the pavement, the sidewalk, towards the gate and he would actually assist them in getting across the fence ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Yes. Just reverting to the meeting. There was evidence here that that gate - first of all, the fence which you spoke about, can you remember what that fence was constructed of?

MR TAYLOR: It was made of corrugated-iron sheeting, about a six foot height, two metres.

MR VISSER: And the gate?

MR TAYLOR: As I recall it was a double gate which was wired in with interlocking wire.

MR VISSER: Mesh wire?

MR TAYLOR: Mesh type wire, yes.

MR VISSER: And what can you tell us about the gate being locked or unlocked?

MR TAYLOR: For the first week and a half of our stay in London, the gates were always open, day and night as I recall. And subsequently, midway through the second week, it came as quite a shock to us to see that for the very first time the double gates had been closed and secured with a padlock on a chain.

MR VISSER: Alright. So that is what you refer to when you say that:

"McPherson went to assist de Kock and Raven. They now had to climb over the gate"

MR TAYLOR: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And what was your duty there?

MR TAYLOR: Just to maintain a monitoring position where I could warn of any approaching danger.

MR VISSER: Alright. When they had finished did they come back from out of the yard?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, in total they must have been absent for not more than two minutes, maybe three minutes.

MR VISSER: Yes, and you then left?

MR TAYLOR: We proceeded back again to the car, individually, linked up at the car, got into the car and then I had proceeded, in terms of that which was pre-arranged, in the direction of St Paul's Cathedral. It had obviously been one of our tasks, in terms of having access to the vehicle, to get to know the streets of London to the ninth degree as far as possible in the allotted time-frame and so we were pretty well acquainted with all the routes and the alternative routes in that area.

MR VISSER: Did you meet up with somebody at that point?

MR TAYLOR: I circled the St Paul's Cathedral once and only on the second time going around did I see Mr Williamson, Mr Goosen and somebody else unknown to me at that stage, approach from the shadows. I think from across the way where the St Paul's tube station was situated, directly across from the St Paul's Cathedral.

MR VISSER: What transpired here?

MR TAYLOR: In a very brief moment in time a parcel changed hands. We had - during the trip we had filled a carrier bag I think, with certain articles, including gloves, balaclava, shoes I think, and in my case certainly the CS canister which I was carrying.

MR VISSER: Had you used any of that canister?

MR TAYLOR: Not at all.

MR VISSER: Do you personally know what the contents of that canister was?

MR TAYLOR: No, other than that it was some form of teargas substance.

MR VISSER: Alright. And what happened thereafter?

MR TAYLOR: I then proceeded to the city centre, dropped off Captains de Kock and Adam. Captain McPherson, although it was quite late, it was after 12, we managed to find a restaurant and we had a meal and returned to our quarters in South Kensington.

MR VISSER: Did you then pack up and leave for the airport?

MR TAYLOR: No, we had a few hours sleep and we left for the Heathrow Airport very early on. We also still had to hand back the hired car. I think this was also done at the airport.

MR VISSER: And you flew out to, what destination?

MR TAYLOR: We flew out on a British Airways flight to Frankfurt.

MR VISSER: Frankfurt. Did you meet any of the other team members?

MR TAYLOR: Not prior to or during the flight but subsequently at Frankfurt Airport, Captains de Kock and Adam linked up with us. I recall that they came from London via either Schipol or Brussels and then on another flight up to, or it could have been a through flight through to Frankfurt but definitely not on the same aircraft. And also, Warrant Officer Jerry Raven arrived on another flight.

MR VISSER: And what happened there at the airport?

MR TAYLOR: Well there was a but of a flurry because, I can't remember how or when the instruction came, but we did receive an instruction that in terms of that which was originally contemplated, namely to spend a few days in the Netherlands and perhaps Belgium, this was now negated and the instruction was to make immediate arrangements for a prompt return to Pretoria. This entailed us having to make enquiries regarding flights etc., and seating available, and the only seats that we could obtain were those on a South African Airways flight leaving that evening. I think it was probably in the region of 6 or 7 o'clock, and that we in fact, the only seats available were in what was then termed "gold class", and the five of us had to actually expend quite an amount of money in upgrading to gold class in order to get those seats.

MR VISSER: After your return ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: When did you get these instructions?

MR TAYLOR: In terms of the return, Mr Chairman?


MR TAYLOR: I can't recall. It must have come from either Mr Williamson or Brigadier Goosen.


MR TAYLOR: Again I cannot recall. I think it must a telephonic instruction either after we returned to our apartment or early in the morning prior to our departure.

MR VISSER: Just reverting for a moment to the actual explosive device itself, did you ever with your own eyes see or with your hands handle the explosive device?

MR TAYLOR: Not at all, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Do you know for what time the device was set to go off?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, at the planning session it had been stated in the discussions that Mr Raven must endeavour to ensure that it went off early morning, preferably, as I recall, between the hours of eight and ten, eight and nine, sorry, so that this would then ensure that most or all the members of the different teams could leave Heathrow on the very first flights out of Heathrow. I know that, I think our flight in fact was the very first flight that did leave.

MR VISSER: In terms of the presence of people in the building on that occasion, on that Sunday morning, was there any aspect or event which was considered by you in regard to the timing of the bomb?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, there was. We had information at our disposal that the following day, from I think mid-morning on, there ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Which day is that now?

MR TAYLOR: That's the Sunday the 14th.


MR TAYLOR: That a large rally or demonstration was going to be held, as I recall, at Trafalgar Square outside South Africa house and that all or most members of the different branches of the ANC and I think the Anti-Apartheid Movement groupings would be involved in that demonstration.

MR VISSER: Subsequent to your return, did you attend any parade or meeting?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, Mr Chairman, I did. A few months later, I think it was in September of 1982, I was again summoned to Pretoria by way of a telex, I think, where I then ultimately attended a parade in the office of the then Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange.

MR VISSER: And what happened there?

MR TAYLOR: At this parade we were decorated with the SOE decoration.

MR VISSER: How high is that decoration?

MR TAYLOR: As I remember, I think it was the second highest decoration in the South African Police at the time, but of significance was the fact as I recall, that this was the first time that the SOE had been awarded to members below the rank of General.

MR VISSER: Of General. Can you remember today were was present at this occasion?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, it would have been Mr Louis le Grange, General Johan Coetzee, General Mike Geldenhuys who was Commissioner of Police at the time, I think Mr le Grange's secretary and the individual members of the task team to London, plus three others who received an identical declaration for another operation, of which I had no detail.

MR VISSER: Yes. At page 176 and following, you refer to "political objective sought", and may I ask you by way of summary, the evidence has been so far, and that was also the evidence of General Coetzee, that the idea as far as he was concerned, was that the ANC had to be taught a lesson, the lesson being that they would not be safe if they planned attacks against South Africa in foreign countries and ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, is it proper for counsel acting for two applicants in leading his witness in chief, to put the words of his other client on record and then asking whether that is correct?

MR VISSER: I'm not going to ask him whether that is correct, I'm going to ask him whether he agrees with it, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: What's the difference, Mr Chairman?

MR VISSER: What is wrong with this, Mr Chairman?

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, a witness in chief cannot be led. There can not be a worse type of leading than putting another person's witness ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, we have tried to avoid, I hope, wasting time by going through these formal bits of evidence. And as I understand, that is what Mr Visser is doing now.

MR VISSER: It's all in the papers anyway.

CHAIRPERSON: If you object to it being led and want him to get the witness to volunteer all this thing about the political reasons, Mr Bizos, we'll be here for another month.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, the witness has already given evidence in relation to him political motivation. What I do object to, Mr Chairman, is a witness being asked to agree to the evidence given by another witness, Mr Chairman. He can ask him whether he confirms what he said in his application, I have no objection, but the putting of the evidence of another witness is not a proper way of leading a witness, Mr Chairman, with the greatest respect. He may have personal reasons. Why is he not asked: "Well why did you do this"?, or "What did you believe is to be"? It would be just as short as my learned friend putting General Coetzee's evidence on record again.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I'm going to do what my learned friend suggests, but I have to add that I know of no rule which prohibits the leading of evidence in this way in which I've done. But I will do it this say if we have to go about it the long way.

Mr Taylor, what is your perception of the political objective in attacking the ANC offices in London as you did?

MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, as I referred to earlier on ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Taylor, could you please have a look at page 176?

MR TAYLOR: I have it, Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: And I believe you've sworn to this on page 180?

MR TAYLOR: I have, Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you confirm what you said on page 176, paragraph 10?

MR TAYLOR: I do indeed.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you want to add anything to it?

MR TAYLOR: No, Sir. I was personally involved in, especially the translation of the wording in this regard, and I acquaint myself with it thoroughly.

MR VISSER: And do you indeed confirm the correctness of the whole of your application, Mr Taylor, now before the Committee?

MR TAYLOR: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, just a few short questions.

Mr Taylor, you testified that Mr Raven may have left early from Daisy Farm. Mr Raven's evidence was that he wasn't at the planning sessions at Daisy Farm, is it possible that your memory pertaining to this is not 100% correct?

MR TAYLOR: It's quite possible in that I may only have seen him perhaps one or maybe two occasions at headquarters for instance, and not at Daisy Farm, prior to his departure.

MR DU PLESSIS: So you don't dispute Mr Raven's evidence? You can't dispute Mr Raven's evidence that he ...[intervention]

MR TAYLOR: Not at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Because Mr Raven testified that he was sent ahead. I don't know if you remember that. He was sent ahead to go and do surveillance.

MR TAYLOR: I in fact do remember that he proceed long before us. Long in terms of quite a number of days.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: As I understood your evidence and your application, you and some of the others from foreign parts were given accommodation at Daisy Farm

MR TAYLOR: Quite correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And you were staying there before there was any consultation or anything taking place. That is where you were accommodated.

MR TAYLOR: That's quite correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And it's possible you might have seen Mr Raven in those days.

MR TAYLOR: Possibly.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

So there's not real dispute between your evidence and Mr Raven's evidence.

MR TAYLOR: No, not at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Taylor, when you did surveillance in London before the operation, did you do anything with Mr Raven? Was he present in respect of anything that you did or did you act separately from him in the preparation phase in London?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, that was a very strict instruction, that the teams, the individual teams operated completely separately from each other and the only contact or liaison between the individual teams was in the form of Mr Williamson. I think the very first time I ever saw him was probably the evening at the Dirty Dicks pub.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. So where you testified that you visited tourist attractions and Mr Raven said he didn't, there is no conflicting evidence?

MR TAYLOR: No, I don't think so, not at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now Mr Taylor, in respect of the planes caught from London to Frankfurt, Mr Raven's evidence was that he saw Colonel de Kock, and I can't remember exactly who else, he saw Colonel de Kock and John Adam on the same plane. Now I'm not sure that I understood your evidence correctly, I think you testified that Mr Raven came separately in another aeroplane. Are you sure about that or would you agree with Mr Raven's evidence?

MR TAYLOR: I can't recall to be quite honest, either Mr Raven or Mr de Kock and Mr Adam being on the same aircraft out of Heathrow as ourselves.

MR DU PLESSIS: You're not sure about that?

MR TAYLOR: I'm not sure about that. I know we had the luck of the draw to get seats on one of the very first flights out of London and I think, I think, the departure times were staggered on different flights and that certain different routes were involved, in terms of Mr de Kock and Mr Adam. But that's the impression that I have at this stage.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. But you would have no real reason to dispute Mr Raven's evidence, that he saw Mr de Kock and Mr Adam on the same flight that he was on?

MR TAYLOR: No, not at all. It could easily be that they were on the same flight.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And then lastly I just want to ask you, would you regard the distance from the ANC's offices and Trafalgar Square as a substantial distance?


CHAIRPERSON: If you want to look at a map, Mr Visser has made one available which shows the distance.

MR DU PLESSIS: I know exactly the distance, Mr Chairman, I have been to London a few times.

MR TAYLOR: In terms of distance, as the crow flies, it's quite a substantial distance.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.


MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Jansen on record, I have no questions.


MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Cornelius on behalf of McPherson, I have no questions.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Hugo on behalf of Mr de Kock. How many of these briefing sessions at the farm Daisy did you attend before you went across to London?

MR TAYLOR: I can't remember that, Mr Chairman, even if I try. We were based there at Daisy for - I arrived in London on the 1st of March, and we must have been at Daisy, as I said from about the 20th of February onwards, so anything up to 10 days.

In terms of the arrangements, the briefings, the plannings, it was an ongoing business. So there could have been a number of different discussions, either jointly or severely.

MR HUGO: And can you recall the contents of all these discussions clearly today?

MR TAYLOR: I can't recall all the contents, by no manner of means. But I've indicated that it included looking at maps, looking at photographs, included as I recall lectures or briefings on upgrading surveillance and especially counter-surveillance techniques. So there were a number of issues which were at stake.

MR HUGO: Yes, Mr Taylor. And when these maps were shown to you, what was said, what was the purpose of that?

MR TAYLOR: The purpose as I remember, it was pointed out to us that we must acquaint ourselves with the area, especially pertaining to the ANC office and the SACP office in Goodge Street, the area. And by studying these maps and these photographs and that an operation was contemplated around these buildings.

MR HUGO: Yes, what sort of operation?

MR TAYLOR: Well my impression was that it, as I've said, it was going to be an intelligence gathering operation which could possibly include a break-in into the offices.

MR HUGO: What made you decide that there was a possibility of a break-in as well?

MR TAYLOR: Well, sheer logic.

MR HUGO: Well on what basis?

MR TAYLOR: In that if it was going to be an intelligence gathering operation it would possibly or probably include the gathering of intelligence in the form of documentation, which could only be obtained by actually breaking into the offices.

MR HUGO: Well in which officer were you going to break into?

MR TAYLOR: I don't know. In terms of the ANC office, the office in general.

MR HUGO: But which particular door were you going to use?

MR TAYLOR: It would in all probability have been through the rear, Mr Chairman.

MR HUGO: Well were you told which door was going to be used?

MR TAYLOR: I can't recall. The final briefing - what we were told was the final briefing and planning would actually take place in London.

MR HUGO: And if your understanding was that there was going to be possibly a break-in into the offices, what equipment were you to take with you?

MR TAYLOR: I can't recall that we, in terms of this, had any equipment, not myself or Captain McPherson, because out role was not that of perhaps actually undertaking the breaking-in itself. I thought this would perhaps be somebody like Jerry Raven who would undertake that, for instance.

MR HUGO: And what documents were you supposed to take from the offices, that is from the ANC's offices and the SACP's offices?

MR TAYLOR: But this never transpired, Mr Chairman. At the final briefing it was brought home to us that the operation was going to be of another nature.

MR HUGO: And why were you then supplied with a gas canister as well, if you were just going to go on an intelligence gathering exercise?

MR TAYLOR: Because in both cases my role and that of Mr McPherson, would have been exactly the same in terms of providing a support role, in providing counter-surveillance and in providing cover for those actually engaged in the task. So that role wouldn't have changed.

MR HUGO: But didn't you, whilst you were still at Daisy, didn't you ask Mr Williamson: "But what is the purpose of this operation"?

MR TAYLOR: I can't recall having asked him.

MR HUGO: Well is it possible that you've asked him?

MR TAYLOR: It's possible.

MR HUGO: And is it possible that he could have said to you: "Well we're going to bomb the ANC's offices in London"?

MR TAYLOR: No, I dispute that, Mr Chairman. My recollection is that the first time I ever heard about that was actually in London. A week or 10 days prior to the commencement of these proceedings, for the very first time I was given copies of the other applicants' applications and upon studying them I saw amongst other things, that people like Mr Williamson and General Johan Coetzee supported my contention in that the need to know rule was in place in terms of this operation.

MR HUGO: Well will you just turn to page 204 of bundle 3. Right at the bottom there, will you just read it out for us please?

MR TAYLOR: Page 204?

MR HUGO: Yes, this is Mr Adam's application. Paragraph 4.5 right at the bottom.

MR TAYLOR: It reads as follows"

"Williamson told me that a decision had been made to plant a bomb at the ANC offices which would serve as a warning to the ANC. He did not discuss the proposals in detail with me, but said that it, the operation, was being carried out on orders from the highest authority".

MR HUGO: Yes. So if there was such a strict need to know principle, why did the person that was really for all practical purposes in charge of this operation break this need to know principle, in the sense that he told the other operatives as to the true purpose of the operation?

MR TAYLOR: Well if that's the case, Mr Chairman, then that question I think, I submit must be posed towards Mr Williamson, if he did in fact breach the need to know.

MR HUGO: Are you saying that Mr - well, you wouldn't be in a position to say whether Mr Adam is lying or not in this particular paragraph?

MR TAYLOR: I don't, other than that he could also be under a misapprehension, that he himself also only learnt of the actual story in London, either from Mr Williamson or from somebody else.

MR HUGO: Yes. Had you known about the true purpose of this operation beforehand here, would that have made any difference as to your mind-set and as to whether you would have gone on this operation?

MR TAYLOR: No difference at all, Mr Chairman. I considered it an honour to go on the operation. And in fact when that which was achieved one was reasonably proud of the fact that one was involved in the operation.

MR HUGO: I have no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.


MR BOOYENS: Booyens. No questions, Mr Chairman.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: Levine. Mr Chairman, I will be very brief.

Mr Taylor, you said that you did not know of the intention to bomb the ANC offices in London until you got to London.

MR TAYLOR: That's correct.

MR LEVINE: One thing we do know from your evidence of having looked at photographs of the ANC offices, and that is you knew that they were a target for some form of operation?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct.

MR LEVINE: On your own version. Now let's deal for a moment with the SACP offices. This never went any further than a mere discussion, I would [indistinct] from your affidavit at page 174 of your application.

MR TAYLOR: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: The idea was immediately abandoned as being in any form viable?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct.


MR TAYLOR: Well it was the opinion of all those concerned who had viewed the premises, and Mr McPherson and I had, as I can remember, viewed it on numerous occasions but also the other teams. It was general consensus that the premises were of such a nature and were situated in such a fashion that there could be no guarantee as to not injuring of killing or maiming innocent passers-by.

This flowed directly from the fact that amongst other things there was a paint shop of some kind adjacent to, as I recall, adjacent to the SACP offices. I seem to recall that there may have been an apartment or living quarters of some kind above the, or next to the premises, the offices, which in fact did house people in a form of a residence of some kind.

MR LEVINE: And finally, Mr Taylor, as I understand your evidence, you said you could not remember as to which of Brigadier Goosen or Mr Williamson spoke to you about instructions coming from the top?

MR TAYLOR: No, but if I think back I would think that amongst other things, during the course of such a briefing and during the course of his own personal introduction, this could easily have been said by somebody like Brigadier Goosen.

MR LEVINE: Yes. And it's quite possible I think, if I understood you correctly, that no names might have been mentioned to you and that it's also quite possible based on the premise, that you reached your own conclusion as to the persons from whom the instructions may have come.

MR TAYLOR: That my be so.

MR LEVINE: Thank you Mr Chairman.


MR BIZOS: Bizos.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, before my learned friend, Mr Bizos, asks any questions, I would challenge my learned friend to tell you on what authority he wishes to put questions to this witness, who is the interested party whom he represents on whose behalf he wants to put questions. The witness has given no evidence which affects any of the witnesses for whom Mr Bizos appears, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] of the victims.

MR VISSER: The victims, I'm sorry.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, yes, I will tell you, Mr Chairman. I'm going to ask this witness questions, Mr Chairman, in relation to the need to know principle because I believe that the practice in relation to it is a particularly relevant matter effecting our clients, Mr Chairman. May I proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: On that basis, yes.


You yourself Sir, must have taken many statements from many people as an investigator?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: And you yourself recorded many statements of your own to be put into the docket for consideration of the Attorney-General and others that had to make decisions.

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: And you are sufficiently experienced not to implicate anybody in a statement taken by you from others or a statement made by yourself in relation to others?

MR TAYLOR: That does not necessarily follow, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't understand that question. You say he's sufficiently experienced not to implicate anyone else in a statement he makes.


CHAIRPERSON: The whole purpose of the statement is to implicate the people.

MR BIZOS: No, not to implicate - I'm sorry, I should have finished it. Not to implicate incorrectly or without basis ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: That you didn't put.

MR BIZOS: Sorry, Mr Chairman. It was my fault but I did not express it, I'm sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you understand the question now?

MR TAYLOR: I'd like it repeated so we have no confusion in that regard.

MR BIZOS: Yes, yes. You were particularly careful not to implicate in any statement made or taken by you, any person that you knew that was not implicated or the person from whom you took the statement had no knowledge of the persons implication, is that clear?

MR TAYLOR: To a certain extent. I take it Mr Bizos is referring to the normal type of statement and/or affidavit which one would take during the course of an investigation?



MR BIZOS: So that you - ...[indistinct] taken a statement as to who a person suspected of having committed the murder, if the name was not mentioned by that person, you wouldn't put that name in the statement?

MR TAYLOR: Again that doesn't necessarily follow, because in terms of interviewing a person from whom you're taking a statement you may directly question them.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question is, when the person doesn't mentioned the name, you don't supply it in the statement?


MR BIZOS: That would be a clear dereliction of your duty, which would lead to confusion and injustice?

MR VISSER: That is not necessarily so, with respect, Mr Chairman. The description of the witness - I don't know what this has to do with need to know but be that aside, but the description of a witness in a statement may be such that it could point only to one person.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but then he can put that in his statement. He doesn't put it in the witness' statement as emanating from the witness, which is as I understand the question.


CHAIRPERSON: If the witness says: "I saw a man get into the car", he doesn't say: "I saw Mr Visser get into the car", as the witness' statement.

Is that what you mean by ...[indistinct]

MR BIZOS: Precisely Mr Chairman, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But you can then in your statement, your report, say: "I believe the person he was referring to was Mr Visser", if you have other information.

MR TAYLOR: I would go along with that, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just make one point here. The need to know principle on the basis of which Mr Bizos is cross-examining now, obviously effects my client, Mr Raven, as well. If this aspect is going to become an issue, which it seems to be, I just want to state here on record that I want to reserve my rights pertaining to this issue, Mr Chairman. If Mr Bizos is allowed to ask ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, you've reserved your rights with every witness.

MR DU PLESSIS: I want to make that clear, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Well let us just carry on and find out what Mr Bizos wants to ask.

MR DU PLESSIS: If he wants to ask each and every person, Mr Chairman - and I just want to put that on record, if he wants to ask each and every person about the need to know principle then it may become necessary eventually to call other people as witnesses, pertaining to this point, Mr Chairman. And that's all I want to state.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on Mr Bizos ...[indistinct]

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

You were not told by anyone were you, that Prime Minister Botha was involved, on the evidence that you have given here today?

MR TAYLOR: I stated that at the time this is what I believed and whether it was something I'd heard by word of mouth or, and the impression that was generated within me, I cannot say.

MR BIZOS: You see, I am going to suggest to you, Mr Taylor, that you have changed the statement that you made at page 179 of your application, in order to accommodate your colleagues who are apparently concerned about the need to know principle.

MR TAYLOR: Which colleagues are those?

MR BIZOS: Your fellow policemen that say, particularly in relation to my clients, that there was a very strict need to know principle. Now I put the question to you that I do want to put to you now. Look at page 179, paragraph 11.

MR TAYLOR: One moment please.

MR BIZOS: 11(b). The question is:

"If so, state particulars if such order or approval and the date thereof and if known, the name and the addresses of the person/s who gave such order or approval".

You didn't say: "it is possible", or: "I believe", or: "I may be mistaken". You wrote:

"Officially approved at Cabinet level and sanctioned by the then Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha and equally supported and passed on through the then Minister of Police, Mr le Grange".

Where did you get that from?

MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, whether the names of Mr Botha and Mr le Grange were actually mentioned or not, the mere fact that the words used by, presumably Mr Goosen, that this operation has been approved at the highest level, created the impression in my mind both then at the time and even now, at a later stage, that an operation of this kind, of this nature, with its probable diplomatic fall-out of a stupendous nature, if it went wrong, could only be sanctioned at the very highest level and that in parting to me, Mr Goosen or whoever it was, was correctly informed whether it had been from General Coetzee, the Commissioner or Minister Louis le Grange directly.

And both then at the time this was my impression and at the time of completion of this application, because of that very strong impression being in existence then and as of now, I framed the wording in terms of paragraph 11(b) in this regard because this I believe reflected that which I properly believed then and as of now.

And Mr Chairman, both then and now in terms of the proceedings of this hearing, in terms of the evidence that I've heard, in terms of the evidence of General Johan Coetzee when he says or he quotes Mr Louis le Grange as having said: "The government has decided", I have no doubt in my mind that the inference or the interpretation or that state of mind which was in existence in 1982 in terms of my own person, was indeed correct.

MR BIZOS: I'm going to put to you that you would not have implicated the Cabinet, you would not have implicated the Prime Minister and you would not have implicated in this statement under oath, the Prime Minister and Minister le Grange unless that was mentioned at a meeting. Specifically, there's a difference between the highest level, it could have been the Commissioner of Police, it could have been the President alone, it could have been the Minister alone or I'm sorry, the Prime Minister, he wasn't the President then. Why did you choose these words if that was not mentioned at a meeting?

MR TAYLOR: I don't know if Mr Bizos is referring to a meeting prior or subsequent to the operation.

MR BIZOS: At any meeting before you put these office bearers and names down.

MR TAYLOR: Mr Chairman, it may very well be so that these names were in fact mentioned by somebody, either prior or subsequent to the operation but I cannot recall when, how, under what circumstances and by whom they were mentioned.

MR BIZOS: Would that have been a breach of the so-called need to know rule?

MR TAYLOR: Not necessarily, because if these people were in the know and had properly and duly authorised the operation, in terms of compartmentisation, that needed to know rule would apply to all those within that compartment, namely all those with prior and/or subsequent knowledge of the operation or who were directly involved in it.

MR BIZOS: So that it would not be a breach to know, there would not be a breach of the need to know rule among those who were taking part in the operation?

MR TAYLOR: If it was said that this operation has been authorised at the highest level?

MR BIZOS: No, the question is, would there be a breach in the need to know rule if matters germane to the operation were mentioned to persons who took part in the operation?

MR TAYLOR: No, I don't it would.

MR BIZOS: So that ...[intervention]

MR TAYLOR: If it pertained to the general role of all those concerned, it wouldn't be a breach ...[indistinct]

MR BIZOS: From who authorised it to who carried it out?

MR TAYLOR: I beg your pardon?

MR BIZOS: Everyone, from the person or persons who authorised it to the persons who carried it out, there would have been no breach of the need to know rule for people to talk about it?

MR TAYLOR: No, not at all because whether they authorised it or whether they carried it out, they would be in the know.

MR BIZOS: In the know, yes. There was no point in trying to hide from people who were in the know, what other people in the know were doing?

MR TAYLOR: No, not in terms of the general conducting of the operation. When it came to specifics, that could be something else. In terms of that which was happening on the ground six thousand miles away, that would be something else.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And this was said to you as to who had authorised it, when you were six thousand miles away?

MR TAYLOR: That's as I recall it, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. I want to turn to another aspect ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, perhaps you could do that after the adjournment.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We will now adjourn until quarter to two.






Thank you Mr Chairman. I may by way of introduction in view of my learned friend Mr Visser's request that I indicate the relevance, I have a number of questions, Mr Chairman, in relation to the recognisance and the relevance is ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, can I remind you that you're far away.

MR BIZOS: Sorry. In order to justify the relevance, Mr Chairman, that my learned friend, Mr Visser has put me on terms, I indicate that I have a few questions to ask in relation to the recognisance deposed to by this witness and I believe because they have some relevance to Mr Williamson's state of mind and his subsequent conduct of after the event, Mr Chairman.

Did you do recognisance work during the weekend previous to the explosion of the bomb?

MR TAYLOR: Reconnaissance? Surveillance?

MR BIZOS: Reconnaissance, surveillance.

MR TAYLOR: Yes, we would have done that in terms of that which we were told to do in terms of trying to establish norms and patterns and movements of people throughout the period. So I take it we would have gone there on that Sunday, it may or may not be the case.

MR BIZOS: Did you know that the explosion was going to take place on a Sunday morning?

MR TAYLOR: No, I did not, because I became aware of that at the final briefing or that briefing held during the mid-week of the second week.

MR BIZOS: Was it anticipated during your reconnaissance work that it might be over the weekend and more particularly on the Sunday morning?

MR TAYLOR: That the operation was carried out?

MR BIZOS: Was going to be carried out.

MR TAYLOR: Yes, it was - we had an indication that it was going to be that particular weekend, whatever the nature of the operation was going to be.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Well when did you find out that there would be a bomb?

MR TAYLOR: At the final briefing at our apartment in South Kensington.

MR BIZOS: How long before the Sunday morning?

MR TAYLOR: I've indicated in my application, Mr Chairman, that I thought or I was under the impression that it was on that Wednesday. There has been other evidence which indicates that it could have been the Thursday or possibly even the Friday. I cannot vouch for either of the two being absolutely correct.

MR BIZOS: How do you do reconnaissance work without knowing what you are doing it for and precisely what it is that your work may, what effect your work may have?

MR TAYLOR: Very simple in terms with that which we were charged with. Not only were we to do a reconnaissance of the buildings concerned, and I was under the impression that this reconnaissance was with a view to in some way or other obtaining physical access to the buildings, but my brief went wider than that in that I was called upon to acquaint myself with the streets and the routes of London in its entirety. So it was twofold.

MR BIZOS: At what stage, if any, were you asked by anyone as to what effect there might be as a result of an explosion of a bomb at 9 o'clock on Sunday morning at the place at which you were reconnoitring?

MR TAYLOR: That would have been at the final briefing. Amongst other things, when that sort of thing was discussed, that is when the contemplated or the possibly contemplated attack on the SACP offices were vetoed by everybody concerned.

MR BIZOS: Am I then to understand that there was no reconnaissance on a Sunday morning with the view as to whether or not it would avoid the loss of human life if the explosion took place on the Sunday morning?

MR TAYLOR: I can only speak for the reconnaissances carried out by myself and Captain McPherson. That which was done by others who may have had foreknowledge of what was contemplated, I cannot comment upon.

MR BIZOS: You were one of the reconnaissance people, you did not do any reconnaissance, specific reconnaissance in that regard and was therefore not in a position to report on the possible or likely effect of an explosion at 9 o'clock in the morning, on a Sunday?

MR TAYLOR: Only in terms, or appertaining to that which I had become acquainted with during the course of those two weeks and only then in terms of comment and/or recommendations at that final briefing on the Wednesday or the Thursday night.

MR BIZOS: Well I want certainty of your answer in relation to this. Would you agree that if there was no report on the Wednesday or the Thursday or Friday meeting as to what was likely to happen with whatever size bomb there was on the Sunday morning, that there was no proper reconnaissance to your knowledge, as to what was going to happen?

MR TAYLOR: No, I wouldn't go along with that. In terms of that which was discussed, at that final planning meeting and briefing on the Wednesday or the Thursday, whatever it was, these are the sort of aspects that would have been discussed when it became known that which was contemplated.

MR BIZOS: Was there any discussion as to whether or not ANC people worked in that office from any particular time on a Sunday morning?

MR TAYLOR: I cannot recall.

MR BIZOS: Was there any discussion as to precisely what portion or next to what portion of the building the bomb was going to be put?

MR TAYLOR: I didn't hear the second part of the question.

MR BIZOS: Was there any discussion as to where the bomb was going to be put, precisely where?

MR TAYLOR: No, I don't think there was because it was left to those concerned who were going to do the placing to make a decision in that regard.

MR BIZOS: Did anyone at any of the briefings, sessions or discussions or any report submitted by you or anyone else to your knowledge, as to whether or not the present Deputy Minister of Finance worked there every Sunday morning?

MR TAYLOR: No such report was made to me, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Was there any report made from any reconnaissance, that a large group of children or young people were working until late on Saturday making placards in order to be used at the next day's rally?

MR TAYLOR: On the Saturday the 13th?


MR TAYLOR: Well if that had been the case and they'd been working till late that evening, I presume that we would have detected that presence.

MR BIZOS: Until when were you there?

MR TAYLOR: I think we went in as from about eleven thirty onwards.

MR BIZOS: No, they stopped before eleven thirty. Did you report about a special school in the vicinity?

MR TAYLOR: I cannot remember, Mr Chairman. We may have done in terms of the joint, combined reports. I can't recall.

MR BIZOS: Did anyone report that this was an informal school and that there may be ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, we've heard all about these things from every single applicant, haven't we? And nobody, as far as we know, was injured at the school or anywhere else.

MR BIZOS: No, but the issue that I'm asking the question on is, Mr Chairman, in view of the card sent to Jill Marcus as to whether or not any reconnaissance or any report was made ...[indistinct] to Mr Williamson's state of mind. I am on my final question to this witness, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on, carry on.

MR BIZOS: The real leader of the operation was Mr Williamson?

MR TAYLOR: No, the leader in terms of command and seniority was Brigadier Goosen. In terms of his operational knowledge and expertise and especially appertaining to London itself, in terms of input and comment and advice, that would be the secondary role of Mr Williamson, and then thirdly, the rest of us.

MR BIZOS: Well I thought that it was common cause that Mr Williamson's knowledge of the building, the environs and London as a whole was much better than certainly, Mr Goosen.

MR TAYLOR: That is why I refer to his operational experience and knowledge, but in terms of actual command, the way I understood it then and now, is that Brigadier Goosen, it would up to him to make the final decision based on the recommendations received from the rest of the team. It would be up to him to make the decision to inform Pretoria that everything was in place and that we could go ahead. In fact I believe that this is what followed.

MR BIZOS: We know that he was a senior officer. The question is, was the effective leader, Mr Williamson?

MR TAYLOR: No, I don't think Mr Williamson would presume to hold himself the effective leader of a team where a senior officer with the rank of Colonel is present. And it was understood by all that the team was under the command of Colonel Goosen, as he then was.

CHAIRPERSON: But your evidence earlier was that: "We had instructions not to make contact with one another except through Mr Williamson", which would appear to indicate that he was the person responsible for what the team was doing in London.

MR TAYLOR: In our operational sense, Mr Chairman, yes, he was the active liaison between the different teams.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

MR VISSER: None, thank you.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, there's one matter arising.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR PENZHORN: I will bow to Mr Levine and then ...


MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I think counsel ...[inaudible]

MS PATEL: I'm not sure, should I wait for ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think after the next cross-examination is finished.




Mr Taylor, what date did you depose to your affidavit? Was it late 1996?

MR TAYLOR: December the 11th, if I'm correct.

MR LEVINE: Of December?


MR LEVINE: And these matters that you seek to recall 14 years before?

MR TAYLOR: Ja, 14 years before the date of this affidavit.

MR LEVINE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PENZHORN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. For the record, Penzhorn.

Mr Taylor, I just shortly want to refer to your application in bundle 3, page 174 - maybe once the airforce is past.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, could you just allow the noise to subside.

MR PENZHORN: Yes. It's page 174 of Volume 3, Mr Commissioner.

It's regarding the meeting in London prior to this operation, and I think this aspect has been dealt with. I just want for clarity's sake, you were present here when Mr Williamson gave evidence and Mr Williamson on a question from me replied that he had never mentioned something that, the second part of the statement:

"We were also informed that the operation had been authorised at the very highest level"

and then:

"Which included the then Prime Minister, P W Botha, the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha".

Now I'm referring to the latter part of the sentence which I've just quoted to you. You - in any event, you were never briefed directly by either Mr P W Botha or Mr le Grange, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: And the highest level, could you tell us, the highest level in this particular operation which you received instructions from?

MR TAYLOR: Prior to the operation being carried out?

MR PENZHORN: Prior to the operation having been carried out.

MR TAYLOR: Yes, that would have been Brigadier Goosen.

MR PENZHORN: You never had any direct contact with Mr Louis le Grange?

MR TAYLOR: Not prior to the operation, no.

MR PENZHORN: Now if I refer you to page 179 under 11(b), the answer there, where you were requested to:

"State particulars of such order or approval and the date thereof, the name and addresses of the persons who gave such order or approval".

Your answer is:

"Officially approved at Cabinet level".

If I may stop there. Did you have or have you now got any records pertaining to this approval at cabinet level?

MR TAYLOR: I have not, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: And the sanction by the then Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, have you got any direct proof in regard to the sanction of this particular operation by the then Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha?

MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: Similarly, have you got any direct information in regard to the equally supported and passed on through the then Commissioner of Police, Mr Louis le Grange?

MR TAYLOR: Other than the evidence rendered by General Johan Coetzee at these proceedings, in terms of that which was communicated to him personally by Mr le Grange, no, I have not.

MR PENZHORN: Yes, but you were not ever present during any such communications?


MR PENZHORN: And you were also present here during this hearing when Mr R F, otherwise known as Pik Botha, questioned some of the applicants and in relation to his knowledge of this particular operation?

MR TAYLOR: I was present.

MR PENZHORN: You never had any direct dealings with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, in this regard?

MR TAYLOR: Surrounding this particular issue?



MR PENZHORN: Now am I correct that the information which you had received in regard to the authorisation of this particular operation, that that was actually limited to that it had been sanctioned at the very highest level?

MR TAYLOR: That's possibly so, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: And the inclusion of the then Prime Minister and probably the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that was mainly a deduction from your side?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, I've already indicated during my evidence this morning that that could be an inference that I made personally, in terms of which flowed from the discussions held in that apartment of ours that particular night in London.

MR PENZHORN: Had you ever in the past, in regard to other operations, received any orders from either the then Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha or the Minister of Foreign Affairs directly?

MR TAYLOR: In terms of similar type operations?

MR PENZHORN: That is right.

MR TAYLOR: No, not at all.

MR PENZHORN: I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.



Mr Taylor, you've stated in your application that Brigadier van den Hoven gave you instructions to proceed or to report to Mr Goosen but that he had no idea what the purpose of that instruction was.

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: How do you know that he had no knowledge of this operation, did you ask him?

MR TAYLOR: Well as I recall, he probably said something to me. I mean this was my lasting impression. He said to me something to the effect that: "You have to report to headquarters for a special operation", and probably added the words: "I don't know what it's about". But that was the impression that I had then and thereafter for that matter, that he was never in on the know.

MS PATEL: Alright. So you based this generally on an impression and not on anything specific?

MR TAYLOR: I would have thought that if he knew more about that which was required of me, he would have conveyed it to me in some way or other.

MS PATEL: Would that have been standard practise if he was sending you out elsewhere, that he would inform you why he sending you wherever?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, he would have indicated to me. For instance, I must prepare myself for a two week absence or a three week absence or something to that effect.

MS PATEL: And for what purpose, he would have explained that to you?

MR TAYLOR: If he had known he would have given me some general idea anyway.

MS PATEL: Alright, okay. To move on just to another area. You've stated that your briefing sessions at Daisy Farm were very general in nature, is that correct? That you weren't given specific instructions as to what the purpose of the operation was, but that you had a general idea that you were going to London to the ANC/SACP offices.

MR TAYLOR: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Alright. Do I understand you correctly that you said that as part of the reason that these sessions were probably not as specific as they should have been was because you also spent a lot of time out in Pretoria sorting out your documentation?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct. What would have been more detailed is for instance, the lectures and discussions on surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques, routine generally in London, how to use and make use of the transport systems, the various transport systems, that would have been a lot more detailed.

MS PATEL: And you didn't get any of that at Daisy Farm?


MS PATEL: By whom?

MR TAYLOR: Well it would have been Major Williamson, it would have been Captain Derek Broon.

MS PATEL: Was Captain Derek Broon not responsible for the preparation of all the documentation? And would that not have precluded your having to spend time in Pretoria, as opposed to ...

MR TAYLOR: No, not at all. I mean just - in one instance we had to physically come into Pretoria to have photographs taken for passport purposes and numerous other things.

MS PATEL: Alright. Did he not prepare your documentation for you though, for the trip?

MR TAYLOR: I think he would have played a role in processing the documentation, yes.

MS PATEL: Alright. Then just briefly, there was an allegation that there may have been people living in the surrounding areas at the ANC London offices and that I believe it was Mr McPherson who had stated that he didn't think that there were people living there because he didn't notice any lights on at night. What is your comment on that?

MR TAYLOR: Is that within the confines of the ANC offices itself?

MS PATEL: That's right.

MR TAYLOR: I go along with that, yes.

MS PATEL: Okay. And then regarding your changing of your flight arrangements when you came back, you said that, in your application at page 175, you note that:

"This was done in accordance with the late instruction that had been received from Pretoria".

Who would that instruction have come from?

MR TAYLOR: Who would be the person in Pretoria?


MR TAYLOR: I don't know. My only recollection is that it was channelled through to us telephonically, I think by either Mr Williamson or Brigadier Goosen.

MS PATEL: And you remember specifically that they had said that the instruction had come from Pretoria?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, and it was a late instruction but it was very specific. There was a certain level of urgency in that regard, that we were not to follow the original planning but we were to re-route and return immediately.

MS PATEL: The inference that one can then draw from that and reasonably so I would put to you, is that somebody besides Goosen, Williamson and the rest of the crew that were in London who was based in Pretoria had full knowledge of this operation and was therefore able to send that instruction through to you at the relevant time?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, well I think that's - obviously, if I recall we've had direct evidence in that regard from General Johan Coetzee, that the him self was in communication with Brigadier Goosen from time to time.

MS PATEL: So you assume that it was him, that the instruction came from him?

MR TAYLOR: Ja, in retrospect I would presume that it probably did.

MS PATEL: Okay. And then finally, when you came back from London, were you ever debriefed by General Coetzee?

MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Was there ever a meeting held between you or other members of your group and General Coetzee?

MR TAYLOR: Not a meeting as such, a formal meeting as such. I can recall, I don't know whether it was at the time, within two or three days after our return from the United Kingdom or whether it was perhaps later in that year in September when we received the decorations, but at one particular juncture either at those two occasions there was a function at Daisy Farm in which General Coetzee and the Commissioner were present, but it was a social function. Matters could have been discussed appertaining to that which had occurred but I can't recall.

MS PATEL: Can you recall at the social function whether there were only people present who'd been part of the operation or was it a general social function?

MR TAYLOR: I think it was mostly confined to members who had been involved in the operation, but there could have been one or two people assisting in preparations, I can't remember.

MS PATEL: In terms of the need to know principle, would it have been appropriate to discuss the operation at a social function?

MR TAYLOR: If that discussion was confined to those who had been involved in the operation, yes.

MS PATEL: But you can't say for certain whether the people present there were only people who had been involved in the operation?

MR TAYLOR: I can't, no I can't.

MS PATEL: Alright. Thank you, I have no further questions.


CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I don't have any re-examination but it's been brought to my attention that I omitted to ask of this witness something in evidence in chief. I wonder with your permission, and obviously subject to any questions that might arise, I might be allowed just to put the one question, Mr Chairman.

It really relates to the question Miss Patel has commenced asking you, Mr Taylor, and I forgot to ask you this in your evidence in chief. Mr Raven gave evidence about a meeting which was held after you came back, and I believe it was stated that it was at the offices of General Coetzee, where you were met by General Coetzee. Now do you have any recollection of such a meeting?

MR TAYLOR: No, Mr Chairman, I can quite honestly say I don't.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is all I forgot to put.


MR SIBANYONI: Mr Taylor, before the London operation did you know Mr Williamson?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, I did.

MR SIBANYONI: Since when before that did you know him?

MR TAYLOR: Well the London operation was in 1982 and I think Mr Williamson returned from Europe in 1980 and it would be during those two years that I would have got to know him.

MR SIBANYONI: Did you also know that he was at the same time, had infiltrated the ANC?

MR TAYLOR: Oh yes, it was common knowledge, especially subsequent to his return that it became common knowledge.

MR SIBANYONI: Common knowledge within the police or outside of the Security Police?

MR TAYLOR: Even outside there was a lot of publicity about his role and his return from Geneva. So it was in every sense common knowledge.

MR SIBANYONI: When you say "outside", do you also mean the public?

MR TAYLOR: Yes, yes, most certainly. In terms of the media reports I think the public would have, or certainly large sections of the public would have taken due cognisance thereof.

MR SIBANYONI: And lastly, you are referring to Daisy Farm as a place which was known as Daisy Farm, has the name changed?

MR TAYLOR: Not to my knowledge. I don't if it still exists but during my service career it was always known as Daisy Farm.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

ADV DE JAGER: The medals were handed to you, or the decoration, in September '82, is that correct?

MR TAYLOR: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: What happened at the function, was it a formal function?

MR TAYLOR: Are you referring to the one that I ...[indistinct] at Daisy Farm?

ADV DE JAGER: No, when you were decorated in the Minister's office or wherever it might have been.

MR TAYLOR: It was very semi-formal or informal in the sense that it was, as I recall, it was a tea and sandwiches, light snacks, something like that, and it wasn't of any duration at all. It was perhaps half and hour and it was over and done with.

ADV DE JAGER: Did the Minister make a speech?

MR TAYLOR: Not as such, Mr Chairman. My recollection is that he simply congratulated us and apologised, as I have it, for the fact that the normal brevet which is issued at the time of such an award being awarded, that that was lacking.

We did in fact receive certificates, normal diploma type certificate where the award is mentioned. We did received that at a far later stage, but the brevet itself, when it is published, that reflects a reasonable amount of detail regarding any particular award. And since this was not going to be forthcoming he sort of apologised in that regard. That is my recollection.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, I see the certificate itself was only signed in 1984.

MR TAYLOR: Yes, I think that's probably about the date that is reflected on my own certificate.

ADV DE JAGER: Ja. Now what did he say, why decorate you?

MR TAYLOR: Well Mr Chairman, he congratulated us on the operation that was carried out. I don't know, there may have been, in terms of a short speech, there may have been some comment to the nature of the operation in a sort of verbal comment from him but I can't recall exactly what it was.

ADV DE JAGER: So at that stage, September, about six months after the event, you realised that at least the Minister at that stage knew all about the operation?

MR TAYLOR: Most certainly, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Did he congratulate you? I don't want to put words but what did he say? Were you decorated on behalf of the citizens of South Africa or what was the position?

MR TAYLOR: I would truly like to be helpful in that regard, Mr Chairman, but I can't for the life of me recall the exact wording. What I can recall is that we were all lined up and perhaps after making a short introductory speech, I can recall him proceeding down the line, pinning the decoration on each person's lapel and shaking each one individually by hand.


MR TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr Chairman.


MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may, we were going to call Brigadier Schoon on Monday as a stand-in when we were running out of witnesses. He is available now. I understand that there may be a problem about us calling him. Perhaps those who have a problem may vent that problem to you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well what problem is there?

MR BIZOS: It was indicated when we agreed to sit during the course of this week, Mr Chairman, that Mr Schoon, the person whom we represent, was not available this week. I am reluctant to deal with the matter in his absence. That's the first reason. Secondly it was a witness that was going to be taken by Mr Berger, my colleague, and he has prepared it. I indicated clearly that there was an agreement which on whom I rely on Miss Patel that we would only deal with matters relating to the London bombing because we did mention those two difficulties at that time, if not in open session, certainly in the discussions that we've had.

I am not in a position, if the witness is called, I am not in a position to cross-examine him, I am not prepared. But even on the assumption that a cursory reading of his application may enable me to try and do some sort of cross-examination of him, I am most reluctant to do it in the absence of the person most actively affected by this, Mr Chairman. And he did go away back to his work where he was wanted, on the clear understanding that we would not deal with any portion of the case that he is concerned with during the course of this week.

CHAIRPERSON: What cross-examination can you really want of him, Mr Bizos? Unless I'm mistaken this has nothing to do with the other applicants.

MR BIZOS: No, it has - Mr Chairman, it has to do with an attempt on Mr Schoon's life ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well would a suggestion that Mr Dirk Coetzee wanted to take some action and that he gave him a 38 revolver?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, there are in fact two instances which on our instructions were, in which attempts, preparations were made to kill Mr Schoon before the bomb that killed his wife and child. That has got to be done, Mr Chairman. I have not read the evidence of Dirk Coetzee, I have not prepared it for the reasons which I have given, Mr Chairman.

What I am saying is that even if I manage to do it, I will have broken an assurance to my client that no portion of his case was going to be dealt with during this week. I did that on the strength of what I believe to be a very firm agreement that we would not do anything else other than the bomb this week. And I did mention I remember, in open hearing, that because of our minimal interest in relation to the bomb in London, I would come here alone and I would deal with the matter, Mr Chairman. Those are the reasons, Mr Chairman, why we are unable to deal with it.

I may say ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Surely Mr Bizos, when you accepted the brief in this matter, it covered all of it not just select little bits and your junior was going to do others?

MR BIZOS: No, Mr Chairman, where there are volumes upon volumes upon volumes of paper to ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Three volumes.

MR BIZOS: Well three volumes, Mr Chairman, may be enough but it is not unusual in our profession, as Your Lordship may well remember, to give a ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: This is an incident in 1981, before any thing else.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, how do I deal with my undertaking to Mr Schoon, my client ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: One wonders how you can give such an undertaking because it is not you who determines what goes on here, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: No, Mr Chairman, I thought that there was an agreement ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: There was no agreement with the Committee.

MR BIZOS: Well Mr Chairman, Miss Patel is the person who is counsel for the Committee. We expressed very clearly that we would only deal with the London bomb, and from the practical point of view, Mr Chairman, what are we really saving? And weigh that, with respect, against an undertaking given to a client that no portion of his case is going to be dealt with in his absence. Not ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: That won't interfere with his business. Thank you Mr Bizos. Well who else can we deal with? We have been told Mr Adam is ...[inaudible]

MR JANSEN: That is so, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you try to find out whether there would be objection to his evidence going in?

MR JANSEN: Yes, Mr Chairman, I have canvassed that but I think my colleagues generally were careful of making any concessions, they reserved their rights to question him on aspects that may come to light after having examined all the other witnesses. So I don't know whether this is an appropriate time to maybe take the matter up with them again.

ADV DE JAGER: You see the trouble is we can't now ever ask you to write heads of argument about the London affair so that we can have a look at it and deal with it at the next hearing because it's not finished now.

MR JANSEN: Yes, that is unfortunately so, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Honestly, I really want to again appeal to counsel. You must try and assist the Committees. We've got a lot of work to do, all the Committees, and every time we must do double work. We must read all the evidence again because there's a postponement. We all want to finish the work as soon as possible, so please counsel, I appeal to you, try and see whether you could co-operate in order to assist the different Committees.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, maybe then what we should do is ask for a short adjournment now and let me take the matter up on a final basis with my colleagues and we can maybe reach an agreement on Mr Adam's evidence. And even if the evidence is needed, I respectfully submit that we can file heads on the London bomb incident, Mr Chairman, in any event without his evidence. His evidence would be in the vein of Mr de Kock. He was in the team that Mr de Kock was in and very little of controversy came out of that. So it's literally, possibly an hour that we will spend at the subsequent event, but I'm sure we can all file heads even if his evidence is required.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, may I say something in relation to the heads of argument on the London bombing? From our point of view it would be quite practical to incorporate as a starting point, the matter of law that you asked us to address, and that is as to whether the res inter alios actus principle is applicable or not.

From our point of view we can actually illustrate what we believe to be our submissions as the correct position by illustrating it on the London bombing, Mr Chairman. The fact that one witness is outstanding can't really affect the substance of the argument, Mr Chairman, in relation to the bomb in London. So we would agree that whenever the case is postponed to, that we should deal with that and the London bombing.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn for a few minutes to settle the question of Mr Adam.

MR VISSER: And has it now been decided that Brigadier Willem Schoon will not be able to give his evidence, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Well in the light of Mr Bizos' attitude, it seems we should not hear it. I'd also like to know why there should be a public hearing for this ...[inaudible]

MR VISSER: The attempt on Marius Schoon.

CHAIRPERSON: As far as I know from the papers, the only circumstances are that Mr Coetzee approached him, discussed it with him and he lent him a 38 revolver which was then returned and nothing was done.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if that's the view you take, which I, with respect, submit is the correct view, we can assist you by handing in the full affidavit of Brigadier Schoon to cover the whole issue.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll discuss that in five minutes time. We will adjourn for five minutes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.



MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Jansen on record on behalf of Mr John Adam. Mr Chairman, I've taken up the matter of Mr Adam's evidence with all my colleagues. They're all in agreement that they would not require him to give evidence orally.

Mr Chairman, I'm just quickly looking at the provisions of the Act. As I see it's in Section - I would imagine a ruling has been made by the Committee that the people in the London, or has exercised its discretion that the people involved in the London bomb incident should testify orally. I will ask you to revoke that ruling in respect of Mr Adam and rule that you will deal with his evidence without oral evidence, in terms of Section, I think it could be Section 19 3(b).

CHAIRPERSON: And we will consider his application together with the other applications relating to that.

MR JANSEN: Yes, Mr Chairman. And the application is before you in bundle 3. There's nothing more that I wish to hand up. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you gentlemen all in agreement?

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Is there anybody who proposes to lead any further evidence in connection with the London bombing? Mr Bizos, you talked of submitting argument. I'm not prejudging in any way but if the decision was that people could participate in hearings where they were not implicated parties, applicants or victims, would you intend to lead any evidence?

MR BIZOS: Not on that issue, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: On the question of the London bombing.

MR BIZOS: On the question of the London bombing, Mr Chairman, let me make it clear that our questions have not been directed for the purposes of the Committee refusing amnesty to the people applying ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: So you are not opposing?

MR BIZOS: We will not be opposing anyone's application in relation to that. What I am saying is that our input in relation to it is going to be about the legal principle as to whether people who are not directly involved in the application can cross-examine people that give evidence on that application.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that is for a general ruling because you have been allowed to cross-examine throughout ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Yes, and that is because there was a request for a general ruling, Mr Chairman.


MR BIZOS: And that is what we will confine ourselves to.

CHAIRPERSON: So you are not leading any evidence in connection with the London bombing, you are not opposing it?

MR BIZOS: We are not opposing any applicant's application for amnesty on the London bombing, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And you do not intend to lead any evidence?

MR BIZOS: Not in relation to that, Mr Chairman.


MR BIZOS: But, Mr Chairman, may I say that for instance, the evidence of Jill Marcus is going to be led but not in relation as to whether amnesty should be granted or not, but Mr Williamson's general attitude in relation to loss of life, Mr Chairman, relating to ours, because we will say that his attitude there in relation to Jill Marcus is relevant to his attitude in relation to the killing of First and Schoon.

CHAIRPERSON: So the evidence you would be leading would be in connection with the First and the Schoon applications?

MR BIZOS: That is so, Mr Chairman. There may - the evidence may impinge on the happenings insofar as it affects Mr Williamson, in order to prove his general attitude and his state of mind, not in relation, the direct issue as to whether he should get amnesty for the London bombing or not.

CHAIRPERSON: That does not cause me any difficulty because Mr Williamson ...[indistinct] a party to the other applications. He will be represented there. So we can now close the London bombing hearing and as we cannot - well, I don't know, are you gentlemen ready to address argument?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, first of all may I just refer to your comment just before the adjournment, as to whether the application of Brigadier Schoon ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well in terms of the Act it is, it's a conspiracy.

MR VISSER: It's a gross - Sub-Section 9 of the definition, so obviously it will have to be heard in open hearing, Mr Chairman.


MR VISSER: But Mr Chairman, with all due respect, my learned being the seasoned counsel that he is, surely he can prepare this afternoon and the whole of tomorrow and let's go on with Willem Schoon on Thursday, Mr Chairman. We've got two days that we can utilise. And Willem Schoon has been sitting here for close on three and a half weeks to have his application heard, Mr Chairman. There's also a matter of fairness to him.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, my main problem, Mr Chairman, and I have indicated, yes, I can prepare it, Mr Chairman, and yes, I can cross-examine on Thursday morning. I have a client who has a job, where he was given two weeks, and it was arranged that during this week he will catch up what he was supposed to do two weeks before because he was told that he need only make himself available until last Friday. I have a problem, Mr Chairman, in upsetting a firm agreement that was made as far as I am concerned and an undertaking given to him that he can go back to his work. And when ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Has any attempt been made to discover if he could come here on Thursday morning?

MR BIZOS: No, because ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Purely as a spectator?

MR BIZOS: No, Mr Chairman, - well an affected party, Mr Chairman, is more than a spectator who ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm not suggesting he should give evidence. He may wish to give evidence. It is merely so we could dispose of Brigadier Schoon, that he does not have to come back to the adjourned hearing. I am not suggesting that Mr Schoon should be available here as a potential witness, he merely wanted to be here to hear the evidence.

MR BIZOS: The question is, Mr Chairman, as to whether we want to interfere with an arrangement that was made by him as a result of an agreement or not, because his employers ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well I'm asking you if you can't vary the agreement, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: Is it necessary he should be here to hear the evidence. You have seen a transcript of the evidence.

MR BIZOS: You mean the written application?

CHAIRPERSON: The application.

MR BIZOS: The written application.


MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it really of any great import to him?

MR BIZOS: It is of very great - Mr Chairman, I think with respect ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: We are not hearing as I understand it, Mr Dirk Coetzee, the man who planned it.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, my learned friend and possibly Members of the Committee may have a view as to how these two attempts that were made on Mr Schoon's life may be connected with the bomb that killed his wife and child. We have - and I believe will be able to show that the two are not unconnected, the matter should be dealt with as a whole and we agree to postpone the matter in that we would deal only with the London bombing.

Mr Chairman, Mr Schoon has been waiting here. Yes, we agreed to sit during this week in order to finish the London bombing, Mr Chairman. And I ask - because of the arrangements made, I have excused my junior, my attorney is on holiday, I agreed to be here on the basis of that agreement, I haven't got an attorney with me in order to do the things that are required, I appeal that the agreement that we have be respected and the matter be adjourned, Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, may I come in here?


MR LEVINE: I would think, Mr Chairman, it's a fairly simple exercise for Mr Bizos to phone his client and find out whether his client would be available on Thursday. It may necessitate a few minutes of an adjournment but it certainly will clarify the position.

MR BIZOS: I am prepared to do that, Mr Chairman, but it doesn't solve all my problems, even if he is prepared to come.

CHAIRPERSON: You'll still have to consult with your attorney in the evening or something of that nature.

MR BIZOS: And she's not around, Mr Chairman, she's on the South Coast.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you have your client and your junior.

MR BIZOS: My junior is not available, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Your attorney would no doubt, having looked at the weather report, be extremely grateful if you called him back from the South Coast.

MR BIZOS: I don't follow the Natal weather so closely, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It's very unpleasant.

MR BIZOS: But Mr Chairman, ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Let's find out first about your client before we argue any further. If he's not available, that's an end to the matter.

MR BIZOS: Well Mr Chairman, I'm sure that being a public spirited citizen, if it is absolutely necessary for him to come I am going to suggest to him that he might make himself available. But what I am saying, Mr Chairman, is it does not solve my problems.

CHAIRPERSON: No, you've got to cross-examine Brigadier Schoon.

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, without an attorney, without a junior and having to go into reams of records in which Mr Coetzee has given evidence, Mr Dirk Coetzee has given evidence, that I haven't looked at before. When, Mr Chairman, in order to accommodate anyone, we agreed that we would come here for the sole and specific purpose of finishing the London bomb. But if you want to take an adjournment I will ask him, and even if he says yes, I am still going to submit that the Committee ought not to force him to come or should not request him to come and ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well, it's not him so much now, you say you won't be ready, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: I say, Mr Chairman, the reasons are composite, all of them, Mr Chairman, you cannot separate them, with respect. And I do not know why one wants to break the agreement that we have that I am so certain about that I am reasonably certain that if we play the record back, that will be borne out, Mr Chairman. We agreed to come here ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: As I have said, I know nothing about your agreement, but I understand from the Leader of Evidence that there was some such agreement.

MR BIZOS: And it was on that basis ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: And I now appreciate - if you'll let me finish, that the problem is not reading Brigadier Schoon's application which should take you five minutes and you don't need your attorney for, but if you have to unravel Dirk Coetzee's versions, that may take you some time and I appreciate the problems you have. I don't know if you have all the transcripts available or if you have to obtain them.

If you have not made any arrangements in that regard, that may well be relevant to any questions you want to put to the Brigadier. And in those circumstances it seems to me if there was an agreement, and I am told there was, it would be unfair, Mr Bizos, to tell you now that you must disregard that agreement and get ready for Thursday.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, may I just come in here? I may perhaps make myself very unpopular with some of my colleagues in what I'm about to say but I would suggest that all of us have reserved this week insofar as the London bomb is concerned. My learned friend, Mr Bizos, has got no interest in the London bomb, he's not opposing it. And subject always to the availability of the Committee which always also kept this week open, my suggestion would be that let us viva voce argument on Thursday morning and at least get the London bomb over and get some of us away from here.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, for those ...[intervention]

MR DU PLESSIS: Like I said, I may be unpopular.

MR LEVINE: For those who are involved as I am in all three matters and Mr Visser is involved in two, I certainly would regard it as being quite futile to argue on one aspect with the numerous overlapping and interlinked aspects such as the, for example, and I'm just talking off the top of my head, Section 20, 21 and those sections which deal with the subjective and the objective approach which deals with an analysis of the legislation and the statute and which will only have to be repeated on a second occasion after the matter has been concluded in all respects, my submission would be to you that for those of us who are involved in the various aspects, that argument should addressed at the conclusion of this hearing.

CHAIRPERSON: That is on Thursday, the conclusion of this hearing, because I will tell you now that if we do not hear oral argument now I will direct that we get written argument by the 1st of November.

ADV DE JAGER: The trouble is if we can't get rid of the London thing now all counsel only involved in the London thing should come back at a later stage in order to address us or to submit argument or whatever it may be.

You're not all involved in the same thing, and we've got to accommodate each other. And at the beginning of the hearing I think I've warned that counsel should be prepared to argue at the end of the hearing because in the past we also had the trouble that: "No, we can't argue now because we're waiting for a transcript of the record". And we've warned that: "Listen, make your notes, you've got to argue like you argue in a court case". At the end of a case you should be in a position to argue. And the London hearing is now ending because no further witnesses will be called and I think really you should be in a position to argue and let's try and dispose of something.

MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, with all due respect, just bear in mind that Mr Visser indicated this morning that he wants Mr de Kock to be available for further cross-examination and he reserved the right to re-call General Coetzee.

CHAIRPERSON: He hasn't applied to do so. I asked if there was any further evidence and I was told: "No".

MR VISSER: With respect, Mr Chairman, that matter hasn't been concluded yet. I ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well why didn't you say: "Yes" when I said: "Is there any further evidence in the London bomb matter"?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, ...[indistinct] this morning because of the questions of my learned friend and the evidence of Mr de Kock, that matter has to be finalised at some stage in the future.

CHAIRPERSON: If you want to call further evidence on it, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Do you, do you intend to call further evidence?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Mr Chairman, our attitude is well-known, we think it is ridiculously irrelevant to the present proceedings. If you give me an indication that you agree with that assessment, Mr Chairman, then we won't.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not pre-judging any issue at the moment, Mr Visser.

MR BIZOS: But I have a client here, Mr Chairman, who has been called a liar this morning.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you intend to call any further evidence? I am not going to adjourn a matter just in case Mr Visser wants to call a witness.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, I haven't been able to speak to General Coetzee about what has transpired here this morning.

CHAIRPERSON: Your attorney appears to want to talk to you.

MR VISSER: The problem is, Mr Chairman, that the basis upon which my learned friend, Mr Bizos cross-examined, was on the basis that this is an umbrella issue which covers all the aspects. It covers not only the London bomb, it covers even aspects of Koevoet which again we say we fail to see the relevance of. But Mr Chairman, certainly I'm going to have to discuss this with General Coetzee. It is his honour that is at stake here. He has come to this Commission and told you what he's applying for amnesty for ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: So everybody must sit here while you go and discuss it with General Coetzee?

MR VISSER: Well, Mr Chairman, if ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: How long will it take you to telephone him?

MR VISSER: Well we'll have to telephone him this evening and discuss the matter with him.

CHAIRPERSON: And we must be put to the expense of the fees of all counsel ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we didn't bring this along.

CHAIRPERSON: You did, you've raised it.

MR VISSER: No, Mr Chairman, it was raised by the cross-examination. We're just reacting, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, sorry. The one other problem, if I may act on Mr du Plessis' behalf who is not here to put his views, I heard that he promised very illustrious and long arguments on the London bomb incident and said he'd need a day. So if we are going to stand down until Thursday, I would imagine that we should maybe just give him a ring somewhere.

ADV DE JAGER: Perhaps it would shorten his argument if we proceed on Thursday.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, in support of what Mr Visser says, I do not think, with respect, it's his decision whether or not to call, to apply for the recall of General Coetzee. We are going to submit, Mr Chairman, and rely on a judgment of His Lordship, Mr Justice Zietsman in the Goniwe case, that a person who says: "I did nothing unlawful", evidence to contradict that is admissible in order to show that it is likely that he was being untruthful in relation to the matters of the First and ...

We are going to submit that relying in that authority ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: In which matter?

MR BIZOS: In the Goniwe matter, Mr Chairman. We are going to argue, Mr Chairman ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: In what matter are you going to argue that, Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: In the matter of First and Schoon, Mr Chairman. In the matter of First and Schoon, that when General Coetzee says that: "I never did anything unlawful in South African", and you have direct evidence under oath that he did, unless the point is taken that South West Africa was not part of South Africa or by which something that may even be suggested, a finding of fact will have to be made, with respect, for a proper adjudication of the First and Schoon matter as to whether Mr de Kock is telling the truth or whether Mr Coetzee is telling the truth.

CHAIRPERSON: So what you are saying is that this evidence is relevant to the First and Schoon matters?

MR BIZOS: Yes, from our point of view Mr Chairman, yes. So it may be a solution ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You will not be using that evidence because you are not a participant, you've told us you're not objecting in the London bombing.

MR BIZOS: In the London bombing, Mr Chairman. But it does not mean that, it does not mean Mr Chairman, that we will be abandoning the point in relation Mr Coetzee's credibility in the two matters in which we are dealing with.

I merely wanted to say that for the protection of our interests in the matter. I don't know how it affects Mr Visser and his client in relation to being recalled on the London bomb matter.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, now matters are as clear as mud to me but may I, I really do need time to consider this, Mr Chairman, with all due respect.

CHAIRPERSON: Take a short adjournment, discuss it with your attorney. If this matter is to be raised as part of those then quite clearly you should be entitled to call your client at that stage and to cross-examine Mr de Kock in that connection, if it is to be used for that purpose. And arrangements would have to be made, but think about it. We'll take a short adjournment.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.



CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, there appear to be a great many difficulties, and I appreciate the difficulties Mr Visser has in obtaining instructions from his client and deciding what he is going to do and that is, whether he will apply to recall General Coetzee and address further cross-examination to Mr de Kock.

In any event, it seems to me that such evidence will have very little bearing on the evidence against, applying to the other applicants, and it would be possible for them to start preparing argument. I regret that we can't hear oral argument as we were offered, but we propose to adjourn until the 2nd of November, Monday the 2nd of November in these premises.

We would ask you to start preparing your written argument, but I have requested Mr Visser, and he has agreed that he will make every effort to obtain instructions from his client, to discuss the matter fully and to notify us as soon as possible, within say 10 days?

MR VISSER: Sooner than that, Mr Chairman, but 10 days ...[inaudible]

CHAIRPERSON: And if he tells us that he is not going to apply to lead any further evidence, we will notify each of you so you know that you needn't make any provision for any other aspect, that the matter is finished. If he does, we will give you a chance to amplify your argument.

The purpose of this is - sorry, I haven't made that at all clear, that if Mr Visser tells us he is not going to call any further evidence and we ask for written argument, we would not expect you to appear on the 2nd. You would be released from further attendance here. I don't want you all to have to keep yourself available for an unnecessary long period, which is why I've asked Mr Visser to do it in a maximum of 10 days. If he can do it earlier, we will notify all of you earlier so that you know that you needn't appear but you must submit written argument by the 2nd of November.

We adjourn the other two hearings till the 2nd of November when we will proceed with them, and we ask all persons to make sure that interested parties, applicants and victims, are here to give evidence thereafter.

MR BIZOS: This will be only in relation to the applications of Slovo, First and ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Not the applications, the applications relating to them.

MR BIZOS: Yes, the applications relating to and also Brigadier Schoon.

CHAIRPERSON: It may - if Mr Visser wants to call, we may on the 2nd have to deal with the London bomb, but that is a matter that we will have to sort out later. We will adjourn that matter till the 2nd of November but trust that it will not be necessary to call it on that day. I think I should indicate though that we propose on the 2nd to commence with the applications relating to Ruth First and Jeannette Schoon and her daughter, and hear that evidence first, dispose of that and then we will go back to the others. So we will notify you ... That will be part of that.

MR VISSER: ...[inaudible]


MR VISSER: ...[inaudible] Jeannette Schoon, Mr Chairman. Brigadier Schoon is involved in the Marius Schoon attempt. I think you might have forgotten that incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Well he is put down on the paper we have as being one of those that will be dealt with. It's put down as one of those applications.

MR VISSER: Perhaps this time we can start ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: What I'm indicating is that we will come to the London bomb after we have finished hearing those applications. I think I can with some confidence say, let's try to be as realistic as possible, we will notify those concerned only in the London bomb when they should appear. There seems no point for them to appear on the 2nd. I am confident that the parties interested in the other two matters will certainly keep us busy for the 2nd, probably the 3rd. So perhaps we should say they should not be here before the 4th but even then we will endeavour to notify them if matters are lasting longer. Does everybody understand what I'm proposing now?

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[indistinct] that meet their convenience as much as we can.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, we understand what you are saying. If the Committee would just bear in mind that some of us do practise in centres reasonably removed from here. We may not be able to be here, bearing in mind especially the village where I live, where the arrival of aeroplanes are few and far between.

CHAIRPERSON: Well it's for you and your attorney to decide whether in fact there would be any need for you to be here. It will be strictly limited to the question of recalling General Coetzee and cross-examining Mr de Kock on the allegations he has made about the Colonel. We do not intend to re-open the hearing or have a general ... So you can decide, all of you, or your attorneys can decide whether they want you here at all.

MR BOOYENS: I take Your Lordship's point, thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chairman, finally, I'm still involved of the offices in Lusaka and the attempted murder of Joe Slovo, so obviously I'll be here on the 2nd of November. I should probably prepare heads of argument on that as well, because I might have an interest in what General Coetzee is going to say, obviously.

CHAIRPERSON: If you have an interest, General Coetzee will not be giving evidence before the 4th at the earliest.

MR CORNELIUS: I understand, Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, am I then to understand that heads must be prepared, if Mr Visser elects to call or recall General Coetzee, then those heads in regard to the London bomb will if need be supplemented?

CHAIRPERSON: If you wish to supplement them.


CHAIRPERSON: And you will be at liberty to supplement.

MR LEVINE: And heads of argument in regard to the Schoon incident and the First incident will only be submitted at such later stage?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, or if we can have oral - depending how the thing goes, if possible we will invite oral argument at the end of the hearing, of those two separately.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, you do understand my position. I'm sure the same will pertain to Advocate du Plessis, that there may be in such a circumstance, the unnecessary but inevitable doubling up of the heads.

CHAIRPERSON: Duplication of the heads?



MR LEVINE: Duplication from each of our points of view.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, in the later heads you could kindly refer as to: "Paragraphs 1 up to 14 of my previous heads, and I'm incorporating it herein and I'm continuing with the rest of my heads". We'll take note of that and we'll accommodate you in that respect.

MR LEVINE: Obviously Mr Chairman, if the heads lend themselves to that form of application, I will certainly do so.

CHAIRPERSON: Well if they are a duplication, they would lend themselves to that. If they're not a duplication you will have to set out the different heads.

Right, we will now adjourn both matters till the 2nd of November on the understanding that evidence - sorry, not both, all three matters, on the understanding that evidence will not be led in the London bombing before Wednesday the 4th. If there is any delay we will take what steps we can to notify all the interested parties, advocates, attorneys and anyone else who is here.

And if you have any problems, please do not hesitate to get in touch with me and I will refer them to my secretary.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser again. I don't want to detain you longer than is necessary. There are just a few matters. Insofar as your remarks may be construed as a ruling as to how the evidence will proceed on the 2nd, Mr Chairman, I would ask an indulgence perhaps that Willem Schoon might go first before the other two go, Mr Chairman. But at this stage, I don't want you to ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well the other two won't go before the 4th.

MR VISSER: No, the Ruth First and the other Schoon matters. As long as it's ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: He is an applicant in that matter, he will have to go before. He will be the last of the applicants in that matter.

MR VISSER: Yes. Well he's in a separate matter, Mr Chairman, yes. Then there's only the question as far as your remarks may be regarded as a ruling to confine the issue of General Coetzee, I may just mention that there's a very real possibility that other witnesses will be called to rebut the evidence of Mr ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well they will be limited strictly to rebuttal of what was said by Mr de Kock. We are not giving you an opportunity to re-open the case and start new evidence. That you understand I think, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Well there is no other case I would wish to re-open, it will all concern the evidence of Mr de Kock, yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Right gentlemen, thank you for your assistance up to now and see some of you on the 2nd of November.