ON RESUMPTION: 23RD SEPTEMBER 1998 - 12

MR VISSER: Visser on record. I have a few questions in re-examination to Mr Williamson.

CHAIRPERSON: Not quite re-examination.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Oh well, further examination sorry Mr Chairman. Mr Williamson, having listened to the cross-examination on behalf of various of the applicants and other persons here, one can be forgiven to having come to the conclusion that Gen Coetzee and yourself along the line of thinking of those questions, must have had a hand in the pie in just about everything that went on in this country during the struggle. I want to ask you as far as suggestions were made that you yourself, were guilty of much more that what you admitted to before this Committee, what do you say to that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, any acts that I committed that I regard as illegal, I have applied for amnesty for.

MR VISSER: And so did Gen Coetzee say - now, I don't want to go into every question, suggestion or innuendo that was passed. I am just going to ask you this one omnibus question.

You, yourself, and in your own knowledge, do you know apart from the London bomb, of any illegal act or unlawful act that was performed, committed by Gen Johan Coetzee or that he had knowledge of, you yourself?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes. Lastly, it seems does it not, Mr Williamson, that history has a way of repeating itself if one looks at the newspapers of this morning, and looking at another invasion into Lesotho, not so?

MR WILLIAMSON: It does bring back 1981 Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: I have no further questions Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: We finally get to re-examination.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I believe my estimate to you given late during the day, was wrong, I think I will be somewhat quicker.

Mr Williamson, my learned friend Mr Du Plessis put a question towards the end last night and he was interrupted by Mr Bizos, who objected and said surely that is within the province of your Attorneys duties. All I would like to know from you in regard to that, what was the objective behind the letter bombs?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, every act that I committed that I am applying for amnesty for, and everything else that I ever did in my service in the Armed Forces, the Security Forces, was aimed against the African National Congress, South African Communist Party alliance and had political motives Mr Chairman, in order to destroy them and to destroy their onslaught against the Republic.

MR LEVINE: You were asked by Mr Chairman in dealing with the London bomb as to the time the bomb was set to explode. You initially answered approximately 06H00?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: It was then put to you that if the evidence will show that the bomb went off at 09H00, having been set for 08H30, what would your attitude be?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, as I said, I did have the impression that the bomb was supposed to go off earlier than it did, but I knew from discussions, there had been a window of time that had been established and I believe that as I said then, that 08H30 would have been within that window of time Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: How long ago was the London bomb?

MR WILLIAMSON: It is 16 years ago Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Was the positioning of the bomb important?

MR WILLIAMSON: It was very important Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Why?

MR WILLIAMSON: In order to achieve our objective in the way that we had been ordered to achieve the objective, and the way we had been ordered to achieve the objective was to avoid if humanly possible, any injuries or death Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Well, in fact we know that there was only one injury to Mr Mtamba and a lady was sent, went to hospital suffering from shock.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Did you know at the stage of the London bomb, of the planned Sharpeville ceremony later that day?

MR WILLIAMSON: I can't remember that it was specifically Sharpeville, in fact it would have been, I think the 21st of March was the so-called Sharpeville Day and this was the 14th of March and we were aware that there was some gathering planned later in the day for I believe, Trafalgar Square.

CHAIRPERSON: It was a fairly usual meeting place for this sort of gathering wasn't it, it was immediately outside South Africa House?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Bizos sought to depict you as deceitful, being a spy and a good one, would this be normal?

MR WILLIAMSON: Sorry Mr Chairman ...

MR LEVINE: Deceit would be part and parcel of spying?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I lived, I was put into that life from about 1971 and I lived it until I went into politics in 1987, when the type of deceit was a little different, but that was what was going on, it was a clandestine, secret war.

I was in particular involved in the covert, clandestine, secret war against the ANC and the Communist Party.

MR LEVINE: As opposed to politics?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, that was as I said ...

MR LEVINE: Mr Williamson, Mr Bizos has sought to suggest that because you were a spy and did things that were deceitful, this Committee can't accept your evidence as being truthful, would you comment on that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I entered into this process at least four years ago knowing full well that a process which I had supported, had meant that there would be an election in this country and that the majority would win that election.

I have been trying for the last four years, and hoping that what we did here would be the final unburdening of the history of what I did in 26 years of covert political warfare basically against the ANC and the Communist Party. Obviously the main objective of this hearing is for me to ask for amnesty.

As I think I mentioned the objective is also wider, it is personal, it is to get this done and to tell what happened. It will be on record, my children can read it in the future.

MR LEVINE: Mr Williamson, there were questions by Mr Bizos about the second Gaberone raid, do you have any involvement about that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Not the second raid, no Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Had you in fact already left the Defence Force?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I had left the police, I was then in the Defence Force.

MR LEVINE: Police yes.

MR WILLIAMSON: But my role in the Defence Force as I said, was as SO1 in charge of "ander lande" which was, I was dealing with the geopolitical implications of Soviet power, etc Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: A document was put to you, Exhibit W about Sanhedrin, do you have it or can I put one in front of you?

MR WILLIAMSON: I am sure I have it here somewhere.

MR LEVINE: Let me put one in front of you.

MR WILLIAMSON: We have it here Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Did you coin the name Sanhedrin for the meetings?

MR WILLIAMSON: No Mr Chairman, I am sure that name existed possibly even before I was born Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Bizos sought to suggest that some sort of death sentences were dealt with at these Sanhedrin meetings, what do you say about that?

MR WILLIAMSON: I think as I said Mr Chairman, in my evidence, the Sanhedrin was almost a rapid fire, quick report back meeting Mr Chairman, and there was no discussion or death sentences passed Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Where does the term Sanhedrin come from?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, I at the time thought it was a Biblical term, but I have now actually seen that it is an old Rabbinical term from what I read here Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: If you read the first paragraph of Sanhedrin, you will see that it is a (indistinct) of the Greek, Synédrion, meaning assembly?

MR WILLIAMSON: I see that Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Yes. Now, do you have any knowledge about the Jewish (indistinct) laws?

MR WILLIAMSON: No Mr Chairman, but perhaps my legal advisor can assist me in that area Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: It could be a very costly opinion Mr Chairman. Mr Williamson, read the last paragraph please to yourself of Exhibit W. Tell us what that sets out as being the purpose of the Sanhedrin?

MR WILLIAMSON: From in the course of Jewish history?

CHAIRPERSON: Is there any importance to be attached to the Sanhedrin point? The applicant has said that he doesn't know where it came from, and it already existed when he joined the Committee, isn't that an end to it?

MR LEVINE: I would think so. Mr Williamson, did you apply your mind to whom the letter bomb which killed Ruth Slovo was addressed?

MR WILLIAMSON: I have applied my mind over the last four years to that Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Did you apply your mind to whom the letter bomb which killed Jeannette and Katryn Schoon, was addressed?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman, I have applied my mind. I know it was addressed to Marius and Jeannette Schoon.

As far as the Ruth First bomb is concerned Mr Chairman, I spent 12 years of my life convinced that that bomb was going to Joe Slovo, and it was only four years ago that I started having doubts about it and that is why I made my application in the way that I made it, encompassing Ruth and Joe Slovo Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: You were questioned by Mr Bizos about your having been best man at Charles Nupenís wedding.

ADV DE JAGER: I think that has been solved too.

MR LEVINE: It was in fact all I wanted to clarify for the record, Mr Bizos quite properly some five days after that line of questioning, withdrew this assertion, is that correct?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: What is your comment about the fact that there were only four South Africans in Lobango?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, as I believe I said I have no personal knowledge that there were only four South Africans in Lobango, but given the nature of Lobango at the time and the military bases around Lobango, as I think, I believe I said, that this would have just served to make people more suspicious Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: What were your suspicions about the Schoon's in Lobango?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, my suspicions and the suspicions of other people in the Security Forces were that they were there as part of continuing their work with the ANC, Communist Party alliance, the revolutionary onslaught against South Africa and in specific Mr Chairman, Lobango, it is well know, was an area that was being used for infiltrations by SWAPO. It was also an area that was being used in the confrontation against UNITA by the ANC and the Angolan and other Forces Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: And you said in Botswana in the ANC, there was a spy v spy situation. Could you explain that please?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, throughout my history as a spy as it were, now I am talking not as a spy master, afterwards running other spies, but actually being the spy undercover, it was common procedure in clandestine organisations and within organisations working with or related to the African National Congress, Communist Party alliance, that there was constant paranoia about South African agents infiltrating and there were constant questions about various people in the organisations, related to the organisation.

I was on many occasions asked about other people, I am sure other people were asked about me. That was part of the Security process that was caused by this paranoia about South African infiltration Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: But it wasn't really a paranoia, was it, it was a well thought out suspicion?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I didn't mean that it was an unbiased paranoia. The fact that the ANC, Communist Party alliance was so well infiltrated had led to the state of paranoia Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Instead of paranoia, would you perhaps consider mindset as being a better description?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, there was a belief that South African agents were around and were dangerous. They were regarded as the enemy Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Why do you believe that Mr Mac Maharaj wanted you to travel to Angola?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, at the time when I was talking to Mr Maharaj about travelling around and meeting, I thought it was to meet, to continue to get instructions from him on what I was doing for the ANC, Communist Party alliance.

I can only now come to the conclusion Mr Chairman, that there may well have been a level of suspicion against me which had meant that they would lure me or order me to go to Angola where I could be detained and possibly killed Mr Chairman, as a South African agent. But that is what I surmise now hearing what I hear now Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Williamson, during your cross-examination you mentioned a man called McGiven. Can you just deal with that quickly?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes. Mr Chairman, Arthur McGiven was the agent of the National Intelligent Service who I referred to in my evidence, and who left South Africa with considerable information relating to the National Intelligence Service and to South Africa's Intelligence activities, which led to various articles in the British press in I believe, January, February 1980 and I had been at University with McGiven.

I had come to know, I had obviously realised that if he was a member of Intelligence and he was sitting on the Student Desk at National Intelligence, he must have known who I was or that I was at least an agent Mr Chairman.

When one of the articles said that there was a specific South African Intelligence operation using the International University Exchange Fund, I realised then and my superiors realised then Mr Chairman, that it didn't take as I think I said, a rocket scientist to go through all the employees of the IUEF and pick out the most likely South African spy Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: What do you say about Mr Bizos' suggestion that you acted with ill will, malice and spite towards the Schoon's because they had exposed you as a police spy?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman, I didn't act out of any malice or spite and I really have never heard this theory that they exposed me or they were specifically involved in exposing me until this hearing Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: I would like you to have a look at Exhibit AA, it is a telefax from Mr Alfred Nzo to, who is it to by the way? Do you have AA, let me give it to you.

MR WILLIAMSON: I think this is it, is it the one from the ANC to SWAPO?

MR LEVINE: It is marked "press statement". You say it is from the ANC to SWAPO?

MR WILLIAMSON: I, yes I believe so Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: If you look at the final paragraph, how is Ruth ...

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, it was identified as a press release. I don't know where it is suggested that it was to SWAPO. Presumably it also went to SWAPO, but it was a press release if I remember correctly, relating to the death of ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos, start again.

MR BIZOS: It was a press release Mr Chairman, relating to the death of Jeannette Schoon. That is how I remember it and that is how it was put in. I don't know if the applicant or his Attorney have any other information.

MR LEVINE: No, this is why I asked, I didn't say who it was sent to and it is marked "press statement". My recollection is it was described as a press statement.

If you have a look at the ...

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, you know I have seen a lot of these things and this is an ANC telex, it may well be a press statement, and it is from the ANC to SWAPO. It is in fact, it is from the ANC in Zambia and it is addressed to SWAPO in Angola. The number 3069 is the telex number of SWAPO and AN denotes Angola.

But I mean that is, I accept it is a press statement Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Williamson, how is Jeannette Schoon described in the second line and third line of the final paragraph?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, as a late dear comrade in arms.

MR LEVINE: Thank you.

MR WILLIAMSON: And who did not struggle in vain.

MR LEVINE: Now, reference was made yesterday to some organisation called E & LC and you had difficulty in recalling it. Have you been able to recall what that was at this stage?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I haven't. As I say the letters mean something to me, but - and I accept what was put to me by Mr Bizos, that it has something to do with Military Ordinance something or other.

MR LEVINE: But you cannot attach ...

MR WILLIAMSON: I don't know what the specific letters stand for Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Now, you also spoke yesterday afternoon of a man called Jaap van Jaarsveld. Do you remember that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Did you know the gentleman?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman, at one stage he was on my staff Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: What function did he fulfil?

MR WILLIAMSON: I don't specifically remember Mr Chairman, but I - after having been reminded, I do remember that he came from the Secretariat of the State Security Council. He was well academically qualified.

I believe he had some analyst function and I have some recollection that he was involved, if I am not wrong, in Stratcom, but I don't even know which section. I cannot remember which section of the nine sections that he actually fell under Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Did you send Mr Van Jaarsveld to carry out surveillance on Mr Goniwe?

MR WILLIAMSON: I did not Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Did you ever have any motive or receive any instructions to eliminate I think is the word, Mr Goniwe?

MR WILLIAMSON: I did not Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I trust I have come within my undertakings to you time wise.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LEVINE

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that you have, thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Williamson, I want to ask you some question in clarifying the letter bomb or the envelope to Ruth First. The way you explained it, it would appear when it came back from Mr Raven, there were two small envelopes in a big envelope, is my analyses correct?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct Mr Chairman. I think there was the original postal envelope and then there was another envelope in which I assume, the IED was Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: To my mind, I have expected that Mr Raven as an expert, will complete the work, in other words he would put the envelope where there is an IE in the original envelope, in other words he wouldn't leave it to somebody else who didn't have that much experience in explosive to put the envelope in the original envelope? To put the bomb in the original envelope? What do you say about that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, as I said I - my recollection is, I think it probably was in the original envelope. All I did was to look and see as I said, whether it looked any different and what I meant by that was, you know, I had never seen one of these before Mr Chairman, and I just wanted to see if you know, if there was a big bomb in the packet for example, and I was surprised that it looked so normal Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: We were also told that the Schoon's had left Botswana because of a threat by the South African agents to attack them? Do you have any knowledge of that threat?

MR WILLIAMSON: I don't have any specific knowledge of a threat that was made. I thought it was more that, not that there was - somebody had threatened them, but that it appeared from information that people had the ANC or we even heard that the British government had advised the ANC that they had Intelligence information that the Schoon's were under threat.

In other words that there was a possibility that the South African Forces were going to try and kill them. That is how I understood it. I didn't understand that somebody had phoned them or sent them a letter, threatening them Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Right. You said the instruction or the suggestion to put a bomb in an intercepted letter came from Brigadier Goosen. I want to find out how high was Brigadier Goosen, would we accept that if this idea originated from him, he was highly placed enough to say he was acting on behalf of the police or the Security Police?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, that is the assumption I would have made, but because those postal items came from somewhere, they wouldn't have - they weren't manufactured by us. They came from somewhere and they went somewhere, so you know, I assumed that this was an instruction as I said I think several times, that somebody somewhere decided that Brigadier Goosen or Major Williamson's division can take care of this. The instruction was made Mr Chairman.

I didn't question, I just did what I was asked to do Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: I heard you saying you declined using funds from the Legal Aid, but I didn't get you, what was your reason for declining that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I took a decision during this process to be independent. I didn't want, I was trying to avoid any suggestion that I was involved in a conspiracy of silence by the Security Forces or we were all grouped together and working together and that I was still being funded from the Security Force's side Mr Chairman.

I just made that comment, trying to illustrate that I really tried to say I want to say what I want to say and nobody ... (tape ends)

MR SIBANYONI: ... with you not intending to have anything to do, any assistance from the present government, that is not the reason?

MR WILLIAMSON: No Mr Chairman, it is that I don't want anybody, it was purely so I could be independent and that no allegation could be made that somebody was holding some type of sword of Damocles over my head, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: If what was the main concern was to fight communism, there were two offices in London, the one belonging to the ANC, the other belonging to the Communist Party, South African Communist Party, I have expected that perhaps the one to be attacked, was that one belonging to the South African Communist Party, what do you say about that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, Mr Chairman, I, as I said from the beginning, from a practical point of view thought that attacking the South African Communist Party, was completely out.

I am talking now purely from a practical point of view in terms of damage and potential threat to life and limb, but secondly from the political point of view Mr Chairman, an attack, I believe also, on the South African Communist Party office wouldn't have had anywhere near the same impact as an attack on the ANC Mr Chairman.

We believed and it is in the documentation that I have given the Committee, it wasn't just my belief, it was an absolutely entrenched belief right through the Intelligence Services of South Africa, but also throughout the western world Mr Chairman, that the African National Congress was very strongly linked to the Soviet Union and the use by the Soviet Union of surrogate international terrorist forces, the belief at that time Mr Chairman, was that the Soviet Union could not risk open confrontation with the western world, because obviously of the dangers of escalation and therefore it was working through the so-called revolutionary movements in many countries in the world Mr Chairman.

As far as we were concerned, the ANC was the focal point, the ANC was the organisation that was doing things. The ANC was the organisation that in fact had to be branded as terrorists.

I think everybody in the world, in the western world regarded the South African Communist Party as just you know, a department or a sub-department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Finally, how would you react to a suggestion, I am just putting it as a suggestion, it doesn't mean this is my belief, to say it would appear what was being fought was not communism, but was to prevent a majority government and to maintain a white rule?

Why I am saying that is because the South African Forces were also involved in Rhodesia and I am not sure whether the liberation movements in Rhodesia would also be viewed as communists?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I will try and give a short answer to that one.

That is that what I believed then and what I believe now, are two different things. I think I also tried to illustrate yesterday in answer to one of the questions that my belief now is that we were all, that the men and women in the Security Forces and in the Armed Forces and revolutionary Forces or whatever one wants to call them of the then revolutionary alliance, were used ultimately as pawns on an international geopolitical chess game.

I have said this before and I have written it, that I think one of the greatest tragedies that has ever struck this country of ours, is that we ended up fighting South African against South African, South African against Angolans, South African against Mozambican, Botswanan, Zimbabwean, that we here in this sub-continent ended up fighting and killing each other as part of a geopolitical war, an east/west struggle.

I accept absolutely that the ANC and the South African Communist Party had their reasons to go across to armed struggle in 1961, and I hope and accept and I expect that there is some understanding from their side that we also had our reasons to go across into meeting violence with violence.

And that we felt threatened, we believed that there was a super power that wanted to destroy us as part of its goal to make like the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, we seriously believed Mr Chairman, that somebody wanted to create a Union of Southern African Republics of Socialist Southern African Republics and it is not only me that believed that Mr Chairman.

I think to go into the whys and wherefore's, that we could write historical books about Mr Chairman, but that is what we believed. At the end of the day, as I said at the Armed Forces hearing, we didn't see the ANC and the Communist Party struggle for freedom and justice and democracy and the vote and human rights as what was really going on Mr Chairman, we saw them as an alien enemy. We treated them as such.

That is the tragedy of what happened in this country, and I think from their side also Mr Chairman, they saw us as only Jack booted monsters, defending white privilege and apartheid Mr Chairman, and I don't think that my view of them then as being Stalin's legions wanting to rampage through Africa and create a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics here, in southern Africa was correct.

But I had that perception, and I don't think that their view of us then and perhaps sometimes their view of us now, is that we were the other side of that coin. The racist storm troopers of apartheid Mr Chairman, I think it was a lot more complicated than that.

MR SIBANYONI: In fact you reminded me, you even said before this Committee, that you do not see them as you used to see them in the past? In other words your view has now changed?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I have had the humbling privilege to in many instances meet people who have been my enemy and to be now working with them. It is something that makes it very difficult to understand what, how what happened, could have happened. But it did Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.

ADV DE JAGER: Exhibit BB and Exhibit DD, that is the photograph and copy of a photo, and a sketch plan.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Perhaps you would know the vicinity better, could you try and give us a reliable layout of the ANC offices?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, it is as it is depicted here. If one looks at BB, as far as I remember it, there was one single building that stretched from street to street, to White Lion Street to Penton Road, or one terrace of buildings.

The ANC office itself, as one can see from the photograph and I think in fact the original photograph even shows it better, went back northwards to the back area. I was not, I was many times in this office through this front door Mr Chairman, and I was never personally in the back yard, but I knew from being there, that there was this back yard, that there was a type of a printing press, annexed that stuck out of the building into the back yard.

As far as I remember also, the wall was in fact, I would say a two meter wall and it was a corrugated iron wall, and there was access to the ANC's area at the back, and then in the years that followed and before the bombing Mr Chairman, I saw on many occasions surveillance photographs and I knew for example that there was a school there Mr Chairman, because we in fact used that school to take some surveillance photographs from. Or I believe that certain agents used that school.

But unfortunately after this number of years and all the confusion, all I can say is that in this building that is on BB, that part of it was the ANC office, and I don't think in fact it was an Italian delicatessen next door. I remember it to have been a Greek type of eating restaurant.

The purpose of nearly two weeks of surveillance Mr Chairman, was to make sure that the people involved acquainted themselves in particular, with the back of the building, which I wasn't particularly well acquainted with personally.

There was never ever, not from the first moment of conception of this operation, an idea that the attack would be the front of this building, the photograph we see, because that would not have been possible to attack that side of the building without having a serious possibility of injuring or killing innocent passers by or people living in the buildings next door.

The idea was to take this building which you can see, and especially as I said, if you can look at that original photograph shows it better, that sort of individual structure that is the ANC part of the building, and with a controlled explosion Mr Chairman, and here I can't give evidence because I am not an expert, a controlled explosion which would scoop our almost like a spoon in a cake, scoop out the inside of that building and to focus the explosion into that building and to avoid if humanly possibly, to damage anything else Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I want to continue a bit for that, can one assume that on the other side of the road, I am talking now about Penton Street, there was a similar row of buildings?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It was just an ordinary London street?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is right Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: But at the back there was this wider open space?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is right, in a type of a yard Mr Chairman, where the ANC was and it had an L-shape, the yard, which was because of that annex where the printing press was.

So the explosion could be focused into obviously the printing press which also the allegation was, was where the files were being kept. I mean it was I would say one of the more important rooms in the building Mr Chairman, being as Mr Bizos said, the room that was also used by Jill Marcus who was running the office Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you estimate and it is probably a grossly unfair question so long afterwards, how many buildings there were along that block? We can see three in the photograph?

MR WILLIAMSON: Not more than ...

CHAIRPERSON: A lot more?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, not more than five I would say.

CHAIRPERSON: Not more than five?

MR WILLIAMSON: Maybe one, two, three, four, five. I would imagine, yes something like that Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That is enough to give an - and I take it that they would each have, as normally in such buildings, have had an entrance at the back?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman, but from how I remember it is that it was, my instructions to the Unit was certainly to use that gate on the side, the corrugated iron fence gate, to get over and get into behind the ANC office to that annex, specifically that annex Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And that annex would have not been sticking out as shown in Plan B, at the end of the building, it would have been somewhere about the middle of the building, sticking out into the yard?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, a little bit and I thought also my recollection is that it was more long than, it is oblong here, I thought it was a bit longer than that, but I - yes, here is another one that has been amended Mr Chairman.

This one ...

CHAIRPERSON: Is this Mr Visser's second guess?

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR WILLIAMSON: And that is why I also when I was asked I think by you Mr Chairman, if this accorded I said I had a problem with the gate, because that was ...

CHAIRPERSON: It wasn't right up against the gate, it was well away from the gate?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, your guess or on what basis?

MR VISSER: He has just confirmed it.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but on what information, inspection?

MR VISSER: No, but we can go on an inspection.

ADV DE JAGER: We have been waiting for a request.

MR VISSER: But speaking for myself, Mr Chairman, I believe this is an extremely important point and that we really should go and look.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes. Mr Visser, like some of your other points, we don't agree with you.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, if we could go onto something else please. You told us that you, when you visited Mozambique, you were shown photographs of the damage caused by the bomb which killed Ruth First?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And as I understood your evidence, you were amazed at the amount of damage and decided it must have been some other bomb?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I was and I am referring now specifically to the structural damage.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WILLIAMSON: I was amazed.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you discuss the matter with Brigadier Goosen and with Mr Raven on your return?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I believe I mentioned it to, because the photographs would have gone through to the file, and I think I did mention to Mr Raven specifically and I could well have even asked, is this possible that this was the device that you manufactured.

CHAIRPERSON: Because it was important, well, I would have thought that it would have been important that they should have been aware of the amount of damage caused by this device if it did cause it?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman, it was several years later that we got the photographs, but you know, I just remember when I got them and I looked at them, I was amazed.

CHAIRPERSON: Because I think in one of these many newspaper cuttings we were given, ...

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, there was the allegation made that it ...

CHAIRPERSON: That it couldn't have been a letter bomb?

MR WILLIAMSON: There was an allegation made that there was a bomb in the desk.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And this, was it in that bundle of ...

MR WILLIAMSON: I think perhaps that Star article, yes, if you look at the second last paragraph of HH. And then also in GG, the second last paragraph. The third last and the second last paragraph on the first column.

CHAIRPERSON: And that was something that may have been taken up by Security authorities, it seems in fact to have been taken up, you advanced the argument well, we couldn't possibly have left something there, they were too suspicious, it must have been Slovo who did it.

MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: So they were, the Security people were conscious of the degree of damage caused and tried to make use of it?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct, and I think not only ours, but I think other Intelligence agencies got involved in the whole what Stratcom for want of a better word, or ...

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You have been here a long time Mr Williamson, you may leave now.

MR WILLIAMSON: Thank you Mr Chairman.

WITNESS EXCUSED

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

AMNESTY HEARING

DATE: 23RD SEPTEMBER 1998

NAME: ROGER HOWARD LESLEY RAVEN

MATTER: LONDON BOMB

DAY: 11

--------------------------------------------------------------------------ROGER HOWARD LESLEY RAVEN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, just to make it easier for you, I want to explain to you how I intend leading the evidence.

I intend using volume 3, the Williamson and Raven application in the matter of Ruth First as a basis, volume 1 otherwise. Sorry, yes, my numbers are wrong, volume 1.

Because the general background, the political motivation, in all three applications are the same Mr Chairman, so I am going to use this bundle for that. I intend leading evidence pertaining to the general background, then I will lead evidence pertaining to the Ruth First and Jeannette Schoon incidents and then I will lead evidence about the London bomb incident and then the evidence about the political motive.

Alright Mr Raven, can I refer you to page 28 of volume 1? The general information and background to your applications, and this is the same in respect to all three applications. Could you start where it says I immigrated to South Africa.

MR RAVEN: I immigrated to South Africa in 1948 and matriculated from De Villiers Graaff High School, Villiersdorp, Cape Province in December 1960. On completion of schooling I applied to join the Military and Seaman Institute in Gordons Bay but was turned down.

I then applied to join the Rhodesian Nyasaland Army, but before leaving for Salisbury, Rhodesia for induction into the Army, I was visited at my father's factory R. Raven & Company, at 181 Buitenkant Street, Cape Town by a Major MacIntyre of the South African Police.

He was aware of my desire to join the Rhodesian Army and proceeded to spell out the advantages of joining the South African Police. He convinced me and I subsequently travelled to Pretoria and was attested into the South African Police on the 16th of January 1961.

On completion of my 12 month basic training, I was requested to continue my service at the South African Police College as a Musketry Instructor. I continued in this capacity until I purchased my discharge in January 1964.

Between 1964 and 1971 I was employed in the private sector in a number of jobs ranging from representative to salesman in radio and hi-fi industry.

In 1971 I was approached by a Major Swart from John Vorster Square who requested that I consider rejoining the South African Police as they were short of Instructors. I subsequently rejoined the SAP in 1971. I was again posted to the South African Police College in Pretoria as a Musketry Instructor.

In 1974 I requested a transfer to the Quartermaster's stores, to be trained as an armourer. I was accepted and in 1974 was sent as an armourer for a three month term of duty, to Plumtree in Rhodesia. In 1975 I volunteered for a six month tour of duty to Rushinga in Rhodesia.

In 1975, 1976 after the seize of the Israeli Embassy in Johannesburg, it was decided that the South African Police would create a Special Task Force, formed along the lines of the Swat Teams of the United States and the SAS of the British Armed Forces.

I applied and after vetting and on completion of the course, I was chosen as one of the 40 of the Special Task Force under the command of the late Brigadier Verwey.

At that time the Special Task Force was a Unit that fell under the command of the Security Branch of the South African Police. One of the specialised courses I underwent while on the Task Force, was in bomb disposal.

This entailed a detailed knowledge of both commercial as well as military explosives. The course also included the knowledge of the construction of improvised exploding devices, IED's, such as was found during the raid on the smallholding, Lilly's Leaf which led to the Rivonia Trial.

It is essential to know the various chemical compounds that could be used as well as the numerous configurations of household items that could be used as switched for these IED's. It was important to know what went into them, in order to know how to neutralise them.

In 1976 we were sent to South West Africa twice to track and eliminate SWAPO insurgents who had infiltrated through the SADF lines on the Angola border and were operating in the Tsumeb area.

In June 1976 we were also sent to Soweto during the riots. We were also sent to quail the riots in the locations at Middelburg, Transvaal and New Brighton, Port Elizabeth.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you just stop there please. In respect of the operations in South West Africa, and you referred to SWAPO insurgents, were you involved in contacts at all?

MR RAVEN: Yes Mr Chairman, I was involved in two contacts.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you know if you were involved in the shooting of anybody?

MR RAVEN: There was casualties, but it is unknown if I was the one that did the shooting.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Can you go on with the last paragraph please. I am sorry, can I just ask you, in respect of the riots, were you involved in injuring or shooting anybody?

MR RAVEN: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you carry on.

MR RAVEN: While on the Special Task Force, I also served as Chief Instructor in Combat Shooting with handguns and I also trained members in the use of weapons, originating from the Soviet Block Countries.

In 1978 during parachute training, I injured my foot during a bad landing, which eventually forced me to resign from the Special Task Force. While on the Special Task Force, we were told that should we ever become unfit to serve on the Unit, we could choose our own posting. That was not so in my case, I was told that because of my training in explosives, and my knowledge of communist weaponry, I was to be transferred to the Directorate of Explosives at Security Headquarters, Pretoria.

While there, my work entailed compilation of statistics on the amount of bomb threats received during the RSA, assisting in the training of Security Branch members from the various districts in bomb disposal, and investigation of crime scenes where explosives were used, either in the commission of a crime or accident, where explosives were involved, the issuing of permits to commercial blasting contractors, to transport explosives, the inspection of explosives magazines, assistance in the training and equipping of members of neighbouring States, for example Swaziland, Lesotho and Malawi in bomb disposal, the giving of lectures to members of the private sector whose jobs entailed security of buildings and the methods used by terrorists for the smuggling of explosives and weapons.

On a rotation basis, I would be on a 24 hour standby to respond to any bomb threats received. Investigation of any suspicious parcels or items delivered or found by the public. The removal and destruction of any military ordinance found or handed in by the public, for example hand grenades, mortar bombs.

I was also called upon to give evidence in terrorist trials as to the country of origin, lethalness, working condition and mechanism of assault rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, landmines, limpet mines and demolition chargers.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you just pause there for a moment. Could you tell the Committee and give some information about the bomb disposals you were involved in?

MR RAVEN: There was a case in Atteridgeville where I was called out, where a rather prominent member of the community had received a suspicious parcel which he wasn't expecting in the post.

I X-rayed the parcel, it looked as if there could be a device in the parcel, but because of the lack of wires, batteries, I had my doubts if it was a parcel bomb. I proceeded to open it and found inside a box containing a set of dominoes. What led me to believe that it was, it could have been an explosive device, is that the domino, when it is face down, so not to damage it, were facing each other and there was a piece of cardboard in between, and this is a typical method of making a switch as by removing the cardboard section in between, the two metal sections would then make contact and complete a circuit. Because of the lack of battery and the lack of wiring and detonator, it wasn't that obvious as to be a parcel bomb.

There was a case at, I think it was called the Nyati Power Station, where ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Raven, I don't think it is necessary to go into the detail, can you just name a few incidents where you were involved in bomb disposals?

MR RAVEN: Okay, there was, I think it was the Nyati Power Station, where a number of limpet mines had detonated, of which we removed one which had not detonated.

There was the case of the Power Station in, I think it was Capital Park at the Apies River, where a number of limpet mines had gone off, cutting the power to Pretoria. There was a handgrenade incident in Queenswood where a member of the public had picked up a handgrenade. There was a case of a mortar bomb which a farmer had ploughed out of his lands and handed to the police station in Brits.

There was a case of a handgrenade explosion at Crown Mines where a number of suspected insurgents or terrorists had blown themselves up. There was the case of a Krugersdorp chemical factory where someone had made a bit of a mistake with chemicals and had blown himself up. There was the case of the explosion which occurred at the Krugersdorp Magistrate's court which I attended to.

That is all that I can think of at the moment.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and approximately how many terrorist trials were you involved in as a witness?

MR RAVEN: I think it could be in the vicinity of about 20 Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Can you turn over to the next page, page 31. Can you go on please.

MR RAVEN: In 1982 I was asked by my Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frans van Eeden, if I would be able to manufacture an explosive device in a foreign country. I told him that if I was supplied with the material, I could foresee no problem.

I was then seconded to the newly formed Intelligence Unit of the Security Police under the command of Craig Williamson. He tasked me with the gathering of a team, laying out the logistic requirements for the planting of an explosive device and the denotation thereof at the ANC and SACP offices in London.

On the successful completion of the operation, I was transferred permanently to the Intelligence Unit.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you just pause there for a moment. Do you know if Lieutenant Colonel Van Eeden knew anything about the London bomb operation?

MR RAVEN: I cannot say.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Can you go ahead please?

MR RAVEN: My work consisted of gathering Intelligence and surveillance. These operations took place within the RSA and also in Swaziland and Botswana.

I also had to develop a technical capability parallel to that of the Security Branch. As we worked on a strictly need to know basis, it was not always desirable to make use of a person outside the Unit.

These capabilities included all aspects of photography, both still and video.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, can you just pause there. Can you tell the Committee about surveillance you did in Botswana in respect of Mr Marius Schoon?

MR RAVEN: At one stage I was requested to accomplish, I think it was Captain that time McPherson, to ascertain if a certain Landrover with a certain registration number was parked outside or inside the yard at an address in Vuku Close in Gaberone, which we subsequently did and we found the vehicle there.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, was that all you knew about what you had to do there?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you go on.

MR RAVEN: As in the case of Carl Niehaus and the undercover policeman, I supplied the vehicle, the camera, the film he used to film the Brixton Gas Works. I took photographs of him photographing the Gas Works.

The undercover policeman then brought me the roll of film that Niehaus had used and I developed them, making an extra set of prints for evidence.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can we just pause there. Was this the incident for which Carl Niehaus was prosecuted?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And the undercover policeman, what was his involvement?

MR RAVEN: The undercover policeman, if I remember correctly, his surname was Whitehouse and I believe he had been staying in the commune with Carl Niehaus for a number of months or years, I am not sure how long.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and what was the intention of Carl Niehaus in respect of the Brixton Gas Works?

MR RAVEN: It would, if I remember correctly, it came out that they were targeting the Gas Works as a target for attack.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Raven, then you refer to the Allan Boesak and Di Scott affair. Can you just very shortly explain in relation to the bugging of hotel rooms, what you did there?

MR RAVEN: I received instructions from Major Williamson that at a certain date Mr Boesak was going to be booked into a hotel, I think it was the Braamfontein Hotel in Johannesburg, and that he was going to have a liaison with Di Scott.

He instructed me to go there and to endeavour to tape what was happening in the room. I went to the hotel and was met there by a member, I can't remember his name, of the Johannesburg Security Branch, who it appeared, had contact with the Head of Security of that specific hotel.

We were booked into a room adjacent to the room which Mr Boesak would use. Mr Boesak's room was opened, I went in and I disconnected the aerial of the radio which is built into the pedestal next to the bed, so that it wouldn't work, so I wouldn't have any extraneous noises. I then went back to our room and in this case, under the pedestal of the bed was a normal three prong socket plug. In the construction in a hotel and in houses, you have a community wire running down a pipe and then a double sided plug into either room.

I unscrewed the face plate of the plug in our room, and using an ordinary straw which you use for drinking cold drink, inserted a small microphone in that, placed it into the plug, through to the other side, the other wall, and then taped what was going on in the room during Boesak's engagement.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and what was that information used for?

MR RAVEN: I believe it was used in Stratcom operation against Mr Boesak.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Raven, you can go a little bit slower because especially the Committee members are taking down certain extra things that you testify about, so don't go too fast please.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got a copy of this, oh they've got one.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you go ahead please.

MR DU PLESSIS: On one occasion Craig Williamson said that he had received information that a certain post at the British Embassy was to be filled by an undeclared SAS, it is a Secret Intelligence Service agent. On the agent's arrival, he sent me to an address in Waterkloof with the instructions to photograph this person but asked that I should be doing it so blatantly, that the person would know that he was being photographed.

I proceeded to the house and parked across the road. When the agent came home, I climbed out of my vehicle with a camera equipped with a 800 mm lens and proceeded to take photo's. He saw me, jumped back into his car and sped away. I climbed into my car and followed him again blatantly, almost driving on his bumper.

I followed him for about 15 minutes and then broke off and returned to my office. The next day Williamson congratulated me and said that the agent hadn't even bothered to unpack, but had caught the next plane back to the UK.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can we just pause there for a moment Mr Raven. At the time when you were at the Intelligence Unit, you were also involved in education and training of other people, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and did that entail training pertaining to bombs, especially bomb disposal?

MR RAVEN: No, it was pertaining more if we came to explosions, as to how to recognise what could possibly be a bomb.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and can you give us some information what did that education entail?

MR RAVEN: It entailed making dummy devices and showing them the various normal household items which could be used as switches in the manufacture of booby traps.

Due to the work done by our agents and our Intelligence men, should they have to enter a building, they should be aware of what could be waiting on the other side of the door.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you give the Committee a little bit of background in respect of IED's, what is an IED, what do you mean by it and give some examples please.

MR RAVEN: Mr Chairman, there are two terms when it comes to bomb disposals, namely IED and OED. IED is the Improvised Explosive Device. As it says, it is improvised, so you make up as you go along, depending on the requirements, as opposed to OED which is Ordinance Explosive Devices, which is then a military weapon as in a mortar bomb, a handgrenade, a cannon shell, etc.

IED's could be manufactured in a multiple way, for example there was one, I do not have the newspaper clipping with me any more, but there was one place in America, a guy had a grudge against a casino and he built this explosive device in which he inserted 22 anti-handling devices, so basically what he was telling the people there whether you like it or not, you are not going to diffuse this bomb.

Your switches used in the bomb could vary from, we had the case of a spate of bombs, switches that came through that the ANC/SACP were using, where they were using an integrated circuit, which was then encased in a block of resin. The integrated circuit was a (indistinct) and by cutting certain of the loops that extruded out of the resin block, we then determined the time which it would take for the explosive device to explode.

As I was saying, it varied from the very sophisticated down to a thing like a mousetrap, or an ordinary clothes peg which could be used for an IED.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, Mr Williamson, sorry Mr Raven, I am so used to saying Mr Williamson, in respect of the explosives used ...

MR RAVEN: Can you please repeat that.

MR DU PLESSIS: In respect of the explosives used in the Ruth First and Jeannette Schoon incidents, what kind of explosives was that? Can you explain the explosive material and its origin?

MR RAVEN: The explosive material used in the two IED's, which was sent to eventually as I found out to Ruth First and to the Schoon's was called sheet explosions.

Sheet explosives, as opposed to plastic explosives, is a dry substance, it looks very much like blotting paper, but it is thicker. It is odourless and in the case of any military explosive, it is terribly, terribly stable. I say stable in the sense that military explosives, because of the age of, or the time it is manufactured and we can't wait until a war breaks out before we start manufacturing landmines, handgrenades, etc, so that ammunition whether it be a handgrenade or a block of TNT or plastic explosives, should have a shelf life of maybe 20, 25, 30 years.

Whereas in the case of commercial explosives, after a period of a few months you would have a case of for example a stick of dynamite or (indistinct) could start deteriorating, where the chemicals would start separating from one another and it became very, very dangerous to handle that explosive.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that when it is sometimes called sweating?

MR RAVEN: That is correct. I was going to say Mr Chairman, where the nitric glycerine separates from the binding article, it forms a crystal on the outside of the detonating charge and simply by picking it up, can detonate it.

The reason why sheet explosives were used as opposed to plastic explosives, plastic explosives number one is heavy, due to the plasticine which is applied to the explosive material to give it the pliability for using it in sabotage for railway lines, bridges, etc. Number two, this plasticine also gives off an oily residue which then can stain and you would get a letter that looked as if someone had their fish and chips eaten off it, with the oil stains, and also plastic explosives had a very characteristic odour to it.

That is why it was decided that we would use sheet explosives which was a western explosive and if I remember correctly, this was obtained either from America or from, or developed by Nobel in Sweden or America, I can't remember the specifics.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Mr Raven, when you say we obtained it, in respect of the Schoon and Ruth First incidents, was there anybody else with you who were involved in the obtaining of the explosives?

MR RAVEN: No, when I said we obtained it, this was obtained while I was still a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit which we would then use during the course to illustrate to course members what sheet explosives looked like. That is what I meant when I said we.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, thank you. Can you turn to page 32 please. Could you carry on there, on the first paragraph please.

MR RAVEN: It was then decided to establish an Intelligence Unit in each of the large centres. Vetted members of the Security Branch were brought to Pretoria and housed on the Farm Daisy, which Craig Williamson alleged was bought with money that he had transferred from the International University Exchange Fund in Switzerland while he was working undercover for the ANC there.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you just pause there. Were you involved in that at all?

MR RAVEN: Not at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, can you go on please.

MR RAVEN: Here I gave lectures on surveillance and counter-surveillance. I also had to give the same lectures to members of various units of the SAP, example SANAP, Housebreaking Squads and Units of the South African Defence Force.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, in respect of the next paragraph, we will deal with it when we come to the specific incidents. So can you deal with the last paragraph please.

MR RAVEN: At the time of the total onslaught, there were so many media reports of death or mutilation by IED's that I knew I was not responsible for, that I was not sure whether I had been responsible for the aforementioned deaths.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, when you say the aforementioned deaths, you refer to Ruth First and Jeannette Schoon in the previous paragraph?

MR RAVEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you remember any deaths or mutilations that you refer to here?

MR RAVEN: Well, there were the reported assassinations of ANC/SACP members in the various States which I think a list was read of I don't know how many, it was in the vicinity of about 100 I think.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that was inside the country and outside the country, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you go on please.

MR RAVEN: At a later stage, plus minus 1983, 1984 ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Okay, just pause there, you say in 1983, 1984, was this before or after the Schoon incident?

MR RAVEN: This was after the Schoon incident.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, so it must have been 1984, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: If you say so.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, the Schoon ...

CHAIRPERSON: In the previous paragraph he refers to 1982, 1983.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I am coming to that Mr Chairman. I am just determining the date of his transfer, that is all this is about.

The Schoon incident was in 1984. Were you transferred after the Schoon incident?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you go on. I was placed ...

MR RAVEN: I was placed under the command of Captain W. Botha, Head of the counter-espionage Unit. Again this entailed the surveillance of suspects, suspected agents of the ANC and anyone suspected of being enemies of the National Party.

We were tasked to ensure the security of information received from sources, and their identity. In the early 1990's, I cannot remember the date, I was involved in the investigation of Operation Vula, where a large number of classified documents had been leaked to the ANC from the Durban Security Branch.

By comparing reports found on computer discs with the actual reports, I was able to warn various divisions of the Security Branches of sources who had been compromised or who may be under suspicion by the organisation they had infiltrated.

Until my retirement in 1992, I was involved in counter-espionage under various Section Heads.

MR DU PLESSIS: When did you leave the Force?

MR RAVEN: I went on medical discharge in 1992.

MR DU PLESSIS: Where are you working now?

MR RAVEN: I am now in the retail business in Pretoria.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Raven, before we go on to the Ruth First incident. Can you just give the Committee an idea of what you had known of Ruth First at the time you were at the Intelligence Section, say between 1982 and 1984?

MR RAVEN: My knowledge of Ruth First - Joe Slovo of the ANC/SACP, I had obtained I think in 1979, where I had attended a Security course given by Colonel Neels du Plooy at the Police College in Pretoria.

This was a course that was attended by all Security members on their induction into the Security Branch, which gave us a background of the ANC/SACP alliance and their aims and ambitions as far as the overthrowing of the South African government, the National Party at the time, and also various indoctrinations into the PAC as well.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and your knowledge in respect of Marius Schoon and Jeannette Schoon?

MR RAVEN: The family Schoon, pertaining to Marius, only came to my attention on occasion where Craig Williamson sent myself and McPherson to do the surveillance in Botswana.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Now, Mr Williamson, you were in the Intelligence section, is that right?

MR RAVEN: No, my name is Mr Raven.

MR DU PLESSIS: Ag Mr Raven, I am sorry.

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Raven, you were in the Intelligence section, is that right?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, Mr Raven, who was your immediate Head in 1982 and 1984?

MR RAVEN: My immediate Head was Major Craig Williamson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And his immediate Head?

MR RAVEN: It would have been Brigadier Piet Goosen.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and can you give the Committee just a little bit of information of the other sections that formed part of Security Police Head Office in Pretoria?

MR RAVEN: Well, the Head Office was divided into numerous Desks, as Mr Chairman, we have heard before, being Churches, Students, ANC/SACP, Black Organisations, Black Consciousness Organisations, they would then maybe be subdivided as our case was where we had Intelligence and a sub-division of Intelligence was Counter-Espionage. So your other Sections would also have their little subdivisions as well with Heads against them.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, was there a Technical Section?

MR RAVEN: There was a Technical Section as well at Pretoria Headquarters.

MR DU PLESSIS: Was for instance Waal du Toit part of the Technical Section?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And what were they involved with?

MR RAVEN: The Technical Division, their job entailed technical assistance to various Branches on technical problems which could pertain to for instance surveillance or the planting of perhaps microphones or bugging devices.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now Mr Raven, there has been a lot of talk about the principle of need to know. Can you explain to the Committee your understanding of that principle and how you understood it in 1982 and 1984?

MR RAVEN: The need to know principle was a question of if you received an instruction, you were to know and believe that the minimum information was given to you to enable you to carry out that specific task.

It was not your place to question why only that was given to you. It was a question of one could call it blind faith, that whoever passed the information to you, had analysed the situation and decided right, this is all this person needs to know to carry out his task. If I may Mr Chairman, give you an example that I saw this morning in the newspaper which explains it beautifully, it is in the front page of the Pretoria News, on the unfortunate killing of a South African Defence Force member in Lesotho, where his mother says a second Medic, identified as Dr Johan Nel is said to have been killed with Sergeant Sax.

Now, the mother says the last I heard from my son was about a week ago, "he just said they were preparing for some stuff and he couldn't talk about it." That is basically what need to know is.

I mean one couldn't even tell your mother, listen I am going to Lesotho, there is an operation on the go, because she may mention to somebody else, we had a snowball effect and number one, you could place the operation in jeopardy, but it also need to know, gave you a certain cut out principle, where at a certain point, you could then claim that I knew nothing about it, and not be lying.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, Mr Raven, did the need to know principle apply before and after operations?

MR RAVEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: So, the general idea that we have of civil servants that they come in the morning into a room, drinking coffee together and chatting about all sorts of things, would you say that applied to your Unit, that you would come in the morning, sit and drink coffee and chat about operations, covert operations?

MR RAVEN: Never Mr Chairman, it just wasn't done.

MR DU PLESSIS: And would there have been loose talk in the passages and in offices and little "geskinder" here and there about operations?

MR RAVEN: There could have been speculations, but should that speculation have been true and you were given as you would say a nudge, nudge, wink, wink after an operation, it would be ignored completely.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Raven, in respect of the Intelligence section, would it have been expected of you to have in respect of instructions, to have asked questions about it or was it expected of you simply to follow the orders? Can you comment on it?

MR RAVEN: Because of the need to know principle which is always applied, being aware of certain command structures, that a command given or an order, would be carried out without questioning. Unless you felt that the question was needed to clear up something that was unclear in your mind, no questions would have been asked.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, did you trust your superior officers?

MR RAVEN: At all times, yes Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: And with specific reference to Mr Williamson and Brigadier Goosen?

MR RAVEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: And what was your expectation of them pertaining to orders given to you?

MR RAVEN: Could you just ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you expect them to have given you orders which fell within the scope of authority, or did you expect them to give you orders also outside the scope of authority and orders which had nothing to do with Security Force actions?

MR RAVEN: At all times I expected that the orders that were given to me, were within the line, function, the parameters of an operation.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you have knowledge of cross-border operations of the Security Forces at that time?

MR RAVEN: Only what I heard in the newspapers Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: What was your perception about the government's attitude towards cross-border operations?

MR RAVEN: Well, in hindsight at that time, could be that after our operation in London, there was again the government's indication to the ANC/SACP alliance that this was done in either retaliation to an attack within the Republic, it could have been to pre-empt an attack that was being planned that was picked up via Intelligence or it could be simply to intimidate them, to show them no matter how far they are away, it is possible to reach them.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and what influence did the London bomb operation have on your perception on cross-border operations and the view of the South African government pertaining thereto?

MR RAVEN: I would say that any cross-border operation would have been sanctioned at the highest level. It would have been carefully planned to let's say meet a certain specific, what can we call it, let's put it this way, the target that they have targeted would give the necessary results as to what their aim of the target was.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and was your perception at the time around the operation of the London bomb and thereafter, that the same principles applied inside the country as outside?

MR RAVEN: I would.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, did you in respect of the London bomb, the Ruth First or the Jeannette Schoon incident, either have any doubts about the authority that you had or the support that you had from the Security Police and the South African government pertaining to these operations?

MR RAVEN: At no time, at all Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Raven, you saw the video's that were shown by Mr Williamson's legal representatives. In your mind, at the time, 1982 to 1984, does what was depicted in the video's accord with your perception of the situation in South Africa at that time?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, Mr Raven ...

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going on to something else?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I want to start with the Ruth First incident perhaps.

CHAIRPERSON: Would this be a convenient stage to take the tea adjournment?

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

ROGER HOWARD LESLEY RAVEN: (still under oath)

EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: (cont)

Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Raven, I want to deal now with the two letter bomb incidents namely the First and Schoon incidents.

Because of the similarity of the incidents, we will deal with the Ruth First incident first and then just very shortly, deal with the Schoon incident.

Now, before we start with that, can I just ask you about your memory pertaining to these two incidents. Can you explain to the Committee?

MR RAVEN: Mr Chairman, in my application I erroneously put down that the request for the two IED's had come simultaneously, that Major Williamson had asked me to make IED's, identical, at the same time.

The reason therefore is because of the similarity of the incidents, similarity of the instructions given, combined with the timespan between the items and the date I made this application. It was in my mind as one incident.

It was only on receiving Major Williamson's bundle that it became apparent that it was in fact two different timespans, at least two years apart. As I say because of the similarity, it was in my mind as one timespan, one incident.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, now Mr Raven, when did you read Mr Williamson's application for the first time?

MR RAVEN: Shortly before the commencement of this sitting.

MR DU PLESSIS: And did that jog your memory?

MR RAVEN: It did.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, Mr Raven, is that the reason why on page 44 you refer to two explosive devices and it seems that the version that you set out there, relates to two explosive devices dealt with at the same time?

MR RAVEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And that also relates to what you have stated on page 32, the second paragraph, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now Mr Raven, can we start with the Ruth First incident and can you explain to the Committee when did you first speak to Mr Williamson about this operation? When, how and where?

MR RAVEN: Mr Chairman, in the course of 1982 after the London bomb, on a date I cannot remember, I was summoned to Major Williamson's office. He had on his desk a large official envelope and he stated that Brigadier Goosen had requested that I endeavour or to see if it is possible, to replace the contents of an intercepted postal piece with an IED.

I opened ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you just stop there? When Mr Williamson asked you that, did you find it strange or out of the ordinary?

MR RAVEN: Not at all Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. What was your, what went through your mind when he said that to you, when he asked that?

MR RAVEN: Well, what went through my mind is that a postal item had been intercepted, the addressee would apparently be a high ranking ANC/SACP, whoever, target, and the powers that be, had decided that my sending them an IED or letter bomb, would be the only feasible way to either injure or destroy or intimidate them.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you give any thought to the possibility or to a possibility that this might have had no relation to the political struggle between the National Party and the liberation movement?

MR RAVEN: No, not for a moment.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Did you have faith in Mr Williamson in respect of the order that he gave you?

MR RAVEN: I did.

MR DU PLESSIS: What was your view, what was your perception and your view pertaining to the authorisation of such an operation? Was it your view that it would have been authorised from higher up or that Major Williamson did it on his own, or what was your view in that regard?

MR RAVEN: Well, Mr Williamson's words were Brigadier Goosen had asked. Now bearing in mind that this happened shortly after the London bomb, so I automatically perceived, or I had the perception that the order had come down via a chain of commands, not necessarily originating from Brigadier Goosen, but at least he was somewhere in the line of command.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Did Mr Williamson at all say to you where the IED had to go to?

MR RAVEN: No, at no time.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did he give any indication to you if the IED had to go to some place inside or outside the country?

MR RAVEN: At no time was it intimated to me the origin of the envelope or where it was going to, or whom it was going to.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. What was your view pertaining to the end result of this operation, after he had asked you if you could manufacture an IED, what did you think what could the result have been?

MR RAVEN: Well, I believed in the powers that be, that a legitimate target had been identified. This target was a high ranking official of either the ANC/SACP alliance and that whoever should open the packet, would at the worst be seriously injured but most likely, be killed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you accept that?

MR RAVEN: I accepted that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now what exactly did Mr Williamson show you?

MR RAVEN: Mr Williamson showed me a large official envelope, inside which was it looked like an intercepted postal item with loose documents laying in the envelope.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now just to avoid confusion Mr Raven, we have brought along examples of envelopes to make it much easier for you to give the explanation of how this worked.

Can you just show the Committee and we will deal with that again later, the large envelope, approximately how did it look like?

MR RAVEN: The large envelope was approximately this size, the one I am holding. It doesn't unfortunately give the measurements, but I would say it is about an A3 size paper.

CHAIRPERSON: That means nothing to me, I don't know if it does to everyone else here. Perhaps if someone could estimate the size of the envelope as indicated.

MR RAVEN: I would say just over 30 cm wide and 50 cm deep.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I didn't think that that should be an exhibit.

CHAIRPERSON: No, just get the measurements.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, now Mr Raven, and what exactly was inside this envelope?

MR RAVEN: Bearing in mind the envelope that was used, was an official government envelope, the same colour, the buff form, but with your official and "amptelike" printing on it, it didn't have the bubble pack as this specific envelope has got. Inside it was a second envelope of an A4 size. It is called an A4 size, because it is used for documentation up to an A4 size, which would be a folio.

Inside that, larger that what I have here, were loose documents in the envelope, in the large envelope. So we have had here, as I heard in the previous testimony, there was a bit of confusion, but it was a large envelope, with an envelope inside with loose documentation with that envelope.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now you testified that Mr Williamson gave you the large official envelope.

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: What did you do with that?

MR RAVEN: I in his presence, I opened the large official envelope, I removed to a certain degree the inside postal document which had been lifted out of the post.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, can we just for conformity for the record sake, can we speak about the official envelope as the large envelope, can we speak about the intercepted mail item as the intercepted mail item, that is the other envelope.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, do we need to be as intercepted mail item?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, all right the mail envelope.

CHAIRPERSON: The intercepted envelope.

MR DU PLESSIS: The intercepted envelope, thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Raven, can you just show to the Committee how did you lift the intercepted envelope out of the official envelope?

MR RAVEN: Mr Chairman, I used in between the knuckles of my index and middle finger, took the flap and lifted it slightly out of the larger envelope. The reason for that is, I didn't want my fingerprints on the intercepted envelope.

I saw the size of the envelope, I saw the documents inside, so I could estimate the thickness of the envelope and I could then do my further planning from there.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you at all take anything further out of the official envelope there in Mr Williamson's office?

MR RAVEN: No, I did not.

MR DU PLESSIS: And in respect of, could you see the address on the intercepted envelope?

MR RAVEN: No, as far as I can remember, in some or other way that address had been covered.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and you already testified that Mr Williamson didn't tell you who it was intended for?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And at that point in time, did you have any interest or did you want to know who it was intended for?

MR RAVEN: No, as I explained, in the need to know basis, to be able to say with great honesty I don't know who made that parcel, I don't know who it went to, I did not enquire, I did not try and find out, I simply followed my command.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and what did you do with the official envelope and the intercepted envelope and the loose documents inside the official document, what did you do with that then?

MR RAVEN: I took the mentioned envelopes to my office and locked them away in the filing cabinet.

MR DU PLESSIS: Why did you do that?

MR RAVEN: Well, it is obvious that if I wasn't to know who the documents were for, and I wasn't going to be told, it would be silly leaving them laying around on the table for anybody to walk into the office and start scratching around, leaving it firstly with fingerprints and secondly knowing that I am in possession of an envelope addressed to X, Y, Z.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. What did you do in respect of the manufacturing of the bomb, can you explain that to the Committee? Just explain how you did it and then I want you to indicate graphically to the Committee on the paper there in front, exactly what you did?

MR RAVEN: Right, first of all was the sitting and thinking of how to manufacture an IED that met the requirements that were laid down to me, how to do it in the safest way for both myself and should it be sent through the postal services again, for the postal services or anybody else.

That if possible, because when working with explosives, there is no absolute, as far as possible, there would be no danger to anybody except the addressee. I decided to use a electronic circuit and with sheet explosives as opposed to plastic explosive for the reasons which I have mentioned earlier.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and where did you obtain that?

MR RAVEN: Obtained the?

MR DU PLESSIS: Obtained the explosives?

MR RAVEN: The explosives I obtained from my magazine in the Police College. We have a number of magazines in the Police College in which ammunition, explosives are kept in safekeeping which had been lifted from arms caches as also in this case, the sheet explosives which had been obtained, as I said I can't remember from whom, for training of bomb disposal experts.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, how did you get access to the magazine?

MR RAVEN: I approached my Commander, my ex-Commander at that time, I think, I can't remember if I had been seconded to Intelligence full time at that time, I approached Colonel Van Eeden and asked him for the keys of the magazine. He obviously had taken cognisance of the London bomb and on the need to know basis, he didn't ask questions, he handed me the keys.

I went to the magazine, removed the sheet explosives and detonator, returned the keys to him, and I locked the explosives away in my filing cabinet.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, carry on.

MR RAVEN: I then finalised the circuitry of the device that I was going to make. I obtained the necessary printed circuits, wire, soldering irons, solder and then took that with a separate envelope and a sheaf of papers, and a standing knife up to our lecture hall in the South African Police College which had attached to it at the back, a small work area.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and where did you manufacture the bomb?

MR RAVEN: The bomb was manufactured in this small work room at the Police College in Pretoria West.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Raven, I think it would be best if you explained the technical part of that at the end of the explanation of the whole incident, so let's leave that for last.

After you had manufactured the bomb there, what did you do with the bomb?

MR RAVEN: The prerequisite for the device was that it was to be able to fit into the A4 intercepted postal piece, so what I did, I took identical size envelope, I steamed it open on the other two sides and laid it flat. The idea of that, if one looks at an A4 envelope and one takes an A4 piece of paper, one can see that there is a large border around the envelope which is in actual fact, wasted space.

In order to have this to fit into the intercepted piece, it was steamed open, the device was manufactured, it was primed and in the reconstruction of the envelope, it was made smaller so that the documentation inside the device envelope, could not move around.

It was then restructured and taken back to my office at Pretoria Headquarters.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, Mr Raven, I have changed my mind, I think we should look at the technical parts also now at this stage, so that we have the same evidence at the same time.

CHAIRPERSON: It was another A4 envelope that you steamed open, just to get the size comparison?

MR RAVEN: Yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And then worked on that one, and once you had completed the device, you put it into the intercepted one?

MR RAVEN: That is correct, that is where the third envelope comes into the story.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Raven, the steamed open envelope, was the bomb placed in the steamed open envelope and then closed or was that enveloped closed up to a smaller size than the intercepted item?

MR RAVEN: Yes, as I indicated that the device was placed into the steamed open A4, it was then resealed. Can we just show perhaps that it was restructured along the lines of how I am showing here, where the A4 piece of paper which would depict the device, couldn't move up or down, left or right because that would then defeat the purpose of any safety precautions built into the device.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Raven, and the end result of that, before you took it back to your office, how did it look like, can you just explain that to the Committee?

MR RAVEN: How the IED looked?

MR DU PLESSIS: How did the IED look?

MR RAVEN: Well, the IED looked like an A4 envelope which was slightly smaller and thicker with the documentation inside it, which was in actual fact IED.

MR DU PLESSIS: Was that the envelope that was steamed open at the beginning and then closed after the IED was put into it?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now can you perhaps just go forward in front there and explain to the Committee exactly how the bomb was manufactured?

Mr Chairman, may I hand out a sketch which Mr Raven drew last night, a very rough sketch which will be of assistance to you. May I suggest that that be Annexure LL.

CHAIRPERSON: Annexure LL.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Raven, just put that on please. Mr Chairman, I may just mention in respect of Exhibit LL, it actually relates to two aspects.

What is right on top, how can I explain that, there where the letters PP, you see the letters PP and the circle ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Du Plessis, really if you prepare something as an Exhibit, can't it be in a more proper shape?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman ...

ADV DE JAGER: I know you drew it at consultation last night, but can't we take a bit more time and draw a proper one?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, he is going to explain it now on the board, so that you can understand it with relation to this. If you are not satisfied with that and I must tell you that that is how Mr Raven drew it last night during consultation, and I thought it proper to use especially that drawing Mr Chairman, I will provide you with a clearer and a better drawing.

Mr Chairman, I was trying to explain that where the letters PP are and the round circle, that pertains to an explanation about the position of the London bomb and for purposes of this, you should ignore that.

We would only deal with the two sketches at the bottom of Exhibit LL. Alright, Mr Raven, can you explain how the bomb was manufactured please?

MR RAVEN: Mr Chairman, first of all if we come to the switch. The switch was made from a PC board. PC board is used in the manufacture of a printed circuit or radio's or radio equipment.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Raven, I think you should just talk in the direction of the microphone.

MR RAVEN: Right, a PC board is a non electrical, it is an isolation board, it doesn't carry electric current and what I did, I first cut out a T-piece which I will indicate and on the edge of the T-piece, I soldered a piece of copper wire.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Raven, would you just give Mr Bizos a chance every time, just to have a look.

MR BIZOS: Not only me.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Bizos and his team Mr Raven.

MR RAVEN: The second part of the switch was two squares of the PC board and I will do it in two drawings, one on the front elevation and one from the side elevation. The two PC boards which are interconnected with wire, leading off.

Bearing in mind that the PC board is in the vicinity of 1,5 to 2 mm thick, we are looking at a total here of approximately 6 mm of thickness that we are using. This section, the two flat sections then - okay, let's rather take it this way.

Are we happy to here Mr Chairman, can I turn the page?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, turn the page.

MR RAVEN: First of all a piece of cardboard was taken as you would find at the back of a (indistinct) pad of folio paper. On that was placed between 30 and 40 pages of A4 size paper, which had been clued approximately 2,5 cm around the edge.

The reason for that is that should anybody look into there, it would still be a loose piece of, or a loose document shall we say. That section was then, the centre was cut out and the sheet explosives was placed in the hollow that was left in this piece of these papers. The T-piece switch was then affixed to the envelope itself and on this section here, the paper hadn't been clued, so that T-piece was then inserted in the centre of the pack of papers, so it was now protruding onto the inside.

A cut out was made in the sheet explosive for a battery and for a detonator. The rectangular piece with the two contact points were placed across there, of course this is slightly out of proportion, with your wires running to a negative, positive, negative.

So here we had electric circuit which was broken by the T-piece being in between the two centre poles as indicated on the first drawing. There are T-pieces now laying in that position there. The connections were made and another piece of loose cardboard as I first described, was placed over the top of the complete article and it was then put into the envelope. As I said that part was affixed to the envelope and it was then re-closed and built up to make a smaller particle, so that this couldn't move, because if it moved that way, sideways, it would then pull the T-piece out of the switch.

If it was too long top and bottom, you could have movement of the object inside which would then close the circuit and cause it to explode. That is basically how the IED was constructed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, thank you Mr Raven. Could you just switch on.

CHAIRPERSON: Am I right in saying that then you have affixed it, now if somebody tries to remove that bundle, they will then set the device off?

MR RAVEN: That is correct Mr Chairman, whether it is opened at the top or the bottom, unfortunately we are all animals of habit. If you get an envelope you will either open it where it is stuck down or perhaps the other side. Very, very seldom along the length, because that would have defeated, if it had been opened like that, then of course it wouldn't have gone off.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, thank you Mr Raven, and after you had placed the bomb inside the blanket envelope and after you had closed it up and had glued it together, what did you do with that item?

MR RAVEN: I took it back to my office at Pretoria Headquarters, took the large official envelope with the intercepted envelope out of my filing cabinet, partially removed ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Just go slowly Mr Raven please.

MR RAVEN: Partially removed the intercepted envelope and inserted the IED therein.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you just show that to the Committee members again after they had finished writing?

MR RAVEN: Partially removed the intercepted mail piece, taken the IED, inserted it into the intercepted postal piece and returned it to Mr Craig Williamson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now did you - how did you take it to Mr Williamson, did you take it to him personally?

MR RAVEN: I took it to him personally.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you say something to him?

MR RAVEN: I said that the request that had come via him from Brigadier Goosen had been carried out.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and was the intercepted envelope, was that closed, was it glued closed or was it still open?

MR RAVEN: No, I left it open.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and did Mr Williamson say anything to you about it when you gave it back to him?

MR RAVEN: No, he just said thanks Jerry and he took it up to the Brigadier I believe, well, he left the office.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now Mr Raven, in respect of the Jeannette Schoon incident, can you explain to the Committee the similarities between the two incidents?

MR RAVEN: When the request came some two years later, it flashed through my mind that the device that was built for, which I later found out was for Ruth First, was almost as if it was a rehearsal for the second request because all the components were the same, it was a request from Craig via Brigadier Goosen, or from Brigadier Goosen via Craig, the same official envelope type thing, the same intercepted mail piece inside, the same type of documentation and it was a question of without sounding callous, you know, here we go again.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did everything happen in the same way?

MR RAVEN: In an identical way.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, now Mr Raven, after the death of Ruth First, were you congratulated by Mr Williamson?

MR RAVEN: I was.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you remember how?

MR RAVEN: Not specifically. It could be along the lines of "nice go Jerry, it worked".

MR DU PLESSIS: And did you ever see the damage caused by the bomb?

MR RAVEN: The first time I saw damage caused by the bomb which I could (indistinct) as damage caused by the bomb, was when Gillian Slovo came and interviewed me at my shop.

MR DU PLESSIS: What was your reaction?

MR RAVEN: In so far as?

MR DU PLESSIS: In so far as the possibility that the bomb that you manufactured, causing the damage that was shown on the photographs that were shown to you?

MR RAVEN: It was consistent with a device approximately of the size which I constructed. As far as I can remember, there was no visual structural damage to the building itself.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, Mr Raven, can you remember if Mr Williamson ever discussed the damage with you?

MR RAVEN: I can't remember that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Now Mr Raven, in respect of the Schoon incident, that is volume 2 Mr Chairman, may I refer you to page 109 were you congratulated by Mr Williamson on the Schoon incident as well?

MR RAVEN: I believe I was.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you remember how?

MR RAVEN: In my mind the perception was that he had said that the Schoon's regularly used the child or can I rephrase that, regularly on receiving suspicious parcels or letters, would throw them out into the back yard and leave them there for a few hours until they deemed it fit to be picked up.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, that is what you say on page 109. Now, can you remember if Mr Williamson said that to you, are you sure about that?

MR RAVEN: I am not sure.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Raven, in my cross-examination on Mr Williamson I referred him to a piece written in a newspaper that stated that the Schoon's threw their mail into the back garden. Did you see that article?

MR RAVEN: I saw that article.

MR DU PLESSIS: And what is your reaction to that?

MR RAVEN: It could be that that stuck in my mind, what was said to the newspaper as of originating from Mr Williamson.

MR DU PLESSIS: But are you sure?

MR RAVEN: No, I am not sure.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, you also say on page 109 in the middle of that paragraph, on questioning Williamson about the Schoon incident, he said that the letter had been intended for Marius Schoon, but that it served them right. Can you comment on that?

MR RAVEN: No, I can't.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you remember that he said that?

MR RAVEN: No, I can't.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, Mr Raven, is there anything else in respect of the Schoon incident that you want to tell the Committee that differs from the Ruth First incident?

MR RAVEN: Not that I can think of Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Raven, can we turn to the London bomb incident. Mr Chairman, you will find that in volume 3 on page, it starts on page 137 where the background is exactly as what we have already dealt with.

Then I want to refer you to page 154 where you deal with the nature and particulars of this incident. Can you start on page 154?

MR RAVEN: Where must I begin?

MR DU PLESSIS: Page 154, paragraph 4, nature and particulars.

MR RAVEN: In the beginning of 1982 I was seconded by the Directorate of Explosives to the Intelligence Unit of the Security Branch. The sole purpose being to conduct a feasibility study on the viability of an operation which could entail the detonation of an explosive device at the London office of the ANC/SACP.

The aim of the exercise was retaliation for the attack on Voortrekkerhoogte and number two, to show the ANC/SACP that the SA government had the ability to strike back irrespective of where they were.

I requested photographs, sketches, diagrams and routines on the two targets. While waiting for Williamson's sources in London to obtain the necessary information, the size of the team was discussed and it was decided that four other members would be sufficient.

Captains Jimmy Taylor and Vic McPherson were decided upon as drivers to extract the team from the target area and Captains Eugene de Kock and John Adam to run interference at the target, should we be disturbed. The photographs and Intelligence reports were duly received and I studied them.

I told Williamson that the information on the SACP ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you just stop there for a moment. You say that photographs and Intelligence reports were duly received and you studied them. Where did you receive them, in South Africa?

MR RAVEN: In South Africa, in the office of Craig Williamson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you go on.

MR RAVEN: I told Williamson that the information on the SACP office in Goodge, was insufficient and that I would have to study the target personally before a decision could be made.

I told him that from the photographs, it did not appear to be viable as there was a paint shop next to the front door, and this could create a fire hazard to the surrounding buildings. There did not appear to be any problems with the ANC office in Penton Street as there was a vacant lot behind the offices.

Intelligence indicated that only one person slept on the premises in a room, on the top floor, facing the street. The offices were unoccupied on Sundays. At the rear of the building was a single storey room, projecting from the main office block.

Intelligence reports indicated that this room housed the printing press. It also had a 500 mm retaining wall around it, being lower than the adjacent stand. I indicated that a kilogram of plastic explosives placed on the ground, against the building, and detonated towards the building, and the retaining wall, would concentrate the energy of the explosives towards the building.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can we just pause there for a moment. Could you have a look at Exhibit BB. That is the plan of Mr McPherson Mr Chairman.

MR RAVEN: Yes, I have it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and you have also had a look at the photograph that was handed in, Mr Chairman, the one that I have, doesn't have an Exhibit number, can somebody just assist me? DD?

Right now, Mr Raven you will see that the building of the ANC's offices is depicted there as if it runs from the one road to the other road, from White Lion Street to Pentonville Road.

MR RAVEN: I see that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is that entirely correct?

MR RAVEN: No, it is not.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, can you explain how you remember that?

MR RAVEN: If I can remember correctly, I think there was a question of five shops in Penton Street, one of them being a photographic shop because I still bought a second hand camera lens from that shop, while I was doing surveillance in the area.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, just on a point of order, I want to thank Mr Bizos for not saying that Mr Williamson and my client are in a conspiracy together, because I refer to Mr Williamson the whole time.

MR BIZOS: I haven't said anything yet Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am just joking Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Let's get on with the serious business.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now, Mr Raven, the back part of that building, can you explain to the Committee the parking area there?

MR RAVEN: It was rectangle, I remember there was rubble and when I went in there one time to have a closer examination of the rear of the building on the excuse of relieving myself against the wall, there were a number of taxi's parked there.

It was a corrugated iron fence with an open gate in it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now where it is depicted wall, where it says wall, how high was that wall?

MR RAVEN: Is that the wall to the north of where the ANC offices is?

MR DU PLESSIS: Correct yes?

MR RAVEN: If I remember correctly, it was a wall of approximately two storeys high.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, the place where the printing press is depicted there, is that in the right position?

MR RAVEN: No. I remember the printing press as being further to the eastern side, slightly in because there was a slight indentation in the 500 mm retaining wall around that area.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, we will get to the 500 mm retaining wall. Are you saying that the printing press should be more to the eastern side?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, you mentioned ...

CHAIRPERSON: Would you like him to look at Mr Visser's second chance?

MR DU PLESSIS: Please Mr Chairman.

MR RAVEN: I am looking at Mr Visser's version. I agree to the positioning of the printing press, but it was the same dimension as the one from Mr McPherson, but as I say, more to the east. It wasn't a long, narrow room.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, but is the positioning to the east, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: That is more correct yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. We are getting closer and the 500 mm retaining wall around it, can you just explain that? What was that?

MR RAVEN: Well, your parking area was on a higher level than the foundation of the building adjacent to it, so we had a drop of 500 mm, half a metre, and it was approximately I would say a metre from the back wall of the printing press and built up with bricks.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that what you have depicted on the first drawing on LL?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that was my next question Mr Chairman. Is that what you have depicted in the top drawing on Exhibit LL?

MR RAVEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and the little circle on LL, what does that mean?

MR RAVEN: Can I see it again please? That is the side view of where the device or the bomb was placed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is it correct, was the bomb placed in the, below the level of the parking area?

MR RAVEN: That is correct. As I said in my previous evidence, that is why when I got the extra information and Intelligence from Mr Williamson's sources, I saw that we didn't need a large explosive device because the back wall would retain the power of the charge and we would be able to project it towards the building.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, Mr Raven, and what was your information pertaining to the person who slept on the premises?

MR RAVEN: As I understood, he was a night watchman or a night watchperson who lived on the top floor in the front of the building.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, because it was stated here during cross-examination during some stage that it may have been, or that it was a refugee living there?

MR RAVEN: I have no knowledge of that Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, Mr Raven, the situation around in that area, did you have any knowledge of a school in that area?

MR RAVEN: I can't remember seeing a school there Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, but you won't dispute it if other witnesses say that there was a school close by the parking area?

MR RAVEN: It was quite possible.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And the kinds of buildings in the surrounding areas in the other streets, in White Lion Street and Pentonville Street?

MR RAVEN: As far as my recollection goes, there was a supermarket going in a northerly direction in White Lion Street, but I can't remember any residential buildings in the immediate vicinity.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and did you do surveillance on the preceding Sunday before the Sunday when the bomb exploded?

MR RAVEN: I believe I did.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you remember what the situation was at 9 o'clock in the morning, when you did the surveillance in that area?

MR RAVEN: I think it was very quiet in the area, if I remember correctly.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, while you are on the subject of the school. As I understand it, the school was to the back of the parking area, to the north that is.

MR RAVEN: As far as I can remember Mr Chairman, the north of that parking area was where the shopping centre was.

CHAIRPERSON: No, directly in the same, there is a wall there, is that the wall you said was about two storeys high?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: On the other side of that wall I believe, you don't know if it was there?

MR RAVEN: No, I don't.

CHAIRPERSON: It was a very high solid wall, was there along the back?

MR RAVEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright Mr Raven, page 156, the second paragraph, can you carry on please.

MR RAVEN: I can't remember how many days passed until Williamson called me into his office and told me that the operation had been approved and that I should commence with the preparations.

I went to Waal du Toit, member in charge of our Technical Division and requested two airtight metal containers, equipped with a false front plate to resemble a piece of electrical equipment.

I then filled in an application for an RSA passport in the name of Jeremy Rowan and gave it to Captain Andre Beukes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you just stop there. You say it resembled a piece of electric equipment. There was evidence here that it resembled a radio, can you comment on that?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you carry on?

MR RAVEN: I then manufactured a false international driver's licence and inoculation certificate. Upon receipt of the documents, I was sent to a person, I can't remember his name at Volkskas Bank and I was issued with Traveller's cheques in the amount of five thousand American dollars.

I was also give a climatic clothing allowance as I would be travelling from a summer to a winter climate. I was given a letter of introduction from an arms dealer. I can't remember the name, to the Walthor arms factory in Germany.

This was my cover for the operation. I was on a business trip to Germany, but was stopping over in London en route to Germany. Williamson gave me an ABC of London map book and a few tourist brochures.

We went through the brochures to find hotels in the vicinity of the two targets. We chose three or four and gave them code names. The plan was that on my arrival in London, I would find out which of the chosen hotels had accommodation and then telephone him in the RSA and say that I was staying with Aunty Rose, which would indicate that I was staying at the Russel Hotel on Russel Square.

I then went to Waal du Toit and inspected the containers that he had manufactured. I found them to be satisfactory. I then collected 4 x 250 g of plastic explosives of communist origin together with appropriate detonators.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you just pause there for a moment. There was in previous evidence, reference made to four and a half kilograms of explosives and there is also reference in a newspaper article to that. Can you comment on that?

MR RAVEN: No, I can't, all I know is I put it 4 x 250 g blocks of plastic explosives.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you carry on please.

MR RAVEN: Explosives were part of an ANC arms cache found during investigations. To my knowledge, at the time of loading the containers, it was the only time that Du Toit was aware of the purpose of the containers.

I asked him what tools would be needed to open the containers and he suggested a pair of metal shears, available at any hardware store. I delivered the containers to Craig Williamson, who said that he would see that they got to London safely.

I requested to be sent out ahead of the team so that I could acquaint myself with different transport systems, reconnoitre the target in person and find a safe place should I be unable to leave England after the devices had been planted.

The team members were then called together and we discussed the operation in general terms. Williamson made it clear that although I was the most junior ranked member of the team, I was in charge and that the operation would only be completed if I was satisfied that it would succeed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you just pause there. There was also evidence about a meeting at Daisy Farm some time, in South Africa, some time before the operation. Did you attend that meeting?

MR RAVEN: No, I believe I already left for the United Kingdom.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you carry on.

MR RAVEN: I was given an open return ticket on SAA to London and the telephone number of Peter Castleton who was an agent of Williamson, in the UK.

I was taken to Jan Smuts airport and dropped off at international departures. From here on I was on my own. I don't remember dates or times, but I am sure that Williamson will have them diarised.

Upon my arrival at Heathrow Airport, I went to the tourist counter and managed to obtain accommodation at the Russel Hotel. I took a taxi to the hotel and booked in. I contacted Williamson from a card telephone at a subway station and told him where I was staying and my room number.

The first few days I spent travelling on the underground and busses, getting the feel of the city. I walked for miles using passive counter-surveillance to make sure that I was not under surveillance. I avoided all the tourist attractions and kept to myself.

At night I stayed in my hotel room and watched television. I was afraid of going out at night and getting mugged, which would jeopardise the operation.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you just stop there. Mr McPherson testified that when he was there in London before the operation, he went to look up certain addresses of well known ANC members such as Mr Joe Slovo and Mr Ronnie Kasrils. Did you do anything of that nature?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't, it wasn't part of my brief.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you go on.

MR RAVEN: I then started reconnoitring the targets. I immediately eliminated the Goodge offices of the SACP as a target as, as the photograph had shown, there was a paint shop next to the front door and there was no access to the office from the rear.

I then went to the ANC office in Penton Street. Here the photographs and Intelligence reports verified that the operation was possible. I entered the vacant lot behind the office on the pretext of relieving myself and saw that everything was as it had been reported.

I contacted Williamson and confirmed that all was okay. He gave me a date and time and said that I should be on the ferry boat that leaves from Tower Bridge to Greenwich. Williamson contacted me on the ferry and I brought him up to date on my observations.

He informed me that the rest of the team had arrived in London and suggested that we meet at the Dirty Dicks Pub opposite Waterloo station. He also said that he would contact me at my hotel and give me a date and time which I should go to the foyer of the Tower Hotel.

He would make sure that I was not followed, he would then show himself and I was to follow him. The team met at Dirty Dicks and we had a few beers and chatted in general. It transpired that Eugene de Kock and John Adam had booked into a hotel around the corner from mine. I think it was the President Hotel.

Jimmy Taylor and Vic McPherson had rented a furnished flat and a car and had spent their time getting used to the London traffic as well as the fastest route from the target to the various hideaways.

On the day and at the time, I was at the foyer of the Tower Hotel. I saw Williamson walk out of the hotel, and followed at a distance. We walked around the yacht basin to the Dickens Pub. He approached me in the company of Peter Castleton.

A date and time was decided and Castleton would pick me up at the Hotel and take me to where the explosives were being kept. A further meeting was arranged and Williamson gave me an address in London where I was to be.

The address transpired to be the flat where Jimmy Taylor and Vic McPherson were staying. The late Brigadier Piet Goosen was also at the meeting.

Here the finer details of the operation was discussed. It was decided that the device should be placed on a Saturday night, the 14/15th of March around midnight, as there was to be a Sharpeville rally on the following Sunday and no one would be at the office.

Surveillance had also shown that the gates leading to the lot, were now locked, but we decided to proceed with the operation and then take the first flight out of London to Frankfurt or Amsterdam and from there make our way back to the RSA.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you just stop there. Something that was raised during cross-examination previously was the fact that it was alleged that certain youths would have gone to the offices on that Sunday morning to collect some banners and other items. Did you have any knowledge of that?

MR RAVEN: I did not.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you go on.

MR RAVEN: The next day I booked a seat to Frankfurt and then went to various shops and bought a soldering iron and solder, metal shears, radio wire, batteries and two timex (indistinct) watches.

I also purchased dark clothing, running shoes, a balaclava and a bag. On the designated date and time, Castleton picked me up at my hotel and took me to a double storey house in one of the suburbs of London. I had no idea where it was.

A male person opened the door for us, let us in and then left. Castleton took me upstairs, left me in a room and returned with the two metal containers which Waal du Toit had made for me.

I opened the two containers and removed the explosives. I took the watches and removed the face glasses. I then removed the minute hand, drilled a small hole in the glass opposite the 12 o'clock position and removed the hour hand and scraped it clean to ensure a good contact point.

I then constructed the explosive device and checked the circuit with a torch bulb. I made a parallel circuit with the other watch, in case there was a failure on the one circuit. I placed the device in the bag. I summonsed Castleton, gave him this bag, made arrangements to come out to the farm where he was staying while he was constructing his and Williamson's yacht, the day prior to the operation.

He took me back to my Hotel, ensuring me that he would dispose of the tools and empty containers. On the prearranged day, I took the train to the station nearest to where Castleton stayed. I can't remember its name.

I phoned Castleton from the station and he came to pick me up. He showed me the yacht that he was busy constructing and took me for supper at a Thai restaurant.

We then returned to the farm where he was staying in a flat on the farm premises. I never met the owner of the farm. Later that evening Castleton left the flat, and returned with a black refuse bag covered with soil. I presumed that he had buried the device in the woods area behind his flat.

I changed into my dark clothing, placed the bag on the back seat and we proceeded to London. Castleton decided to take the back road to lessen the chance of running into a police roadblock.

As luck would have it, that is precisely what happened. At the roadblock a female police constable approached the car and asked Castleton the registration number of the car. Fortunately he knew it, which seemed to satisfy the police officer who waved us on.

Fortunately the car had an automatic transmission, or Castleton said he would have stalled the engine, such was his relief. What, with me dressed in black and a bomb on the back seat.

We met up with the rest of the team and proceeded to the target. John Adam walked ahead with Vic McPherson behind him and Eugene de Kock walked with me. Jimmy Taylor brought up the rear and the car.

When John Adam, standing on the corner, gave the all clear sign, De Kock and I approached and scaled the gates. By the light of a cigarette lighter, I wound up the watches, set the timing and connected the batteries.

I placed the bag in a black refuse bag and placed it against the wall. We found an old broken chair laying there, and placed it over the bag just to disguise it further.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, can you just pause there Mr Raven. Can you just explain to the Committee, how the bomb was placed and where the impact would have gone to?

MR RAVEN: The bomb was placed as indicated on Exhibit LL at the base of the wall, in the centre of the printing press annexed to the ANC office and this old broken arm chair was placed over it, further disguising it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and what was the intention, in what direction would the impact of the bomb had gone to?

MR RAVEN: With the detonators placed to the north of the device, it would have then concentrated the detonation waves in a southern direction, into the building.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and what is your view pertaining to with that in mind, pertaining to the possibility of people getting injured in the street possibly, or in the parking lot or to the north of the building?

MR RAVEN: Well, our prime instruction had been to see that no one was injured, especially not United Kingdom citizens. That is why such a small device was placed and why it was placed where it was placed, so as to minimise the loss or damage or injury to innocent people in the surrounding area which transpired, worked.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and what was your view pertaining to the night watch?

MR RAVEN: Well, being on the top floor in the front of the building, he was the furthest that he could get away from the device in the building, and I saw no danger to him.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, can you please go ahead?

MR RAVEN: Making sure that all was clear, we climbed back over the gate and strolled to the meeting point. In the car I removed all my clothes and changed back into normal clothes, placing the clothes in a black refuse bag.

We then drove back to the centre of London where we met Castleton.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you just pause there for a moment? What time of night approximately did you place the bomb there?

MR RAVEN: I can't remember exactly, it must have been in the vicinity of 12, 1 o'clock.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you have any, can you remember at what time the bomb was supposed to go off?

MR RAVEN: If I remember correctly, it was in the vicinity of 8 and 9 o'clock. It was difficult to judge the time because not having a minute hand, only the hour hand, one can only approximate, but I seem to recollect that that time span was selected because the instruction was the whole team had to be out of the United Kingdom when the explosive device detonated.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you go ahead please?

MR RAVEN: I gave him the bag of clothing with the instructions to dispose of them. We then all returned to our places of abode. The next morning I caught my flight to Frankfurt. On the same plane I saw Eugene de Kock and John Adam, but we did not greet them.

On arrival at Frankfurt, I saw the rest of the team. We all managed to get on the same flight to the RSA. Upon our return, we were summonsed to the office of Gen Johan Coetzee, Head of Security Branch. His greetings were, "ja Raven, jy het al weer 'n vrot eier gelê."

MR DU PLESSIS: Now, can you just pause there. Firstly there was evidence that, and I believe Eugene de Kock will also give evidence about that, that Joe Slovo was seen at Frankfurt airport, do you know anything about that?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't see him at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Was this operation the first operation of its kind that you were involved in?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you have any idea why Gen Coetzee used the word "alweer"?

MR RAVEN: No, I don't.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you go ahead please?

MR RAVEN: Thinking that the device had been discovered or had malfunctioned, I was very dejected. Later Williamson phoned and it transpired that during the final stages of operation, he and Brigadier Goosen had been in Switzerland. He had picked up a BBC broadcast reporting the (indistinct) completion of the operation.

Weeks later we were summoned to the office of the then Minister of Police, Louis le Grange. At the meeting were the Minister, Commissioner Gen Mike Geldenhuys and Gen Johan Coetzee.

After a speech the contents of which I cannot remember, we were decorated with the Police Star for outstanding service, at the time the highest decoration in the SAP.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Did you know right at the beginning of this operation, exactly who higher up had authorised this operation? Did you have any knowledge?

MR RAVEN: No, I had no knowledge at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: What was your view on that?

MR RAVEN: Well, I surmised that it had to come from very, very high up because of any diplomatic damage that could be done.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, Mr Raven, page 163, you state in respect of this incident, political objectives. Before we go ahead, you have heard the evidence of Mr Williamson in respect of the political objectives of this operation. Is there anything in his evidence that you disagree with?

MR RAVEN: No, I don't.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you just deal with paragraph 10?

MR RAVEN: The preservation and protection of the former government and political order and to ensure that the citizens of the country, did not loose faith in the government due to intimidation and fear caused by the liberation movements and their supporters.

To counter the revolutionary onslaught by the ANC/SACP alliance and the PAC in their attempt to overthrow the former government by means of force and by so doing, to destroy the political and social order.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Page 164.

MR RAVEN: The protection of covert operations, including the identities of informers, colleagues and other co-agents with relation to the combating of terrorism and political actions aimed at destabilising the political order.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and then paragraph (b), your justification for regarding such acts as associated with a political objective?

MR RAVEN: The aims and objectives of the ANC/SACP alliance, the MDM and the PAC were to overthrow the former government by means of force and in doing so, to cause the destruction of the political and social order.

To achieve these aims and objectives the ANC/SACP alliance was actively involved in starting a people's war.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, you can leave the definition out, and the last paragraph you can leave out. Do you confirm that? You don't have to read it, do you confirm it?

MR RAVEN: Yes, I confirm it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Page 165. Do you confirm the rest that is stated on that page?

MR RAVEN: I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now can we in respect of the political motivation in general, return to volume 1, page 46. You have already dealt with that because it is exactly the same as in respect of the London bomb incident.

Mr Raven, do you confirm that part of your evidence in respect of all three incidents?

MR RAVEN: I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: That was your views and objectives in respect of all three incidents?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you then turn to page 33 please. Alright, now just for the record Mr Raven, I just want to state the nature of this pertaining to your application.

Where it says further political objectives, it is dealt with under three categories, elimination, bomb attacks and interrogation.

This was a general motivation which was included not only in your application, but in the applications of all the clients, Mr Britz and I represent. Mr Chairman, we have had this situation before, you probably know this part already by heart and I just want to place this on record, because we have experienced every time that our clients are cross-examined on certain parts of this which may not be relevant exactly to their applications, so I will just draw your attention to the relevant parts pertaining to Mr Raven's application.

For instance the part dealing with interrogation, does not have any bearing upon these applications and I will therefore not deal with it. I just want to say Mr Chairman, that it doesn't mean that Mr Raven doesn't agree with what is stated under the heading interrogation. It is just not necessary to deal with that in respect of this application.

Alright, Mr Raven, I want to deal with, in respect of your political objectives, with two aspects, elimination and bomb attacks, starting on page 34 in respect of intimidation.

Now, I don't want to belabour everything, can you just be quite quick with this. Can you deal with the first paragraph, just read it and confirm it?

MR RAVEN: This was to prevent further action taken by them, and to take preventative measures and to eliminate potential activists, terrorists.

MR DU PLESSIS: And was that your objective in respect of all three these incidents?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. The second paragraph?

MR RAVEN: Freedom organisations such as the ANC were being dissuaded to give public support and momentum to the freedom struggle.

MR DU PLESSIS: Third paragraph?

MR RAVEN: There was a total feeling of distrust between MK, members and supporters as to who to trust and who not.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would that have been the cause of your actions?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And would that have related also to normal ANC members?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Paragraph 4?

MR RAVEN: The modus operandi was the same as the Mosad, being that all involved in the war against the apartheid government, were aware that the Security Police immediately retaliated after operations of activists, supporters and terrorists in a similar way, which would even lead to the elimination of activists and terrorists.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you comment on this with reference to the London bomb incident?

MR RAVEN: This is exactly what happened in the case of the London bomb, this is retaliation on the attack on Voortrekkerhoogte.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, paragraph 5?

MR RAVEN: Elimination usually took place in regard to high profile or very sufficient activists, whose detention in terms of the Security laws of the country, would give momentum to the freedom struggle or create other similar problems.

The Security Police in the country, could not again afford another Nelson Mandela in the freedom struggle.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, was that your perception when you participated in the Ruth First and Jeannette Schoon incident?

MR RAVEN: Can I quantify that in saying that not knowing who the targets were being targeted with these IED's, but believing that it would be a high profile ANC/SACP activist, office bearer, yes, I would then.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you have already testified that according to your perception, the target could have been inside or outside the country?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is that correct? Paragraph 6?

MR RAVEN: All the above had to lead to the demoralising of MK and other military wings of the freedom fighters which led thereto that they could not act as sufficiently in the struggle to reach the targets and goals of the liberation movements. I think that should be act as efficiently.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, efficiently yes.

MR RAVEN: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: The next page, 35, the influencing of white voters as part of the intimidation objective, paragraph 1.

MR RAVEN: White voters which had to vote for the government of the day, had to have trust in the Security Forces and had to believe that they were still in control of the country.

A disinformation campaign regarding the effectiveness of the war against communism and terrorism had the effect that white voters were under the impression that the Security Forces were easily winning the war, because activists either disappeared or were murdered in secretive ways without the guilty parties ever being caught or prosecuted.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, the third paragraph is not applicable to your situation. The fourth paragraph?

MR RAVEN: The public had suspected that what the Security Police were doing in regard to the elimination of terrorists and activists, and were brought under a false impression as to the effectiveness of the war against terrorism and the Red Danger.

MR DU PLESSIS: Does this relate to Stratcom exercises?

MR RAVEN: I would believe it would.

MR DU PLESSIS: Paragraph 5?

MR RAVEN: The aforementioned had created trust in the apartheid government, leaving whites to once again vote for the government.

MR DU PLESSIS: 6?

MR RAVEN: Actions against terrorists and activists, had given the impression that South Africa was involved in a life and death struggle against such elements.

MR DU PLESSIS: Paragraph 7?

MR RAVEN: Our actions had influenced white voters to keep their trust in the apartheid government and had persuaded them to once again vote for the said government.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, in respect of the protection of the information and prevention of deeds of terror, where we deal with elimination. The first three paragraphs are not really relevant to the three operations we are dealing with here, can you deal with paragraph 4?

MR RAVEN: Where activists wanted to go into training, either in the country or abroad, they necessarily had to be eliminated to prevent destabilisation of the country and its people by way of deeds of terror such as bomb attacks on Security Forces as well as soft targets.

As soon as an activists had received training, he was in a totally different class than normal activists and his knowledge and skills were similar to those of the Security Police and he could therefore be much more effective in military operations.

All of the above led thereto that the National Party stayed in control and stayed the government of the day and that communism was successfully countered. The goal of these actions was to destabilise the ANC and other liberation organisations, which led a revolutionary campaign against the apartheid government.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and then if you turn the page, we deal with bomb attacks under two headings, intimidation and disinformation.

Can you deal with the three paragraphs on page 37 in relation to bomb attacks and the intimidation motive?

MR RAVEN: Activists and their supporters had known that if they were to be involved in any form of petrol bomb throwing, rioting or destabilising of any particular area, there would be retaliation against themselves or their property by way of a bomb attack or a petrol bomb.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Raven, this would have been applicable if the target had been inside the country, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, paragraph 2.

MR RAVEN: If activists or supporters had become too militant, or if they had effectively influenced the Security consciousness of a particular community, there would be retaliation against them by way of bomb attacks and their supporters had a strong suspicion as to where the bombs came from.

This led to the dissuasion of their supporters to support the liberation struggle, because they did not know who would be next on the list.

The activists and their supporters had specific suspicions that it was the Security Police who attacked them by way of bombs and who burnt their houses if they had become too effective and too successful in their activities.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, paragraph 6?

MR RAVEN: The above actions was successful in as far as they had dissuaded political activists to become involved with destabilising activities.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and then the motive pertaining to disinformation in respect to bomb attacks.

MR RAVEN: The picture that was sketched to the general public was that it was only black on black violence which destabilised the black townships specifically. It was painted to be a struggle between blacks.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would that have been inside the country?

MR RAVEN: That would have been inside the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: And how would that have related to STRATCOM exercised?

MR RAVEN: That was a typical Stratcom exercise.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Then the next paragraph is not applicable. The third?

MR RAVEN: The above once again created the impression that the RSA was involved in a life and death struggle.

MR DU PLESSIS: Four?

MR RAVEN: Voters were once again persuaded to vote for the National Party in the light of Black Power, in order to keep the government in power.

MR DU PLESSIS: Five?

MR RAVEN: The disinformation campaign had therefore worked and was fully effective.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, Mr Raven, this would have been applicable even though the government or the police had not in public confirmed that the police were responsible for that, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Raven, just one or two other aspects that I want to deal with here.

I am sorry, can you turn to page 40 please. I haven't dealt with that, the last paragraph on page 40.

MR RAVEN: The motive of my deeds were to fight communism and other strong freedom organisations which led a revolutionary onslaught against the apartheid government and to intimidate these fighters and their followers and to disrupt their freedom fight and plans.

A further motive was to fight terrorism and to promote safety and security in the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: Were you a supporter of the National Party at that stage?

MR RAVEN: I was.

MR DU PLESSIS: And what was your view pertaining to the government, the National Party and the fight against the liberation movements, can you elaborate a little bit?

MR RAVEN: I saw at that time that the apartheid regime was fighting to retain western norms and to prevent a government coming into power that was Moscow, had Moscow puppet masters.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you turn to page 41 please. 41 over to page 42, do you confirm this as correct? You don't have to read everything?

MR RAVEN: Yes, I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Can I just ask you pertaining to the last paragraph on page 41. You refer there to certain submissions made by Gen Johan van der Merwe, evidence by Brigadier Jack Cronje, you have also heard the evidence by Mr Craig Williamson, do you agree with his evidence pertaining to the political objectives?

MR RAVEN: I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you were also told in broad terms what the evidence of Mr Adriaan Vlok was?

MR RAVEN: I was.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you agree with that?

MR RAVEN: I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then on the next page, page 42, do you confirm the correctness of that page?

MR RAVEN: I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: Page 43, do you confirm that?

MR RAVEN: I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now I just want to ask you about the third last sentence on page 43, you state there it was not difficult to hate the alliance. Can you just elaborate a little bit? The use of the word hate, against whom was that directed?

MR RAVEN: Hate might have been the wrong word, if we look at this in the political sense of the word and maybe replace it with a very, very strong dislike of the alliance. Trying and the word hate, not to imply malice or personal dislike.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, did you have any malice or ill will against any specific person in the liberation movements?

MR RAVEN: No, I did not.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now can you elaborate a little bit for the Committee on what you knew about the relationship between Gen Coetzee and Mr Williamson?

MR RAVEN: Well, it wouldn't be much, most of it would be hearsay but I know that Gen Coetzee was referred to as Coco which I would say was maybe his handler's cover name that he used, and it was used for want of a better word, in a loving sense.

I believe that Craig Williamson had a great respect for Gen Coetzee and I think that the feeling was mutual.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Did you have contact with Mr Williamson frequently?

MR RAVEN: During my ...

MR DU PLESSIS: During 1982 to 1984?

MR RAVEN: Yes, I did.

MR DU PLESSIS: How frequently would you say?

MR RAVEN: It could be on a daily basis because his office was right opposite mine.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can you remember him saying anything about the Schoon's or about Ruth First that could have indicated that he had something against them or that he had some ill will towards them?

MR RAVEN: At no time did I have that impression, he never said anything to me about that at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And then, Mr Williamson explained in respect of the London bomb in his presentation, written presentation, there is reference about the bomb having been transported in two boxes, or three boxes and you said two boxes?

MR RAVEN: I had requested Waal du Toit to make two boxes. Where the third box came from if it ever existed, I don't know about it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Raven lastly ...(intervention)

MR RAVEN: Can I just interject there please. Mr Chairman, the reason for the two boxes is that at no time do you transport explosives and detonators in the same container, whether it is commercial or military. It is always two separate containers.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right Mr Raven, how old are you now?

MR RAVEN: I am 56 years old.

MR DU PLESSIS: And Mr Raven, can you just comment a little bit on your memory and what the effect, the timespan between these operations during these years until today may have had on your memory?

MR RAVEN: As far as the London bomb went, I think my memory is quite clear because it was to a certain extent an adrenaline rush, it was my first time returning to the UK since immigrating.

It was the first time I had been involved in such an operation. As far as the other two incidents go, the First and Schoon incident, as indicated in my submission, it had melted into one incident in my brain, because of the similarity of it, but also to a certain extent, it was only after reading Craig's submission, Mr Williamson's submission, that certain things came back to me, because I was to a certain extent in my mind, I was still not sure that the devices I had built, had been used against the two targets.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Raven, do you want to make any comment or say anything about the truth and reconciliation process and your views on that?

MR RAVEN: Well, nothing more than to say I came here on my own free will. As I have said at a previous interview to Gillian when she intimated that Craig had said that I was the one that had built the bomb that had caused her mother's death, I intimated then, I said Gillian my heart goes out to you, I would like at this stage to say the same thing to Marius and I hope with all my heart that what is happening here today, can clear the air and that we can go forward from here, and to build this nation as we would like to see it in the future.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Visser on record. I will not call you Mr Williamson.

Mr Raven, will you turn to volume 1 please, page 38. Under the heading disinformation, you have three Roman numbered paragraphs, the first reads under disinformation, the picture that was sketched to the general public was that it was only black on black violence which destabilised the black townships specifically. What does that mean?

MR RAVEN: That the unrest in the black townships was caused by a dissatisfaction either between members of the ANC/SACP alliance or what eventually came out as Third Force members which then would give the impression of being members of the ANC which were having an in-fight struggle.

MR VISSER: Isn't the fact that in black townships the violence was between blacks or are you saying that that is not so?

MR RAVEN: No, it was between blacks.

MR VISSER: So that wasn't disinformation, that was a fact?

MR RAVEN: It was a fact yes.

MR VISSER: And in the second paragraph you say the above led to a fear amongst whites as to the dangers in the above regard, particularly that such actions could possibly run over to white areas. Are you aware that it was in fact after the conference in 1985, during 1985 declared to be the intention by the ANC that whites should also feel the war closer to themselves, that they should be, that the war should spill over into white areas? Were you aware of that?

MR RAVEN: I believe I could have been aware of that.

MR VISSER: Yes, so once again it is not disinformation? The third paragraph where you say the above once again created the impression that the RSA was involved in a life and death struggle, was it not a life and death struggle for many people?

MR RAVEN: For many people it was, yes.

MR VISSER: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Could I kindly clear up something? Have you applied for other incidents too or are all the incidents that you are amnesty for, the three incidents that is being mentioned here?

MR RAVEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: I am sorry, what is correct, I was just about to ask the same question. Are all the incidents that you are applying for, contained in the bundles before the Committee at the moment?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Well, then I immediately want to go to volume 3, page 162 Mr Raven, the second unnumbered paragraph and I want to ask you a few questions about that.

Are you aware that in order to report on the success or otherwise of the operation in London, it was agreed that there would be a sentence used, a cover sentence to say "the egg has been laid"?

MR RAVEN: At the time I was not aware of that, and that is why this sounded weird coming from the General.

MR VISSER: Yes, we are coming to that. So you say you were not aware of that? Did you ever become aware that that was a code phrase used to indicate on report back to Gen Coetzee that the operation had been successfully completed?

MR RAVEN: I only became aware of it when I received the bundle of Williamson in which he mentioned it.

MR VISSER: And was that at a time after you had completed page 162?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Well, you have told this Committee that your memory has been jogged in certain respects after having read the statement made by Mr Williamson. I want to direct your attention specifically to what you say here and bearing in mind that it is 16 years ago, "yes Raven, once again you have laid a rotten egg". Were you surprised by that?

MR RAVEN: Yes, I was.

MR VISSER: The question which I want to ask you today is in view of the fact that you now know and apparently accept that there was this code, "the egg has been laid", to signify that the operation had been completed successfully, don't you believe that there is scope for a misunderstanding as far as this allegation is concerned, that you may be referring to that code that was used?

MR RAVEN: Well, I didn't know about the code until I read Williamson's application.

MR VISSER: You see what this sentence, "yes Raven, once again you have laid a rotten egg" appears to signify are two things. One is that before this time if the rotten egg refers in your mind - let me ask you that first, what does the rotten egg refer to in your mind as you sit here today? What do you think it refers to?

MR RAVEN: Well rotten egg, as I said, I was thinking that the device had been discovered or it had malfunctioned.

MR VISSER: And an egg would refer to an explosive device?

MR RAVEN: No, I wouldn't say an explosive device. A rotten egg I would say is something that didn't work.

MR VISSER: Well, that is the thing that bothers me you see, because this one did work, the one in London.

MR RAVEN: Exactly. That is why I said I was really dejected.

MR VISSER: Yes, it makes no sense.

MR RAVEN: I cannot remember if that was said to me before the report back from Williamson and Brigadier Goosen, it could have been that the General had not yet had confirmation of the success of the operation at that time of uttering those words to me.

MR VISSER: Alright, but now that we agree that the intention here was to refer to the explosive device ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, hadn't you all heard in Frankfurt that the device had worked, that the explosion had occurred?

MR RAVEN: No.

CHAIRPERSON: I thought that was the evidence that we heard?

MR RAVEN: I didn't know that Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you suggesting that the others of your team flying back with you from Frankfurt to South Africa, wouldn't have told you?

MR RAVEN: I don't know if they ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You were the man who had made it?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I think as I remember the evidence, it was that there was a phone call for Mr Slovo and that there was a deduction made that it had worked. But that they didn't hear about it at that time Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. You see, it is quite clear and your learned counsel is correct, the evidence of Mr Williamson was that the information desk apparently announced for Mr Joe Slovo to come to the information desk and that he then drew the inference that this must be in regard to the fact that the explosion occurred.

Along the lines of the question of the Honourable Chairman, didn't you, did you hear such an announcement for Mr Joe Slovo to go to the information desk when you were at Frankfurt?

MR RAVEN: No, I did not.

MR VISSER: You did not, all right. We are now back to what this sentence might mean. We know that the egg must refer to an explosive device, but it entails two further aspects, does it not Mr Raven?

The first is "once again you have laid a rotten egg", seems to signify that this is not the first time that you went to place an explosive device. Isn't that the logical inference to draw from what those words mean?

MR RAVEN: I agree with you Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Alright, now before that time, where had you laid another rotten egg?

MR RAVEN: I had never placed another device prior to the one in London.

MR VISSER: It becomes just more inexplicable as we go along, does it not? And in fact the word once again, would appear to connote knowledge on the part of Gen Coetzee of such a previous incident, wouldn't you agree?

MR RAVEN: I would agree.

MR VISSER: Yes. Would you have, as you sit here today with all the knowledge of hindsight, know of such an explosive which Gen Coetzee knew about before the London operation?

MR RAVEN: Not that I had placed, no.

MR VISSER: Yes. It is just a pity that this matter wasn't clarified with him in cross-examination or in, yes in cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Going back, is it correct Mr Williamson and Brigadier Goosen did not return to South Africa with you?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Because it wasn't Mr Williamson who said he heard about Slovo from Mr McPherson, Mr Williamson in fact said that at Brussels airport they heard there had been a large explosion.

MR VISSER: I stand corrected. My Attorney has just corrected me as well, it was Mr McPherson, quite correct Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I have no further questions, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Jansen on record, I have no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman, Cornelius on record for McPherson, I have no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Raven just two aspects, as far as the logistical support is concerned for this particular operation, where did the money come from for this operation, I am talking about the London incident?

MR RAVEN: I have no idea.

MR HUGO: Did you also receive traveller's cheques and credit cards?

MR RAVEN: No credit cards as I stated, I had to go to Volkskas Bank and I received five thousand dollars in traveller's cheques.

MR HUGO: Did you use all the money during this operation?

MR RAVEN: No, I did not.

MR HUGO: What did you do with the rest, the balance of the money afterwards?

MR RAVEN: The balance went together with all the necessary receipts and pertaining papers, back to an auditor, I think independent of the police where all the monies were then changed back to rands and it was audited.

MR HUGO: Was it paid into a particular fund to your knowledge?

MR RAVEN: Not as far as I know.

MR HUGO: Then I just want to clarify one further aspect, at the commencement of this operation, once again the London incident, do I understand your evidence correctly that there were two targets, one the ANC's offices and then the other one was the SACP's office?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR HUGO: You had certain reservations as to the viability of the bombing of the SACP's offices when you had a look at the diagrams and the photographs etc?

MR RAVEN: Exactly.

MR HUGO: You nevertheless foresaw that there was a possibility that you would be able to plant a bomb at the SACP's offices in London, whilst you were still here?

MR RAVEN: The possibility did arise.

MR HUGO: And bearing that in mind, you then requested explosives, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR HUGO: How much did you order or request for?

MR RAVEN: I took 4 x 250 g of explosives.

MR HUGO: And what would you have done had you ascertained in London that there was a possibility of bombing the SACP's offices?

MR RAVEN: Then we would use 500 g or less depending on the circumstances, and divided it up between the two targets.

MR HUGO: And you then ascertained that the SACP possibility was not viable, what did you do with that particular segment of the explosives?

MR RAVEN: That was just added to the main one that was going for the ANC.

MR HUGO: Is it true that Mr De Kock was never present when this device was assembled in London?

MR RAVEN: That is right, he was never there, I did it on my own.

MR HUGO: I've got no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Booyens Mr Chairman. The measurements of the two containers, did you give that more or less to Mr Du Toit, in other words how big they were supposed to be?

MR RAVEN: I must have given him some kind of indication how big it should be.

MR BOOYENS: Not exact measurements, but indicated approximately how large? That is what his evidence will be?

MR RAVEN: Yes, it was two, I can't remember honestly.

MR BOOYENS: And then there is just one bit of your evidence that sounded ambiguous, but I just wanted to clear this up.

When you took the explosives to Mr Du Toit, you testified if I understood you correctly, that that was the first time that he would have learnt the purpose of the containers. What were you trying to convey to the Commission there?

That he then knew that the containers would convey explosives to make a bomb in London to blow up the ANC offices or that the containers would be used for the conveyance of explosives?

MR RAVEN: That the containers would be used for the conveyance of explosives, because at no time was it necessary for him to know where it was going to.

MR BOOYENS: So in other words if Mr Du Toit were to testify that he at no stage was informed beforehand or at a later stage, specifically informed by anybody else that those containers he made was for the purpose of blowing up an office or offices in London, he was at no time informed, you would have no quarrel with that because you certainly didn't inform him of that?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Just one more aspect, at page 156, it is not even necessary to look at that, page 156 in volume 3 you make the statement that Mr Du Toit was the member in charge of our Technical Division. In fact Mr Du Toit says that he was in charge of a section of the Technical Division, namely the mechanical section in the ...

MR RAVEN: I won't dispute that.

MR BOOYENS: You won't dispute that? Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROUSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, Roussouw on behalf of applicant Bosch.

Mr Raven, Mr Bosch is applying for amnesty in the event that he might be involved in the manufacturing of the explosive device that led to the death of Jeannette Schoon and her daughter. I would appreciate it if you could perhaps help us to determine whether he was in fact involved or not.

Mr Bosch will testify that he received an instruction from you to perform a certain function. Now, let me just take you back to the manufacturing of this device in the Jeannette Schoon incident, the second time in other words.

You have said that it was exactly the same as far as you can remember, as to that procedure that you followed with the First incident?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR ROUSSOUW: Now, as far as the papers that you stuck together with glue are concerned, first of all, did you do that on your own?

MR RAVEN: I did.

MR ROUSSOUW: Did you ask Mr Bosch to ask you?

MR RAVEN: At no time.

MR ROUSSOUW: Was that part also done at the Police College in Pretoria West?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR ROUSSOUW: Alright. Mr Bosch will testify that he shared an office with you at Police Headquarters?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR ROUSSOUW: In Central Pretoria?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR ROUSSOUW: And that as far as he can remember, the time when you requested him to glue together certain papers, documents, that was done in the office at Wagtehuis, the Headquarters?

MR RAVEN: Well, if that is the case, and Mr Bosch can remember that clearly, it could quite easily be a device, but a device in the sense of a training device, not as explosive device.

MR ROUSSOUW: Yes Mr Raven, I will come to that, but when you went to Pretoria West, are you absolutely certain that nobody accompanied you and definitely Mr Bosch did not accompany you?

MR RAVEN: I went on my own.

MR ROUSSOUW: And the total of the devices were made in that small room at Police College?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR ROUSSOUW: Alright. In discussion with my client, Mr Bosch, we have come up with two possibilities for which you could have requested him to glue together certain documents.

The one could have been for training purposes that you wanted to construct a IED for training and the other one was that it could have been a dummy?

MR RAVEN: Can you qualify between a dummy and a training device?

MR ROUSSOUW: Alright. Maybe in the sense of the dummy as a test run, how to manufacture the eventual device in this incident?

MR RAVEN: Well, as I stated further in my first, is that this was almost a dry run or a continuation of the first device that was made for Mrs First. It was identical so I mean there was no preplanning mental-wise, supply wise, necessary.

MR ROUSSOUW: Alright. So you didn't need to make a dummy, you have already constructed a device previously, you knew how you were going to go about your business?

MR RAVEN: Exactly.

MR ROUSSOUW: Alright. Did you at any stage discuss this with Mr Bosch?

MR RAVEN: Never.

MR ROUSSOUW: Did you at any stage afterwards, informed him about the explosion and your possible involvement therein?

MR RAVEN: I just have to explain again, the principle of need to know. It wasn't necessary for Mr Bosch to know prior or thereafter of any action taken. It was just not done, you didn't walk around bragging, you didn't walk around boasting, you didn't say beforehand we are going to do this, we are going to do that.

It was strictly a need to know and this is something I have noticed through the questions being asked, that the people find difficult to understand. It is a culture.

MR ROUSSOUW: I accept that Mr Raven. Just lastly, Mr Bosch will testify that the first time that he discussed this whole incident with you, was during the course of last week when he met you at this hearing, would you agree with that?

MR RAVEN: I would.

MR ROUSSOUW: Okay. Sorry, just a moment Mr Chairman. Mr Raven, Mr Bosch said that he will testify that he formed the suspicion about his possible involvement herein at the time much later and the evidence will be that it was after he received training in explosives, the handling of explosives during September and October of 1985.

In other words, I am putting to you that at this stage in 1984, when this device was manufactured, Mr Bosch had no experience or expert knowledge about the handling of explosives?

MR RAVEN: I would agree with that.

MR ROUSSOUW: Alright, and that from even gluing together a similar document, which could eventually lead to the manufacturing of a device, an explosive device such as this, the testimony will be that at that stage, it did not give him any indication that it could eventually be made into a bomb?

You were an explosives expert, but can I ask you to place yourself in the frame of mind of somebody who is not an explosives expert like myself, and would a document that is being glued together, give you any indication that it might be turned into an explosive device?

MR RAVEN: No, unless you watch a lot of James Bond and McGyver things, that could possibly be, but I doubt it very much.

MR ROUSSOUW: It seems that there is going some of those spy stories around. Thank you Mr Raven, I've got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ROUSSOUW

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until a quarter to two.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

ROGER HOWARD LESLEY RAVEN: (still under oath)

CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, there is a function taking place here this afternoon and I have agreed that we will adjourn this hearing at 4 o'clock. Despite my colleague's request, I don't think we will adjourn for the Jazz Concert at 3 o'clock tomorrow.

MR VISSER: I think there will be an argument before you make a ruling.

MR LEVINE: No cross-examination Mr Chairman.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE

MR BIZOS: I am sorry Mr Chairman, I didn't hear Mr Levine. My learned friend, Mr Berger, will examine the witness Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, is Mr Levine not asking any questions?

CHAIRPERSON: He has indicated that he has no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: I am sorry, I never heard that. Mr Raven, what work were you doing when you started to work for Mr Williamson or work under Mr Williamson?

MR RAVEN: I commenced my duty under Mr Williamson at the time of the London street bomb.

MR BERGER: And after you got back from London, what work did you do?

MR RAVEN: There were various times, clandestine meetings with foreign dignitaries, we were requested to go and sweep was the term used, various hotel rooms to make sure that there were no listening devices or explosive devices planted in these said rooms.

MR BERGER: You see the reason I ask you that question is because if you look at bundle 2, the amnesty application of Mr Bosch, the application starts at page 115 and then if you would turn to page 123, you will see there is a single paragraph on that page, paragraph 4, do you have that?

MR RAVEN: I have it.

MR BERGER: He says during 1983 I was transferred to the Security Branch Head Office, under the command of Craig Williamson, Section G1. My direct Head was Warrant Officer Jerry Raven. There we undertook monitoring and following.

And then he goes on to say what you told him on a certain day or an instruction you gave him, but just let's stop in the middle of the third line. Was that the kind of work that you were doing on a day to day basis?

MR RAVEN: Not on a day to day basis.

MR BERGER: What did the listening involve?

MR RAVEN: Listening was as I explained in the case of Mr Allan Boesak, it was the bugging of his hotel room.

MR BERGER: And Mr Bosch was also involved in that kind of activity?

MR RAVEN: He may have been, I can't remember, it is a long time ago.

MR BERGER: Did you bug lots of hotel rooms?

MR RAVEN: No.

MR BERGER: How many did you bug?

MR RAVEN: In actual fact I think that was the only one that I can remember of off hand now at the moment.

MR BERGER: Well, did Mr Bosch help you bugging that hotel room?

MR RAVEN: No, Mr Bosch, where Mr Bosch's expertise came in if I remember correctly was that he had come to us, that would say Intelligence if I remember correctly, he had come from what was called IJ which was Intelligence Johannesburg, it was a surveillance team whose specific day to day job was to keep surveillance on suspects, activists, call them what you want to.

It could have been there that his expertise was used by our section and under my command.

MR BERGER: Well, he says that there we undertook surveillance. So when did you and Mr Bosch go and do bugging?

MR RAVEN: I think there was one case where we climbed up either a telephone pole or at some switchboard where we were asked to bug a telephone, but that was to do I think with organised crime if I remember correctly.

I can't remember the place.

MR BERGER: When was that?

MR RAVEN: That would have been 1983 thereabouts.

MR BERGER: So the Security Police were used to bug organised crime?

MR RAVEN: There were times when our expertise was used, yes.

MR BERGER: And you can only remember the one incident?

MR RAVEN: At the moment yes.

MR BERGER: Well, perhaps you will think about it and come up with some other incidents, because it seems, the way I read Mr Bosch's application, that that was something which you did regularly?

MR RAVEN: No, it wasn't what we did regularly.

MR BERGER: Well, the other thing that you did he says, is following. Do you agree with that?

MR RAVEN: Yes, that is surveillance.

MR BERGER: And what sort of surveillance did the two of you do together?

MR RAVEN: I think at one stage we did, if I remember correctly, I think it was Beyers Naude. We went passed his house and took photographs. At another stage we were in what was called the Hot Spot for some activist, seeing who was coming to the house, who was leaving the house.

MR BERGER: Who was that activist?

MR RAVEN: I can't remember.

MR BERGER: When was that?

MR RAVEN: Also 1983, 1984. I can't remember the date correctly.

MR BERGER: Besides bugging and surveillance, what other work did you do?

MR RAVEN: I was doing training of members.

MR BERGER: That is technical training?

MR RAVEN: Not technical training. Training in surveillance, counter-surveillance. At one stage I remember I gave the team from what we called Intelligence Johannesburg, I gave them firearm training because there were - a lot of them were youngsters that had just come out of the Police College and being an ex-Musketry Instructor at the Police College I knew that the training in firearms there, was inadequate when it came to a, let's call it a fire-fight situation. From my experience that I had in training for the Special Task Force.

MR BERGER: Would you agree if I, you were a member of Group G, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And Group G became Group A or was it the other way around?

MR RAVEN: You will have to refresh my memory, I can't remember.

MR BERGER: At one stage it was A, am I right?

MR RAVEN: I have no recollection, it is too long ago, I can't remember which one we jumped around to.

MR BERGER: You can't remember if you were even in A5, Intelligence?

MR RAVEN: If A5 was Intelligence in those days, I must say yes.

MR BERGER: You can't remember?

MR RAVEN: I can't remember.

MR BERGER: And this Group A, had Brigadier Piet Goosen as the Head and Craig Williamson as his Deputy?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And Brigadier Goosen and Craig Williamson reported to Johan Coetzee?

MR RAVEN: I presume they did, yes.

MR BERGER: And Johan Coetzee had the ultimate authority?

MR RAVEN: I presume so.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, you presume so but you were a Security Branch operative, surely you knew so?

MR RAVEN: Well, as I said the chain of command, I don't know if the Head of Security reported to the Commissioner.

MR BERGER: You never knew that?

MR RAVEN: I didn't know as a fact, I didn't know. I could presume so, but I didn't know it as a fact.

MR BERGER: But the Head of Security was Gen Johan Coetzee? I see Mr Wagener shaking his head ...

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it wasn't, I don't know what period we are talking of because we heard evidence that it was Gen Steenkamp at some stage and Schutte at some stage, so I think the question is a little bit widely framed.

MR BERGER: No, it is not. The question was when Group A began, who was the - I told you that and you agreed that Brigadier Piet Goosen was the Head, Craig Williamson was his Deputy and they reported to Johan Coetzee.

We are talking 1980.

MR RAVEN: In 1980 I wouldn't know, because I wasn't in the Section.

MR BERGER: 1981?

MR RAVEN: I wasn't in the Section.

MR BERGER: Alright, you only joined in 1982?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And in 1982 we know that Gen Johan Coetzee was the Head of the Security Police. I know that, you should have known that?

MR RAVEN: I said I don't know if the command stopped there.

MR BERGER: I wasn't talking about the command stopping there, I was talking about your Section, it worked this way, there was Brigadier Piet Goosen he was the Head, Craig Williamson was his Deputy. The two of them reported to Johan Coetzee and he had ultimate authority in relation to that Section, am I right?

MR DU PLESSIS: No Mr Chairman, the question stopped at he had ultimate authority, not ultimate authority of that Section, but he had ultimate authority and the witness said well, he doesn't know if the Head of Security reports to the Commissioner or reports to anybody else.

So Mr Berger must just frame his question correctly with respect Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, I will be a bit more particular with the words I choose. In 1982, when you were in the Intelligence Section of the Security Police, is it correct that Brigadier Goosen and Craig Williamson reported to Johan Coetzee, the Head of the Security Police?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Is it correct that Gen Johan Coetzee had ultimate authority as far as the Security Police were concerned?

MR RAVEN: I can't answer that, because as I said I don't know how that top senior management of the police, worked.

It would appear if we go back to the London bomb, that the Commissioner of Police, Mike Geldenhuys and the Minister were all concerned along the line somewhere. I can't say that categorically and say yes.

MR BERGER: Well, whether or not Gen Coetzee had to report to someone above him, is not my concern at the moment. But as far as the Security Police were concerned, as far as you were concerned, the ultimate boss in the Security Police, the person with the ultimate authority in the Security Police, was Gen Johan Coetzee?

CHAIRPERSON: But was he, surely the Minister was above him?

MR BERGER: In the Security Police Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes? The Minister controlled the Police Force, did he not?

MR BERGER: He did.

CHAIRPERSON: And would that not cover the Security Police or do you think they were a separate entity?

MR BERGER: Chairperson ...

CHAIRPERSON: You keep saying ultimate authority.

MR BERGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Surely the ultimate authority is as high up as you can go?

MR BERGER: I will rephrase the question then. Within the Security Police, within the structures of the Security Police, Gen Coetzee had ultimate authority, would you agree with that Mr Raven?

MR RAVEN: No.

MR BERGER: Within the structures of the Security Police, who did you believe had ultimate authority?

MR RAVEN: The State President.

MR BERGER: And under him, there was the Minister of Police?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: And under him, there was the Commissioner of Police?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And under him was Gen Johan Coetzee?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And you knew that?

MR RAVEN: Yes.

MR BERGER: Your Group, Section A, was divided into various sub-sections. Head of the International Section was Captain Piesang Nel, am I correct?

MR RAVEN: What Section was that?

MR BERGER: International Section?

MR RAVEN: Yes, that could be correct.

MR BERGER: Why do you say it could be correct, was there an International Section?

MR RAVEN: Yes, but now we are talking, I am trying to get my times right, because when I joined Intelligence, I think International Section was Lieutenant G.G. Smit. I think Captain as you call him, Piesang Nel, only came on later. At that time I think Captain Piesang Nel was working with Brigadier Neels du Plooy.

MR BERGER: I am sorry Mr Raven, I just want to check something. When you got there, there was an International Section, but you say it was G.G. Smit who was in charge?

MR RAVEN: I think so.

MR BERGER: And then there was, I am sorry, there was an Internal Section, correct?

MR RAVEN: I can't recollect that.

MR BERGER: Does the name Captain Louis Jack van Niekerk ring a bell?

MR RAVEN: As far as I can remember Louis Jack van Niekerk, I think at one stage he was in charge of the Stratcom and of, I think he was in charge of RS System.

MR BERGER: You don't know whether in fact there was an Internal System and you don't know who the Head could have been? An Internal Section, I am sorry.

MR RAVEN: I am not completely sure, I cannot answer with honesty.

ADV DE JAGER: Van Niekerk as far as you know, was in charge of what Section?

MR RAVEN: Either the Stratcom or the RS Programme.

MR BERGER: Did you know that there was an African sub-Section in your Group? Let's call them Desks, perhaps that would be easier, an African Desk?

MR RAVEN: An African Desk came into being much later than 1982 I think.

MR BERGER: When was that?

MR RAVEN: Don't ask me dates, but I think who was in charge there was Kobus Pretorius.

MR BERGER: What about Captain Vic McPherson?

MR RAVEN: I think Vic McPherson was in charge of STRATCOM as far as I can remember.

MR BERGER: No, he told the Committee yesterday that he was the Head of the Africa Desk?

MR RAVEN: Well, if he says so, I can't dispute it.

MR BERGER: But you didn't know that?

MR RAVEN: I didn't know that.

MR BERGER: Counter-espionage Desk?

MR RAVEN: Counter-espionage Desk became into being later under Captain Willie Botha.

MR BERGER: Yes, you are correct on that one.

MR RAVEN: Pardon?

MR BERGER: That is correct. Then there was a Training Section, wasn't there? A Training Desk?

MR RAVEN: Training Section ...

MR BERGER: Captain Derrick Brune?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And finally there was a Technical Section and that was yours, Warrant Officer Jerry Raven?

MR RAVEN: That is right.

MR BERGER: So you weren't really responsible for training, were you?

MR RAVEN: It was part of my duties.

MR BERGER: You could be called in from time to time to perform training, but that wasn't your Desk?

MR RAVEN: Exactly.

MR BERGER: Okay. What I am really trying to establish is what were you doing on a day to day basis, you would come into the office and what would you do?

MR RAVEN: There was a lot of research being done.

MR BERGER: What sort of research?

MR RAVEN: As far as surveillance, using photographic equipment in the sense that in the past, using SLR's, that is single lens reflex camera, you could only get a certain result because of grain on the film, you couldn't find a place from where to do the photographs which were out of the eye, in place where you were sitting what we called the Hot Spot, you couldn't sit there in the car, surveilling someone's front gate for long, because the neighbours would come around and think what is this suspicious guy doing here and either phone the neighbour or come up and say, listen, what are you doing here.

So we had to look at ways of increasing the distance between the surveillant and the target and I came across in conversation with people in photographic shops, we came across a method where we could utilise a video camera, replacing the C-type mount with a screw in mount, where we could utilise all your photographic lenses and if I remember correctly, your ratio of enlargement on a video camera was in the vicinity of I think, three to one.

So in the case of a 800 mm lens on a camera, putting on a video camera, you have the effect of a 2 400 mm lens.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, I don't want to unnecessarily interrupt you, but I am really interested in what you were doing. You are explaining what you were doing and I accept that, I am not criticising you, but was this - did this take up the bulk of your work, this research into cameras and how they could be used for surveillance?

MR RAVEN: And technical equipment as in video cameras that you could place in places for videoing movements, we were looking at movement triggers so that you can have a camera zoomed in at one area and if a movement takes place, it automatically switches the camera on and has a recording of what takes place.

It went as far as let's call it bugs, radio transmitting equipment, available overseas. There were ways of developing what we called SRAC, which was a short range agent communication, where we found that the movement of RS agents on campuses coming under suspicion in so far as you would find a case in fact, I think it was one of our RS agents, had a motorbike down at Cape Town University ...

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, it is not necessary to go into so much detail. It was technical?

MR RAVEN: Exactly.

MR BERGER: What else were you involved in on a day to day basis?

MR RAVEN: That took a lot of time.

MR BERGER: I am sure, but was there anything else that you did on a day to day basis?

MR RAVEN: I helped out before going, I think I wasn't on the Counter-Espionage Unit yet with the Helena Pastoors and the Klaas de Jonge case.

MR BERGER: That is where you gave evidence in court?

MR RAVEN: That is correct, on the decoding of coded letters.

MR BERGER: Yes, you were called in as an expert witness is that right?

MR RAVEN: I wouldn't call it an expert witness, but I was called in as a witness that broke the code. That was used in one of the communicae's.

MR BERGER: That was that specific case?

MR RAVEN: It was that specific case, yes.

MR BERGER: Is there anything else that comes to mind that you were doing on a day to day basis, or have you basically explained everything that you would do, unless there was something you know, special like you had to go and instruct people on the use of firearms, that would be a special thing to do, but day to day, have you basically covered everything?

MR RAVEN: I remember one day I came into the office and Craig said Jerry, here is a letter, go and post it in Gaberone for me please.

Now, that wasn't anything weird, I mean, it had to have a stamp on it from Botswana, it had to be stamped in Botswana and he sent it somewhere either to cover someone's cover story or to build up credibility, but again need to know, I took the envelope, went to Botswana, went to Gaberone, bought a stamp, put it in the post and came home again.

MR BERGER: Who was that envelope addressed to?

MR RAVEN: I didn't look. If I did look, I wouldn't have remembered anyway, at this day and age now.

MR BERGER: Well, you just said you didn't look.

MR RAVEN: No, I said I didn't see.

MR BERGER: No, you said you didn't look.

MR RAVEN: Okay, I didn't look, I meant to say I didn't see. I didn't look, I didn't try to find out, if I looked, I can't remember.

MR BERGER: Mr Williamson gives you an envelope and he says Jerry take this up to Botswana and post it for me, he hands it to you, you take it and you drive all the way up to Botswana and you never look to see who it is addressed to?

MR RAVEN: I said I may have looked, I can't remember.

MR BERGER: What did you think you were being asked to do that for?

MR RAVEN: I just explained now, that it was either to substantiate someone's cover story, to keep someone's cover intact, it could be a multitude of reasons.

MR BERGER: Maybe it was a bomb?

MR RAVEN: No, it wasn't a bomb.

MR BERGER: How do you know?

MR RAVEN: Well, number one, it was an ordinary little envelope, a small one and as light as a feather. Otherwise there would have been a surcharge on it at the post office for the posting, which they didn't do. It went through as a normal posting piece.

MR BERGER: Where was it being sent to?

MR RAVEN: I can't remember, I don't know if it was, no, I can't remember. It wasn't airmail. I would have remembered that, I think it was just normal postage. It could have been posted back to the Republic.

That is why I say I don't remember.

MR BERGER: You just don't want to remember, isn't that right Mr Raven?

MR RAVEN: No. I said I don't remember.

MR BERGER: When was that?

MR RAVEN: It could have been any time between 1982 until Craig left. I can't remember.

MR BERGER: You can't remember. Isn't it correct Mr Raven that during 1983 you left South Africa, or you left Head Office where you were working, Headquarters, for Botswana on a number of occasions, very quickly after one another, you went, came back, went, came back, isn't that correct?

MR RAVEN: I don't think I went, came back, went, came back. I can think of maybe three occasions that I went to Botswana and they weren't in short spaces of time.

MR BERGER: They were in 1983, were they not?

MR RAVEN: They could have been, I can't remember.

MR BERGER: Who sent you up to Botswana?

MR RAVEN: Craig Williamson.

MR BERGER: Why?

MR RAVEN: The first time as I said, one of the times was to see if the Landrover with a given registration number was parked in Vuku Close in the grounds of whatever that organisation was.

MR BERGER: In where?

MR RAVEN: In the grounds, outside or in the grounds of the organisation, I can't remember the name, but it was in Vuku Close.

MR BERGER: It was a Landrover?

MR RAVEN: Yes.

MR BERGER: You had to find out if it was parked there?

MR RAVEN: Yes, with a certain registration number.

MR BERGER: And did you find it?

MR RAVEN: It was there, yes.

MR BERGER: You don't remember the registration number?

MR RAVEN: No.

MR BERGER: And you reported that back to Craig Williamson?

MR RAVEN: Correct, or maybe Mr McPherson reported back because we went together. And him being the senior officer, I would have thought that he would have reported back, but I may have reported back as well.

MR BERGER: And the second time that you went up?

MR RAVEN: The second time, I think we had to go and see if I think it was ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just correct this. I think Mr Raven said one of the times was the time of the Landrover, so we are not dealing with the second time. I don't think he was sure of the fact that it was the first time or not.

If my learned friend could just phrase the question a little bit differently and not say it was the second time.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, the one incident you have spoken about was to look at a Landrover?

MR RAVEN: Yes, as I said I am not putting this in any timeframe.

MR BERGER: Any sequence?

MR RAVEN: Any sequence.

MR BERGER: I accept that.

MR RAVEN: Another time we went up, I think we had to ascertain if a certain, I think it was an Anglican priest arrived in Botswana by air from I don't remember where, it was Lesotho or wherever. We had to identify him and make sure that he did arrive in Botswana and the third time, it was also I think to ascertain whether a source's information was correct where a certain building, I don't know if it was called something Cycle Works, were a source had maintained that this was a cross on a photograph, a cross on a window said this is where the ANC had a printing press or some story.

I think myself and McPherson went there again and I still had a small little Pentax camera in my hand, I walked up the stairs, taking photographs. I went and we got to the top, it was the offices of Air Botswana and I approached an individual who came to me and I said listen, I was thinking of importing spares to Botswana, can you give me some kind of tariff on weight or how you charged it and things like that.

That is the only three times I can remember spot on reasons why I went there.

MR BERGER: So your source's information was not correct?

MR RAVEN: It wasn't my source, it was a source.

MR BERGER: And the Anglican priest, who was that Anglican priest?

MR RAVEN: I can't remember.

MR BERGER: You went up to Botswana to see if a particular Anglican priest by name was there, and you cannot remember his name?

MR RAVEN: I think, if I remember correctly, we were working on a photograph. The name was known, but we were looking from a photograph. I mean it is no point stopping every guy who is walking in ordinary clothes and say what is your name. You work according to a photograph, looking for the similarity of a person.

Knowing that person's name is so and so.

MR BERGER: Did you find the person?

MR RAVEN: Yes, he did arrive on that flight as it was reported.

MR BERGER: And did you give that information back to Craig Williamson?

MR RAVEN: The information was given back either via myself or Mr McPherson, I am not sure.

MR BERGER: And these are the only three incidents that you can recall?

MR RAVEN: That I can recall at this time, at the moment, yes.

MR BERGER: There might be more?

MR RAVEN: There could possibly be. Sorry, can I interrupt you here, yes, there was another time where a Russian diplomat's wife was ill. She was brought to I don't know if it was the Millpark Hospital, but she was brought and a member of the Embassy came with her.

This is sap, standing operational procedure, when a Russian comes over to the West, invariably one presumes there is no proof, that that person coming over was a KGB agent and a meeting was arranged between Mr Williamson and this individual in the gardens of the hotel, tea garden next to the hospital if I remember correctly.

I was there together with I think, Mr Bosch to make sure that the grounds were secure. After that meeting, Mr Williamson called me in and said Jerry there is a chance that we can get this Russian to defect to the Republic.

A plan was drawn up whereby certain ... (tape ends) ...

MR BERGER: Did any of these four incidents involve either Mr Marius Schoon or Mrs Jeannette Schoon?

MR RAVEN: Only the one that I mentioned as far as the Landrover went.

MR BERGER: What was the connection to the Schoon's?

MR RAVEN: Apparently it was in the grounds of the house that they stayed in Vuku close.

MR BERGER: And that incident would have been in 1983?

MR RAVEN: It could possibly, I can't remember.

MR BERGER: We have spent a lot of time on what you did generally. Would you, are you happy that what you told the Committee fairly reflects the type of work that you were involved in during the period 1982 to 1984?

MR RAVEN: Yes, I am.

MR BERGER: I want to move to your political objectives. You deposed to an affidavit or in fact your application for amnesty was confirmed under oath, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And everything that you put in there, everything that is contained in your application, comes from you, is that correct?

MR RAVEN: No, there are certain portions that were placed in my application, which I was told by my Attorneys that was a standard insert placed in all the applications that they were handling.

MR BERGER: Why did you agree to insert that into your application?

MR RAVEN: On advice from my Attorneys.

MR BERGER: Did you read it before you signed your application?

MR RAVEN: Yes, I did.

MR BERGER: And you agreed that the contents of your application were correct in all respects and applied to you?

MR RAVEN: That is what I believed I signed, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, when signing an affidavit, you agree with the contents and you say it is the truth, but it doesn't necessarily apply to you. If he says in this affidavit, he spoke about interrogations and he confirmed it as being correct, as within his knowledge, but it doesn't apply to him, because he wasn't necessarily involved in interrogation, so the question wasn't put hundred percent correctly.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, I don't think there is a problem with my question, but I will put it differently.

Why would you put stuff into your application that you felt didn't apply to you?

MR RAVEN: As I have stated, on advice from my Attorney this was a pro forma which was put into all the people's applications and I think in the cross-examination for example, my Attorney said that for instance in the interrogation section, that did not pertain to this application.

MR BERGER: When were you told that?

MR RAVEN: He said now.

MR BERGER: But you see I am talking about when you submitted your application, that was in May of 1997, you read your entire application.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, can I come in here, as you know, we have gone through this I don't know how many times. Every time I have explained to the Committee what the basis of this was, all the applications look the same, the applicants have gone through them, some of it is applicable and some of it is not.

These applications were drawn in a haste before the cut off date in December. We have explained that over, and over and over again Mr Chairman, in all fairness to Mr Berger, I understand his position, because he hasn't been involved in previous hearings, but it is unfair to cross-examine the witness.

Then he must cross-examine me and my Attorney Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, isn't that the position with anybody that goes to an Attorney to fill in documents. The Attorney says well, this is the normal practise, we put this, this and that in and the person signs?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, then there is no point in cross-examining anyone on any affidavit that they make, because they can say my Attorney told me to put this in.

CHAIRPERSON: You can see whether it is just the usual formal stuff put in, or whether it relates to the applicant.

MR BERGER: But Chairperson, with respect, this isn't usual, formal stuff. It relates to an essential requirement for amnesty, and that is the political objective of the applicant. That is fundamental and specific to the applicant himself.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, he has said his Attorney told him to put it in and he put it in and he signed. It is for us to decide whether he has complied with the provisions of the Act.

MR BERGER: Absolutely.

CHAIRPERSON: And has shown that he had political objectives.

MR BERGER: Absolutely Chairperson, that is what I am trying...

CHAIRPERSON: That is not what you have been cross-examining him on for the last half an hour.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I have only just moved to political objectives. For the last half an hour I have been talking about the applicant's daily routine.

Mr Raven, then we will go through this. Would you turn please to page 33 of bundle 1, under the heading Further Political Objectives, do you have it?

MR RAVEN: I do.

MR BERGER: You have three categories, Elimination, Bomb Attacks and Interrogation. And then you go on to The Purpose of Elimination and the first purpose of elimination is intimidation, that is over the page on page 34.

You said that point 1, page 34, this was to prevent further action being taken by them and to take preventative measures and to eliminate potential activists or terrorists.

You said that was applicable to all three applications that you have made?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: How does this relate to Ruth First?

MR RAVEN: Well, it prevented her taking further action.

MR BERGER: Because you killed her?

MR RAVEN: Because she was killed.

MR BERGER: And the same for Jeannette Schoon and Katryn Schoon?

MR RAVEN: Well, firstly in the case of the Schoon's, it was a question of they were pushed further away from our borders, from Botswana up to Angola, from action taken by I don't know who, and it would appear that one of the devices I made, ended up in their possession.

In the case of Mr Slovo, we heard that he would move house regularly, maybe he wouldn't sleep in the same house two nights after each other.

MR BERGER: Why do you mention Mr Slovo?

MR RAVEN: Well, you have just asked me on the contents. This was the previous further action taken by them. I am just giving you an example.

MR BERGER: But why are you referring to Mr Slovo?

MR RAVEN: I don't see why not. I mean you are asking me this was to prevent further action taken by them. He was part of the ANC/SACP alliance structure group.

MR BERGER: Yes, but he wasn't killed by a parcel bomb or a letter bomb?

MR RAVEN: But here we are not talking about who was killed. Here I understand you are asking me about political motivation.

MR BERGER: My question to you was how does number 1 on page 34, relate to Ruth First, Jeannette Schoon and Katryn Schoon? That was my question, I never mentioned Joe Slovo.

CHAIRPERSON: You must listen to the question because counsel did carefully put three names to you and asked you how this applied to those. He didn't ask you for a general discussion.

MR RAVEN: I beg your indulgence sir, sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: Answer the question.

MR RAVEN: Well, it would prevent further action, that was from the Schoon's and Ruth First.

MR BERGER: Who told you that Mr Slovo used to move house?

MR RAVEN: I think it was general knowledge in the Intelligence community.

MR BERGER: Mr Slovo was a regular topic of conversation?

MR RAVEN: I would say rather regular.

MR BERGER: Was this in meetings or was this gossip?

MR RAVEN: No, I would say this was often in cases of where we would have in your Sanhedrin, in your mini-Sanhedrin, you would have what they called "'n daaglikse veiligheidsoorsig", which is then a daily update and report would come through that a source report, that Slovo is no longer living at point A, he has now moved to point B, but he was at point C, he slept last night, that sort of thing.

MR BERGER: Coming back to page 34 number 1, was it your view at the time that Ms First was a potential activist or terrorist?

MR RAVEN: At the time, I think, yes.

MR BERGER: On the basis of what information that you had?

MR RAVEN: Well, on the basis of daily Security reports that were circulated, the nature of which I cannot now after these years say it was this specific report that brought it to my notice.

MR BERGER: I am sure it would stick in your mind the primary reason why Ms Ruth First was considered a potential activist or terrorist. What was the nub of the Intelligence that you got?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't get the Intelligence as such. One must remember that I made the device, not knowing who the recipient was.

MR BERGER: But your evidence now was Mr Raven, that at the time, 1982, on the basis of information that you got at Sanhedrin meetings and mini-Sanhedrin meetings, you Jerry Raven, considered Ruth First a potential activist or terrorist?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: What was that information?

MR RAVEN: It could have been that she was a member of the SACP hierarchy, the ANC hierarchy. At this moment in time, I cannot remember.

MR BERGER: But she wasn't a member of the SACP hierarchy or the ANC hierarchy?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just enquire, is my learned friend putting that she was not a member of the ANC or SACP or does he refer specifically to the hierarchy, meaning the - yes, I just want to make clear Mr Chairman, for purposes of cross-examination.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I have been told to choose my words very carefully. I am choosing my words very carefully.

MR RAVEN: Maybe hierarchy was an incorrect term then, was an active member of either or both parties.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that a basis for assassination, that someone was an active member of a party, of either of those parties?

MR RAVEN: Mr Chairman, bearing in mind that I didn't know that she was the recipient of the parcel.

CHAIRPERSON: The question counsel is asking you is you have said, nothing to do with the parcel, that in your view she was a potential activist or a terrorist? But you said that was in your view in 1982 and counsel is asking you how could you come, why did you come to this view?

MR RAVEN: I said it was either through daily Security reports, it could have been during our Security course that we did back in 1979. At this moment of time I cannot give a definite answer and say this is why I came to that conclusion.

MR BERGER: What is the difference Mr Raven between a potential activist and a potential terrorist?

MR RAVEN: I would say an activist would be a, it might be too light a term to use, is a non-combatant who is not personally involved at grassroots level in actively taking part in acts of terrorism as opposed to a terrorist who is also a member of said organisation, who does the acts of terrorism, planting bombs, etc, etc.

I say the activist is the person maybe who was the planning of that.

MR BERGER: Now, as far as information you got relating to Ruth First is concerned, did you receive any information that she was responsible for acts of terror, planting bombs and that qualified her to be called a terrorist in your mind?

MR RAVEN: I can't remember that at all.

MR BERGER: So then, on the basis of the information that you had at the time, 1982, Ruth First was a potential activist not a potential terrorist, would that be correct?

MR RAVEN: It could be.

MR BERGER: No, no Mr Raven. I am asking you about your mind in 1982 on the basis of the information that you had.

CHAIRPERSON: He didn't say he didn't have any information, he said he can't remember if he had any.

MR BERGER: No Chairperson, as far as planting bombs and acts of terror?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he said he can't remember if he had any information if she did this.

MR BERGER: No, he said not at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you say you can't remember if you had that information?

MR RAVEN: I said I can't remember what information I had, if I had any information.

MR BERGER: My recollection is different, but I will move on. In your mind in 1982, was Ruth First a potential activist or a potential terrorist?

MR RAVEN: I don't know.

MR BERGER: But you must know Mr Raven.

MR RAVEN: If I must know, I would have said yes or no. If I don't know, I don't know. We are going back, what 16 years now.

MR BERGER: Was this sentence put in, is this the pro forma part?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Does this apply to you?

MR RAVEN: This is part of what my Attorney said is a standard insertion in the application.

MR BERGER: Well, if you had to describe Ruth First, would you have described her as a potential activist or potential terrorist or don't you know?

MR RAVEN: I don't know.

MR BERGER: We are talking about 1982, you don't know?

MR RAVEN: I don't know.

MR BERGER: In 1982, you might have described Ruth First as neither?

MR RAVEN: If I could remember what activities she was busy with, I may be able to have placed her into one or other of the categories. More an activist than a terrorist, but at this moment in time, I cannot remember.

MR BERGER: Let me try and help your memory. Do you know that after she left South Africa, Ruth First went to England?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't know that.

MR BERGER: Do you know that in England she became a well known and respected speaker, much in demand at anti-apartheid meetings?

MR RAVEN: What year was that?

MR BERGER: In England, while she was in England.

MR RAVEN: What year?

MR BERGER: In the 1960's, the 1970's?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't know that.

MR BERGER: Did you know that she was an authority on Africa, that she was invited to international conferences, that she had served as a Judge on one of the international tribunals held to investigate what was happening in Ethiopia?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't know that.

MR BERGER: Did you know that she was an ordinary member of the ANC and the SACP?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't know that.

MR BERGER: Did you know that she was a well known anti-apartheid speaker?

MR RAVEN: That may have come to my attention.

MR BERGER: Did you know that she was neither a member of the ANC National Executive Committee, nor of the Communist Party Central Committee?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't know that.

MR BERGER: In fact, she had never been a member of the ANC NEC, she had been a member of the Communist Party Central Committee, but not since the early 1960's. Did you know any of that?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't.

MR BERGER: If Ruth First was a highly vocal anti-apartheid activist concerned with the struggle for human rights in South Africa and articulating that on every international platform, would that have qualified her as a target for assassination?

MR RAVEN: No, I don't think so.

MR BERGER: Did you know what Ruth First was doing in Mozambique?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't.

MR BERGER: Did you know that she was training students, Mozambican students in research techniques?

MR RAVEN: I just said I don't know what she was doing in Mozambique.

MR BERGER: So it would be pointless for me to ask you anything about her work in Mozambique?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: What about Jeannette Schoon 1984, what qualified her as a potential activist or terrorist?

MR RAVEN: I don't know.

MR BERGER: And Katryn Schoon, six year old Katryn Schoon, what qualified her as a potential activist or terrorist?

MR RAVEN: There is nothing that could classify her as either.

MR BERGER: Did you know what Marius and Jeannette Schoon were doing in Angola in 1984?

MR RAVEN: No, I did not.

MR BERGER: Or in Lobango in 1984?

MR RAVEN: No, I did not.

MR BERGER: Did you even know that they were in Lobango in 1984?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't.

MR BERGER: You knew they were in Botswana before that?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: You knew that their children were with them?

MR RAVEN: I had never seen any of the children with them.

MR BERGER: Then how did you know that Marius and Jeannette Schoon were in Botswana?

MR RAVEN: I said I was sent to verify the presence of a Landrover with a certain registration number. When that was reported back, I perceived this is what the person wanted to hear to verify that their presence was still there.

MR BERGER: But you never saw them there?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't.

MR BERGER: But you never saw them there?

MR RAVEN: No, I didn't.

MR BERGER: So you had no idea what Marius and Jeannette Schoon were doing in Botswana before they left for Angola, nor did you know what they were doing in Angola?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: You knew when you made the letter bombs, I am putting to you, if you disagree you can say so, that a letter bomb can kill innocent people, am I right?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Why did you not ask Mr Williamson to whom the letter bombs were being sent?

MR RAVEN: Simply because of the need to know principle.

MR BERGER: So the need to know principle can be invoked to justify the death of innocent people?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: But this is more than a need to know principle here Mr Raven. As I understand it, you were given envelopes with people's names and addresses on them. Nobody was keeping it from you? You were given that, why didn't you look?

MR RAVEN: Sir, Mr Chairman, if Mr Williamson had said this is going there and there, it doesn't matter. All my instructions were to construct. If he didn't tell me, it was because I wasn't supposed to know.

CHAIRPERSON: He told you to construct a bomb to go into that envelope?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: He gave you a specific envelope and he wanted a bomb to fit into that envelope. Surely that indicates that he was telling you to construct a bomb to go to those people?

MR RAVEN: No, he said ...

CHAIRPERSON: Or that person?

MR RAVEN: No, he said construct a bomb to go into that envelope.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR RAVEN: It was not my place ...

CHAIRPERSON: No effort to conceal it from you?

MR RAVEN: And there was no effort on my part, Mr Chairman, to find out to who it went.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were prepared to make a bomb, to kill somebody, and make no effort to find out who they were, although all you had to do was look at the piece of paper in front of you? Is that what you are telling us?

MR RAVEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You chose not to find out?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were prepared to kill people where you might have thought their death was a complete mistake?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, with respect, the testimony was that the address was covered. The testimony was that the address was covered on the envelope.

CHAIRPERSON: There was some form of covering in the one case, there was no such evidence in the Schoon case?

MR DU PLESSIS: In both Mr Chairman. He testified that the incident happened exactly the same and that means that it happened in both incidents Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you telling us now that this covering of the envelope was such, you couldn't have looked at the address?

MR RAVEN: No, I couldn't have looked without taking and actually damaging perhaps the envelope.

CHAIRPERSON: How, tell me about this cover now that you would have to damage the envelope to look at it, but you were going to put a bomb into it.

MR RAVEN: It was some type of 3M sticking tape that was covering the address.

CHAIRPERSON: Sticky tape on the envelope?

MR RAVEN: Yes, sticking tape, but not sticking tape as in sellotape. Sticking tape as in these flags that you use on documents.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, which leaves a residue on the envelope?

MR RAVEN: Unless it is taken off properly.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR RAVEN: Now that wasn't for me to take off, that is why when I placed the IED's inside the envelope, I didn't seal them either. I didn't know if the recipient from my end, when I gave them to Mr Williamson, who gave them to Mr Goosen or whatever the case may be, who the other persons were, what their intention was with it. My instruction started and ended with the construction of the IED and the placing of it in this envelope.

CHAIRPERSON: And you weren't interested?

MR RAVEN: I was not interested, I did not need to know so I could at any time deny and be truthful in saying, I didn't know about it.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, how do you know that the name and address on the Ruth First envelope was totally covered?

MR RAVEN: I never, as far as I can remember, I never removed that envelope completely from the large envelope.

MR BERGER: Then how do you know that the name and address was totally covered?

MR RAVEN: I say as far as I can remember.

MR BERGER: As far as you can recall, there was a piece of paper stuck over the name and address on the envelope to Ms First?

MR RAVEN: That is if I can recollect it correctly, yes. But the thing is I can't remember when I removed the envelope to look at it, whether it was looking backwards towards me or with the address side towards me, that I cannot remember.

Bearing in mind, I didn't remove the envelope completely and take measurements of it.

MR BERGER: If you can't remember if the back was facing you or if the front was facing you, then how can you remember that there was something stuck over the name and the address? You might have been looking at the back, and it might have been stuck over the front. You wouldn't have seen it?

MR RAVEN: And vice versa is also the fact that could have been.

MR BERGER: Well, if you were looking at the back, why are you making up this story about sticky tape on the name and the address, you would never have seen it on the first place?

MR RAVEN: I said I never knew who it was going to.

MR BERGER: No, no Mr Raven, please listen to what I am saying. You are saying you could quite easily have been looking at the back of the envelope or the front?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: You didn't look at both sided of the envelope?

MR RAVEN: Well, I didn't take it out.

MR BERGER: Exactly, so you didn't look at both sides of the envelope?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: So you could have been looking at the back?

MR RAVEN: Correct, I could have.

MR BERGER: And the name and the address wouldn't have been on the back?

MR RAVEN: No.

MR BERGER: So then you wouldn't have seen any sticky paper covering the name and the address?

MR RAVEN: No.

MR BERGER: So why are you talking about sticky paper covering the name and the address?

MR RAVEN: Because it could just as well have been on the front of one of the two cases, where I didn't see the address because it came out the other way and there was sticky tape, I couldn't see the address, therefore it was really a need to know.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, your evidence is sounding absurd. Do you recognise that?

MR RAVEN: That may be your opinion, yes.

MR BERGER: You see Mr Williamson's evidence was that he took a peak at the Ruth First envelope and he saw the name, I beg your pardon, not the name, he definitely didn't see the name, he says, he saw the address Eduardo Mondlani University, Maputo, Mozambique. He saw that.

He never said there was a sticky piece of paper stuck over the address?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, his evidence was that he lifted a piece of paper over the address, up with his pen and he looked at it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, not that it was stuck onto it, that he lifted it up with his pen and he saw the name of the University and the town.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, Mr Chairman, we can look at the record again. My recollection was that he testified that it was a piece of paper over the address. Now if it was stuck on it or not ...

CHAIRPERSON: Don't you remember him saying he saw the name of the University?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I remember that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so it wasn't over it.

MR DU PLESSIS: And he used a pen to lift up the paper that was covering the address Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, not stuck on.

MR BIZOS: With respect Mr Chairman, he used the pen to lift the envelope, not a piece of paper, the outside envelope and not a piece of paper on the envelope.

MR BERGER: He also said that there were loose pieces of paper in the envelope and that he lifted them up to look at the, with his pen, to have a look at the intercepted envelope and that is how he saw the address.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, we will have to look at the record, but I am pretty sure of the evidence that I heard.

ADV DE JAGER: I think Mr Berger is putting it correct. There was evidence about lifting loose papers, there were loose papers in the envelope.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I can recall clearly in my cross-examination of Mr Williamson, that I covered this point.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, do you remember the demonstration that you gave this morning, about how you took the envelope gingerly out of the large brown envelope?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And you barely took it out and then you put it back in?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I think he indicated that he took it slightly less than half the other envelope out of the larger one?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: Now, if you can remember that, surely you can remember what you saw on the front of the envelope?

MR RAVEN: I was not looking for any names or addresses, I was simply looking to ascertain the size of the envelope which was inside the official envelope, the intercepted postal piece.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, you know need to know, can't cover you in every circumstance. Need to know means you only get given the information that you need to know, am I right?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: You were given the envelope containing the intercepted envelope by Mr Williamson, correct?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: You opened it in his office, correct?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: And you gingerly took out the A4 envelope that was inside, correct?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: So by the time you left Mr Williamson's office, you already knew that the intercepted envelope inside was size A4, correct?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: Well then my question to you is, what did you need to take the envelope for you if you already knew that?

MR RAVEN: Because I had to lock it in my filing cabinet, should I have to for any other reason, go back and look at it, because I hadn't formulated the format of the IED simply by looking at it and simply saying, right, I am going to do X, Y and Z.

I had to think about it, I had to plan it out.

MR BERGER: What possible other reason could you have needed other than to look at the name on the envelope?

MR RAVEN: I don't understand your question.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, he has given the reason. With respect, he has answered that question, he has given the reason. The envelope was to be kept in his filing cabinet, so that when he constructs the bomb, when he has planned the bomb, he wants to look at it again.

CHAIRPERSON: I understood his evidence was that the large covering envelope was also put in his filing cabinet, so it doesn't explain why he had to take this other one out.

He didn't put it in his filing cabinet separately, he put the one, both of them, and that is the question he is being asked. He has given the reply he has chosen to give.

MR BERGER: Yes Chairperson. I will suggest to you why you took the envelope with you Mr Raven and that was because you needed the exact dimensions of the intercepted mail item in order to ensure that whatever you put inside, fitted snugly, isn't that right?

MR RAVEN: No, it is not correct.

MR BERGER: And your evidence is that after sizing up the intercepted item in Mr Williamson's office and registering this is A4, you put it back inside the large brown envelope, you took the large brown envelope, the loose documents inside, the intercepted item inside, back to your office, put it in your file, locked it there, did what you had to do, unlocked it, returned it to Mr Williamson. That is your evidence?

MR RAVEN: After inserting the IED, yes.

MR BERGER: You could have if you had wanted to, you could have taken a peak like Mr Williamson did, am I right?

MR RAVEN: It is possible.

MR BERGER: Why didn't you?

MR RAVEN: It wasn't my place to know the recipient.

MR BERGER: Did Mr Williamson tell you that you shouldn't look at the name on the envelope?

MR RAVEN: It wasn't necessary.

MR BERGER: Did Mr Williamson tell you that you shouldn't look at the name on the envelope?

MR RAVEN: It wasn't necessary for him to tell me, it was a need to know, otherwise he would have told me this is going to X, Y, Z. He didn't do that, the result, I didn't have to know.

MR BERGER: No, the reason he didn't tell you was because he gave you the envelope, you could find out for yourself?

The reason Mr Williamson didn't say as you say, this is going to X, Y, Z, is because he gave you the actual envelope, you knew who it was going to?

MR RAVEN: If he told me that in the first place, it wouldn't be necessary for me to peak and I didn't peak because I didn't need to know.

And as far as I can remember as I said, I have recollections that the name was covered up.

MR BERGER: Well, you can't have it both ways Mr Raven. Either the name was covered up and you couldn't see or it wasn't covered up and you didn't bother to see, which one is it?

MR DU PLESSIS: No Mr Chairman, with respect, that question is totally totally unfair. The evidence is that he took the envelope out, he looked at the envelope how big it was, he saw the address was covered, he put it back into the big envelope, he put it into his filing cabinet.

Mr Williamson testified that he gave him the big envelope with the other envelope inside, with the documents inside. Mr Williamson testified that he wasn't present when he manufactured the bomb, and that is the evidence Mr Chairman.

To put two alternatives which are both inconsistent with both those versions, is totally unfair.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, when you demonstrated this morning on how you took the envelope out, you indicated that you only took out approximately the top third of the envelope, correct?

MR RAVEN: It could have been more, it could have been less. At this time I can't say I pulled out five cm or six cm or half the envelope. I can't be exact at this time and date after the act, as to say how much of the envelope came out.

MR BERGER: Could you demonstrate how you put the item back into the envelope, this is now after you had made the bomb?

MR RAVEN: Yes, I could.

MR BERGER: Please do it again.

MR RAVEN: Bearing in mind that this will be completely sealed, it will have no edges that will catch anywhere, that was inside, it is a question of bringing it out so that I had an opening, insert, which will then go easily as I say.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you wearing rubber gloves at the time?

MR RAVEN: I was wearing rubber gloves at the time of manufacturing the device, but not when handling, because that is why I used my knuckles, because it would look strange walking around Head Office ...

CHAIRPERSON: No, I am talking when you put the bomb back in?

MR RAVEN: No. That is why I had it in my briefcase and at all times it was handled, as I said it is difficult to do it now because it is falling to pieces, but that is why you use the knuckles to stop fingerprints.

CHAIRPERSON: The demonstration you have just given, you held the various envelopes with your fingers, your fingerprints would have been all over them?

MR RAVEN: Yes, but I was under the impression that the question was how it was inserted.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and you demonstrated it by holding it in the ordinary manner?

MR RAVEN: Yes, but the thing is I said there I am holding with my knuckles. This one as I said, bearing in mind that this would be a solid item. I mean I can't hold it like that now and try and guide these corners to show how it would go in. I need to hold it with my fingers.

CHAIRPERSON: But you were holding it with your fingers open, over it when you demonstrated it a minute or two ago, not with your knuckles?

MR RAVEN: Yes. No, but as I am saying Mr Chairman, that was now to help get it in because it has got too many angles sticking out.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I just want to point out he did testify about that in evidence in chief. He did testify about that in evidence in chief, how he held it.

CHAIRPERSON: When he took it out for the first time, he did not testify in evidence in chief, how he held it when he returned it.

MR BERGER: That is so Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: He demonstrated in chief how he held it with his knuckles when he pulled it out, because he didn't want to get his fingerprints on it, but that was before he had gone away to make the bomb.

MR VISSER: I remembered that he did, but I may be wrong Mr Chairman, but in any case, that is for argument.

MR BERGER: My learned friend is wrong, and Mr Raven the reason I asked you to demonstrate again was because you demonstrated in exactly the same way as you demonstrated in your evidence in chief, when you put the envelope back into the intercepted item, in chief as well as now, you held the envelope with your fingers so that your fingerprints were all over the IED.

MR RAVEN: Right, now the reason therefore as I explained now to the Chairman, is that in the case of the IED, it was a completely sealed envelope which had weight, which had no sharp angles that were lifting up, so to get it into the envelope here, I couldn't just use my knuckles because you've got angles sticking out.

I had to put it in to show you how, because the argument was going or the contention or the misconception is the amount of envelopes and how the envelopes worked. What I was trying to demonstrate here was how the envelopes, the three envelopes came into work, it wasn't a question of this angle sticking out like that and now I've got to bend it forward to get it in.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, why didn't you simply once you had made the bomb, go into your office, close the door, put on your rubber gloves and insert the envelope properly so that you wouldn't have to use your knuckles?

MR RAVEN: Because my rubber gloves were at the workshop, I didn't take them with me.

MR BERGER: You see Mr Williamson also testified that when you brought the bomb back to him, he looked inside the envelope and it looked exactly as it had looked when he gave it to you in the first place. Did you hear that evidence?

MR RAVEN: Yes.

MR BERGER: And there was nothing sticking on the envelope, the loose pages, the intercepted item and inside the large brown envelope.

Do you have any comment on that?

MR RAVEN: Well, it was the large envelope, the intercepted envelope, my IED inside the envelope and the loose documentation which presumably was with the original intercepted mail piece in the large envelope, that is how I gave it back.

MR BERGER: Subsequently his evidence was that there was a large brown envelope, this is the official one, and inside there were the loose documents, the intercepted mail item and your envelope. In other words, your envelope was not in the intercepted mail item?

MR DU PLESSIS: No Mr Chairman, with respect Mr Chairman, he didn't testify to that. I am pretty sure about that, because I knew from my cross-examination from Mr Williamson that this was an issue which had to be canvassed in detail. He never testified as far as I can remember that when he got it back, the bomb envelope, was separate from the intercepted mail item.

He testified that he looked at the envelope, the large envelope, he saw the documents and he saw the intercepted mail item and it looked the same.

Mr Chairman, we will have to look at the record eventually again, it seems like, if we are going to have ...

ADV DE JAGER: It is a pity, it seems that the only people taking notes are the Committee members. We must now try and see from our notes because I have watched around and I didn't see counsel taking any notes or Attorneys taking notes about the evidence.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I've got notes Mr Chairman, if you will bear with me.

ADV DE JAGER: Well, refer us to your notes then.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, our notes are that the way I put it to Mr Raven, is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Berger, could you perhaps assist us, when round about was this question asked?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, my Attorneys Clerk is looking for the exact place and we will give it to you in due course, can I move on to other issues.

Oh, apparently we have it Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: I think it will take quite a while for us to find it, perhaps you could move on.

MR BERGER: I will move on. Mr Raven, you say that you followed exactly the same procedure in relation to the bomb that was sent to Marius and Jeannette Schoon?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: If indeed it was sent to Marius and Jeannette Schoon?

MR RAVEN: If it was sent to Marius and Jeannette Schoon.

MR BERGER: The reason I say that is because, have you heard the cross-examination about the letter being sent only to Marius Schoon?

MR RAVEN: No, I have not.

MR BERGER: You wouldn't be able to say if the letter was sent to Marius Schoon, Jeannette Schoon or both of them?

MR RAVEN: I couldn't say because I never saw the address.

MR BERGER: And that was also because there was a piece of paper stuck over the name and address?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And you saw that this time as well?

MR RAVEN: It could have caught my eye.

MR BERGER: And you also just pulled it out using your knuckles about a third of the way, out of the envelope?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And you also put it, after you had made the bomb, you put it into the intercepted mail item?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: So there is absolutely no difference whatsoever in your action in relation to the Ruth First bomb as opposed to the Jeannette Schoon bomb?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Also A4, exactly the same?

MR RAVEN: It was identical.

MR BERGER: I want to put it to you at this stage, that you are lying, both in relation to the letter bomb that was sent to Ruth First, you know it was sent to Ruth First and you don't want to admit that now.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, does my learned friend have any basis for saying that? Any factual basis?

MR BERGER: I think I have established that already.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is there any factual basis Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: You are putting that as a fact, have you any basis for it?

MR BERGER: Yes. His evidence is so totally ...

CHAIRPERSON: That you can put, but the way you put the question, it would indicate that you have factual evidence to that effect.

MR BERGER: That is was sent to Ruth ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Bizos agrees with that?

MR BERGER: That it was sent to Ruth First?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Yes, there will be evidence about that.

MR BIZOS: From the people that were there.

CHAIRPERSON: And that he knew, is what you put to him?

MR BERGER: Well, I am putting it to him that he knew on the basis of the cross-examination up to now.

And there will also be, not as far as what was inside your head, but as far as the fact that it was addressed to Ruth First, there will be evidence from the people who were there when the bomb exploded.

MR RAVEN: I wasn't there so I can't comment on that, but I don't know who the recipients of the two IED's were that were manufactured.

CHAIRPERSON: You see the evidence, I have now found my note of Mr Williamson's evidence as to the First envelope. He said I used a pen to push the documents aside and saw that it was addressed to the University. No mention of something stuck over it so you couldn't see the address.

In respect of the second one, he says that the parcel was addressed to the Schoon's, which would indicate that there was nothing over that either. You said you never looked at the addresses?

MR RAVEN: I never looked at the addresses.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you didn't, you said you couldn't see the address in the First case because there was something stuck over the address?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I don't want to dispute your notes, all I want to say Mr Chairman, is that it will be important to have a look at the record, because I didn't take notes because I was cross-examining during that stage, but I know distinctly and clearly that I did cover that point with Mr Williamson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, in your cross-examination you have those answers.

MR DU PLESSIS: And I know that he testified that the address was covered with something over it Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Not in the second case, do you agree? The second case he knew perfectly well who it was going to?

MR DU PLESSIS: Not in the second case, he testified that he looked at the address in the second case, yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Any more questions?

MR BERGER: Yes Chairperson. Mr Raven, so that I understand your evidence correctly, in both cases there was something stuck over the name and address so that you were unable to see to who the letters were addressed?

MR RAVEN: To my recollection, correct.

MR BERGER: Please turn to page 55 of bundle 1. Do you have it?

MR RAVEN: I have it.

MR BERGER: This is your amnesty application in relation to the bomb that killed Ruth First?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: You have already explained that what you put down here as Mr Williamson instructing you to construct two explosive devices, is incorrect?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: On two separate occasions Mr Williamson instructed you to construct an explosive device in the form of a letter and that on both occasions, is it your evidence that he said it should be constructed in an envelope of A4 size and approximately 30 to 40 pages thick?

MR RAVEN: He did not say the size, he gave me instructions to construct the IED's and he showed me the size, or I looked at the size of the envelope that it should be, and the thickness.

MR BERGER: How did you know that it should be approximately 30 to 40 pages thick?

MR RAVEN: At a glance I could see the amount of pages that were in the large official envelope, together with the intercepted postal envelope.

MR BERGER: The 30 to 40 pages were already out of the intercepted envelope?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: How did you have a look at those 30 to 40 pages?

MR RAVEN: I saw them head on.

MR BERGER: Because you took a peak inside the brown envelope?

MR RAVEN: Well, I had to look inside to see how thick the pages were going to be, so all I saw them was head on.

MR BERGER: No, you had that big brown envelope, A3 size or was it A5?

MR RAVEN: A3.

MR BERGER: A3, and you looked inside and the contents would have fallen to the bottom?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: As you looked inside?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: So why didn't you just have a look then at the address?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I don't understand my learned friend. When he is saying the contents fell to the bottom, is he saying that it fell out of the envelope to the floor, or does he say that it fell to the bottom of the envelope, still inside the envelope?

MR BERGER: I didn't say it fell to the floor, I said it fell to the bottom, meaning the bottom of the envelope. You know, you had that big brown envelope, you looked inside, it was facing you from the ...

MR RAVEN: Perhaps I can demonstrate.

MR BERGER: No, I've also got one, it is fine. Here is your A4 envelope, right, it is inside. Here is an A4 envelope.

MR DU PLESSIS: There weren't so many.

MR BERGER: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: There weren't so many.

MR BERGER: I am not joking. Here is the A4 envelope with 35 pages inside. Take them out, take out this one. Should I put the loose papers on the top or underneath?

MR RAVEN: Immaterial.

MR BERGER: No, no, how were they positioned when you looked inside the envelope that was addressed to Ruth First?

MR RAVEN: I can't, it is 16 years ago, I can't remember that if it was at the top or the bottom.

MR BERGER: Well, Mr Williamson said he had to lift them up to have a look at the address, so we will assume that they were on top?

Do you see what I mean when I say falls to the bottom?

MR RAVEN: I can't see from here, but I take your word for it.

CHAIRPERSON: What you mean is that the end of the sheets of papers, are against the bottom of the envelope and the rest of the sheets of paper, come up into the envelope?

MR BERGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: They are not like little balls of marbles or something that fall to the bottom, they are sheets of paper that remain?

MR BERGER: Yes. So you looked inside like this, would that be correct?

MR RAVEN: No.

MR BERGER: Well, then how did you look inside?

MR RAVEN: From the top. Because remember I pulled out the intercepted envelope.

MR BERGER: So you put your hand in?

MR RAVEN: Yes, remember using your knuckles, pulled out the envelope to ascertain the size, looked in, could see the amount of documents.

MR BERGER: I put my fist in, I have to open it to get my fist in.

MR RAVEN: Yes.

MR BERGER: And then I pull this out.

MR RAVEN: Yes, and?

MR BERGER: And then I look inside?

MR RAVEN: Yes, and you can see how many documents are inside.

MR BERGER: And you saw 30 to 40?

MR RAVEN: Approximately.

MR BERGER: Now, if you are looking down the front to have a look at the 30 to 40, you see the address?

MR RAVEN: If the envelope was that way around, possible. But I said I took it out as you are holding it now.

MR BERGER: And if it was this way around, in other words, towards me, you would see the address here?

MR RAVEN: But you wouldn't see the documents because the documents are this side now.

MR BERGER: You've got to see both Mr Raven, that is my point?

MR RAVEN: Not simultaneously.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you are forgetting, aren't you, that the address was covered, there was something stuck over it?

MR BERGER: Then we go on on page 44 Mr Raven. You describe at the bottom of page 44 what you have already told us and at the top of page 45 you say if the envelope was opened from either end and the contents removed, the circuit would be closed and the detonation would take place.

Now, you heard Mr Williamson giving evidence and he said that the documents would have to be taken out of the envelope in order for the circuit to be closed and the explosion to take place. Was he correct?

MR RAVEN: Correct, that is what I am saying here.

MR BERGER: The documents would, in other words, the ...

CHAIRPERSON: The documents would have to be moved either way, it would not be removed entirely as I recollect from your evidence, probably an inch or two would be sufficient to set off the explosion?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: So they wouldn't have to be taken out completely?

MR RAVEN: No, no.

CHAIRPERSON: While we are on this aspect that has just been read to you, did Mr Williamson tell you what quantity of explosives should be used?

MR RAVEN: I think Brigadier Goosen had intimated to him that it must be of the strength of approximately a handgrenade which is in explosive alone, approximately 100 grams.

CHAIRPERSON: And he told you this, did he?

MR RAVEN: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, the page 45 which continues, it says specifically the envelope was opened from either end and the contents removed, not merely moved.

MR BERGER: Well, that is as I understood, exactly what Mr Williamson's evidence was Mr Chairperson.

MR RAVEN: Mr Chairman, what I am intimating here is that should the documents be moved, or the removal thereof, would complete the circuit.

MR BERGER: That is not what you say Mr Raven.

MR RAVEN: Well, if the contents were being removed, that removal process would end within the first inch or inch and a half.

MR BERGER: Alright, I will leave that. There is no mention whatsoever in your statement about a large official brown envelope, an intercepted mail item or the contents of an intercepted mail item. Would you agree Mr Raven?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And that is because your story now, your evidence now is a reconstruction based on what Mr Williamson has said, isn't that right?

MR RAVEN: To a certain extent, yes.

MR BERGER: Why is there no mention at pages 44 and 45 of the large brown envelope, the intercepted mail item or the contents of that item?

MR RAVEN: Because at the time when I made out these two applications, the fact that I admitted to making these two IED's which would appear took the life of Ruth First, Jeannette Schoon and Katryn, the detail thereof I did not realise would be of such importance.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven ...

MR RAVEN: The fact that I made the bomb, I made two bombs and they were used and they caused the deaths, this is what I am saying in this application.

MR BERGER: Why did you think that the detail in relation to the London bomb was of such importance?

MR RAVEN: Because of political implications, it was more clear in my mind. As we said earlier here, this case I've got in my mind then as one occurrence, which was actually two over a period of two years.

MR BERGER: No, but you see you didn't say that you couldn't remember the details. You said that the details weren't important, you didn't think that the details were important. That is why you left them out of page 44 and 45.

MR RAVEN: Yes?

MR BERGER: But my point is you considered the details for the London bomb, important. Why for the London bomb if not for this bomb?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I didn't let Mr Raven read this, but on page 42 you will see that as in every other application that we have made, we have stated the following, I have endeavoured to draft this application as comprehensively as possibly.

Further evidence in respect of the relevant facts which could not be included in this application, due to time constraints, will be given verbally or by submitting further documentation at my hearing. I didn't let Mr Raven read that, he confirmed that page, but it is said there.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, you knew that Mr Williamson had identified you as being responsible for the bomb that killed Ruth First and Jeannette and Katryn Schoon, you knew that?

MR RAVEN: Would you say that again?

MR BERGER: You knew from 1995 that Mr Williamson had identified you as being responsible?

MR RAVEN: I believe there was a report in the newspapers.

MR BERGER: Yes, February 1995, correct?

MR RAVEN: If you say so.

MR BERGER: And then in 1996, Ms Gillian Slovo came to interview you at Mattress World in Pretoria, do you remember that?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And during that interview she asked you whether you were the man who made the bomb that killed her mother and you denied it, do you remember that?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And she said to you but Craig Williamson is naming you and your response was, well Craig Williamson is saying wild and wonderful things these days.

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And Ms Slovo asked you what are you going to do if Mr Williamson, or what are you going to do at the TRC, what is your attitude in relation to the TRC, do you remember that?

MR RAVEN: No, I don't remember that.

MR BERGER: You don't remember that Ms Slovo discussed the forthcoming TRC with you?

MR RAVEN: No, I can't remember that at all.

MR BERGER: You don't remember that Ms Slovo asked you what if Craig Williamson names you at the TRC?

MR RAVEN: No, I can't remember that.

MR BERGER: Whether you remember that or not, you knew about the TRC and the fact of amnesty proceedings in 1996, am I correct?

MR RAVEN: Yes, I think I am.

MR BERGER: Throughout 1996 and in 1997, you knew that there was this amnesty process and that you might have to apply for amnesty?

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And you chose to wait until the very last moment, being the 9th of May 1997 before you submitted your amnesty application, the cut off date, you will recall, was the 10th of May 1997?

MR RAVEN: If that is the case, I admit it.

MR BERGER: Why did you wait until the last moment?

MR RAVEN: I don't think I had any Attorneys, or Instructing Attorneys to which I could turn.

MR BERGER: When did you first go to your Attorneys?

MR RAVEN: I don't recall the date, you can call my Attorney, I don't know.

MR BERGER: You had ample time to draft an amnesty application Mr Raven? And you didn't, I put it to you, you didn't leave out the details of the large official brown envelope, the intercepted mail item and the loose documents inside, because of a shortage of time.

Aren't I right?

MR RAVEN: No, you are not right.

MR BERGER: You put together ...

CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry, am I now understanding that Mr Williamson put forward a version of a large brown envelope in an endeavour to cover Mr Raven, to give him some excuse for not seeing?

MR BERGER: No, I am not suggesting that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, what is the - what are we to assume from Mr Raven not having mentioned it? That it didn't happen or that he just didn't bother to mention it?

MR BERGER: Mr Raven hasn't told the truth in his amnesty application.

CHAIRPERSON: Not mentioning a detail is not the same as not telling the truth?

MR BERGER: Well, Chairperson ...

CHAIRPERSON: The important fact is he built the device that killed these people, he has said so in his application.

Whether it was given to him in a large brown envelope or not, is not a matter of vital importance is it. He says it was given to him. He made the bomb, and he gave it back.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, the point is not that Mr Williamson has introduced a large brown envelope to protect Mr Raven, the point is that Mr Williamson has introduced the large brown envelope to protect himself.

Because if there wasn't a large brown envelope, then he wouldn't be able to explain or at least attempt to explain, how it was that he never saw the name on the envelope.

If it was the intercepted mail item that was being passed around without a large official brown envelope, well then he would have no excuse for not seeing the name.

CHAIRPERSON: And the Schoon's? Mr Williamson doesn't say he did not see the name?

MR BERGER: Well, one has to be consistent in a lie, and there has to be a, so we are told, there are procedures in place and everything is properly authorised. It would be a bit strange if one method was followed in one instance and then a different method was followed, in another.

In order to be consistent, the brown envelope has to apply to both.

CHAIRPERSON: And to be consistent, you know the name of the target in both? Consistency can be argued both ways. Carry on with your questioning.

MR BERGER: But Chairperson, unfortunately the target, the person who was blown up by the bomb, was Ruth First and she wasn't a legitimate target, so Mr Williamson has to find a target to fudge the issue on who was the target.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understood his evidence, he was arguing that she was.

MR BERGER: Ex post facto, yes. You see Mr Raven, what I am going to suggest to you, what I do suggest to you is that you and Mr Williamson have done a deal. I see how you lift your eyebrows in surprise?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, if my learned friend suggests that, perhaps he should ask the witness if the witness and Mr Williamson had any discussions about this issue before they ...

ADV DE JAGER: I suppose they will do so Mr Du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: But before he makes the suggestion.

ADV DE JAGER: Let's get to the questions and continue now. You can object after he has put his question, but let's have the question and see whether it is a bad question or a good question or rather not bad or good, but whether it is a legitimate question or not.

MR BERGER: Let me put to you what the deal is. The deal is that you retract your evidence about Katryn Schoon being a "bomb disposal unit", or you cast sufficient doubt on that and in return, Mr Williamson accommodates your version of a blank envelope inside or to be put inside an intercepted item. Isn't that the deal?

MR RAVEN: Both cases are ludicrous.

MR BERGER: Okay. Well, then let's look at what you say about Katryn Schoon and her being a "bomb disposal unit".

It is at page 109. Do you have it?

MR RAVEN: I have it.

ADV DE JAGER: Volume 2?

MR BERGER: Volume 2, I am sorry, volume 2, bundle 2, page 109. Your evidence is that you, let me just read it, I am referring to the portion which says on questioning Williamson about the Schoon incident, he said that the letter had been intended for Marius Schoon, but that it served them right.

What is your evidence on that? You don't dispute that Mr Williamson said that it was intended for Marius Schoon?

MR RAVEN: I think I stated here that as far as I can recollect, these are the words uttered to me by Craig Williamson. As far as I can remember.

MR BERGER: I thought this morning you said, you can't remember that?

MR RAVEN: As far as I can remember. Whether I remember it or not, as far as I can remember.

MR BERGER: But that it served them right, who is them?

MR RAVEN: I presume it would be the Schoon's.

MR BERGER: Marius and Jeannette?

MR RAVEN: Yes.

MR BERGER: And Katryn?

MR RAVEN: I don't think it would have included Katryn, she was an innocent victim.

MR BERGER: Then you go further, he alleged that the Schoon's had always used their daughter as their "bomb disposal expert". I had said unit, that is my error, you say expert. On requesting clarification, in other words, you asked him Craig, what do you mean by this, what are you talking about, you go on, he said whenever they received suspicious parcels, they would throw them into the back yard and let the child play with them until such time as they deemed fit to open them.

Now, when Mr Williamson was being cross-examined it was put to him by your counsel, that you would say that you were not sure that he had said this. Do you remember that?

MR RAVEN: I think so.

MR BERGER: You were sure that he had said this when you submitted your amnesty application in May 1997, now you are not sure?

MR RAVEN: It was in my mind. The same case of making the two packets at the same time, this utterance in my mind was made by Craig. In my mind, whether I am right or wrong, whether he said it or not, but in my mind, at the time of making this statement, that is what I recollect.

MR BERGER: That wasn't what was put to Mr Williamson. It was put to Mr Williamson that on reflection, you don't think it was him who said it.

MR DU PLESSIS: No Mr Chairman, what I put was that on, I can't remember how I put it, but that it may, it is a possibility that it may have been derived from the newspaper article.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, may I make an appeal through you to Mr Du Plessis. If he is not sure about what he has been said, that he should not interrupt the proceedings and that he should allow his witness to answer the question.

He cannot every time some sort of contradiction is introduced into the evidence, Mr Du Plessis, objects and says he doesn't recall, but he thinks that the record is wrong. It is not - or his witness did not say that, this is not a permissible way of the orderly nature of the proceedings and interrupting the cross-examiner. I would appeal Mr Chairman, that you ask Mr Du Plessis ...

CHAIRPERSON: Most of Mr Du Plessis' interruptions and I will call them interruptions in this way, have been where the cross-examiner purports to put something that Mr Du Plessis said, haven't they? And Mr Du Plessis then has corrected, well, that is not what I think I said.

MR BIZOS: That is not what I think I said Mr Chairman, isn't correct because we all remember and we have a note as to what Mr Du Plessis said.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, let him put it, this is what my note says.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, sorry, on a point of order, this is Mr Berger's cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Levine, there is no point in you interrupting on points of order at this stage. Mr Bizos is leading for those persons, his junior has been asking questions. Mr Bizos has intervened. I don't think it now becomes a matter for general discussion.

I think you are quite entitled to put what your note says, was put. If Mr Du Plessis disagrees, he can re-examine on it. But if you have a note and you make it clear that this is your note of what was said, you can put it.

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't have a problem if he says that that is what his note says, Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, if I could, while I am looking at my notes, there is an earlier note that I have now found, from the evidence of Mr Williamson in relation to the envelopes, he said I gave Mr Raven two envelopes plus documents. I received back from Mr Raven the two envelopes plus documents plus the new white envelope.

The new envelope was to replace the original contents of the intercepted item. That is my note.

ADV DE JAGER: I think there is an ad idem about that. I think even the witness ...

MR BERGER: No, the witness didn't concede.

ADV DE JAGER: The big envelope, the original envelope and the new created one?

MR BERGER: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: So it is the three envelopes?

MR BERGER: No, the new created one the witness said was inside the original envelope, the intercepted envelope.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I don't think it was canvassed at all as far as I can remember, unless I canvassed it, if the bomb was already inside the intercepted mail item when it was handed to Mr Williamson.

I think I canvassed it, but I didn't make notes when I did my own cross-examination so I stand to be corrected, but that is how I remember, how I prepared my cross-examination.

MR BERGER: And then Chairperson, on the second point, my note reads as far as the "bomb disposal expert" is concerned, Mr Raven will say that it is possible that he heard that from someone else.

And also there was a rumour that it was published in the newspaper, but I leave the newspaper for the time being. It is possible that he heard it from someone else, that is what was put to Mr Williamson. Is that your evidence Mr Raven?

MR RAVEN: It is possible.

MR BERGER: You see, that is my point. You are backing down from what you are saying on page 109 of bundle 2, and the reason you are backing down, is because Mr Williamson gave you something in return. No answer?

MR RAVEN: No answer at all.

MR BERGER: Well, the first part of my question, to concede that you are backing down from what is at page 109?

MR RAVEN: I am not backing down. Here I am saying on questioning Williamson about the Schoon incident, this I am writing from recollection, something that happened a long time ago.

In my mind this which is said, was purported in my mind, to be said by Williamson, because I don't think I would have gone and questioned somebody else, Brigadier Goosen or somebody else and said what is this about Jeannette and Katryn.

In my mind I would have said, I would have gone to Williamson.

MR BERGER: You put this in at page 109, deliberately did you not Mr Raven?

MR RAVEN: I put it in deliberately, because this is in my mind what happened. I am trying to come clean, I am trying to tell you the truth, so I put this in here.

In fact if I wanted to protect somebody, I didn't have to put this in.

MR BERGER: No, you see at the time that you put this in, you didn't want to protect Mr Williamson, in fact you were very angry with Mr Williamson, weren't you?

MR RAVEN: I was angry with Mr Williamson, not at this time.

MR BERGER: You were angry with Mr Williamson because he was the person who disclosed your name as being one of the people involved in the death of Ruth First, Jeannette and Katryn Schoon?

MR RAVEN: No, I think the first person that gave that name out, was Dirk Coetzee?

MR BERGER: Yes, but you see you could say Dirk Coetzee was a madman, but then your and I am not saying that he is a madman, I am saying that you could have said that, we all remember what Judge Harms said about Mr Coetzee's evidence at the time of the Harms Commission of Enquiry.

But you couldn't do the same with your Section Leader, because here was the person who was now fingering you as being responsible for the death of Ruth First, Jeannette and Katryn Schoon and you were very angry, were you not?

MR RAVEN: I was disappointed. As I think I said to the newspaper, I was disappointed that Craig had gone to the press and opened these things out.

MR BERGER: You told the newspaper you were very angry?

MR RAVEN: If I have time, I can look for the newspaper cutting, unless you have it.

MR BERGER: If you will just give me a moment, I will find it.

ADV DE JAGER: Was that in one of the Exhibits perhaps, or can't you remember.

MR BERGER: No, it is not an Exhibit, but I do have the article somewhere here. Here we are. This was published in Die Beeld, 21st of February 1995 and you will recall that the article appeared in The Observer, if my memory serves me correctly, on the 19th of February 1995, so that is two days after the article in The Observer.

The heading of the article is "Bomb builder angry at Craig". Let me read to you what the reporter wrote, "I do not want to say anything, I am too angry and too disappointed because Craig Williamson now speaks out", one of the ex Security Policemen says who purportedly made the bomb that exploded at the ANC offices in London, Mr Jerry Raven is one of the men whose name is mentioned by Mr Williamson as a member of a team of seven who were responsible for this explosion. Mr Raven yesterday said that he does not plan to testify before the TRC or to ask for amnesty.

It goes on, I can read the whole article to you if you want.

MR RAVEN: I would like to hear the rest of the article.

MR BERGER: This is a quote from you. "This was outside the country and we were just following orders, it was not necessary to speak of it. It could have political repercussions he had said. He is now the Manager of a shop in Pretoria. Mr Williamson the weekend told a British newspaper that he was the second in command of the team who placed the bomb. He also mentioned the names of the other members. According to him it was Colonel Piet Goosen, later promoted to Brigadier, he is already deceased, Colonel Vic McPherson, still in the police service and he is on leave, before he worked at the District Commissioner's office, Colonel Eugene de Kock, who yesterday denied the charges of murder amongst others and Mr Jimmy Taylor, John Adam and Raven, the bomb was made in the South African Embassy after the parts were sent from South Africa. Mr Williamson said that he helped to doctor the letters that were sent to ANC members, Joe Slovo and Marius Schoon.

It were these letters who caused the death of Mr Slovo's first wife, Ruth First and of Mr Schoon's wife, Jeannette and his daughter Katryn. In another development in the matter, Mr Schoon was going to lay a charge of murder against Mr Williamson because of the death of his wife and daughter, Mr Schoon according to SAPA had said that the people who are guilty of these acts must take responsibility. Can I just take you back, if you go back a bit and say ...

MR RAVEN: That is the end of the article. Who was responsible for the bombs?

MR BERGER: It were these letters ...

MR RAVEN: Further back, further back.

MR BERGER: Mr Williams said that he helped doctor letters ...

MR RAVEN: No, is it saying Mr Williamson helping, or is it Mr Williamson saying, I helped?

MR BERGER: I am just reading to you what the article says.

MR RAVEN: Well, you are making implications that Craig said there that I, doctored the bombs, that is why I was cross with him. That is what you are implying.

MR BERGER: No, you were cross with him because he named you in relation to everything.

MR RAVEN: No, he named me, implication with the London bomb, which Dirk Coetzee had named me already at a previous occasion.

MR BERGER: But you were cross with him about naming you?

MR RAVEN: I said I was disappointed. Cross and disappointment, but disappointed.

MR BERGER: And too cross?

MR RAVEN: That is cross.

MR BERGER: But let's get to what you say here. You now say it is possible that you heard this from someone else, or you say it is possible that you didn't hear it from anybody, you read it in the paper?

MR RAVEN: That is quite possible, yes. I might have discussed that article in the newspaper with Mr Williamson.

CHAIRPERSON: You also in fact gave a reference to where you read it in the newspaper, didn't you?

MR BERGER: If my learned friend could stay out of it this time.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am not going anywhere Mr Chairman, I was trying to get something out of a file.

MR BERGER: Mr Raven, where did you read this article?

MR RAVEN: It would have been in a newspaper.

MR BERGER: Which newspaper?

MR RAVEN: I can't remember at this time.

MR BERGER: When did you read it?

MR RAVEN: After the occurrence.

MR BERGER: Which occurrence?

MR RAVEN: Of the explosion.

MR BERGER: Immediately after?

MR RAVEN: I can't remember, I can't give you the exact date that I read this article.

MR BERGER: Well, how many newspapers did you read, let's say in June/July 1984?

MR RAVEN: Can you tell me how many newspapers you read in June/July 1984?

MR BERGER: Yes, I can.

MR RAVEN: I am not being ...

MR BERGER: Yes, I can.

MR RAVEN: How many?

MR BERGER: I read the Star, I read the Sunday Times, I read the Sunday Express. What did you read Mr Raven?

MR RAVEN: Sunday Times, it could have been an article that was brought to my knowledge from the cutting room at Security Headquarters on the incident.

MR BERGER: Why would it have been brought to your notice?

MR RAVEN: No, it would have been circulated.

MR BERGER: Why?

MR RAVEN: Well, here is can we say an activist which I don't like to use, but here is now a person known, Mr Schoon's wife and daughter who were killed in an explosion.

MR BERGER: You see Mr Raven, it was published in the Cape Times, which is not a newspaper you were reading at the time?

MR RAVEN: That is why I am saying it could possibly have been coming from a clipping from our clipping room. Was it published only in the Cape Times though?

MR BERGER: That is the article that your counsel referred to.

MR RAVEN: I can't dispute that, I can't say it was only in the Cape Times.

MR BERGER: Let me show you the article. Chairperson, we have made copies for everyone, if it could go in as Exhibit MM.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the Cape Times of the 4th of July 1984?

MR BERGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Which was referred to by Mr Du Plessis in his cross-examination as a source?

MR BERGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: A potential source?

MR BERGER: Do you have a copy Mr Raven?

MR RAVEN: I do.

MR BERGER: Cape Times, 4 July 1984. Headline explosive history of letter bombs.

MR RAVEN: That is correct.

MR BERGER: The whole of the first page deals with the history and if you turn over to page 2, you will see top of the page, Mrs Schoon's death has been blamed on apartheid in some quarters and on an internal struggle within the ANC in others.

It is unlikely that the person responsible will ever be arrested. It goes on to talk about a letter bomb. It said mail bombs in general, are notoriously inaccurate because they tend to go off at the wrong moment, something which wouldn't have bothered you, am I right?

MR RAVEN: I don't think this one would have gone off at the wrong time, because of its construction.

MR BERGER: Okay. Then you go on or then they go on, I am sorry, and if you look at the last paragraph, it says according to relatives, the Schoon family used to throw parcels hard into the back garden and let them lay there for a few hours, "that is the silliest way of dealing with mail bombs I have ever heard of", a Security source said.

All the hallmarks of Stratcom would you agree Mr Raven?

MR RAVEN: It could very well be.

MR BERGER: And this is possibly where you got it from and then you perhaps in anger, you attributed it mistakenly to Mr Williamson. Could that be what you are saying now?

MR RAVEN: No, I am not.

MR BERGER: This is where you got it from, and mistakenly you attributed it to Mr Williamson?

MR RAVEN: I said, it could have been from here, it could have been from discussions with Craig about this article, it could have been in my mind that Craig said this.

MR BERGER: It is possible it came from here?

MR RAVEN: It is possible.

MR BERGER: Alright.

MR RAVEN: There is a realm of possibilities here.

MR BERGER: You said it was possible it came from here, and that no one had mentioned it in passing?

MR RAVEN: It is possible.

MR BERGER: Right. Now, look at what is said here, here it says that the family used to throw parcels hard into the back garden and let them lay there for a few hours. Do you see that? No mention of the daughter, Katryn?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: And yet the recollection you have at page 109, is that Mr Williamson mentioned the daughter as being the "bomb disposal expert"?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: So in other words, you didn't get that from this article?

MR RAVEN: No.

MR BERGER: You see what makes it more interesting Mr Raven is that in your evidence in chief this morning, when you were asked about page 109, I noted your evidence down and I noted it down carefully, because you said in my mind, this is, he said, Craig Williamson, that the Schoon's regularly on receiving suspicious parcels, would throw them out into the back yard for a couple of hours.

MR RAVEN: And as I stated there and I made it categorically, I said in my mind's eye. I didn't state it as a fact. I said it as I perceived it, as I remembered it.

MR BERGER: But you see Mr Raven, my point is this what you now remember accords one hundred percent, word for word, with what is in the Cape Times article of the 4th of July 1984. Do you see that, that is what you testified about this morning, you said that is in your mind's eye, remember?

MR RAVEN: Correct.

MR BERGER: But neither of those versions, nor the version that you, neither the version that you spoke about this morning in your evidence in chief, nor the version in the Cape Times, mentions Katryn Schoon, the daughter.

MR RAVEN: Say that again?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, as I understood his evidence this morning, and I am speaking under correction again, is that he confirmed what was stated on page 109.

He was asked certain questions about what was stated on page 109.

MR BERGER: No Chairperson, my learned friend is not correct. I specifically noted it down when he was asked about page 109. He said yes, I was congratulated and when asked to explain the comment about the daughter, he said in my mind, Mr Williamson said that the Schoon's regularly on receiving suspicious parcels, would throw them out into the back yard for a couple of hours, which is precisely what is stated in the Cape Times' article.

My question to you remains Mr Raven, where did you get the version about Katryn Schoon being used as a "bomb disposal expert"?

MR RAVEN: As I said I don't know. As you say it is not in this article. In my mind it is what Craig mentioned to me when we discussed this incident. I can't say where the name Katryn came from, who originated the name Katryn into this concept of the letter bomb.

MR BERGER: It came from Craig Williamson and no one else, do you agree?

MR RAVEN: I cannot dispute that. In my mind's eye, or in my mind, that is as I put it down here, as I can remember it.

MR BERGER: You don't dispute the Mr Williamson congratulated you on the bomb which killed Jeannette and Katryn Schoon, correct?

MR RAVEN: I think he did congratulate me if I remember correctly, yes.

MR BERGER: You don't dispute that when he congratulated you, he told you that Jeannette Schoon and her six year old daughter, Katryn, had been blown up by your bomb, correct?

MR RAVEN: No, I don't recollect that.

MR BERGER: When did you discover for the first time that Jeannette Schoon and her six year old daughter had been blown up by your bomb?

MR RAVEN: Either from the newspaper cutting or at a time thereafter.

MR BERGER: The newspaper cutting in the Cape Times?

MR RAVEN: Either the Cape Times or a Security report that came through from Angola, I can't give you a time.

MR BERGER: No, no Mr Raven, have a look at what you say at page 109. I did not know who the letters were intended for. It was only after the death of Jeannette Schoon and her child and the congratulations from Williamson, that I realised that they had been the targets for one of the two devices I had manufactured.

MR RAVEN: Yes, I am giving no time there, because I can't remember the time.

If I remember it and said right, two weeks after I had given the packets back to Craig Williamson, this appeared in the newspaper and Craig came along to me and said congratulations. I can't recollect the timespan between the giving back of the envelopes and the receiving the news that Jeannette and Katryn had died because of the parcel or the letter.

I can't give you a timespan and say it was two weeks, three weeks, it was this date or that date.

MR BERGER: What was Mr Williamson congratulating you for?

MR RAVEN: I am saying here, on one of the parcels that had killed Jeannette and Katryn.

MR BERGER: Yes. So when he congratulated you, you knew and he knew that your parcel had killed Jeannette and Katryn Schoon?

MR RAVEN: I surmised.

MR BERGER: When he congratulated you, you knew that he was congratulating you for a bomb which had killed Jeannette and Katryn Schoon. That is what he was congratulating you for?

MR RAVEN: He mentioned it.

MR BERGER: Yes.

MR RAVEN: But I mean till today, I do not know that that was the parcel that I had manufactured.

MR BERGER: When he congratulated you, you knew and he knew that he was referring to the bomb which had killed Jeannette Schoon and her daughter Katryn Schoon?

MR RAVEN: It is possible, yes.

MR BERGER: And you never said to him, oh my God, Craig, we have killed a child?

MR RAVEN: This is what I am trying to say here, why I approached him and made the statement, because of the child.

MR BERGER: You never expressed shock and horror that you had killed a child?

MR RAVEN: When?

MR BERGER: When Mr Williamson congratulated you Mr Raven?

MR RAVEN: I was shocked, but unfortunately in a war, in an armed situation, it is an unfortunate fact that innocent people, women, children, old people unfortunately get caught up in the crossfire.

MR BERGER: You never expressed your shock and horror to Mr Williamson, did you?

MR RAVEN: I may have, I can't remember.

MR BERGER: You said that the child was killed in crossfire?

MR RAVEN: Well, that is the terminology like in eliminate. Crossfire is when there is a war going on, when you are in a war situation, when there is an aeroplane flying over Dresden or London during the Second World War, and they drop bombs children and old people are unfortunately killed. This is the sort of thing I was referring to.

MR BERGER: Oh, it is the same is it Mr Raven?

MR RAVEN: The unfortunate part of it, yes.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, perhaps this would be an appropriate place to take the adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS