CHAIRPERSON: Today there are two matters which I wish to deal with. The first is that we had some controversy yesterday about what the correct position was where a person interested in one application seeks to question persons who are witnesses in that application when they are giving evidence in connection with another and different application which the questioner is not a party to.

There has been a ruling made in the past. I was not prepared, we were not prepared to make a ruling yesterday because it is a matter that we are of the view that the Committee as a whole should adopt a uniform approach.

So I am inviting all of you because I think you all appeared in several other applications and will be appearing in the future to let me have your views on this question in writing. I propose to communicate with other persons who have appeared before the Committee at hearings elsewhere and ask them for their views and I will then request the Committee as a whole to consider it.

So that we can come to a uniform decision that will apply at all future hearings. I don't when I say I would like you to let me have something in writing I don't mean that you must submit long legal argument. It is a largely I think a question of having regard to the problems that will arise of unlimited questioning and what the best way of meeting them are and I would like to have your views. Because I am sure you have all got different ideas which we can try to combine.

The second matter is that we propose to continue with the hearing now but Mr Visser has indicated to us that for various reasons he is not available to sit both on Thursday and Friday. We have decided and I think most of you agree on this that it would be in the general interest that we sit if that is the position that we sit on Thursday and not on Friday. Rather than have to come back here for a day.

So we agree with Mr Visser that we won't sit on Friday but we do intend to try to make up some of that time by sitting perhaps an hour later each day for the rest of this week. That is Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday.

I say this because those of you who still hope to make bookings on aircraft for the long weekend can do so because you have already missed the long weekend booking on Wednesday. So it should be possible to get them on Thursday.

But there are other problems. I think most of you are aware of them. Mr Bizos has problems with his clients who will be returning to the United Kingdom, well certain of his clients, certain of the people he represents. I don't wish to say his clients in that context.

It would be desirable if we could conclude the evidence that the daughters of Mrs Slovo may give by the end of Thursday. But if that is not possible we will then have to adjourn those matters to another date. We do however intend to continue thereafter with the London bomb next week and hope to conclude that as far as I can determine but I must say I am continually surprised.

The evidence of the next applicants should not take nearly as long as the evidence of the applicants we have already heard and it should be possible to perhaps conclude the evidence. But we will go ahead and see how we go with that. But we won't be hearing any further evidence about the other two applications after Thursday.

The last point is that it appears I think clear that we will not conclude, even if we go on next week we won't conclude all these applications and we will have to adjourn them. We want if possible to adjourn to a date arranged before we adjourn and we would ask that you consult with our Leader of Evidence as to dates you may be available for.

We would like if possible to hear the matter in October but we appreciate that many of you may have briefs elsewhere. But if we can draw up a tentative list of when you are available so that we can adjourn then to a date that suits all of you, rather than arbitrarily pick a date and find one of you plan to go skiing in Switzerland and one of you has gone to the South Pacific and all the other places that advocates go to. In arriving at this decision I am judging by what I read in the newspaper this morning as to the fees charged. But I do think we should try to fix a date and I would like you to apply your minds to your diaries as to a suitable date and also to how long you think we should make allowance for. I would propose that when we adjourn we adjourn to a date when we will finish. We will go on till we finish. I don't know how long that is going to be. If you could please think about this and if we could reach some agreement on suitable dates.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman could I perhaps just make one inquiry. You indicated that you would like some written argument on the issue as to how far cross-examination should go. The one thing you didn't indicate is by when because finding us in the position that we are if you say written argument that may be exactly what you get from us written argument and yet the Committee may have some problem in reading that written argument if it is done in manuscript.

Can we just have an indication by when because we have got a logistic [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I am not suggesting that I want that in the next few days, no. Certainly in the next few weeks type it out, because as I said I will approach the other counsel who have appeared frequently. There are some between the Cape, Eastern Cape and the Cape itself. So we can get views of as many counsel as possible and try to work out some system that will work satisfactorily and will meet the interests not only of the applicants but of victims, interested parties and matters of that nature. But I don't expect something tomorrow morning.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. May I say immediately that we fall in with all the arrangements and my learned friend Mr Bizos has indicated to us what his problems are and we indicated to him that we fall in with all the arrangements.

Mr Chairman speaking for myself, if one has to retain some sort of remnant of one's life and you sit from 9 'o clock in the morning until 5 'o clock in the afternoon it becomes totally impossible Mr Chairman and you know very well that we have always given our assistance wherever we could possibly do so, but frankly Mr Chairman sitting until 5 'o clock in the afternoon just can't happen.

CHAIRPERSON: For three days before a long weekend Mr Visser. I am not saying that we will of necessity do so each day but we must be prepared to do so because we must get as far as we can with this evidence.

MR PENZHORN: Mr Chairman, Penzhorn on record. Just a question and that is in regard to the sequence of witnesses. We have obviously heard what you have said in regard to the incidents but for myself I am appearing for an implicated victim - if you may call it that.

The position is that I would really appreciate it especially in view of next week the hearings have been extended into next week, whether we could have an indication as far as the witnesses that are going to be lead. I do know that this also applies to another implicated person, Mr Pik Botha who I see is absent today and who in fact it would also I think accommodate those people if we know on what day.

Especially as far as next week is concerned. I do know that for this week probably we have a problem in cross-examinations, extended cross-examination taking place. But as far as next week is concerned if we could have an indication. I take it that today we will continue with Mr McPherson. You know who will come after him and who will follow. If we have a name of either applicants or witnesses then we can try and schedule and if it is at all possible to you.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we will know more about that by the end of today because again speaking for myself I find it impossible to estimate how long an applicant is going to be. The applicants that I think will be a matter of half an hour I am told will take a day. Today I understood that we were going to deal with the other applicants but Mr Raven was not available. You remember we had some considerable discussion about his problems and he will be available tomorrow.

Schoon I am told [intervention]

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman we have got Mr Williamson to be completed. Then we have Raven and we have Bosch.

CHAIRPERSON: No, we didn't mention Raven for today. You mentioned Bosch for today.

MR VISSER: Bosch, we said that we will fill in if [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: And Schoon I think was mentioned for today.

MR VISSER: Yes, yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That is merely for the information of Mr Penzhorn. I am not binding you to that.

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman may I perhaps just mention something that I have to give consideration to and that is the possibility if we accept that everything is finished and Mr Raven starts testifying tomorrow, on Wednesday it means it leaves two days for Mr Raven's evidence.

Now having come to learn the length of time of cross-examination my learned friend Mr Bizos takes and I am not criticising him for it. I am concerned about one thing Mr Chairman and that is the possibility that at the end of Thursday Mr Raven's cross-examination is not finished. That is going to leave my client in a very unsatisfactory position that his cross-examination is going to stand over for one doesn't know how many weeks or months.

CHAIRPERSON: Till Monday of next week.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Mr Chairman I understood that Mr Bizos is not available to go on next week.

CHAIRPERSON: No Mr Bizos has indicated he can make himself available. He does not want to make himself available for the entire week. He has problems with those appearing with him. But if it is a question of continuing in completing Raven's cross-examination on Monday I understand there will be no problem. Certainly we do not propose to adjourn for months in the middle of a cross-examination.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman and then the only other concern is the possibility that if Mr Bizos should want to call witnesses that they are in the middle of cross-examination. Such as one of the Slovo daughters. Now that is not my concern. I must [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: They will be leaving us on Friday if we haven't finished them by Friday they will not be giving evidence till the adjourned hearing.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, so we are not going to start with them if we see that they are not going to finish.

CHAIRPERSON: If we are not going to finish, no. I think they we will do that on Thursday. The other witnesses next week I will certainly agree that I do not want to adjourn this matter. I do not like to (indistinct) with a witness subject to cross-examination it means his legal advisors cannot consult with him and he has then some months later subject to searching cross-examination about what he said last time and it is grossly unfair to a witness. I think we won't do it.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman may I assure Mr du Plessis' concerns. As a result of remarks made by him and Mr Levine during the course of the morning and formal gathering among us, Ms Gillian Slovo will be giving evidence. As agreed that if she is not finished by Thursday she will stay over. She wants to get this over with Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Will she stay till Monday and Tuesday if need be?

MR BIZOS: She will stay until Monday in order to finish. It is something Mr Chairman and I am making an appeal to my learned friends to have some consideration for the people whose emotions are very deeply felt and ask for their co-operation Mr Chairman.

The wishes of the daughters of Ruth First are that they want to hear those who admit responsibility for their mother's death and particularly Mr Raven. She will be giving evidence. She cannot live with this emotional state with any sort of comfort and she wants to get it over with.

The difficulties of my colleagues and my instructing attorney will not prevent her from continuing to be cross-examined on Monday if that is the case. So that I would appeal Mr Chairman that we do not take any more time and that we do not say things which are particularly careful to our clients and that we carry on with it. That we hear Raven. That we hear Gillian Slovo. We understand the Friday position. If need be she will be here on Monday.

But may I ask Mr Chairman in all earnestness that this is not an insolvency inquiry Mr Chairman. Peoples' emotions are involved and that some consideration should be given by our colleagues to the emotions of our clients before they blurt out remarks during the adjournments and other occasions. They are particularly hurtful. I have said what I wanted to say Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman may I say that I don't really know what Mr Bizos is complaining of. It is because of my consideration that I suggested that Ms Gillian Slovo's evidence be concluded. I can only assume Mr Chairman that the reference to insolvency inquiries relates to me as this is a fair amount of my business but I have done nothing or said nothing to indicate that there was any lack of feeling. I believe that Ms Slovo should not be under the position where she is kept in limbo.

In regard Mr Chairman to the suggestion of sitting till 5 'o clock I have the added difficulty in that I then have to get back to Johannesburg and I do have certain consultation work which I have lined up for half past four onwards each day.

There is one further matter which I would bring to your attention and that is next Wednesday, the 30th of October is another Jewish religious holiday.

CHAIRPERSON: We arranged not to sit on Wednesday Mr Levine.

MR LEVINE: Next Wednesday?

CHAIRPERSON: Next Wednesday.

MR LEVINE: I am indebted to you Mr Chairman but the other thing is that I would like to raise we have already shifted our calendars around from finishing on the 25th to finishing a week later and I think we should make every effort if at all possible to finish that week ending the 1st of October.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's carry on with the evidence now to achieve that.

MR ROUSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman can I just perhaps be the last one to interrupt. Mr Chairman I have given you an indication on Friday that Mr Bosch is at a work interview today. I will be able to determine during the course of the morning when he will be available later this afternoon. I will inform the Committee accordingly. He is not available at this moment.

CHAIRPERSON: I understood he would be here in the afternoon.

MR ROUSSOUW: I will be able to inform the Committee exactly when during the course of the morning.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman I am sorry. I don't want to belabour any points. There is just one matter of concern that I have to raise and that is the question if we are going to run into a piecemeal, a part-heard situation in respect of the First and Schoon matters I just want to make one point clear Mr Chairman.

That is that if my client finishes his evidence I don't want to end up in a situation in three months time that my client is recalled because certain other witnesses are going to be called by Mr Bizos and he wants to put certain things to my client.

I want the insurance that we have finished and that Mr Bizos will then do his cross-examination on my client and that he will call the witnesses which are necessary. I don't want this to run into a situation where there is a re-opening Mr Chairman. Can I just have that assurance?

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman of course Mr du Plessis can have that assurance but he is an applicant. The applicants give evidence first. It is not unheard of that matters may thereafter arise. I have no right to have him recalled but the Committee has a discretion and if such occasion arises it may well be.

But he can't get out of his responsibility as an applicant on that [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand Mr du Plessis is saying if you have information available at the moment you should put it now.

MR BIZOS: Oh yes of course. Of course, now who would keep it back Mr Chairman and for what reason.

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chairman the final part from this side. Can I just confirm then that as far as Mr Williamson is concerned Mr Williamson will only - the rest of his cross-examination will only take place after McPherson, after Bosch, after all those or does he come in right after Mr McPherson?

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] Yes.


ADV DE JAGER: One thing good counsel and legal representatives please try and work out a suitable date for the adjournment because if you can't work out a suitable date here while you all here you could imagine the trouble of somebody trying to organise a date that would suit you at a later stage.

So that we could confirm it with the TRC whether the date is available and whether we as Committee Members are available. If possible try and make it during October because we don't want to postpone this thing for quite a while and I believe as far as the TRC is concerned in October dates may be available still.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman may I ask one further question which may take up a lot of time in due course. Is it your intention to hear viva voce argument or are we to (indistinct)?

CHAIRPERSON: We told you that we wanted arguments at the end of the hearing, oral argument.

ADV DE JAGER: Of course you could hand in at the end of the hearing, on the day the hearing is ending, written argument if you have got it available.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson, Danny Burger. Mr McPherson I am going to try and move as fast as possible.

MR McPHERSON: Thank you.

MR BERGER: And if you can just answer my questions without going to - well say what you want to say but try and answer the questions and then we will move a lot faster.

I am going to spend a very short time on the ANC offices in London and then I will move on. I have copies of photographs that I was looking at yesterday. I would like you just to have a look at it. I have made copies for all our learned friends as well as for the Committee. Have a look at it please and tell us if that is similar to the photograph that you were looking at when you were at Daisy.

Chairperson I think this will be Exhibit DD. Mr McPherson have a look at that photograph. You can see there on the right hand side of the photograph Ambrose Dry Cleaners. That is number 26. Do you see that?

MR McPHERSON: Yes I do. Yes I see it Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And then on the left hand side that would be number 28. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BERGER: That is the one that says: "Shop for sale or to let"?

MR McPHERSON: Correct.

MR BERGER: And then at the bottom on the left hand side that is the Italian delicatessen that I was referring to yesterday.

MR McPHERSON: Yes that is correct.

MR BERGER: And then if you have a look at this building it is terraced houses as I was saying.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on is the ANC building only comprises the building with the notice "Shop for Sale," on front of it?

MR BERGER: That is right.

CHAIRPERSON: It is only two windows wide and goes up to the third floor. There, there are - I don't know what you call them, the wall extends up with the chimneys through it and it is just that portion between the two walls you see at the top of the photograph?

MR BERGER: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So these plans that were handed in are completely misleading as showing a completely separate building. I am referring to 'BB'.

MR BERGER: Mr McPherson can you comment on that? You can see that it goes up from the ground floor there are in fact three floors above ground floor. Because on the roof there is also a floor. Do you see that?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson I think the third floor's windows are behind the wall because there are four floors so the first floor which we can see with the two windows. Then there is a wall and behind that wall would be the third floor and the windows of the third floor and what you would see then would be the fourth floor's window sticking out. So there are definitely 4 floors.

MR BERGER: Mr McPherson I am going to show you the original photograph. I am not handing this in as an exhibit but after you I will ask for the Committee to have a look at it and that might help you. You will see that the windows that you are referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: With a little more confusion the need for an inspection will become even more (...indistinct)

MR BERGER: I won't oppose that Mr Chair.

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson I would not be so long.

MR BERGER: Thank you, so Mr McPherson what I was referring to as the ANC building is in fact just the part of that terraced building between 26 and 30 and it goes up from ground floor then three more floors above that. Those were the offices that the ANC occupied.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Chairperson. I would just like to add that the photo's which I looked at on Daisy Farm were not taken from directly in front like this one. But were taken from an angle more to the left hand side from the corner of White Lion Street and Penton Street. From that corner.


MR McPHERSON: We didn't look at this specific photo.

MR BERGER: But when you went to do surveillance, perhaps I can ask you that, when you did surveillance of the building it looked like this. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And the point I was making about residences it is the windows on the second, third and fourth floors on either side of the ANC building - of the ANC offices. I keep saying building but it is the offices. For example above Ambrose Dry Cleaners you see there are residential windows?

CHAIRPERSON: Well there are two floors. How could you see it is residential?

MR BERGER: Well I am putting it Chairperson to the witness.

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson I was not aware of that.

MR BERGER: Alright. Then Mr McPherson you recall yesterday afternoon just before the adjournment you agreed that the weight of the bomb was 4.5 kg. You remember that?

MR McPHERSON: Yes I said that and then afterwards I remembered that while I was testifying regarding the involvement of Jerry Raven that I quoted a statement that according to him the bomb was 4 x 250g of explosives ... it only 1 kg. Where I arrived at the weight of 4 x 250 was a result of Friday's evidence when I read the report which was speculation from England that the bomb had weighed 4.5 kg.

Personally I don't have personal knowledge of what the actual mass of the bomb was.

MR BERGER: Excuse me on a point of order. This article from the Rand Daily Mail was only handed in yesterday. It wasn't available on Friday.

MR McPHERSON: Or at least yesterday.

MR BERGER: And secondly you saying that you had no knowledge of the actual weight of the bomb?

MR McPHERSON: No, not at all.

MR BERGER: Well have a look please at page 132 of your application bundle 3. In your [intervention]

MR McPHERSON: Yes, in my application I speculated approximately 11 kg.

MR BERGER: Well you didn't speculate you said and I will read it to you, you said:

"At one stage I was shown a metal container,"

This is in the middle of page 132.

"In which the plastic explosives (11 kg) would be sent to London."

Now where did you get that figure from?

MR McPHERSON: That is my own inference which I drew. My own approximate inference.

MR BERGER: Then can I refer you to the articles handed in by Mr Pik Botha, it is Exhibit CC the article that you were referring to. You will see there in the article headed:

"ANC London office wrecked by powerful 4.5 kg bomb."

Detective Inspector Cole is quoted at the bottom of the first column. He says there:

"The bomb was about 4.5 kg of explosives placed at the rear of 28 Penton Street. The rear of the building has been practically destroyed and extensive damage had been caused"

he said.

"It was a hefty bomb but we have no indications at this stage of the type or where it could have come from."

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, where are you reading from?

MR BERGER: It is the Rand Daily Mail article Chairperson:

"ANC London office wrecked by powerful 4.5 kg bomb."

It is Exhibit CC and it is the third page of that, the bottom of the first column.

You can't contradict anything that is said there. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: No, I can't Chairperson.

MR BERGER: It goes on or the detective inspector goes on to say:

"The school at the rear of the building had its windows blown out but luckily there was nobody about."

You confirm that as well. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I confirm that.

MR BERGER: And you confirm that there was or this is the impression I got from your evidence that there was flying projectiles which caused the windows of the school to be blown out. Is that right? Mr McPherson if you don't understand my question perhaps you should use [intervention]

MR McPHERSON: No, I don't have a problem. I can only generally say that once an explosion occurs there is air pressure which would usually shatter windows. It doesn't necessarily have to be the result of projectiles. Simply the air pressure alone would shatter windows.

MR BERGER: Well there was sufficient force from the bomb to break the school windows.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Also if you would have a look please at if you would page to the second article after that you will see there is an article headed, it is the last - no it is the second last article in the bundle. Sunday Times, 21st of March 1982. Do you see there is an article headed:

"Rivals may have set ANC office bomb."

Do you have that?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct. I have it before me.

MR BERGER: Now have a look please in the middle of the second column, it is second paragraph:

"Although South African agents have been blamed for burglaries."

Do you see that?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.


"Although South African agents have been blamed for burglaries at the offices of various anti-Apartheid movements it was pointed out that last week's bomb was placed in a position where innocent bystanders could have been killed. It went off close to a busy street market but only two people were slightly injured."

When you did your surveillance you obviously saw the Chapel Street market was a block away from the ANC offices. Am I right?

MR McPHERSON: Yes that is possible.

MR BERGER: And the Chapel Street market is a very busy market, particularly on Sundays. You would have seen that?

MR McPHERSON: As I can recall on the Sunday that we were there I didn't observe anything like that.

MR BERGER: And I can just tell you that the Chapel Street market, the vendors got there by eight 'o clock in the morning and by nine 'o clock in the morning there were people.

MR McPHERSON: I would accept that.

MR BERGER: Finally on the question of the bomb itself you will see back to the article headed: "ANC London office wrecked by powerful 4.5 kg bomb." Rand Daily Mail 15 March 1982, first column, third last paragraph in that column.

"Detective Inspector Cole said the bomb exploded shortly after 9 am."

Is it correct Mr McPherson that the bomb was intended to explode at 9 am?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson as I recall I only knew that the bomb would go off in the early morning and that it would have gone off at a time when we had already left England. So that would have been in the early morning. I can't tell you what the exact time was.

MR BERGER: Mr McPherson I am putting to you that the bomb was programmed to explode at 9 am. Do you dispute that?

MR McPHERSON: No, I would not deny that.

MR BERGER: But you can't say anything positive about it?

MR McPHERSON: No, I can't because I did not set the timing mechanism of the bomb itself.

MR BERGER: Well have a look then please at page 133 of your application. Third paragraph on that page:

"Eugene de Kock also climbed over and assisted Jerry Raven on the premises. The bomb was set up at 23h00 and programmed to explode at 9h00 the next morning."

That is your evidence Mr McPherson.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Wasn't that what was discussed the night before the Friday night at your final planning meeting that the bomb would explode at 9 am on the Sunday morning?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson an exact time was not discussed. We discussed that the bomb would go off while we were in the aeroplane. We would be safe when the bomb went off.

MR BERGER: Then about the surveillance of Mr Joe Slovo. The house that you described yesterday was not the house of Mr Joe Slovo, Mr McPherson. It was the house of Mr Harold Wolpe. Did you know that?

MR McPHERSON: That could be possible.

MR BERGER: That was a detached house in Muswell Hill.

MR McPHERSON: It could be possible.

MR BERGER: Mr Slovo's house was a terraced house in Campden Town.

MR McPHERSON: That could be possible.

MR BERGER: But he wasn't staying in Campden Town and sometimes when he was in London he would stay at the house of Mr Wolpe.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I can actually recall something like that.

MR BERGER: You see what I want to suggest to you is that you followed Mr Slovo to the house in Muswell Hill. Didn't you?

MR McPHERSON: No, I didn't.

MR BERGER: Then if I can move to your position as head of Stratcom. You were appointed as the head of Stratcom in 1989. Is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Mr McPherson you seem to have difficulty understanding what I am saying and asking your attorney. I would much prefer if you rather put the headphones on and you get an interpretation or translation.

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson I don't have a problem. I have simply asked my legal representative seeing as there are questions about Stratcom that I should have my documentation available. I apologise for the disruption.

MR BERGER: I am not suggesting that you are doing anything wrong. I am just saying I would prefer it if you had the headphones on if you don't understand what I am saying.

Any way I will proceed Mr McPherson. Stratcom was part of the Security Police. Is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: And you became the head of Stratcom because of your knowledge and your experience. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Can I ask you please to explain to the Committee how, what your general modus operandi was which enabled you to manipulate the SABC as well as the various newspapers?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson I don't know whether I should begin first by giving you a basic definition of what was meant by Stratcom and I would just like to say at press conferences it would usually take half an hour just to explain how I exploited the media, certain agents and informers and so forth to send certain messages through via the media.

First I would like to give a brief definition of strategic communication. It is very brief. I will do it in English.

It is the planned, co-ordinated execution of a deed and or the presentation of a message by means of various communication instruments.

2, and there are three objectives then. To change the attitudes, values and views of individuals and or a group of persons and to create the required attitude and or to maintain an existing attitude.

To neutralise hostile propaganda and or to utilise hostile propaganda and then thirdly to reach national objectives.

So Stratcom can be seen as political warfare as utilised in the Republic of China or more easily understandable psychological warfare as utilised in Europe. Civic action as utilised by the Americans and active measures as utilised by the old Soviet Union.

MR BERGER: Mr McPherson I don't really want to unnecessarily interrupt you but I don't want to have to get into a four hour representation at this point. I just want you to briefly explain how it was possible or how you went about manipulating journalist at the SABC and at the various newspapers.

What I have in mind really is; did you have identified people and did you brief them in advance of certain things that were going to happen so that they would come prepared or that they would come to you and you would hand out a prepared copy.

CHAIRPERSON: This was in 1989. What is the relevance of that to an application of amnesty for events in 1982 and 1984? Or are you endeavouring to expose members of the press now? I don't see the relevance of this to his application for amnesty.

MR BERGER: No, Chairperson I am not attempting to expose any members.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, what is the relevance, tell me please?

MR BERGER: The relevance relates to once Mr McPherson has explained how he went about it I am then going to ask him to have a look at certain articles which were written at the time of Ruth First's death and Jeannette and Katryn Schoon's death. Perhaps I can put those articles to the witness. Thank you Chairperson.

Mr McPherson have a look please at 4 newspaper articles and we have made copies for everyone.

MR McPHERSON: Mr Chairperson during the years which are being discussed now I was not yet the head of Stratcom but in 3 minutes I could offer a brief explanation of how we went about dealing with the media. In the course of years I established a network of media contacts. People I recruited within the media. They fell into various categories. We had infiltrated police members who worked full-time at newspapers and so forth.

We had paid agents who naturally by nature of their services worked there full-time. I had informers, acquaintances and journalists who inadvertently were used.

MR BERGER: You are going to be shown 4 articles. The first one which should be marked Exhibit EE is an article which appeared in Rapport on the 1st of July 1984. The headline is "Letter bomb murder, ANC's work?"

Then Exhibit FF is an article which appeared in the Sunday Times also on the 1st of July 1984. Headlined: "Red assassins blamed for parcel of death by Stefan Terreblanche."

The third article is Exhibit GG which is an article which appeared in the Star, 14th of July 1984 by Russel Gould headline: "Who killed Ruth First?"

The final article is Exhibit HH also appeared in the Star on the 14th of July 1984: "Reports claim Slovo responsible for wife's 'letter bomb' death".

Do you have all of those Mr McPherson?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Chairperson do you have all the exhibits?

MR CORNELIUS: Could we just have the exhibit numbers again Mr Chairman? The exhibit numbers were given before we were given our document (...indistinct)

MR BERGER: Sure 'EE' is Rapport 1st July 1984. 'FF' is Sunday Times 1st July 1984. 'GG' is the Star 14th July 1984 "Who killed Ruth First?" 'HH' is the Star 14 July "Reports claim Slovo responsible for wife's letter bomb death."

The reason I was asking you to explain how things worked in your time Mr McPherson, is because I wonder whether you would be able to explain how things worked in 1984 and in 1982 and I take it at the time you were in the Security Police? You were in the Intelligence Section. You were involved with the Africa, in fact you were in charge of the Africa Desk of the Intelligence Section and I take it from there you must have known how Stratcom activities worked at that time. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct. Could I just briefly go through the articles before I offer any commentary?

MR BERGER: Certainly.

MR McPHERSON: Would it assist if I took you through the articles and pointed out the significant parts that relate to the Security Police?

MR McPHERSON: That would be of assistance.

MR BERGER: If you could look at 'EE' the main paragraph reads:

"Strong possibility exists that the letter bomb murder on South African defector Mrs Jeannette Schoon (35) and her daughter, Katryn (6) in Angola has to do with the power struggle in the inner circles of the African National Congress (ANC). This was determined by Rapport yesterday on good authority."

Then if you go further down that column you will see second last paragraph.

"The police now have access to information which indicates that ANC terrorists are very unsatisfied about the manner in which the heads and sometimes self-appointed ambassadors such as Johnny Makatini travel the world and waste money. They are being used as cannon fodder while their so-called heads stay in only the best hotels and travel in comfort, it was said to Rapport."

Then you will see, you can read it quietly for yourself the second column again is information which is reported to Rapport and then again, well perhaps you should just read it.

MR McPHERSON: Mr Chairperson it appears to me to be a definite covert Stratcom exercise in disinformation. I would typify this as a typical Stratcom disinformation report.

MR BERGER: Now let me read to you and then if you look again in the third column before I read to you something else. Third column at the top it says:

"Rapport was also informed yesterday on good authority that the Schoon's during their stay in Botswana were actively busy with the 'planning of deeds of terrorism in South Africa.'"

Again that would fit in with the Stratcom disinformation. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And then at the bottom of that page you will see there that it seems as though at least some fact did get through.

"Mrs Schoon and her husband were both lecturers at the University of Lubango."

MR McPHERSON: I see that.

MR BERGER: Now what I wanted to read to you was from Mr Jacques Pauw's book 'Into the heart of darkness' at page 194. Well let me read it to you. He says:

"On June 28 1984 the ANC activist, Jeannette Schoon and her 6 year old daughter, Katryn were blown up by a letter bomb in Lubango in Angola. The bomb had been intended for Marius Schoon but he wasn't at home at the time and his wife opened the letter. A day after the explosion my news editor sent me to do an interview with the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee."

Now I can tell you I have asked Mr Pauw about this and this article Exhibit EE is the article that was written as a result. But you will see that the by-line in Johan Botha. Johan Botha was Mr Pauw's senior. Mr Pauw was a very junior reporter on Rapport at the time and his name didn't warrant getting into the by-line.

But this is the article he confirms that was written as a result. He says, he continues at page 194 the next paragraph to say:

"Coetzee told me that the Security Police had information that Jeannette and Katryn had been killed by the ANC as a result of an internal struggle within the organisation. I wrote a story quoting Coetzee and it was published."

Now this is what I really want to ask you. This information was given to Rapport by General Johan Coetzee. Can you explain how it would have happened that General Coetzee would have been in a position a day or two after the bomb exploded in Lubango to come up with this story or with this Stratcom, with this "dekstorie"? How would he have been in that position?

MR McPHERSON: Mr Chairperson it is very difficult for me to comment regarding that because when I read this report I can see that I definitely hadn't been involved with this. So it is very difficult for me to say how General Johan Coetzee had this information to make available to the media.

MR BERGER: Would you agree with me that in order for a "dekstorie" to be effective and to have the germ of truth as Mr Williamson spoke about, it would have to be conceived in advance of a particular event and more than that, that anyone who might talk to the media would have to have that knowledge in advance so that a consistent and plausible official line could be put out?

MR McPHERSON: It is difficult to comment on that at this stage. An incident may have occurred and then I would believe this would have followed Stratcom's action to point the finger away from the police.

MR BERGER: Yes but you see my question really is this and you are perfectly placed to give this evidence because you eventually became the head as a result of your experience. How does it work that the Commissioner of Police is in a position a day or two after the explosion to give an official line which accords with the Stratcom which is fed to the media?

MR McPHERSON: As I have said it is very difficult for me to comment about that at this stage. Because I don't have any personal knowledge about this report. I can only offer my opinion as a result of my experience in terms of how I view the article.

MR BERGER: Yes and from your experience would you agree with this proposition that the Stratcom in all probability would have been devised in advance of the explosion?

MR McPHERSON: Once again it is very difficult to say because this could have been planned after the time. It didn't necessarily have to be planned before the time.

MR BERGER: Alright so what you are saying it could have been before or it could have been after?

MR McPHERSON: As I have said it is difficult to speculate regarding that, very difficult.

MR BERGER: It is not - well let me ask you this. If it had not been conceived before then it would have to be conceived immediately after the event takes place because all the relevant personnel would then have to be in a position to give a consistent official line. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is possible Chairman.

MR BERGER: Well it would have to be. There would have to be briefings where all the relevant role players including the head of the Security Police, the Commissioner of Police would be briefed on what the official line was and that would have to take place immediately after the event occurs. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: I have no personal knowledge of that. The General himself [intervention]

MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius for the record. I think my client has clearly stated in his answer he doesn't want to speculate. He says it could have been prior. It could have been after. He doesn't know. He has got no knowledge of the article. I don't know where we are leading to.

MR BERGER: Mr McPherson I am not asking you to speculate. I am asking you to give evidence about what you know to have been the practice in the past and you were a member of the Intelligence Section of the Security Police at the time when Stratcom was operative. I am not asking you in this particular case. I am saying at that time; 1982, 1983, 1984 when Stratcom was operative.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Berger didn't he say it could be before or it could be afterwards?

MR BERGER: Yes I have moved on from there Adv de Jager. I am asking him in relation to that period 1982, 1984 if it was after. If the "dekstorie" wasn't conceived before it would have to be conceived immediately after the event occurred and before information was fed to the media and in that conception of the "dekstorie" the relevant role players, the head of the Security Police, the Commissioner of Police, anyone who might be approached by the media would have to be briefed. So that a plausible official line could be put out. Mr McPherson?

MR McPHERSON: Once again Chairperson that time I had no personal knowledge of how the Commissioner went about. If a cover story had to be conveyed to the media.

MR BERGER: Well let me ask you then about your time when you were in charge of Stratcom would it happen that before a "dekstorie" is put out to the papers that all the relevant role players are called together including the head of the Security Police, the Commissioner of Police and briefed on what the official line will be?

Mr McPherson I really don't want [intervention]

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I really don't want you to consult with your attorney when you are under cross-examination. You say that is correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: And there is no reason to believe that, that wasn't happening in 1982, 1983 and 1984. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Can we have a look at the next article please 'FF'? "Red assassins blamed for parcel of death."

"South African Security Branch sources yesterday blamed a Communist Party assassination squad for the parcel bomb deaths of South African exile Jeannette Schoon (35) and her 6 year old daughter, Katryn."

Again this has all the hallmarks of a "dekstorie" consistent with the previous one in Rapport. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BERGER: But skip two paragraphs:

"Security Branch sources believe the bomb was intended for Mr Schoon who they say was suspected by the banned South African Communist Party and the banned African National Congress of working for British Intelligence via the international voluntary service. They believe his wife was a victim of the serious power struggle in the ANC between the SACP and nationalist elements and of a post-Nkomati spy witch hunt within the ANC."

Now who would those Security Branch sources have been?

MR McPHERSON: Once again I have no personal knowledge of this specific article. But it could have been anybody from John Vorster or Pretoria I don't know where Stefan Terreblanche was working at that time or where he was placed. The Sunday Times has an office in Jo'burg and in Pretoria. It could have come from any side.

MR BERGER: And those Security Branch sources who gave that information that the bomb was intended for Mr Schoon and so on they would have had to be briefed by somebody in the Intelligence Section of the Security Police. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: Not necessarily.

MR BERGER: Where would they get their information from? Surely and this is the premise of my questions Mr McPherson. What the Security Police could not afford was for different official lines to come out from different spokespeople. Am I right?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: It had to be a consistent line and it had to be a line which could be linked to some fact that the Security Police had that they could prove. Am I right?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So where [intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Could I perhaps. Were there persons who were appointed as official spokespersons if an incident did occur? Could anybody speak on behalf of the police or were there certain persons who would speak to the press on behalf of the police and put out statements?

MR McPHERSON: Mr Chairman we, when I say we I say the South African Police we are a unit involved with communication services and public relations and there was a specific group of policemen who liaised with the media. But it also happened as I can infer from here that on a non-official level the Security Branch would liaise with the press.

In later years, in 1990 we had a person who acted as a speaker for the branch but in those years there was no specific person appointed in the Security Branch who was a media liaison officer.

ADV DE JAGER: I think what we would like to know could the press just call up anybody and try and get information or was there a determined person who would call the press to give them information if something had happened?

MR McPHERSON: Mr Chairman there were official structures in existence as to how it was liaised with the press and the media. In fact we had a department of Public Relations. Every morning they had a crime meeting where all the crime reporters would be called into an office where they give guidance as to, or information as to the previous twenty four hours and the successes which the police had, had in the last twenty four hours, important arrests and so forth.

ADV DE JAGER: Well if a Stratcom story, a cover story had been worked out who gets that story to give it to the media?

MR McPHERSON: What usually happens in that instance is that selected journalists are approached who would place the story in their paper and if you see here they only speak of Security Branch sources. If it goes through public relations then the police officer who makes the statement his name is mentioned and one could see clearly who was the source of the information.

In such an instance as this one they would just name or they say sometimes intelligence sources or as they say here security sources so the person who gives the information is not mentioned or not named.

The media when they write up a report they usually have to give a definite indication as to where the information came from to give this report some credibility. Just to write in a vacuum [intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: But is that what you mean by credible sources or?

MR McPHERSON: Because you see the person who writes this report has to give his editor an indication.

MR BERGER: Mr McPherson we know from Exhibit EE that the "goeie gesag" that the reporters of Rapport are referring to was General Johan Coetzee.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: We see in Exhibit FF that there are Security Branch sources. My question to you is this and you have already said in answer to Adv de Jager's question you said that - sorry are you distracted by something?

MR McPHERSON: I just wanted to get the exhibit in front of me, yes.

MR BERGER: Alright you said that it went through, the "dekstories" went through the Security Branch. You remember that?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Now my question to you is this; if a lie is going to be put out into the media that lie must be consistent. You have agreed with that.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And everybody who is going to be or might be approached in the Security Police for comment be it General Johan Coetzee or be it some other Security Branch source would have to give a consistent line. Otherwise the Security Branch will look like fools. Is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is right.

MR BERGER: My point is and I think you have agreed with this that there would have to be briefings all the way up to the head of the Security Branch and the Commissioner of Police. Those briefings would have to be carried out by security operatives concerned to ensure that a single official line was maintained. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And the people best placed to give that line would be the Intelligence Section of the Security Police. Am I right?

MR McPHERSON: Not entirely. There were other units at head office who were also involved with Africa and terrorist organisations and the movements of suspicious persons, and I think for example with the investigations unit of terrorism they had regular interviews with people who were caught and then such information would be ...[intervention]

MR BERGER: But Mr McPherson we are dealing with the death of Ruth First, Jeannette and Katryn Schoon. These were murders which took place in Africa and what I am putting to you is that the Intelligence Section of the police would have been consulted every time before a "dekstorie" was put out. You can't dispute that can you?

MR McPHERSON: Not necessarily it is possible but it did not happen in this manner at all times. There were certain people who were specialising in certain fields.

MR BERGER: Okay well let me ask you this. Have a look at 'FF'. You see there: "Security Branch sources believe the bomb was intended for Mr Schoon."

Where could the sources have got that information from if not from the people who sent the bomb?

MR McPHERSON: The information as it stands here would have come from the Security Branch.

MR BERGER: Which section of the Security Branch?

MR McPHERSON: I wouldn't be able to say. It could the Intelligence Unit. It could be the investigations unit of terrorism. It could be the interrogation unit of information. It could have come from a file at head office.

MR BERGER: Mr McPherson please put yourself in the time frame. This is the 1st of July 1984. The bomb exploded on the 28th of June 1984. Three days before.

CHAIRPERSON: It would appear from reading 'FF' that the Security Branch sources were not the official statement of the security.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So it is not an official statement issued by the Security Police because that is referred to in the third paragraph or the third column where they say in an official statement: "A senior member of the Security Branch, Brigadier Herman Stadtler said ... " and he said merely the tragedy of the thing. He was not the person who was putting the story around. Is that the position?

MR McPHERSON: It would seem to be so Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Yes but we also know that General Coetzee had granted an interview to reporters from Rapport and so he was giving a line as well and his line was part of the "dekstorie."

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Any way we seem to be going in circles Mr McPherson. You can't dispute the proposition that I am putting to you and that is that the Security Branch sources who believed that the bomb was intended for Mr Schoon could only have got that information from the people who sent the bomb. You can't dispute that can you?

MR McPHERSON: It is difficult to speculate Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Then if you go further in the first column: "They," these are the Security Branch sources, "also see several similarities between the killing in Maputo of Dr Ruth First, wife of the leader of the SACP, Mr Joe Slovo and recent events involving the Schoon's."

"Members of the ANC who gave themselves up to the Security Branch after the Nkomati Accord have told us that the death of Ruth First was a secretly planned SACP execution. Shortly before her death she was suspended from the SACP because of ideological differences, the sources said."

MR McPHERSON: I see that.

MR BERGER: Would you agree with me that there appears to be a Stratcom going on at the time to link the deaths of Ruth First and Jeannette and Katryn Schoon?

MR McPHERSON: I agree Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: If we go over to the next exhibit. It is 'GG'. Now you see the fruits of the Stratcom operation in relation to Ruth First.

"Who killed Ruth First? Allegations are spreading that Joe Slovo, South Africa's number one wanted terrorist and known KGB colonel may have organised his wife's murder in 1982. This incredible accusation comes from British and American sources and is based on new information and a theses."

You will recall Mr Williamson gave evidence that he had fed information to the newspapers long before this relating to a Stratcom about Ruth First and Joe Slovo. Do you remember that?

MR McPHERSON: I remember.

MR BERGER: And then he also gave evidence that he was surprised when the Stratcom finally surfaced in 1984 in relation to Ruth First. Do you remember that as well?

MR McPHERSON: I can recall something to that effect.

MR BERGER: Now you were working under Mr Williamson at that time - 1982, 1983, 1984.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And you were in charge of the Africa Desk which would have covered Angola and Botswana. Correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: When you were asked yesterday by Mr du Plessis a question do you have any knowledge about the Ruth First or Jeannette Schoon incidents your answer was a very curious one Mr McPherson. You said: "I was not involved." Do you remember that?

MR McPHERSON: I recall that yes.

MR BERGER: What knowledge did you have at the time of the death of Ruth First and the death of Jeannette Schoon and the death of Katryn Schoon?

MR McPHERSON: I had no knowledge Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: How is it possible if Mr Williamson was making up "dekstories" in relation to the death of Ruth First, how is it possible that you were not involved?

MR McPHERSON: I would just think it was on a principle of the need-to-know basis and the sensitive nature of this action that I was not informed.

MR BERGER: But the telling of lies wasn't a secret. Everybody knew that lies had to be told. In fact I can refer you to the evidence of General Johan Coetzee when he was confronted with Exhibit K. You remember the article in the Argus dated the 15th of March 1982: "ANC blames boss bomber for London blast," and there is a quote from Minister Louis Le Grange saying it was laughable and General Coetzee said and I remember his words. He said: "I would not have expected anything else."

MR McPHERSON: I recall that.

MR BERGER: So everybody in the Security Police and in particular in the Intelligence Section would have known that these "dekstories" were put out as a matter of course.

MR McPHERSON: I would not say as a matter of course.

MR BERGER: Well here you have the assassination of Ruth First, a very prominent anti-Apartheid activist and are you saying that you were not aware of a "dekstorie" put out at the time by the Security Police to cover the Security Police in case fingers were pointed at them in relation to the death of Ruth First? You did not know?

MR McPHERSON: Mr Chairman I recall this report in the Star specifically and when I read it I thought to myself that this was definitely a Stratcom because it is impossible that Mr Joe Slovo would have killed his own wife. So I saw that this was a Stratcom but who was involved there with was never divulged to me.

MR BERGER: Didn't you ask yourself who was responsible for the death of Ruth First at the time?

MR McPHERSON: I did ask myself who was involved.

MR BERGER: Yes and who did you think it was?

MR McPHERSON: I realised that it had to come from the security community somebody or the military of the South African Police.

MR BERGER: But Mr McPherson you were the head of the intelligence desk for Africa. How could you not know that your own men, the people in your section were responsible?

MR McPHERSON: That is very possible Mr Chairman. There is lots of things that I never heard anything of or knew of. It was not necessary for me to know these things. There are many things.

MR BERGER: Let me just read to you two portions of evidence that were confirmed by Mr Williamson in the interviews he had with Ms Slovo. It is from Exhibit X1 at page 17:

"Mr Williamson: It would have been Soviet explosives. It would fit in with the cover story which was that it was Ruth was being a nuisance inside the ANC and therefore was eliminated and it could not have been a letter bomb because the explosion was too powerful."

Then let me read to you what he said [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what page is that?

MR BERGER: That was at page 17, Chairperson, Exhibit X1. Then from page 22 top of the page. Second time Mr Williamson speaks:

"Mr Williamson: That is why I had some feeling that because I thought that either it hadn't been sent or if it had, it had been detected you know I - and then one morning you know we monitor BBC every morning of Africa news just for general and of course the ANC the operation - I can't remember I think it was called Falk. I think he was listening to the ANC coms between Maputo and London and Lusaka.

Ms Slovo: On the phone?

Mr Williamson: On telex ja.

Ms Slovo: And that is when you had the Stratcom meeting too?

Mr Williamson: Ja. That is when the Stratcom guys were told because of course the press then started running around saying you know who had done this and that is when the second aspect of the thing ..."

And then he gets asked about the Stratcom guys.

MR McPHERSON: Mr Chairman I was not involved with this. I was definitely not one of the Stratcom guys at that time.

MR BERGER: And then finally at page 23 the bottom of the page:

Mr Williamson: But it is you know again I don't, it is not something that I had got - now that you mentioned it I think I remember that we were quite surprised that the story then came through after having unsuccessfully fed it through. Ja and I would imagine what happened with that you know when one then feeds these things, these rumours and stories into the networks it ends up coming back to people from the most sort of surprising sources."

Ms Slovo: So he never said exactly where he got the story from?

And then Ms Slovo:

"He said British and American."

MR McPHERSON: It would seem then that Mr Craig Williamson did the feeding work. Fed this through to have this report placed if I read it correctly.

MR BERGER: Yes, I have no doubt about that. But you worked under Mr Williamson in the same section. He was your boss.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Mr Chairperson but I was not at Stratcom at that stage I was not at Stratcom.

MR BERGER: Yes, I know that but you were on the Africa Desk and you had no knowledge of anything to do with this "dekbrief" that was put out about Ruth First.

MR McPHERSON: Not at all Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going onto something else?

MR BERGER: Perhaps this would be the convenient time to take the adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take a short adjournment.



J L McPHERSON: (s.u.o.)


Mr McPherson I then want to move briefly to the final article which is 'HH'. I don't know if you read all the articles during the adjournment. Have you?

MR McPHERSON: No I didn't.

MR BERGER: Well the first three articles that we have looked at you have agreed that they bear all the hallmarks of a Stratcom operation. Am I right?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: I have been advised that I haven't dealt with 'GG' but I thought I had referred you to 'GG' Mr McPherson.

MR McPHERSON: What is the heading of?

MR BERGER: "Who killed Ruth First?"

MR McPHERSON: Yes, you have referred to it.

MR BERGER: And you will see there at the top or the last paragraph of that article:

"Any conflict in the ANC detrimental to Soviet intention locally benefited Western interests. Her death could only benefit Slovo as the man directly answerable to Moscow for ANC terrorist and political activities."

MR McPHERSON: I see that.

MR BERGER: And you have also said that you never believed that and it was clear that this is a Stratcom operation.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: But I really want to refer you to 'HH' which is again part of this Stratcom operation.

"Mozambique's success in getting rid of top ANC activist, Joe Slovo the Soviet KGB colonel highlights a man who is widely believed to be capable of extreme ruthlessness."

We know now that Mr Williamson was instrumental in promoting or demoting Mr Slovo to the rank of colonel in the KGB. But again would you agree that this is a Stratcom operation?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, it appears to be so.

MR BERGER: Just cast your eye down - I am really going to refer you to the next page but I don't want you to not to have the context of this article. Tell me when you get to the bottom of the first page.

MR McPHERSON: This one about "Reports claim Slovo"?



MR BERGER: You have read the first page and at the bottom you see there:

"After they moved to Mozambique from London, First got an academic post at Eduardo Mundlani University in Maputo. Slovo was appointed unanimously by the ANC to take charge of all ANC operations within South Africa and he appointed his wife as his principal assistant."

Which is a total lie. But again that would be what Stratcom did.

MR McPHERSON: That is what we did.

MR BERGER: And then over the page: "That is when his trouble started."

"Ruth Firsts ultra left outlook [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: We only have one page.

MR BERGER: Oh dear. Chairperson what has happened is that the second page of 'GG' should actually be the second page of 'HA'. I am sorry about that. ... is the start of 'HH.' Mr McPherson?


MR BERGER: Do you see what has to be done? 'GG' is just one page.

MR McPHERSON: Yes we understand.

MR BERGER: Alright and then 'HH' I read the last paragraph to you on the first page.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And now I am going on to the second page of that article. Well the second page of the photocopy; "That is when his trouble started."

"Ruth First's ultra left outlook isolated her even from the SACP's central committee in 1979 Twenty Four Hours was told.

Twenty Four Hours is the Star column.

"She had demanded that the basic statement of ANC goals, the Freedom Charter be updated to display a clearer socialist bias. She was critical of the fact that greater emphasis was placed on the arms struggle than the workers' struggle."

Now this came from the Security Police. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: It appears to be so.

MR BERGER: And this sentence: "She was critical of the fact that greater emphasis was placed on the arms struggle than the workers' struggle," that has the germ of truth in it.

MR McPHERSON: Yes for Stratcom to be effective it had to be built up around certain truths. The article had to be constructed around certain truths.

MR BERGER: Yes and you heard Mr Williamson talking about that and I can refer you to page 24 of Exhibit 'X1 and you will see there what is recorded. Do you have it, page 24? I can read it to you.


MR BERGER: I am not going to question you too much about it.

"Mr Williamson: Ja and if I remember that story was about Ruth being anti - she said the Communist Party was too Stalinist.

"Ms Slovo: Ruth was a Trotskyist?"

"Mr Williamson: Ja"

"Ms Slovo: And Joe was a Marxist?"

"Mr Williamson: Ja"

I am not putting this as being the true position of Ms First. What I am saying to you is that this was the debate.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: This was the debate in the Security Police circles.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: "Mr Williamson: Ja, no and it was to do with ideological differences. I remember that she was causing him trouble."

"Ms Slovo: Why did you pick on that story?"

"Mr Williamson: I think they picked on it because it had come from somewhere in the ANC. I mean they would always have a - you know these things don't work unless there is a germ of truth in them."

"Ms Slovo: Ruth of course was never a Trotskyist?"

"Mr Williamson: Yes but you know I don't think they were particularly worried what exactly she was but I think the thing was just to - somebody had probably - I remember reports on Ruth's stance on certain saying that the - if I remember correctly that she was objecting to the principle of how democratic centralism was being abused. There was enough democratic decision making in the organisation and I think that is where, that was the kernel of the thing. And we were trying also at that time - I mean the idea was to also say that the Communist Party and uMkhonto weSizwe guys and the security department were dominating the ANC and sort of anybody who didn't toe the line was at risk or either sent to Quatro or if they were too high profile to go to Quatro they would be killed."

"Ms Slovo: And did you believe this?"

"Mr Williamson: No not really. I mean obviously we knew there was a degree of dissension but it wasn't important whether it was you know the level that was true or not but in an organisation like the ANC was at that time trying to operate in secrecy and so on it feeds on rumours and intrigue and so the more you can add to that the more you destabilise the whole operation."

My question to you Mr McPherson is again all of this was happening under your nose literally and figuratively. Your nose covering Mozambique, Botswana, Angola and you say you cannot assist the Committee by giving any further information in this regard?

MR McPHERSON: Not with regards to this specific report in the newspaper. I wasn't directly involved with this.

MR BERGER: Well in relation to anything relating to the deaths of Ruth First, Jeannette Schoon and Katryn Schoon? Anything either before or after, any information that you might have in relation to their deaths. You say you have got nothing further to give the Committee?

MR McPHERSON: No, nothing more.

MR BERGER: You were not involved and you didn't hear anything?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Would you agree with me Mr McPherson that the fact that the Security Police and in particular the Intelligence Section of the Security Police were aware of the fact that Ms First was critical of certain arguments in the ANC as I put to you that sentence: "She was critical of the fact that greater emphasis was placed on the arms struggle than the workers' struggle."

That shows that the Security Police and the Intelligence Section in particular were very much aware of the exact nature of the debate. Yes they deliberately obviscated and mixed it up and all of that but they themselves, Intelligence Section knew precisely what Ruth First was doing in Mozambique. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: Mr Chairperson it is so that the ANC and the SACP had been infiltrated by agents and by nature of the situation such reports would have reached the Security Branch and we would then have had such information.

MR BERGER: Yes, that is exactly what I am saying to you. That whilst the Security Police might have put out disinformation to the media which was then carried to the general public. So that the general public were kept in the dark the Security Police and the Intelligence Section of the Security Police knew exactly what was going on in relation to Ruth First, Jeannette and Katryn Schoon in Mozambique and in Angola. Am I right?

MR McPHERSON: There would have been reports because we weren't the only group who was gathering information about Africa.

MR BERGER: But the Intelligence Section would have known and did know exactly what was going on. Correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Then I just have some other points to raise with you. Video number 1 which was shown by Mr Williamson. Do you remember that video?

MR McPHERSON: Yes , that is correct.

MR BERGER: That was the one with Freek Robinson and Ruda Landman and the interviews with Prof Barry, Prof Hough and Dr Jan du Plessis. Do you remember that?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: And you remember you told me certain things about that. That, that was pre-planned.

MR McPHERSON: The way it worked was that if such as in that case it was a cross-border operation that took place to Botswana. In such a case in the planning phases arrangements would be made that as soon as it had occurred immediately thereafter specific messages would be sent out to the public. To among others pacify the public and also to make it known to the public that such cross-border operations were justified.

MR BERGER: And you told me that those panellists would have had the questions in advance. They would have known exactly what questions they were going to be asked and they would have known what responses they were required to give. Do you remember that?

MR McPHERSON: Yes. In certain cases we had contact persons such as at the Institute of Strategic Studies and in other departments and these persons would be informed beforehand. Confidantes of the government would be informed beforehand that something like this was going to take place. That it would be in Botswana and then that person would do some research before the time so that when the panel discussion took place he would be prepared for the questions which would be posed.

MR BERGER: Yes but you went further than that. You said that they got the questions in advance.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: In answer to questions from Mr du Plessis yesterday [intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Pardon and those posing the questions?

MR McPHERSON: No, Mr Chairman in certain cases at the SABC I had persons who would receive the questions beforehand. I wouldn't say in the case of Freek Robinson.

ADV DE JAGER: Well how would this operate? One person knows the questions which are going to be put to him but the person putting the questions doesn't know which questions will be put.

MR McPHERSON: Well perhaps I didn't express myself adequately. The possible questions which would be posed. For example if there were to be something about Botswana and the obvious questions which would be put such as; how many terrorists are there in Gaberone, what is the role which the ANC is playing within Gaberone. What tasking have terrorists in Gaberone received, those sort of questions which were to be expected would be given to the persons beforehand so that they could prepare themselves for that.

MR BERGER: You also told me that journalists many times would come to the SABC and you would have prepared stories ready for them to take to their editors.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct. That is how we operated.

MR BERGER: They didn't even have to do the typing.

MR McPHERSON: That is entirely correct. I testified according to that at the media hearings.

MR BERGER: You said that: "Ms Ruth First was a very highly placed person within the ANC/SACP alliance," remember that?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: That is false. You know that?

MR McPHERSON: Wasn't she part of the central organ of the ANC?

MR BERGER: She was not on the central committee, no. You see Ruth First was a high profile anti-Apartheid activist whose activities were public knowledge world-wide.

MR McPHERSON: Yes I would accept that.

MR BERGER: And you then said that there was no doubt that she supported the ANC.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Yes, well there is no doubt about that but is that reason to kill someone?

MR McPHERSON: I didn't make the decision regarding her death.

MR BERGER: Well you would agree that, that would not have been a reason to kill somebody simply because they were a supporter of the ANC. Even in your paradigm at the time.

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson as I have said I didn't take a decision regarding her death and nothing like that was ever put to me to make a decision regarding her death. So therefore I can't comment on it.

MR BERGER: You see I am asking these questions because you gave that evidence.

MR McPHERSON: That is how I viewed her at that stage.

MR BERGER: But even at that time in your frame of reference somebody who supported the ANC was not a target for killing. Am I right?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson at that stage the ANC/SACP alliance was the enemy of the country and if you were part of the enemy and there was a war situation then you ran the danger of becoming a casualty of war.

MR BERGER: I see so they didn't have to be highly placed members of the South African Communist Party, they didn't have to be on the central committee of the Communist Party. Anybody, anywhere in the world who supported the ANC or the SACP was a target to be killed no matter what position they occupied and what they did within those organisations. Is that what you are saying?

MR McPHERSON: No that is not what I am saying. Persons who played specific roles such as persons who went for military training, persons who were leading figures would naturally have stood out as targets.

MR BERGER: Yes but that wasn't Ruth First was it?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson Ruth First was a symbol of a person with a high profile as we viewed her at that time.

MR BERGER: And who was that person?

MR McPHERSON: Ruth First.

MR BERGER: No you said she was a symbol of a person.

MR McPHERSON: She was the symbol of a person who stood out as a person with a high profile.

MR BERGER: Yes, she was a well-known and respected speaker, much in demand at anti-Apartheid meetings.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: She was an authority on Africa.

MR McPHERSON: Correct.

MR BERGER: She was invited to international conferences.

MR McPHERSON: Correct.

MR BERGER: She served as a judge on one of the international tribunals held to investigate what was happening in Ethiopia.

MR McPHERSON: I accept that.

MR BERGER: Her life was completely public. There was nothing secret or underground about her life at all.

MR McPHERSON: It is difficult for me to comment on that.

MR BERGER: She was not a member of the ANC executive nor the Communist Party central committee and she hadn't been one since the early sixties.

MR McPHERSON: I don't have any commentary regarding that.

MR BERGER: Well I find it very surprising that you don't have comment on that because after all you were head of the Africa Desk. She was in Africa.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Come on Mr McPherson you knew exactly what Ruth First was involved in and you knew that she was a high profile anti-Apartheid activist.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: You knew that she wasn't on the central committee of the SACP. You knew she wasn't on the executive of the ANC. You knew she wasn't planning acts of violence in South Africa. Correct?

MR McPHERSON: It is difficult to comment on that.

MR BERGER: Why? You knew it.

MR McPHERSON: Because I didn't have any specific information regarding her activities.

MR BERGER: So you say as the head of the Africa Desk you didn't know those things?

MR McPHERSON: No, I didn't concentrate specifically on her.

MR BERGER: Well if you as the head of the Africa Desk didn't concentrate on her, who did?

MR McPHERSON: As I have put it to you persons would be captured and questioned. There would be information emanating from interrogation of suspects regarding specific individuals. There would be the intervention of certain forms of communication such as telexes as well as information emanating from documents and so forth and I didn't appoint anybody to spy specifically on her.

MR BERGER: All that information, all the intelligence gathered about Ruth First would have come to you. Am I right?

MR McPHERSON: Not necessarily. It would go to a file. I would have to look it up.

MR BERGER: And then about Marius and Jeannette Schoon you said when they were in Angola - correct me if I am wrong, you said: "They were also highly placed members of ANC/SACP alliance."

MR McPHERSON: That is how I regarded them.

MR BERGER: What did you know about their activities in Angola?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson I had to read numerous forms of documentation during that time and I knew that they were in Angola and that they were involved with ANC individuals.

MR BERGER: In Angola?

MR McPHERSON: In Angola.

MR BERGER: But you see they weren't because they were teaching English in Angola.

MR McPHERSON: All that I can discuss now is statements made by those who were in detention who had liaise with them at some or other time. So with regard to myself they had liaison with the ANC.

MR BERGER: Well you see there were only 4 ANC people in Lubango during the time that Marius and Jeannette Schoon were there. So if it wasn't Marius and Jeannette Schoon statements that you had in your file [intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Weren't there only 4 whites? Wasn't that what was put before that there were only 4 white ANC members there?

MR BERGER: No. It wasn't put 4 white ANC members. It was put 4 ANC members and if I must give a breakdown [intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Well my recollection but I may be wrong.

MR BERGER: No Mr Chairman that is how I remember it.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman I think it was 4 white South Africans.

CHAIRPERSON: We were told about all sorts of ANC members there and bases and things of that nature.

MR BERGER: Not in Lubango, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Outside Lubango but it is my recollection is the same as my colleagues there were 4 whites.

MR BERGER: There were 4 ANC people in Lubango. That was the only ANC presence in Lubango. If you are talking about other camps in Angola that is far from Lubango. We are talking about Lubango.

MR McPHERSON: So are you trying to say that he didn't have any liaison with those 4 ANC members?

MR BERGER: He was part of those 4. It was Marius and Jeannette Schoon and two others, all teaching at the university in Lubango.

MR McPHERSON: Well then they would have had liaison with ANC members.

MR BERGER: Oh I see, the other two.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you agree there were only 4 ANC members in Lubango?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson I can't comment regarding that. I have only just heard about it here.

MR BERGER: And there was no ANC camp anywhere near Lubango.

MR McPHERSON: It depends upon what you mean by near. Because there are quite a number of kilometres.

MR BERGER: Hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of kilometres away from Lubango.

MR McPHERSON: It could have been Giyana if I remember correctly.

MR BERGER: So knew that within a radius of hundreds and hundreds of kilometres there was no ANC base near Lubango.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And that there were only 4 ANC people in Lubango; Marius and Jeannette Schoon and two others. All 4 of them teaching at the University of Lubango.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Now if you knew that then everyone else in the Intelligence Section knew that. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: No, not necessarily.

MR BERGER: It was need-to-know? You didn't share that information with anyone else?

MR McPHERSON: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And if you knew that there were 4 ANC people in Lubango you also knew that Marius and Jeannette Schoon had their children with them in Lubango. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: I didn't know that.

MR BERGER: Where were their children?

MR McPHERSON: I had no idea where they were.

MR BERGER: You knew they had children, didn't you?

MR McPHERSON: No Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Oh Mr McPherson.

MR McPHERSON: I would just like to rectify things here. There was no specific operations surrounding Marius Schoon which I had. That which I heard of him was as a result of documents which I read. I didn't specifically investigate issues such as children.

MR BERGER: Yes you read his file and the file on Jeannette Schoon and from that information you saw that there were only 4 ANC people in Lubango. Correct?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson, today is the first time that I have ever heard of those 4 ANC members.

MR BERGER: Mr McPherson you are trying to slip away from your previous evidence. I will leave it there. You said to the Committee yesterday that the whole struggle was against Communism. Everything you did was against Communism. Did I understand you correctly?

MR McPHERSON: Among others, yes.

MR BERGER: I don't know what you mean by 'among others' but let me ask you this; did it ever occur to you Mr McPherson that the ANC was struggling for national liberation and fundamental human rights? Did that ever occur to you?

MR McPHERSON: I read about that.

MR BERGER: But it never occurred to you that, that was what the struggle was all about?

MR McPHERSON: I knew what their struggle was about.

MR BERGER: National liberation and the establishment of fundamental rights in South Africa, you knew that at the time didn't you?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And everyone else in the Security Police and in particular in the Intelligence Section of the Security Police knew that. Am I correct?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson I have no further questions. Thank you Mr McPherson.

MR McPHERSON: Thank you.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson.

Mr McPherson just a couple of questions I need to clarify with you. My learned colleague Mr Hugo questioned you on the role of Derek Broon yesterday but I don't believe you informed us who authorised Derek Broon's involvement in the operation. How did it come about that he assisted you in the documentation that you needed to go over to London?

MR McPHERSON: Derek Broon was part of our staff. He was our chief training officer in intelligence. The Daisy Farm was under his control and because he had very good knowledge regarding documentation along with his knowledge of London and his background of the ANC offices in London he was the ideal person to assist us with the documentation. He was second in command of the Intelligence Unit and he would have thus fallen directly under the command of Craig Williamson.

MS PATEL: So are you saying by inference that Mr Williamson would have authorised his involvement in the operation?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Then just regarding - to move onto another aspect. The transfer of the bomb via diplomatic bag. Do I understand you correctly, yesterday you said that the position is generally that Foreign Affairs wouldn't be informed about this?

MR McPHERSON: When it was a cross-border operation such as the Botswana raid Foreign Affairs would have been informed as a result of the possible repercussions which could follow with a neighbouring state which was being invaded. However in the case of the London bomb I cannot see that Foreign Affairs would have been informed.

MS PATEL: So it is not something that you draw on from general knowledge regarding the use of this procedure to transfer equipment or whatever else in and out of the country. Are you saying that your answer is specific to this incident itself?

MR McPHERSON: Yes with regard to this incident I don't have personal knowledge of the placing of the explosives and the equipment in the diplomatic bag. I simply sketched to the Committee how I visualised it happening.

MS PATEL: Right so what my question boils down to basically is that you don't have knowledge of any other time in which a diplomatic bag would have been used for any other unlawful purpose?

MR McPHERSON: I wouldn't know about other illegal or unlawful actions during which a diplomatic bag was used. From within myself I simply used the diplomatic bag ...

MS PATEL: ... and different once again [intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, before you moving on could I? Yesterday Mr Botha questioned you.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And please assist me if I am incorrect. I had the impression that there were two types of diplomatic bags.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is entirely correct. There would be the military - I heard yesterday about the military diplomatic bag which solely military staff had access to and then the Intelligence Services also had their own diplomatic bag which they solely had access to and in my case for the purposes of communication with my agents I made use of the regular diplomatic bag of Foreign Affairs with Foreign Affairs staff.

ADV DE JAGER: You said to us that you heard yesterday about the military bag?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, when Mr Botha testified. So it is possible that the equipment could have gone over in a military diplomatic bag.

ADV DE JAGER: But you didn't say yesterday that this was the first time that you heard about it. I had the impression that you knew about the existence of two types of bags.


ADV DE JAGER: And that is the problem which I have with your evidence and I want to put it to you things are being put to you and you answer yes to just about every single question. So please listen carefully to the question which the lady here is putting to you and answer the question so that we know what you knew and what you didn't know.

MS PATEL: Leading on from that are you confirming now that you were not aware of the separate systems that were in place regarding the use of diplomatic bags?


MS PATEL: Regarding the internal workings of the ANC offices was your sole source of information Craig Williamson?

MR McPHERSON: Of which office are you speaking?

MS PATEL: The London offices.

MR McPHERSON: I had one person who at certain times would visit the ANC offices. However most agents who provided direct information were those agents of Craig Williamson.

MS PATEL: Was this other informer that you had, consulted during this period?


MS PATEL: So do I take it then your information regarding the arrangement between the taxi owners and the ANC regarding the use of the parking lot in the evenings that, that information would have come from Craig Williamson?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I believe so.

MS PATEL: And also [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well before you go on for that, did the ANC have its own parking lot at the back of the building or was there one large area that served the various buildings that we have now seen in the photograph?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson the ANC had their own parking area behind the building. It wasn't part of the other parts of the property. It had its own gate and wall. So therefore it was part of their premises.

CHAIRPERSON: But how did you get to it? I just can't understand any more.

MR McPHERSON: If you look at the map which was drawn in White Lion Street.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes but that map is now, we have been told is totally inaccurate. We have been shown a photograph that shows that between the ANC building and White Lion Street there is another building. If you look at the photograph 'DD' and we were told the other building was number 30. So the ANC building did not go to White Lion Street.

MR McPHERSON: Yes Chairperson the back building, 28 Penton Street if one entered through that front door - if you look at the photo there is a tree and just to the right, not immediately to the right but the second door to the right was the entrance to the ANC offices and one would walk through. The building which you see behind is still part of the ANC building and if you go through to the back of the building where the chimneys come out is a back door and that is where the printing press is. Where the tree is if you walk around on the right where Penton Street is you would arrive in White Lion Street.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but what about number 30?

MR McPHERSON: Excuse me let me just begin again. If you are at the tree and you turn left you go around the corner and end up in White Lion Street. Then you would walk down towards the right upon which you would find a gate and the back area of this building.

CHAIRPERSON: What about the back area of number 30?

MR McPHERSON: I didn't look at that. I am not aware of a back area for number 30.

CHAIRPERSON: It must have had a back to the building if it had a front. Was number the 30 and the next building alone? We have been told that the ANC building was only the width of the two windows that we can see. Therefore the next building is number 30 that also extends up to the top and must have a back.

MR McPHERSON: As far as I know there wasn't a back area for that shop.

CHAIRPERSON: Did it back onto the ANC area?

MR McPHERSON: I believe so.

CHAIRPERSON: Well did you enquire?


CHAIRPERSON: Were there any divisions on their area at the back?

MR McPHERSON: With the exception of a wall in the parking area or which surrounded the parking area there was a wall which cordoned off the parking area on the street side of White Lion Street.

CHAIRPERSON: And what about the back of number 26?

MR McPHERSON: I didn't see that.


MS PATEL: Mr McPherson in relation to the cordoned off parking area of the ANC offices where is the area that the taxis would have parked? Is it the same area?

MR McPHERSON: It is the same area.

MS PATEL: And in relation to the school that is being referred to how far is that from that area?

MR McPHERSON: The what?

MS PATEL: The school.

MR McPHERSON: The school [intervention]

MS PATEL: Is it behind these offices?

MR McPHERSON: It is behind this wall, behind the wall in the parking area. The school was here on the northern side of these premises.

MS PATEL: Okay so how big would this parking area have been?

MR McPHERSON: I estimated approximately [intervention]

MS PATEL: Is that the estimation for yesterday?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, from where Mr Hugo is seated to the left side of this room.

MS PATEL: Okay fine and you say the area was cordoned off by a wall. How high was this wall and what type of wall was it?

MR McPHERSON: It was approximately two metres high and the gates were also approximately two metres high.

MS PATEL: So would you have been able to [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well should we put on record that the estimated distance from Mr Hugo to the wall here is I would think about 15 to 20 paces. It is about the length of a cricket pitch or just a little bit shorter.

MS PATEL: Mr McPherson would you have been able to see the play area of the school from the parking area?

MR McPHERSON: No because the school building was right next to the wall and the playground for the children was obstructed.

MS PATEL: Sorry, there was just one more aspect on that. The bomb that was placed, was it placed near the parking area? Would that have been the immediate section from the yard of the ANC offices where it was placed?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MS PATEL: And regarding your information about the refugees sleeping in the building would that information also have come from Craig Williamson?

MR McPHERSON: Yes that is correct.

MS PATEL: As well as your [intervention]

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman can I just interrupt here. The question was phrased, I am sorry, the question was phrased that he testified as if Mr McPherson testified that there was a refugee sleeping. I don't think that was his evidence. It was put during cross-examination by my learned friend Mr Bizos that he was a refugee. So I just want to clear that up so that there is no misunderstanding about that. I don't think Mr McPherson ever testified that it was a refugee.

ADV DE JAGER: Whether it was a refugee, a person sleeping in the building. He might not have known whether it is a refugee or a caretaker or whatever.

MR SIBANYONI: In fact it was said it was a homeless person who had taken refuge in the ANC office.

MS PATEL: Ja I phrase my question accordingly because when it was put - my recollection is in any event that when it was put to Mr McPherson that there were refugees sleeping in the building he didn't take issue with whether they were refugees or not. So it was on that basis that I put the question.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, I am just making the point that Mr Williamson didn't say that it was a refugee. So there is a dispute on that and I just don't want that to be - I just want to record that.

CHAIRPERSON: This witness did say didn't he that he didn't see any refugees in the building and if there was such information he was sure that Mr Williamson would have told them about it.

MS PATEL: Regarding your surveillance of the area and your apparent lack of knowledge as to whether there were indeed residents in the buildings adjacent to the office, was this because you were also informed by Mr Williamson that there were indeed no residents in that area?

MR McPHERSON: No, as I have said I didn't notice that people were living in the area.

MS PATEL: Did you also not expect there to be residents in the area?

MR McPHERSON: I didn't expect it because as I testified it was an industrial area where people would usually go home in the evening.

MS PATEL: Okay so can I then infer that because of those expectations you wouldn't have been alert to whether or not there were residents in the area?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson because of the planned time for the explosion of the bomb would have been on a Sunday we didn't specifically look for people in that vicinity who were residents in that vicinity. We simply concentrated on the ANC office itself.

MS PATEL: So you saying [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Did you say in your evidence that when you inspected the area at night you didn't see any light on?

MR McPHERSON: That is entirely correct. During the evenings we didn't see any lights on in the building.

MS PATEL: Just from what you said before, you are saying that because of the time, the expected time of the bomb being detonated it wasn't a concern to you whether there would be people around or not because you assumed it would be an industrial area and that is it? So you weren't as vigilant as you would have been if you had been informed prior to going there that there may be residents in the area.

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson we performed general surveillance and my impression was that there were no residents in the vicinity.

MS PATEL: To move onto another aspect regarding the involvement of Mr Neethling and the teargas canisters would that have been a - let me phrase it this way. My recollection is that those were given to you on the instructions of Mr Williamson to Mr Neethling or how did that come about?

MR McPHERSON: I believe that, that is how it would have functioned.

MS PATEL: Then just one final point regarding the Lusaka bombing. You have stated that the bomb wasn't built by your department but the request went to the Special Forces. Can you tell us who specifically you approached there?

MR McPHERSON: It was a major. I have forgotten his surname but it was a major in their technical unit.

MS PATEL: Can you explain on what basis he would have accepted a request from you directly regarding this? Was there a relationship between the two of you in terms of this? Had it happened before? What was the position?

MR McPHERSON: This was the first time that I had asked him to do something like this and our collegial relationship emanated from planning which we had been busy with at that stage with Special Forces regarding cross-border operations.

MS PATEL: Did he not question you as to the authorisation for this?

MR McPHERSON: No, not at all.

MS PATEL: So he accepted your bona fides. Is that what you are saying?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MS PATEL: Was he informed as to the nature of the purpose of the bomb?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MS PATEL: And still he didn't request whether this was okayed by your superiors and what procedures and he didn't question why he was approached and not people from your own department?

MR McPHERSON: No, not at all.

MS PATEL: Absolutely not?

MR McPHERSON: Absolutely not.

MS PATEL: And you say this relationship of trust flowed out of your working relationship with him regarding is it the Botswana raid?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MS PATEL: And how long had that relationship lasted? I mean how long were you working together in the planning of that operation before you made this request to him?

MR McPHERSON: I believe there had been co-operation over several years during the eighties with Special Forces.

MS PATEL: And with this specific major?

MR McPHERSON: With regard to this major I must have known him about a year at least.

MS PATEL: In terms of rank, were you of a higher rank than him at the time?

MR McPHERSON: No, we were of equal rank. We were both majors. He was a major and I was a major.

MS PATEL: And still he didn't question whether you were authorised to do this or not given that you were of equal rank.

MR McPHERSON: Not at all.

MS PATEL: Would he not have had to okay this with his superior at the time? Why would he have accepted? Basically what I need to know is why would he have accepted a request of such a nature from a colleague who is at best at the same rank as he is?

ADV DE JAGER: And in another totally different department?

MR McPHERSON: As I have explained during that time the co-operation between the military and the Security Branch was very good.

MS PATEL: So what you are saying basically is that because there was an overall general working relationship between the two departments he would have accepted a request from you of such a serious nature purely on that basis and not questioned it at all?

MR McPHERSON: No, he never questioned it.

MS PATEL: And also given that this was - this would have been a cross-border event which would have required I would imagine special authorisation.

MR McPHERSON: He didn't question it at all.

MS PATEL: Alright thank you Honourable Chairperson. I have no further questions for this witness.


CHAIRPERSON: The impression I get from you in this regard and in some of your other evidence that you, the people who did the work co-operated very closely with one another.

MR McPHERSON: That is definitely the case.

CHAIRPERSON: And that you didn't always bother very much about the chain of command going up on either side. It was a cross co-operation.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: They would ask you favours, you would ask them favours.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And this had carried on for some years between the various people engaged in the covert warfare.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That concludes the cross-examination of the witness.

MR LEVINE: I haven't had an opportunity.

CHAIRPERSON: No you haven't.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: Mr McPherson you mentioned a wall in the parking lot.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: What was the construction of this wall?

MR McPHERSON: It was concrete.

MR LEVINE: And what about the wall on the street side?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that was the one on the street side as I remember it.

MR LEVINE: Was it not corrugated iron?

MR McPHERSON: Not that I can remember.

MR LEVINE: Can you dispute it?

MR McPHERSON: I would not deny it.

MR LEVINE: Very well because I want to deal to some extent with your memory. Before we get there. On what date did you depart for London?

MR McPHERSON: As I have calculated it, it was on the 28th of February. It was the Sunday and it was also the last day of the month and it was the evening flight.

MR LEVINE: And your task was to perform surveillance on the ANC building?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: And you performed that surveillance from the 1st of March to the 13th of March?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: Now on Sunday the 7th of March, that is one week before the bomb blast, did you do surveillance on the ANC office area?

MR McPHERSON: I believe that we were in that vicinity on that Sunday.

MR LEVINE: In order to establish the Sunday routine?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: Very well. Now I would like your views and I am referring Mr Chairman to a document in volume 2 I wonder if it could be placed before the witness. It starts at page 31 and it is Exhibit C. Do you have it before you?

MR McPHERSON: Which page Sir?

MR LEVINE: Page 31, merely to derive where it comes from. It is a paper by the Muldon Institute, Moscow's politico-military offence in Africa. Do you have that?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I have it.

MR LEVINE: Would you be good enough to turn to page 58. That is at page 26 of this briefing paper.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: At page 58 you will see a map and it sets out Angola's air defences.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I see that.

MR LEVINE: Predominantly around Lubango.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I see that.

MR LEVINE: And would you turn to page 76 of the next document. It is page 76 of the papers.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I have it.

MR LEVINE: Number 18 about two-thirds of the way down the page. Could you read that into the record please?


"The USSR's military strategy with regards to the RSA is still directed at indirect action. That would be a revolutionary onslaught. Part of this indirect strategy is a continued arms provision programme to Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho. With which it is still busy placing the military balance of power in Southern Africa with regard to the availability of military equipment at the disadvantage of the RSA. By means of this the USSR has continued on the one side to attempt to protect the SWAPO and ANC base areas and on the other hand creating strategic mobility for itself in the region."

MR LEVINE: Do you agree with that?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I do agree with that.

MR LEVINE: So this was a full-scale military operation?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: And wasn't indicative of human rights, attempts at observing human rights per se?

MR McPHERSON: Could you repeat the question please?

MR LEVINE: This was a full-scale military operation?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: That was predominantly the position as is summed up at the article, portion of the article which you have just read.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MR LEVINE: It wasn't a peace situation?

MR McPHERSON: No, definitely not.

MR LEVINE: And would you look at page 77. It is the very next page and have a look at 'Air Defence,' at the bottom 'D'.

MR McPHERSON: I see that.

MR LEVINE: Could you read the first sentence into the record?


"During the past number of years Angola and Mozambique especially with the assistance of the USSR have emphasised the extension of their air defence capacity."

MR LEVINE: That is what would happen at a time of war. Is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: Again not a peaceful situation?

MR McPHERSON: I agree.

MR LEVINE: Could you read the last two words on page 77 and the next five lines in the record please?


"The current deployments in Mozambique and especially Angola are already of such a nature that it would limit South African Air Force action. It provides to a certain extent a protective umbrella for terrorist organisations who are acting from within these countries against South West Africa and the RSA."

MR LEVINE: Yes, it was a haven for terrorist organisations. I am talking about Lubango, it was a haven for terrorist organisations to launch their actions against South Africa.

MR CORNELIUS: Chairperson it doesn't say that.

MR LEVINE: I beg your pardon I believe it does. It says there [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: That is surely a matter for argument. I don't see the word Lubango in that article at all.

MR LEVINE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And Lubango is in extreme west of Angola.

MR LEVINE: That is correct but it is not what one would associate with a peaceful human rights type of operation is it?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: In Mr Raven's evidence there is reference to 4 x 250 g or 1 kg of explosive.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MR LEVINE: Your evidence is 11 kg.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I did indicate that. It was an estimation on my behalf with regard to the container that I saw in the office.

MR LEVINE: You concede it was a highly unreliable estimate?

MR McPHERSON: I realise that.

MR LEVINE: Now in regard to Stratcom would you say that Stratcom was primarily political or primarily military?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson I would say that it was more political than military.

MR LEVINE: Would you say about 80 percent political and 20 percent military?


MR LEVINE: Let's have a look at Exhibit EE if you would be good enough to. I would like to deal with the third column and the second paragraph in the third column:

"Rapport was also informed on good authority yesterday that the Schoon's during their stay in Botswana were actively busy with the planning of acts of terrorism within South Africa."

Do you see that?

MR McPHERSON: Just a moment. I have read it.

MR LEVINE: Was that the general perception in the Security Branch in regard to the Schoon's?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct.

MR LEVINE: So you agreed with my learned friend when he put to you that this was disinformation. It wasn't disinformation and I put it to you that it was completely accurate.

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson as I have explained that in terms of a Stratcom action there should be an aspect of truth to be published in order to lend a greater degree of credibility to the false information which is being published.

MR LEVINE: But this particular sub-paragraph was completely true and it was how the Schoon's were perceived in the eyes of the Security Forces in so far as their conduct in Botswana was concerned.

MR McPHERSON: That was our impression at the time.

MR LEVINE: On reliable information obtained?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were getting information about the Schoon's at the time when they were in Botswana?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson as I have explained earlier I didn't have a specific operation with regard to the Schoon's. I didn't have an agent who had to focus on them specifically but by nature of my work regular circulations and documents went around regarding information which was obtained from terrorists who had come back into the country and had been captured. So that was my impression.

MR LEVINE: Would you be good enough to have a look at the article 'GG' and to the last paragraph on the first page - well I believe it is the only page. You see that paragraph - "Any conflict..."?

MR McPHERSON: I see it.

MR LEVINE: Is that disinformation?

MR McPHERSON: I beg your pardon I have read the wrong report.

MR LEVINE: Was that disinformation?

MR McPHERSON: Just let me look at it.

MR LEVINE: I am sorry.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman can we just make sure I think there is a bit of confusion here on the marking of the - Mr Levine can you just read the heading of the article?

MR LEVINE: "Who killed Ruth First."

MR DU PLESSIS: And you are referring to the last paragraph?

MR LEVINE: Yes, just above where it says: "See page 11."

MR DU PLESSIS: Excuse me, Mr Chairman, Mr Bizos has some sort of problem. I don't know if he can perhaps just state the problem that he has.

MR BIZOS: Yes Mr Chairman I mentioned to my learned friend Mr Berger and my attorney that Mr du Plessis has a habit of interfering with other peoples' cross-examination.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman my exhibit is marked wrongly. So I was enquiring exactly which is the right exhibit. I would request Mr Bizos to leave personal attacks out of this.

MR LEVINE: Have you had an opportunity?

MR McPHERSON: The first sentence: "Any conflict in the ANC detrimental to Soviet intentions locally benefited western interests." That is a true statement. Then: "Her death could only benefit Slovo as the man directly answerable to Moscow for ANC terrorist and political activities," I can't conceive how her death would have benefited Slovo. So that one could regard as disinformation.

MR LEVINE: Was Slovo not the man directly answerable to Moscow for ANC terrorist and political activities?

MR McPHERSON: That was so Mr Chairperson but the first part of the sentence: "Her death could only benefit Slovo," [intervention]

MR LEVINE: So the words: "Her death could only benefit," that is the disinformation?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct disinformation and then [intervention]

MR LEVINE: But as for the rest it is perfectly true?


MR LEVINE: So it wasn't correct for you to have conceded that this was disinformation?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson as I have explained with regard to any Stratcom action one had to incorporate certain elements of truth with disinformation in order to render a greater degree of credibility with a report. If it was total disinformation people would see right through it and it would not be effective. But to add certain elements of truth would lend greater credibility to the report itself.

MR LEVINE: In regard to the cross-border raid into Botswana I think it was put to you that a story was prepared before the raid took place.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct. I was personally involved with that.

MR LEVINE: Well it would hardly be feasible or intelligent to prepare a story after the cross-border operation would it?

MR McPHERSON: No, Chairperson because once this event had taken place there had to be an explanation which would be readily available.

MR LEVINE: Precisely. Now I would like you kindly to have a look at Exhibit L. That is the tribute to Comrade Ruth First, Mr Chairman by Comrade Mzala. Do you have it?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I have it.

MR LEVINE: I wonder if you would be good enough - you could take my copy and merely read what appears on pages 67 and 68 which is marked in green. If you could read that into the record please? Could you read that into the record please?


"A tribute to Comrade Ruth First by Comrade Mzala. Comrade Ruth however and this will certainly come as a shock to those enemies of the ANC and the SACP whose propaganda seeks in vain to show that the ANC is lead by white communist, was at one time a member of an ANC unit in Mozambique of which I was chairman. It was in this unit that I first met her and worked with her albeit for a short while. A brilliant and seasoned revolutionary activist."

MR LEVINE: What is a brilliant and seasoned revolutionary activist denote in your intelligence minded way of thinking?

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, you have left out; "albeit for a short while, ever modest and disliking any sort of ..."

MR McPHERSON: Yes, Chairperson they did not highlight that aspect. They omitted it.

MR LEVINE: Sorry, if it is not marked. It should have been marked.

MR McPHERSON: Okay I will read it again.

"Ever modest and disliking any sort of pomposity or pretentiousness. She made her contributions in the unit with exceptional capability and devotion. As a brilliant and seasoned revolutionary activist."

MR LEVINE: What is a brilliant [intervention]

MR BERGER: That is not the end of the sentence either Chairperson.


"As a brilliant and seasoned revolutionary activist educating and encouraging us with her example."

MR LEVINE: A brilliant and seasoned revolutionary activist, what does that cast in your own mind?

MR McPHERSON: That would be somebody who was very clever with what she did and it also indicates that she had very good experience as a revolutionary activist.

MR LEVINE: Yes. Would you turn to the next page, I think it is page 68.


"What maybe made her quite distinct from the rest of us was her staunchness to the ANC. Her tireless fulfilment of every assignment given to her by the unit which was mainly composed of young cadres of our movement."

MR LEVINE: What were the young cadres in Maputo doing at that time?

MR McPHERSON: Under young cadres I would understand individuals who had undergone military training.

MR LEVINE: They were involved in military matters.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: In which she showed staunch support.

MR McPHERSON: That is my interpretation.

MR LEVINE: Now I would just like to deal for a moment with Marius and Jeannette Schoon. How were they regarded by you in the intelligence and in charge of the Africa Desk?

MR McPHERSON: As I have put it to you I didn't have a specific operation surrounding them as individuals in Angola. I relied more on reports which were communicated information and intelligence which was gathered from terrorist who had returned to South Africa and according to my opinion they stood out as persons who were members of the struggle.

MR LEVINE: Would you have a look please at Exhibit N "Further submissions and responses by the African National Congress to questions raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation." Do you have it Sir.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I have it.

MR LEVINE: Would you be good enough to have a look at page 40. You will see the numbers at the bottom of the pages and have a look at paragraph 3.9. 1 page 40.

MR McPHERSON: I have it.

MR LEVINE: The Botswana IPC, you see a whole lot of names there including Jenny and Marius Schoon.

MR McPHERSON: I see it.

MR LEVINE: What function was the Botswana IPC forming?

MR McPHERSON: They would occupy a supporting role for ANC structures within Botswana. Perhaps I could just help you out. IPC was Intelligence Political Community or rather Internal Political Community. In other words within the political structure of the ANC.

MR LEVINE: And would you be good enough to look at page 43 of the same document. Page 43 sub-paragraph 4.6.2.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct. I have it.

MR LEVINE: And you see the names there of Marius and Jenny Schoon?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I see them.

MR LEVINE: Or Jeannette Schoon as she has been named here. What was the function of the Botswana Senior Organ?

MR McPHERSON: If I look at the years in 1976 and 1980 they were part of the internal politico committee and after 1980 and up until 1983 they served on the Botswana Senior Organ which would indicate that they fulfilled a greater role within the ANC.

MR LEVINE: In what aspects of the ANC activities in Botswana?

MR McPHERSON: Well it was known that Botswana was a neighbouring state of South Africa which was used as an interim stop-over point for terrorists who were infiltrating from Zambia and in Botswana, Gaberone especially the houses which had been occupied by the ANC served as places of transit. In other words over-night facilities for terrorists who were on their way to South Africa.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine I don't know whether you were present. I can't quite remember but I raised this at the stage and I think Mr Bizos replied that he lead evidence that this is a mistake. I don't know whether you are aware of it or I am only telling you.

MR LEVINE: No I am aware of it but at the moment we must look at the document as it stands. If he leads evidence that [intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Ja. No you can continue. I am only wondering.

MR LEVINE: I am indebted to you Mr de Jager I was here. You said in your evidence I am told that was the occasion I wasn't present - you said in your evidence yesterday in regard to the London bombing that Mr Williamson had told you that Mr de Kock and Mr Adam were being followed while in London.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: By whom were they followed?

MR McPHERSON: Mr de Kock was at the airport and it was there that he was questioned for approximately three hours by British Intelligence regarding his bona fide reasons for entering the country as a tourist or whichever cover-up he was using and they wanted to know why they should grant him a visa. He explained his situation to them verbally and he was then granted a visa. John Adam and Eugene de Kock became aware that there was a team following them for the first number of days as I understand it.

MR LEVINE: Was this not - well firstly there are two legs to this question. Certainly the people who questioned him did not themselves follow him, did they?

MR McPHERSON: No, definitely not. What would have happened was that the British special branch would have been notified and they would then have appointed a surveillance team to follow them.

MR LEVINE: Did Mr Williamson not explain to you that because of the questioning of Mr de Kock at the airport he had arranged to have them under surveillance?

MR McPHERSON: I can't remember that he ever said that to me.

MR LEVINE: No I am not saying that you said it. But can you dispute that?

MR McPHERSON: No, I would not deny that.

MR LEVINE: Did you tell the members of the team that went to London that the mission was a bombing mission or were they merely told that this was an operation against the London office of the ANC?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson all that I can recall is that Mr Williamson told me from the beginning what the objective was and I accepted that he had also informed the other members of the team regarding the objective and as I have already testified I was rather surprised when I read in the amnesty applications of the applicants that some of them didn't even know and that it was in London where they were first informed regarding the actual purpose of the mission.

MR LEVINE: You making an assumption as to what Mr Williamson told other members.

MR McPHERSON: That is right.

MR LEVINE: It isn't something you are saying of your own knowledge?


MR LEVINE: Mr McPherson it seems to me and I must put this to you that your memory is on certain instances and issues somewhat vague.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct. We are discussing things which happened 13 and 16 years ago and I have had a long police career of 31 years. So it stands to reason that one can't always remember everything.

MR LEVINE: Yes and would there be any contributing factors to your vagueness of memory? Such as tension, stress, matters of that kind.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman there is a rule of practice that people with substantially common interests who do have a right to cross-examine ought not as a matter of practice put words in the witnesses mouth with whom their client has made common cause. Of course I do not believe that the Committee can stop people from doing it but I think that a stage has been reached judging by the preamble of this question that if Mr Levine wants with respect any value to be placed in the witnesses answers he will try and observe that rule.


MR LEVINE: I am indebted to my learned friend for the tutorial. Would you say that there were any other factors that contribute to your vagueness of memory in certain instances?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson it is very difficult for me to comment on that. I am not a psychologist who can interpret the mental condition of people. To sit here naturally places a level of pressure on someone. However I feel that under the circumstances I am coping quite well.

MR LEVINE: So you say that the only tension that you have is the fact that you are here in this Committee seeking amnesty?

CHAIRPERSON: He didn't say that.

MR LEVINE: He said it places [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You asked him if there were any other and he said "placing myself here," that is any other, you have said stress and tension and your question was: "Is there anything else?" He then said: "Placing myself, I am not a psychologist but placing myself here."

MR LEVINE: No, Mr Chairman I spoke about stress and tension before Mr Bizos interrupted. I am now asking [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You repeated it after Mr Bizos had interrupted you repeated the words stress and tension. Mr Levine you may have forgotten having done so but you did.

MR LEVINE: Well Mr Chairman then I don't intend to convey any other matters in regard to the vagueness of memory in certain issues. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you concluded your cross-examination?



CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman due of course to the order which we followed it will sometimes happen that matters arise during cross-examination which were not dealt with by us beforehand. Perhaps for that reason Mr Chairman some of the Amnesty Committee have followed the procedure to let the so-called opponents cross-examine first.

But I don't express any criticism but all that I say Mr Chairman is from Mr Bizos' cross-examination and that of Mr Berger rather certain points have arisen Mr Chairman. I would ask your permission to address then briefly if I may.

CHAIRPERSON: If they are new points Mr, then yes.

MR VISSER: Mr McPherson would you please look at Exhibit BB.

MR McPHERSON: I see it Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: It is a diagram which was compiled and it was based on a rough sketch which you drew yesterday. Is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: According to what you heard today are there any changes which you would like to bring to Exhibit BB in order to incorporate this with your evidence?

MR McPHERSON: Mr Chairperson that is how I remember it. That is how I visualised it and I wouldn't like to bring any changes to this.

MR VISSER: Very well. You were referred by my learned friend Mr Berger to among others Exhibit EE and the suggestion which was left to the Committee was that as soon a Stratcom was compiled and communicated through other members of the Security Branch would necessarily have known about this Stratcom.

MR BERGER: Chairperson that wasn't what I said or what I put to Mr McPherson.

MR McPHERSON: I didn't say that.

MR VISSER: Well then that takes care of that question Mr Chairman. We can move on. With regard to your evidence that in 1982 when you were London along with Jimmy Taylor you went to look at the home of Mr Joe Slovo or as it was later put to you that you went or followed him to the home of Mr Wolpe. Do you remember that evidence?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: Let me just tell you that Mr Taylor does not concur with your evidence. He said that this never occurred while you and he were in London.

MR McPHERSON: Well he would have to testify accordingly.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser just two problems which I have picked up regarding that. The first is that you went to look at the house. The other is the statement that you followed him. Does he deny both?


ADV DE JAGER: That they ever went to look at the house and that they ever followed him.

MR VISSER: To put it clearly Commissioner de Jager he denies that the two of you had anything to do with Joe Slovo when you were in London in 1982. That is clear.

Finally I would just like to ask you questions have been put to you and once again my learned friend must correct me if I am wrong but these questions indicate that it is accepted that the police would only have compiled the Stratcom in cases where the police were responsible for a determined deed. If that is an impression which was created I would like to ask you the following.

Were Stratcoms solely compiled and sent out into the world with regard to incidents in which the Security Branch and the police were involved or did this happen with regard to other incidents as well?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson was applied on a very broad basis. It was not strictly with regard to this sort of incident. Other departments were also involved in Stratcom. They had their own Stratcom committees or units. Military intelligence had a Stratcom unit, National Intelligence also had a Stratcom division and at a stage Foreign Affairs also had a Stratcom division and this existed covertly. That would be in secret.

MR VISSER: With regard to the question which was put to you when you were asked to read Exhibit BB you said this appeared to be a Stratcom to you. That wouldn't necessarily mean had you read it as a Security Policeman that you would have accepted immediately that the police had done something wrong here?

MR McPHERSON: No, not necessarily.

MR VISSER: Commissioner de Jager also asked you if one refers to reliable sources and so forth and we will restrict ourselves to the police now, isn't it true and I don't think that your answer was sufficiently clear - isn't it true that the police in its entirety had a division which worked with the press reports and information which was released in the press and so forth. Is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: Yes I did explain we had a unit and I think that it still exists the communication services. It is now known as communication services formerly it was known as public relations. That group of police officers were tasked with full-time liaison with the media on a daily basis.

MR VISSER: Thank you and now finally, in as far as it is possible to determine from questions and answers which you gave with regard to video 1 which was handed in by my learned friend Mr Levine the impression could originate that persons Hough du Plessis and Barry were confidantes of the government and received questions beforehand so that they could prepare themselves to provide answers which would be favourable to the government of that time. Would there be any basis to suspect this?

MR McPHERSON: Let me put it this way. I am not going to name the person but one of the persons who you have just mentioned was often involved from a military perspective as well as from my side in the preparation of such transmissions. So if I have created the impression that all those persons were involved in such a - shall we call it conspiracy at a certain point then I would like to rectify it with this.

MR VISSER: The mere fact that someone was frequently involved with these sort of interviews on TV or in the news or in public would that necessarily mean that he or she would have twisted opinions in order to suit the government ultimately. Is that what you are trying to say?

MR McPHERSON: No, it just offers that person the opportunity to conduct the necessary research in time because he or she would know that within a day or two they would have to answer questions and appear on a public transmission and so be prepared.

MR VISSER: I would just like to say Mr McPherson that one should guard against committing political murder. Mr Barry is a very old friend of mine and if this was in any way directed at him I would regard your evidence as largely suspect.

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Are you giving evidence now Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: No, Mr Chairman I am just trying to avoid people just making statements about people without having found foundation for making such statements.

CHAIRPERSON: You haven't said he hasn't got foundation, you haven't challenged him, you haven't asked him on that. He has volunteered something and there it is.

MR VISSER: And he publicly apologised if any.


CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination is there any?

MR CORNELIUS: I have no re-examination.


CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to ask him anything?


CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will now adjourn until quarter to two.



J L McPHERSON: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: ... one of my colleagues who in fact has a question or two he wants to put.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr McPherson, Mr Craig Williamson said General Johan Coetzee is the person who was instrumental in persuading some of you people to come and apply for amnesty. In other words to participate in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's process.

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: I now take it that it was sort of a co-ordinated effort by Mr Johan Coetzee and also that it was common cause that there are incidents which need you people to apply for amnesty. Was there no stage where those incidents will be mentioned, for example the Lusaka bombing and the like to say that "we as police, some of us will be applying for such and such an incident"?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson I was not aware and I was not in discussion with the other applicants surrounding the fact if they were to apply for amnesty or not. If I understand your question correctly.

MR SIBANYONI: In other words there were no mention of incidents for which people would be applying for amnesty?

MR McPHERSON: Not to me Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Now there is some sort of differences in the version or one would call them contradictions. More especially let me take the instance where you are saying General Johan Coetzee was aware of the operation into Lusaka. In fact he approved the payment of R20 000 and according to Adv Visser your explanation is improbable. It cannot be true. Now can you give a reason why should there be some contradictions?

MR McPHERSON: Mr Chairman I have no idea why General Johan Coetzee would deny this.

MR SIBANYONI: You still maintain what you told the Committee that you approached him with the Kobus Pretorius?


MR SIBANYONI: You correct me if I am wrong. I think I heard you saying that the operation, the intended operation to Tanzania was aborted because Mr Pik Botha was against that in that there were some South African agencies who would attend that conference.

MR McPHERSON: Yes I testified to that effect Mr Commissioner and I also said that a colonel in the army told me.

MR SIBANYONI: But also what I put to you, you did say so?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I used words to that effect.

MR SIBANYONI: Now what is not clear is why should Mr Botha be informed about the proposed Tanzania operation but apparently knew nothing about the London operation.

MR McPHERSON: I am not in a position to speculate as to why Mr Botha had to be informed.

MR SIBANYONI: According to you are there any instances where ordinary Security Police initiated some plans maybe taking an example of what has happened previously? Let me put it this way; would you say perhaps from the London experience Security Police also thought to themselves that there are certain actions which they can start in attacking the enemy so to say?

MR McPHERSON: I believe that certain members could have drawn such an inference but they would have asked permission first.

MR SIBANYONI: Like in your case the proposal came from your side and you asked for approval from General Johan Coetzee?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, no further questions.]

MR McPHERSON: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: (indistinct) did you want to ask a question to this witness or?

CHAIRPERSON: Oh I am sorry.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PIK BOTHA: Mr McPherson who told you that the Tanzania incident that I disapproved of it or that I tried to stop it?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson I was asked by means of my infrastructure that I had in Africa through Malawi into Tanzania to assist the army in an operation that they were planning to during a meeting of the national executive committee of the ANC in Morogoro in the Solomon Mshanglo Freedom School, that they had to be assisted by some of my sources to place a bomb beneath the stage of the school hall. I am not going to elaborate on how the plan would take place. It would take too much time but it was a day or two before the two persons from Special Forces would jump with parachutes in the area of the school a day before they would have gone in. The colonel - I think his name was [intervention]

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chairman, Cornelius for the record. I just want to place on record that this forms part of his amnesty application which will be heard I presume in future where Mr Botha will obviously if he wants to put questions as an interested party would at that venue be in a position to put questions to him in this regard.

MR BOTHA: I, with respect, it had just been said questions had been put and allowed on this issue. I do not see why I should be excluded. Because the papers will publish what is said here. It does me a lot of damage and harm.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the following suggestion you should be excluded Mr Botha I think it was a suggestion that you might hear far more about it at that hearing. But the question was - as I understood it was, you were simply asked who told you.

MR McPHERSON: It was a colonel in the army. He was with Special Forces.

ADV DE JAGER: Just his name?

MR McPHERSON: I have forgotten his name Mr Chairperson. He had an Afrikaans surname. He was in control of the operation. We were in Lilongwe when he informed that the operation was cancelled and that is why I testified as to what I heard from him.

I have no firsthand knowledge of any government involvement and his words were Minister Pik Botha had discussions with Dr Neil Barnard who at that stage was the chief of National Intelligence, the Director General and that the operation was called off because agents of National Intelligence would be on the stage and they could not afford that they be killed or injured. That is the words that I heard.

MR BOTHA: Why would the Minister of Foreign Affairs who had no intelligence service, he had no espionage service, why would he ask that National Intelligence agents be spared? How did it come around that he was involved here?

MR McPHERSON: As I have said Mr Chairman I am just conveying what I heard at that time and this was a costly operation and we had to return back to South Africa.

MR BOTHA: So you have no proof that the Minister of Foreign Affairs ever said anything like that?

MR McPHERSON: That is quite correct and I put it like that.

MR BOTHA: You also have no proof that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had any knowledge of the Tanzanian adventure or attempt?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOTHA: Thank you.


ADV DE JAGER: Just to explain, Dr Neil Barnard was the Chief of National Intelligence, the Director General of National Intelligence, so it was his own agents who would have been on the stage?

MR McPHERSON: It could have been persons who they recruited who were members of the ANC and there were also representatives from other offices world-wide or offices in other countries.

ADV DE JAGER: But the people - why the thing was called off was because there were National Intelligence agents on the stage and Dr Barnard was the Director General of National Intelligence.

MR McPHERSON: That is quite correct.

ADV DE JAGER: So if anybody knew that there would be agents it would be Barnard himself.

MR McPHERSON: That is quite correct Mr Chairperson.



CHAIRPERSON: We revert to Mr Williamson. I think you were still cross-examining him Mr Bizos.


FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Williamson what did the letters EMLC stand for in your circle during 1982 to 1985?

CHAIRPERSON: Could you repeat them?

MR BIZOS: E for Ellen, M for Mary, L for love and C for whatever, the Church. No that is not fair, colleague. EMLC letter of credit perhaps what did it stand for?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman just off the top of my head I am not sure. In which context was it?

MR BIZOS: Well wasn't that the expert explosives unit of the Security Forces. Electrical Mechanical something, something.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman really. I have heard the term EMLC but what it stands for [intervention]

MR BIZOS: Well let me tell you what they did. Perhaps which is more germane to this enquiry. Were they the experts in making bombs?

MR WILLIAMSON: What was this? Military or police Sir?

MR BIZOS: Never mind.

MR WILLIAMSON: No because [intervention]

MR BIZOS: Were they the experts in making bombs?

MR WILLIAMSON: I really don't know Mr Chairman. I think if I am not wrong it is a military term.

MR BIZOS: A military term. Does that mean that during those years the military were more adept at making bombs than your unit?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman again it is very difficult for me to say because I wasn't directly involved in these structures but as a general comment I could say that yes I would imagine when it came to highly sophisticated devices that the military would have a better technical ability than the South African Police.

MR BIZOS: Was it the technical department of the Special Forces?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is possible Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Now let's try and personalise this. Do you know Mr Bill Grive? I don't know whether it is Grive or Grive but I have a spelling G-r-i-v-e. Do you know him?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I don't Mr Chairman and may I also just say that one of the problems in the world that we operated in at that time was that when you met somebody he gave you his name and that was the name you used dealing with him and whether that was his real name or not or whether the next time you met him he still had that same name Mr Chairman was sometimes a confusion and that name I can't say I have come across that name.

MR BIZOS: And what about Mr Phil Freeman?

MR WILLIAMSON: Now I believe I have heard of Mr Freeman. I don't think I have ever met him. But I think he [intervention]

MR BIZOS: What did you hear about him?

MR WILLIAMSON: I just heard that there was somebody with the name Freeman and in fact in this - if I am not wrong - I heard his name in the context of the National Intelligence Service in Boss, not Special Forces. But I have heard that name Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well we will deal with that a little later but I just wanted by way of introduction of what you would admit about them. I want to turn to the farm Daisy. Do you remember that the lowest level of this structure in which you met was a basement or semi-basement. Would that be a correct description of it?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman if it is being said ... the lowest level of the structure or the lowest level of the structure in which we met it is two different things. The lowest level of the structure because of the nature of the construction of the training component of the farm was against a rocky hill and there was advantage taken of the fact that because the building had to be more or less cut into the top of the hill instead of filling up the foundations room was left - if I am not wrong - for three rooms.

Two of which were store rooms and one was also a store room and it was a room which we used to joke about and say one day we would keep Joe Slovo in there.

MR BIZOS: Oh yes, yes. There was a ring, was there not? An iron ring in one of the concrete blocks which formed the floor of this structure. Is that right?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman I don't remember the ring. There could well have been a ring but I well remember that every time we showed dignitaries around we used to - when they were looking at the facility we often used to joke that, that particular store room was waiting, we had prepared it specially for Joe Slovo.

MR BIZOS: Well let me remind you of what you said about that ring. That it was there for the purposes of chaining Joe Slovo to it on a short enough chain so that he couldn't kill himself as Biko had done. Did you used to say that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman I have got absolutely no recollection of saying something like that. I could well have made some comment like that and had we ever captured Joe Slovo we could possibly have used that room to keep him in Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well what about the short chain so that he couldn't kill himself like Biko had done? Is that also something that you can't deny?

MR WILLIAMSON: I cannot deny something that I can't remember saying Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Yes but now did you believe that Biko had killed himself?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman I really don't think that if comments like that were being made that this was now a serious judgment on what had actually happened to somebody like Mr Biko.

MR BIZOS: The question was did you believe that Mr Biko had killed himself?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, Mr Biko as far as I know was involved with a scuffle, was beaten and sustained certain injuries to the brain which were not treated and he was ignored and his condition deteriorated to a stage where he could not be saved medically and he died.

MR BIZOS: Yes that is what we heard at the amnesty application but was it not your colleagues' version that he actually banged his head against the wall?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct Mr Chairman so at that time I might well have believed that he did in fact bang his head against the wall.

MR BIZOS: And that he had killed himself and that you would not accord Joe Slovo that comfort if you had got hold of him.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman as I said I do not remember making the comment. It is the type of joke that may well have been made. We always joked about that room as being Joe Slovo's suite that was waiting for him and really it was just that. It was a joke.

MR BIZOS: That was a room at which you the 10 to 12, 13 or sometimes up to 14 members of your unit that you headed met. Not necessarily for, always for serious business.

MR WILLIAMSON: No Mr Chairman it was not a meeting. It was a basement like a type of a store room that instead of having a completely filled in basement foundation structure they had hollowed out a room Mr Chairman and it really was not used during my time ever as a meeting room.

MR BIZOS: Yes but it was the place where you met in order to chat and drink and where you took guest.

MR WILLIAMSON: You mean the farm or that room Mr Chair.

MR BIZOS: I am confining my questions to that room. If I ask you about the farm I will make it clear.

MR WILLIAMSON: Thank you but that is why I ask the question because if it is suggested that, that room is where we used to meet, socialise, drink and take guests it is completely devoid of any truth Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: I thought that you had told us a couple of minutes ago that this is what you would tell your guests that this was the Joe Slovo room.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes exactly. That is right.

MR BIZOS: Have you forgotten that?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, Mr Chairman I haven't. That is precisely what I said that when we took guests or some high ranking officers or whoever was coming when we showed them that room we would make that comment and that is why I specifically asked the question when I was asked was this not to where we took these guests to socialise, drink, etc I said to that room or to the farm.

We used to go to the farm to socialise, to have braais, to have a few drinks, to meet with higher ranking officers as well also of course the on-going training purpose for which the farm was used. But we never, ever, ever used that room as a room where we socialised and we took visitors and we sat and had meetings Mr Chair.

We had very nice type of meeting rooms and things upstairs and I really don't know why we would have had our meetings in Joe Slovo's basement room as we called it Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: If evidence is in due course lead that you did say that you would tie him up on a chain and prevent him from taking his own life and the Committee finds that as a fact would you agree that, that is a completely unprofessional, vindictive attitude to have against a fellow human being?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman as I said I do not remember saying it. If I said it, it was certainly said in some type of jest, Mr Chairman and I would imagine Mr Chairman that I can see easily its the type of thing that would have been said and I think it would have been a passing comment and people would have laughed and it was not now a serious plan that was going to be put into operation.

MR BIZOS: I thought you said that if you did catch him you might have put him there.

MR WILLIAMSON: I said if we did capture him we might well have put him there Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: And how would you have secured him? By tying a chain to the ring that was on the concrete block?

MR WILLIAMSON: I have absolutely no idea Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well you said it. What was the plan?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman the difference between making a jest when there are social visitors visiting the facility and what I would actually have done in this very, very serious possibility that we had actually captured Joe Slovo are two completely different things Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Did you only say it to visitors or did you also say it to the dozen or so of your subordinates?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well obviously Mr Chairman when we were there at social functions various of my subordinates would have been present Mr Chairman. It became as I said right at the very beginning that from its first day of existence that room became a joke and people used to say: "What are we going to use this room for? Oh well maybe when we catch Joe Slovo we can keep him here."

MR BIZOS: Well I hear you say so now but no doubt the Committee will hear the evidence in due course. In the first half of 1984 did you send any member of your group to Port Elizabeth?

MR WILLIAMSON: It is possible Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Try and think.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman by 1984 and 1985 I had a group that by that time had 9 sections in it and it is absolutely possible that I would have sent somebody to Port Elizabeth for some reason that I may have been asked to send somebody for to Port Elizabeth for some reason and I - in fact I am even sure I know who I am going to be told now I sent to Port Elizabeth. But I do not have any recollection of the incident Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: I see well since you are so well informed can you please tell us whether you sent any member of your intelligence group to Port Elizabeth in the first half of 1984?

MR WILLIAMSON: As I said Mr Chairman I have absolutely no idea. It is perfectly possible. Amongst other things Mr Chairman one of my sections or one of the sections in the group of which I was involved was involved in student activities and these people travelled regularly all over the country to all the divisions. So I can in fact even say I must have sent people there.

But if Mr Bizos is referring to Captain at that time I believe Jaap van Jaarsveld and the evidence that he gave down at the TRC hearing in the Eastern Cape that I had sent him down I think to do a recce or to give advice on the killing of I believe it was Goniwe or the Pebco 3 or some of those people Mr Chairman - I have absolutely no idea what he is talking about Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well you have mentioned him. Was he a person on your staff?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: In the first half of 1984?

MR WILLIAMSON: I believe so.

MR BIZOS: Yes and if he says - we must be careful to use the precise words.

"Approximately in the middle of 1984 I received an order from Major Craig Williamson to go and investigate if it would be possible to take out Matthews Goniwe. It meant to kill him."

Would you say that, that is untrue?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes I would Mr Chairman. I don't think that if I was involved in an operation to "haal uit" or take out Matthews Goniwe in 1984 that I would have sent that particular officer. That was not his forte Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well can you suggest any reason why he should say so?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman you know 1984 is 14 years ago like some of the events here that we are discussing. On occasion I would be asked to send one of my officers with a particular knowledge and in his case he was very well highly academically qualified and it is possible that I was asked to send him to the Eastern Cape to go and do something or other.

A request would have come to me Mr Chairman but if somebody had said to me: "Major Williamson we need your help. Send one of your men to advise us on how best to take out Matthews Goniwe," I do not believe that I would have sent an academic Mr Chairman. I think that I would have sent somebody else Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well let us just take this step by step.

MR WILLIAMSON: And I think also Mr Chairman that I would have remembered it.

MR BIZOS: Leave it aside the nature of the request, the order or suggestion do you recall that you actually sent him to the Eastern Cape for some purpose?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman as I said I do not recall sending him to the Eastern Cape for any purpose but it is possible that he was sent to the Eastern Cape for some purpose.

MR BIZOS: By you?

MR WILLIAMSON: By me on order, somebody told me to do it and if, if the reason had been to have something to do with planning the killing of an activist like Matthews Goniwe I most certainly would have remembered it Mr Chairman. That is all I can say.

MR BIZOS: Yes I am sure that you would have. As I am going to suggest in argument that you do but let us proceed. Now what lack of experience or knowledge did you believe that the person that you may have sent lacked in investigating whether or not it was possible to murder Mr Goniwe? What did he lack?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman as I said if I was sending - if I had been told that there is now an operation of the nature that we have been discussing at this hearing and now falls within also the parameters of the words that we have been discussing here such as "elimineer, neutraliseer, haal uit" - if there had been an operation of that nature Mr Chairman number one I do not believe I would have been asked to send one of my staff.

That is - I think that there were officers and units involved in the Security Branch that were far more should I say highly trained in the area of actually physically dealing with the enemies of the State.

MR BIZOS: That were more experienced in planning murder?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well I don't know what the plan was Mr Chairman if it was to attack or to take out or neutralise or so on Mr Chairman I would imagine that I would have sent somebody that had some experience, some - how should I put it like border duty experience. Some active experience in killing the enemy Mr Chairman and I just (...indistinct)

MR BIZOS: Who would you have sent? You raised this question that you wouldn't have sent him. Who would you have sent? Or is it whom? I must be careful about my grammar. Whom would you have sent?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman I don't want to speculate on who I would have sent because I don't know who I would have sent. I didn't get asked the order. It is not fair to name people just on the basis that if perhaps I had been asked to do something would I have chosen A,B or C. Mr Chairman it really isn't fair.

MR BIZOS: Who on your staff that you might have sent had border experience?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman I would imagine quite a number of them.


MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman I really can't even say everyone, which one. Most of us in some stage in our police careers had counter-insurgency training and been in some counter-insurgency type of role somewhere along the line and most of us from a Security Branch point of view had also been involved if not directly carrying the guns in operations against ANC basis in the planning and so on in neighbouring states.

We had people as I said in previous evidence that we participated at various times in the target selection process for raids across the border Mr Chairman and I don't believe I ever used Mr van Jaarsveld in any of those target selection meetings or anything. So I had other people that I believe I would possibly have selected as being more suitable Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Are we now in view of your last answer to accept that you attended target selection meetings in relation to individuals?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, no. I made it very clear when I talked about target selection that this was the process that was undertaken on an ad hoc basis when it had been decided to for example attack targets in neighbouring states Mr Chairman and I can't say that I specifically participated on an in-depth on-going way in every single time.

What happened was, Mr Chairman was that I would have given orders for members of my staff to pass the information through to this type of target selection process and Mr Chairman I said very clearly for example that we had full-time military officers based in our headquarters and their full-time job was to gather information from us. Any information whatsoever that could be of use in planning cross-border actions against the ANC Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: From what office did the person that says you sent him come from before he joined your unit?

MR WILLIAMSON: I cannot remember but it could have been trade unions or churches Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: No, I think that if you reflect upon it you will no doubt remember that he came to you from the secretariat of the Security Council.

MR WILLIAMSON: Well that is also possible Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: That is also possible and you have told us that eliminations we will give them the euphemistic name, were authorised from the highest level.

MR WILLIAMSON: Right Mr Chairman I have got no problem with that.

MR BIZOS: The Security Council would have been the highest level.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman of course it would be the highest level but then this doesn't then follow that because somebody who had once served on the secretariat [intervention]

MR BIZOS: Listen to the question before you answer it. You are two questions ahead of me Mr Williamson.

MR WILLIAMSON: I apologise.

CHAIRPERSON: So you asked him the question and he was answering. You asked him whether the State Security Council was not the highest level.

MR BIZOS: Yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was answering that question.

MR BIZOS: No he answered that question but he went on to say Mr Chairman to argue the case that, that would not have been sufficient reason to ask the person to become involved Mr Chairman. That is why I appeal to the witness not to be a question or two ahead of me.

MR WILLIAMSON: Alright, sorry Mr Chairman but what I was then saying in answer to that question was yes. The State Security Council obviously was as far as we were concerned the highest command structure. But of course there were people above or at least the Cabinet and the President above the State Security Council. Ja but [intervention]

MR BIZOS: Can I ask a question?

MR WILLIAMSON: So that is the answer to that part.

MR BIZOS: That is the question. Then the next question that you tried to answer is slightly different formulated from the one that you tried to answer. Would a person with Security Council connections that if Mr Goniwe was in fact going to be killed that having a highly qualified man who had come to you from the Security Council having a chip so to speak in the eventual plan.


ADV DE JAGER: Well I don't know what is the question.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, sorry I was about to ask what.

MR BIZOS: No I would have thought it - but I will repeat it without using metaphors.

ADV DE JAGER: Well we have heard about 6 phrases and I can't understand your question either.

MR BIZOS: Well let me leave out the one phrase that may have given to some form of ambiguity Mr Chairman. Appointing the person to do the initial reconnaissance for this murder a person who had connections with the Security Council would have been beneficial to the final planning of the murder. Does that make it clearer Mr Chairman?


MR WILLIAMSON: Well again Mr Chairman we are in the realms of speculation. I personally don't believe that it would have been of any huge assistance were such an operation to have been carried out Mr Chairman. Because there is a huge gap between theory and practice and there is a huge gap between making a political or security decision to target an individual or a group or whatever and to actually then plan the physical operation Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Did you know General van Rensburg?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Would he be correctly described [intervention]

MR WILLIAMSON: I assume General van Rensburg [intervention]

MR BIZOS: Listen to me please.

MR WILLIAMSON: From State Security Council.

MR BIZOS: Yes, Security Council. Yes thank you. Thank you I am sorry I interrupted you. It was a proper intervention. Would it be correct to say that although he had been an army general he when in the secretariat of the Security Council he had frequent contact with the Security Police?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman I think previous evidence has been lead about the fact that once you become a member of the secretariat of the State Security Council or once you became such a person you were in fact seconded and you did in fact then fall under a different structure.

So he would have nominally still remained an army general but he would have no longer reported to the chief of the defence force and he would have obviously had very close contact with all the different elements of the Security Forces. Including the Security Police.

Not only with those parts of the Security Forces that were active in terms of line function but also through the members of the different organisations in the Security Forces who also had seconded members on the secretariat structure, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Yes. You of course know don't you as an intelligence officer, trained intelligence officer that it was this van Rensburg that was on the secretariat of the Security Council that suggested to the then Brigadier van der Westhuizen in Port Elizabeth that a - what is a "druk telegram"?


MR BIZOS: A telex, thank you - a telex which was eventually admitted to be the death warrant for Goniwe, Calata, Mkonto and Mahauli.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman I have no knowledge of that whatsoever besides my media, what I have read or heard on the media Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: The evidence of the person who [intervention]

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman we are busy with the Goniwe matter now here in which I appeared against my learned friend. My learned friend said that the telegram was admitted to have been the death warrant. My recollection of the evidence in that matter was that non of the applicants in that matter ever even admitted knowledge of that telegram.

MR BIZOS: No but they were asked to interpret it my learned friend will remember and they interpreted it as a request for a death warrant Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman that goes a long way from admitting that, that was the death warrant that was instrumental in the death.

MR BIZOS: No, we haven't touched that yet Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Perhaps my learned friend just didn't put it rightly but the way I understood him he said it was admitted to have been the death warrant, the death warrant.

MR BIZOS: No, interpreted - correctly interpreted to be a request for a death warrant Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: If my learned friend put the question that way I would agree with him.

MR BIZOS: Thank you. Do you now know that the people that actually killed Goniwe and applied for amnesty although denying specific knowledge of the telex say that it was clearly understood by them as a request for a death warrant?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman as I said I have got absolutely no knowledge beyond what I have read or seen on the media Mr Chairman. May I just ask one question. What date was Mr Goniwe murdered?

MR BIZOS: Yes well that is well known 28th of June 1985.


MR BIZOS: Well let us just proceed. You knew that the Security Council or you tell us that the Security Council authorised these killings.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman I haven't said that Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Authorised killings.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman I don't believe I have even said that Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Or was responsible for authorising the deaths of the many activists that you told us you did not believe were killed by fairies.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman I don't believe I drew that direct line Mr Chairman. I certainly discussed the perception amongst members of the Security Forces relating to the language that was used at the time, Mr Chairman, and I don't believe that I ever talked about direct orders to kill anybody by anybody at the State Security Council, Mr Chairman. I talked also about the Secretariat structures and how it worked and how there was a fudging of the - or there was a fuzzy problem in relation to direct orders of the line function etc. Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Yes well, would the Secretariat of the State Security Council and it's officials from General van Rensburg down to the person that came to your unit be concerned with given effect with the effect along the way of the Security Council's decisions?

MR WILLIAMSON: I've no doubt they would, Mr Chairman, and that is I think accords with the evidence that I've given, that there was, as I experienced it and as many people have expressed, the reality that we had our line function structures but there was also was this Secretariat of the State Security Council line of command and that, and I gave even examples, Mr Chairman.


MR WILLIAMSON: There was interaction between these two structures in a way that did not follow the strict rule that should have been directly up and down. Let me put it that way, that all instructions should have flown vertically up the one command chain and up the other command chain and I said and I think evidence has been that there is, it cannot be denied that there was at times horizontal decision making connections between the Security Forces and the Secretariat of the State Security Council.

MR BIZOS: If the evidence of the person who says you sent him to Port Elizabeth and Cradock is correct, the whole house of cards of your defence that you didn't do anything unlawful within the country would fall to the ground, wouldn't it?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, Mr Chairman, it's not correct and when we got the letter from the TRC informing us that there was an allegation being made about me, I discussed the matter with my legal advisor and I said it's so completely absurd, we must just tell them we have no interest, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Well, so schooled in deception as you are, you wouldn't have admitted it, even if it was true?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, why - that's completely unfair, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Unfair?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well, is it unfair to expect of a person that has told so many lies about himself and his work in the past to deny direct evidence of involvement in at least the preparation of a murder?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, had I been involved and especially because there was a process as we all know under way of this Truth and Reconciliation, I would have added it to my application, Mr Chairman. The reason that I did nothing about it because it's an absurd allegation, Mr Chairman. I cannot remember anything about it, I'm sure if it ever happened, I would have remembered and if I did send that member of my staff to the Eastern Cape at that time and I believe it was sometime before the murders, Mr Chairman, it was certainly not, to my knowledge, that it had anything to do with planning any murder of anybody, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well, did you know that the person that you sent or says that you sent to Port Elizabeth had made an application for amnesty before you filed your application for amnesty?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I did not, Mr Chairman. I only knew when I got a letter.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Might we not infer that like the maxim, the right to know, the maxim of let's apply for amnesty, what we know has become public and we will bury our knowledge of the other things that we have done?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman, all I can answer to that is number one, that was not my motivation and number two, I believe that the fact that people were applying for amnesty for Goniwe's death was in the public knowledge and if I'd had anything to do with Goniwe's death, I would have applied for amnesty, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Do you recall whether the person that you sent to Port Elizabeth for whatever reason that you can't remember, reported back to you?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I cannot, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: His evidence is going to be that he did report to you, he reported to you that Goniwe was so surrounded by his own people in Cradock that no attempt should be made to kill him in Cradock because he was hardly ever alone but that you should be waylaid somewhere along the road and get rid of this great enemy of the State in that way. That's what he will say to the Committee was reported to you.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, is this Mr van Jaarsveld?


MR WILLIAMSON: Well, now we're going from the sublime to the ridiculous, Mr Chairman. It gets better and better and ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Or truer and truer?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, it now gets even more completely - I'm even more completely sure of my answers because I'm even more completely sure that if anybody had said anything like that to me, I would have remembered and Mr Chairman, may I add that if and I welcome the evidence that will be led and I will be happy if this evidence, that I'm given an opportunity here to test this evidence and Mr Chairman, I just want to mention one thing and that is, that if, as it now appears from this question, part of the mission of Mr van Jaarsveld was to put some type of a surveillance on Goniwe and see how protected he was or whatever, I can assure you Mr Chairman, that all that does is strengthens the answer I gave before, that Mr van Jaarsveld would not have been the individual that I chose for such a task. I had at my disposal probably one of the most sophisticated surveillance organisations in the country, if not the most sophisticated, Mr Chairman, and I would have used that, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Now, I did not suggest to you - I did not suggest to you that he should do the future surveillance. You know, we know ...[intervention]

MR WILLIAMSON: I did not say future surveillance.

MR BIZOS: My learned friend is here, that there was surveillance, there was surveillance of Goniwe, his telephone was tapped, there was a Chemotic(?) in his house, the hall that he spoke in was bugged. The question was as to what would be a good plan to kill him and he reported to you that no attempt should be made to kill him in Cradock but that he should be waylaid.

MR WILLIAMSON: But Mr Chairman ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Now you've given an answer to it.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, I must repeat my answer, it's ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Bizos, could I kindly ask?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman?

ADV DE JAGER: We're entering into the Goniwe Trial too now. Is it really relevant? If you consider it really to be relevant and of such importance well then I suppose we'll allow you to ask the questions.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: But we're trying to get down to the Schoon and the Slovo families troubles.

MR BIZOS: No, Mr Chairman, we have person in the box, Mr Chairman, who says "I have never, ever done anything in relation to the murder of anyone within the country". We have a member of his department who is going to give evidence that he was sent in order to prepare a plan for Goniwe's killing. For anyone to suggest, with the greatest respect sir, that that is an irrelevant fact as to whether this person is telling the truth or not as to the circumstances under which Ruth First and the - Jeanette Schoon and her child were killed, with the greatest respect to you, sir, with the greatest of respect, is really not to be able to see the pertinence, the great pertinence and relevance of the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Neither of them were killed in this country, were they?

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: Neither of them were killed in this country.

MR BIZOS: Yes but he says ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: His point is, he never did anything in this country. We are investigating two things outside this country.

MR BIZOS: No, but can he be believed, Mr Chairman, in relation to his role in the - in the - as the head of the Security Police's Intelligence Department, Mr Chairman. Can he be believed if the witness is believed? How can it be relevant with respect? May I proceed please?

ADV DE JAGER: Yes please proceed Mr Bizos but I only want to request you to see whether we could really do something to finish this, the applications we're busy with.

MR BIZOS: We are anxious to ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: We can proceed for years and years on other applications.

MR BIZOS: No Mr Chairman, we too are anxious to proceed with the matter but I would appeal, with the greatest of respect, to a patient hearing in relation to what we consider, particularly cogent and relevant evidence Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Well I'll try to write down all your long questions, Mr Bizos, if that could ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Well I'll shorten the questions but that's hardly a matter of relevance.

ADV DE JAGER: Well if you shorten it perhaps it would be irrelevant.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now did, or do you know that they were - that Goniwe and in the language of the Security Police his "travanta", his cohorts or hangers on, were in fact some time later killed by being waylaid along a road?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, again, as I've said, the only knowledge I have is knowledge I got from the press and probably from security reports at the time and I'm sure the security reports I would have seen, wouldn't have said that these people had been waylaid by the Security Police.

MR BIZOS: Now I am going to put to you, Mr Williamson, that

your statements about Slovo being chained up, your statement reported by Mr Raven even though an attempt was being made to water it down, your evidence in relation to your attitude to your enemy, shows clearly that you had a hatred of people, particularly those whom you informed on who were friends, who were at the university with you and that you took malicious pleasure in having them killed, particularly the Schoons.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I have to - all I can say is that I totally reject that statement, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Now you said in your evidence that you believed that the presence of the Schoons, I'm summarising it but I think in the interests of brevity let's do that, that the Schoons would have assisted Soviet expansionism in South Africa by their presence in Angola. Is that a serious suggestion, Mr Williamson?

MR WILLIAMSON: It's a very serious suggestion Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well we will argue a contrary in due course.

Now there are some questions that I want to ask you which arise out of some of the things that Mr McPherson has said. First of all the word revolutionary does not necessarily mean that one is involved in an armed struggle. I don't have to debate that with you?

MR WILLIAMSON: No and I don't have to debate that Mr Chairman, I agree and I tried to make very clear in my evidence that revolution is twenty percent military and eighty percent political.

MR BIZOS: Yes, right, thank you. The other is that the word - that the word cadre doesn't necessarily mean a person who has received military training.

MR WILLIAMSON: Again Mr Chairman, I'll agree that it doesn't necessarily mean that, but that most cadres or involved in units of the ANC especially in what they called the forward areas which were the countries with common boarders with South Africa were usually military trained, Mr Chairman.


MR WILLIAMSON: Military or security intelligence trained.

MR BIZOS: And although I do it with reluctance, I have to draw your attention the newspaper cuttings that were put in by Mr Botha yesterday, just let's see please? The United Kingdom in the early '80's had a conservative government headed by Mrs Thatcher?

MR WILLIAMSON: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Yes just find the - you're also finding trouble in finding them, so we'll just take a pause.

MR WILLIAMSON: I apologise, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: That's alright. You told us ...[intervention]


MR BIZOS: Yes, "C.C. ANC Blames Boss" and the others, yes. I just want to refer to them but before we go to those, let me ask you some questions. Again I'm paraphrasing and shortening your answer. One of the objectives to be achieved, you've told us, was to send a message to the Government of the United Kingdom that if it did not deny the ANC presence or an ability to organise, mobilise support in the international community then the United Kingdom may be importing foreign terrorism. Have I summarised it correctly? I'm speaking from memory, you can play around with it but that's how I understood your evidence?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman, basically as I understood it was that the - I don't believe the idea was to get the ANC excluded completely, the idea was to get certain individuals involved in the ANC excluded in terms of the legislation that existed in Britain and to basically give a warning and to give people in the British administration who perhaps had the same type of idea about certain members of the ANC as we did and in particular at the time about the links between the ANC and the Soviet Union, some type of an excuse or reason to say that we must exclude terrorists, terrorist members of the ANC from the United Kingdom, otherwise we run the risk of having the war spill over into the United Kingdom.

MR BIZOS: Into the streets of London?

MR WILLIAMSON: That's right.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Well on page 35 of bundle 3 at the bottom of the page it is said:

"And requests the British Government in accordance with British legislation to exclude from the United Kingdom the personnel of the ANC in the United Kingdom and have their offices closed."

MR WILLIAMSON: I read that Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree with it?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes and it says "In accordance with British legislation" which means that only people with terrorist links could have been excluded.

MR BIZOS: Right, now let me ask you this - of this group that went over to London to put this bomb, you were the best informed about the location and the best informed about the effect that it would have?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman, as I said, I probably knew the office better than anybody else, that is because I had been there on several occasions personally. Other members of the team would have obviously had some idea about the offices because of the surveillance briefing that they'd been given and then were sent to acquaint themselves with the office, Mr Chairman. That's the one part.

The second part is, when it comes to the political effect of the attack, I think I would have been in a good position, I won't say the best position, to judge what effect this might have on the ANC, but when it comes to what effect this might have in terms of South Africa's and other countries political if I would say or diplomatic efforts to have the ANC excluded from Britain, I don't think I would have been the best to judge that, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Now when I spoke about effect, I meant how much damage it would do and to whom? You were there more often than anyone else, you knew the neighbourhood, you knew who was coming in, you knew who was coming out, you knew whose office was where, you knew whether there was a parking lot or not, you knew that there were adjoining houses, you knew that there was a school, a free school nearby, there was nobody in a better position than you to judge the damage to property and people it could do than anyone else?

MR WILLIAMSON: I would put it this way, Mr Chairman, I would say that of the team who went over, I certainly would have been in the best position to understand the problems that the mission presented to the team in terms of the instruction we had been given and in the light of Mr Bizos has described the position has been, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Now I am going to put to you, that having regard to your callous utterances after people's deaths, having regard to the lack of morality that you pride yourself in, in your own writings and speeches, it would have served your purposes if the photographs after this explosion showed people killed on the streets and both ANC and British subjects because that would have been a real message to the British Government to exclude the ANC, wouldn't it?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I totally and categorically deny that. That would have had the opposite effect and if I had wanted to achieve that or if we had wanted to achieve that, it would have been far more simply achieved than what was achieved, Mr Chairman. I wouldn't have needed to put a team in London for nearly two weeks, to put surveillance on the target, Mr Chairman, we could have gone in quickly and put a bomb and a much bigger bomb in a position where it would have done even more damage and we could have made it go off at a time that would have achieved the results that Mr Bizos is talking about so I think that the results of this operation must also be allowed to speak for themselves, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Yes, the surveillance I would suggest to you was probably to avoid getting caught rather than taking great care that there should not be damage to neighbouring property, loss of life of either ANC or non-ANC people?

MR WILLIAMSON: Obviously, Mr Chairman, part of the reason for the surveillance would have been to avoid being caught but the longer you spent there holding the ANC under surveillance, the bigger the chance that there was of getting caught and it was a calculated risk and the reason that risk was taken was to do everything possible to avoid deaths or injuries, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Yes, now you see, what better way to get the British Government to kick the ANC out and close it's office if your "dekstorie" took root? You would be able to say to the British Government: "Do you see what you do when you allow terrorists to operate from your capital? They try to kill one another because of their internal conflicts and look at it, they've killed British citizens, they've killed themselves and they've killed British citizens." Wouldn't that have been a very strong message to the conservative government of the United Kingdom to close down the ANC office?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, that is pure speculation and so, you know it's ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Well, you see had it not been for your callousness in other aspects that it may have been suggested that my suggestion to you is farfetched. But for a person who congratulates a bomb maker for killing a child isn't going to worry, is he, about people being killed on a Sunday morning on a street in London?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman, first of all I've explained my congratulations to Mr Raven and secondly I was there, I was the second in charge of this operation and as Mr Bizos has correctly said, I was the one I would say that there was the biggest pressure on to make sure that this operation didn't go wrong and I know what instructions I gave to my men and I know what we achieved and I know the risks that we took in terms of our own safety in order to achieve the results that we achieved, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: You know that your Minister said that the South African Government was responsible for this, was a suggestion that he would treat with contempt, it was not worthy of consideration?

MR WILLIAMSON: He said it was laughable, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Laughable - well the same thing. Secondly, General Coetzee says "I wouldn't have expected him to say anything else, well knowing what the truth was." And then we had circumstantial accounts in C.C. of how the ANC was to be blamed. It's in there, I don't want to read it out. Add to it that you can't deny that you sent a postcard to Gill Marcus who would have been killed if it went off a short while thereafter?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: And you gloated over it by sending her a card?

MR WILLIAMSON: You know the propaganda effort after an action aimed at exacerbating or increasing or improving the psychological aspect of that operation is standard procedure, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: You're a student of history, Mr Williamson?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well not really, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZO: Not really? Well you know you've got Klausewitz, you've got this, that and the other?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well that's military history, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well even military history. Do you know how many wars have been lost if in deed this was a war as a result one of the sides lying about itself?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I don't and I can just comment that in my experience politicians spent most of the time lying about themselves, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well I am going to suggest that the Goebels example would have prevented you from doing what you did and the tremendous lies that you have told. For a person who went to Wits University I believe that judgement at Nuremberg, Mr Williamson, was compulsory hearing - compulsory viewing by Professor John Dugard. Did you take an opportunity of going to see it?

MR WILLIAMSON: I believe I've seen it Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: It's a pity you did not take it's lesson.

Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I'm a bit at a loss. I'm not a student of history, I don't understand exactly what my learned friend is referring to, what's the relevance of the Nuremberg Trial is, or Goebels?


MR DU PLESSIS: Really, Mr Chairman, I don't know if my learned friend can perhaps can enlighten me some time.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I've been accused of giving a tutorial, I'm prepared to give Mr du Plessis one but not during ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Not during the hearing, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Yes, that's what I was going to say, not during the hearing, Mr Chairman and if he's so ignorant about it, it's also a great pity.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Mr Williamson? This side. There's just a few points I want to clarify with you. Are you ready?


MS PATEL: Oh, okay fine. Mr Williamson, do I remember correctly that when the possibilities of targets was discussed at the meeting with General Coetzee and the possibility of the SACP offices were raised, that you at that stage had already decided that this wasn't a feasible target given what you had remembered of the building?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman, I never regarded or paid very much attention to the possibility of attacking the South African Communist Party, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Could you then perhaps explain why Mr McPherson and I believe even Mr Taylor at some stage had gone and surveyed the area where the SACP offices were and it was only

subsequently at a meeting, one of the meetings held in London, that an unanimous decision was then at that stage taken that the offices, the SACP offices, would not be targeted?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, because I just didn't stand up at the previous meetings and say no look this is absurd, I said fine, let's do some surveillance on the office and let's see what the result is. I went along with that Mr Chairman and the upshot was that the surveillance showed exactly what I had predicted it would show, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Alright, to move on then, could you please explain why you didn't include in your application the role of Derek Broon and why even if my memory serves me correctly that it wasn't even mentioned in your evidence in chief here, or under re-examination for that matter.

MR WILLIAMSON: Because, you know, I hadn't even thought about it, Mr Chairman, I don't even believe that Mr Broon actually knew about the main purpose of the operation. As far as I'm concerned at the level I operated on and the people that I discussed it with, there was an idea that a team would go to London initially to ascertain whether an operation against the ANC and the Communist Party would be possible. I don't think that and certainly besides the key, like Mr McPherson who was the key surveillance figure, who would be involved in the operation, that I told people exactly what was going to be going on. I also didn't attend all the meetings and training that went on at Daisy and I may add, in fact, that something Mr McPherson left out of his evidence completely, was that one of the aspects of training at Daisy before the team left was in fact counter-surveillance and I remember he was asked at one stage "well what did you do for so many days?" and he never mentioned that and in fact counter-surveillance was one of the biggest sort of refresher courses that the team were given and the people at the farm who were involved in training gave anybody training in counter-surveillance or whatever that I sent there to be given that training and they didn't have to be told these people are being given this counter-surveillance training because they're going to blow up the ANC offices. They may well have known these people are going on a mission to London yes, so as far as I'm concerned the - and in fact I would imagine there were numerous other people involved in the actual training process and briefing process that went on and I don't know to what extent those people were in fact fully briefed about the absolute purpose about the operation.

MS PATEL: Are you saying that you didn't personally give Mr Broon directions to assist in the appropriation of documentation for this operation?

MR WILLIAMSON: Not in specifics that I called him in and said "we're going to go and blow up the ANC office, please prepare documentation" no. I think Mr McPherson was given the instruction to do - to get all the information from the files that existed on the ANC office and the Communist Party office, that means that their physical location etc, and then Mr Broon's role as far as I remember was specifically counter-surveillance training and then there was as was mentioned who I also didn't mention, other people who were involved in the legends and the issuing of documentation so I didn't mention them either, Mr Chairman. Those were people who were as far as I was concerned, providing the technical services which were within their responsibility and that they weren't in fact actually involved in the planning and carrying out of this specific operation.

MS PATEL: But surely they were involved in providing support to an unlawful operation and in terms of that, the roles are significant and one can't then, if I may, one can't then argue strictly that this fell within their job description because to provide services for an unlawful operation is not part of your normal job description or do you care to differ?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well you know, this is part of the difficulty that we were faced with when we came up against, what did one apply for amnesty for and what didn't one apply and I would say that things that I did for example for the Gaberone Raid and now I must make very clear, I'm talking about the 1985 Gaberone Raid, were to a certain extent very similar to what these people did on this operation and when - you know, I didn't go into great sort of legal or philosophical debate about whether this was specifically legal or not, I thought that this was the type of operation we could carry out legally if we could go and - it, as I said it relates specifically to the problems that we had and I've been advised subsequently that operations such as Gaberone for which I haven't applied for amnesty, were perfectly proper operations, legally authorised in terms of all sorts of rules and regulations and the constitution and the Police Act and the Defence Act, etc., and that I don't know in fact and I'm not, as I said once before here, an international lawyer or a constitutional lawyer who can actually tell me whether the type of instruction that we got fell within the legal or correctly legal structures of the State Security Council, the State, the command structures above us. This is exactly why we applied for amnesty for the London Bomb.

I mean, what would have happened if, instead of Louis le Grange saying it was laughable, what would have happened if he, if the South African Government had made a statement that this was, you know, a special secret service operation aimed at the ANC and not at Government of the U.K. or whatever which is the type of statement that they made in other cases, in Gaberone for example, in Maseru for example.

So we were faced often with the situation where, I mean, I knew generally that a State had a right to hot pursuit and this wasn't hot pursuit, the State has a right to pre-emptive strikes, the State has a right to retaliation in certain circumstances, but I'm not the international lawyer and this is why I applied for amnesty for these type of clandestine operations where we were sent as officers of the State to carry out actions against the enemy and this was done clandestinely, in order that the State did not have to accept this responsibility, so I'm just trying to sketch that the question you asked me, you know, is something that I've thought about because it related to our dilemma on these things, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: But the point is still, Mr Williamson, that you were at all times aware that this was in fact an unlawful operation and that's probably the basis for your application?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well it was a clandestine operation, now ...[intervention]

MS PATEL: But it was still an unlawful operation and you understood that then and you understand that now?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, well, you know I didn't at that time, you know, make a firm analysis of now have all the rules and regulations been followed. I mean I knew that order had come from the highest levels. After I carried the operation, I was decorated and as I made before and it's been made here, this wasn't a little medal, this was a proper decoration, so - and I knew also because of my involvement in this world and I mentioned it before that States do these types of things. Mosad spent a lot of time and spent a lot of time in those years, running around killing PLO's and Black Septembers and I didn't ask myself is this, is this order now strictly legal according to the constitution of South Africa and so on, I believed that this was an order which was given to me which was related to my tasks and my duty which were to attack and destroy the revolutionary enemy and I then didn't waste time applying my mind to the legal nicety of it, I spent my time on working out the operational side of it.

MS PATEL: Okay. The C.S. gas sprays that you refer to in your application for the London bombing, is that the same thing as teargas, as the teargas canisters that were used?

MR WILLIAMSON: I'm not exactly sure from a chemical point of view but I believe so, I think it's, I think teargas is more a sort of general term, ja, I think there's C.S. and C.N.

MS PATEL: Okay, well the terms have been bandied around, you know, they're substantially the same thing.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, I'm sure there's a C.N. and a there's a C.S. but I'm not exactly sure but basically it's what's called teargas, it's incapacitating gas which causes problems in the olfactory membranes, the eyes, the nose, the mouth, obviously if you breathe it in, in the lungs.

MS PATEL: Did you give Lothar Neethling instructions to provide these canisters to the members of your team?

MR WILLIAMSON: Sorry, I couldn't give a General instructions, no. Lothar Neethling was a General and I got issued those cans and ...[intervention]

MS PATEL: And how would he have issued those to you without a request from someone, where would the request have come from then?

MR WILLIAMSON: I don't know where the request came from, obviously it came from higher than me and I don't actually believe I ever saw those cans until London.

MS PATEL: Okay. Alright. Then just, this may be completely arbitrary, but it just puzzled me, Waal du Toit says at some stage in his application that you requested three boxes, him to make three boxes and Raven, in his application, mentioned specifically that they only packed the stuff into two boxes. Was there something more that should have gone or is it just something arbitrary, inconsequential?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, you know I wasn't really involved, I just issued instructions, get the containers made, as I said I think I did go up to the roof at one stage to have a look. I think when the containers, I believe, when they'd been completed because I remember seeing - it looked like electronic equipment. But, you know, even to what was in them was more of the level where I said to the people involved: "Put into them what we're going to need", you know if they'd come to me in London and said we've forgotten the spanner or something, you know, I would have been a bit upset. It was up to them to make sure that what was in the boxes was what they require.

MS PATEL: Alright, there's something I'd like your views on, is John Adam in his application, in his East London application, that's bundle 3 at page 205, mentions that it would have been a bad career move on his part if he had after had been informed of the nature of the operation had decided to withdraw. But it goes a step further than that and if I can read to you, it's on paragraph 3. He says that:

"If I had withdrawn through some pretext such as illness and the operation had for some or other reason have been comprised, I would definitely have been in mortal danger."

Would you like to comment on that? Have you any idea what he is referring to?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well obviously ...[intervention]

MS PATEL: Is it part of the culture, I mean I don't know?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, obviously, Mr Chairman, I have some idea what he is saying there but you know, one would have to ask him why he thought such a thing and obviously he's suggesting here that if the operation had been compromised and he had withdrawn, he might have been regarded as the source of the information that led to the compromising and that then he would be in some mortal danger. That's how I understand reading it but, you know, he would have to explain why he thought such a thing.

MS PATEL: Is there some basis to that fear?

MR WILLIAMSON: I really can't comment, I mean obviously if somebody did betray an operation, you know, there would be very deep anger but I don't think he's talking here about actually betraying the operation, so it's again something I can just speculate about, I can't - but you know, if what he's saying is that, you know, we sort of all knew that if any of us betrayed our comrades we would be executed, I don't think it was as dramatic as that, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't it more that if something had gone wrong and somebody had been killed at the scene of the operation, he would have had every fear to think that the rest of you may think he was responsible and one or other of you may have come looking for him?

MR WILLIAMSON: I think that's how I understand what he means but why he actually, I mean what I'm trying to say is that as far as I'm concerned, I wouldn't have thought that this would be a generalised fear somebody on the team would have, I think that it never would have crossed our minds that any one of us was not any less than a 150 percent loyal and ready to do whatever had to be done.

MS PATEL: Alright and then just one minor matter on the first incident. You mentioned as one of your reasons for handling the envelope with such a great deal of care, that you didn't want your fingerprints to be found on the envelope. My question to you is, if that, if the bomb as we all know was put into that envelope, it would have been blown to smithereens in any event, so where is the fear that your fingerprints would then be found on it?

MR WILLIAMSON: If the item was intercepted, it did not explode.

MS PATEL: Why whom would it have been intercepted?

MR WILLIAMSON: Some - the security, some security mechanism that the ANC or whoever, the Mozambican authorities may have had, I didn't know, I mean one has to in planning this type of operation take into account that there could be a failure in the sense that the device didn't go off. In fact it may have had a technical problem and been opened and not gone off at which stage there would have been a very serious forensic investigation.

MS PATEL: Okay and then my final point really is, much has been made of your co-operation with the TRC, but I'd just like to mention that at the pre-hearing conference your legal advisor had in fact threatened to withdraw your application if the Ministry of Justice had not given a firm undertaking ...[intervention]

MR LEVINE: That, Mr Chairman, is totally incorrect. There was mention made of a letter written to the Minister and in fact if my learned friend looks at her correspondence, she wrote to me after I received a letter from the Department of Justice which said they could not give me a decision and she said "Bury it in mind, are you still going to go on with your client's evidence?" and I wrote her a very short one line letter "The overwhelming answer to your question is yes." So that is not accurate and it's mischievous.

MS PATEL: With the greatest of respect, my learned colleague, Mr Chairman, the reason that I in fact directed the correspondence after we had received advices from the Ministry of Justice was in fact because there was a threat to withdraw the application, otherwise there would have been no point to my correspondence to him.

MR LEVINE: There was no threat by me, Mr Chairman and those of my colleagues who were at the pre-trial conference will bear me out.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I wasn't there and legal strategy and tactics, you know, is not my field.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman, I can remember at the pre-trial conference that there was doubt about this whole situation of extradition and quite a few parties expressed their reservation in respect of the problematic situation. There was talk of a possible postponement, there was all sorts of talk. There wasn't - later on a letter came from the Minister making it clear that he will judge each extradition applications at it's own merits so to a large extent both Ms Patel and Mr Levine are correct.

ADV DE JAGER: I don't think this would assist us in coming to a conclusion of the application.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes Mr Chairman, but I want to say, I want to say that I cannot remember that Mr Levine threatened anybody at that pre-trial conference and there was no question that if the Minister didn't give an answer that an application will be withdrawn. There was no question of that.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson, I will not take this any further. That's the end.


CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

MR PENZHORN: Mr Chairman?


MR PENZHORN: I think I will grant the opportunity to my formerly learned friend, Mr Pik Botha. Or I might say, no longer learned but at least implicated.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOTHA: Thank you Mr Chairman. Major Williamson, you were here yesterday when I put to Mr McPherson a number of preoccupations that I attended to round about February, March, April in 1992 and at the conclusion of my presentation, Mr McPherson agreed that Mr le Grange would not have consulted me or mentioned to me the plan to explode a bomb in London in the light of what I said here. Do you agree with that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I don't believe that I have at any stage said that the Minister of Foreign Affairs would have known about this operation, you know, nobody ever made that suggestion to me or in my presence, Mr Chairman, so I agree.

MR BOTHA: Thank you. Then, that makes my task a lot easier. It is just one matter which for the sake not only of my erstwhile department of Foreign Affairs but also for reasons relevant to the present proceedings should be rectified. As I understand it, Mr Chairman and I stand to be corrected by you, questions were put here apropos of the so-called Coventry Four. These were four gentlemen who had to stand trial in Britain in 1984 because of alleged contraventions of British customs regulations and the South African Government drew - gave an undertaking that they would be returned to London to stand trial if they could be released on bail so that they could join their families in South Africa in the meantime and as I understood it, this was portrayed as a breach of the South African Government's undertaking and it was interpreted apparently by the Security Forces or the police or whoever, as a sign that the South African Government would come to the rescue of security officials who might get into trouble in other countries for breaking the laws of those countries.

Now my first question is, the London bomb was exploded in 1982 and the Coventry Four saga occurred in 1984, so how could an event of '84 have a bearing on what the Security Forces could have thought would have happened in '82? This is my first question to Mr Williamson.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, as I remember I think and it was unfortunately probably me who brought up the Coventry Four matter because I used it as an example of an instruction which had nothing to do with the London bomb or anything else that I'd got directly from one of the structures of the Secretariat of the State Security Council to put surveillance on a journalist who was in South Africa trying to scratch out the Coventry Four story and it was then later, I believe, put to me by one of the legal representatives that did the South African Government's actions relating to the Coventry Four and their not going back to Britain after having been granted bail, give us in the Security Forces the impression that we would be looked after and my answer, I believe, was that yes, that's the type of perception we had and it wasn't specifically related only to the Coventry Four and I think perhaps it was an unfortunate example in general but it had nothing to do with London, it was after London. We're talking generally, did we have in the Security Forces the feeling that we had the backing of the Government? Well of course we did, of course we did, Mr Chairman and you know I certainly believed that the Government would back me if I did things that I'd ordered properly to do by the Government. That's the only relevance of it, Mr Chairman.

MR BOTHA: Yes, Major Williamson, certainly your Minister, if your Minister gave you an order I would expect him to back you but each Minister of this country took an oath also in those days that they would respect the law of this country and Government departments, except mine, I had no internal function and no law giving me powers, I just had to try and survive despite the turbulence of the ANC and the Security Forces. Each Minister had a law, there's a Police Act, there's a Defence Act. When the Cabinet took a decision, I put it to you now, you say every now and then at the highest level, at the highest level. The highest level was the State President. The decision of the State President was the decision of the Cabinet. I sat in that Cabinet for seventeen years, perhaps I should know. If a Minister did not agree with the State President, he had to resign or the State President would fire him, as it happened to me on almost a number of occasions. Now the highest level then is the State President. The State President is advised by Ministers, but there are laws giving Ministers certain rights passed by parliament, those laws and those Ministers are then supposed to exercise their functions and duties within the ambit of the laws which were passed by parliament. In the case of the defence force, the whole of Africa was their operational area by law. By law. In the case of the Police it was not, with respect.

Now, when you refer every time, and other witnesses here, to the highest level, what do you imply? Do you say in all these cases the State President approved? That's my question, because he was the highest level?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, obviously I can't say that in every single instance the State President knew everything and he approved every order that was given. We were talking and I think other witnesses and in other hearings, people are talking about a perception and when people - I know this term at the highest level has become some type of a loose term that covers what one might call a, you know, a variety of situations and when a Cabinet minister is involved in giving an order, then always that term "at the highest level" was used. Now this doesn't mean that we had personal knowledge that for example the State President had personally authorised an operation but I think that one must also have some regard for the position of members of the Security Forces.

I understand what Mr Botha says about Cabinet Ministers positions and collective responsibility and the fact that if at a Cabinet meeting, in terms of our law, if the Cabinet Minister didn't go along with the decision, he would basically have to resign. But, Mr Chairman, that with respect, I think can also be extrapolated or extrapolated from that can be our position, is that we were members and officers of the Security Forces and we were given instructions from our generals, our line function bosses and then also at times we knew that some of these instructions were coming through from political levels and our political chiefs and I really believe that in the situation that existed at the time and this word that's been going on and on, the "moet weet" and the need to know and clandestinity and the secret war against the ANC that perhaps there was room for misunderstanding and problems but, Mr Chairman, I also just want to say again, I might be completely correct, but I mean completely incorrect, but I do believe that at a certain stage the Police Act was in fact amended to allow for the South African Police to serve outside South Africa's borders but that's just a minor issue. But at the end of the day I think that our perception and my perceptions and the things that I and others have said have to a certain extent also been confirmed by what we've read about applications made to the TRC where I think the allegation has been made in fact by members of the Cabinet that the State President did on occasion take them aside and give them a specific instruction and what I'm saying - and that that instruction went down the line function chain and was carried out and I'm not saying that this happened in every single case, Mr Chairman, all I'm saying is that I believed and I think my colleagues believed that we were fighting a war for South Africa and that our political heads supported what we were doing and I think that we believed that the people who supported the Government throughout the country, supported what we were doing and under that umbrella obviously, there was room for the use and abuse for the term "at the highest level" because - ja, I concede that - but we believed that for example when we were sent to London, again with respect, I think that if I'd refused to take this team to London, I might also have been in the same position as Mr Botha said and that is that I would have had to decide either to obey my orders or to resign.

MR BOTHA: For that I have respect because during these proceedings and over the past few years, maybe I should have known it earlier, the cultures in various departments differed. In my case, more than 40 ambassadors abroad had no hesitation and the records are there, luckily, to send me confidential and secret reports telling me absolutely the truth on how they see things and I never took it amiss. The Director's General of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Directors and the Directors and I met regularly and I'm not aware of a single instance where anyone of them ever had the slightest hesitation in disagreeing with their Minister when they thought their Minister was now ill advised or wanted to do something which were not regarded proper by them and I never took it amiss. Did you not have such a culture in your make up?

MR WILLIAMSON: I think Minister, with respect, your department was a civilian department, I think there was a difference in culture, I think obviously in the Security Forces and in particular I can comment on the units in which I was involved. We were allowed to voice our opinions to a certain level. We obviously were allowed to contribute to debate but as in your case, Minister, when a decision was taken, we had a choice, do it or go and I think that we - and I know that many people, and in fact I said it at the armed forces hearing, it wasn't only in the Department of Foreign Affairs that there were people who were opposed to the emphasis put on the use of violence, the use of force, in combating the ANC's political onslaught against South Africa. That same opinion was also in some of the Security Forces and I said it and in my bundle Q2, document 14, there's an article that I wrote and published and I think Minister will remember that the Beeld, maybe Minister will remember, that the Beeld actually put part of my article in as a leader in the newspaper and Minister Louis le Grange got very, very angry about what I'd said. So we also at times took political chances and confronted political decisions and - but in my case, Minister, I was not in a civilian organisation, at the end of the day I had pips on my shoulder and I was not a civilian, I was somebody who was used to confront the enemy in the harshest, in the harshest way.

MR BOTHA: Thank you. To return to the Coventry Four, had you any knowledge of public international law on the principle of reprisals?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, Mr Chairman, I just know it exists.

MR BOTHA: Reprisals are acts by one State in retaliation for prior acts of another State, contrary to international law.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, this relates to - if they accuse one of your staff of being a spy and expel him and then you tit for tat ...[intervention]

MR BOTHA: No, no, I'm talking on the Coventry Four.


MR BOTHA: I just want to put a question to you apropos of that issue. Acts of reprisal would themselves be contrary to international law but for the fact that they are taken in response to an unlawful act and the purpose of an act of reprisal is to compel the offending State to observe international law. It's breach of which has given rise to dispute between the States which after a demand for redress and negotiations to that end remains unsettled. It is to compel that State to consent to a satisfactory settlement of the dispute. Now what happened, the case of the Coventry Four, they were trapped in London, they didn't go there like you and your team. They were trapped by the customs, British Customs Officials. There was a Briton, a Mr ...[indistinct], who turned state witness or whatever the Brits call them and he phoned the four gentlemen in South Africa and said: "look, there's something going wrong with my deal, can you come over to London to help me?" So these gentlemen, not being experts in intelligence work but a man like an engineer and a financial manager, got onto a plane and walked into ...[indistinct], they were arrested and ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Botha, at present you are giving evidence and if you're giving evidence, the other people would be entitled to cross-examine you. At this moment you've got the opportunity to ask questions of Mr Williamson.

MR BOTHA: Well, I cannot ask the question ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Please pose the question as short and lucid as possible?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Chairman, it was alleged here that the Coventry Four should serve or served as an encouragement or example of how the Government would help security officials if they get into trouble. Surely I'm entitled to point out that there is no comparison whatsoever between the London bomb and the Coventry Four and I can only do so by putting the facts to Mr Williamson and then ask for his reaction and in the course of putting the facts, namely that in that case the South Africans wanted bail, they returned to South Africa, they went back to Britain and stood trial but the case was again postponed which proved the South African Government resolved that they should return to Britain. So they received no help. But then fugitives went into the British Consulate in Durban and the British Government committed an unlawful act by not releasing them and the South African Government, in terms of the reprisal doctrine was fully entitled then to say, irrespective of whether the four wanted to return, we now take this retaliation. Do you agree that this is not comparable to security agents operating and breaking laws in other countries? It's not comparable and it does not justify you or anyone to conclude that the South African Government would have rescued agents who broke the laws of other countries?

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I'm sorry to intervene but the people who took refuge at the consulate, Mr Chairman, feared that they would be detained without trial. They were UDF hide...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, we are not debating the rights and wrongs of the Government at this stage or their policies.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well at least if ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: The witness is being asked if he agrees that where a decision was taken by the Government on a basically political ground, it does not entitle the police to expect them to support them at all times. That is your question, isn't it?

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR WILLIAMSON: You know, Mr Chairman, I mean the way the facts have been put would mean that, you know, that I've got to comment on whether I realised that the State would only have supported us if they were given at a later stage a sufficient excuse to do so or whatever, Mr Chairman, but I accept, I really think that this was just something that came up because of the fact that at one stage I'd been asked to put surveillance on a journalist and I made the comment that I believed, yes, I agreed that that's one of the incidents that happened that would have increased my perception that the Government would support or the Security Forces or the people assisting the struggle against the ANC or whatever and you know I accept you can't put - you can't relate our situation going to London and blowing up the ANC office and the situation several years later of people who were involved in breaking the sanctions and helping our arms industry. There's no direct connection, Mr Chairman, but you know I just have to say that at the end of the day, I believed that if we were doing what the Government wanted us to do, that we would have the backing of the Government and I really don't want to bring the Coventry Four or anything else into that statement, Mr Chairman.

MR BOTHA: Thank you. Thank you for that. Just on the issue of your conversation with Ms Slovo and apparently McBride, is it correct that you had conversations with both of them?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOTHA: Would you be so kind as to tell me how did it come about?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well as I understand it, Mr Chairman, I was -well first of all the conversations with Ms Slovo were after she contacted me a number of times asking whether she could discuss what had happened to her mother and with Robert McBride, it was related to my having discussions with him on the basis that he was a senior member of the ANC and that he would relay to certain other senior officials in the ANC what I was saying and in particular what I was saying about the process of getting former members of the Security Forces to come to this forum, to the TRC forum and to participate fully and I think I did say earlier in my evidence, Mr Chairman, the upshot, in fact at the time I gave my original evidence, I didn't mention Mr McBride’s name, he's one of the officials I was referring to. At a later stage I spoke to even more highly placed people than Mr McBride and at the end of the day what happened was that there was a meeting between various generals including General Coetzee and the President of South Africa as well as, I think, the Deputy President, at which the fears and concerns of the Security Forces were discussed and the encouragement of the Security Forces to participate in this process was discussed and obviously somewhere along the line, a tape that Mr McBride made of our, one of our conversations or part of our conversations found it's way to Ms Slovo. That's as far as I understand the explanation but if my explanation of why I had that discussion with Mr McBride is that it was part of this process that I was exploring and entering into, Mr Chairman.

MR BOTHA: Did you get the impression from those conversations that your conversationalists were trying to get at me, to - because it's seems to me from what I've seen now of the evidence submitted to this Committee, that questions were put repeatedly about Pik Botha's role in bombings and in violence and heaven knows what, just about everything that went wrong, Pik Botha was in charge apparently of everything?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, Mr Chairman, I think there's only a couple of other people who were more involved than Minister Botha and that was me and then people like General Coetzee, ja. I mean, I think yes, I got the impression that there was a focus of -on particular individuals in the South African Government and Security Forces to a greater degree than on others, Mr Chairman.

MR BOTHA: Can I put to you the following:

"During this week in the Pretoria Supreme Court, a state witness in the trial testified that an assassination on Mr Botha was one of the chief objectives of the ANC in South Africa. The witness who did not wish to be identified testified that he received intensive military training in Angola as commander of the urban areas in Natal. He received specific instructions from the ANC's Revolutionary Council."

Did you not discuss this kind of thing with Ms Slovo and Mr McBride?

MR WILLIAMSON: No I'm afraid not, Mr Chairman, I wish I'd known about that.

MR BOTHA: Thank you.


CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

MR PENZHORN: Mr Chairman?


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PENZHORN: If I may, Mr Chairman, I will be brief.

Mr McBride - Mr Williamson, just first of all, I think some of the aspects I think were covered by Mr Botha just before and I'm going to be, trying to be very brief. You did in fact refer to this slogan, if I may call it, "right from the top." Now could I ask you, in relation to the London bombing episode, what was the highest top that you have any direct knowledge that any order was given in regard to this operation?

MR WILLIAMSON: The Minister of Law and Order, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: In regard to the letter bomb which was despatched to the Slovo family, what was the highest top which you have direct knowledge of where that was authorised or order was given?

MR WILLIAMSON: Brigadier Goosen, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: And could I ask you the same question in relation to the Goosen - the Schoon letter bomb?

MR WILLIAMSON: The same person, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: Okay, so you as such have no direct evidence of the order or authorisation having been any higher than those two instances?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, Mr Chairman, I think I've said that clearly yesterday.

MR PENZHORN: Now can I refer you to the meeting in London just prior to the London bomb operation, I think Mr McPherson in fact testified in that regard and it's also mentioned in one of the other applications. A meeting took place, I think it could be termed the final planning meeting on the eve before the actual operation?

MR WILLIAMSON: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: Do you recall at that stage having briefed anybody that the authorisation for that particular operation was in fact, or did that in fact came from either Mr P.W. Botha the State President and/or Mr Pik Botha and/or the Cabinet?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I'm sure I would have just said from the top, Mr Chairman.


MR WILLIAMSON: Because, you know I think also you must see the phrase "from the top" is also being a way not to specifically name individuals.

MR PENZHORN: Yes. Am I correct in the assumption that in police circles at the time and their normal police in the police hierarchy, an order from the top would mean the Commissioner?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: And from the very top in police circles, would actually, that would end with the Minister of Police?

MR WILLIAMSON: I would say Cabinet level, ja.


MR WILLIAMSON: I mean we wouldn't have made any semantic differentiation between one or other member of the Cabinet. Our Minister would have been what we would have focused on.

MR PENZHORN: Sure. Because in fact he was the primary responsible Cabinet minister or member of Government, he was responsible for that particular department?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: Now the - I'm going to try and cut this short. This just relates to the whole system of state security of the state security system and the national management system etc. which was implemented at the time and what I would like to do is, is to quote to you or maybe ask your comments first. Am I correct that the State Security Council had no, in itself, at no executive functions?

MR WILLIAMSON: You're correct, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: And am I correct that the function of the State Security Council by virtue of it's statute was to advise the Government on request of the Prime Minister, I think the Act says, in regard to the formulation of national policies and strategies in regard to the security of the Republic of South Africa.

MR WILLIAMSON: I believe that is correct yes, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: Okay now I would like to also quote to you the passage and if necessary I can distribute, I have actually made copies for the Committee but if it's not necessary to burden the Committee with more paper, I will refrain from doing so. And this is, it's a quote by Johan Christiaan Kriek van der Merwe who wrote a thesis for a doctorate at the University of South Africa entitled "The State Security Council - The development of a system for security management in the Republic of South Africa 1972 - 1989." Now on page 90 he says:

"It should be mentioned that Act 64 of 1972"

which is the Act to which I've previously referred to you

"only makes provision for the advisory capacity of the Committee. The Cabinet is the primary organ which implies that any advice from the SSC has to be ratified by the Cabinet. The SCC has no executive powers. The execution of policy and strategy is seated within the responsible State departments. All decisions which are made by the SSC are subject to the approval and ratification by the Cabinet because the Cabinet is the responsible institution."

Would you say that in view of your experience and also the briefings which you have had that this is a correct summary of the functions of the State Security Council?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman, all of this and the past is correct in terms of the legislation and the theory behind the State Security Council.

MR PENZHORN: Yes, that's right. And then referring to and I will refer you briefly to Exhibit O ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Could I just ask something about this? What about the feedback, did they have any function in feeding back what they've advised to the Cabinet? Well the State Security Council or the Secretariat?

MR WILLIAMSON: The State Security Council would take decisions, Mr Chairman, which would be noted on minutes. The minutes were then passed back to the Secretariat of the State Security Council and that's where we get to the practice, Mr Chairman and the fact that there was a very large Secretariat of the State Security Council with hundreds of employees, right down, as we saw on the videos, we've had evidence, right down to six hundred or more than six hundred mini-GBS's or JMC's right round the country. So attached to the State Security Council, the strict Cabinet committee on security as it were, which also only sat at relatively regular periods. You had a big machinery.

ADV DE JAGER: All I want to know is, after they've advised the Cabinet did they have any role in feeding back what the decisions of the Cabinet or was that fed back through another channel?

MR WILLIAMSON: No the decision and I have seen some documentation where next to the "bespreekingspunte" there would be a column for decision and it would be "accepted as such with singular expectations" and this would then go back to the Secretariat and it was the Secretariat's job then to inform the departments and the line functionaries of these decisions and how this fitted into whichever strategy but the State Security Council itself, Mr Chairman, basically made decisions on "strategie" and it would then be - a strategy would be recommended and then he would get the situation where it would come back saying "ja, strategie 44" for example, has been approved and then the government departments, all of them through the State Security Council structures would be informed through the "nodale punte" that now they must orientate their specific line functions in terms of this overall strategy.

MR PENZHORN: Mr Chairman, I've taken the liberty to, in view of the question put by Commissioner de Jager to hand up a short extract from this thesis that I've quoted to Mr Williamson, I've just made copies of the relevant pages, it's a very thick thesis, I think that will be ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Does it have to be an exhibit? We've all got it, can't we just use it?

MR PENZHORN: It was just for convenience. Mr Williamson, in regard to the question which Mr de Jager has just asked you, there was also the National Joint Management Centre.


MR PENZHORN: N.G.B.S., you remember that?


MR PENZHORN: And am I correct that the function of that was as it's summarised here:

"It was established as a result of an urgent need to manage the national emergency situation and to co-ordinate the counter-revolutionary planning and execution."

That's on page 101 of that document, Commissioner de Jager.

"The N.G.B.S. functioned in a co-ordinating manner in order to synchronise the functions of all State departments and the State departments were still autonomous in the execution of their departmental line functions."

And then as far as the whole question of the departments which we discussed and I think from what Mr Botha asked you in regard to the various security departments, I would refer you to that at page 161 of that same document at the bottom:

"The execution of the security objectives was done by the security department. The departments were autonomous and only had to react to orders given by the specific Minister. The State department could decide whether it would carry out these objectives and how it would do so."

Now why I read this to you is, if you would look at Exhibit O, I think which you mentioned at the time, it's a diagram, you mentioned I think in your application that this document was part of a briefing given to the President's Council at the time?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is correct, 1989.

PENZHORN: Yes, now the only - I want you to look at this document which claims to be a presentation of the "Nasionale Bestuurstelsel". Now it's got "Staats President" on top, you've got the Cabinet and then you've got the various Cabinet committees. You've got the S.V.R. which we know was the Cabinet committee for security, am I correct?

MR WILLIAMSON: That's correct.

MR PENZHORN: And the next one is the - are the welfare committees which you have the K.K.S. Die Kabinet Komitee, I think Staadkundig, you said and then the K.K.E. Ekonomies and K.K.M. Maatskaplik. So on the right hand side we have all the welfare departments whereas on the left-hand side we have the Cabinet Committee for Security and it's hierarchy. The only thing that I want to put to you is a line is drawn from the N.G.B.S. which is in fact the one that we've just discussed. A direct line of communication between the State President and the N.G.B.S. Now, from what I've read to you, this seems clearly to be wrong because I also wish to refer you in that bundle, the last page at page 296 is the same schematic representation, I think one can call it, of the system and there you will actually see the hierarchy totally different. So what I want to put to you, is there was in fact the line of the President to the N.G.B.S. which was drawn and it must have been a mistake because you will also see the mini-GBS's and the sub-GBS's and all these mentioned underneath the whole security system on page 296. It's a bit different from what we have here.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja Mr Chairman, you know, I as I think I've said before, I'm certainly not a constitutional lawyer and I don't know in detail how all these things worked and I didn't do a thesis on it and I in fact didn't even notice, you know, this line that it created some contradiction with what other people had said and basically all I was trying to do when I handed this in was to give some idea of the, what I called the octopus system.


MR WILLIAMSON: So, you know, I accept that there can be mistakes on this.

MR PENZHORN: Then, just one other aspect. A document was handed in, Y2. I cannot recall whether this was in fact handed in by my learned friend Mr Bizos and whether it was handed in by you. It purports to be a copy of a letter of the 24th November 1979 - "Dear Craig" and signed Mac or Mace or something like that. I think your evidence was that this was a letter from Mr Maharaj?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes that is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: Now this particular letter, I think this refers to the institute, the I.U.E.F. and that was also referred to in your evidence to which you were attached during the '80's?

MR WILLIAMSON: From late '70's to 1980 yes.

MR PENZHORN: Yes, now could you just tell me, this particular letter refers to a couple of urgent matters. There's a student in Botswana whose applied for some time for a scholarship and then the last sentence says:

"We would recommend that Steve be given this scholarship."

Now, just for clarity, in what capacity did Mr Maharaj write this letter of recommendation to you? Was he an official of the I.E.U.F.?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, Mr Chairman, he was an official of the ANC.

MR PENZHORN: Now in what capacity could recommendations by Mr Maharaj have been made to the I.U.E.F. in regard to the allocation of scholarships?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well I think at that time, Mr Chairman, the I.U.E.F. - I mean the ANC regarded me as their man in the I.U.E.F. and so this was an instruction to me to make sure that the I.U.E.F. did something that they wanted them to do.

MR PENZHORN: Now, okay, so and one of the main purposes of the I.U.E.F. was to give scholarships?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, to refugees Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: Okay and there's okay then the second request is for this scholarship application for Maseru, for a student in Maseru and then there's a medical student at the University of Natal. So were these all bona fide applications for scholarships for these people for bona fide students?

MR WILLIAMSON: You know, Mr Chairman, I didn't ask. This was basically an instruction from the ANC to me and obviously I would in - there was the type of thing that I would attempt to assist with because this would increase my credibility. Request A I could have handled because we had - well there were scholarships being given obviously to South African refugees in Botswana so I could have just made sure that this individual got it. He says here something about our friend Harry, I mean we don't have to go into it, but there was obviously some tension here between the Black Consciousness Movement people and the ANC people.

Number two, I could also handle because that was a refugee in Botswana, from the name I would assume to be somebody quite high up in - or a well known ANC family at least - sorry, in Lesotho.

Number three - that's a different matter. We had no mandate to give scholarships internally. In that case money would be diverted to achieve the purpose.

Number four ...[intervention]

MR PENZHORN: What do you mean by "money would be diverted"? What you're saying is that the I.U.E.F. was only giving scholarships to refugees out of the Republic of South Africa. In other words they weren't entitled to give scholarships to people within the Republic?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, that's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: And what do you by funds would be diverted?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well it means that funds that had been given for the purpose of education of refugees would have been used to pay the fees of this person at the University of Natal who obviously wasn't a refugee.

MR PENZHORN: And then the last one is a hundred rand - do you have knowledge of that particular one or is that in the normal scope of the activities of that institute?

MR WILLIAMSON: Dora Tamana was one of the senior members of the struggle at that time, I mean an old lady at that time and I think she needed some money. I don't - I would imagine there again I would probably have used money from the - money that was available for the support of political prisoners and their families. Whether she fell within that category or not I wouldn't really have worried about, I would have just made sure that she got the money that she needed.

MR PENZHORN: I have no further questions Mr Chairman.


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, before - before Mr Chairman, there are certain issues that flow obviously from the cross-examination by some of the other members. One issue which is important, which I've already alluded to, is the transcripts of that tape. Not that I admit the tape at all or the transcript as being correct, but there are certain parts which Mr Levine did not change which reflect on my client and certain questions I would like to put to Mr Williamson about that and then one or two other issues if you would allow me?


MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I'll be as short as possible.

Mr Williamson, just in respect of one question that Mr Penzhorn asked you, can you just have a look at those - your pictures again? Can I just show the two to you? The one is Annexure O and the other one is the document handed in by Mr Penzhorn. In the document handed in by Mr Penzhorn, there is a block with the letters MKK. What is that? Is that the same as the N.G.B.S.?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, that's something that I'm not - it's probably explained in this thesis but I don't know what that is.

MR DU PLESSIS: You don't have any idea what that is?



MR WILLIAMSON: I mean, I could take a guess. NKK could be National Co-ordinating Committee or something like that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes alright, we will find out what that is. I have no further questions pertaining to that. Now Mr Williamson, in respect of the interview you had with Ms Slovo. I'm referring to Exhibit X2 and specifically page 29 over to page 30. The only concern that I have there, Mr Williamson, is the fact that when you speak there in the transcript there, you refer to "they" the technical section took it off to another, the overall, that is in the middle of the page and then you keep on saying "they" when you refer to the technical section. What, if you read this now, what did you have in mind? Did you want to disclose at that time everything to Ms Slovo or why did you refer to "they".

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I was talking very generally, I used the term "we" I used the term "they", I was also saying that I'm talking about things that, many things that I assume, then we talked about why I wouldn't give any specific names and I think I made it clear either here or other places that the TRC process was going to - was something that was going to happen. This was, as I said Mr Chairman, particularly tight and difficult circumstances, I mean it's not everyday that you meet somebody whose mother first of all has been a famous member of the liberation movements, to put it that way and secondly that you've been involved in an operation that actually ended up with her mother dying. And then thirdly, you know, this was what had happened in South Africa then, you know, it was a - I mean this was a totally unique process we were involved in and I was talking cautiously and generally, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, now Mr Williamson, we also know from what Mr Bizos has told us where the first transcript of the first tape is that it was never - Jerry Raven's name was never mentioned in the first transcript and the first discussion. Am I correct Mr Bizos?


MR DU PLESSIS: Right, now wouldn't you say Mr Williamson that the use of the word "they" and the loose way you refer to it in this conversation may have been because you didn't want to disclose Jerry Raven's name during that conversation?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well I think I said specifically I wanted to avoid giving names, I said it more than once Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right and this never meant that you intended to say that there were more people than Jerry Raven involved in manufacturing the bomb and involved on the technical side?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well Mr Chairman, you know, I was using general terms "we" and "they" and you know, I know that I asked him if it would be possible for him to make a device and I actually don't know exactly how and what he did, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, thank you. Then Mr Williamson, certain aspects have been put about the Schoon's involvement in Angola and especially Lubango. Now can I, Mr Chairman, may I hand out certain documentation in this regard just to make it helpful for the Committee? Mr Chairman, I'll be very brief in this regard.

Mr Williamson, I just want to know from you in respect of the research that I did pertaining to Lubango and the situation of Lubango, if you, maybe your memory is spurred with the references that I'm going to refer you to and I just want to know if you agree with this. These are documents, Mr Chairman and I don't know if we should hand them in as exhibits, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: I think you'd better. What are they?

MR DU PLESSIS: H - that would be HH Mr Chairman. JJ, sorry Mr Chairman, JJ.

Right, now Mr Williamson, the first book is a book by Mr John Turner about "Continent Ablaze" about all the wars that happened during the last 15 years and if you turn to the next page, page 113 of the book, the third dark dot there, the paragraph starts with "FAPLA" and then you will see about four lines down it says:

"Defences in South West Angola sought to counter South African incursions with major bases at Kahama, Lubango and Kayundu."

Do you see that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Does that accord with your perception?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman, because at the time South Eastern Angola was an Angolan Government stronghold. South Western Angola was a UNITA stronghold and the South African troops were mainly down on the South West African, Namibian, Angolan border, Mr Chairman, and at different times obviously there were South African troops also in Angola but afterwards mainly on the South Western side.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, so this means FAPLA had a large base at Lubango, do you agree?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, I mean Kahama, I mean Kahama, Lubango, Kayundu were hard points, strongholds.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, now the next page you will see that comes from a book by the British author, Fred Bridgeland, "The War for Africa" which also deals with the Angolan conflict. Firstly there's a map that shows clearly where Lubango was. On the left hand side of the map about from the Okavango River border about one and a half centimetres up, Mr Chairman, you'll find Lubango. Now if you turn to the next page, you will see on the right hand side, right down the last paragraph on the right hand side. Mr Chairman, I may say that if you look at the second paragraph on the left hand side, you'll see this deals with 1988, the situation with 1988, but it is important to read what's on the right hand, last paragraph, the right page, it says:

"The SADF high command had long speculated that FAPLA and the Cubans might open up a new front in order to divide South Africa's military capabilities while it was busy fighting alongside UNITA in the East. The runway at Zungongo was upgraded sufficiently to allow heavy transport planes to land but Kahama gave the most cause for alarm. MiG-23'S could now operate from there instead of from Lubango, the main southern Angolan war plane base 300 kilometres north of the border."

Do you agree that Lubango was the main southern Angolan war plan base 300 kilometres north of the border?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Mr Chairman, I mean if one looks at that first on the left hand side, where it says "by late January 1988 some three and a half thousand Cuban troops were deployed" you can go on and say that this, the Cuban State north of a line, roughly 300 kilometres north of Ovamboland since 1984. "When South Africa withdrew from Southern Angolan territory it had captured and big operation Askari between '83 and February '84." So, you know, this was the time where there was this to-ing and fro-ing of South African forces and particularly the Cuban forces in that area, Mr Chairman, and the fear was that this, these Cubans were coming southwards, Mr Chairman and in particular the air - you know, we had a specific problem with the air power of the Cubans and others, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, Mr Williamson, the next page 379, in the middle of the page it starts and I want to find out from you if you agree with this?

The sojourn of the ANC in Angola was a particularly shameful chapter in the history of the movement. Despite all it's grandiose words about loving freedom and democracy, it put it's fighters into the civil war alongside the MPLA and Cuban army which were demonstrably denying liberty, as defined by the ANC itself, to the people of Angola and had killed tens of thousands more black Africans than had died in the legitimate struggle of the ANC inside South Africa. uMkhonto guerrilla fighters were so appalled at being ordered by Slovo and others into battle against UNITA in Angola rather than against this government in South Africa, that they arose in a great mutiny in 1984. Many were locked up, tortured and killed by their leaders in re-education camps in Angola, presided over by the security organ of the ANC."

Just to there, do you agree with that and especially what I want to know from you is if you agree that the ANC, uMkhonto weSizwe fighters fought together with the MPLA and Cuban armies?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, this statement is obviously a very strongly partisan political statement and I don't want to continue the war of the past, that's not why I came here, Mr Chairman. I'm trying to end it and to explain and what I'll say about this is, without going into, you know, whether the MPLA was right and wrong and killing people, I think more than a million people have died in the war in Angola, Mr Chairman, but the reality is that there was a war in Angola, that it was being supported by the Soviet Union and surrogates of the Soviet Union, in particular the Cubans, that this war was not only a war to merely put the MPLA into power and to beat, to destroy the so-called rebel group UNITA at that time, Mr Chairman. This was a war in which the West was integrally involved, UNITA as what was termed then a resistance movement in Angola, was involved, UNITA was being supported by certain Western forces, including South Africa but also the United States and other Western powers and this was a war that was being fought as part of a global geopolitical strategy that involved the Soviet super power in it's struggle against what they termed imperialism and capitalism, Mr Chairman, and I have many Angolan friends with whom I've discussed this war and people who fought on the other side to me, Mr Chairman and basically at the end of the day, as far as I'm concerned, the ANC was there, it used it's troops on behalf of the Angolan government to fight against UNITA as part of this overall geo-political struggle that was going on and at the end of the day, Mr Chairman, as far as I'm concerned, people such as I and people such as the commanders and the foot soldiers in the ANC and soldiers in the Forces Armadas Angolana, were all in a war being used as pawns on a chessboard, a geo-political chessboard, Mr Chairman and that's what I'd like to say about this, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now Mr Williamson, I'm going to put it to you and I going to argue that as well, in the ANC's first statement to the Truth Commission on page 94 to 95, you will interestingly find a list of 99 ANC cadres killed in UNITA ambushes. That's page 94 to 95 Mr Chairman of the first statement to the Truth Commission of the ANC.

Now Mr Williamson, all I'm putting to you is that that shows that the ANC aligned itself with the struggle of SWAPO for the independence of Namibia and the question I want to ask you in that regard is the military base at Lubango, the air cover that was provided at Lubango, would that have assisted SWAPO? Would that have been facilities that SWAPO would have used?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, I think it's clearly put out in the documents that I've appended to my applications. The military intelligence perceptions and exactly that, that these hard military bases manned by Forces Armadas Angolana but as well as Cubans were there and they were a danger, they were giving an umbrella to the so-called terrorist forces at the time which were SWAPO and the ANC and it's well known, Mr Chairman, that ANC troops participated in the war, they fought against UNITA, they were used in a political role inside Angola, they fought and died and in fact, Mr Chairman, just to mention as an aside, if we talk about Stratcom, that because Stratcom isn't only an attempt at this, to use this information, Stratcom’s also an attempt just to counter-revolutionary propaganda and at the time we tried very hard to get the press and the world to tell this story of ANC cadres who were dying fighting UNITA and about the mutiny that occurred and we were laughed off to a large extent, Mr Chairman, it took a lot of time to get the newspapers in fact to admit that what we'd been saying was true. So was happening at that time, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Williamson, I want to go fast because it's late in the afternoon, there are a few items that I just want to draw your attention to. Could you look at volume 2 please of the application bundles and I want you to turn to page 36 please, of volume 2. That is the Schoon application.


MR DU PLESSIS: Page 32, you will see the ...[intervention]


MR DU PLESSIS: Page 36, I beg your pardon, 36. The second last paragraph, four lines from the bottom. It states there:

"SWAPO has an estimated five thousand men in South Western Angola, fully integrated into FAPLA units. Their attack would be against Namibia's northern province, Ovamboland, where most of SWAPO's ethnic supporters are located."

Do you agree with that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, Mr Chairman, that's part of an invasion scenario which certain military strategists in the West believed was what was being planned, yes Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right and can ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, permission was sought to put in some things that he was unable to put in originally. He's now referring, Mr Chairman, first of all, we haven't had an opportunity of seeing these documents, of dealing with them in any way. No explanation has been given as to why they were not at the time. Some of them I've had already, why are we having this rehash?

CHAIRPERSON: This was not something new, was it Mr du Plessis? You don't have a second go of cross-examination?

MR DU PLESSIS: No Mr Chairman, it's the same basis upon which Mr Visser asked permission to cross-examine.

CHAIRPERSON: On matters that had been raised that hadn't been raised before.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, there were certain issues flowing from cross-examination of my learned friend about the Schoons involvement in Angola which was not something which I knew was coming, it was not something that I knew was going to be disputed, when I cross-examined Mr Williamson, it is something that I had to go do research about after that was put. Now the only way that I can get the statements that I have found in my research into the evidence, Mr Chairman, is to ask Mr Williamson about this and if he agrees in respect of this and I haven't had that opportunity, Mr Chairman, otherwise I can't and I can't ask Mr Raven because he wasn't in such a position as Mr Williamson to do. Now I don't know if my learned friend, Mr Bizos, is disputing the points I'm putting to Mr Williamson, but in all fairness, Mr Chairman, that's the only basis upon which I can get it into evidence before you.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, the document that he is now referring to is in evidence, it is part of Mr Williamson's application for amnesty, it does not require to be rehashed. He's confirmed the correctness of it.

MR DU PLESSIS: He never gave evidence that he confirms the correctness of each and every document attached hereto and he believes in each and every statement made? If he does so, Mr Chairman, then I will stop.

CHAIRPERSON: My recollection was that he had confirmed his application.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's the application but does he confirm ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: That's part of the application.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, then let me then ask this, Mr Williamson. If you - I'm going to argue that in respect of the documents you attached to your amnesty application that at various places it indicates that the ANC aligned themselves with SWAPO, that they aligned themselves with FAPLA, that they received training and education from FAPLA and from the Cubans and I want to argue that. Now do you, you have read the annexures to your amnesty application, do you align yourself and do you confirm the correctness of each and every statement made in each and every document attached to your amnesty application?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well obviously Mr Chairman, you know, some of the statements and some of these documents might be wrong. What I'm saying these documents do is, as far as I'm concerned, they give an accurate overview of the situation that pertained at the time in relation to the global, the global geo-political elements of the struggle, Mr Chairman and to that extent I appended them in support of my perception and my justification for my application, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I've got four other places that I want to refer to. I want to appeal to you to ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You said you'd be short, I want to appeal to you, Mr du Plessis, it's now quarter to five, you started at four o'clock.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, it is important because I believe Mr Marius Schoon is going to come and testify that he and his wife were innocent civilians teaching at a high school or a university campus in Lubango.

CHAIRPERSON: And none of this contradicts that.

MR DU PLESSIS: No Mr Chairman, but ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: We know there was a state of war in Angola at the time, we know that there were ANC forces, is that in dispute?

MR BIZOS: No, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, Mr Chairman, the basis upon which the cross-examination was done, as I understood it, was to lay ground and the perception that was created that that was placed in dispute, especially what was going on in Lubango. I will then keep this for cross-examination if Mr Schoon gets into the box, Mr Chairman.


MR DU PLESSIS: And I will gladly ask him the questions, Mr Chairman and then he's also not forewarned. Mr Chairman, may I then just deal with one last issue?

Mr Williamson, may I hand up a document to you, Mr Chairman, which is the address by Mr Nelson Mandela to the closing session of the 50th National Conference of the ANC. Mr Chairman, can I suggest that that should be KK?

CHAIRPERSON: What is the relevance of this?

MR DU PLESSIS: Now, Mr Williamson, the - it will become clear immediately Mr Chairman - the third paragraph from the bottom, Mr Mandela states the following:

"I'm certain that I speak on behalf of the veterans who graced this historic conference and many others when I say that if we were fortunate to smell the sweet scent of freedom, there are many more who deserve perhaps more than us to be here to witness the rise of a generation that they nurtured."

And then he names people who were deceased at that time and he names eminent names such as Oliver Tambo, Yusuf Dadu, Helen Joseph, Joe Slovo, Braam Fischer and he also names Ruth First in that list. Does that surprise you or does that accord with your view of the position Ruth First had within the ranks of the ANC.

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, she was a leader of this level I would say, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright and Mr Williamson, if Ruth First or Jeanette Schoon was not part of the liberation movements, but if they both worked for the Security Forces, would you still have sent letter bombs to them because you hated them?

Would you still have wanted to kill them?


MR DU PLESSIS: If they were part of the Security Forces?

MR WILLIAMSON: If they worked for us? Of course not, Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: The question was would you have still have wanted to kill them?

MR WILLIAMSON: Of course not.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you want to kill them, did you send letter bombs to them because you wanted to kill them?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman, we sent ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I'm asking you, Mr Williamson.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Mr Chairman, the bombs were intended to kill the people who received them, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Intended to kill the people who received them.

MR DU PLESSIS: And Mr Williamson, that was not - was it done out of hatred or was it done with a political motive?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mr Chairman ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, isn't this a question more appropriate to the witnesses attorney? Who is my learned friend acting for?

MR DU PLESSIS: I will leave the question Mr Chairman, I've no further questions.


MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I will promise you I'll be brief, but I think at this stage you don't believe in counsel's promises any more so ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: What do you want to ask?

MR BOOYENS: I want to ask, on X2 there's a reference to Mr Waal du Toit, Mr Chairman. It's a document that was introduced by my learned friend, Mr Bizos.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it's passing reference to that he may have done something isn't it?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Yes, I would just like to put that beyond doubt. Mr Williamson - may I proceed Mr Chairman?


MR BOOYENS: Exhibit X2 page 30, Mr Williamson. You refer to Mr Waal du Toit, but am I correct in my reading of this that that is purely speculative, you do not make a positive statement of involvement by him because you don't know?

MR WILLIAMSON: I think I make it quite clear there, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.


MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record, Mr Chairman. I find myself in a similar situation except that as you will recall, my learned friend Mr Bizos' cross-examination was full of references to General Coetzee. I don't intend in rehashing all of it, Mr Chairman. There might be one or two issues, now that he's finished, that I might want to raise. I notice that it's ten to five. I believe, Mr Chairman, that time might be saved if we took the adjournment now and I'd be allowed to look at the evidence again tonight. It may shorten ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I find it very hard to believe that.

MR VISSER: Well, you might be surprised, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: How long do you think you'll be, Mr Levine?

MR LEVINE: Well Mr Chairman, without interruption, I would think probably between thirty minutes and forty five minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: As long as that? Very well, we'll adjourn till tomorrow.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, before the adjournment, could I ask you to order, with respect, that Mr Raven will be the next witness, Mr Chairman. We don't want any more misunderstandings, we are prepared to deal with him and I don't want to have another argument tomorrow of about three quarters of an hour as to who the next witness is going to be.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I'm not quite sure that that is right, Mr Bizos. There are two more witnesses we want to dispose of as I understand it?


CHAIRPERSON: One is Mr Bosch and one is Mr Raven.

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bosch should take five minutes in my view.

MR ROUSSOUW: Mr Chairman, if I could have that assurance, no problem.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I can't give you that assurance, I'm just saying what I think.

MR ROUSSOUW: Mr Chairman, my view on the matter is that it would be more suitable if Mr Bosch testified after Mr Raven.


MR ROUSSOUW: Because that follows the line of command for him.

CHAIRPERSON: I just wondered if you want to call him early so he could get away tomorrow, but you don't, you abandon that. So very well we'll call Raven. That has been agreed, hasn't it?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I've stated that numerous times in public that that will be the case. I don't know why my learned friend's asking this.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, if I may just come in at this stage, I'm just scared. What I'm scared of Mr Chairman, is that Raven is going to take us into Thursday and past the adjournment on Thursday and then we come back only next week, then my client, Mr Adam, has a problem and I really believe that Mr Adam will be extremely short. He was not part of the security police headquarters and I am going to, I have asked some of my learned friends whether they would indulge me in that regard whether I can call him at an as early as possible stage, as possible Mr Chairman, otherwise he will have to stand down until the second hearing later.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, we have prepared for Mr Raven. We have planned our logistical support of the cross-examination of Mr Raven. Can we please get to him without any intervention?

CHAIRPERSON: What is Mr Adam's problem next week?

MR JANSEN: Well Mr Chairman, he has duties with his employer abroad, outside the country.


MR JANSEN: And these arrangements were made ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: When is he leaving?

MR JANSEN: Monday, Mr Chairman. Or over the weekend and I understand the problem that my learned friend has, but I think this is a relatively small indulgence and I cannot see his evidence taking more than half an hour, Mr Chairman, with the greatest of respect.

ADV DE JAGER: Well, he's not applying for a gross violation of human rights.

MR JANSEN: Yes, that's the other option Mr Chairman, that you make a ruling that he need not testify but I don't think that ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: No we wouldn't like to make such a ruling but we would suggest that perhaps you negotiate with the other parties round and see whether they - it could be accepted, his application, what he says in the light of ...[intervention]

MR JANSEN: Yes, otherwise Mr Chairman, as far as I'm concerned, he must simply stand over until the next re-hearing. That's not such a big thing, it's just that we won't finish completely with the London bomb incident next week.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I think counsel should be able to apply their minds, to discuss it before we start tomorrow morning.

MR BIZOS: I have just had an instruction from my clients, Mr Chairman. They also have jobs, they also have lives and ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, will you please let me finish.

MR BIZOS: I'm sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: If you will discuss whether you are not prepared to agree to my colleagues suggestion, whether anybody in fact wants to question Adam or whether his statement could go in. Or if you do want to question, how long you're going to take. If you can guarantee that you will finish him in half an hour, that's one thing. If it's merely counsel's optimistic anticipation, it might take two or three hours and ruin the other - what we intend to do with other matters. So I would ask you please to discuss the matter, apply your own minds to it as to whether you want to ask him any questions in the light of the information contained in his application and then decide, if you can safely say that he will only take a few minutes and we can then interpose him if possible.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I don't want to detain you any longer. Just one - I don't want - one matter, I don't want to give permission to Brigadier Schoon to go without your blessing, he has been sitting here all along and it doesn't seem as if we'll have to call him. We can reach him this week and he has a problem for the rest of the week. May he be excused, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: He will be available next week?

MR VISSER: Yes of course.

CHAIRPERSON: He links up with Coetzee?

MR VISSER: Schoon.


MR VISSER: Marius Schoon, the attempt.

CHAIRPERSON: No with who?

MR VISSER: No that's Dirk Coetzee.

CHAIRPERSON: De Kock? Who is the person who came?

MR VISSER: No it's Dirk Coetzee, applied for an attempt on the life of Mr Marius Schoon and the Brigadier also does, but that's an issue really ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, he supplied the 9 mm - it's a completely separate issue. I think that there's no problem in saying he can come back on Monday if required.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I think he has probably shown more patience than anyone else in this hall over the last two weeks.

We'll adjourn till nine o'clock tomorrow morning.