DAY : 1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: I wish to identify myself and would ask my colleagues and the different representatives to do the same. I'm Judge Ronnie Pillay.

ADV MOTATA: I'm Advocate John Motata.

MS KHAMPEPE: I'm Ms Khampepe.

ADV STEENKAMP: I'm André Steenkamp.

MR KOOPEDI: I am Brian Koopedi.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, you are appearing for the applicants?

MR KOOPEDI: That is indeed so, I'm appearing for all four applicants.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, you are appearing as Evidence Leader?

ADV STEENKAMP: Yes, Mr Chairman, and also on behalf of the victims, in the Katlehong incident and the Wimpy attacks. As you wish Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Are there any other representatives?

ADV STEENKAMP: No, Mr Chairman, no further representatives.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Then we can proceed.

MR KOOPEDI: As it pleases the Committee. There is something which one wishes to raise in limine, and I will ask the indulgence of the Committee. Two of our application forms were not attested to. If the Committee will allow me, I would wish to address that with each applicant as he starts.

CHAIRPERSON: Why can't it be attested to now? Why can't it be signed now?

MR KOOPEDI: We do not have any problem with signing that now, but because it was not done timeously, one thought it would be proper to raise it in this forum and do it correctly. We have discussed this and do not have a problem with signing them now.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, are you saying it is not attested to or not deposed to? Is it not signed by the person who made it?

MR KOOPEDI: The applicants have signed but they were not signed before a Commissioner of oaths.

CHAIRPERSON: If during one of the adjournments they are willing to confirm that that is their signature, then it can be attested to.

MR KOOPEDI: As it pleases, we will do that, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Are there any objections to that, Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: No, objections, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR KOOPEDI: Mr Chairman, our first applicant is here, Mr Sigasa. Could we have him sworn in?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, his application appears in the bundle, pages 21 till 27.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sigasa, do you have any objections to the taking of the oath?


CHAIRPERSON: Which language do you prefer to use?

MR SIGASA: English.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you quite sure?


CHAIRPERSON: Would you not be more comfortable with any of the vernacular?

MR SIGASA: My submission is done in English.

CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't matter, I need to know that you are comfortable.

MR SIGASA: I'm very comfortable.


MR SIGASA: In English, yes.


EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Mr Sigasa, you are an applicant in this matter, is that correct?


MR KOOPEDI: You have prepared a statement to present, to read to the Honourable Committee Members, in support of your amnesty application, is that correct?


MR KOOPEDI: Will you please proceed.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Koopedi, do you have copies of the statement he is about to read for the benefit of the members of the Committee?

MR KOOPEDI: We had thought that as usual we would find the photocopying facilities here. We worked until very late last night and unfortunately we have not yet been able to make copies but as soon as we have made copies, our intention is to submit that but for the moment, if the Committee Members will bear with us, we do not have enough copies to give to the Honourable Committee Members and my learned friend on the other side.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

MR KOOPEDI: Please proceed.


"I, Ernest Phumuzi Sigasa, born on the 4th of June 1965 joined the African National Congress and its armed wing, Umkhonto weSizwe in 1984. I became the commander of the Regional Command Structure, Johannes Nkosi Unit, between 1987 to 1990. I received my military training and combat training in Botswana, Zimbabwe and the former Soviet Union. Johannes Nkosi Unit was constituted by the following combatants: myself, Ernest Sigasa, overall commander of the unit, combat name Happy. My responsibilities were overall command, clearance of the DLB's, the guidance to military activities, to communicate with the front command of Botswana and the military headquarters, Lusaka and Zambia and also to execute armed attacks. The other fellow applicant, Tebogo Kebotlhale, the Commissar of the Regional Command Structure, combat name, Bernard. His responsibilities were to do political work within the unit to train and distribute arms in our various sub-units, clearance of the DLB's, executing attacks and sustain the moral of the unit members. Alfas Ndlovu, fellow applicant, a member of the Command Structure, combat name Ambros. Responsibilities was to train armed units in the various areas, execute attacks and he was also a principal tactician, a military tactician in the unit. Molwedi Mokoena, fellow applicant, combat name, Bensaramos. He was responsible for the overall welfare of the unit. He served as the principal fund-raiser for the unit. He trained armed units, he executed attacks and his also responsibility was a politico military analyst in the unit. Gift(?) Sephras Mkomezulu, though late, member as well, combat name, Press. His responsibilities were to train arm units, execute attacks and he was also the military tactician in the unit.

Johannes Nkosi, the person, was born in 1905 and joined the Communist Party at the age of 19. He was assassinated on Dingaan's Day, 1930, during the burning campaign, past burning campaign. He was shot at point blank, stabbed and beaten to death by a chief police constable. No policeman was ever punished for his assassination. He was a true veteran Trade Unionist, a seasoned communist from the countryside.

Our unit was impressed with his selfless devotion to the liberation struggle, hence the unit was named after him, Johannes Nkosi. The composition of Johannes Nkosi Unit was characterised by the proven record of involvement of members traced from the Congress of South African Students, COSAS, the youth organisation during the '80's.

Johannes Nkosi Unit members involvement in the mass democratic movement, championed by the United Democratic Front was in various capacities as members and activists and leaders. This informed their political readiness to serve in MK. Proven leadership and political consciousness was the fundamental criterion characterising membership to Johannes Nkosi Unit"

The structure of Johannes Nkosi Unit, it is in page 4 in the bundle of files, the organogram of our structure.

"The political situation then, the mid-80's was characterised by the heightened activity by liberation movements against illegitimate regime. The apartheid regime had launched a brutal campaign of repression and suppression against all the people, both the black and white, urban and rural, rich and poor, unionised and non-unionised, who were bent on bringing down apartheid machinery through participation in the ranks of the people's organisations, civics, Trade Unions, youths, students and many more other progressive organisations.

The occupation of the townships by the then SADF meant that the apartheid regime was clearly gearing itself for unleashing its might on an unarmed and defenceless people. The occupation of the African townships such as Sebokeng, Katlehong, Duduza and others necessitated an urgent need from the side of the African National Congress, ANC, through Umkhonto weSizwe to defend the people against this occupation.

The occupation by the then SADF of our schools, churches and sports fields was a calculated attempt by the apartheid regime to capitulate the masses of the people and cause a hole to the struggle for liberation. The occupation was a desperate response by the regime in order to save face in the light of the successes made by Umkhonto weSizwe, MK.

The call by President Tambo, the late President Tambo of the African National Congress, comrade Tambo, I quote:

'Render the country ungovernable and apartheid unworkable'. That was the January 8th statement of 1985, had been met with positive revolutionary responses by the majority of people in South Africa. To mention but a few, in 1984 school boycotts in the East Rand, the local government elections in August '84, the national strike by the National Union of Mine Workers, the rent boycotts in Sebokeng, Duduza, Sakane and other townships. At that time the front-lying states as well were under constant cross-border raids conducted by the racists commandos as a result of the intensification of the armed struggle in the country. The country was in a general state of war.

The Johannes Nkosi Unit was born out of the circumstantial realities of the time. The Johannes Nkosi Unit was established henceforth to lead our combat groups against apartheid tyranny. We believed that the seeds of people's war were now charred by tribulations of mass struggles waged by the people of South Africa. And believing that, the armed struggle was integral component part of a broad political process towards liberation of South Africa.

The Johannes Nkosi Unit emerged to reinforce those struggles through increased armed activities and the revolutionary propaganda, to marshal revolutionary forces into war for freedom, peace and democracy in our country.

The strategic importance of Johannes Nkosi. The East Rand region as an economic powerhouse in the province and the country was an ideal and strategic place to launch an accelerated armed struggle. The East Rand region through its multitudes of industries occupied and served as the nerve centre of the apartheid economy. As an industrial and economic giant through levies, taxes, rates, wealth created, subsidised and maintained apartheid regime.

The East Rand region, due to its economic progress as part of the broader campaign to weaken an cut the resource base of apartheid regime was eventually targeted as an ideal place for armed struggle, championed by the ANC's armed military wing, Umkhonto weSizwe.

Political turmoil in the East Rand. During the second half of the '80's and countrywide informed the origin of the Johannes Nkosi Unit. Furthermore, the whole country was in fire. Umkhonto weSizwe and the masses of the people, organised by the mass democratic movement, were engaged in fierce battles with apartheid regime. It is during this period when killings, detentions, torture and displacement of ...[indistinct] was experienced across the line of fire.

The emergence of Johannes Nkosi Unit in the East Rand was due to political conditions existing countrywide and particularly in the region. A need to build popular armed forces, a need to consolidate armed activities in terms of quality and number in order to salvage the people's war and finally to galvanise the support of the people and the international community through armed propaganda activities expressed in the operations executed by our forces to ensure that total isolation and the defeat of apartheid is realised.

Our sub-units. Johannes Nkosi Unit trained, armed and led people to battle, the combat units in various locations in the region. These sub-units were ordered to deliver a heavy blow to the bogus municipal elections in 1988 and the security personnel. The following operations illustrate the extent of the blow unleashed by one of our combat units under our command, Baizel February based in Duduza. There was a blowing of a police van in Duduza with a limpet mine. There was a blowing of the administration block in kwaThema with a limpet mine. The sabotage of electrical sub-station in De Notre with a limpet mine. The blowing of a post office in Nigel with a limpet mine. Despite the difficulty to locate other units under our command and keeping their records of operations, we however salute those sub-units.

The brief or the mandate to Johannes Nkosi Unit. Our brief was to train, arm and lead the people into battle. It was also to defend out people, to severe the enemy lines of communications and power. To disperse and immobilise the enemy forces. To destroy the enemy's economic resources. To attack the enemy on all fronts and ...[indistinct] its forces. To make a people's war flourish in its dimensions in every part of our country.

Our modus operandi. Our modus operandi was planning, execution and control and the support services. On planning. We met every Wednesday in a plannery to analyse, review and take decisions on our actions.

On execution. We retrieved the dead letter boxes, we trained various sub-units, we conducted reconnaissance, we distributed arms in various sub-units in the East Rand, we issued out combat orders, we executed armed actions.

On control. We received reports from units, we visited units to ascertain welfare and needs, we monitored arms in their possession. On the support services. We had links with the mass democratic movement leadership, we owned two vehicles, we also had underground houses.

Operations. The context of the operations. The nature of the operations carried out by Johannes Nkosi Unit ranged from the point of qualifying the elaborate position of number one, to attack the enemy security personnel, to accelerate armed propaganda, hitting the economic infrastructure of the system.

The least of our operations: Johannes Nkosi Command Structures Operations.

1) We bombed the ...[indistinct] Barracks in Mnisi section. It was carried out by my fellow applicant, Tebogo Kebotlhale and Alfas Ndlovu.

2) The bombing of the sewerage pipes in Sunwatt Park, Boksburg, it was by myself, Ernest Sigasa and my fellow applicant, Molwedi Mokoena.

The ambush of "Kitskonstabels" and the SAP Motsamai Section in Ndela hostel, it was myself and my fellow applicant, Alfas Ndlovu.

3) The bombing of Wimpy, Benoni, it was carried out by my fellow applicant, Alfas Ndlovu.

4) The bombing of railway line and the sub-station, electrical sub-station next to Katlehong Station, it was carried out by Alfas Ndlovu and Molwedi Mokoena.

5) The bus terminus in Germiston, it was carried out by Tebogo Kebotlhale.

We now classify our operations as follows: The electrical sub-station in Katlehong - The bombing of the electrical sub-station in Katlehong which powers the railway services between Germiston and Katlehong areas was to signify the vulnerability of apartheid economic system. The electrical sub-station serves as a reliable means to effect transportation at the benefit of apartheid rules, as part of the broader transportation network. The bombing of electrical sub-station came on the eve of the stay-away campaign called by the Mass Democratic Movement. For us to support struggling masses of the people, the progressive organisations and undermining the apartheid economy, the electrical sub-station became the target. For us to disrupt and support the stay-away, we had to render trade services of use. In summary, the electrical sub-station blast in Katlehong signified the passion the Johannes Nkosi Unit had in supporting the progressive forces which engaged the enemy despite limited means.

The Johannes Nkosi Unit attacked the electrical sub-station to support the stay-away planned by the progressive organisations in the townships. The Johannes Nkosi Unit attacked the electrical sub-station in order to engrave in the minds of the people in South Africa, that MK is with them and MK is everywhere. That action served as an armed propaganda tactic as well.

Wimpy Bar. Wimpy Bar was not the target at first, the actual target was the notorious Security Branch headquarters in Benoni next to Benoni Railway Station. The extensive and constant information sought through reconnaissance led to Wimpy Bar attack. Our reports and information as a result indicated that most of the Special Branch personnel frequented the place before and after their notorious crusade of activities in the townships and elsewhere.

Wimpy Bar which is several metres from this Special Branch headquarters became the target. To us Wimpy Bar was an ideal place to attack the security personnel where they least expected. Furthermore, it was to mark the 67th anniversary of the South African Communist Party which was on the 30th of July.

Furthermore, guided by the revolutionary call of the leadership, in particular the late Chief of Staff of Umkhonto weSizwe, comrade Chris Hani, I quote:

'That we must turn the white areas into battle zones because there's a popular war for total liberation in this country'.

In summary. Wimpy Bar in Benoni was bombed in line with the principles of attacking the enemy security personnel as legitimate targets and the revolutionary armed propaganda intended to cultivate the spirit of rebellion and the frame of mind which puts the politics of the revolutionary change to the fore. That was also a statement by comrade President, the late President Tambo on the January 8th statement, 73rd anniversary of the ANC.

The bus terminus blast in Germiston. The bombing of the bus terminus in Germiston was carried with the sole purpose of furthering the revolutionary armed propaganda. The bus terminus was practically for white persons use in Germiston. The bus terminus was observed and reconnoitred over a period of time. The outcome of the reconnaissance revealed that it is only busy during peak hours of the morning, roughly between from 7 up to 10 in the morning. The bombing was time for 12 o'clock and during that time the place is deserted. Hence it was placed consciously at a time when there are no people around. They were done in order to cause confusion. Despite the fact that it was an all white bus terminus we did not aim to attack those white civilians.

The bus terminus bombing in Germiston was not an attack on the whites but an armed propaganda tactic. In its planning and execution of the operation, Johannes Nkosi embraced the message on the white civilians' life as elaborated by the late President, comrade OR Tambo, I quote:

'We have not been avoiding hitting whites as whites, there was no policy of hitting buildings instead of whites, no whites instead of buildings. This is not a distinction that we have been making. If we have made any distinction it has been to avoid hitting people'

The bombing of the bus terminus in Germiston was planned in line with the zeal to spread revolutionary armed propaganda and extend the war into greater heights in the region.

The ambush on policemen. The Kitts Constable, the Municipal Police known as the "Kitskonstabels", came to ...[indistinct] at a time of the state of emergency declared on the 21st July 1985 by the ex-Law and Order Minister, Louis le Grange. The Municipal Police in various townships in the East Rand engaged in most brutal attacks on the community. They enforced curfew with much more abhorable arrogance ever shown by the racist Security Forces in the country.

They collaborated an action with the riot police, the then SADF and the councillors, to extinguish the flames of war and to abort the cause of liberation struggle. The Municipal Police, due to their geographic deployment in townships, were always the first of the enemy security machinery to be in touch with the popular activities of struggling, waged by the communities. In all cases they crushed these activities with a brute force ever unleashed by other enemy Security Forces, that is the then SAP, the then SADF.

For us, Municipal Police represented part of the security machinery of the apartheid regime. The defeat of the enemy plans to abort the struggle for liberation in our country depended on the cleansing and the elimination of all those cohorts in the apartheid regime's payroll.

The Municipal Police as the security apparatus of the apartheid regime equally as the other agencies became the legitimate target for our unit. It was about time that the armed offensive was directed against the Municipal Police. In our minds they constituted the last blow of the security agency that was created to suppress the ...[indistinct] wave of mass resistance against apartheid colonial ...[indistinct] forces.

It was also important for us, in order to deter and discourage the people from joining the enemy ranks which was heavily infiltrated, which has heavily infiltrated our communities through some 007 types, spies, informers, collaborators, at the point in questions.

In summary, the attack on the Municipal Police in Motsamai Section, Ndela Hostel was a legitimate target act of defending our communities against the savage attacks of apartheid regime.

The Municipal Police never hesitated to unleash systematic violence against the fighters for the people's cause. They fanned fratricidal conflict amongst the people in order to ensure the perpetration of apartheid system, from which they benefited.

The late ANC President, comrade OR Tambo called, I quote:

'The offensive against apartheid system must be extended to reach Bantustan and other apartheid institutions in all corners of the country, among all population groups'. That also is the 73rd anniversary of the ANC, 1985.

Johannes Nkosi Unit rose to the occasion to deliver telling blows against the apartheid system and their puppets who have denounced the people by defending the people's enemy.

The contribution. We saw our struggle as part and parcel of a contribution by other MK cadres. The time has come therefore when we should dip the revolutionary banner in honouring the memories of our fellow martyrs, like comrade Izak Mokoena, Gift Mtaung, Aubrey Nkosi and many others. The unsung heroes and heroines of our struggle.

We want to say that today the heroic work of our people's army goes on. The new dispensation, democracy, nation building and the healing process testimonised the noble ideas of instituting a new South Africa, united democratic in nature. The time has come when we should extend gratitude and appreciation to all those MK forces who made the spear more sharper and precise in line with the slogan: "Every combatant a patriot and every patriot a combatant". It is through their blood and sweat that South Africa is a free united democratic in nature.

Our address to yourselves, the Commissioners. The Johannes Nkosi Unit takes this opportunity to appreciate work done by the TRC and the role it has played in bringing about reconciliation and healing our ghastly past. We feel very much gratified for been afforded an opportunity by the TRC to tell the truth. It is our firm belief that through our actions we have in one way or the other contributed to the establishment of a democratic dispensation. And it is those actions which in a way contributed to the establishment of the TRC as an important vehicle excavating the true history of South Africa.

It is also our firm belief that even the Commissioners and the supporting staff have at one point or the other in their lives cherished an ideal South African society in which democracy reigns supreme and that the rule of ordinary law of the land applied. It is that kind of society for which we ourselves risked our lives for the preservation of life itself.

Address to victims if they are present in this hall. It has never been our intention to deliberately kill and injure ordinary people. It was not our intention to be sitting with you in the hearing like this. Our actions were not specially directed to you and your families. It has however happened within the context of escalating armed activities that we sit here today and that you happened to be caught in that cross-fire. We do not pretend that pain and all sorts of inconveniences have not been suffered by yourselves as a result of our actions, but it is within the context of the intensification and escalating armed struggle that some of you fell victims.

We also wish to bring to your attention, the Commission and the sundry, that you are not the only victims. In a way we are also victims of circumstances which prevailed then. Those activities have affected us tremendously to an extent that we need some kind of help of sort specialised counselling.

It is also with the aforegoing reasons and circumstances that we appeal to victims to understand our actions within that context. We also make a humble request to all victims to accept our application for amnesty. We acknowledge without any hesitation the trauma you have suffered and undergone as a result of our actions. We know there has been pain and suffering and we hereby extend our hand of reconciliation.

We are convinced and hold a firm belief that all of these activities were carried out in pursuit of the political objectives of the ANC and its armed wing, Umkhonto weSizwe. These actions were intended to bolster the moral of South Africans, to mobilise them and enhance their revolutionary zeal and participation in the liberation struggle.

The other objective as mentioned elsewhere in this application was also to create conditions for a general revolutionary climate and demoralise and confuse enemy forces, police and army personnel. Having said that, I present myself and my co-applicants, comrades, members of our unit, before yourselves to be considered for amnesty. I thank you".

MR KOOPEDI: That does his testimony for now Chairperson.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Sigasa, did I understand you properly when you said you were not personally involved in the wimpy bombing?

MR SIGASA: Well technically I would say yes.

MS KHAMPEPE: Your involvement is only to the extent that you were the commander?

MR SIGASA: Yes, I was an overall commander. The question of any identification, reconnaissance and execution I viewed myself as part. We might also delegate a responsibility to an individual person within the command structure in the East Rand, but yes, I did not personally, but I am responsible because I was part of that collective.

MS KHAMPEPE: Were you part of the collective which did the reconnaissance?

MR SIGASA: Initially yes, but we delegated the responsibility for further reconnaissance and execution to my fellow applicant.

MS KHAMPEPE: But to some extent you did direct the attack?

MR SIGASA: Excuse me?

MS KHAMPEPE: To some extent you were responsible for directing that attack, as the overall commander of the Johannes Nkosi Unit?


MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, Mr Sigasa, what my colleague is getting at, we stuck with this lacuna of taking responsibility for actions of the underlings, even if you didn't know that they're going to do it or did it. In that context, were you party to the decision to plant that bomb in, let's say, the Wimpy Bar?

MR SIGASA: Yes, I was.

CHAIRPERSON: And through all that planning stage you were party to it?

MR SIGASA: As an overall commander yes, I was.

CHAIRPERSON: And you were being informed of certain information or you were receiving certain information because of reconnaissance?


CHAIRPERSON: And when the decision was finally made, the Wimpy Bar in Benoni was set to be a target, you were party to that decision?

MR SIGASA: Yes, I was.

CHAIRPERSON: And you knew what was going to happen there?

MR SIGASA: I think it confuses a bit. As I elaborated in the submission, the target as we indicated, because we have realised that it has created some kind of hullabaloo, particular situation, we knew that people were going to be affected in our military attack in that blast but I also clarified that Wimpy at first was not the target but it happened to become a target then. As I elaborated, that through the reconnaissance and the information gathered, security personnel as well in fact were frequenting the place, particularly from the Special Branch stationed here in Benoni, that is next to the railway station.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let me put it clearer then. You see people can't get amnesty for something that occurred that they didn't know about, they have to be guilty of something in order to obtain amnesty, not so?


CHAIRPERSON: And that is why I'm asking these questions, to see to what extent you were involved in this. And in respect of the Wimpy, you do say that you were party to the planning.


CHAIRPERSON: Is there, of all these events that you talked about, is there any event that you were not party to, either by planning or actual activity?

MR SIGASA: Not at all, not that I know of. I was responsible. Everything that happened I was party to.


Mr Steenkamp?

MS KHAMPEPE: Chairperson, if I can be granted an indulgence, on a question of clarity.

Can I therefore assume Mr Sigasa, that what you are crisply putting before the Committee is that you were responsible for selecting Wimpy as a target?

MR SIGASA: A bit dicey question. I must start by saying I'm an ordinary man. The question of selection of the targets, we delegate responsibilities like in terms of the orders given to us or the brief, was that we identify wherever they are the enemy personnel. The target of interest, economic and so on and the identification of that resulted into Wimpy. The identification of the security personnel resulted into Wimpy.

And yes, I was informed from time to time, the reconnaissance mission conducted and the reports thereof.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

Mr Steenkamp?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman, Honourable Members.

Sir, the view of the victims of the Wimpy Bomb Blast is that first of all they are opposing the application on the bases that the attack of the Wimpy Bar was a callous attack because it was not a military target and can't be seen at all to benefit your political motive at the stage. Can you comment on that first?

MR SIGASA: I think also, Commissioners, we indicated in our application or submission where we quoted also our late President OR Tambo in relation to or in regard to the issue of civilians or soft targets or hard targets, whatever one wants to call it.

As the struggle intensified it was difficult to separate or to have a distinction of the soft or the hard. When we talk of callousness we also knew at the back of our minds that innocent civilians will be caught in that kind of, in the crossfire.

So I was saying therefore, they happened to be victims of circumstances at a time when we were in fact directing our blows to the enemy security personnel.

ADV STEENKAMP: I can tell you as a matter of fact, that not a single Security Police officer or military personnel or anybody related to any military structure was involved in this incident or on the day of the incident. All the people that were injured were only civilians, people working at the Wimpy, other people eating there but no military people at all.

MR SIGASA: During also the other operations of MK in the country where clearly the target was a military one in nature, but all reports that we received through press of course at that time, we did not have the control of the press, even to date, the reports that would come forth would say so much civilians have died and no security personnel died. So we cannot deny or confirm that but our targets were directed against the security personnel as I've said before.

ADV STEENKAMP: Before we go on Sir, from whom did you receive your order? Did you get any specific orders from anybody to attack Wimpy Bars?

MR SIGASA: I think I must also clarify also again or repeat or reiterate what I said. Firstly, the order given, we were dealing with the front command in Botswana and the military headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia.

At no stage was Wimpy a target, at not stage. And as a result I also said that in executing that action, military action, at no stage have we felt that Wimpy is a target, it has never been a target before.

ADV STEENKAMP: So you haven't received any direct orders or implicated orders from anybody, am I right or am I wrong?

MR SIGASA: Implicated orders to say?

ADV STEENKAMP: I mean implied orders, sorry. Did you receive any orders from anybody? I'll tell you why I'm asking this question, because on page 25 of the amnesty application - do you have your application in front of you Sir?


ADV STEENKAMP: Do you see page 25?

Mr Chairman, Honourable Members, paragraph 11(b). I'll read there:

"Orders by Chris Hani at Zimbabwe 1988 which is in line with ANC police"

Can you clarify that?

MR SIGASA: Mr Chairman, Chris Hani never said: "Go and blast Wimpy". I would want, if I may, to recall what Chris Hani said, and in fact it was captured in the press. After the people in South Africa in the townships were saying: "Through these struggles only innocent African people are dying, therefore there is a need to step up the armed struggle and extend it to the white areas", he said and I quote:

"Even those who are going to make the world sit up and take note and for those who benefit from apartheid will feel the brunt"

So therefore when we were targeting Benoni Police Station we realised in our minds that Benoni was also in town and in line with that call we said we were going to take that struggle to the white areas.

ADV STEENKAMP: You see, maybe just for your comment, it's also the view of the victims, specifically the Wimpy bomb attack, that is attack was planned basically against white civilians who frequented this place, not against any military target whatsoever.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps if you are able to you must put to the witness as to why that proposition or why those people feel that way.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, the view of the victims who visited this place and were injured is that according to them this place was mainly visited and frequented by white civilians and not ordinary military personnel as stated by the applicant, Mr Chairman.

MR SIGASA: Mr Chairman, I think what I said, of course I hear what the advocate is saying, like I said all operations carried out, like I said that in all operations where activities, armed activities were carried out, where security personnel were affected but you would find that the reports that come forth every time would say: "No military personnel were in fact affected".

We also said in the application that the question, we never said they state there, but in terms of our reconnaissance and the information gathered, that they frequented the place.

ADV STEENKAMP: Did your information also indicate that a large majority of the people visiting this place were actually children? If you look at the list of the victims you will see, and if necessary we will put evidence to the Committee, that there was a lot of information that people visiting this specific Wimpy Bar were actually children coming from school or wherever and visiting this place. Have you any information on that or can you deny that?

MR SIGASA: Well I wouldn't deny or accept that. The questions that the report as it came, is that military or security personnel, not military, but security personnel were in fact frequenting the place. That is the information came, that came forth.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you maybe explain to the Committee, what was the ANC or the MK's policy regarding the identification of targets?

MR SIGASA: Commissioner, I would refer to my application when I, or the submission as we, as I read it, that the overall brief we must also understand that the front command, at that time the ANC was a banned organisation and as a result in terms of communication it was very difficult to frequent in and out of the country, but the brief in our origin was that we train, arm the people and so on, in terms of the brief.

So identification of the brief has to be within these parameters as I indicated. Parameters to say, you train the people, you attack the security personnel wherever they are to sever the lines of communication and so forth.

So I was saying the identification of a target is influenced or informed by the guide or the brief or the broad mandate as it were.

ADV STEENKAMP: Did you take any steps to minimise the injuring or the killing of the civilians, did you take any steps whatsoever?

MR SIGASA: Well in terms of steps I'm not sure what that means, but of course the question of affecting innocent civilians, in fact it was a touchy one.

We have in fact consistently throughout, in terms of the illustrations of our operations, we have consistently refused to be drawn into a racial line also where innocent civilians will be affected.

However there are certain circumstances where you can't avoid the affecting of innocent civilians, but that has in fact been our mandate and our brief.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can I ask you, why was this attack planned on a Saturday afternoon at 12 o'clock, why wasn't it planned during the day when Security Police were actually in the building or probably in the building or next door? Operational, why on a Saturday at 12 o'clock?

MR SIGASA: Like I said before, the question of actions, in all our actions we did not wake in the morning and decide on an attack. Based on any information at the disposal of one we would prepare plannings based on the information and we would act accordingly.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I don't know what is an appropriate time, if you can indicate?

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman.

So you called, if I'm not mistaken, you called the Wimpy a military attack, am I right? Is that what you said in your evidence in chief?

MR SIGASA: Wimpy as Wimpy is not or was not the military attack, not a military target but the people who went to Wimpy were in fact unfortunately the target, they happened to be in Wimpy.

If for instance one would make an example, was it Nandos, although Nandos is a current thing or is a recent thing, if there were a Nandos and our information told us or informed that they were in Nandos we would have hit them in Nandos or we would have hit them in whatever restaurant. So it so happened to be Wimpy but Wimpy as Wimpy was not a target.

ADV STEENKAMP: What information did you actually have on the Wimpy Bars? Can you elaborate, exactly what did your reconnaissance say? What information did you have on person frequenting that place?

MR SIGASA: We would all remember, at that time, during that time, the state of emergency and so on, that many of the political activists were in fact arrested, tortured in Benoni Police Station and some of the information that we got from those was that the security personnel themselves, Special Branch in particular, in terms of their movements and the place where they dine happened to be Wimpy.

So that is the kind of information, but of course in military situations or in armed situations what you do is that you would have to verify and that is why based on that, the question of following that information for verification purposes was in fact conducted and hence the reconnaissance conducted and so on. That led to Wimpy.

ADV STEENKAMP: Of the group of the four applicants, who of you exactly did the reconnaissance? Were you involved yourself, personally?

MR SIGASA: I think I clarified that in my submission. I was involved in the planning, the identification, the planning and so on but the execution was my fellow applicant, Alfas Ndlovu.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you tell us ...[intervention]

MS KHAMPEPE: I'm sorry.

I thought I understood Advocate Steenkamp's question to have been: "Were you personally involved in the reconnaissance"? Not in the actual execution.

MR SIGASA: I was not involved in the actual execution but in the planning, yes.

MS KHAMPEPE: In the reconnaissance, in reconnoitring Wimpy Bar?

MR SIGASA: We delegated the responsibility. I said it also, that my fellow applicant Alfas Ndlovu was in fact the person that we delegated.

MS KHAMPEPE: So you were not involved in the reconnaissance?

MR SIGASA: No, I was not involved in the reconnaissance.

ADV STEENKAMP: Do I understand you correctly, Mr Ndlovu actually updated you exactly what was happening in the Wimpy Bar, he was the guy with the information at hand, first-hand information?

MR SIGASA: I'm not sure when one says "first-hand" information but in terms of the reconnaissance data, yes he would report, as I indicated in terms of our modus operandi, that we met every Wednesday to review, to take stock of the situation and come up with new plans. And of course he would come and report in that plannery session where decisions would be taken.

ADV STEENKAMP: Wouldn't you agree with me Sir, that probably to attack a real military target like a police office or a military target like a military installation, would probably have been a real military target?

MR SIGASA: Can I hear that again?

ADV STEENKAMP: Sorry, I'll repeat that for you. Would you agree with me that to attack a police station or a military installation would probably have been a real military target opposed to the Wimpy Bar on a Saturday?

MR SIGASA: I think I also indicated that - although the question comes in a different form, but the question of attacking, we have been attacking, we have hit, in the list of our attacks we have indicated we hit the barrack, we've ambushed the security personnel, we have done that in terms of the information.

So I'm saying that forms part of the operations that we carried out, the security personnel. And in fact in our operations we have carried out attacks on their barracks as well.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, will you allow me, I've got a few more questions.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Sir.

Can you explain to the Committee, why and how was the attack on the Wimpy Bar beneficial to your political cause?

MR SIGASA: Our attack, firstly we indicated that we were a liberation movement, we did not have the regular army. Part of our strategy or our tactic was to engage in armed propaganda to prove to the people that MK is there but also to annihilate the enemy forces was also part of our responsibility, where we believed that they were vulnerable, where they least expected attacks. So I believe that we were in fact hitting a target, they happened to be in Wimpy.

ADV STEENKAMP: Do you know where the arms came from, the limpet mine and who decided to use a limpet mine? Can you elaborate on that?

MR SIGASA: Excuse me?

ADV STEENKAMP: Do you know where the limpet mine came from and who decided to use a limpet mine?

MR SIGASA: The limpet mine was part of our arms that we cleared or collected from the dead letter boxes, supplied of course by the unit of the ordinance which of course we don't know but they would simply give us a sketch that in such and such a place there such armament, quantity of armaments and that would include of course limpet mines, AK's and so on, grenades and so on and so forth.

ADV STEENKAMP: Do you know if the ANC officially acknowledged this act as part and parcel of their political struggle? Do you if they acknowledged this attack as part and parcel of their political struggle, the attack on the Wimpy Bar?

MR SIGASA: I remember at that time when we met the leadership, they indicated that there was an outcry, not only about our unit but the manner or the trend that was beginning to assume in terms of targets and so on. Oliver Tambo said, interviewed, I remember it was in January '86 when he was asked about the soft targets, he said there is no policy of hitting civilians in the ANC policy.

However, he indicated in the context of struggle, that certain innocent people would be caught in the cross-fire. There is no policy in the ANC in regard to the question of hitting of whites.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]



CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, have you got any re-examination?

MR KOOPEDI: No re-examination thank you.


MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Sigasa, I'm just going to put a few questions on issues of clarity. You have given us an elaborate detail of the reconnaissance which was conducted on the Wimpy Bar. Can you just explain to us further on who constituted the reconnaissance group?

MR SIGASA: The reconnaissance was conducted by Alfas Ndlovu, it was after - I think I must also clarify, I also said in my submission that for us to get to know about the intended target, there were a number activists in Daveyton, Tematsakan(?) and so on who were detained in Benoni Police Station. That's how we got to know about that.

Further, what one forgets as well was that the police used to, Special Branch, used to meet, particularly senior people, to review ...[indistinct] reports on Saturdays as well, so that formed part of the data that came to us.

MS KHAMPEPE: No, but my question was quite simple, who constituted the reconnaissance group that conducted the various reconnaissance on the Wimpy Bar, the names of people who formed part of that group?

MR SIGASA: There were no groups except my fellow applicant who was assigned the responsibility.

MS KHAMPEPE: So you are saying only Mr Ndlovu conducted the reconnaissance?

MR SIGASA: That's it.

MS KHAMPEPE: On the information received from ex-detainees of the various prisons?


MS KHAMPEPE: For how long was this reconnaissance conducted? Are you able to shed any light on that?

MR SIGASA: Well I can't strike a total recall in regard to the duration of the reconnaissance conducted but I know for a fact that we used to conduct for a period of some time, depending on the nature of the target and so on.

We would take some time basically, and also for verification purposes as to whatever the information that is at our disposal is in fact the correct one. But in regard to the period and so on I can't strike a total recall.

MS KHAMPEPE: How many reports did you yourself as the overall commander receive from Mr Ndlovu, with regard to his reconnaissance on the selected target? Was it only one report?

MR SIGASA: No, no, various reports. I think - I would say various reports.

MS KHAMPEPE: You were part of the group that approved Wimpy Bar as the selected target, is that not so?

MR SIGASA: Yes, as the head of Johannes Nkosi Unit.

CHAIRPERSON: No, that's not what is being asked. Were you in a meeting or a gathering where the decision was made that in Benoni a particular target, because it is frequented by members of the Security Police, that a bomb would be planted in the Wimpy Bar?

MR SIGASA: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: You were in a meeting?


MS KHAMPEPE: Was this decision decided after you had received the various reports on the reconnaissance which had been conducted or was the decision to target Wimpy as a target, to target Wimpy, decided before the reconnaissance was conducted?

MR SIGASA: No, no, no. In fact Wimpy is not an exception, all our targets we would identify, reconnoitre, collect data, verify and it's a period of time before you reached the decision. For an instance you did not go or decide to go to Wimpy Bar without planning, or any other target, without planning the route of entrance, the route of retreat, the surrounding area, the enemy, the hostile forces around the area and so on. You take that all in account and weight it before you decide to ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: But the question is, the decision to target Wimpy in Benoni, the one that was ultimately blasted, was that decision in which you were in a meeting to decide that, was that decision taken before or after reconnaissance had taken place?

MR SIGASA: It was after the reconnaissance had taken place. Clarity for that, Wimpy was not - in fact it came to picture some time after we had identified the actual target and then it led us to Wimpy. So Wimpy was an aftermath basically.

MS KHAMPEPE: Wimpy was an aftermath after you had been informed that members of the Security Branch were visiting that place?

MR SIGASA: Absolutely.

MS KHAMPEPE: And are you able to tell us how many times these members were identified as having visited that particular Wimpy Bar?

MR SIGASA: The report - well firstly, the security personnel works every day, seven days a week, and particularly Saturdays. Head of departments on the Security Branch would in fact meet and give reports, so we knew that they were meeting frequently, almost every week.

After that of course they would then go to whatever place that they would go to, but in particular in this case we are talking about the place in question, Wimpy, they then happened to go to.

To add probably is that some of the detainees themselves, they used to order, if my memory serves me well, they used to order for detainees from Wimpy, if my memory serves me well. But you would understand as I'm saying if my memory serves me well, because this thing happened more or less 9/10 years ago but I'm trying to strike a total recall and so that I would have a total picture.

MS KHAMPEPE: In the reports that you must have received from Mr Ndlovu, were you able to be informed of how many black people visited Wimpy?

MR SIGASA: I can't remember, but yes, there was an information to the effect that blacks are in fact you know, some you know, eating in Wimpy but I can't clearly remember but yes, I think I do recall a bit where an information came to say they have seen blacks in Wimpy.

MS KHAMPEPE: As an overall commander, was it not something that was of particular importance to you, to ascertain if the relevant people that you were targeting would actually be the main targets of the attack and that innocent would not actually form part of this attack?

MR SIGASA: Well there are two statements that one has to probably try his utmost to address. One, we were and are not a racist organisation, if fact we championed the course of non-racialism over the years despite the fact that there have been numerous cases where there have been only blacks were dying. To that effect if you look at the Botswana raid, Botswana nationalists died innocent and so on, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and so on. So in many cases in a state of war ...[intervention]

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Sigasa, I'm going to interrupt you, I'm sorry to be doing this.


MS KHAMPEPE: I just want you to stick to responding to the question that I pose to you.


MS KHAMPEPE: All that I want to know is whether you did as the overall commander, take any precautions to ensure that the targets were the ones who would suffer mostly in this attack and that innocent people would not be the ones to suffer mostly in this attack?

MR SIGASA: Well, I - may I be allowed to say that in terms of planning and executing any military or armed action, you look at the degree of the impact or effect that you would deliver, and it was clear in terms of the report that we would deliver a devastating, to a devastating degree in terms of our action. So it is on that basis that we took the decision.

MS KHAMPEPE: So you didn't take any precautions to ensure that innocent people who were not the subject of the attack should not be harmed?

MR SIGASA: I think that question should be put to the enemy personnel who deliberately ...[indistinct] with innocent in return blame the liberating fighters for the victims or the injuries incurred.

I would say in this case we viewed that and we regret where innocent lives, life for that matter because it's very valuable and previous, where innocents were caught in that kind of action, so we dearly regret. However, we do not regret of delivering or carrying out armed actions that would annihilate the enemy personnel.

MS KHAMPEPE: You were a member of the MK from 1985, is that not so?

MR SIGASA: Yes, I joined the ANC inside the country in 1984. I went to Botswana late '85 for the actual joining of Umkhonto.

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes. And you are aware that apart from this particular incident there were also other Wimpy Bar incidents in the country which were conducted by unknown forces?

MR SIGASA: Well, I'm not aware of that except the report that I read on the newspaper that there was one Wimpy, if I'm not mistaken in then Eastern Cape or something.

CHAIRPERSON: Which one occurred first, the one in the Eastern Cape or the one here in Benoni?

MR SIGASA: I don't know, it's only something that we took into account now recently after the unbannings and so on.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't know at that time that there was a spate of attacks at Wimpy outlets?

MR SIGASA: No, no, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Not at all?

MR SIGASA: No, no.

CHAIRPERSON: So you can't even say whether the one in Benoni was the first or the last or whatever?

MR SIGASA: No, I can't but I believe in fact we were not - I would imagine in terms of the, I think Benoni came first. Whether that one came after and so on I can't strike a total recall.

MS KHAMPEPE: ...[inaudible]

CHAIRPERSON: What is your answer?

MR SIGASA: No, it didn't.

MS KHAMPEPE: You are saying, to your knowledge you are not aware whether there had been any Wimpy attacks before you launched your attack on this particular Wimpy Bar?

MR SIGASA: Absolutely.

MS KHAMPEPE: Did you report the outcome of this operation to the Botswana Front Command?

MR SIGASA: Botswana Front Command was a - in fact we reported to the MHQ, Military Headquarters. But the question, in fact we relied largely on press on radio and TV at that time. So it was on the basis of what we read that we would know as to the degree of the effect and so on about the operations and so on.

MS KHAMPEPE: No, I'm just asking whether you did report this particular situation to the front command?

MR SIGASA: Yes, to the military headquarters.

MS KHAMPEPE: Would that be different from the front command that you've referred to in your evidence?

MR SIGASA: Yes, that would - there's a distinction or there is a difference between the front command and the military headquarters. Like in our case, Johannes Nkosi Unit, we interfaced with Botswana Front Command as a service centre so to speak. We would go to get some resources, information, update and so on. But in terms of orders, activities and so on, we would deal with the military headquarters in Zambia.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And when you reported the outcome of this particular operation, did any personnel in the Military HQ say anything about the other operations that had been conducted on other Wimpy outlets in the country?

MR SIGASA: No, at that time no, at that time no.

MS KHAMPEPE: And you are positive that you were not aware at all of the other attacks on Wimpy outlets throughout the country?

MR SIGASA: Not at all. Like I said, it was only recently when one in fact read about that and I tried to verify and so forth and seemingly not even our people or MK members and so on were involved, but it was a recent thing. But at that time, no, absolutely not.

MS KHAMPEPE: After the operation was conducted were you able to ascertain whether any person from the Security Branch had been affected by this operation?

MR SIGASA: It becomes very difficult. At that time -I think I also indicated in the submission that what we relied on, we were a liberation movement, we did not have the resources, the machinery and so on to be able to gather that kind of information. We would rely on the public, the mass media and so on. But we didn't. As a result we cannot deny or accept whether ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: How would you measure your successes then?

MR SIGASA: Measuring successes, we measured successes through, as I said we relied on media but there would be a time when one would have to verify and so forth but largely that's how we do. For an action taken or executed, that in itself counts.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja. Given that, would you not have seen reports of heard reports over the media about other blasts at other outlets of Wimpy?

MR SIGASA: Judge, we are talking about a situation of about almost 10 years ago.


MR SIGASA: Yes. I do not recall personally the other except in the recent past.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Sigasa, you must have, immediately after this operation had been conducted, seen either on TV or in the printed media that the severity of casualties suffered in this incident were those of civilians? And you have stated that the policy of the ANC was to attack the military or the security forces. Indeed that was the report you received from Mr Ndlovu, that this outlet was frequented by the members of the Security Branch. What do you think you have achieved, taking into account the fact that you are unable to identity a single member of the security force, who fell casualty to this operation?

MR SIGASA: It's a bit difficult one as I was saying before. It is true firstly, that we were interested in papers and reports and so on about what happened on the day in question, the 30th of July, which by the way was the anniversary of the South African Communist Party, we were interested indeed.

However, the question of the security personnel, it has in fact been - I think we all know as South Africans, we are not coming from outside, that always where enemy has been attacked they would always sensor or they would always conceal or hide that kind of fact, such that they would always portray the ANC as a terrorist organisation. No organisation for that matter has championed the course of freedom, democracy and nation building like the African National Congress.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you Mr Sigasa, there are no further questions from me.

ADV MOTATA: Thank you Chair.

Mr Sigasa, this Wimpy Bar, how far was it from the initial target, when you switched from going to the initial target when you were told that they frequent the Wimpy Bar?

MR SIGASA: I can only be able to say it's more than 200 metres away but several metres away, but in terms of the actual distance, in terms of figures I'm unable to say that but it is within the proximity as I'm saying because the Benoni Station is here, railway station and also the police station is here and Wimpy down in town.

ADV MOTATA: No, I just wanted an approximate distance. I know that is difficult because you wouldn't have measured. That suffices.

What I want to know, did the information received about the reconnaissance that this Wimpy Bar is placed in a shopping complex?

MR SIGASA: Indeed, indeed, the report says as you are saying Chairperson, except the only thing also that we want to add is that the enemy personnel was not moving in isolation or its own country in its own boundaries, it was in fact actively interacting with ordinary people and so on. So yes, we know that, it came to our attention.

ADV MOTATA: The bombing device obtained from the dead letter box, did you know its power in relation to the target selected?

MR SIGASA: The impact I do not remember whether we used a mini limpet or a limpet mine, a super limpet mine. I think we used a limpet mine, not a mini one, not a small one but a super limpet mine. That is what we used.

ADV MOTATA: And wouldn't you say that for instance is too powerful to be used in a complex where even civilians would be caught in that blast?

MR SIGASA: Well it depends on the nature of the target, target intended, to select the weaponry and the devices themselves. We saw it fit to use that kind of an explosive at the time.

ADV MOTATA: Let's just return to what my sister was asking you about constantly, that is the reconnaissance of Wimpy and the security personnel who frequented Wimpy, according to the information or reports received from Ndlovu. Firstly you said you were meeting on Wednesdays, do you recall that?


ADV MOTATA: Now we know it's a long time ago, 10 years to date, could you give us an approximation, every Wednesday is fine but an approximation of the time taken? Obviously it couldn't have been years, but if we could probably have an idea about months that you took.

MR SIGASA: There was no specific time limit basically in regard to our meetings. Depending firstly on the place, Sarati(?) does not draw the unnecessary attention, or secondly, the agenda item that is to be discussed, so sometime we would take or sometimes we would even adjourn and meet the following week or sometimes it would take probably three hours or so, so there was no exact time spent.

ADV MOTATA: For instance let's say you had the initial target, being the Security Police and their station and you had to change because you realised there is a much more way of achieving your objective by saying: "Now we have recognised that the frequent Wimpy". In relation to that, when was this somersault of the actual target to the Wimpy Bar?

MR SIGASA: Well I wouldn't call it somersault. I remember on that, because our plan was to celebrate or commemorate the anniversary, we planned something like more than five operations and in those operations we were discussing about those, and of course we might decide on one but depending on any information that comes up during the course of discussion, we would always move to and from and so on. But I wouldn't say that we spent so much time on this particular matter.

ADV MOTATA: Let's make it easier, in the sense that you received information from your fellow comrade, Ndlovu, that the Security Police frequent he Wimpy Bar, did you have information of how many members of the Security Branch go to Wimpy?

MR SIGASA: Well we didn't have the number but we know that there were many. It stems from the fact that they were meeting, as I said before, that they were meeting every Saturday to give in reports and so on and they would also then go after their reports or meetings and so on, they would then go for lunch or dining. So it is based on that, but the exact number I am unable to you know, say.

ADV MOTATA: Did you have after submission of the reports, when they would go to Wimpy?

MR SIGASA: Well the information, depending of course on how long they take, but they would come in in the morning and so on and before lunch, lunch I would imagine that what I'm talking about I'm referring to 1 o'clock, before lunch they would in fact go out. Sometimes they would knock earlier than that, sometimes they would come in at around about 11, 12, 1 and so on.

ADV MOTATA: So in relation to the number of the security people after submitting their reports and going to Wimpy, did you take into consideration the volume of people, whether the number of the Security Police would outnumber the civilians who would visit Wimpy?

MR SIGASA: Firstly it's important to draw the attention to the fact that in the second world war, the people who suffered, the majority of the people who suffered was not nazism or nazists but ordinary civilians, true.

I'm saying therefore, in terms of that in our view, a loss of one life of a security personnel is too great to send a demoralising message on the part of the security personnel.

ADV MOTATA: Your submission was to the effect that some of the attacks was to strengthen the propaganda that would make people aware of the existence of the MK's, the ANC people within the country by attacking military forces, did I hear you correctly there?

MR SIGASA: The legitimate targets, yes. The nature of the ANC as I was saying, liberation movement with limited means and resources, South Africa was experiencing an armed propaganda period at that time. I would term it personally an armed propaganda period because it was not a full scale war where fronts or armies would meet and so on in a battlefront. You are talking about a guerrilla tactic, an urban guerrilla tactic to hit visibly so that that operation is intended also as well to mobilise and conscientise masses of the people about their presence.

ADV MOTATA: I'm asking you this because I just need explanations. You said civilians were not your target, hence my question that by looking at Wimpy, taking into account that in things as you have explained of this nature, civilians would be touched in the process, but it would have been of paramount importance for instance in your unit that you weigh up if you go to Wimpy, who are the most, because in fairness to you before you give your explanation, we all know that this was a Saturday and this particular Wimpy was placed in a shopping complex. Now in terms of civilians vis-à-vis the security forces, we wanted to make our propaganda most felt with the security people. Would I be right in that context?

MR SIGASA: No, not at all. I think all of us at that time I would imagine, we were in the country. At that time when in Mamelodi a six year/eight year old run down with a Hippo, then in return the reports would be that no, he was stoning the, she will be run down to death by a Hippo armed vehicle, then the reports would be no, she was stoning the armed vehicle. You talk of situation where people in schools, children in schools would in fact be sjamboked, teargassed and be shot with live ammunition. We are talking at that situation at that time when the mood of the people was very high.

ADV MOTATA: That I do understand, that what you are answering is that people, and in this instance blacks, would be attacked at random and reasons would be found by the Security Police, that I understand completely, that such information would not. But I'm saying in relation to say civilians were not uppermost in your minds, you wanted to avoid by all means attacking civilians because the ANC preaches non-racialism. And I want to say - my question is, this is a Saturday, this is a shopping complex, you have answered that the security people after delivering their reports or deliberating on their reports, would then go for lunch there.

My question is, did you in the reconnaissance get data for instance, that: "Look, despite the civilians going there we can't avoid that, but the majority would be the security forces", that's the crux of my question.

MR SIGASA: I think that is what I said. Because I think it's important also to note that we had the capacity at that time as a regional command structure. If we were targeting civilians we had all the capacity, the armoury at our disposal to effect that kind of terror, we didn't. With all, whatever push that the enemy forces were in fact exercising, we didn't. But in this case we are saying in our submission that the issue of Wimpy came as a result of the frequency of some of the people of the Security Branch of the Benoni. It's as a resulted of that, well the least expected our attack. That's how we carried out the operation. It's true that we took into account the issue of civilians, yes we did.

MS KHAMPEPE: If I may ask ...[intervention]

MR SIGASA: I must also add that I also said in this statement, I'm repeating it, that were life is lost whether black or white, it's a shame and we regret that greatly.

MS KHAMPEPE: If I may interpose Mr Motata.

What you are saying and you have already said is that you actually recognised that the civilian casualty was something which was inevitable?

MR SIGASA: Absolutely.

ADV MOTATA: And to give a short answer, you did not have data of the question I asked, you were just interested that civilian ...[intervention]

MR SIGASA: We had, I think I answered that we had data. We had data that restaurant, as a restaurant is in fact attended by people of both colour. We had that information, but the target of interest was of upper most importance to us, particularly the blow that we were to unleash, that was important.

Though we took into account the presence of innocent lives or innocent civilians.

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson, I've got no further questions. Thank you Mr Sigasa.


CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sigasa, you know we understand that many atrocities were committed in this country of ours. Some of them, until today, cannot be excused.

But we are not here today to discuss that, we are here to discuss your application. I can understand the anger of the people. But tell me, you say that the super limpet was used at the Wimpy Bar as you recall?


CHAIRPERSON: If there was no Wimpy there, what would be the operation then?

MR SIGASA: I think Judge, one question since we started, came in many forms. In my submission, explanation or deliberation before, I said that it so happened, unfortunately happened, to be Wimpy. But if they were going to be it another restaurant or cafe or wherever, where we would define them as vulnerable to our advantage, we would have used that opportunity.

CHAIRPERSON: I can understand that.


CHAIRPERSON: Purely as a military strategy, but let's assume that you did not have, or your Unit did not have this information, or that these members of the Security Forces did not frequent a restaurant, and therefore the option of planting a bomb at a restaurant was not an option, how would you attack these personnel?

MR SIGASA: That was going in fact to be informed by reconnaissance activities and so on. I am saying that because the actual objective at that time, because we wanted to show or demonstrate to political activists who were detained and tortured in Benoni Police station, we would have found another way.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, there was another way which was changed then to the Wimpy. What was that other way?

MR SIGASA: The first thing we identified Benoni Police station, and initially if I recall well, was that we would use ourselves when we go in as people who would be visiting detainees and so on, with a pretext of visiting detainees and so on. But we understand as well that the vigilance, because that is the enemy terrain, the vigilance of that, but that was, but as a result we were saying particularly the people who were inflicting terror in particular to our activists, should in fact be the first targets.

So our concentration and focus was on them, hence that led to the Wimpy issue.

CHAIRPERSON: I can understand that the opportunity presented itself at the Wimpy. My question is if the personnel was the target, why wasn't the bomb planted at the Police station then? It is as simple as that?

MR SIGASA: I think we indicated there were opportunities, the possible ways where we can in fact hit. In terms of the situation as it stood then, we decided upon the question of hitting where they were going to frequent. We changed from planting, wanting to plant or make it a target, the Police station, because if you are to plant it outside, the degree of impact as well was going to be very minimal.

CHAIRPERSON: You see when one, I need you to clarify this, by planting this bomb, there was a point to be made that the military and the Security Forces were the targets and they were the targets because the propped up the Apartheid regime as I understand it, is that so?


CHAIRPERSON: Given that on the one hand, and on the other is the risk of civilian life, why choose the latter?

MR SIGASA: It is important also to say that to register the presence in the minds of people away from them, it becomes easier. It becomes easier for the enemy to conceal, however, it becomes important for the registration of the presence of Units of Umkhonto to be known to people.

It is in that context of struggling to popularise our presence and also send the message home that people would see that there is war in the country going on.

CHAIRPERSON: But you would have attained that either way not so?

MR SIGASA: We didn't in Katlehong where there were hit in particular in an isolated area. The enemy concealed and it spoke about some terrorists who have shot and the report was very flimsy basically in regard to that. They always found a way of explaining the failure on the part of the ANC or its military wing, Umkhonto weSizwe.

MS KHAMPEPE: What you are basically saying Mr Sigasa ...[intervention]

MR KOOPEDI: May I interrupt you Honourable Committee Members, I have an indication from the applicant that he wishes to use the loo.

MS KHAMPEPE: With pleasure.

CHAIRPERSON: There is only one more question.

MS KHAMPEPE: Will you take a question which in a way is - will you be able to take that or do you want us to adjourn immediately?

MR SIGASA: Oh no, we can.

MS KHAMPEPE: Okay. What you are basically saying is that you selected Wimpy as a target, simply because it would facilitate your objectives of making your presence felt by the regime because it was seemed to be a sitting duck, it was vulnerable as opposed to the Police station. Is that what you are saying?

MR SIGASA: That is what I am saying, that it served two purposes. One, hitting the Security personnel, but also publicising the ...(intervention)

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes, and you would be able to attain both objectives because Wimpy Bar which was frequented by the Security Forces was also a vulnerable entity as opposed to a Police station?

MR SIGASA: Yes, they were vulnerable in that.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.




CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Sigasa. He is excused.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, sorry Mr Chairman, I would like the Committee's indulgence, I have a few questions for the applicant, purely because I received new information this incident, which I think is highly relevant that must be put before the Committee. If you would bear with me Mr Chairman, I would like to ask a few questions, and maybe make a few comments.

Some of, well, we are in the process of verifying the information, but I think the information is highly relevant to this hearing. If you would allow me Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Why has it only come available now?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, the information was not available to us when this matter was investigated. After speaking to more of the victims appearing here, and attending the hearing, it came out that actually as far as the victims are concerned, that certain information must be put to the applicant.

CHAIRPERSON: Put it as propositions then.

MS KHAMPEPE: Before you proceed Mr Steenkamp, may we ascertain that we have now been able to take proper and full instructions from the victims?

ADV STEENKAMP: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, to start off, I would like to read from a newspaper clipping and then just a comment of the applicant, if needs be further information will be at hand, and if needs be, people will be called to testify to this.

According to a newspaper article Mr Chairman, I might add this is an article that is written apparently as article on a statement that was made by the ANC earlier this year about this specific incident and with your indulgence Mr Chairman, I am just going to read a specific paragraph. It is dated Friday, 6th of February 1998, and it deals with this specific incident, the Wimpy bomb blast in 1988 and just for the comment of the applicant, I am going to read the specific paragraph.

This document will be made available to you Mr Chairman and copies to ...

ADV MOTATA: Mr Steenkamp, for the record, from which newspaper is that article?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, sorry, it is from the Benoni City Times, dated Friday, 6 February 1998. I am going to read paragraph 3 Mr Chairman.

The ANC statement said the Wimpy Bar operations were carried out by Umkhonto weSizwe members, but due to confusion within the organisation, the attacks were not in line with party policy.

It explained that the operations were launched after the ANC decided to take the armed struggle into white areas, but that the party had not intended this to include purely civilian targets. Mr Chairman, with your permission I will hand this document in, preliminary as Exhibit A. If you would allow me Mr Chairman. I will make copies available for everyone.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)

ADV STEENKAMP: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I beg your pardon, it must be Exhibit B.

MR KOOPEDI: Mr Chairman, if you would allow me to come in here, I have not had my learned friend give us the author of that statement and who in the ANC may have made those utterances and we would appreciate getting that for him to be able to respond properly.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, we are in the process of tying to obtain the original statement from the ANC office.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, does it matter who the author was? He has been asked if he can make a comment about what was written there, if he can't he can't. If he can, he can.

MR KOOPEDI: I will say with respect, that I got an indication from him that he does not seem to be able to understand what that is about, but he wanted to know he we know who the author is, so that he could make an appropriate comment. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Listen carefully then. Here is a report in the Benoni City Times, dated the 6th of February 1998. The relevant paragraph which Mr Steenkamp wants you to listen to and perhaps comment on, I am going to repeat.

The ANC statement said the Wimpy Bar operations were carried out by Umkhonto weSizwe members, but due to confusion within the organisation, the attacks were not in line with party policy.

Are you able to comment on that or not?

MR SIGASA: I am able to comment. First and foremost, I indicated or I said in my submission or our submission, that it has never been a policy of the African National Congress and Umkhonto weSizwe, to target civilians.

We did not target Wimpy as Wimpy for the sake of the lives of whites, we didn't. I think conveniently here we did not see the point, or hear the point that we were putting forth.

In fact the people who were meeting in Wimpy Bar were not just ordinary Policemen. Benoni Police station, the Special Branch Headquarters of the Special Branch in the East Rand. In fact in terms of the reports that we received, they would meet as the top brass even other counterparts from other Police stations as well.

So, the attack on Wimpy we must emphasise, was not an attack on Wimpy because it is a restaurant to the vulnerable civilians. It wasn't. It happened to be hit because of the nature of the target.

As we said, it is not just ordinary Police, that is why I said to us that one life was critically important, because it had a demoralising effect on the part of the Security personnel.

CHAIRPERSON: So what you are saying, what is contained in the newspaper report, you agree with?

MR SIGASA: No, I don't.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't agree with it?

MR SIGASA: No. And in fact to make one further comment, the ANC does not always you know, communicate with the media, its people through the media primarily because there is latitude.

A reporter can report the manner in which he understands and give his own or her interpretation.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Sigasa, are you saying in short, you have given us a very lengthy answer to what is being put to you. You are saying in short that the Wimpy attack was in line with the ANC policy? That seems to be the crux of the problem?

MR SIGASA: Because of the target of interest, yes, it is.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you. You may proceed Mr Steenkamp.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman. You see my information is and if needs be, a sworn statement to the effect will be handed in to the Committee, that just across the Wimpy Bar, there was what at that stage was known as a Police kiosk, it was a small shop that was hired by the Police as a kiosk, just across the Wimpy Bar.

Now, my question to you is first of all, do you agree with me, and secondly, why didn't you attack the kiosk and not the Wimpy Bar?

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know there was a kiosk?

MR SIGASA: No, we didn't.

ADV STEENKAMP: But sir, then I don't understand your evidence in chief, you said on numerous occasions and on questions, at least two questions of the Chairperson himself, that your information was verified.


ADV STEENKAMP: You had numerous meetings?


ADV STEENKAMP: So, if your information was verified, how does it come, or how is it possible that you didn't know about this kiosk at all?

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Steenkamp, before you answer, isn't that an unfair question to put to Mr Sigasa? His evidence in chief has been that the information that was verified was the information that was received from Mr Ndlovu through his reconnaissance and that information did not purport to say anything about the presence of the kiosk?

ADV STEENKAMP: Right, I will leave the question there Mr Chairman.

I also has come to my information, my information is and it is not verified as of yet, we are in the process, but the Police station was not very close to the Wimpy Bar, as you said, plus minus 200 metres. It was more or less a kilometre from the Wimpy Bar? Would you agree with that?

MR SIGASA: I said I think the Advocate is twisting my words, I am not sure whether deliberately or not, what I said was that it was more than 200 kilometres, and in fact several metres away. That is what I said.

So to say 200 metres, I say it is more than that - than several metres away.

ADV STEENKAMP: At the day of the incident, you had planned this incident, you have made reconnaissance, you had numerous meetings, so I take it at the day of this incident, at twelve o'clock, you had verified information that there were going to be Security Police at the Wimpy Bar, am I right?

MR SIGASA: Absolutely. Not also to add, not ordinary Policemen. I think that should be clear. As we said, that we termed it the notorious Special Branch. The Headquarters of the Special Branch, Springs, Boksburg and so on, in fact it is its Headquarters, the Special Branch.

As a result of that, the impact or the degree of the action and its impact or the results, they were important for us to identify that target and hit them where they were vulnerable. For your own information, the information that you received, not only were they meeting, that top brass that we were referring to, even the informers were met in that Wimpy Bar.

Burgers were bought for detainees in that Wimpy Bar.

ADV STEENKAMP: Sorry sir, my question was purely this, so you had information that at twelve o'clock that Saturday morning, specific Security Branch Police would visit that Wimpy Bar?


ADV STEENKAMP: Because that is how I understood your evidence?

MR SIGASA: No, I didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: Then you misunderstood his evidence.

ADV STEENKAMP: I am sorry Mr Chairman. Maybe I must rephrase the question. Why did you specifically decide to attack the Wimpy Bar at that specific Saturday at twelve o'clock, why specifically that day and that time?

MR SIGASA: Well firstly, firstly the Security personnel as we indicated, they work seven days a week, every day, and on Saturdays they meet to hand in reports and so on and so forth, their daily duties and so forth, and after that of course, they would go for the dining and so on, for lunches and so on. We had that information.

As to who and how many, we didn't know that, but we knew that there were Policemen, particularly the senior people, meeting in that. Secondly, on that day, we also indicated in our main submission that it was in fact a commemoration of the anniversary of the South African Communist Party on the 30th of July.

ADV STEENKAMP: My information is also that the Benoni Wimpy Bar was actually the last Wimpy Bar to be attacked in this type of fashion? This specific Wimpy Bar attack was the last Wimpy Bar attacked, that was attacked in the spade of Wimpy Bar attacks?

MR SIGASA: I don't know about that. That is news to me and I believe also it is news also to the fellow applicants. That is news.

MS KHAMPEPE: You can only speak for yourself Mr Sigasa.

MR SIGASA: Oh yes, I am speaking for myself, that is news.

ADV STEENKAMP: Am I right in saying that you were well aware that there is a real possibility that a large number of people would have been killed in that Wimpy Bar, would be black people because I can tell you as a matter of fact, that more than 20 people, more than 20 people in that Wimpy Bar were black people who were injured?

The majority of them were workers, who were working in the Wimpy Bar, so you knew very well beforehand that they were going to be injured or even killed?

CHAIRPERSON: What is the relevance of that question Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: The fact is Mr Chairman, if you look at some of the other applications, they are referring to a white only attack. My question to this applicant mainly is this, they were aware that other civilians, normal civilians would also be killed?

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Steenkamp, hasn't this point been sufficiently covered?

ADV STEENKAMP: I will leave the question there, thank you Mr Chairman.

MS KHAMPEPE: Because I think if I recall, it has been covered by yourself previously and also by the members of the panel.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, thank you for the indulgence.
























DAY: 1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR KOOPEDI: Mr Chairman, our next applicant will be Mr Tebogo Kebotlhale. May we call him through.


MR KOOPEDI: Thank you.

ADV STEENKAMP: Page 5 - 11, Mr Chairman.

MR KOOPEDI: May I say Mr Chairman, for the benefit of our Interpreters, that all the applicants intend using the English language.


EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Mr Chairman. You are one of the applicants in this matter, is that correct?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That is so.

MR KOOPEDI: Perhaps before you tell this Honourable Committee about your involvement in the Johannes Nkosi Unit, would you briefly tell them who you are, where you were born, when did you join the ANC?

MR KEBOTLHALE: My name is Tebogo Kebotlhale. I was born on the 14th of November 1967 in Hohodi in Vryburg. I am 30 years of age. I joined Umkhonto weSizwe underground unit in Hohodi in 1983 and I underwent internal training, internal military training.

I left for exile in February 1985 and underwent military training in Angola, Cuba and the former USSR. I was trained in the use of various weapons and underwent specialised training on military engineering and urban suburban guerrilla warfare.

I had been a Section Commander, the Platoon Commander and Company Commander and Sub-Regional Commissar in the East Rand in my career in Umkhonto weSizwe.

I was infiltrated in the country in 1987, I operated in Bloemfontein area and later redeployed to the East Rand. I trained and armed various internal MK recruits in the East Rand and elsewhere.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, have you got a copy of that statement?

MR KOOPEDI: The biographical details that he has just given to you, we are trying to get a copy done. We will most probably be able to hand it over in a short while, however, I wish to point out that it will only be the biographical details, there is no statement prepared by him for the process.

The only statement is the one that I believe has been handed in. The one done by the previous applicant. Have you done?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, I am through. I agree with all that my Commander has presented before the Commission and everybody.

MR KOOPEDI: For the purposes of your application in the matters before this Committee, would you confirm that other than being a member of the Johannes Nkosi Unit, were you involved in any manner whatsoever in the Wimpy matter and if so, how were you involved?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I was only involved in the Wimpy matter in so far as the planning was concerned.

MR KOOPEDI: Would it be correct to say that at all times when the planning was done and whatever decisions were taken, you were present?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I was present, yes.

MR KOOPEDI: And you also take full responsibility for whatever came out of that decision?


MR KOOPEDI: Now, would you also confirm that in as far as it relates to the attack on the "Kitskonstabels" in Lindelani Section in Katlehong, what was your involvement there?

MR KEBOTLHALE: My involvement also included the planning part of it, the distribution of ammunition and the support provided to members of my fellow Unit.

MR KOOPEDI: And you would therefore confirm that in fact you are responsible for whatever consequences that came after making the decision during the planning sessions?


MR KOOPEDI: That is all from this witness for now.


CHAIRPERSON: So you are only making application in respect of two incidents, the attack, the blast at the Wimpy in Benoni and the attack in Katlehong on the "Kitskonstabels"?

MR KOOPEDI: May I interrupt you with respect Mr Chairman, that in fact, he like all the other applicants, are making - have made applications for various offences, however, from communicating with my learned friend on the other side, it appears that with other matters, this can be dealt with as Chamber matters, because perhaps people may not have been injured, however there is a list of the offences for which they apply for and this appears on the statement that I believe is before you, the one that was presented by the first applicant.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, all I am asking is for what he is making an application today so that when we give the judgement, either we grant or refuse an application in respect of specific incidents.

That is all I am asking. Am I correct then that we have to consider an application in respect of the blast at Wimpy Bar at Benoni and the Katlehong attack on the "Kitskonstabels"?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Honourable Judge, if I may refer you to page 10 of our main submission.

MR KOOPEDI: He is actually referring to the submission by the previous applicant.


MR KOOPEDI: Yes, Exhibit A.

MR KEBOTLHALE: On page 10, there we have enumerated the list of operations that we carried as the Johannes Nkosi Unit and we have also made specific reference, specific mention of who carried what operation.

MS KHAMPEPE: But what are you applying for amnesty, in respect of which incident are you seeking amnesty?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I am applying for amnesty for the bombing of the whites only bus terminus in Germiston.

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes, as appearing on page 12 of our application documents.

MR KEBOTLHALE: I am also making application for the bombing of the "Kitskonstabels" barracks in Mnisi Section.

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes. Is that all that you are seeking amnesty for?


MS KHAMPEPE: What about the fact that you have just stated that you were involved in the Wimpy matter in so far as its planning was concerned. Are you not seeking amnesty for that?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That would include, that would include the two operations that were discussed extensively earlier on. The Wimpy one and the ambush on the "Kitskonstabels".

MS KHAMPEPE: We have to be very clear Mr Kebotlhale, in respect of which incident you are seeking amnesty. You have just stated now when you were being questioned, that you are seeking amnesty in respect of the bombing of the Katlehong Police barracks and also in respect of the bombing of the Germiston whites only terminus?

MR KEBOTLHALE: If I may mention, I am also making application for the bombing of Wimpy itself and the application for the bombing of the attack on the "Kitskonstabels" in Lindela Section.

CHAIRPERSON: How many is that now? Four?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That would also include the bombing of the railway line, the electrical sub-station in Katlehong.

MS KHAMPEPE: Why were these incidents not included in your application? In your formal application for amnesty, form 1?

MR KEBOTLHALE: If you may refer to page 6 of the bundle of documents, we are mentioning there that, I am mentioning there that the Benoni/Duduza/Katlehong actions were involved, and if you look into 9.8(1) I am saying there the acts include issuing out of instructions and carrying out attacks on Wimpy outlet, South African personnel and councillors and whites only bus terminus. I have eloquently stated that in my application.

MS KHAMPEPE: Oh, thank you very much Mr Kebotlhale. I have actually looked at your further particulars which appears on page 12 and 13 and I had overlooked that one. I think it has not been very clear and that is why it is important for us to make sure that we in a way detail all the incidents, so that we don't loose sight of what you are applying for.


MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Kebotlhale, maybe if we can again for purposes of the record, enumerate once more the incidents in respect of which you are seeking amnesty. Can you do that?


MS KHAMPEPE: Make use of page 10 and tell us exactly which incidents we should be considering you for amnesty.

MR KEBOTLHALE: The bombing of "Kitskonstabels" barracks in Mnisi Section.


MR KEBOTLHALE: The bombing of the sewerage pipes in Sanwat Park.


MR KEBOTLHALE: Ambush on the "Kitskonstabels" and SAP in Motsamai Section. Bombing of Benoni in Wimpy. Bombing of the rail line and electrical sub-station next to Katlehong station.


MR KEBOTLHALE: And lastly the whites only bus terminus in Germiston.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, now you say that in the Katlehong "Kitskonstabels" attack your involvement was planning and distribution of ammunition.

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, I also included you know, providing support to the attack.

CHAIRPERSON: What kind of support?

MR KEBOTLHALE: As my fellow applicants were attacking, I stood by in the car and I drove them after retreating.

CHAIRPERSON: So you drove the getaway car?


CHAIRPERSON: The sewerage pipes, what did you do there, how were you involved there?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I supplied the ammunition.

CHAIRPERSON: That is all?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, I supplied the ammunition and I was part of the planning thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: The ambush on the "Kitskonstabels" at Mindela?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I have already answered that Honourable Judge, by saying that I provided support. I drove the getaway car.

I also issued out ammunition in that respect.


ADV MOTATA: But I need some clarity Chairperson, that my understanding when we started with the first incident, we have two here, the "Kitskonstabels" in Mnisi Section and we have the "Kitskonstabels" in Motsamai Section.

We want to know in respect of each, that is why we are enumerating them so that we get clarity.

MR KEBOTLHALE: With respect to "Kitskonstabels" in Mnisi Section, I personally together with my fellow applicant Alfas Mabore Ndlovu, executed that operation, I supplied the ammunition thereof and I took part in that incident.

ADV MOTATA: When you say you took part, what did you do?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I left a boobytrapped limpet mine.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Kebotlhale, I note that you have referred to a bombing of the Katlehong Police barracks, is that the same incident as the bombing of the "Kitskonstabels" in Mnisi Section?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That is right, yes.

MS KHAMPEPE: And that appears on page 13 of your further particulars? Is that the same incident?


MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: You dealt with the bombing of the Wimpy Bar.

MR KEBOTLHALE: Sorry, I didn't get that.

CHAIRPERSON: You have already dealt with the bombing of the Wimpy Bar.


CHAIRPERSON: What about the bombing of the railway line?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I have provided ammunition for the bombing of the railway line, and I took part in the planning thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: And the sub-station at Katlehong?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I took part in the planning and provided the ammunition thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: And the bus terminus?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I executed that operation myself.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Steenkamp?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman, if I may just ask a question on the application. Sir, I see in your application you are referring to attacks on Wimpy outlets, page 6. Are you only referring to one Wimpy now or is it more than one?

MR KEBOTLHALE: No, it should read Wimpy outlet, not lets.

ADV STEENKAMP: And you are also referring to attacks on councillors? Is this not now part of your list?

MR KEBOTLHALE: The councillors feature in so far as the operation of our sub-Units were concerned, and I think my Commander has elaborated on the operations of those Units.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)

MR KEBOTLHALE: I was involved ...

CHAIRPERSON: Let me be quite fair to you, you are not making any application now in respect of attacks on Councillors or are you?

MR KEBOTLHALE: No, I am making that application in so far as our Unit helped in the execution of those. In so far as our Unit planned the execution of those incidents.

CHAIRPERSON: You know, as a panel we have a problem with that. One cannot get or obtain amnesty for something one didn't to or one was unaware of.

Now, you say that you are accepting liability for certain things that the sub-Units did. We need a bit more, were you involved or not?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I was not personally involved in the executions of those actions.

CHAIRPERSON: We are not only talking about executions, we are talking about planning and in any way assisting in that operation.

MR KEBOTLHALE: Judge, I would say that I did not plan those operations, but I took part in terms of distributing ammunition for the execution of those operations themselves.

CHAIRPERSON: And you knew for what purpose the ammunition was being distributed?

MR KEBOTLHALE: For - yes, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Who are these Councillors and were they injured or did they die or did they loose property or what?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I think, I would not say for sure who the Councillors are, because we did not get you know, concise reports from Units and because of the lack of constant, given the conditions under which we operated, it was very difficult to get the concise reports.

CHAIRPERSON: So you are not in a position to tell us Councillor X was a victim of a particular operation?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, I am not in a position to tell that.

CHAIRPERSON: So therefore we don't know, neither do you know whether you are guilty of anything in respect of those Councillors? It may never have taken place, not so?

MR KEBOTLHALE: No, we know for a fact that our Units have carried out operations against Councillors.


MR KEBOTLHALE: We have made mention, the Commander has made mention in our main submission, we mentioned the Basil February Unit which carried out attacks in Duduza and KwaThema.

CHAIRPERSON: Now we know where and perhaps we know when. Who?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That I don't know Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: Sir, the same page refers to handgrenade attacks or grenade attacks there. Grenade, paragraph 9(iv), grenade attacks. What was this because you said according to your initial list you are talking about limpet mines, but here you indicate in your application grenade attacks, ambushes and booby traps, but what about the grenade attacks, what was this?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I would indicate for sure that grenades were mostly used in attacks against Councillors.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you put a time frame on this, and where did this happen?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That happened in 1988.

ADV STEENKAMP: And were anybody injured?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I am not sure.

ADV STEENKAMP: And of how many incidents are we talking here, one, two, three or four incidents?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I would not strike a total recall as to how many of those, but it is more than one.

ADV STEENKAMP: Are you saying your whole Unit was involved in these attacks?

MR KEBOTLHALE: In so far as I have indicated earlier on, with regard to the planning, with regard to the distribution of ammunition, issuing combat orders.

ADV MOTATA: Just to interpose here Mr Steenkamp, let's look at the main submission, page 7, you make reference Sub Units, do you have that? We look at the different print, do you see the different print and it says blowing of a Police van in Duduza with a limpet mine. Were people injured, or the Police who were driving that van, injured?

MR KEBOTLHALE: The report I could indicate before the panel is that the Police were there you know, playing soccer and that is how they got attacked at that soccer field.

MS KHAMPEPE: Are you applying for amnesty in regard of that incident?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I have indicated already that in so far as I was part of distributing ammunition and I was part of the issuing out of orders to the Units to carry out those attacks. I did not personally execute that incident.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't know if those operations were successful? You don't know if attempts to carry it out, were made, is that not so?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I would not for sure say that.

MS KHAMPEPE: I thought you had enumerated the incidents in respect of which amnesty was being sought, and that is not one of the incidents you have enumerated?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I am not applying for that incident, I am not applying for amnesty.

MS KHAMPEPE: I am confused Mr Kebotlhale. We want you to respond to incidents in which you are applying for amnesty.

MR KEBOTLHALE: I did not include the Basil February operations, I am not applying for amnesty for those operations.

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes, now I have understood you to be saying that Mr Sigasa has already referred in detail to the February operations, which you have alluded to have included the attack on Councillors, and as I read the submission, because I thought probably I had left something or something had escaped my memory, when I read his reference to the February sub-Unit, there is no reference, there is no evidence that I can deduce about the attack on Councillors, and that appears on page 7, that is where the February Unit is being referred to.

MR KOOPEDI: If you will allow me Mr Chairman and Honourable Committee Member, may I try to explain something which perhaps would clarify the problem we have now.

If we look at page 4 I believe, yes page 4 of the bundle of documents that has been supplied to us, we have an (indistinct) which tries to tell or to show how this Unit was. The incidents that are enumerated on page 7, would have been incidents which were planned and carried out by the people who appear there on the block written Johannes Nkosi Unit.

However, these people were also a command structure which had sub-Units. I believe what the applicant is saying now is that he would wish to apply for amnesty, that is above the things enumerated on page 7 of Exhibit A, he would wish to apply for amnesty for other acts which may have been carried out by the sub-Units.

MS KHAMPEPE: Are you using the word may have been, deliberately Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: With respect I am, and let me explain why. It has been stated on that page 7, that it has not been possible to make contact with those Units for verification and confirmation purposes. As matters stand, applicant here was in a command structure, which below it, were sub-Units.

He does not know whether those Units still exist today. However, he thinks that because at that time it was not within the law to have arms or to supply arms to other people, he is therefore mentioning those. He was not personally involved in the execution of those, and that is why it becomes difficult for him to explain what happened and when did that happen if these were actions carried out by the Unit.

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes, I understand that. I really need clarification.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, are you acquainted or are you aware of the judgement in the case that is commonly known as the ANC application?

MR KOOPEDI: I am, in fact I handled that matter, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't this particular instance a matter similar to that?

MR KOOPEDI: I would argue not, it is not. What we are saying here is, well, let me first start by saying that those applications, the ANC applications we are referring to, are called Declaration Applicants. These are applicants who attached some declaration to their applications, but this is not the case in this instance.

Here we have an applicant who states where he belongs, who states fully what he did, but who also feels that it is his duty for the purposes of this hearing, for the purposes of reconciliation, to state that there were sub-Units which I have assisted, which I have armed. However, I am unable to say what they did and I believe it will then be on this Honourable Committee to decide that, no, we are not entertaining what your sub-Units did simply because of the rationale that you cannot give amnesty to a person for something he didn't know it occurred, but he feels it is his duty to inform this Honourable Committee and in fact everybody here, that he armed those people and they were his sub-Unit. As to what they did, he may not have the facts.

MS KHAMPEPE: But is he not saying what the sub-Units did? He is saying they attacked Councillors, that is what he is saying?

MR KOOPEDI: It is indeed so Madam Commissioner, that he is saying that they attacked Councillors, however, he does not know when, that is the date, he does not know which Councillor, and had it been possible for him to confirm these, he would be saying with certainty, but because he doesn't know who was attacked, he only knows that Councillors were attacked. That is why he is saying so.

MS KHAMPEPE: How does he know that Councillors were attacked as a result of the weapons that he supplied to the sub-Units?

MR KEBOTLHALE: By virtue of grenades having been used in some instances in areas where I distributed some.

MS KHAMPEPE: Were you the Commander of the sub-Units that you supplied ammunition to?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I was the Commander in so far as I belonged to the command structure.

MS KHAMPEPE: And were you not therefore kept abreast with the execution of the operations that you yourself have stated that you gave instructions to?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, I was kept abreast, but the information was not complete in most of the instances. We did not get finer details, given the circumstances under which we operated there.

MS KHAMPEPE: At page 6 of the bundle of documents, that is your formal application, you say that you issued out instructions and carried out attacks. The you enumerate the incidents, then you say on Wimpy outlets, SAP personnel, Councillors and whites only bus terminus. Did you issue out instructions on the attack of Councillors?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Let me explain this. Given all the Units that we commanded, we visited them at all times, regularly if we had time and we would actually give out instructions to carry out attacks against the Councillors in pursuit of the objective of rendering the 1988 October Municipal elections a farce.

MS KHAMPEPE: Did you personally issue out instructions to your sub-Units on Councillors?


MS KHAMPEPE: And were any reports given to you subsequently those instructions having been issued by you, were any reports given to you on the execution of those operations?

MR KEBOTLHALE: No reports were given, but I know that in areas where I have distributed grenades, Councillors were attacked.

MS KHAMPEPE: Did you not find out from your sub-Units how the execution had been carried out, on whom of the Councillors the attack had been ...

MR KEBOTLHALE: I had not been able to do so.


MR KEBOTLHALE: It was very difficult, we were operating under very difficult conditions at that time.

MS KHAMPEPE: But how would you be able to measure the success or the failure of your sub-Unit if such information was not furnished to you?

MR KEBOTLHALE: We depended largely on the media reports, the print and television reports.

MS KHAMPEPE: Why not your sub-Units, these are people who are very close to you? Why should you depend on the media that you didn't trust?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, I am saying that it was very difficult for us to get exact information, given the circumstances under which we operated.

MS KHAMPEPE: In conclusion for what it is worth, you are saying you are seeking amnesty in respect of the attack on the Councillors and the weapons that you supplied on your sub-Unit in the attack of those Councillors. Is that what you are seeking amnesty for?


ADV MOTATA: But it goes further than that, if you have regard to the bundle, page 7, you are saying there have been injury of several Policemen and Councillors, but from what my sister has been asking you, it would appear you have no information as regards whether Policemen were killed, Councillors were killed or injury caused to them?

MR KEBOTLHALE: This I got from the newspaper and media reports.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman. Sir, can you explain to the Committee exactly how did you see your political motive, or how did you understand the political motive or can you describe your political motive for attacking the Wimpy Bar?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, I would, this matter I think has been dealt with extensively by my Commander.

CHAIRPERSON: We want to know how you saw it.

MR KEBOTLHALE: Oh yes. That was part of taking the war to the white areas. It was part of celebrating the 67th anniversary of the South African Communist Party, and that was actually intended to remove the honeymoon out of the television screens.

Removing the honeymoon out of television screens actually meant in everyday life of our television, we would see people sitting in beaches, people sitting in nice places, not portraying the exact situation which was happening in the townships, which was happening in churches, which was happening in schools.

People were being shot at by the Police, people were being killed by the Police on a daily basis in the township. That was not properly projected into the media.

CHAIRPERSON: So, the Wimpy Bar was specifically targeted for that purpose?

MR KEBOTLHALE: It was also part of the armed propaganda.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Are you sure about that answer?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, it was part of the armed propaganda.

CHAIRPERSON: So as far as you are concerned, and you must correct me if I am wrong, the attack on the Wimpy Bar, was not essentially because it was frequented by members of the Security Police?

MR KEBOTLHALE: No, that is wrong. Sorry, can the Judge repeat that for me please?

CHAIRPERSON: You told me that, and I understand your evidence to be that the attack on the Wimpy Bar here in Benoni was to remove the honeymoon off the television screens?


CHAIRPERSON: And you also told me that Wimpy in Benoni was specifically targeted for that and also that it was part of taking the war to the white areas?


CHAIRPERSON: Is that correct?


CHAIRPERSON: Given that, I asked you are you sure of your answers, and you said yes. I said well, I am concerned because there is the prospect of Wimpy being targeted and blasted because it was frequented by members of the Security Police and then you said, no, that is wrong?

MR KEBOTLHALE: It shouldn't have been like that, it was attacked because it was frequented by the top brass of the Police. These other things were just part of it, taking the war to the white areas, and accelerating the armed conflict.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you then understand my question to be when you answered?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I thought you were saying that Wimpy was attacked because it was frequented by the Police?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you understood correctly. You said it was not so.

MR KEBOTLHALE: Then I did not understand it in that sense.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you understand it then, because you repeat my question in essence and you understood it correctly.

MR KEBOTLHALE: What I am saying is that Wimpy Bar was attacked.

CHAIRPERSON: I know you are saying that, we all know it was attacked. The question is why?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Because it was frequented by the top brass of the Police personnel.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, when I asked you that just now, you said no, that is not so.

MR KEBOTLHALE: It must have been a mistake on my part, but I did not mean to say that.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you make the mistake?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Maybe I did not understand.

CHAIRPERSON: No, you did understand it, because you still understand the question correctly.

It is precisely what I asked you. I am asking why you made a mistake then?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Because I did not understand the question clearly.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Steenkamp.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman. Sir, am I correct in saying that the attack on the Wimpy Bar was mainly to create and to instill fear amongst the people, among the civilians in that specific area?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That would be incorrect.

ADV STEENKAMP: Are you sure?


ADV STEENKAMP: Did you understand my question correctly?


ADV STEENKAMP: Can I read from your own application on page 8? Mr Koopedi, can he please read for himself. I read paragraph 1 therein. All the actions above constitute part of the overall conspiracy and strategy to bring about instability and instill fear in those who served in structures of Apartheid. Is that now right or is that now wrong?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That is right.

ADV STEENKAMP: But my question was was the attack on the Wimpy not part of this?

MR KOOPEDI: With respect Mr Chairman, I think we are having a problem of my learned friend putting it that the attack on Wimpy was for this reason and I think what he is saying is that it was not only for that one reason. You know there are a number of issues involved, not the one reason.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you rephrase the question.

ADV STEENKAMP: I will do so, thank you Mr Chairman. My question was simply, I didn't say it was the only reason, I asked you was it a reason and you said no. That is how I understood you.

MR KEBOTLHALE: You see, it was not intended to instill fear on civilians. For those who served in Apartheid structures, the Special Branch in Benoni was part of the Apartheid structure.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can I just ask you then this, why didn't you include in your amnesty application that your attack on the Wimpy was mainly to deal with the Security Branch who was frequenting this place, why didn't you include this at all in your amnesty application, at all?

Even in the further particulars that you were asked, you didn't include this at all? Can you explain this?

MR KEBOTLHALE: You see, it was the personnel that served in the Apartheid structure which frequented Wimpy, and I think that explanation suffices.

CHAIRPERSON: The question is why isn't it included in your application?

MR KEBOTLHALE: It is included in the application. If you go through and if you can go through page 8 there.

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes, can you start from page 7, see under paragraph 10(a) a question is asked, state political objective sought to be achieved in committing the act in which you are applying for amnesty, for which you are applying for amnesty, and you then starting from page 7, respond by stating what you have stated and Mr Steenkamp's question is to this extent and this extent only, why have you not stated that the reason for attacking the Wimpy Bar was to attack the members of the Security Police, that does not appear?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I think we are saying here that, we are talking about those who served in the structures of Apartheid, and that includes the Special Branch in Benoni who frequented that area.

MS KHAMPEPE: But you see the words that you have used, the choice of words that you used in response in particular to paragraph 10(a), you have stated that the reason, the political objective you sought to achieve was to deprive the then South African State the monopoly of violence used and create an environment and climate of war, particularly in towns and places used for leisure and entertainment by whites.

That is Mr Steenkamp's problem, there is no mention there specifically of attacking members of the Security Force. That is the explanation you must give to Mr Steenkamp.

MR KEBOTLHALE: The understanding of the statement is that those who served in the Defence Force, those who served in the Police, would after having carried out operations against you know, innocent people, used the Wimpy, they would use the cinemas and whatever places as leisure places, and these people would be construed to be ordinary civilians. This is what this insinuates in that paragraph.

MS KHAMPEPE: But you yourself had decided to use the word entertainment by whites, you didn't say entertainment by members of the Security Force?

MR KEBOTLHALE: No, but if you would notice that the whites there is "whites", that is what it was intended to express.

ADV STEENKAMP: Sir, can you just tell us from whom did you get your instructions in specifically carrying out the Wimpy Bar attack or the Katlehong attack, both those incidents, from whom did you receive your instructions?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I think the Commander has dealt with the matter by saying that we meet every Wednesday to review, to plan and take decisions.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you tell me who is the person called Vusi, do you know who Vusi was?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Vusi, yes I know who he was. I know him by the name of Vusi. He served in the front command in Botswana. I don't know his other name.

ADV STEENKAMP: You see again sir, unfortunately if I look at your amnesty application, page 9, paragraph 11(b) the question there is who gave such order and approval, you didn't refer to your Commanding Officer, applicant 1, you referred to Mr Vusi.

Can you elaborate on that?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, in so far as Vusi served as a post box in the front command.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can I ask you then maybe just before I go to the Wimpy Bar attack, why didn't you refer to the first applicant and say he was my Commanding Officer and I received my instructions from him? Why didn't you state it there?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That has been stated on page 9.

CHAIRPERSON: What has been stated?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That I received commands from a person known only to me as Vusi.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that is not the question. The question is why didn't you in answer to that question say that the first applicant, the first witness in fact gave me the orders. That is the question.

MR KEBOTLHALE: He did not give me orders because we would sit in a plannery to decide on actions to take.

ADV STEENKAMP: Coming to the Wimpy Bar attack, what information did you have, or what information did you receive about the Wimpy Bar before deciding to attack it?

Did you get reports and from whom did you get the reports, or did you have informers, how did you manage to get the information on the Wimpy Bar?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I think we have explained this. We have also mentioned it in our main submission, that we were sitting every Wednesday to give individual commands as a command structure, and we would then discuss, deliberate on individual reports, make recommendations and take decisions on the basis of that information.

The main source of information with regard to Wimpy came from fellow applicant Alfas.

ADV STEENKAMP: So he informed you about the Wimpy Bar and the possibility of a target and all that, am I right?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, by way of reporting to the Unit, yes.

ADV STEENKAMP: And who decided ultimately that the Wimpy Bar should be attacked, was it you or who was it?

MR KEBOTLHALE: All of us, we decided on it.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you explain to me, at the time why did you think the Wimpy Bar, or how did you see the Wimpy Bar as a military target, or did you see it then, can you explain to me how did you see it as a legitimate target, let's put it that way?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I think the matter has been answered by my fellow applicant in his submission that the place was frequented by top brass Security personnel.

ADV STEENKAMP: What would you say to the possible question or the possible information that I attained, that the attack on the Wimpy Bar as far as the official ANC statement goes, was not part and parcel of ANC policy?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Can you repeat the question for me please.

ADV STEENKAMP: According to information we received which is not verified, what is your comment if I make the suggestion or if I tell you according to the ANC's official statement, the attack on the Wimpy Bar, this specific Wimpy Bar, was not part and parcel of the ANC policy at the time?

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Steenkamp, won't you rephrase your question because there hasn't been any evidence led before us to suggest that the information that is contained in the press report, is official ANC information?

ADV STEENKAMP: You have heard, you have listened to my comment on the newspaper remark, you have heard that, am I right?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I think it has been ...

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you comment?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, it has been explained that Wimpy became the target in so far as it was frequented by that Security personnel.

It was an area which became an interest, a target of interest to us, in so far as the Security personnel frequented the area.

ADV STEENKAMP: Did you verify the information that you got from Mr Ndlovu, that at that stage Security Branch Police Officers and high brass as you call them, would most probably have visited that Wimpy Bar on that Saturday? Did you have information to that extent?

MR KEBOTLHALE: It has just been explained that we got information from the former detainees and we also relied extensively on the information forthcoming from Mr Ndlovu.

ADV STEENKAMP: That on that specific Saturday, please help me if I am wrong, that on that specific Saturday, Security Branch high brass will visit the Wimpy Bar at twelve o'clock, is that what you are saying?

MR KEBOTLHALE: No, I think that you must understand that we are not saying that the Security Branch personnel stayed in Wimpy. We have information to the extent that these people frequented the area, they met there.

ADV STEENKAMP: No, no, sir, I am talking about this specific day. Why did you decide to attack the Wimpy Bar on this specific day?

The only reason I can see is because on that specific day, there was a possibility or you had very good information, that Security Branch Police will be at the Wimpy Bar, high brass?

MR KEBOTLHALE: They frequented the area and we have indicated previously that on Saturdays they held meetings there to give reports, and to debrief and whatever, as it was explained earlier.

ADV STEENKAMP: Am I right in saying, please help me if I am wrong, you didn't have any verified or any confirmed information that on that specific day, on that specific time, twelve o'clock that Security high brass Police would visit the place? You didn't have any information of that sort at all am I right?

MR KEBOTLHALE: No, you are wrong.

ADV STEENKAMP: What is the answer then sir, in other words, please help me. What you are saying is you had information ...

MR KEBOTLHALE: That they frequented ...

ADV STEENKAMP: Can I please finish my question, you had information that on this specific Saturday, this specific incident which happened on I think the 13th of June, 30th of July sorry, at twelve o'clock, you had information that on that day high brass Security Branch Police will be in that place. Did you have information to this extent, can you answer me just that please first?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Not that they will be in that place, but we knew that it was a norm that after having had discussions in their offices they would go have lunch there and have tea there.

CHAIRPERSON: What you are saying is it was the normal thing to happen and you expected them to be there?


ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman. Can I ask you according to our information there was a Police kiosk which was situated in a small shop across the Wimpy Bar, that was actually manned on a full time basis by the Police. Why didn't you decide to attack that kiosk than the Wimpy Bar?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Personally I did not know of the existence of the kiosk.

ADV STEENKAMP: Are you saying you didn't know about this kiosk at all?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, I am saying I did not know of the existence of the kiosk in that area.

ADV STEENKAMP: Who did the reconnaissance on this Wimpy Bar, do you know who was involved there? Can you give us a name of the group who was responsible for this, and who reported to you?

MR KEBOTLHALE: It is not a group, it is Alfas Ndlovu.

ADV STEENKAMP: And he never reported to you that there actually was a Police kiosk there?

MR KEBOTLHALE: No. Not that he did not report, but he reported on the matter that he was dealing with, and that was Wimpy.

ADV STEENKAMP: So did he report there was a Police kiosk?

MR KEBOTLHALE: He could not report on the existence of the kiosk. The kiosk was not an area of interest to us. He reported on the matter that we handled, that was Wimpy at that time.

ADV STEENKAMP: Sorry Mr Chairman, if I have to repeat myself, I don't want to labour this point. Just before I step off this issue, one thing I can't understand you wanted to attack the structures which supported Apartheid, among them Police or Security Police. But in this issue, you decide not to attack this Police kiosk which was full of Police.

MR KEBOTLHALE: I think Mr Steenkamp, the matter has been dealt with, we explained that situation in length in our main submission and it was explained by the Commander.

Our area of interest was in Wimpy and if there was existence of any Police kiosk nearby or opposite, that I did not know.

ADV STEENKAMP: Do you have any other information on other, or do you know, do you have any knowledge on the other Wimpy's that was attacked by ANC or MK members?


ADV STEENKAMP: Can you maybe just in short explain to me what was MK's policy regarding the identification of military targets at the time of the incident?

MR KEBOTLHALE: What we are saying is that we are going to attack all enemy personnel, wherever they are. We have also indicated that we would follow them in the Bantu (indistinct), in towns, in the cities, in the rural areas and everywhere, and this is what we actually did at that time.

ADV STEENKAMP: Who decided on the use of this super limpet I think that is what the applicant, the first applicant said. Who decided on the use of this limpet mine, the super limpet mine?

MR KEBOTLHALE: We collectively decided on it, all of us.

ADV STEENKAMP: Who planted the bomb?


ADV STEENKAMP: How do you know that, were you present?

MR KEBOTLHALE: He reported back to the Unit that he planted the bomb.

ADV STEENKAMP: Were you during this planning, who was also involved in the planning, it was you and the first applicant, who else was involved?

MR KEBOTLHALE: It was Alfas, it was Molwedi, it was Simfrey Mkomesi who is now late.

ADV STEENKAMP: I am sorry, can you give us, it was you, the first ...

MR KEBOTLHALE: It was myself, it was Ernest Sigasa, it was Alfas Mabore Ndlovu, it was Mokoena Molwedi.

ADV STEENKAMP: You said he is deceased?

MR KEBOTLHALE: No, lastly it was Simfrey Mkomesi who is deceased.

ADV STEENKAMP: Okay, sorry, thank you. Exactly what was the role of your Commander? How did it work, did he give you instructions and you had to carry them out or can you just explain to me how did it work? This Unit you had, how did it work?

MR KEBOTLHALE: If I may refer you to page 2 of our submission, we are stating quite clearly there what the role of the Commander was there and Bullet.3, he gave guidance to military activities.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, maybe I have missed the point here, but I was under the impression that this statement was the statement made by the first applicant and that it was not a joint statement. Maybe I am wrong, I don't understand this.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it was a statement by the first applicant, but this witness has associated himself in so far as it effects him, with that statement.

MR KOOPEDI: If I may answer, it was decided that because all the applicants are associating themselves with similar acts, for the sake of brevity, only one statement would be prepared.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I don't want to be very technical, but I would ask on behalf of the victims that this statement at least be signed by whoever is going to be handed in the statement on behalf of the applicants, because the position as far as the Act goes Mr Chairman, we are dealing with applications are required by the Act, and I am not quite sure and my difficulty is this, this information contained in this statement was not catered or not rendered or not supplied by any of the applicants at all.

As far as the victims go we find it a bit difficult to understand how this information can just be submitted and numerous acts be added to the application of this applicant, maybe I must ask the applicant why this is done today.

If I can ask you sir, why are you adding all this new information in this statement, and why didn't you take the opportunity when you prepared your application, to submit this to the TRC? Can you give an explanation of that?

MR KOOPEDI: In all fairness to the witness, if you will allow me to come in Mr Chairman, there are no new incidents that are being mentioned here, because all these incidents if my learned friend goes through the application forms here, he will find a corresponding note to that effect.

On the other hand in as far as the request or the instruction that all applicants sign this statement because the statement cannot be simply handed in, I wish to remind my learned friend that this statement was meant to be read and not to be handed in initially and it was handed in because we were asked to hand it in, and remind my learned friend also that the present applicant has under oath associated himself with this statement and I do not see the need therefore to sign the statement.

But I wish to stress the fact that there are no new matters that are being brought.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I will not take this point any further, except to say that there is definitely information that was added, numerous incidents like page 7, the Honourable Committee Member Khampepe showed, pointed out the sub-Units, there is no information contained in this application at all.

MR KOOPEDI: Mr Chairman, without creating a dialogue if you will allow me, my learned friend ...

CHAIRPERSON: You just did.

ADV STEENKAMP: I will just leave it there Mr Chairman, it is up to the Committee to decide. Maybe it is a question for argument.

ADV MOTATA: No but before you do, we had regard to page 14 of the bundle.

ADV STEENKAMP: Sir, it is the view of the victims that this was an act, a callous and cowardice act mainly targeting white people who were frequenting this Wimpy Bar, do you have any comment on this?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I would say that the action on Wimpy was not targeted on white people. It was targeted at the Security personnel that served on the Headquarters of the Special Branch, whether black or white and it has never been the policy or intention of the ANC to hit or to attack ordinary civilians.

ADV STEENKAMP: My last comment, maybe you can comment on this sir, I can put it as a matter of fact to you that not a single Security Police or political person was injured at all in this Wimpy attack, it was only civilians.

MR KEBOTLHALE: I would also indicate that this matter has been dealt with by my Commander.

MS KHAMPEPE: You are being asked notwithstanding the fact that it has been dealt with by your Commander. You are being asked a question and you must respond to it Mr Kebotlhale.

MR KEBOTLHALE: Yes, I would say that the possibility of concealing blows suffered by the Special Branch personnel cannot be precluded in that regard, as part of you know, concealing their defeats.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: Nothing in re-examination of this witness, thank you Chairperson.


MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Kebotlhale, I just have one question to pose to you. When Mr Ndlovu gave you a report after he had conducted some reconnaissance on Wimpy Bar, did he give you any information with regard to whether there was any black patronage of this particular Wimpy?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I do not recall that for sure.

MS KHAMPEPE: Did you yourself not know whether that particular Wimpy was patronaged by blacks?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That I did not know.

MS KHAMPEPE: Were you resident within the Benoni area at that time?

MR KEBOTLHALE: I was staying at Katlehong at that time, not in Benoni.

MS KHAMPEPE: Were you familiar with the mall wherein this Wimpy Bar was situated?

MR KEBOTLHALE: Personally, not.

MS KHAMPEPE: Had you never gone past the vicinity around the Wimpy restaurant?


MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

ADV MOTATA: Just one Chairperson. You said you relied also on information from former detainees, did I hear you correctly?


ADV MOTATA: And when you say information from former detainees, were they accompanying the Security Branch to the Wimpy?

MR KEBOTLHALE: That I could not confirm, but that is the information that we got from former detainees.

ADV MOTATA: That for instance they got food from Wimpy which was bought by the Police?


ADV MOTATA: But never indicated that they actually went with the Police there?


ADV MOTATA: Thank you Chairperson, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, you are excused.


























DAY: 1


MR KOOPEDI: Mr Chairman, I would ask for some direction here. I am not sure what this Committee proposes to do. When this Committee proposes to close for the day.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly not now.

MR KOOPEDI: I would then ask or request to call the third applicant, I wanted to indicate that I wanted to call him, but was not sure when the Committee intends breaking up, thank you.

The next applicant is Mr Ndlovu.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, page 28 - 34.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ndlovu, which language would you prefer to use?

MR NDLOVU: English.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you comfortable with that?


ALFAS MABORE NDLOVU: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: May I have an indulgence for a second please, there is a document I am trying to find.

ADV MOTATA: Whilst your counsel is finding a document, how do you pronounce or spell your second name? I am not sure of the spelling on page 28 of the second name?

MR NDLOVU: Mabore. Actually it was misprinted because during those days, we had problems. Now my name is being changed to be Mabore, my real name is Mabope.

MR KOOPEDI: I have found the document I was looking for, if I may proceed Mr Chairman. Thank you for the indulgence.

Is it correct that you are one of the applicants in this matter and an applicant in terms of you being, or having been a member of the Johannes Nkosi Unit?


MR KOOPEDI: Could you speak up to the microphone?


MR KOOPEDI: Now, would you tell the Commissioners, the Honourable Committee Members before we go into the details of the acts for which you are applying amnesty, who you are, when were you born, when did you join the ANC?

MR NDLOVU: Okay, actually what I will do is I will read the biography that has been prepared.

My name is Alfas Mabore Ndlovu. The address is 35 Esangweni Section, Tembisa. The date of birth, 1964-07-02. I joined the ANC and the People's Revolutionary Army, MK in September 1985.

I joined the liberation forces during the time when colonialism and perilous forces were displaying African people in particular, and killing them. The total full, calculated military aggression against the front line States, suppression of student bodies, that is COSAS and working class formations (indistinct).

The military skills which I acquired within the ranks of the African National Congress and Umkonto We Sizwe is as follows: I received the following military training in Angola in 1985. I have done the following courses, military engineering, politics, firearms, military tactics, typography, physical training and artillery.

Further I went to Cuba and I have done the following course, that is suburban warfare, Commander's course in the year 1986.

And furthermore, I have done military combat work in 1989, that is the former Soviet Union. That is finished.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, will you tell the Honourable Committee members, the offences for which you are applying for amnesty.

MR NDLOVU: Actually what I would say is that I am applying for all offences which my fellow applicants spoke about.

MR KOOPEDI: Will you please enumerate them?

MR NDLOVU: Number 1, that is the bombing of "Kitskonstabels" in Mnisi Section, Katlehong.

MR KOOPEDI: ...[inaudible] for which you are applying for amnesty.

MR NDLOVU: Actually what I would say is that I am applying for all offences which my fellow applicants spoke about.

MR KOOPEDI: Would you please enumerate that?


1) Number 1: That is the bombing of "Kitskonstabels" in Mnisi Section, Katlehong.

2) The bombing of sewerage pipes in Sunwatt Park.

3) The bombing of "Kitskonstabels" and SAP.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you carry on, the bombing of the "Kitskonstabels" in Mnisi Section, what did you so there? What was your role in that?

MR NDLOVU: My role was that physically and practically I went there to execute the operation and even part of the planning.


MR NDLOVU: Okay, the second one is the bombing of the sewerage pipe. In this one I do agree with my fellow applicants, that together being a unit that was stationed or to organise activities around East Rand, I also planned and approved the operations that it must executed. ...[indistinct] the planning.

4) The third one: Ambush of the "Kitskonstabels" and SAP in the Motsamai Section.

My role, it was that I went there physically and I took part in the execution of the operation.


MR NDLOVU: By carrying an AK rifle and went there to demoralise the enemy by firing shots.

5) The other one is the bombing of Wimpy Bar.

And this one I went there personally to execute the operation.

6) The bombing of the rail line and electrical sub-station next to Katlehong Station.

My role was that I went there physically to execute the operation in benefit of our people.

7) The last one - not last. The bus terminus in Germiston.

I also took part in planning and giving the approval with other comrades and my commanders, that the operation should be carried out.

MR KOOPEDI: Is it correct that the incidents that you are referring to are all enumerated on page 10 of Exhibit A?


MR KOOPEDI: Is it also correct that in all these operations, even though you did not personally, you may not have personally carried out or executed an act, however you were involved in the planning thereof?

MR NDLOVU: Yes, I was involved in the planning and the other things, the operations which were being carried out by our sub-unit. That is the attacks against councillors.

MS KHAMPEPE: I didn't hear that one.

MR NDLOVU: I'm talking about the attacks against councillors.

MS KHAMPEPE: What about them, did you also take part in their planning?


CHAIRPERSON: Do you know the names or identities of these councillors who were victims or possible victims?

MR NDLOVU: No, I don't know the identities.

CHAIRPERSON: So you don't know if any attack took place?

MR NDLOVU: Actually through media we heard the reports ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You don't know yourself?

MR NDLOVU: Pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: You don't know yourself?

MR NDLOVU: Actually I'm trying to indicate that operations were being carried out, especially by our sub-unit.

MS KHAMPEPE: But didn't your sub-unit come back to report to you as people who must have been higher than them, about how they had fared with the operations?

MR NDLOVU: Actually, when it comes to that issue, they do give reports but it was not possible or easier to locate our comrades, especially in the sub-units, to give proper reports because we also were operating under difficult conditions which were by that time, it was not conducive enough for our units to operate. We operated under difficult conditions.

MS KHAMPEPE: Difficult conditions which made it impossible for your sub-units to come back and give you reports about operations that you had given them instruction to execute?

MR NDLOVU: Yes, that's too difficult to locate our units, especially after operations you find that, let's say a person might be under serious stress or either fear of being caught, would take retreat position or take underground retreat.

MS KHAMPEPE: How many instructions did you give to these sub-units to carry out in respect of the councillors?

MR NDLOVU: Actually the instructions which we gave is that they were collective, not as an individual.

MS KHAMPEPE: Was it at one given time or were you able to meet and give them further instructions with regard to the conduct of further operations?

MR NDLOVU: Actually what I can say on that issue is that we do, sometimes we do meet but not meeting - how can I put it, regularly.

MS KHAMPEPE: I'm still a little unclear about it, how these instructions were given and how reports were actually given to you from your sub-units. You must have been in some kind of control of your sub-units?

MR NDLOVU: Yes, we do have the control but the other thing is that a unit cannot give, let's say names, we have to consider the security situation, that we are not allowed, we are going to guerilla warfare, that we should write reports.

MS KHAMPEPE: The only reason why we are posing these questions is we have to ascertain whether there was an offence which was committed or not before we can either consider whether you qualify for amnesty or not.


MS KHAMPEPE: I hope you understand.

MR NDLOVU: I'm saying that to throw a grenade against a councillor, during those days and even presently, it is an offence according to the law.

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes, but you don't know whether that grenade was thrown to a councillor or not since no reports were ever given back to you.

MR NDLOVU: What I'm trying to indicate is that new in the newspapers were being read, that there were attacks, and we knew that our sub-units were carrying attacks against councillors.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

ADV STEENKAMP: Sir, can you maybe state to us how did you ...[intervention]

MR KOOPEDI: May I just say that there are no further questions from my side at this stage?


CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP: I apologise Mr Chairman, to my colleague there as well.

Sir, can you state how did you see or how did you understand your political motive? Can you explain to us your political motive for engaging in these acts for which you are applying for amnesty?

MR NDLOVU: The political motive, it has been stated by my fellow applicants, and I don't think that we have to continue with the same question in different forms, because it has been answered by my fellow applicants and even my commander as a head of the unit.

ADV MOTATA: But Mr Ndlovu, you are before us as an applicant, and if we had to look at you and say the others have answered for you, what would ...[indistinct] be saying what you said before us, which would be considered either to grant or refuse amnesty, we wouldn't be having that. So it might be a repetition but please answer the questions as posed to you.

MR NDLOVU: Will you repeat your question?

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you indicate to us what your political motive was, or how did you understand your political motive at the time, when committing these acts.

MR NDLOVU: The political motive was that I wanted to liberate our country from colonial forces and imperialist forces because our people were being under constant military attacks, assaults and tortures. And again, to boost the moral of our people and to secure a clear environment for victory in our liberation struggle.

ADV STEENKAMP: Help me if I'm wrong. I don't know the ANC policies as well as you do, but was it also the ANC policy to act against colonialism or actions, or can you explain what the ANC policy was regarding these attacks? How did you understand the ANC policy regarding the identification of targets. Let's start there.

MR NDLOVU: Actually what I can say is that when it comes to ANC policy, the policy of the African National Congress there's never mentioned in its political history that we should attack whites in particular. And again there is no policy in the ANC that states that we should run amok attacking civilians, either black or white.

ADV STEENKAMP: Who gave you your instructions Sir?


ADV STEENKAMP: Sorry. In the Wimpy Bar and the Katlehong incidents, who gave you your instructions in those incidents?

MR NDLOVU: Actually in that question, the decision was taken after we have met and we have discussed extensively about the presence of the enemy at Wimpy Bar, but Wimpy Bar, it was not the actual target, our target was these people who were murdering our people and sustaining apartheid structures within our country.

ADV STEENKAMP: And who did the reconnaissance in the Wimpy Bar incident?

MR NDLOVU: Actually I was given the mandate to that, to do that reconnaissance.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you tell us what exactly you reported? What information did you get that you reported to your commanding officer?

MR NDLOVU: Actually, the reports were as follows: Every Saturday, because the enemy spent sleepless nights working overtime until Saturdays, Sundays, during the week. The information was that the security, especially those who are from the higher ranks, were meeting there inside the Wimpy Bar to debrief their informers, to extract information from various operatives under their command.

ADV STEENKAMP: Where did this information come from, where did you get this information from?

MR NDLOVU: Actually the information, it was from the former political detainees around our country.

ADV STEENKAMP: Sir, help me if I'm wrong please. On your own you couldn't verify this, you heard this from other detainees, am I right?

MR NDLOVU: No, you are wrong.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you explain?

MR NDLOVU: Actually we got information from former political detainees, those who were involved in our revolution, that those policemen were buying food from Wimpy Bar and they are frequenting the area.

ADV STEENKAMP: But have you seen this yourself, have you seen police actually buying, Security Branch police visiting and frequently the place, having meetings with informers, did you see this yourself?


ADV STEENKAMP: How did you identify the Security Police, did you know them, because we all know they were wearing plain clothes? Did you identify them yourself and the informers?

MR NDLOVU: Actually I've seen them several times doing their job inside Wimpy Bar and so through continued reconnaissance we have decided, together with my fellow applicants, that our operation should be carried out.

ADV STEENKAMP: But how did you know they were Security Branch police but just visiting the Wimpy Bar?

MR NDLOVU: Actually they were using or utilising the cars which belonged to the state with the registration at the end, B and in the beginning, B. So that is the identification that this vehicle belonged to the state. Whatever they are wearing civilian clothing, an enemy is an enemy, it can't change.

ADV STEENKAMP: Did you know there was a police kiosk just opposite the Wimpy Bar?

MR NDLOVU: Our mandate or our main focus was not ...[intervention]

ADV STEENKAMP: No, no, my question is: "Did you know there was a police kiosk opposite the Wimpy Bar"?

MR NDLOVU: No, I didn't.

ADV STEENKAMP: Didn't you see it?


ADV STEENKAMP: If I put it to you that evidence will be led that there was a kiosk operating, it was an operational kiosk used by the police, or basically a small police station, you can't say anything about that?

MR NDLOVU: Actually what I can say is these are news and the new information for me.

ADV STEENKAMP: But Sir, you did the reconnaissance.

MR NDLOVU: Yes, I did.

ADV STEENKAMP: You frequented this area, as I understand from your commanding officer, not once but a few times.

MR NDLOVU: Yes, but the concentration was not on a kiosk, we wanted to hit the main target, the main planners. Kiosk it was nothing because let's say we have attacked their seniors, it will put a direct impact on the psychology of apartheid.

ADV STEENKAMP: My question is this Sir, the Wimpy Bar had a lot of civilians, we know today that no police were killed. Opposite the Wimpy Bar there are police, a lot of police, and you're saying now today that you didn't want to attack the police ...[indistinct] opposite but rather the one or two individuals in the Wimpy Bar?

MR NDLOVU: I've answered that question, that I couldn't know that there was a kiosk. If I'd known by that time I think they're also going to be our target because we wanted to attack the enemy whatever they are.

ADV STEENKAMP: Maybe you can answer this question, who decided to attack this Wimpy Bar on this specific day and specific time, was it you?

MR NDLOVU: Will you repeat your question?

ADV STEENKAMP: Who decided on this specific day, which was a Saturday at noon, 12 o'clock, who decided at this specific time this bomb must be planted and the operation must be executed? Who decided on this?

MR NDLOVU: Actually the whole unit decided on that because we took a common grounds, especially on planning.

ADV STEENKAMP: So wasn't the reason because it was the anniversary that you decided on this specific day, not because people were frequenting this place?

MR NDLOVU: No, actually what I'm trying to say is that we took a general planning and we took a collective mandate or to execute the operation. And the other thing is that we were celebrating the anniversary of the South African Communist Party.

ADV STEENKAMP: So that's the reason why you decided on a week day, or early morning, or late afternoon?

MR NDLOVU: Will you repeat?

ADV STEENKAMP: Why did you decide on a weekend, or during the week, or early morning, or late afternoon, why noon on a Saturday?

MR NDLOVU: Yes, we have to decide for Saturday because the enemy was supposed to be there exactly 12 o'clock or past.

ADV STEENKAMP: You planted the bomb as well, I mean the limpet mine, yourself?

MR NDLOVU: Yes, I did that.

ADV STEENKAMP: When you planted the limpet mine, did you see any police in the Wimpy Bar at all?

MR NDLOVU: Actually during the time when I went there to organise the thing we knew that their are coming.

ADV STEENKAMP: No, no, no, my question is Sir, according to our information this limpet was planted inside the Wimpy on a leg of a table, am I right? That's right, that's were the limpet mine was planted, am I right?

MR NDLOVU: Not on the leg.

ADV STEENKAMP: Where was it planted?

MR NDLOVU: Underneath the table.

ADV STEENKAMP: Underneath the table.


ADV STEENKAMP: And you did it yourself?

MR NDLOVU: Yes, I did it.

ADV STEENKAMP: When you did this, this is my question, did you see any police, security, high brass police in the Wimpy Bar when you planted that bomb?

MR NDLOVU: Actually I've been repeating that the enemy by that time, they were supposed to be there at twelve.

ADV STEENKAMP: Sir, you said repeatedly you knew these people, you identified them, you did reconnaissance. My easy question is, I think it's just yes or no, were there police inside the Wimpy or not?

MR NDLOVU: Actually what I can say is that through my reconnaissance it's been said that the police personnel and those who belong to the high structures are visiting or frequenting that Wimpy Bar.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ndlovu, when you planted the bomb, were there policemen that you knew of in the Wimpy Bar?

MR NDLOVU: What I can say is that ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Did you see any policemen there?

MR NDLOVU: Is not(?)


CHAIRPERSON: I'm not going to tolerate that.

ADV STEENKAMP: I'm sorry Mr Chairman.

Sir, did you check, before you planted this bomb, that there actually were other people or police close by the Wimpy Bar? Before you did that, did you check whether or not there were police close or even inside?

MR NDLOVU: I have checked.

ADV STEENKAMP: And what did you see, did you see any police close by?

MR NDLOVU: Actually through my reconnaissance, as I have indicated, at 12 they were supposed to be there and so attacking Wimpy Bar, it was meant for attacking, it was not meant to attack civilians.

ADV STEENKAMP: Sir, to be frank and honest with you, you knew very well because you knew the place, there was no police inside or even close to the Wimpy Bar. Am I right in saying this?

MR NDLOVU: No, you're wrong.

CHAIRPERSON: He just said so.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Did you get paid? How did you sponsor yourself, or this trip, did you get paid, did you get any amount of money for this work you've done?

MR NDLOVU: Actually we were being assisted from our frontal commands, to be sustained, especially financially.

CHAIRPERSON: No, the question is: "Did you get paid for doing this job"?


CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] question was.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you answer the question? Did he answer, I didn't hear. Thank you Mr Chairman, sorry.

Sir, who was your commanding officer and who gave you your instructions?


ADV STEENKAMP: For attacking the Wimpy Bar and the attack on the police in Katlehong.

MR NDLOVU: Actually what I said previously is that we took a decision together.

ADV STEENKAMP: Because I don't see that anywhere in your application which was submitted to the TRC, can you give an explanation for that?

MR NDLOVU: Can you repeat your question?

ADV STEENKAMP: I don't see this information anywhere in your amnesty application which was submitted to the TRC, that you took a decision collectively, and you don't mention anybody. Is there a reason for that?

MR NDLOVU: Actually through our organigramme it has been stated that our structure, it was structured the way it exists on the bundle of papers.

ADV STEENKAMP: No, I'm talking about your own application. I can refer you to your application ...[intervention]

MR KOOPEDI: With respect to my learned friend, the organigramme was supplied as part and parcel of the further particulars requested by the TRC from all the applicants. It may well have been supplied by one of them but this refers to all of them and it would improper and unfair to say that this organigramme is not part of his application.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] Mr Steenkamp, look at page 32.

ADV STEENKAMP: I've seen it Mr Chairman.

My last question to you Sir, I see here in your application you refer to page 32, paragraph 11(b):

"The order by Chris Hani at Zimbabwe"

What is the relevance of this information?

MR NDLOVU: Actually what I can say ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: What's the question?

ADV STEENKAMP: Sorry Mr Chairman.

I see you are stating there, on the question: "Who gave such an order". You said:

"It was in line by ANC police to conduct such an act. The order by Chris Hani at Zimbabwe"

MR NDLOVU: Actually we never instructed by Chris Hani to attack a Wimpy Bar because Hani belonged to the MHQ, he never issued out such an instruction.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you explain to me what your role was in the Katlehong attack?

MR NDLOVU: Which one?

ADV STEENKAMP: The one where the police were injured.

MR NDLOVU: What was my role?

ADV STEENKAMP: Yes. The Lindela Hostel, can you remember that?

MR NDLOVU: Yes, I remember that.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you tell me what your role was exactly and your part there in that action?

MR NDLOVU: My role in that action, we went there to execute the operation by shooting at the enemy personnel.

ADV STEENKAMP: Why did you decide on this specific place, Katlehong, was there a specific reason or not?

MR NDLOVU: Actually we decided to attack the enemy at that point because we knew and we were reconnoitring that area, that the enemy they are exchanging their shifts using that barrack within the hostel vicinity.

ADV STEENKAMP: Can you just indicate to me, as far as your knowledge serves you, as far as I know there are two incidents where people were injured or killed, this is the Wimpy incident and the Katlehong incident. Are you aware of any other incidents where you were involved in where people were either injured or killed?

MR NDLOVU: Actually what I can say is that we have been reading newspapers. We couldn't go back and verify because the only thing we knew was that was an enemy, enemy territory. In order to verify we are supposed to be taking other initiatives.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: Nothing in re-examination, thank you.


MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Ndlovu, my questions are going to be in respect of your reconnaissance with regard to the Wimpy bombing.

I want to know how long it took you to do your reconnaissance in terms of days, in terms of weeks, in terms of months?

MR NDLOVU: Actually we took several months monitoring that area.

MS KHAMPEPE: How several, two, three months?

MR NDLOVU: I cannot remember because it's an old incident, but what I'm saying is that several months.

MS KHAMPEPE: With whom were you when you were doing your reconnaissance?

MR NDLOVU: I was on my own.

MS KHAMPEPE: And the information that you had received from the ex-detainees, what exactly did it contain?

MR NDLOVU: Actually the information contained that when people were being captured for being involved in the liberation struggle, they could be taken to Benoni Police Station and then during the process of undergoing severe interrogation, they could be taken to the Wimpy and those security guys would buy food and eat there, went back to the police station.

MS KHAMPEPE: So the information was that the people who were detained were taken to Wimpy by the security members, given food and then taken back to the police station for further interrogation?

MR NDLOVU: What I'm saying is that they could be taken there - let's say they are inside this security cars and so the security personnel, they will went inside buy food and then they will come back and take them to the prison. The other thing, they could go there on a daily basis for consultations or to plan other operations which we couldn't know.

MS KHAMPEPE: So the information was that the security members were frequenting that particular Wimpy Bar on a daily basis?


MS KHAMPEPE: And it wasn't that they went there on Saturdays?

MR NDLOVU: Actually what they were doing is that they could frequent the area every day because enemy we knew that it was operating seven days in a week, because they couldn't rest.

MS KHAMPEPE: What kind of information did you elicit from your reconnaissance?

MR NDLOVU: Actually the information that I've got is that the enemy forces were frequenting the Wimpy Bar and on Saturday, specifically Saturday, they could organise a meeting there or take their lunch after their ...[indistinct] or extracting information from their ...[indistinct].

MS KHAMPEPE: And how was this information obtained, how were you able to obtain this particular information with regard to the meeting on Saturdays?

MR NDLOVU: Actually I've managed to extract the information because I was also using a Wimpy Bar to get food and to listen and to see the environment inside, what they are doing.

MS KHAMPEPE: And in your frequenting the Wimpy Bar for purposes of collecting this kind of information, were you able to see whether there were any black patronage of that particular Wimpy Bar?

MR NDLOVU: Actually in my position what I've noticed is that if the enemy is within the given territory with the support groups, meaning people who are supplying the enemy with information, they could be there always, especially on Saturday.

MS KHAMPEPE: So in brief what you are saying is that you were able to observe black patronage in that particular Wimpy?


MS KHAMPEPE: How big was that compared to the overall number of people that you were able to observe, for the past three months that you did your reconnaissance?

MR NDLOVU: Will you repeat?

MS KHAMPEPE: How big was the black presence of people who were patronising Wimpy? You were able to do this reconnaissance for the past two to three months.

MR NDLOVU: What I can say is that our people couldn't have a chance to enjoy themselves, especially in Wimpy Bars ...[intervention]

MS KHAMPEPE: How big? I'm talking of numbers.

MR NDLOVU: Oh, the number?


MR NDLOVU: I cannot remember but they were very, there were a few but what I can say, I'm not so sure if I can say there were a few.

MS KHAMPEPE: Were you able to also observe the number of workers who were at Wimpy?

MR NDLOVU: Generally I could say they were plus minus 6 or 7, not so sure.

MS KHAMPEPE: And did you give this information to your command structure?


MS KHAMPEPE: And was there any attitude adopted with regard to the presence of black people?

MR NDLOVU: Actually what I can say is that when we planned to execute that operation, our main objective was to attack the enemy forces, not civilians as it has been stated.

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes. And how did you hope to achieve that, after you had seen that there was a small presence of black people frequenting that particular Wimpy? How would you then have averted a civilian attack?

MR NDLOVU: Actually I'm having a problem concerning the concept, civilian. During the year 1985, our comrade President, Oliver Tambo, once spoke about a civilian and a policeman. Now my problem is, how do you differentiate between a person in uniform and a person in civilian clothing but serving the same principle, being a policeman in disguise?

MS KHAMPEPE: Did you take any precautions at all Mr Ndlovu, to avert any civilian casualty? Can you honestly say that you did?

MR NDLOVU: Can you repeat yourself?

MS KHAMPEPE: Did you take any precautions to avert any civilian casualties, in carrying out your operation in that particular Wimpy?

MR NDLOVU: Yes, we did take precaution.

MS KHAMPEPE: Can you explain what precautions you took?

MR NDLOVU: The precaution is that during our operation we knew that that Wimpy Bar, especially 12 o'clock, the enemy forces will be there in large numbers and even their recruits in our townships, to supply them with information and to debrief their agents. According to the area - according to the building itself, the Wimpy, it could not accommodate a large number of people and we know that by that time the enemy forces will be inside.

MS KHAMPEPE: What time did you go into this particular Wimpy to plant the bomb?

MR NDLOVU: If I could remember, if my memory serves me well, I was there plus minus ten, half past ten, I'm not sure.

MS KHAMPEPE: Half past ten.

MR NDLOVU: I'm not saying half past, I'm saying from ten onwards until half past, I'm not so sure.

MS KHAMPEPE: And the people who were there, were you able to observe any security members, of the people who were already there at 10 o'clock or past 10 o'clock? Were you able to recognise any members of the Security Police?

MR NDLOVU: Will you repeat?

MS KHAMPEPE: Of the people who were there when you went in at past ten, were you able to recognise any members of the Security Police?

MR NDLOVU: As I'm saying that you could recognise the enemy presence.

MS KHAMPEPE: You could?

MR NDLOVU: I'm saying that you could recognise the enemy presence by the virtue of, they are utilising their state vehicles, meaning that they could be around there or waiting outside.

MS KHAMPEPE: Were you able to identify any vehicles belonging to the state at that time?

MR NDLOVU: Yes, because I have been carrying reconnaissance against the enemy forces.

MS KHAMPEPE: So from your prognosis, you then concluded that there should be the presence of the enemy inside Wimpy?

MR NDLOVU: If they were not inside, it simply means that they were on stand-by to attend a meeting, Outside, they may be outside or whatever, corner.

MS KHAMPEPE: They would be outside until about 12 o'clock, because your reconnaissance had actually elicited information that the meeting at about 12 o'clock, that's your evidence?


MS KHAMPEPE: And they would be standing outside from about 10 o'clock until 12 o'clock? Could that have been probable?

MR NDLOVU: I'm not so sure about that because when I'm saying that - let's say somebody is attending a meeting, he can decide to stand outside. Let's say like he will be taking a cigarette and smoke for a while ...[indistinct] to a meeting or he is still busy with somebody.

MS KHAMPEPE: With regard to the Lindela Hostel attack, how many people did you actually shoot?

MR NDLOVU: Actually you couldn't went back to the enemy forces and ask them that: "How many people have been attacked"?, but what has been happening is that you have been reading reports from media, especially from Citizen or whatever newspaper, if I remember very well.

MS KHAMPEPE: From which position did you shoot at these people?

MR NDLOVU: Actually would you clarify your question?

MS KHAMPEPE: If you are unable to know how many people you shot at - did you shoot at a police vehicle with the "Kitskonstabels" inside the car or what happened? How did the ambush take place?

MR NDLOVU: We shot them while they were inside the thing, inside the truck.

MS KHAMPEPE: Inside the truck?


MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you, no further questions.

ADV MOTATA: Just two Chairperson.

Just returning to the Wimpy Bar incident. Other than the state vehicles, did you know any Security Branch policemen? Other than the vehicles you saw parked there and the assumption that it belonged to them, they might be in Wimpy Bar, did you know any?

MR NDLOVU: Actually their appearance you could see that this guy he belongs to the state.

ADV MOTATA: Wimpy Bar had the hall, restaurant itself for eating inside and there were people who could also dine outside, would I be right?

MR NDLOVU: If I could remember well, I'm not so sure about dining outside.

ADV MOTATA: In fairness to you, we have several statements that say some would dine outside.

MR NDLOVU: I can't remember that because it is an old incident, I cannot remember everything.

ADV MOTATA: Now let's return to your bundle, your application itself, page 32, paginated. In response to a question asked there you said:

"It was in line with the ANC policy to conduct such an act"

And if we look at your application you are talking about the "Kitskonstabels", you are talking about Wimpy Bar, why now singular it?

MR NDLOVU: Will you repeat?

ADV MOTATA: If you say:

"in line with the ANC policy"

then you say:

"policy to conduct such an act",

you are not speaking of acts and you are making application for several acts.

MR NDLOVU: What I can say, especially when it comes to the position of ANC policy, yes, it's being a policy to attack an enemy forces but not to attack civilians.

ADV MOTATA: No, no, I think we are at cross-purposes here. I say my reading, correct me if I'm wrong, I say reading this submission you are making, you say:

"such an act"

and when we listen to your evidence, you are applying for several acts or attack acts, if I may put it that way.

MR NDLOVU: I think it was a mistake and you have to understand that English is not my mother tongue.

ADV MOTATA: And you say:

"The order by Chris Hani at Zimbabwe"

Did Hani give you any orders whilst he was at the HMQ?

MR NDLOVU: Actually the orders that we have been given, we've been given the order during the time when we were stationed at Zimbabwe. And now it is being ordered that we should escalate assaults and intensify attacks against enemy forces and we have to take the struggle into the white areas.

ADV MOTATA: Thank you Chairperson, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: You're excused.

MR NLDOVU: Okay, thanks.









DAY : 1


MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, I will ask the question I asked before this witness ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR KOOPEDI: There is one last witness.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR KOOPEDI: The idea is not to call any other witness.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, how many witnesses do you propose to call?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, it depends on the situation. At this stage I have two witnesses Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: What does it depend on?

ADV STEENKAMP: Well it doesn't depend on anything Mr Chairman, we'll definitely call them. The problem is, we didn't prepare any sworn statements but we can call them. There's a possibility of a third witness tomorrow morning.

CHAIRPERSON: A third witness?

ADV STEENKAMP: Yes, Sir, but the definitely the two witnesses are available, they can testify immediately.

CHAIRPERSON: The evidence that your witnesses are intending to give, is ...[intervention]

ADV STEENKAMP: Well the first two witnesses, yes, Mr Chairman. The third witness will probably deal with the facts of the incident itself, at the day of the incident. The Security Branch police officer will probably come before. The ...[indistinct] will make a sworn statement if necessary. We're waiting for him but there is a request from the victims to testify, two victims.

CHAIRPERSON: So what we're talking about is actually a maximum of three witnesses and one applicant tomorrow?

Perhaps we can dispose of your last applicant now.

MR KOOPEDI: As it pleases the Committee. Chairperson, the next and last applicant is Mr Molwedi Mokoena. He is before you now.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mokoena, what language would you prefer to use?

MR KOOPEDI: I will answer for him whilst he is still ...[indistinct]. He also, like we indicated earlier, will use English.

MOLWEDI MOKOENA: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, where is Mr Mokoena's ...[intervention]

ADV STEENKAMP: Page 8 until 20, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I see his personal particulars are already set out in his application so you can skip those and get to the nitty gritty.

EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: As it pleases the Committee.

Is it true that you are one of the applicants in this matter and further that you are a member of the Johannes Nkosi Unit which was based in the East Rand?

MR MOKOENA: Yes, I was.

MR KOOPEDI: Now would you, very briefly so, inform the members of this Committee when you joined the ANC and in particular what training you had?


"I joined the African National Congress and its armed wing Umkhonto weSizwe in 1986 internally(?). I became a member of the regional command, Johannes Nkosi Unit, between 1987 and 1990. I received military and combat training in the former Soviet Union, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe"

MR KOOPEDI: Now the offences for which you are here before this Committee, would you, for the sake of the record, state the offences for which you are applying for amnesty?

MR MOKOENA: I firstly say I engaged in the following in my personal capacity:

1) The bombing and electrical sub-station near Katlehong Station with fellow applicant, Alfas Ndlovu.

2) Bombing of the sewerage tanks in the Sunwatt Park with fellow applicant, Ernest Sigasa.

And as part of the overall command, the Johannes Nkosi, I'm applying for the following:

1) Bombing of the "Kitskonstabels" Barracks in Mnisi Section.

2) The bombing of - the ambush of the "Kitskonstabels" and SAP in Motsamai Section next to Lindela Hostel.

3) The bombing of Wimpy Bar.

4) And the bombing of the bus terminus in Germiston.

MR KOOPEDI: Now when all these offences were committed, or in fact prior to that, were you involved in any way in the planning thereof?

MR MOKOENA: Yes, I was.

MR KOOPEDI: Now you have explained or mentioned the offences for which you are applying for amnesty, would you briefly tell the Members of this Honourable Committee what you did on that day, how you went about executing those acts?

MR MOKOENA: ...[inaudible] and on the electrical sub-section, and we placed the mini limpet mine on the railway line, the intersection of the railway lines. And the next thing we only got reports from the newspaper.

MR KOOPEDI: With regards to the main sewerage tank in Sunwatt Park?

MR MOKOENA: With regard to the main sewerage tank in Sunwatt Park, we moved from our base again together with fellow applicant, Mr Ernest Sigasa. We used one of our vehicles, which is somewhere identified as part of our support service to the place in Sunwatt Park. It was in the evening between 8 and 9. We went for those sewerage tanks which were a bit further away from the residential place and we placed our mines, and it happened like in the very first case, that we had to get the report from the newspapers of the explosion.

MR KOOPEDI: That is all for now Mr Chairperson, from me.


CHAIRPERSON: Can you just run by the incidents that you apply for?

MR MOKOENA: I think are two-phased, the specific ones that I applied, wherein I was physically involved and which is the bombing of the railway line and electrical sub-station near Katlehong, and the bombing of the sewerage tanks in Sunwatt Park. And the rest are as my part as component member of the Johannes Nkosi Unit.

CHAIRPERSON: Which events are you talking about in respect of that now?

MR MOKOENA: It's - say for instance, the bombing of the "Kitskonstabels", which my fellow applicants ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: What did you do in respect of that?

MR MOKOENA: The planning. Being part of the command unit, I was part of the planning.

CHAIRPERSON: Which are those now where you were part of the planning?

MR MOKOENA: The bombing of the "Kitskonstabels" in Mnisi, the ambush of the "Kitskonstabels" and SAP in Motsamai Section.


MR MOKOENA: The bombing of Benoni Wimpy Bar and the bombing of the bus terminus in Germiston.

CHAIRPERSON: Your only involvement was the planning? Yes, is that all Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: Yes, that is all for now.

ADV STEENKAMP: I've got no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.


MS KHAMPEPE: I have no questions Mr Chairman.

ADV MOTATA: I've got no questions Chairperson.

MR KOOPEDI: Mr Chairman, that concludes the evidence from and for all four applicants.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn then till tomorrow morning at 09H30.

MR KOOPEDI: As it pleases.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, may I just take the opportunity to apologise on behalf of the victims for the incident which happened. I'm sure we'll take care of it in the future, I do apologise.