ON RESUMPTION: 30.07.98 - DAY 9

CHAIRPERSON: ...revert to the three persons who still have to give evidence in respect of Cry Freedom.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (still under oath)

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, may I proceed?


MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you. Mr Chairman, before I proceed, I just want to place certain facts on record. My attorney made inquiries yesterday at the offices of Beeld newspaper about the exact date of the death of the late president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, and the date that he died was over the weekend of the 24th/25th of April 1993, not 1994 as my learned friend, Mr Mpshe, indicated, and Mr Bellinghan left the Force in August 1993.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, we're obliged to you for that.

MR DU PLESSIS: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it that everybody agrees we can accept Die Beeld on this point?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: (Continues) Mr De Kock, I'd just like to go over to the Cosatu House incident, you know that I am appearing for the persons who formed part of the Bomb Unit?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And in this case I am appearing for George Hammond and Pierre le Roux?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr De Kock, would you agree with me, or can you not recall, Hammond and Le Roux say that during the Cosatu House operation, they were not armed, because they had to set the bomb and plant it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And my instructions are that the charge, you testified regarding the charge and you said that it was between 40 and 50kg?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you agree that the persons responsible for determining the charge were Hammond and Le Roux?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't have any clear recollection thereof. They didn't know how large the basement area was, but I will concede that they would have made the ultimate determination, and that is why they were there, and I will concede that.

MR DU PLESSIS: And they did discuss it with you?


MR DU PLESSIS: Because that's how they recall it.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Le Roux and who, Hammond?

MR DU PLESSIS: Hammond and Le Roux, Mr Chairman. And then, Mr De Kock, if their evidence would be that Mr Le Roux's charge was approximately 10kg, and that of Hammond approximately 15kg, you would not argue that?

MR DE KOCK: No, I will not dispute it, but my recollection is that it was somewhat larger, it was about the total disruption of the building, but I wouldn't dispute that issue, my recollection is different, however both those persons are of unquestionable character and I will accept that.

MR DU PLESSIS: You would also then agree with their evidence that the explosives which were used, as well as the electronic time switch, were of foreign origin?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then my instructions are that not one of them can recall that a meeting was held at the farm at Honeydew, however they will not argue your recollection and if you say that that is what happened, they will concede that.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, they would have been there, because there was no other place between Honeydew and Cosatu House where I could have picked them up from, and that is my recollection. However, I do accept their explanation.

MR DU PLESSIS: They do not dispute this issue with you. Mr De Kock, regarding the ladder, my instructions from Mr Hammond are that the ladder was provided to them by an ex-railway policeman who was also involved in the operation, who was with Greyling, and brought the ladder to Honeydew?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: They will also testify that the persons who went with them into the building were Vermeulen and Nortjè?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I will not dispute that, I don't have a clear recollection, but it would have been both persons who I trusted to make difficult decisions at difficult times, in other words field decisions which by nature were always very difficult to make.

MR DU PLESSIS: For what it's worth, they differ with you regarding the minutes. You say it was four minutes and they say it was shorter?

MR DE KOCK: No, let me qualify, from the time that the mini-bus pulled up into the parking lot and left, it was four minutes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you remember that the ladder was left behind there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I later heard that, because with the gathering of equipment the ladder was missing, and this isn't something that one would want to see quite gladly, but I could never rely that everything would run perfectly. The reason why I remember the ladder so clearly was that I was nagged at until I bought another ladder for the person to whom the ladder originally belonged, and I did in fact purchase another ladder ultimately.

MR DU PLESSIS: Regarding Khotso House, Mr De Kock, my instructions in this case from Mr Kotze and Hammond, who were members of the Bomb Disposal Unit and participated in the operation... (intervention).

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: ...their recollection was, and specifically Mr Kotze's recollection, that the first operation did not work, you heard that yourself?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was informed as such, but I didn't know who the members were that were involved in that, I only liaised with... (no further interpretation).

MR DU PLESSIS: There is no dispute regarding your conversation, but he says that his recollection is very clear that he and Mr Hammond, after the failure of the first operation, drove to Vlakplaas in order to discuss Vlakplaas’ involvement in the next operation with you. Now I'd like to ask you, you didn't testify regarding that and so you don't have a recollection thereof?

MR DE KOCK: No, I don't recall that. My first recollections are of my contact with Mr Zeelie at the Johannesburg Sun Hotel in the city centre.

MR DU PLESSIS: Might I ask you whether it is possible that you simply can't remember this, that you can't remember this discussion?

MR DE KOCK: No, I can't remember a discussion like that, but I can remember a discussion where Mr Kotze and Mr Hammond approached me, and that was at Vlakplaas, for the purposes of the damaging and burning down of Khanya House. Of that I definitely have a clear recollection, I don't want to dispute it. I will accept that I don't have a very clear recollection of this situation with regard to Khotso House, but with regard to Khanya House, it is as clear as yesterday.


MR DE KOCK: It was Captain Kotze and Hammond of the Bomb... (intervention).

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr De Kock, I don't think that we'll dispute this matter, I will take it up with them, whether it is a possibility, it was 15 years ago and I won't take the matter any further. Then they will also testify that your obligation was to ensure that people were not injured insofar as it was within your ability and that no attention was paid to those arrangements?

MR DE KOCK: Those arrangements and that responsibility were my responsibility.

MR DU PLESSIS: They will also testify that the charges of the explosive devices were approximately 50kg for Khotso House?

MR DE KOCK: I would say that it was between 60 and 80 or 90kg. I have a very clear recollection that there were eight rucksacks, and as I carried mine and had to climb over the wall, I noticed that it was either very heavy or I was just getting old, it was rather heavy, and therefore I based the weight of it on that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Didn't you testify that it was eight kilograms per sack?

MR DE KOCK: My opinion was that it was approximately ten kilograms per sack, because the rucksacks were very similar to day packs, between a one and a two day pack, which one could buy.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you concede, Mr De Kock, that the persons responsible for the determination of the charges for the composition of the explosive devices were Kotze and Hammond?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the composition and packaging thereof, the activation mechanisms, but at the end of the operation, it would be my decision, I would be the one to decide how many would go. One of the reasons was, this I saw in south western Angola, that if circumstances were different, I didn't want those circumstances to apply with this specific operation.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you concede that Kotze and Hammond were experts regarding charge and explosive devices?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you also concede that the only objective of Kotze and Hammond within this operation was for the position of the charges and the technical aspects with regard to the explosive devices?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct. I myself would have ensured that these charges were correctly compiled, that the mechanisms were in good working order, because that would have been part of the overall responsibility which I held, but that would not have been something that I would have argued with them about, they were genuine experts.

MR DU PLESSIS: If you say 80 and they say 50, then there's definitely room for a difference on either side?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr De Kock, would you agree with me that they were not armed during this operation, they were responsible only for the explosive devices?

MR DE KOCK: No, I didn't issue any weapons to them and I didn't observe them carrying any weapons.

MR DU PLESSIS: You testified that only Beyers went into the building along with the others who went into the building, among others, yourself?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he led us into the building.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you would also, if I put it to you that there is a possibility that only Beyers could have had insight into the docket compiled by Mr Bellinghan, you wouldn't have any argument with that?


MR DU PLESSIS: You yourself did not have insight into that?


MR DU PLESSIS: Could you tell us regarding the functions at Vlakplaas after the operation, with specific reference to congratulations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, there were, and in this period of time, according to my memory, it was approximately two to three months thereafter that a party was held at Vlakplaas itself and Minister Vlok was in attendance, if my memory serves me well, General Stadtler, General Van der Merwe, General Joubert, who is no longer with us, there were various generals and brigadiers in attendance, and we were congratulated with this operation and other successful operations.

MR DU PLESSIS: Regarding Mr Beeslaar, I'm going to put the same question to you that Mr Booyens did, Mr Beeslaar will testify that he drove in the kombi where a certain Mr Bosch was also a passenger, where Mr Bosch, I don't know who the other person was?

MR DE KOCK: I will concede, I don't remember specifically in which vehicle he drove.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then finally I would like to ask you whether you would have acted upon the order of a commanding officer who was not necessarily in the direct line of command, for example if somebody other than Brigadier Schoon had issued the order or requested this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Only in the absence of Brigadier Schoon would I have done this, but in any other event, he was the commander who would have cleared an operation. If he wasn't there, I would have gone to someone like General Stadtler or to the deputy head of the Security Police, or the head of the Security Police.

MR DU PLESSIS: Might I ask you, regarding an operation that was held away from Pretoria, in that case you or some of your members who were deployed in other areas would have accepted orders from other commanding officers?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but once again I'd like to qualify this, that if an operation was of such a serious nature, I can say here, and this would be my answer, that when we blew up Community House in Cape Town, I think it was in Elsies River or Salt River, Brigadier Schoon flew down to Cape Town and we held a meeting with Brigadier Coetzee and a Colonel Smit or Nel, who wanted the place blown up. Once again I took that step of approaching Brigadier Schoon for his assistance and expertise.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr De Kock, in conjunction with the last question, if you were to go to another region, would you inform that particular commander exactly regarding what you were going to do?

MR DE KOCK: The commanding officer of that area, or the person commanding that group of Askaris would report to the commander of that region and make his services available and ask with which division or branch he would have to liaise, as well as what the nature of the work would be. If there were any problems, I would be approached, and if we could not have been there on time, I would have taken responsibility for it.

MR DU PLESSIS: That commanding officer in Natal, would he have known whether you were busy with covert operations and what the nature of these covert operations would be?


MR DU PLESSIS: For example, if you were there to take someone out?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, because ultimately if something went wrong, he would have to cover it up.


MR BOTHA: Thank you, Chairperson, Botha on behalf of applicant Snyders.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOTHA: Mr De Kock, just two aspects that I'd like to clear up, and the first aspect, I would like to refer you to my client's amnesty application in volume 1, he says there, in the second paragraph from the top, the second sentence of that relevant paragraph:-

"Everybody was armed and received the order to shoot anybody who could raise an alarm."

I would like to put it to you that that might be somewhat crassly stated, or it might have sounded rather crass at that point in time, but my client will testify that his order was that if anybody had raised an alarm to such an extent that the entire operation would have been ruined, then as a last resort that person would have had to have been shot. Would you agree with me that that indeed would have been the impression, or the direct or indirect order which was issued to members?

MR DE KOCK: What would have happened in such an instance, that it would have been possible that night guards would approach you and they themselves would be armed, according to the information that would be provided to us regarding the activities at Khotso or Cosatu House, once again it's a very responsible and extremely difficult situation in which the man on the ground has to make a decision and my order to them was that if this would endanger the members of the operation, then they would be able to use their arms, and after that I would accept the responsibility for this. However, his task was to bring his people out alive and to get out of their alive as well.

MR BOTHA: Therefore, as a last resort, would it have been possible to shoot at a certain stage if the situation required it?


MR BOTHA: Then, this is not extremely relevant, however I feel that it is my duty to clear this up with you, on the next page, page 233, regarding the financial benefit which could be gained:-

"A few days afterwards he came to me and handed over a number of calculators which he retrieved from the debris of the building. The one that he gave to me, I did not accept."

He also mentioned calculators, and I'd just like to place it once again upon the record that my client's recollection is not very clear regarding the entire incident. Do you confirm that at a certain stage, approximately a month after the incident according to you, calculators were brought from Johannesburg to Vlakplaas for official use at the unit?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, my recollection is that no members of Vlakplaas entered the building or helped with the search, and it was approximately a month after my people had rendered their services in Johannesburg that they received some of these calculators from members of the Security Branch who had searched the building which had been blown up, and these devices were used at Vlakplaas itself. Most of my people had their own calculators, but they were to be found in the facilities and offices of Vlakplaas and if they were used, there was really no issue about it, because they weren't in any way unique.

MR BOTHA: Thank you, no further questions.


COUNSEL: Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Rossouw.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Mr De Kock, firstly, my instructions are to put it to you that Mr Bosch has the recollection that he flew with you in the helicopter during the observation of Cosatu House, but that he cannot remember that a similar observation was undertaken for Khotso House. His statement is that he cannot remember it.

MR DE KOCK: I will agree with that.

MR ROSSOUW: And then I'd just like to ask you a number of questions regarding the request which you, according to your evidence, received for the Khotso House incident from Mr Zeelie. Initially my instructions are that Mr Zeelie says that during your evidence his memory was refreshed and that there was indeed a meeting at a hotel in Johannesburg, and that the matter was discussed during that meeting. He would concede this. He would also concede that he might have shown you the building.

What I would like to take up with you, however, is that Mr Zeelie denies that the request for the involvement of Vlakplaas would have come from him, and in relation to this, the evidence would be that we agree with the version of Advocate Du Plessis' clients that the request came from Messrs Kotze and Hammond. Is it possible that there might be a certain level of confusion regarding this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I will concede that there might be a level of confusion, with the qualification that Mr Hammond and Kotze, due to their position, would not have been able to go to General Erasmus and tell him that they wanted the building blown up. That is my view, it happened a long time ago and I do admit that there might be confusion regarding that issue.

MR ROSSOUW: Furthermore, Mr Zeelie's viewpoint is that he wasn't the person who would have been responsible for the operation, in the sense that he served as a point of liaison between General Erasmus and Vlakplaas or you at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is the perception which I held, and I think that we might be moving on a parallel of concepts or perceptions at this point. I'm not going to dispute that.

MR ROSSOUW: Just one further aspect, the answer which you provided during cross-examination in respect of the information which you received, that with the first unsuccessful attempt at bombing Khotso House, Mr Zeelie would have walked along with plastic bags in which there were landmines, my instructions are to place it on record and to put it to you that Mr Zeelie denies this and feels that this is part of a disinformation campaign which is being waged against him to place him a bad light. Could you comment on this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as I've said, that is how I received the information, that as I've also mentioned yesterday, there was a level of jealousy, I could almost say that everybody always wanted to be the biggest dog in the garden, there might have been a campaign of disinformation or gossip that was waged against Mr Zeelie, I will concede that.

MR ROSSOUW: Finally, in your amnesty application on page 245, bundle 2, you mention that you reduced the charge for the explosive for Khotso House and you mentioned that it was Mr Zeelie who had a larger charge in mind, and in light of the concession which you made to Advocate Du Plessis that it was his clients who were responsible for the size of the charge, would you concede that this is possibly a mistake?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, if I had said that I wanted a charge of 150kg, I would have asked for 150kg charge to be made, it was my responsibility, it was my operation. In this case, I would just like to place it in context, the feelings between '85 and '89 was zero tolerance between security forces and the liberation movements, or the liberation fighters, and I would just bring the emotions of that time into account here, it would only be understandable that people had these feelings.

MR ROSSOUW: Colonel, I'm not sure whether I understand you correctly, are you saying that it was still Mr Zeelie who insisted upon a higher charge?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Just a moment. My instructions are to deny that it was Mr Zeelie who was responsible for the planning with regard to the size of the charge and that he would not have insisted upon it and that it was indeed the responsibility of Advocate Du Plessis’ clients.

MR DE KOCK: I don't have a problem with that and I understand the nature of that issue.

MR ROSSOUW: No further questions.


MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman, the surname is Lamey, and I want to pose my questions to Mr De Kock on behalf of Mr Nortjè and Mr Mogoai.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Colonel, firstly, for the sake of distinction and clarification, I will ask a number of questions pertaining to Mr Nortjè's version and the Mr Mogoai's version. It is so that Vlakplaas, in many instances, actually provided assistance to security branches where there was a security problem within the jurisdiction of that particular security branch?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: What I'd like to put to you is that Mr Nortjè will testify that he understood that this was that sort of action, that it was a question of providing assistance to the Johannesburg Security Branch who had a problem with Cosatu House, he didn't know exactly from where the order had come and so forth. Would you concede that this would be the correct assumption on his behalf?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. Just for qualification, usually when I informed the members, I would tell them, "This comes from head office", or I would mention a name, not with the objective of implicating somebody necessarily.

MR LAMEY: Yes, and I'd just like to add that Mr Nortjè will testify that usually with these covert operations, they assumed or accepted that it had been cleared up with head office and that this took the route from the Johannesburg Security Branch commander to Brigadier Schoon and then to you ultimately?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore, I would accept that because this was a sensitive operation, that you would have selectively chosen the members who were to form part of this operation?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And it was also a top-down order?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: Then, just for clarification, I'd like to ask you, you mentioned in your evidence that members at Vlakplaas had the opportunity to withdraw if they did not wish to participate in an operation. I'd just like to ask you to give some more details regarding this statement of yours, or perhaps I should put it to you that, or in the way that I understand it, that if a member, due to a personal feeling, didn't feel right in participating in an operation, he would be able to say to you, "I'm not the man for this operation", or "I've arranged for leave", something like that, so therefore there would have been room to withdraw from an operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: However, if a member were to say to you that, "I'm questioning the reasons for the explosion at Khotso House", they didn't have the room to do that and there wouldn't have been the opportunity to withdraw that would have created the impression that this person was not as committed to Vlakplaas as before, or that his loyalty would be questioned, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, members were all extremely committed and loyal.

MS GCABASHE: Could I ask, Colonel, at what stage would they know that they were involved in a bombing, as opposed to say any other form, you know, in terms of this withdrawal, when they could notify that they're not happy about doing it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, what I did was that when you select the group that you were going to use for the task, they were then called to one side and they were informed. I would then, and there are two cases that I can specifically recall where I did this, I would tell the members, after having discussed the matter, I would say, "Come to my office, but come by yourselves", I wouldn't allow these people to raise these issues in front of their colleagues, what it was about were personal feelings of honour, not that the people necessarily had ego problems, but people had feelings and sensitivities, so these people would come to see me one by one and then I would have replaced them.

MS GCABASHE: So this would certainly not have occurred at Honeydew, this is something you would have sorted out at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Oh yes, yes, it was sorted out at Vlakplaas.

MR LAMEY: Colonel, the reason why the members were committed is, as I assume, as you said in your presentation in bundle 4, that the members of Vlakplaas, and I'm here referring specifically to Mr Nortjè, had come a long way with the whole issue of the combating of the struggle from the days of Koevoet, etcetera, and also saw what was happening at Vlakplaas as a continuation of the struggle against the liberation movements who wanted to overthrow the government of the day by means of a revolutionary onslaught, and by means of his background, exposure and experience, he was also, to some extent, indoctrinated in that struggle, as you were?


MR LAMEY: On behalf of Nortjè, I would like to say that you referred to him as a warrant officer, that that was his rank during the operation, but my instructions are that he was a sergeant then?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I might have been confused, he became a warrant officer at some point.

MR LAMEY: And then specifically he was tasked in this case to ensure that the printing press in the basement area was destroyed, that was his focus during the operation, it was to enter the building with Hammond and Le Roux and to see to the printing press?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would concede that.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortjè's recollection is also that there was an indication that there were people present on the very highest level or floor of this building, but that the placement of the charges and the localising of the charges did not create any risk for those people?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, during my observation and that of Sergeant Bosch, it became clear to me that there were people who were actually living in Cosatu House, something which Mr Greyling didn't tell me and which we saw for ourselves as a result of our own observations, and one of the reasons why I say that is, I think it was on the fourth or fifth floor, we saw clothes being hung out to dry on a daily basis, not just as if to air it, but it was actually washing hung out to dry, and that created the impression that people were actually living there, and then in this case fewer explosive devices were used than in the case of Mr De Kock.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortjè was not involved in Mr De Kock, but in the light of what has been said here, it can be said that the explosive devices were fewer?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Just a number of aspects which arises from the application of Mr Mogoai. Mr Chairman, I refer to page 206 to 208 of volume 2 of the bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: 206 to (indistinct)?

MR LAMEY: Oh, that's correct, Mr Chairman. I just want to put it to you that his recollection is that he knew, as an Askari, or let me put it this way first, shortly before the explosion took place that night, he was involved for the first time at Vlakplaas, and he was told at a meeting as to what he must do, namely that he would be one of the people who would approach the guard with spiked beer, it had been spiked, not in the sense that it was life-threatening, but simply that it would eliminate a person on a temporary basis, just by making him dizzy or whatever?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it depended on how much they would have drunk, but it was done to make them drunk and to reduce their powers of observation and reaction abilities, in that sense he's correct.

MR LAMEY: He says that him and Chris Magopa received six Black Label beers each to give to the guards, but in the event they didn't find any guards there and then they went back to their vehicles?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, I don't have a dispute with that.

MR LAMEY: He says that what he learnt at Vlakplaas is that there would be an explosion, magwaina(?), he said that he could recall that you said that "if they can plant bombs, we can do it too". Can you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: No, because then I would have said that to all the other members as well, I wouldn't have told this to the black members individually or in isolation. I have no recollection of that.

MR LAMEY: He said that this was said at a meeting at Vlakplaas early that evening, about six o'clock, when he was called together with other members, I wouldn't say that all the members were present, but there were a group of members present?

MR DE KOCK: I have no such recollection.

MR LAMEY: He can also recall the Demolition Squad of Vlakplaas. Was there such a Demolition Squad, people who were trained in explosives, etcetera, who were involved?

MR DE KOCK: I saw it as my duty, Chairperson, and virtually succeeded in training almost each and every member of Vlakplaas in the handling of explosives and the disposal of explosives and bombs, and there was also a wide variety of courses and lectures given to them, and ultimately virtually all the members of Vlakplaas were qualified in the handling of explosives.

MR LAMEY: He then says that he was also not in a position to question these orders, would you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: No. No, he wouldn't have been able to question it. He might have told me, or he could have told me that he didn't want to go along, and I would have had sympathy for that, but I can't dispute that.

MR LAMEY: Shortly before the operation, would you agree with me that he was involved, on that same evening and not beforehand like the other members?

MR DE KOCK: No, he was one of the older former ANC members, I found him there when I arrived at Vlakplaas and obviously I had that trust in him.

MR LAMEY: But his recollection was that he wasn't specifically given a choice in this matter?

MR DE KOCK: Well it's not that we would have executed him, but I can't deny that or dispute that. What it's about for me is the bomb itself.

MR LAMEY: What he also will say is that he regarded it as an order and that it was action directed at Cosatu, who was a front organisation for the ANC, and that he, for that reason, also believed that the action was one for the combating of the liberation struggle?

MR DE KOCK: I would agree with that.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not quite sure, you were asked whether, or he said he will say he was only told that evening, he wasn't told earlier, at the same time as the other people, did you agree with that, Colonel De Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, yes, I agreed with that. Maybe I should just qualify it by saying that the group, we would have had a group about to do the demolition, and then we started drawing the outer circles, and on the need to know basis, well one tried to stick to that need to know basis of operation.

MR LAMEY: And he will also testify that he regarded you as the law at Vlakplaas, you as the commanding officer, and he wouldn't have dared to question any orders. I just want to ask you, an Askari was in a slightly different position, am I right? They were people who had been members of the former liberation movements and who had within themselves probably come to the realisation that their conduct at all times should be such that there could be no whiff of disloyalty or cause any suspicion whatsoever?

MR DE KOCK: There were some of these former ANC members who asked for transfers and they received the transfers. Others asked to be released from this obligation and they left the Force. Yes, obviously they wouldn't have wanted to attract any suspicion and they built in a Counter-Intelligence unit at an extra salary, I wanted to make sure that I wouldn't have any deserters so that I would just find my farm empty one morning, but Mr Mogoai was one of the loyal members, he's one of the pillars of Vlakplaas there.

MR LAMEY: He will also say that you were a strong leader and a fairly authoritarian leader, and that, because you also exercised strict discipline, he had respect for you and a measure of fear and awe?

MR DE KOCK: I don't want to actually follow Napoleon's point of view here... (intervention).

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey, I don't think it's being disputed that your client acted on the orders and instructions of Mr De Kock and that he obeyed those orders, and it is clear on the evidence that the foot soldiers received and obeyed orders from above.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases the Committee, that was the last aspect. Regarding the matter of the R200,00 which he received the next day from Simon Radebe, and I understand that it came from you, or he understood that it came from you and that it was in a way a sort of an award or a compensation for his involvement in the action, and he says that that evening after the action had taken place, he also attended this social function.

MR DE KOCK: I can't dispute that. I told you my speculation on this point yesterday, and I can't tell you with any degree of certainty exactly how it happened, but I can't dispute that. What I will dispute is that they were paid for the work. They were not paid for the work, because that would not have been sufficient compensation or reward.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I've got no further



MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Jansen on behalf of applicant Ras.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Mr De Kock, is it correct that in 1987 Vlakplaas was already a fairly large unit, much larger than it had been at the outset?

MR DE KOCK: Correct, yes.

MR JANSEN: Mr Ras says that he stands to be corrected on this point, but he thinks that there were more than 50 people at Vlakplaas at the time?


MR JANSEN: In 1987, Vlakplaas had already been involved in numerous operations, covert operations?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: Which, amongst others, also entailed the death or killing of people?

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR JANSEN: Although Cosatu, I should put it on record that Mr Ras is only implicated or involved in the Cosatu incident, although there were certain new characteristics of Cosatu House, because it was an action which took place in a high density area, but the actual destruction of property was nothing new or strange for the average Vlakplaas operative at the time?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is something which had come from the days of Koevoet in the north of South-West, and also when we did cross border operations in Angola, so it is with some difficulty that one could actually abandon the norms that one learnt in the north and act differently here in the country.

MR JANSEN: Now the problem with Cosatu House, and which took up a lot of your time and planning, was to ensure that nobody lost their lives or were injured in this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR JANSEN: The damaging of the property was business as usual, to put it in that way?

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR JANSEN: And with your knowledge of Vlakplaas and the context in which it operated and the situation in the country, which was actually on fire at the time, the issues as to whether a person was actually acting within the scope of his authority or implied authority would actually have been an academic exercise to a large extent, those operatives would simply have said, "This is an order, an operation is imminent, it's important that everybody do exactly as they were told"?

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR JANSEN: As it pleases, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions. Sorry, Mr Chairman, there was just one aspect which I had to put, which I did not. Mr De Kock, there's just one issue that I still want to ask you and it regards a slight difference on the facts, it's not really serious, Mr Ras’ recollection, and as it is also set out on page 202 of his application, volume 1, he says that from Cosatu House, this mini-bus, which he drove to Cosatu House, this mini-bus went directly back to Pretoria, that's the second-last paragraph from the bottom. Did I understand your evidence correctly that you said the vehicles went back to Honeydew, to the house at Honeydew?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because as far as I can recall, we had to switch number plates and licence discs and so on had to be switched, and the arms had to be handed back, that is my recollection, that I saw the mini-bus there, but I can't actually dispute it, that is my recollection.

MR JANSEN: As it pleases, Mr Chairman, no further questions.


MR RADITAPOLE: Thank you Chair, Raditapole on behalf of Cosatu.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RADITAPOLE: Colonel De Kock, this story about Mr Zeelie, the plastic bags and the bombs, where did you hear it from?

MR DE KOCK: I heard this by means of the direct words and evidence of one of my members, and the whole time I thought that it was either Mr Vermeulen or Mr Willie Nortjè who had used those words, that's my recollection, I may be wrong, but that is the first picture that springs to mind.

MR RADITAPOLE: And was there an indication about where his instructions would have come from?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at that stage, I didn't know.

MR RADITAPOLE: Subsequently did you ever get an idea about where he might have got his instructions?

MR DE KOCK: No, I wasn't there, I only came into the picture as from the second attempt, it now appears.

MR RADITAPOLE: If you could just put volume 3 close by you, I'm going to be referring to it quite extensively. At page 458 there's a discussion about orders to shoot, to shoot anybody that might have disturbed you, and you state there that those orders came directly from General Erasmus. Now, during the cross-examination yesterday, you sort of indicated that it didn't necessarily mean that you would shoot policemen. I was just a bit confused, because you seem quite certain that the instructions were that if anybody came upon you who disturbed the operations that they should be shot, including policemen. Could you just clarify the situation?

MR DE KOCK: Obviously, by virtue of the nature of this operation, your own people get preference, your own operatives get preference, we all wanted to go home, and those who opposed you, you would have to do what you had to do, and that's also why we had the necessary weapons. If a night watchman approached us, and I shudder to think what might have happened, what would have happened, he would most probably have lost his life, I can't or couldn't have allowed him to raise the alarm or to identify us, because then the bona fides of this entire covert operation would have been blown, and I believe that it would have led to the loss of his life.

MR RADITAPOLE: Okay, so that's in relation to a night watchman, what about a policeman, a comrade of yours?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would most probably have led to a shooting. If the police got a message that there was a group of men with weapons in a back yard and dressed in civilian dress, then the police, if they would approach us, would already have been armed, they would not have approached us on the footing of being co-colleagues, because we weren't dressed appropriately, they would obviously have shot at us, I believe we would have shot first, because the second place in a shooting match is a grave, and I was not prepared to take my people to the grave, and it would most probably have led to the deaths of policemen, and that would most definitely have led to the fall of the National Party and the government.

MR RADITAPOLE: And I mean obviously this mission was high priority, wasn't it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that was the impression I got.

MR RADITAPOLE: So you would have taken General Erasmus’ instructions seriously?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did take it seriously.

MR RADITAPOLE: So that's clarified, we are clear, this was a serious instruction, if policemen came upon you, you were to shoot them if they were to interfere with that operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that would have been the only way out, because otherwise then, in the position with Cosatu House, we were actually trapped between various buildings in a small backyard, so there was no escape route other than to actually just go right over your enemy or your opposition.

MR RADITAPOLE: And I understand that, I mean on your own, you may well have done that, but the point is, there was an instruction and you took that seriously?


MR RADITAPOLE: Right, if you can turn to page 460 then. You speak about commendations, that you received the Star of Excellence and so on. You then state there that the awarding of this commendation can only be authorised by the State President himself. Could you just clarify this, is this something you know for sure?

MR DE KOCK: That's right, I'm not quite so familiar anymore with the standing orders of the time, but certain types of medals could be approved by the Commissioner and others by the minister, but in the case of, for instance, a decoration which could only be awarded to a general, that was referred to the State President for his approval.

MR RADITAPOLE: And this was for your work in London, the bombing in London?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, amongst other things.

MR RADITAPOLE: Would it be fair to say to you that, having been commended for bombing in London, that you, by P W Botha, that an instruction then, a later instruction from him to commit another bombing, although in South Africa, was not a very, very strange thing, as such.

MR DE KOCK: No, it caused some concern for me, because there was almost a shifting of boundaries, we were no longer acting outside the borders, but we were actually acting internally.

MR RADITAPOLE: No, I understand that, and I'm going to come to that in a moment, the point I'm making is, the fact that, you know, a State President could award you medals for illegal work outside of the country would have meant in a way as much as it was a change of strategy, you weren't surprised that you'd get instructions to bomb, to commit a similar illegal act?


MR RADITAPOLE: You see where I'm going, I understand that there was a concern that there was a change of strategy, but it was within the bounds of what this State President would do?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was, in a covert sense, lawful and acceptable, as such.

CHAIRPERSON: A covert thing, what did you say, lawful and acceptable?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. You see, obviously a covert operation is already an indication that there is an element of dishonesty, somebody's rights are going to be violated, somebody's house is going to be broken into or he's going to be killed, but here we already had a pattern, it was no longer as if it was something entirely strange.

MR RADITAPOLE: Okay, if you could turn to page 462. This is where you speak about the visit by Mr Vlok and generals and the congratulations. Can you recollect whether there was any reference to the State President in this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, I have no such recollection that there was any reference to the State President, I have no recollection whatsoever.

MR RADITAPOLE: If you'd turn to page 466. Here you speak about your requiring some reassurances in terms of how high up the instructions came from, and then in the third paragraph you mention that you were called in by Schoon and he was quite irritated. What did he call you in for?

MR DE KOCK: He called me in to inquire from me as to why the place had not yet been blown up and why it was taking us so long, and that is why I reacted in the way that I did, which is actually quite an unusual reaction to have against a senior officer, especially somebody of Brigadier Schoon's stature, it's not something which I would normally have said to such a senior officer.

MR RADITAPOLE: You say it's your reaction to say "P W Botha can blow it up himself"?

MR DE KOCK: Then he should rather have done it himself, because I was not prepared to sacrifice any of my people or to be caught. We would either do it well or not do it at all, there was no middle course.

MR RADITAPOLE: And what was Brigadier Schoon's response to your response?

MR DE KOCK: He gave me more time.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, sorry, I'm going to be jumping about a bit, I'm going to try and follow the sequence which you were cross-examined and led. At page 468, there's reference here to terminology, and there's been cross-examination also around terminology. Now, if you were told directly that, look, this place is a problem, a particular place is a problem, and let's take Khotso House, the SACC is giving difficulties, we need to do something about this building to render it unusable, how would you have understood that instruction?

MR DE KOCK: I would have asked, "How do you want me to disrupt this building, by means of fire, by means of liquid poured over the floors"... (intervention).

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, I think the translation might have been different, but the question was that you should render it unusable, not disrupt it.

MR DE KOCK: Well then there are only two ways that I know of, you'd either blow up the building or burn it down, I don't know of any other method.

MR RADITAPOLE: Would you accept that in fact this was the instruction of P W in relation to Cosatu House and to Khotso House?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR RADITAPOLE: And then, coming to the Cosatu House operation, how did you collect your intelligence, I understand you did your own reconnaissance and so on, did you receive your intelligence from other sources also?

MR DE KOCK: This is Cosatu House?

MR RADITAPOLE: Cosatu House, ja.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the information which I received from Colonel Deon Greyling was so sparse and of such little value that it was not possible for me to rely on that or to formulate some definite action from that in order to actually launch an action. It was necessary for me to gather my own information and plan from the information which I gathered.

MR RADITAPOLE: Yes, what I want to understand is where you gathered your information from, the sources of your information?

MR DE KOCK: It was personal and physical on ground level and also from the sky. I didn't have an inside source in Cosatu House, I had no access to the building.

MR RADITAPOLE: Did you use informers at all, any other informers?

MR DE KOCK: I had quite a number of sources, but they were not centralised in Johannesburg and also not specifically in certain buildings, we moved on a national basis and it was task-oriented counter-terrorism.

MR RADITAPOLE: Ja, no, no, I'm not talking in broad, general terms, just to find out whether, where I'm going to is to find out whether insider, any Cosatu-affiliated person may have assisted you?

MR RADITAPOLE: No, Chairperson, and I also had no idea or notion that there may be sources within Cosatu, that was purely on a need to know basis.

MR RADITAPOLE: And then this unreliable information from Greyling, for example the hand-drawn sketch of the basement, do you know where he got that from?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I have no idea.

MR RADITAPOLE: And do you know where he got the information about the printing press from?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I could speculate, but that would not be the objective. Unfortunately I don't know.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, in relation to the spiked beer and the security guard, whose idea was this?

MR DE KOCK: That was my own idea.

MR RADITAPOLE: I'm just struggling to understand the rationale behind the idea, I mean the guy, a person is a security guard, with a responsibility to watch a building, did you expect that some strangers would walk up to him and offer him beer and he'd drink the beer? I'm just struggling to understand this.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it's simply one of the facets which I used to monitor the guards. If we would be busy at the back and he would suddenly run to the back, then the two members would be able to warn me, they had a radio, but from personal experience, I served for ten years in the uniform branch and I also walked quite a number of beats, and I must say that I found very few sober night guards in my experience, to the extent that I would have to wake the night guard up and tell him, "Look, you've been burgled", and from that viewpoint, I tried inasmuch as possible to establish an early warning system for those who were active and would have to take very unpleasant field decisions. I'm not a perfectionist, but we tried, inasmuch as possible, to give the operative on ground level a chance to avoid being in a difficult position.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now if you could turn to Annexure G, that's the list of incidents, Annexure G. Annexure G then is that list of individual incidents related to attacks on Cosatu and individuals and so on. Do you have any knowledge about any of the incidents listed in there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, apart from Khotso House and Cosatu House, I can refer to page, if you'll just allow me to find it, I can refer to page 5, or at least page 443 of Annexure G, incident No 33:-

"A bomb exploded at Community House in Cape Town. Weekly Mail 20.5.88."

If I have the date correctly, then that would have been one of our tasks, or one of our explosions, and I haven't found it here, but the fire at Khanya House here in Pretoria, on a local level, was also one of our tasks.

CHAIRPERSON: Khanya House was not Cosatu, that was a church?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct. From this entire list, and I have studied it, I cannot find anything else that we were involved with.

MR RADITAPOLE: Well, can you just, let's just talk about that item 33, bomb at Community House in Cape Town. Can you just tell us a bit about that incident, how you got involved and where the instructions came from and so on?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was a request which was directed from the Western Cape Security Branch, and I think at that stage the head of the investigation of terrorism desk was either Colonel Nel or Smit, Colonel Smit, and the request came from him to one of my members, I can't remember who it was that was working there at that stage. I took it to Brigadier Schoon and he told me that we could provide assistance. I went down to Cape Town and the divisional commander of the Security Branch at that stage was Brigadier Coetzee. Brigadier Schoon also flew down to Cape Town, and that morning we held a meeting in Brigadier Coetzee's office, the then Brigadier Schoon and myself as well, Colonel Smit and there were also two or three other members present. We then decided to continue with the blowing up of this facility.

MR RADITAPOLE: And who comprised your team?

CHAIRPERSON: We've discussed this yesterday. I know that you are interested, for the sake of your clients, in getting all this information, but has it any relevance to the inquiry we are conducting, which is an application for amnesty in respect of three other events?

MR RADITAPOLE: Chair, I'll leave it there, save to say that the whole concern that Cosatu has about those three events is, well about the incident against Cosatu, is that that wasn't a once-off incident and that it's related to others, and therefore that it can be taken out of context. I've said this before, but I'll leave this issue.

CHAIRPERSON: I didn't stop you to inquire as to whether it was planned, but now you are starting to get down to the level of who your team was, which has certainly got nothing to do with the general picture.

MR RADITAPOLE: Were... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going on to something new now?

MR RADITAPOLE: No, Chair, I'm still on this issue. Did you get to learn what the reasons were for blowing up, for the instruction to blow up this building?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, is that with regard to Community House?

MR RADITAPOLE: Yes, indeed.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the Community House in Cape Town had just been completed, it was a brand-new building and within two or three days from the building being put to use, a variety of affiliates of Cosatu would use the building, and if my recollection is correct, the bank accounts of the Western Cape were in the red as a result of the construction of this building.

MR HUGO: If I might just intervene, Chairperson, I don't want to be unnecessarily obstructive, but this is the subject of another amnesty application. The details thereof are contained in the other amnesty application and I think that we are now approaching the level of delving too deeply into political motivation and political reasons, which really do not form part of the current discussion.

CHAIRPERSON: The political reasoning may be, if there's going to be a suggestion that what we have been told about Cosatu House was not true, there hasn't been a full and frank disclosure because there were other reasons for other attacks, but, so I think we can ask if he knows if he was told why the attack had to be carried out, was it a political reason?

MR DE KOCK: It would have made it impossible for Cosatu, and of course the affiliates who would be working there, on the one side, if the building were to be destroyed or rendered unsafe. Secondly, it sent them into bankruptcy, and I will explain further after this, and if there were any actions to be launched from that building for civil disobedience, which could have led to violence, any such activities would be cut down. It was also a question of complete disruption. In order to explain further, there was a telephone interception between Bishop Tutu and another person, when he was informed that night that the building had been destroyed or severely damaged. He was highly upset and practically in tears, and the nature of his remarks were, "Now we don't have any money left, we're bankrupt". That's basically as far as I can go at the moment, without letting myself in any further.

MR RADITAPOLE: Ja. Look, I don't want to prejudice your other applications, it's just a question of trying to find what the situation was. Now if you refer to item 20 on Annexure G.

CHAIRPERSON: No, if you refer to your watch, you will see it is now the time for the adjournment.

There are two matters I would like to dispose of. Firstly, I would like to thank somebody whose identity is at present unknown to me for the photographs of the buildings, two photographs of the buildings they produced this morning, whoever it was, thank you very much.

And secondly, you may have been told that there are problems in this building at the moment with the water supply. In consequence of that, we have decided we will adjourn, take the long adjournment from 1:00 to 2:00, we hope by that time, the problems will have been sorted out.




MR RADITAPOLE: I'd just like to place something on record relating to the inquiries about Cosatu's property that was confiscated. I've been having formal chats with General Van der Merwe, who was keeping me up to date about the investigation. He's now handed me a letter from the commander at Johannesburg Central Police Station, confirming that these items are no longer available. So I thought I should just place that on record, that that puts that matter to rest. These are items that were confiscated at Cosatu House during various raids, it was just a request that was a request that was made earlier.

CHAIRPERSON: General Van der Merwe, was you will recollect, undertook to make inquiries, and he obviously has made inquiries and this is the information as a result. Thank you, and thank you, General.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RADITAPOLE: (Continues) The Community House bombing, you referred to this telephone call that was intercepted that involved Bishop Tutu. Would you agree, in a sense, that this confirmed that the churches were in an alliance of some sort or were supportive of the trade union movement?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I think it's just the question that he was notified and by nature of his prominence I can remember, but I can't say that there was inter-action between the churches and the trade unions, because that was not at all within my line function or my line, as such.

MR RADITAPOLE: Okay. Which, ja in fact talking about churches, just reminds me, when I referred you to Annexure G, you said you'd looked through this but you didn't see a reference to Khanya House?

MR DE KOCK: No, can you assist me?

MR RADITAPOLE: No, no, there isn't, but I'm just wondering why you mentioned that? I'm inviting you to say whatever you want to say about Khanya House.

MR DE KOCK: Well it's not much more, sir. It's merely that it was a further part of a pattern, in this case the building had to be burnt down, the order came from Brigadier McIntyre who was the head of Stratcom at security head office, and later when we deal with the political aspects it will be discussed further.

This building was 30 metres away from 400 policemen living in an old hotel that had been transformed into a - I think we will discuss that later, and Brigadier McIntyre should of course be given notice about this.

MR RADITAPOLE: Okay, fair enough. If you, at tea-time, before I was referred to my watch, I was about to refer you to item 20 on page 3.


MR RADITAPOLE: This was another bomb blast at the same, at that Community House, do you know anything about this blast, or did you ever hear anything about it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. As I recall, and my recollection may be faulty, which I wouldn't concede very easily at this stage, it could be that the CCB was involved in this operation. I know that the CCB at one stage blew up a building in Cape Town, The Early Learning Centre, if I remember correctly, but personally I know only about the one Community House which we blew up, it was a brand-new building and it was about two or three days away from occupation and usage. That's all that I can mention about that.

MR RADITAPOLE: Okay. And then in relation - do you know of any other incidents, similar incidents to these that are listed here, against Cosatu or its affiliates?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we were not asked about any other actions.

MR VISSER: I do believe, I mentioned to you this morning that there was a matter which we wanted to rectify in the evidence of General Van der Merwe, and I'm sorry to interrupt now, but it seems to be imminently relevant to the very questions that my learned friend is putting now, and perhaps I may be in dereliction of duty if I don't mention it now.

Mr Chairman, very briefly, General Van der Merwe, when he was cross-examined about Exhibit G, and particularly asked about, as far as his knowledge was concerned, in how many of those incidents the police might have been involved. Part of his answer was this, he said he would have expected that if policemen were involved in some of those incidents, that they would have applied for amnesty, and he added, you will recall, Mr Chairman, that they would have been stupid not to have done so.

Now he has thought about that, and something has occurred to him which had slipped his mind, and he says, and he's asked me to rectify this, and if needs be, he will go back into the witness box at an appropriate time to explain the fact that he had forgotten about the factor that I'm going to tell you about now.

Mr Chairman, General Van der Merwe at another occasion told you that prior to a decision being taken by members of the police to apply for amnesty and to co-operate with the process of amnesty with the TRC, there were meetings, and he told me last night that he recalled after his evidence that there was one and at that meeting they obtained the services of a certain person from the old indemnity office, and I'll come to explaining that in a moment, to come and inform them as to the validity of indemnities which had been granted to certain policemen in terms of the 1990 Act, it is Act 35/90. Mr Chairman perhaps I should straight away refer you to that Act. I haven't got the Act before me, but Mr Chairman it is the Indemnity Act No 35/90, as amended by the Indemnity Amendment Act 124/92, and that Act, Mr Chairman, in section 2 provided that:-

"The State President may, by notice in the Government Gazette, grant indemnity to any person or category of persons in respect of any event or category of events specified in the notice."

It was a very wide indemnity provision, and section 2.2 then proceeded to say that:-

"In the event of any such indemnity having been granted, there shall be no process, either civil or criminal, instituted against any such person having been granted indemnity."

Now, Mr Chairman, it is common knowledge that a large number of policemen were granted indemnity in terms of that Act, and that was the reason why the person from the indemnity office was called and asked to address the policemen on that score.

General Van der Merwe tells me, and if needs be he'll come and testify to that, that they were informed that that was a good indemnity and it was a valid indemnity, but this person's view was, if you want to make doubly certain, if you want to wear belts and braces, perhaps you should apply for amnesty before the TRC in regard to those incidents for which you had obtained indemnity in terms of the Indemnity Act again. What has occurred to General Van der Merwe is that his reply to you might have been misleading insofar as there may be policemen who were involved in some of the incidents which are referred to in Exhibit G, which had not applied for amnesty on the strength of the assurance that their indemnity was a valid indemnity, and therefore his reply was, to that extent, not quite correct.

I don't know whether my learned friend - but I believe that it was fair that we should mention it now, Mr Chairman, and if needs be, General Van der Merwe can come back at an appropriate time to take more cross-examination on that issue, if needs be.

CHAIRPERSON: I can't really see the necessity for that, I think it is information, but I don't think that counsel is going to rely on the fact that a policeman hasn't applied for indemnity as an indication that the police didn't commit the act.

MR RADITAPOLE: Thank you, Chair. Ja, I'd leave this in your hands, Chair, I won't take it any further. I'm just trying to remember where I was. I forgot now. Oh, I was asking you about other incidents.

CHAIRPERSON: You were asking about the bombing of the - the two bombings at the Community House and the colonel said he only knows of one, two days after the building had been completed.

MR RADITAPOLE: Yes, thank you, Chair, I have found myself now, thank you. Now, Colonel De Kock, if you look at Annexure G, would you, and analyse it, what impression would it give you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that there was a continuous, constant sabotage of Cosatu and its affiliates, and I'd like to qualify by saying that if we put this next to the issue involved, there must be other State departments who also had covert wings. I'm not trying to put the blame on anybody here, but it simply follows logically.

MR RADITAPOLE: I think you've already, in other words you'd agree that it seems there was a campaign against Cosatu?

MR DE KOCK: In consideration of these documents, there can be no doubt.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, of course, the way things operated, you wouldn't know about a plan, you know a planned campaign, because you got orders on a, instructions came on an ad hoc basis, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, we wouldn't have known about a broad plan.

MR RADITAPOLE: In fact will you agree that that situation applies generally to all your other operations, you'd get instructions to do particular things, you wouldn't necessarily know within what framework you were doing it or for what purpose, but you took instructions and carried them out?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: And this brings me to page 507 then, back to volume 3, page 507, there you speak about this General McEwan.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: And you talk about a form of operating on what you call a one to one basis to ensure that politicians, in a sense to ensure that politicians are protected from the acts of operatives, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, can you just tell us a bit about your understanding of this doctrine, of General McEwan's doctrine? I want to relate, I'm asking you this to relate it to what was said in evidence earlier by, I think it was Mr Vlok who said they were told the what and then the how was left to other people, and I'd just like you to relate your understanding of General McEwan to that evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the person on ground level, and I will provide an example which occurred locally in the RSA with regard to a cross border operation, it boils down to the fact that firstly the government of the day should not be embarrassed, that it would be able to deny any knowledge.

Secondly, it would give the politicians and the commanders serving below them the opportunity to undertake damage control. That would also boil down to the principle of denial, cover-up, distancing, and we can look at the instance where two members of the Special Forces or CCB were detained in Botswana after a shooting incident during which a Botswana policeman received 22 bullet wounds and survived, the government denied that these people were working for the Defence Force, that they were actually working for the RSA government, although the CCB formed part of the Special Forces component, whether General Malan likes that or not.

It offers the opportunity to government to distance themselves completely and ultimately walk away freely from this situation, and it works on a one to one basis, because whose word will be accepted, the word of a general or the word of a major? They could say that the major is a rogue and he may not be that, but he would ultimately be the victim of a wider pressure group from above, and that's basically the situation.

MR RADITAPOLE: And you'd agree again it's the same thing, who would be believed, P W Botha or yourself?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, they would never have believed me.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now that brings us to page 509 of volume 3, the last paragraph where again the question of the identity of the source of the instructions is investigated. You seem almost like 110% certain that it was from the State President. Can you explain this, why you are so certain?

MR DE KOCK: Because, and the reason is ambivalent, firstly it was conveyed to me by Brigadier Schoon, a man of unquestionable integrity, I would have believed him above a church minister. Secondly, the declarations were approved by the State President, and that once again confirms what he said to me later.

MR RADITAPOLE: If you then go on to the next page, the third paragraph, you refer to General Erasmus being an informed general, this is now when you get to Honeydew... (intervention).

MR DE KOCK: On which page are we?

MR RADITAPOLE: 510, page 510.

MR DE KOCK: Okay, thank you.

MR RADITAPOLE: There in the middle. There you are referring to General Erasmus being an informed general.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: And by that you meant he knew already about the operation?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: And have you any knowledge about from whom he would have obtained knowledge?


MR RADITAPOLE: Now, what would you say, what would your comments be to a view that you are trying to implicate P W Botha and so on out of spite that, because of your current circumstances, because you feel betrayed, that you are now trying to bring everybody down with you, what would your response be to that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it has nothing to do with that. I could be subpoenaed under certain sections, I think it's actually section 29 if I'm not mistaken, of the Truth and Reconciliation Act, and then I would be compelled to testify, and if I was under oath, I would have to decide whether or not I would once again break the law, so it's not even about that. From an emotional view, it took me three days before I decided that I would testify against former President Botha. One retains that feeling of reverence or respect, and at times it is substituted with a feeling of betrayal, but I believe that's because we are human, and it's not about embitterment. However, I feel that it is my duty, and I wouldn't be an officer of any nature if I didn't see to the needs of those below me. This is about the foot soldiers below me, those who worked with us in the execution of these duties and that's what officers are there for. Their function is not only to lead and to drink their port or wine.

MR RADITAPOLE: Colonel, I hear you and I don't want to take issue with you, but I'd like you to explain further what you've said in the light of what you've said now, in the light of what you say at page 467 of volume 3, which I am, I'm going to read into the record. I'm sort of from about one third of the way down, you speak about being sold out, it's about the 14th line, you say:-

"I'm talking specifically of the police in the army, especially the Special Forces, have been sold out by cowardly politicians in the National Party especially. They want to eat lamb, but they do not want to see the blood and the guts. They are cowards. They will remain that and their so-called cover of respectability is but..."

that's indistinct:-

"...that is all. Furthermore, is that seeing that the politicians does not have the moral fibre nor the guts, I myself personally as a lowly colonel and a lowly academic here and then later on will take responsibility for all the members in the South African Police and Security Police, as well as those members in the army and the Special Forces for their actions which did occur within the framework of the incitement of the politicians and the gaoling for the volk and fatherland syndrome. We did well, we did the fighting, I'm proud of that, but the politicians know they have no pride, they made sure that they only looked after a small 5% of their little incestuous Afrikaner group."

Then you go on and on. Now, I'm saying in a sense that would give somebody a perception that well you are bitter, they say well you are bitter, we hear you but you are bitter and you are bringing everybody down with you. Would you care to comment on that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that may create that certain perception with certain people. For those of us who were part of the Forces, it was a general feeling of disappointment to see how people would deny for four or five years, and then eventually, after this time, begin to admit. For me, it was never an issue of embitterment, it's more an issue of repulsion, because those to whom I had looked up had said that if the bugle blows we would storm, and when that time came, they stormed backward. It's not about embitterment, I was trying to say, "Stand up and be the man that you said you were ten or eight years ago".

Once again, it is my duty as an officer to take responsibility for the people below me. I've constantly maintained this vision with the Motherwell Bomb incident, I did it again in George, and I'm doing it once more today.

MR RADITAPOLE: And if you return to page 512 of volume 3, you'll remember in the evidence, and I'm not sure whether it was Mr Vlok or General Van der Merwe, but they spoke of these, the activity of bombing Cosatu House, as a holding action. Do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, they did say that.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, how would you relate that to, well let me put it this way, do you believe that it was a holding action, or do you think it was something else?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that might be the political impression which was created, I can't argue that, I'm not a politician myself, but for us on the ground, and I cannot put it any lighter, and one could put it more crassly, but I won't, but those who were on the ground were in the blood and the guts, that's where we were, people might not want to know this, but that's how it was, it was a man to man situation in which we fought.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I think what was said, and I say this subject to correction, that the witness was being questioned about what was the purpose of destroying a building when they could go and find another building, and I think it was in that context that the witness said no, this was a holding action, it would stop them operating for some time.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I would not know how the Johannesburg region would have handled it, they might have taken action of preventing people from obtaining telephones or removing their post, in 14 days it would have been in full swing, if I had been the manager there, it would have taken place within a question of a week.

MR RADITAPOLE: Also, if you'll recall the evidence by Mr Vlok, he, I'm not going to quote it verbatim, he said something to the effect that, well P W Botha was working towards dismantling apartheid, that they believed negotiations and so on were going to resolve the situation, do you remember that evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do recall it.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, how would you relate that evidence to your evidence about what Mr Vlok said, which you talk about on page 512, this is what he said when he'd come to congratulate you at Vlakplaas, you say at page 512 on the third paragraph:-

"That is incidental, it was the same day when he said we will fight the ANC for the next thousand years, the sort of Third Reich bypassing."

How would you relate that evidence to what was told to you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I understood that we would fight this out to the bitter end, that there would be only one victor, that there would be no form of negotiation, and if it were to lead to negotiation, it would be one of those diplomatic situations where you would be patting the dog's head and with the other hand you'd be looking for a stone to throw at it, that's how I saw it. To me it was "Keep your weapons ready, we'll fight this out to the bitter end". With us there was no other view.

MR RADITAPOLE: In other words, what Minister Vlok told you at Vlakplaas is certainly very different from what he told us previously in this hearing?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. However, I want to qualify by saying that a lot of time has elapsed since then. The blood barons as we were provided, did not take place as it did in Angola and other places. All of these actions have been tempered, and with retrospect, as Mr Vlok and the others have seen it, we were wrong. My perception, and the perception of the man on the ground, was that we would bleed each other dry.

MS GCABASHE: Could I ask you, Colonel, this perception you had, do you think it was as the result of disinformation from your employers essentially, the policy-makers, the politicians, or was it just a matter of burying your heads in the sand and not wanting to deal with what might be happening at a broader political front? Just to help me understand that.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, our perception was that this would be a battle. There was no question of giving over, no member of the police or the military was ever given a white flag, we would not surrender, we would fight to the bitter end, there would be only one victor.

MS GCABASHE: Yes... (intervention).

MR DE KOCK: I hope that answers your question.

MS GCABASHE: I was just trying to understand the information you got that helped form those perceptions, that's really where, I was looking behind the perception.

MR DE KOCK: The interpretation was, "Prepare yourselves for battle".

CHAIRPERSON: Can I suggest, I'm taking this on that it was rather the information you did not receive. You have told us this morning that, "We had one of the best Intelligence services in operation", that if you wanted, if the politicians wanted to find out something, they could have found out, they would have known.

MR DE KOCK: Definitely, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And as I understand your evidence, they never pulled you up when an operation had been done, when things had been done, the politicians never told you not to, they never condemned you for any act, although they must have known what was going on, they must have received reports, they must have read in the newspapers that buildings were being damaged, this Exhibit G, they must have been aware of a campaign like that, but they never took any steps to stop the police, the security forces, from doing it?

MR DE KOCK: That is completely correct, there is no doubt about that.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that what gave you the perception that the war was continuing unabated?

MR DE KOCK: That is absolutely correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr De Kock, what would have been the influence on your men and, or the police officers, if Mr Vlok had come to you and said, "Hold on a minute, we want to negotiate, we're going to surrender", would you have continued fighting?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that happened on the 2nd of February 1990, when President De Klerk made his announcement, and still there was no perception of surrender on our part, there wasn't even any information that there'd be an opportunity for us to get amnesty. The perception which was created within us was, "You will have to pay by yourselves, if we have to sacrifice you, then that's what we'll do", so we could either fight it out and be shot dead, or fight it out elsewhere. There were a lot of problems.

The members amongst Vlakplaas did not present ourselves to the ANC to not establish some kind of cross-pollination, so that we could see that they're not the monsters we think they are, we're not the monsters they think we are. There was a lot of trouble into keeping us apart, and the Security Branch and the NIS, on the other hand, liaised quite often on a daily basis with the ANC.

MR RADITAPOLE: Mr De Kock, can I traverse just one aspect in relation to Annexure G that I omitted, I'd just like to refer you to it? If you look at Annexure G, you'll see that in May of 1987, when Cosatu House was bombed, let me put it this way, in that year, according to Annexure G, there were about 22 incidents against Cosatu and its affiliates, and in May when Cosatu House was bombed, there were eight incidents in that month against Cosatu affiliates, would that strengthen your view and Cosatu's view that in fact there was a serious campaign which peaked at that time?

MR DE KOCK: Certainly, there is no other inference to be drawn.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, in your cross-examination I think by Advocate Booyens, there's a reference to Mr Kock, the lock-picking expert... (intervention).

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: ...and you testified that to access his services you would have had to go through Wahl du Toit?

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, would you have had to tell Wahl du Toit the reasons why you needed this person, the services of this person?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would probably have given him a brief explanation for this, such as, "There's going to be an action, we're going to need explosives, we need access", but one would keep it brief. Mr Wahl du Toit and I had a very good relationship, I can't recall whether I provided him with more information or details, but it would have been of such a nature that there would have been no doubt within his mind that I required the services of this particular member.

MR RADITAPOLE: At the time you received the instructions about bombing Cosatu House, what were your perceptions about Cosatu as an organisation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they were a very difficult organisation. I saw the activities of Cosatu and its affiliates with a much broader view, and that was the view of guerrilla warfare, not that they were the guerrillas.

One of the basic principles of doctrine in guerrilla warfare is that while you are destabilising the country internally by means of the use of grievances which people have, the things which they are unhappy about, and rightfully so, simultaneously there would be military pressure coming from the external side and then Cosatu and ANC had the advantage of international pressure, especially financial pressure, and the consequence thereof was that there was a division of powers within the country, such as the security forces, the borders were wider, finances and financial expenditure would multiply on a daily basis by 100 from the State Treasury, and it had multiple objectives, and that's why Cosatu had a number of grievances, people don't have the right to vote, they don't have access to the same schools, hospitals and other facilities, which united communities on a national basis, especially the black communities, and that was my view.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, you testified that you were quite surprised by the first instruction, the bombing of Cosatu House, for the reasons you've given, it was now internal?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: And then you went on though to say that you were not surprised by the second instruction in relation to Khotso House, do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: Why was this the case?

MR DE KOCK: Because the line was exactly the same. The Intelligence and action or modus operandi was exactly the same.

MR RADITAPOLE: And can you just tell me this, if you were given an instruction based on information which you doubted, which was a bit dubious, what was the position, would you continue and carry out the instruction?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. With cross border operations, I would ensure that my own people, before the operation took place, I would send my own people in to make observations. In that type of situation one would only trust yourself and your own people.

MR RADITAPOLE: I'll tell you why I'm asking you this, it relates to Khotso House and some of the motives for bombing it. You will recall, well as I recall, one of the motives was that there were explosives kept in the building.

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, you testified that in the original plan there were about 150kg of explosives and you reduced that, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: Because there was this whole issue about uncontrollable damage and you told us about the kind of energy that is created by explosives, do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, about 150, that was the suggestion, that was the sort of request or idea.

MR RADITAPOLE: Yes. And you reduced it because you thought it was too much, that there would be this - cause more damage than it was meant to?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR RADITAPOLE: Now, did you have any Intelligence about the amount of explosives that could possibly be in Khotso House?


MR RADITAPOLE: You see I ask you this because if there were explosives there and there was this concern to reduce the possibility of damage to other buildings, if there were explosives there, those explosives, combined with the reduced amount of explosives that you would have brought in, may have created much more damage than you may have anticipated, isn't that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, if we had placed the explosives right on top of the explosives which allegedly were there. With explosives the situation of storage would lead to a space which was known as the detonation gap. There wasn't anything like sympathetic detonation, and sympathetic in this context means that if one explosion occurs, it would not lead to the explosives next to it going off either, the gap would be too wide, and the energy release of the one charge would not be sufficient to activate the following charge, just by the way.

Just to explain further, if the explosives which were in Khotso House were on the second, third or fourth floor, it wouldn't have gone off.

MR RADITAPOLE: And if it was in the same vicinity as where the actual bomb was put?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would say that if it had been two or three steps away from our charge, then our charge would have been a complete detonation, the other charge wouldn't have gone off, it would probably just have scattered the explosives all over the area, but we wouldn't have had a detonation. That is my opinion.

MR RADITAPOLE: Colonel, thanks for your evidence. I don't know if you, I'm about to wrap up, I don't know if you wish to say anything to my clients at this stage, I'll give you that opportunity, otherwise that's the end of my cross-examination.

MR DE KOCK: With your leave, Chairperson, when everybody is finished, I would just like a few moments to make a few statements.



ADV MPSHE: No questions, Chair, thank you.



MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, there is one issue if you would allow me. It's not a range of questions, it's just one statement which I would like to put to Colonel De Kock if you will allow me? I neglected to do that when it was my turn. It will be very brief.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Colonel, I'd just like to put it to you, we are aware of all the evidence which has been given by you at various places and that which appears in your affidavit, I would just like to place it on record that inasfar as no action was taken against you regarding every single thing that you said, it does not necessarily imply that there is agreement with everything that you said, and I would just like to place that on record.

CHAIRPERSON: Once again may I point out, this is not a trial where you have to put everything, this is an inquiry, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Yes, that's all I wanted to put on record, thank you, Mr Chairman.



MS GCABASHE: Colonel De Kock, there's just one area that I am still not too sure about. Now you have told us that you tried to be a thorough man in your planning and in the execution of operations, yes?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MS GCABASHE: And with Cosatu House, you were thorough in that you reconnoitred and surveyed and made sure you knew where you were going to and what you were going to do in a period of about a month, roughly?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MS GCABASHE: But when we look at Khotso House, if I understood your evidence correctly, you only spent about a week planning and getting yourself prepared for the operation, you did not go there and reconnoitre and establish who was doing what and what was going on in the area, did I understand that correctly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. Just to qualify, and I said it yesterday, there was an element of urgency to blow up Khotso House, and the reason for that I don't know, I don't know if it coincided with another action, if Stratcom had anything bigger in mind or if they wanted to prevent it by means of that specific disruption, I didn't have enough time. I would have preferred to have two months to reconnoitre the place and smuggle the explosives in piece by piece, for example a kilogram at a time, something in that line.

ADV DE JAGER: Just in conjunction with that, Mr De Kock - ja, okay.

MS GCABASHE: But you see you, with the Cosatu House bombing, actually said to Brigadier Schoon, "You'll have to wait for me to be as thorough as I normally am", and you did just that, you spent your month?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MS GCABASHE: Why didn't you do that in this instance? I hear you on urgency, did you feel that there wasn't room to make that demand in these circumstances?

MR DE KOCK: That's the impression which I had. There was already, as Mr Zeelie informed me, that there was already an attempt and now you're being called in and we need it now, I'm not trying to shift anything away, that was my awareness, that's what I believed at that time.

MS GCABASHE: I have one more question, Chris, I don't know if you want to... (intervention).

ADV DE JAGER: In conjunction with this, that's exactly the question which I wanted to put to you, at Cosatu House you said, "Tell P W he can do it himself if he wants to", why didn't you do the same with the Khotso House incident?

MR DE KOCK: Well it wasn't said to me that this came from P W, I just accepted it like that, but by nature of the urgency, and this wasn't unusual to us to be told, for example, at two o'clock in the afternoon that tomorrow morning at two o'clock you'd be attacking a house in Swaziland, you'd have to get your people together, organise false passports, gather your weapons and the necessary vehicles, race to the border, regroup on the other side and so forth. That impression was definitely created and I acted on that.

MS GCABASHE: And then in a sense this is related to the same aspect, Mr Ntumba, the night watchman who was in the building, from the evidence in either volume 3 or 4, we know that he was there, your instruction was to ensure that nobody was killed?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MS GCABASHE: At Cosatu House you dealt with that, via Mr Mogoai, amongst others. Here you don't appear to have done anything about it at all, because the man was in the building when the floor collapsed below, you know, underneath him?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MS GCABASHE: Can you explain this variation in the way in which you attended to the same instruction?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I can scarcely answer you, everything is connected to an element of haste. It's not that his life was regarded as less important, there might have been other people in the building, but this was a case of get it done and get it over. It was the element of motivation with me.

MS GCABASHE: And had you agreed previously with General Erasmus that they would come and do the clean-up operation, if I might call it that, you know you'd get out and they would deal with the rest of whatever might have to be dealt with?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I didn't arrange that, that was his area of command and that investigation would have been taken up by him automatically, it would have fallen under him automatically. With any explosion in Johannesburg, his people would be involved.

MS GCABASHE: And you didn't specifically discuss it with Zeelie either, at your prior meeting, no?

MR DE KOCK: No, I don't recall that.

MS GCABASHE: Thank you, Colonel.

ADV SIBANYONI: Colonel De Kock, when did you realise for the first time that the battle is now over, because I heard you saying when De Klerk made an announcement on the 2nd of February it was not yet clear to you?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct. Within my unit, and I don't want to speak for every security policeman or every member of the Special Forces, but there was a general feeling of forlornness, of being sold out, there was a feeling of demoralisation, and when Operation Vula took place after that discussion and it was made public, it was simply a question of "There won't be any peace here, this will be a revolutionary take-over". A year before, we had a similar opportunity in Ovamboland, where there were UN troops, peace flags were blowing and the troops were shooting everything that was remotely a Koevoet Casspir, it might have been a sense of paranoia which accompanies this kind of situation, we had the same situation in Russia, where the Russian troops and the KGB decided that they were being sold out by Gorbachev. We must take note of history, because by not learning from history, we repeat history. There was this constant feeling that we fought against these people for 30 years, we might as well just fight it out. That was my framework of relevance.

ADV SIBANYONI: Should I take it that that was your framework until you were requested to take a package, until you were requested to resign?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't ask for a package, it was imposed upon me. I was approached by my opposition to go and work for them. I mentioned to them that after the election, if any posts were advertised, I would apply, but to go over before the time would definitely be treason. It's treason, it doesn't matter in which country, in which part of the world you are. Perhaps I should have grasped the opportunity, but then who would that make me?

ADV SIBANYONI: Who is this opposition?

MR DE KOCK: Members of the ANC's Intelligence Service. I refuse to give their names, they're decent people, and this is the first time that I had actually been able to talk to people and see but they're not actually the way they were presented to us, they are cultivated people, very good academic backgrounds, and let's leave out the aspect of communism, because we might just end up at nationalism, but I couldn't walk over. I knew that we would have a black government, and that's why I joined the IFP. I must have turned left instead of right.

ADV SIBANYONI: One or two last questions, it would appear that the Askaris were given less important roles to play during these operations, and can I ask you for a reason or should I perhaps suggest a reason for you?

MR DE KOCK: If you can make a suggestion?

ADV SIBANYONI: Is it not perhaps because of the fact that they have crossed the floor previously, they were not trusted as much as you trusted the other members of your unit?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is so. I yesterday referred to the case of Judas Iscariot, and we can refer to many, many examples from history. Some of these men we used, only a couple of them, in positions of trust, they were good people, apart from the fact that they had crossed the floor, but if a man has betrayed you once, he can do so again, and I think that was the problem.

ADV SIBANYONI: Thank you, no further questions, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: My first question's an easy one, I hope. I'm not sure if it is on the record, but if it isn't, let's get it on there, what was the date of the London bombing? Not - the year just?

MR DE KOCK: I think it's 1981, sir.



CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. My second question is one that I am very uncertain of myself, and I haven't been able to check it, unfortunately I didn't have all the papers with me last night, my recollection is that I have read somewhere fairly recently of, and I think it was Minister Vlok's visit to Vlakplaas, that when he started congratulating, somebody, an aide of his or somebody else, told him not to talk about the incident?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did that happen?


CHAIRPERSON: Who was it who told him not to talk, can you remember?

MR DE KOCK: It was myself, I asked one of the people just to tell him not to talk about it, because not everybody was aware of it. To just confirm it further, when Khotso House was blown up, that morning at head office some of the section heads who were attached to other desks came and congratulated me with the blowing up of Khotso House.

There were only a couple of us who were supposed to be in the know, and I denied it, until the second one came in and said, "Well, congratulations, we've just heard about it at the general meeting, at the Sanhedrin, congratulations", and I was very embarrassed with a red face in front of all the others, because I just denied it.

CHAIRPERSON: But it was, still there was a cover-up working even, or an attempted cover-up even at Vlakplaas, that the political, other politicians felt it should not be talked about?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, some of these things just couldn't be spoken about.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that now conclude... (intervention).

MR DE KOCK: If I may just be given two minutes?

CHAIRPERSON: ...the questioning? No, you can now, you've asked for two minutes, you can now have your two minutes?

MR DE KOCK: I just would like to say to the South African Council of Churches and Cosatu that I apologise, not only for myself and my men, but also in a broader perspective, for the fact that we caused hurt, injury and disruption, inconvenience, paranoia, all those psychological aspects which were involved, and then secondly, just as in George and at the Motherwell bomb, I take responsibility for all the men who were with me, those who were co-opted and who worked with me, I take full responsibility from my level downwards, I can't unfortunately do it upwards.

And then, this is an extremely sensitive aspect which was raised here, I don't want to talk about Askaris, white or black Askaris, we must simply accept that certain things happen in life, changes as those that we saw were dramatic as well as traumatic, and people differ as far as their resistance and strengths were concerned, and each one of us here should just have mutual understanding for those that we thought betrayed us.

Let there be no hate and malice, let there be no pointing fingers and feelings of revenge. In time these things will sort themselves out. When my little boys started realising what was happening, I told them, "You can either be an eagle or you can be a chicken, an eagle can rise above these things and see the full picture, well if you want to remain at the bottom, then you don't have much of a perspective".

I can't pretend that the Vlakplaas people were more noble than they were, but they were good men.

I have finished, thank you, Chairperson.

MR HUGO: May he be excused, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: I take it you want him to remain at the hearing?





DATE: 30TH JULY 1998



DAY : 9


MR POLSEN: The next witness will be Colonel Kendall. If that suits everybody, could I go ahead?

A C KENDALL: (sworn states)

MR POLSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, before I lead the evidence, I asked my learned friend to place before you a small bundle... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Will you wait please. It is impossible, certainly for myself and Adv de Jager, I think for all of us here to see the applicant with that light just behind him, would it be possible for you and the applicant to move up? Perhaps Mr Hugo would be kind enough to let you have his seat.

ADV MPSHE: ...[inaudible] Committee on this applicant, his application is in the bundle, but his counsel has failed to give to the Committee members only the full application which was bound and give it to you this morning. It is the same as in the bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Where in the bundle?

ADV MPSHE: On page 86 in the bundle, page 86, volume 2, but it's the same as the one that was given to you this morning.

MR POLSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I'm indebted to my learned friend for that explanation. The reason why I compiled this little bundle for you is to enable you to be able to judge the merits of the application and whether it falls within the parameters of the Act as prescribed. May I refer you to this bundle?

CHAIRPERSON: Have you put your name on record, I'm sorry, I didn't hear.

MR POLSEN: Sorry, I didn't, Mr Chairman, my name is Graham Polsen of the firm Rooth and Wessels and I act on behalf of the applicant. If you turn to the bundle which I placed before you, you will note that on page 1 is the original application. The application refers to certain incidents which are not relevant at this particular point in time. That application was supplemented at a later stage to add further incidents, and you will find that on page 6, to which I will refer you. Obviously some of the common information is contained in each and every one of the applications.

Now then on page 11 you will find a description of the incidents for which amnesty is applied for in that particular application and they're irrelevant as far as these proceedings are concerned.

If you will then be good enough to turn to page 22, I will ask you, and I've handed that to my colleagues, ask you to read that as part of this application, and it deals with the political motivation which applies in this particular case.

Then, if you go to page 24, it is once again a supplementation of the application and deals with the background of the applicant. Some of it is relevant to this particular portion of the application, particularly, I don't want to deal with the full content of this, because it's irrelevant for this particular application.

Then on page 29 there is a further supplementary notice dealing with an incident under paragraph 9 of the prescribed form, and that is a relevant one in this particular case, and it deals with Cry Freedom, any offence or delict arising from the dummy hand grenade and the planting thereof, and that is a relevant application before you.

And then if you'd be good enough to turn to page 32, that is the same affidavit that is in my learned friends' bundle No 2 on page 87, and deals specifically with the Cry Freedom incident for which application is being made in this instance.

Mr Chairman, I will now present the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you do that, this document you've handed in is, I think, too lengthy to add to volume 2, it will have to be a separate document and I think, for clarity's sake, we should give it an exhibit number, and I think it will be T.


MR POLSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. May I continue, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: I take it we're just going to deal with the factual part, the others, you have drawn our attention to where the matters are dealt with in the affidavit and we can refer to them when we wish to? I don't think it's necessary and I think this applies to all the subsequent applicants who are, as I understand it, all committing acts as a result of the orders they were given, but the background, unless there's anything particular you wish to draw our attention to, we can consider later.

MR POLSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I will be brief with those (indistinct).

CHAIRPERSON: Actually, Colonel Kendall may be a little bit higher than - my remarks may be more apt with regard to the foot soldiers who appear later, I think the colonel may possibly have some responsibility that he wishes to explain, so we won't... (intervention).

MR POLSEN: Okay. Thank you, we've taken note of your comments, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR POLSEN: Colonel, can you tell us, when were you in the Police Force?

MR KENDALL: I joined 9th November 1967, and I left the Force on the 30th of April 1993.

MR POLSEN: What was your rank? 

MR KENDALL: When I left I was a lieutenant-colonel.

MR POLSEN: Can you give us your Force number?

MR KENDALL: 51667.

MR POLSEN: You were involved in the Cry Freedom incident?

MR KENDALL: That's correct.

MR POLSEN: Can you still remember in what way you became involved?

MR KENDALL: Before I do that, I just want to point out that there is a big difference between a landmine and a mini limpet mine. I only noticed now that the application says a dummy landmine, but it's actually a mini limpet mine.

MR POLSEN: Colonel, we'll give you that opportunity to explain that just now, let us just follow the pattern. You were involved in the Cry Freedom incident, is that correct?


MR POLSEN: When was this?

MR KENDALL: It was during 1988.

MR POLSEN: Do you want to continue and to tell us how you became involved?

MR KENDALL: At that stage, I was involved in the Stratcom component of the Security Branch head office.

MR POLSEN: Where is that head office?

MR KENDALL: It was in Pretoria. We were not in the same building as the head office itself, we were in a building on the corner of Pretorius and Bosman Streets.

MR POLSEN: Thank you. So it was in Pretoria. During which year?


MR POLSEN: When did you hear about Cry Freedom for the first time?

MR KENDALL: If I remember correctly, there had been speculation in the press beforehand about this film which was to be screened and that it had been approved by the Censor Board which gave approval for the film to be screened.

MR DE JAGER: Mr Polsen, is he now referring to paragraph 3 on page 32?

MR POLSEN: Yes, and also on page 87 of that bundle, it's volume 2, it's the same statement. You've now heard that Cry Freedom was a film and that it could have a disruptive effect. Where did you hear that from?

MR KENDALL: I heard this from Brigadier Robert McIntyre.

MR POLSEN: Was he your head, was he your boss?

MR KENDALL: He was my commanding officer.

MR POLSEN: What did he ask you to do in respect of Cry Freedom?

MR KENDALL: Brigadier McIntyre was attached to head office, we were in a different building, he came back, I think it was a Friday morning, I don't know for sure anymore, and the film was to be screened from that day onwards in theatres across the country. He put it to us that the Security Police should be notified countrywide that disrupting actions should take place at these theatres across the country. I was given the task of notifying the various departments. I can't remember too clearly whether I did so by telephone, we did so in many cases, we would contact the divisional head, or whether it was done by means of a cryptogram.

MR POLSEN: Could you just tell us, what was the political situation in the country at the time as regards security and the political situation?

MR KENDALL: I would like to link up with what the previous applicants, Minister Vlok, General Van der Merwe and so on have said regarding the political scenario at the time, in other words the political situation of the eighties. It was also my view that it was like a pressure cooker, the security forces simply had to keep the lid on the situation to prevent it from exploding and causing total anarchy and chaos in the country, and it was in this light that I carried out this order and also became involved in the action which I'll describe later.

MR POLSEN: Perhaps you can just describe it for us right now?

MR KENDALL: If I remember correctly, after the various branches or divisions were notified, Brigadier McIntyre and I discussed the issue regarding the theatres in Pretoria, or specifically one theatre... (intervention).

MR POLSEN: Which one?

MR KENDALL: I can't remember the name of the theatre, it was in Esselen Street in Sunnyside. It was definitely in Esselen Street in Sunnyside.

MR POLSEN: It's no longer a theatre today?

MR KENDALL: No, not as far as I know.

MR POLSEN: Please continue. What did you do thereafter?

MR KENDALL: We then decided that, as we had also suggested to the various divisions, that we should make bomb threats to these theatres, and Brigadier McIntyre then contacted the Explosives Department, Mr George Maxwell was contacted, and requested a mini limpet mine, which was totally harmless... (intervention).

MR POLSEN: Is this now Stratcom but not Vlakplaas? You were at Stratcom and not at Vlakplaas, because then you would have known these terms?

MR KENDALL: That is correct, yes. And I've also been out of circulation for a long time, and also a little bit nervous.

MR POLSEN: Can I just point out to you on page 87 of volume 2, you say in your affidavit, or you refer there to a mini limpet mine?


MR POLSEN: And that is what you actually mean and that is what you're applying for amnesty for?

MR KENDALL: Correct, yes.

MR POLSEN: Please continue.

MR KENDALL: I personally went to fetch this mini limpet mine from Mr Hammond in the building where they were. We got back to the office and Brigadier McIntyre called Mr Mogoai, a sergeant, a female constable, I can't remember her name, if you asked me what she looked like, I also would not be able to remember, we decided upon the following strategy: Sergeant Van der Merwe, who was also called in, he was a young man, him and this young police woman would go to the theatre and that they would plant or place this harmless limpet mine in the theatre, they would then contact us again at the office, after which Mr Piet Mogoai would phone the theatre and would then utter a bomb threat, and that is how it worked. These two people went to the theatre, they placed the mini limpet mine, they phoned back to the office and Mogoai then also phoned the theatre and the theatre was then vacated. The explosives experts then searched the theatre, there were even sniffer dogs, as we saw here this morning, but they could not find the mini limpet mine. Thereafter, on the orders of McIntyre, I went to General Van der Merwe, I saw him in General Joubert, who is now deceased, I saw him in that office, and I notified him that the mini limpet mine was still present in the theatre, it hadn't been found. The Saturday evening I saw on the television news that a member of the public had, during that Saturday morning screening, found the mini limpet mine, that the theatre had once again been evacuated and that the whole area had been cordoned off with razor wire, and as far as I know, I think that was the last screening there, and I think then all screenings were stopped throughout the country.

MR POLSEN: Colonel, this landmine, was it charged, was it activated?

MR KENDALL: Once again, it's not a landmine... (intervention).

MR POLSEN: Sorry, it is a mini limpet mine, was it activated?

MR KENDALL: No, not at all, its detonator and even the explosives had been removed from it by Mr Hammond and his department.

MR POLSEN: Is that the reason why the dogs could not find it?

MR KENDALL: There is such a thing as contamination, Chairperson, the smell would always cling to such an object if I remember from my training correctly.

MR POLSEN: Let us hope it's not the same dog as the one that searched the premises this morning.

MR KENDALL: It might be related to it.

MR POLSEN: The fact that the dogs could not find the mini limpet mine and that there was a second disruption was actually a bonus for you, for the whole operation?

MR KENDALL: Chairperson, I would say that one could regard it as a bonus, but the fact that it wasn't traced, well I can't give you an answer about that, it happened so long ago, I really had to dig very deep to actually be able to put these facts on the table today.

MR POLSEN: Now after the operation was completed, did you report back to anybody about it?

MR KENDALL: As I said, that is the only matter on which I reported back regarding disrupting actions at the Cry Freedom screenings. I also can't recall what happened in the other theatres across the country and I can't remember, and this is speculation, whether Brigadier McIntyre made a full report to General Van der Merwe.

MR POLSEN: Just to get back to the political objective which you were pursuing, that is set out on, or in your affidavit, can you confirm that, can you recall that you read it and that you motivated it and that you confirmed it?


MR POLSEN: So in summary it can be said that you come from a conservative Afrikaans background and that you were an active member of the National Party from your early days onwards?

CHAIRPERSON: A member of the National Party?

MR POLSEN: That is correct.

MR KENDALL: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR POLSEN: Which church did you belong to?

MR KENDALL: It was the Dutch Reformed Church.

MR POLSEN: And where did your sympathies lie in the political order of the day?

MR KENDALL: Most definitely with the government of the day, with the National Party.

MR POLSEN: And when you committed these acts, what was your objective? How did you align that with your political views?

MR KENDALL: As I described the security situation just now, as also Mr Vlok and General Van der Merwe described far clearer than I did, one could also state it as follows, or I would like to state as follows, that, I've also listened to the applicant De Kock, that at that time I realised that the National Party was busy moving away from discriminatory legislation, and that the government was under pressure from both the left and the right, from the right wing not to continue, and from the left to actually proceed even faster, and as I've said, the security situation was, as everyone will be able to remember, well it was such that limpet mines were planted, we've heard about the bomb explosions, several buildings were involved, there were strikes, I can't remember correctly, but I think there was a state of emergency at the time, or before or afterwards, so the security situation was such that if the lid blew off, then the country would have been plunged into anarchy and chaos, and that is how I experienced it and what I believed at the time.

MR POLSEN: So your action was aimed at the bolstering of the existing dispensation of the day?


MR POLSEN: As far as the reconciliation aspect is concerned, since these events you've had an opportunity to live in South Africa since 1990, what are your views regarding human relations and your relations with other fellow South Africans?

MR KENDALL: I really believe in reconciliation and I believe that if you keep your ears and your eyes open out there, then reconciliation is actually busy manifesting itself in this country. I would like to add that what I experience today in this country of ours is that sun shines on everybody and I hope that no group will ever again try to just have the sun shine just on them, because then we would have a repeat of the same situation in which I find myself today.

MR POLSEN: I have no further questions.


MR VISSER: Visser, on record, Mr Chairman, I have no questions to this witness, thank you.



CHAIRPERSON: Well, shall we do what we did earlier, has anybody got any questions? Mr Du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, very shortly.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Colonel Kendall, my client, Colonel Hammond, says that he can't recall the incident, and I'm just putting it to you, he can't recall the incident where you got the limpet mine from him, but he says that it is possible, because they regularly made available dummy limpet mines for various purposes, for training and for lectures to the public, etcetera, and he says as well, and you may react to that, that if you came to fetch it from him, you never told him what the purpose of it was and that he would never have known what it was to be used for?

MR KENDALL: Chairperson, as I said just now, I had to dig very deeply into my memory to be able to put these facts on the table today, and I am not going to dispute the matter with Mr Hammond. It is true that on various other occasions I had received certain things from him and other members of the Explosives Unit, and if he can't recall that, well I won't dispute it.

MR DU PLESSIS: You would also not dispute the fact that he says that he didn't know what it was to be used for, or wouldn't have known?

MR KENDALL: No, I can't dispute that.


MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman, on behalf of Mr Mogoai. I just want to place on record that Mr Mogoai is not an amnesty applicant in respect of this incident, but I represent him insofar as he is implicated here by Mr Kendall, and I just want to put Mr Mogoai's version, as instructed by him to Mr Kendall.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Kendall, my instructions from Mr Mogoai, which I want to put to you, is as follows: he was not involved in this incident and inasfar as you've implicated him here, he denies his involvement?

MR KENDALL: Once again, I must say that this incident took place more than ten years ago, I've dug down deeply into my memory to give you these facts as I recall them, I'm not going to dispute this with Mr Mogoai, that's all I can say.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman.


MR DE JAGER: This person who you got to go and help you, was he in your office or did he come from another division, this person that you referred to, Mr Mogoai, was he working in your office?

MR KENDALL: At that stage Mr Mogoai was working for the Stratcom unit.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I just want to place on record that that aspect is not in dispute, he did in fact work in that, among other Askaris as well, also there. Thank you.

MS GCABASHE: Could I just ask briefly, does this mean that you didn't talk to Mr Mogoai at all prior to this about his possible involvement in this, you didn't consult him at all, to help refresh your own memory?

MR KENDALL: No, I didn't, Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV MPSHE: Mr Kendall, did you see the film?

MR KENDALL: Not at that stage, I saw it about two or three years ago.

ADV MPSHE: Is it after the incident or before the incident?

MR KENDALL: No, as I said, at that stage I hadn't seen it, in other words I hadn't seen it before the disrupting action which we took, I saw it about two or three years ago, when it was screened on television, that was the first time I saw it.

ADV MPSHE: Now at that time when you were placing this mini limpet mine, did you know the reasons why you had to do this operation?

MR KENDALL: As I've already said, it was a controversial film, especially given the security situation, which I've already sketched, and the content of the film, according to the higher authority, well I don't know exactly why the order was given, but I think it was because the screening of the film would have aggravated the already bad security situation in the country.

ADV MPSHE: Mr Kendall, am I right that what you are telling us now is what you were told, it's not your personal knowledge?

MR KENDALL: That was my personal opinion at that stage.

ADV MPSHE: But you had not seen the film, how could you come to such a conclusion?

MR KENDALL: The film had been discussed in the newspapers as well, and it dealt with a black activist, Mr Steve Biko, and Mr Donald Woods. Both of these men had been activists in the Eastern Cape, Mr Biko for the Black Consciousness Movement and I can't recall, but I think Mr Donald Woods had been under a restriction or banning orders, and the film dealt, as I also saw later, dealt with the Security Branch in PE's assault on Mr Biko which led to his death.

As we all know, there have been applications for amnesty in this regard relating to Mr Biko's death and I only saw the true facts in the newspaper, and at that stage there were denials from all sides that the security police had been responsible for Mr Biko's assault or anything which led to his death. There was a judicial inquest and no single member of the security police was ever charged after the inquest, so from what I read in the newspapers, the situation was that the security police would have been implicated and portrayed as rogues.

ADV MPSHE: I really wonder what question you're now answering, but let us continue. Did this take-over of this operation bring any political change or confirm any political change there?

MR KENDALL: Could you please repeat the question?

ADV MPSHE: Did this operation, the "ontwrigtingsaksie", bring or cause any political change?

MR KENDALL: Not at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand, it wasn't intended to bring any change, it was intended to prevent further change?

MR KENDALL: That's correct.

ADV MPSHE: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I stand corrected. And that will be all.


CHAIRPERSON: I take it there's no re-examination?

MR POLSEN: There is no re-examination, thank you.






DATE: 30TH JULY 1988



DAY : 9


MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record, there are two witnesses in the same vein. I intend calling Mr Heyneke first, with your permission. You will find his application in volume 2 at page 79, volume 2.

C S HEYNEKE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Heyneke, you are applying for amnesty for any unlawful deeds or omissions committed by you in relation to a bomb threat at the Highgate Shopping Centre in Roodepoort on the 29th of July 1988?

MR HEYNEKE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: I wonder whether it's occurred to anyone, Mr Chairman, it is yesterday, ten years ago. Your application appears in volume 2, page 79 to 85, and you request that the honourable Committee regard it as read in with your evidence?

MR HEYNEKE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You say that paragraph 7(a) and (b) on page 79 are not the correct facts and that you indeed were a supporter of the National Party for the greater part of your life? Mr Chairman, on the same basis could we ask for that amendment please in paragraph 7(a) and 7(b), "Nasionale Party" and 7(b) "ondersteun het" and to strike out the words "not applicable", of "nie van toepassing nie"? Thank you, Mr Chairman.

You were informed regarding the content of certain documents which have been submitted to the Amnesty Committee, Exhibits P45, 46 and 47, and you request that the content thereof also be incorporated in your application, is that correct?

MR HEYNEKE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: You have also been notified regarding the nature and extent of the evidence of ex-Minister Vlok and General Johan van der Merwe which was delivered during this hearing before the Committee, and you also request that that evidence be incorporated with your evidence?

MR HEYNEKE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Your personal particulars have been set out, you were born on the 4th of December 1955 in Johannesburg, you grew up in a conservative family where tasks had to be performed very definitely, your father was a teacher, a school principal and later an inspector of education, and not surprisingly discipline in your household where you grew up was of the utmost importance, is that correct?


MR VISSER: Your police career appears on page 79 and goes on till page 85, and it has been briefly summarised. Is it correct that in September 1996, you were put on sick leave for post-traumatic stress disorder?

MR HEYNEKE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And on the 31st of March 1997, with the rank of superintendent, you were declared permanently medically unfit for service in the South African Police Force?

MR HEYNEKE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: During the relevant incident, you were stationed at the Security Branch in Krugersdorp?

MR HEYNEKE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you briefly tell the Committee what your involvement was? We are aware that General Le Roux has in essence referred to this incident and also described it in essence, but will you proceed to explain your share in the incident?

MR HEYNEKE: Chairperson, this incident is fully described in the application of J H le Roux and I request that the Committee incorporate that with my application. On the 29th of July 1988, I received an order from General Le Roux, at that stage he was a colonel. At that stage he was the divisional commander of the Security Branch on Krugersdorp. His order to me and Lieutenant Louw, as demolition experts, was to create an explosive device and place it at the Highgate Shopping Centre, or at least to allow for it to be placed there. The action, he told us, was aimed at preventing the screening of a film by the name of Cry Freedom.

General Le Roux explained that the order had come from the security head office and that security head office was of the opinion that the screening of the film would influence the climate of unrest and the revolutionary climate at that stage. General Le Roux made it very clear to us in the order that there should be no injury to any person or that no person should be killed and that no damage should be done to property.

MR VISSER: Your political ideas and opinions appear on page 79 to 85 in volume 2. Briefly, is it your evidence that because of your knowledge of the revolutionary climate which existed during 1988, also on the West Rand, that you had the opinion that anything which would aggravate the revolutionary climate had to be avoided at all costs?

MR HEYNEKE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And it wouldn't matter what the film was actually about, as long as there was the opinion that it could influence the revolutionary climate, it was your feeling that steps had to be taken to prevent this?

MR HEYNEKE: That is entirely correct.

MR VISSER: Was that also the reason why you agreed to execute the order?

MR HEYNEKE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And what did you do then?

MR HEYNEKE: At that stage we prepared a harmless device, which was obtained from an information sign, it was fake explosives which were completely harmless.

MR VISSER: This particular explosive, what was it, was it a landmine, was it a mini limpet mine, was it sticks of dynamite?

MR HEYNEKE: Chairperson, I can't remember exactly what it was, but it certainly wasn't a limpet mine or a landmine, it was definitely some sort of commercial explosive, it could have been dynagel or pethalide(?), it was definitely harmless. We fabricated the device and placed it at the Highgate Shopping Centre, at the cinema, in the toilet.

Lieutenant Louw later contacted me via radio and told me that everything was ready, that he had completed his task. From a public telephone box I made a call to the cinema and made a bomb threat. After that, the police called me by radio to the cinema with a message that there was an explosive device in the theatre, that it had been found in the theatre. Upon my arrival at the theatre, this so-called explosive device was pointed out to me by uniformed policemen.

MR VISSER: So the situation here, if one had to speculate, was the following: you make a bomb threat phone call and the theatre management contacts the police, and the police in uniform go to the scene and you were also called. Upon your arrival there, a person from the police uniform branch points out the bomb to you?

MR HEYNEKE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: What happened subsequently?

MR HEYNEKE: I dragged the so-called explosive device outside with a piece of rope, the area had been cordoned off.

MR VISSER: Why did you go through the action of dragging the device out with a piece of rope?

MR HEYNEKE: That was the usual procedure and because there may possibly have been people who could see me from a distance and I wanted to ensure that there be no idea that the device may have been harmless.

MR VISSER: So you were trying to create the impression that this was a real device. What happened then?

MR HEYNEKE: I took it to the parking area, which had been cordoned off, there were no vehicles parked there. However, there was a lot of construction materials and a large heap of sand.

MR VISSER: And you then planted the device along with something else in the heap of sand?

MR HEYNEKE: That's correct, I took the device and buried it very low in the sand, as well as a thunder flash along with it.

MR VISSER: Would you explain to the Committee and other members what exactly a thunder flash is?

MR HEYNEKE: It is a type of explosive device. However, it's not the sort of instrument which could hurt somebody unless it would be restricted. We used it to simulate explosions.

MR VISSER: You said that there was no risk of injury or death or any damage to any property?

MR HEYNEKE: Absolutely not. That's correct.

MR VISSER: If a docket had been opened later and you made statements which were false or in any other way resulted in covering up the involvement of the police, you are simultaneously also asking for amnesty?

MR HEYNEKE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Ja, it's stating the obvious, I suppose, this thunder flash, did you allow it to simulate an explosion in the sand?

MR HEYNEKE: That's correct. I simply did that by means of electrical control.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.


ADV MPSHE: I'm sorry, Mr Chairman, no questions.




DATE: 30TH JULY 1998



DAY : 9


MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, the next witness, and my last hopefully for today, is Johannes Carel Wilhelm Kasparus Louw. He is present and available, Mr Chairman. His application you will find in volume 2 at page 164 to 170.


EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Louw, you are an applicant before this Committee for any unlawful deed or omission committed by you with regard to an action which was executed, which included a bomb threat at the Highgate Shopping Centre in Roodepoort on the 29th of July 1988 with regard to the screening of a film by the name of Cry Freedom, is that correct?

MR LOUW: Yes, that's correct.

MR DE JAGER: Mr Visser, was he involved in the same incident as the former witness, as well as General Le Roux?

MR VISSER: Yes, that's correct, these three witnesses are involved only in this one incident.

MR DE JAGER: If there's anything that he wishes to add to the evidence, or if he differs with any evidence, he is free to point that out.

MR VISSER: Indeed. I would just like for Mr Louw to confirm his application, the truth and correctness thereof, as it has been filed and allow for it to be incorporated in the application. Mr Chairman, in fact this witness had the least to do with this, he was present when the order was received. He assisted Heyneke in manufacturing or obtaining this simulated device, and he placed it in the toilet, and then he went away and had nothing further to do with it. Is that correct?

MR LOUW: That's entirely correct.

MR VISSER: And I think, Mr Chairman, with respect, there's nothing I could add to that.

CHAIRPERSON: You've listened to the previous evidence?

MR LOUW: Yes, I did.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you agree with it all?

MR LOUW: Completely.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chair.


ADV MPSHE: No questions once more, Mr Chairman, thank you.


MS GCABASHE: Could I just ask, Mr Visser, is this 7(a) is

there an amendment there in order or not, or have we done it?

MR VISSER: Thank you very very much for reminding me, I have forgotten about that. Mr Chairman, in this case, the paragraph 7(a) and (b) are also not in order, and I would respectfully request you to make the same amendments in that regard. Thank you. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, you're excused.

MR LOUW: Thank you very much.


CHAIRPERSON: We'll now adjourn until two o'clock provided all goes well.




DATE: 30TH JULY 1998



DAY : 9



A D BAKER: (sworn states)

MR BOOYENS: Thank you. Mr Chairman, may I just enquire, has the Committee in its possession the introductory part of this witness' application, that is the form Annexure A, because I see the only thing that was bound in was schedule 4?


MR BOOYENS: Volume 2, Mr Chairman, at page - he actually starts at page 258, but you would notice it only starts at schedule 4.

CHAIRPERSON: (Indistinct)?

MR BOOYENS: Baker, Mr Chairman.


MR BOOYENS: Yes, but that's just the hand-written one, Mr Chairman, the introductory... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: And then you've got a separate one handed in?

MR BOOYENS: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll number that 251A

MR BOOYENS: Yes, Mr Chairman, it runs to - do you just want to call it 251A, then I could just refer to the typewritten pages.


MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. While we are busy with that, Mr Chairman, my next applicant, Mr Bellinghan, there are also some pages left out in his instance, he is at 260 in volume 1, not actually at 260, he starts at 247, but there should be, there's four pages that's been left out there, which, seeing that we are dealing with the administration at this stage, at page 260 the Committee would notice that's page 14 and it then carries on at, typewritten 14 and it carries on at typewritten 18. I have handed pages 15, 16 and 17, as well as typewritten page 19 and I ask that that also be put into the record.

CHAIRPERSON: (Indistinct).

MR BOOYENS: You should have been given four loose pages, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: 15, 16, 17?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, and then there's a - and 19.



CHAIRPERSON: These are the same to do with (indistinct)?

MR BOOYENS: Ja. 260B 16, 260C 17 and page 19, 261A, Mr Chairman, that's... (intervention).


MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Baker, as set out at page 258, you apply for amnesty for the explosion damage to property at Cosatu House and all other dealings and crimes arising from the same set of facts, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Have you got in front of you a document headed Annexure A, page 25, that has just been handed to the Committee, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the contents of the first page thereof?

MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.


MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: page 3?

MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.


MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.




MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.


MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.


MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.


MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.


MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And onwards till page 16?

MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: At page 258, Schedule 4, you set out the role that you played in your involvement at Cosatu House, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And your application runs to page 267, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Just dealing very briefly with a few aspects arising herefrom, at page 9(a), paragraph 4, you tell us about the instructions you received.

MR BAKER: Indeed so, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And there's, in the fifth line from the top, at Roman (iv) should that read "by the members of":-

"had been instructed by members of the executive command structure"?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: You have heard the evidence of Colonel De Kock... (intervention).

MR BAKER: I have, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: ...about the instructions given to you? You also heard the evidence of the then Minister of Law and Order, the then chief of the Security Branch. Do you confirm that evidence?

MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: You agree with it. Very well. Now, Colonel De Kock, you say, at page 259, gave you an overview at Vlakplaas of the reasons for the operation, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: First of all, the second sentence should read:-

"The object of the operation...",

is that correct:-

"...was to damage the HQ of Cosatu House"?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Do you further confirm that he conveyed the intelligence that you set out here to you?

MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And then the purpose of the operation was twofold, was that conveyed to you by Colonel De Kock?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And did you have - you were an operative at that stage, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That's correct, That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have any independent way of checking the correctness of this information, as to the why Cosatu House was to be damaged, or did you have to rely on what Colonel De Kock told you?

MR BAKER: I had no independent way, Mr Chairman, I relied on what I was told by my commander.

MR BOOYENS: And you believed that Colonel De Kock was given the correct information?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And as far as that was concerned, were you satisfied that you had no objection in principle, in the circumstances, of getting involved in this operation?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. At page 19, and we've heard the evidence already, do you confirm that Colonel De Kock stressed that loss of lives or injury was to be avoided?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: You were armed and wore a balaclava, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.


MR BAKER: I had my service pistol with me, I also had my identity card with me, my police identity card, that was my part of the operation, was to move on the perimeter and try and keep people out of the target area. I had my identity card with me to use in case I should see people and just inform them to get out of the area, and I had a balaclava with me, which was not worn over the face, it was just part of the operational kit that I had in my car.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't wear a balaclava?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I had it with me. I see I did make a mistake there.

MR BOOYENS: You state here that you wore the balaclava, is that incorrect?

MR BAKER: Yes. I just want to set the record straight, I had a balaclava with me in the vehicle.

MR BOOYENS: And did you, Mr Bosch and Mr Beeslaar patrol the area, as you set out?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Did you at any time enter the building or have anything to do with the placing of the charge or the setting of the explosion?

MR BAKER: No, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now, to all, if you'll go to page 261, for all practical purposes, from what you could observe outwardly, this was an authorised operation at the time, because Brigadier Schoon was there, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now, then I think you have stated it already, but in the second paragraph at page 261 you say you never considered it necessary to query any instructions regarding covert defensive or offensive operations given by Colonel De Kock, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: So, and you also make mention of the fact that you were subsequently visited and congratulated by the Minister, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now at page 262, Colonel De Kock's credibility, that once again deals with the aspect that you have already referred to, was that the general feeling of all members in the unit, that you never doubted his credibility?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: You've already dealt with the fact, the last paragraph, that you were unable to verify this information that was conveyed to you by Mr De Kock, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now, at page 263, you received motivations before all operations, it was explained to you why the operations were necessary, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And could you, if, or would you, if you had objections in principle against an operation, voice your concern about it and could you withdraw as Colonel De Kock has testified?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: In this instance you didn't do it, because you were satisfied that this was necessary, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now, then at the last paragraph at page 263, you just deal with the need to know basis... (intervention).

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: ...that this type of operation was conducted in? Mr Baker, as far as you yourself was concerned, dealing with your own political objective, in your background you have already set out fully your beliefs and your history, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And included in those beliefs was included, as set out at page 265, paragraph 10(a) and (b), the belief that Cosatu was in fact part of the struggle to overthrow the government of this country at the time, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And did you regard it as justifiable in the circumstances to oppose these efforts?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And is that why you were involved in these operations?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And do you furthermore confirm your political motives, as set out on page 265 and 266?

MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Is there anything else you want to add?

MR BAKER: No, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Do you ask for amnesty as set out in the application?

MR BAKER: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: No questions?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I do have one, Visser on record.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Baker, at page 261, typed page 20, the last sentence of the first paragraph reads:-

"Minister Vlok personally visited Vlakplaas, during which time he complimented the unit on the success of this operation."

This operating referring to Cosatu House?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, actually on a number of operations. Why I referred to this operation is because it's the one that I was involved in.

MR VISSER: Which is Cosatu House?

MR BAKER: Which is Cosatu House.

MR VISSER: Now, you see because my instructions are that Minister Vlok, the then Minister Vlok, visited Vlakplaas at the end of 1988, which was approximately 18 months later, is that the visit that you're referring to here?

MR BAKER: That's correct, Mr Chairman, he came to the farm.

MR VISSER: Yes. And he didn't specifically refer to any incident (indistinct)?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.


MS GCABASHE: Could I just ask, why then do you associate your particular operation with Mr Vlok's visit? Sorry, I've lost you somewhere there?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, he congratulated the unit on its operational successes, if one could put it that way.

MS GCABASHE: Was this the first time he came to Vlakplaas after the Cosatu House bombing, 18 months later, as has been pointed out?

MR BAKER: That is correct, Mr Chairman, that's my recollection, that that was the first time he came to the farm.

MS GCABASHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: No other questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV MPSHE: I have one question, Chairperson. Mr Baker, could you tell us how long it was after the Khotso House bombing that Mr Vlok visited Vlakplaas, was it soon after?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I'm not aware of the exact date that the Khotso House operation took place, I was not involved in it... (intervention).

ADV MPSHE: Yes, we know that.

ADV MPSHE: ...so I don't know what the... (intervention).

ADV MPSHE: August.

MR BAKER: ...time period was.

ADV MPSHE: Yes, it was in August '88, it was in August of 1988, do you recall when Minister Vlok came to visit Vlakplaas?

MR BAKER: I'm not sure of the month, Mr Chairman, it was afterwards.

ADV MPSHE: Would it have been in the first half of the year or the second half of the year?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can remember, it was in the second half of the year. If I had to put a month to it, I'd say October/November, I'm not sure.

ADV MPSHE: Thank you, no further questions.


MS GCABASHE: How often did Mr Vlok visit you after the Cosatu House bombing?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, if I can recollect correctly, it was on approximately three occasions.

MS GCABASHE: And you are very sure that those started from about October/November 1988, not before?

MR BAKER: As I said, that's my recollection, Mr Chairman, that's how I recollect it.

MS GCABASHE: Up to what time? So he started, the first time you saw him October/November, then the second time, and when was the third time?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I'd say the last time was at the end of

1989, if my memory serves me correctly.

MS GCABASHE: The last time?

MR BAKER: The last time, yes.

MS GCABASHE: So in between '88 and '89 he saw you some time again in between?

MR BAKER: Approximately three times in all, approximately three times.

MS GCABASHE: And at each one of these visits, these are just general congratulatory comments he made?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I'm aware that he came to a year end function for the unit, whereupon he also congratulated the unit on their successes and work.

MS GCABASHE: The year end function was the one in 1988?

MR BAKER: I beg your pardon?

MS GCABASHE: The year end function was the one in 1988?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, if I'm correct, in 1988 he came twice, the end of the year function and also in end of '89 a year end function, but that this time was before the year end function, the first time.

MS GCABASHE: Thank you.





DATE: 30TH JULY 1998



DAY : 9


MR BOOYENS: I call Mr Bellinghan, Mr Chairman.


EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Bellinghan, like your colleague before you, you're applying for the amnesty for your involvement in the bombing of Cosatu House? Sorry, I beg your pardon, Mr Chairman, it's volume 1 and it's at page 247. As set out at page 261, you apply for amnesty for damage flowing from the, and any other offence or delict flowing from the explosion at Khotso House, is that correct?

MR BELLINGHAN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Now, just starting at page 247, is there anything you want to add?

MR BELLINGHAN: No, everything still remains the same.

MR BOOYENS: On page 248, is it correct to say that right from the outset, you were at Vlakplaas?

MR BELLINGHAN: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: So you started working under Dirk Coetzee?

MR BELLINGHAN: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Perhaps just an additional bit of background here, which perhaps was not clear, as different commanding officers came and went, did things at Vlakplaas change, did it become more disciplined and structured?

MR BELLINGHAN: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: For instance, we've heard that Colonel De Kock testified that you, at all times when you worked outside of your normal area, were under the command of the Security Branch commander of that area, and that he would be notified of your presence. Was that always the case?

MR BELLINGHAN: That was the instruction from Brigadier Schoon from 1981. Some of the senior members did not keep to that and Brigadier Schoon reprimanded them about that, it was an order that you would always report to the divisional commander of that region.

MR BOOYENS: You say some of the senior members did not keep to that, and that there was an order from Brigadier Schoon that they should report... (intervention).

MR BELLINGHAN: Please just go a little bit slower.

MR BOOYENS: Brigadier Schoon said to the members that they all had to report to the divisional commanding officer and he would then tell them where to go and work.

MR BELLINGHAN: Some people did not keep to this arrangement, they, for instance, didn't say when they were going to the Eastern Transvaal or wherever, and at a later conference there was a bit of a spat about this, about certain members of Vlakplaas who didn't co-operate. That changed drastically with the advent of Colonel Jannie Coetzee, Jack Cronje and Eugene de Kock. When he took over, he laid down this rule once and for all that there would be co-ordination and that it wouldn't be a sort of a random movement into these various regions.

MR BOOYENS: So is the inference justified that during Dirk Coetzee's time the discipline was not as strict?

MR BELLINGHAN: Yes, he was only there for a very brief period as a commanding officer, I think for about three months, and that was in the beginning stages, and it was a little bit confused at the time.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the rest of what is said on page 248?


MR BOOYENS: Let us deal with the background, from 249 onwards to 260. Up to page 260, do you confirm the correctness of the contents of those pages, as far as your background is concerned?


MR BOOYENS: You also heard the evidence of Colonel De Kock, Mr Vlok and General Van der Merwe?

MR BELLINGHAN: That's correct, Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And as far as you know, you agree with their testimony?


MR BOOYENS: If we then look at the role which you played yourself in the Cosatu House incident, on page 261 you say that you received an order from Colonel De Kock?


MR BOOYENS: Were you given a brief outline as to the reasons and motivation for the operation?


MR BOOYENS: It appears from your evidence as to what Colonel de Kock told you, is that the reasons that were given to you, the last paragraph, 261 and 261(a), it appears from those paragraphs?


MR BOOYENS: Were you satisfied in your own mind that that constituted a sufficient reason for you to take part in the operation?


MR BOOYENS: Did you accept the motivation as a sufficient motivation for this action?


MR BOOYENS: And did you see it in the context of your role as a security policeman, as also appears from your written evidence?

MR BELLINGHAN: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: You then give an explanation of how you went to Honeydew and then departed for Cosatu House?


MR BOOYENS: You, Sergeant Willemse and Warrant Officer Gadebe took members to the scene?


MR BOOYENS: And you had a .22 with a silencer and a leather baton, a cosh?



MR BELLINGHAN: The cosh was to help us in a crisis situation on the ground. We didn't know what we would find in the building, there might have been freedom fighters, and as Colonel De Kock told us, we should take the necessary precautions.

MR BOOYENS: After the members went in and exited, you removed them?

MR BELLINGHAN: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: The last paragraph on 261(a), you say that on the next day you made a call to General Van der Merwe's office at Brigadier Schoon's request, did you hear what Schoon told Van der Merwe, what he reported to him?

MR BELLINGHAN: I can't remember it verbatim, but he had a telephonic report-back, and he said he was staying on the farm for that day and he wasn't coming in to the office. He was a brigadier at that time, Van der Merwe, and I spoke to the secretary.

MR BOOYENS: Do you also confirm that Mr Vlok visited you and congratulated you?


MR BOOYENS: Did you hear the evidence of your colleague that he said he remembers it was about 18 months later, in other words towards the end of the next year?

MR BELLINGHAN: Yes, but I think he had been at the farm earlier, I don't know the exact date, but it wasn't very long after the incident.

MR BOOYENS: You mention, in the second paragraph, that you never questioned any orders for covert operations and you assumed that they were properly authorised and came from head office and were properly conveyed to you by De Kock?

MR BELLINGHAN: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you at any stage have any reason to doubt De Kock's credibility?

MR BELLINGHAN: No, none whatsoever.

MR BOOYENS: Mr De Kock was very strict about discipline?

MR BELLINGHAN: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: It is also correct that some of the information conveyed to you, or could you verify this in any way?


MR BOOYENS: So you had to rely on what other people told you?


MR BOOYENS: And then, on page 264, you say that you believed that Cosatu House formed part of a place that was used and furthered a threat against the government of the day?


MR BOOYENS: And that's why you associated yourself with the plan of action?


MR BOOYENS: And that is why on pages 264 to 266, and you apply for amnesty for your participation in this operation?


MR BOOYENS: Just a moment please, Chairperson? Thank you, Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.


MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Bellinghan, I put it to you that Mr Vlok went to Vlakplaas in October or November of 1988 for the first time, and you are wrong if you say he went there before that?

MR BELLINGHAN: I won't argue with Mr Visser, but I do know that it wasn't very long after the incident, maybe four to six months or so. I won't dispute what Mr Vlok says.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.


MR HUGO: Thank you, Mr Chairman, it's Hugo on behalf of Mr Radebe.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Mr Bellinghan, I put it to you that Mr Radebe says that he was not present when the initial order was given to you by De Kock to take part in the operation concerning Cosatu House. Is that true?

MR BELLINGHAN: I can't deny that, it may be that that is the case, that he was only in the vehicle with us.

MR HUGO: I have no further questions.


MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, Jansen. Mr Chairman, you would know that it's no secret that I and my attorney, Mr Knight, appear also for Mr Coetzee. We obviously don't represent him in these proceedings. I do, however, have this problem, that the evidence that was led relating to Mr Coetzee of the years 1981, is of course wholly irrelevant to these proceedings.

By 1987, the people in Vlakplaas, or at Vlakplaas were generally already all seasoned killers and the discipline and the structure of Vlakplaas in 1981 is of course completely irrelevant, and I wish to place that on record.

I think I should also add that the factual allegations that were made were mostly in fact incorrect. For instance Mr Coetzee was not the commander for three months, he was the commander for a period of 15 months, and I would therefore ask you to ignore all that evidence completely for any purposes, whether of this application or any other application. I have no questions on behalf of Ras, thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR PENZHORN: Mr Chairman, I seem to have been skipped in the process. Penzhorn. Just one question.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PENZHORN: Mr Bellinghan, on page 257 of volume 1, page 11 of that document of yours, right at the bottom of the page, there is a portion which deals with the video recordings that were made. Are you in any way aware of such a video, or did you see the video?

MR BELLINGHAN: Yes. I had the video in my possession, it was almost like a personal possession and I burnt it when Vlakplaas disbanded, I saw the video, because I was in the Cape at that time.

MR PENZHORN: This video, I'm inferring from the previous paragraphs, especially the second paragraph, where you said that Vlakplaas was at that stage very successful and Askaris regularly identified ANC and PAC terrorists for arrest within the Republic, and that paragraph then you also there refer to the major breakthrough which was made with the arrest of one Sipho and 25 others. Is that what the video dealt with?

MR BELLINGHAN: Yes, that's correct. As I said in my previous amnesty application in Cape Town, there'd been a series of successes which was condensed into eight minutes.

MR PENZHORN: My emphasis is on arrest. Is it correct that it dealt with arrests, successful arrests that were made?

MR BELLINGHAN: Successful arrests and where members were killed during skirmishes with the security forces.

MR PENZHORN: Were members or... (intervention).

MR BELLINGHAN: I'm sorry, I mean freedom fighters.

MR PENZHORN: Were you present when it was screened for Mr Botha?


MR PENZHORN: I have no further questions.


MR RADITAPOLE: Raditapole on behalf of Cosatu, Mr Chair.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RADITAPOLE: There's just one thing I'd like to clear. Please relax, I'm not intending to jeopardise your (indistinct).

MR BELLINGHAN: I'm definitely not stressed, sir.

MR RADITAPOLE: I just need to understand, did you participate in this mission because you were following orders, or did you participate because you believed Cosatu to be connected with the ANC and the struggle?

MR BELLINGHAN: We were engaged in a process, it was part of our orders, and we believed in what the orders said, and if Cosatu was involved and if some of their liberation fighters were involved, well yes.

MR RADITAPOLE: Well where I'm driving to is, does it matter whether you believed in the order or not? I mean the point is, there was an order, you had to carry it out, (indistinct)?

MR BELLINGHAN: Yes, I believed in the order. Colonel De Kock never came to me with any unreasonable orders.

MR RADITAPOLE: So are you saying if you didn't believe in a particular order, you'd refuse to take part in - you'd disobey orders?

MR BELLINGHAN: Yes, you had the choice, but fortunately I only received the orders that were lawful in those terms.







DATE: 30TH JULY 1998



DAY : 9


MR BOOYENS: At the pre-trial meeting, it was agreed that, I don't whether the list was made available to you, it was in fact agreed that we will deal with the applicants contingent by contingent, and that the next, the Vlakplaas operatives and so, we'd first finish their evidence, thereafter I think the Johannesburg Security Branch, then the technical section and then the Bomb Squad. Now I'm finished as far as Vlakplaas operatives are concerned, so I don't know which of my colleagues is next.

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chairman, I've got a problem, my client left at 1:00 and he hasn't returned at 2:00, so I'm a little bit concerned about his safety. I suggest... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: It's twenty to three now.

CORNELIUS: I'm most concerned. I suggest my colleague, Mr Chris Nel, calls his client and if my client turns up, we can quickly lead.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps he went to a disco somewhere.

MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I would like to refer you, Christo Nel for the record, I would like to refer you to volume 2, at page 171, we'll be dealing with the application of my client, Mr McCarter.

First of all, a number of pages were left out of the bundle which we received from Advocate Mpshe, and I have subsequently distributed pages which I marked. The first one was page 172(a), the second one was 173(a), and then the third page that was left out, I marked 174(a). I don't know if everybody's got these pages, I hope so, Mr Chairman.

FRANK McCARTER: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Mr McArthur, if I may refer you to page 171 of the volume that we've just mentioned, is it correct that you're applying for amnesty for any illegal act or offence or any omission that might stem from your involvement in the bombing or explosion at Cosatu House?

MR McCARTER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MS GCABASHE: Mr Nel, could I just check, is he McArthur or McCarter?

MR NEL: As it is spelt, Mr Chairman, McCarter, it's not McArthur, I see the record that we, the running record that we received on, a couple of days ago referred to Mr McArthur, that is a mistake. Now, referring briefly to your application on page 2, you were a member of the Security Branch and you joined in 1996, during February, is that correct?

MR McCARTER: 1976, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: I beg your pardon, that's my mistake. If we may go to page 172(a) of your application, there is a - paragraph 2 you say that on the 6th of May 1987, you received instructions from Major De Kock, and from your evidence you heard Major De Kock or Colonel De Kock now there’s evidence where he testified that that instruction would have been given to you approximately a week before. Do you agree with that?

MR McCARTER: That's possible, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: We are now dealing with the matter of Khotso House where you received the instructions from Mr De Kock, and after the preparation you met at a security house in Jo'burg, where you also, on page 173, made mention of a person that was there, a Major At van Niekerk, but you have also told me that this was a mistake, bona fide mistake on your part and you now remember that he was not there at all?

MR McCARTER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: Is it correct that you were part of the contingent which drove, or were driven in the bus that went to Cosatu House on the evening?

MR McCARTER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: And you state on 173 that yourself, Larry Hanton, Willie Nortjè, Snor Vermeulen, Le Roux and Hammond drove to the back of Cosatu House where a fence was cut and there-after a ladder was used to gain access to the house, is that correct?

MR McCARTER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: Is it further correct that yourself and the Larry Hanton remained outside and did not actually enter the premises of Cosatu House, while the others which you recall, Mr Le Roux and George Hammond, went in?

MR McCARTER: That's correct, we were there to provide guarding.

MR NEL: And as we've heard the evidence of Mr De Kock, where the ladder went missing. Is it so that the ladder was, on the exit of Mr Hammond and Le Roux, was accidentally dropped?

MR McCARTER: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: If we may go to page 173(a), paragraph 10, you set out your political objectives, in paragraph 10(a), paragraph 10(b) on page 174, your justification associated with the political objective, you set out your background on page 174, from when you joined the police, from where you joined Koevoet in 1980, you returned in 1984, you worked under Craig Williamson and until up to where you left Vlakplaas at the end of 1987. Do you confirm the contents of your statement on those pages and do you

adhere to them?

MR McCARTER: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: Is it so that you believed that you were involved in preventing the ANC with it's Marxist and socialist leanings to violently take over the government of the Republic of South Africa, and that is what you thought and believed in?

MR McCARTER: I did, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: If we may refer you to page 174(a), did you in any way, because of your involvement in the Cosatu House explosion, received any financial benefit or otherwise?

MR McCARTER: No, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: And is it correct that you acted strictly on the orders of Major De Kock at the time, now Colonel?

MR McCARTER: I did, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: You heard the evidence of Colonel De Kock with regards to the political beliefs and what you were told. Do you confirm that evidence?

MR McCARTER: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: That is the evidence, Mr Chairman.


CHAIRPERSON: ... [inaudible] enough. Thank you.




DATE: 30TH JULY 1998



DAY : 9


MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I now call my other client, Mr Hanton, and I refer you to page 66 I think it is, yes, Mr Chairman, page 66 on volume 2, in volume 2, page 65, sorry, 65.

LARRY JOHN HANTON: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Mr Hanton, I refer you to page 65 of your application, is it so that you are here to apply for amnesty for any illegal act or omission - you are here to apply for amnesty and you do apply for amnesty for any illegal act or omission which might stem from your involvement of both Cosatu House during May 1987 and also the bombing of Khotso House during 1988? I see that page 66 makes reference of 1987, but that is a mistake, it was the 31st of August 1988.

MR HANTON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: I refer you to page 66, is it correct that you joined the South African Police during 1971 and served in the police till 1995?

MR HANTON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: If I may just briefly take you to page 66, where you set out your involvement in Cosatu House. Once again, like Mr McCarter, you mention here that you received an instruction from Major De Kock, but at the time when we drew up this application, you seemed to remember that you started preparing and acting on the same day, but do you concede that that might be a mistake, as we've heard Mr De Kock say that you would have received the instruction approximately a week earlier?

MR HANTON: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: And also you make mention of certain members who were there during the briefing, and you also make mention of a person, Mr At van Niekerk, and you realise today that that is a mistake and that he was never there?

MR HANTON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: Now, you were also one of the members who were in the mini-bus who proceeded to the back of Khotso House, where access was gained, sorry, ja, did I say Khotso House? You proceeded to the back of Khotso House, where access was gained by cutting a fence, you and Frank McCarter remained outside the wall and certain of the members went into the actual Khotso House, returned, and you then left?

MR HANTON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: You remember the persons going in to be one Snor Vermeulen and a Mr George Hammond?

MR HANTON: Correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: What building are you talking about?

MR NEL: Cosatu House.

CHAIRPERSON: Cosatu House.

MR NEL: I beg your pardon, Mr Chairman, at my... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: I thought you'd been asking about Khotso House the whole time.

MR NEL: Sorry, Mr Chairman, it was Cosatu House, it's the first incident explained on page 2 running - page 66, running over to page 67.

CHAIRPERSON: Now do you say that for Cosatu House there was a week's notice?

MR HANTON: That is correct, sir.

MR NEL: May I proceed, Mr Chairman? On page 67, dealing with Khotso House, is it also true that you also received an instruction from Major Eugene de Kock at the time that the house was to be attacked and that you went to a - with certain members went to a safe house in Johannesburg, where you remember Brigadier Erasmus to be present?

MR HANTON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: Is it also further correct that you went to Khotso House where you remember Eugene de Kock and George Hammond climbed on top of the wall, explosives were passed to them and that they then vanished from sight and you, together with Snor Vermeulen, remained outside?

MR HANTON: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: You also recall that you actually stopped some distance away and waited for the explosion to actually detonate?

MR HANTON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: On page 68, in paragraph 10(a) and 10(b), you set out your political objectives sought, with the justification in paragraph 10(b), carrying on to page 69, where you set your police career. Do you confirm that as part of your amnesty application as correct and you adhere to that?

MR HANTON: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: And then paragraph 10(c), is it correct that you also did not receive any benefit from your involvement in these explosions?

MR HANTON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: And lastly that you state that you acted on instructions of Colonel De Kock?

MR HANTON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that is the evidence.


MR VISSER: Visser on record, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Not that it's really part of my case, but may I put this to you, sir, that you, we've heard evidence that the preparation for Cosatu House, I think it was mentioned by Colonel De Kock, was a month to five weeks, whereas in the case of Khotso House, it was merely a week. Where you state that you had a week's notice, aren't you perhaps mistaken and that it should be a month of five weeks' notice?

MR HANTON: That would be correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Hugo on behalf of de Kock. As I understand the evidence, the preparation was done five weeks before the time, but only he and Mr Bosch initially knew about it.

MR HANTON: That would be correct, Mr Chairman.


MS GCABASHE: What is the position pertaining to yourself, one week, five weeks, three weeks, how much notice did you have?

MR HANTON: One week.

MR DU PLESSIS: Just one question, you don't mention the name of Hennie Kotze as a person who went into the building. Would you concede that he, along with Hammond and De Kock, also went into the building?

CHAIRPERSON: (Indistinct) Mnr Du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: Kotze, Mr Chairman.


MR HANTON: Into which building?

MR DU PLESSIS: Khotso House. I beg your pardon. (Long silence). ...all, Mr Chairman.


MS GCABASHE: Just one question. Page 68, you set out your political objective, and there I understand you to say that you were acting essentially in the course and scope of your employment, is that right?

MR HANTON: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MS GCABASHE: Now I know some of the other applicants have tried to marry their support of the National Party with their political objective. I don't know if you are able to marry your support, or is it membership, support of the IFP with the political objective you have stated here?

MR HANTON: I only joined the IFP, I supported the IFP later, Mr Chairman.

MS GCABASHE: Oh, so at the time, in 1987/88, what was the status then?

MR HANTON: I was a Nationalist Party supporter, Mr Chairman.

MS GCABASHE: Thank you.




DATE: 30TH JULY 1998



DAY : 9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR BOTHA: Thank you, Chairperson, Hannes Botha,

appearing on behalf of the applicant, P C Snyders, we are ready to make our submission. I don't know if you expect that we move to the front once again. I know that this morning the light created a problem.

MR DE JAGER: Would you assist us with the reference?

MR BOTHA: It's volume 1, page 229 until page 234.

P C SNYDERS: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOTHA: Mr Snyders, I refer you to your amnesty application, volume 1, page 229 until page 234 of the bundled record. You have had insight to the content thereof, is that correct?

MR SNYDERS: That is correct.

MR BOTHA: Do you confirm the content of the entire amnesty application?

MR SNYDERS: Yes, I do.

MR BOTHA: Subject to the following, and I refer you to page 231 of the bound record, where you say the deed, omission or delict for which you are applying is in reference to Cosatu House, it would appear from the evidence that you are referring to Khotso House?

MR SNYDERS: That is correct.

MR BOTHA: You also say at the top that your memory regarding the incident is not very clear and that it may be possible that your memory could be refreshed by means of further information, is that correct?


MR BOTHA: I refer you to Roman (iv) of paragraph 9(a) in which, amongst others, you say that Dawid Britz and Leon Fleuris were also present during the action, and during discussion and the leading of evidence, it appeared that the possibility exists that they were not present. What is your commentary regarding that?

MR SNYDERS: Because it was such a long time ago, I don't have a very good recollection thereof. However, after renewed discussions with some of my colleagues, it would appear that they were not present during the incident.

MR BOTHA: And you reconcile yourself with that?

MR SNYDERS: Yes, I do.

MR BOTHA: I refer you to page 4 of your application, page 232 of the bound record, paragraph 2, during which you say:-

"Everybody was armed and received the order to shoot anybody who could raise an alarm."

It was put to Colonel De Kock that this could have been the incorrect choice of words and that the content of that should actually be:-

"In extreme circumstances, such violence could be applied in order to save the action"?

MR SNYDERS: That is correct.

MR BOTHA: You also say at the bottom of the page, the second last paragraph, approximately a week after the incident, the then Minister of Law and Order, Mr Vlok, addressed you at Vlakplaas and congratulated you for your action at Johannesburg. It appears that this could be a mistake, that it was not in fact a week afterwards, but much longer than that?

MR SNYDERS: I agree.

MR BOTHA: You refer specifically to the action in Johannesburg, that this was what you were thanked for. Were those the direct words or the inference that you drew, or can you not remember precisely?

MR SNYDERS: That is the inference that I drew. Not, the words Khotso House or Cosatu House were never specifically used, but I assumed that that was what we were thanked for.

MR BOTHA: And then in paragraph 10(d) on page 233 of the minutes, you say, with regard to any financial gain, you refer to an incident where Steve Bosch, one of the applicants in this matter which has been served to the Committee, two days after the incident Steve Bosch wanted to hand over calculators to you, which apparently had been retrieved from the debris at Khotso House, but that you refused it? It would appear that calculators were indeed brought to Vlakplaas, but only arrived there much later. Do you reconcile yourself with that, that it could possibly be those calculators which were mentioned?

MR SNYDERS: Yes, I do.

MR BOTHA: You also then request, or let me put it to you that do you understand that the total import of your involvement in Khotso House was driving the mini-bus from Vlakplaas to Honeydew, and from Honeydew until Khotso House, where other members placed the explosives, after which you transported the members back to Vlakplaas?

MR SNYDERS: That is correct.

MR BOTHA: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.


MR VISSER: Visser on record, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Snyders, page 232, you state, or let me put it to you like this, Colonel De Kock said that he asked Brigadier Erasmus what would happen if policemen were to arrive. He said, "Shoot them dead". What would happen if members of the public arrived there? He said, "Shoot them dead", and then it continues. Apparently it was mentioned that if one of your people spoke to somebody regarding the incident, he personally would shoot that person dead. It's starting to look like a joke. Did you really take this seriously?

MR SNYDERS: Yes, Chairperson, I believe that it creates the wrong impression, the use of those specific words, I think that General Erasmus said it as such that we should appreciate the seriousness of the situation and that it was not to be taken up literally.


MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman, Rossouw. I've got just two questions, or rather, that I would like to put to the witness.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Mr Snyders, on page 231, I heard what you said... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Could I ask, as a personal favour, if counsel would also refer to the numbering on the bottom of the page? My copies have had the other numbers cut off and I can't read them. So if you could refer both to the 231 and also the page number at the bottom?

MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman, that is, I think, the typed number, page No 3.


MR ROSSOUW: Mr Snyders, I heard what you said regarding your recollection and the members that you said would have been involved, but I'd like to put it to you, regarding Khotso House, Mr Dawid Britz was not involved. You mention his name. Would you make that concession?

MR SNYDERS: I have already said that I will make that concession.

MR ROSSOUW: And then finally, I'd also like to put it to you, arising from page 233, the incident regarding the calculators, that it's also Mr Bosch's recollection that this pertains to another incident and does not involve a later incident as quoted by you?

MR SNYDERS: It may have been later, but what I wanted to say was that I received these calculators after the Khotso House bomb incident.

MR ROSSOUW: I've got no further questions, Mr Chairman.


MR RADITAPOLE: It's Raditapole, Mr Chair.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RADITAPOLE: Sorry, I got a bit confused around your answer to Advocate Visser's question about General Erasmus’ instructions in the event that there was disturbance. You're saying your interpretation would be that it was not to be taken literally, that police or civilians should be shot if they happen to interfere?

MR SNYDERS: Chairperson, the discretion was left to us that should the operation fail, we could go over to extreme violence and thus kill somebody, but that would only be in the event of the failure of the operation or if one of us were to be in a situation of danger. It has been mentioned that weapons and ammunition had been stored in the building and our members could have been in danger, and if one of our members had been in danger, we would have had to go over to extreme violence.

MR RADITAPOLE: Yes, but the point is this, is that the instruction wasn't given by General Erasmus to you?

MR SNYDERS: The instruction was given by Brigadier Erasmus at that point, while we were in the safety premises, not specifically to me, but to everybody.


MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chair, my client has arrived, I don't know if my learned friend, Mr Rossouw has finished all his clients. I think that would be appropriate.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, one of my clients are also not here at present, I don't know where he is, I hope he will be here shortly, and if Mr Cornelius can proceed at this time?

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I just want to say that we're also ready to proceed on behalf of Mr Nortjè, but I'm in the hands of my colleague, Mr Cornelius, if he wishes to proceed, he's welcome.




DATE: 30TH JULY 1998



DAY : 9


MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, my client was involved in a motor accident and sought to recover a problem, he's out and he's fully available now. Thank you, Mr Chair. I ask leave to call the applicant, Mr N J Vermeulen, he's present at the moment. Are we visible here, or do we need to move to a more visible position?


EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Mr Vermeulen, you have applied for amnesty and your application has been partially included on page 268 and 269 in the bundle before the Committee?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You will note that with the presentation of the pieces, we have seen that, notwithstanding the extent of your application, only two folios of that application has been included?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You have also prepared a document which has been submitted to the Commission, in which you have an affidavit which explains all the facts and there is currently a document in preparation which will make the facts more convenient to you and will be handed in to the members of the Committee?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: With the leave of the chairperson, I would like to proceed.

CHAIRPERSON: Sal ons dit 268(a) noem?

MR CORNELIUS: As it pleases you, Chair. Mr Vermeulen, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of your application, do you confirm the content thereof?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Paragraph 8(a), you were in the service of the South African Police and you were stationed at C Section, of which evidence has been given to the Committee?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Paragraph 8(b), you have explained your schooling and your training until the 3rd of April 1990, where you were discharged from service by the South African Police for medical reasons?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You have schedule 1 and schedule 2. Schedule 1 gives the details of the bomb explosion in which you were involved at Cosatu House on the 7th of May 1987, and schedule 2 the bomb explosion at Khotso House with which you were also involved?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You confirm paragraph 9(a), Roman (i), (ii) and (iii)?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Paragraph Roman (iv), you were connected to Section C10 or C1 of the South African Police stationed at Vlakplaas. You confirm that you received an order from Eugene de Kock to be available for an operation in Johannesburg. Is that so?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Were you involved in the planning for the operation at Khotso House?


MR CORNELIUS: Did you receive orders, or did you obey the orders from Colonel De Kock?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Do you have respect for Colonel De Kock?

MR VERMEULEN: Very much so.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you ever doubt his credibility with regard to the orders that he gave you?


MR CORNELIUS: And you never questioned the authorisation for operations in which you were involved, especially with regard to the expressions of gratitude by ministers such as Minister Vlok, the logistical support and liaison with head office and such, did that not lead you to doubt the authorisation for these orders?


MR CORNELIUS: If you were not to follow through with an order, as you heard in the testimony of General Van der Merwe, would it have held consequences for you in the police?


MR CORNELIUS: It has also been testified by General Van der Merwe and also Colonel De Kock that you could possibly be transferred away from the unit and branded by your cohorts?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Before the Cosatu House operation was executed, you gathered at Vlakplaas, you tested the ropes which you were going to use in the operation for climbing?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: On page 3 of the annexure, you say that upon your arrival at Cosatu House, you parked at the back of the building, the mini-bus was parked against the fence, the bars were cut and members went through and you were one of these members?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Can you remember the members who remained in the mini-bus?


MR CORNELIUS: In the building itself, and I understand it was your duty to keep watch, that you should not be overcome by anybody who would appear on the scene?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And the charges were then planted by members of the Explosives Unit?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And then, on page 3 of your statement, you say that you left the building, went to Pretoria and heard later that the explosion had been a success. You then celebrated at Vlakplaas on that particular evening?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you ever personally determine what level of damage you incurred?


MR CORNELIUS: According to you, nobody was killed during the explosion?

MR VERMEULEN: Not as far as I know.

MR CORNELIUS: You will recall that Mr Vlok congratulated you on your conduct?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Then, very briefly, the content of (b) and (c) on page 4, do you confirm that as well as Roman (iv) on page 5?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, I do confirm that.

MR CORNELIUS: Paragraph 10(a), was your political objective also the maintenance and protection of the former government's political order in the Republic in its struggle to oppose the political onslaught of the ANC/SACP alliance?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you also work on a need to know basis at the unit?


MR CORNELIUS: Did you believe that Cosatu House held a threat for the former political order?


MR CORNELIUS: And then you have given an explanation in 10(b), folio 5 and 6 of the application, that you carried out your duties in service of the South African Police, that you committed these acts as part of the execution of your duties in this struggle, and that you regarded Colonel De Kock's orders as legal and lawful?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you regard it as the task of the police to assist the Security Branch to defend the former political order from this onslaught?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Paragraph 11(a) and (b), do you confirm the content thereof, of those two paragraphs, that you acted as part of a State Department and that you acted according to the orders of Colonel Eugene de Kock of C Section of the South African Police?


MR CORNELIUS: Very briefly, Schedule 2, paragraph 9(a), Roman (i) to (iv), do you confirm the content of these paragraphs?


MR CORNELIUS: To expedite the proceedings, you were part of the Cosatu House explosion?


MR CORNELIUS: Did you enter the building?


MR CORNELIUS: As I read these pieces, I see that your duty was once again to wait at the mini-bus while members of C section moved into the building?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You did not take part in the planning?


MR CORNELIUS: You once again followed all the orders given by Colonel Eugene de Kock?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Before the operation you gathered at Honeydew, there were various members of the Security Branch, you cannot recall the specific names of these people?


MR CORNELIUS: After the mini-bus had been parked at Khotso House, the explosives were off-loaded in canvas bags and picked up by members who were standing on the wall?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: The members of C Section then scaled the wall down in the direction of Colonel De Kock and you waited at the wall?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You and a person who you suspect is Douw Willemse?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: After a while you say that you began to return and you moved to an open parking space behind the Braamfontein Hotel?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: There you waited, the explosion followed and you then moved back, I think you told me yesterday that you went back to Honeydew again and then back to Vlakplaas?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: So you would just like to make an amendment to folio 4, that you did go to Honeydew before you went back to Vlakplaas?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you determine whether or not any damage had been done to the building?


MR CORNELIUS: Was it your knowledge that no-one was killed during the explosion?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: The political objective, as you have already testified before this Committee is the same in paragraph 10(a) in relation to Cosatu House and your motivation in paragraph 10(b) is the same as your motivation for the Cosatu House explosion?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you receive any financial remuneration or gain from the Cosatu House or Khotso House incidents?


MR CORNELIUS: You are applying before this Committee for amnesty for the two bomb explosions in which you were involved and whichever unlawful acts may have emanated from that and any civil or criminal action which may be taken in terms of the incidents?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.


MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. Mr Chairman, we're at the disadvantage that we somehow did not receive the documentation to which reference has been made. We didn't want to interfere, but may we ask your indulgence to let this gentleman's cross-examination stand down until we've just had an opportunity of looking whether there isn't something lurking in the wings in the papers that we have to deal with? It's very unlikely, but just for that possibility, Mr Chairman.

MR CORNELIUS: I'm sorry, Mr Chairman, we did forward it, but apparently it was mislaid. It is available now to my learned colleague, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: I don't suggest that you should wait for me, certainly not, Mr Chairman, it seems like quite a bit, but I'll try to deal with it as soon as... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: There's a lot of duplication, Mr Visser.


MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Vermeulen, with regard to the Cosatu House incident, Du Plessis, on record here, do you remember anything about the ladder which was used?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And can you remember that the ladder was left behind?


MR DU PLESSIS: And the other person from the Bomb Disposal Unit who entered the building, can you recall whether it was George Hammond and Pierre le Roux, or can you not remember?

MR VERMEULEN: I'm not certain.

MR DU PLESSIS: However you would not dispute this?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the other person who went into the building with you at Cosatu House was Willie Nortjè, is that correct?


MR DU PLESSIS: As far as you can recall?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, as far as I can recall.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.


MR DE JAGER: Just one question. You have indicated a person who remained outside with you, Douw Willemse?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR DE JAGER: Is that the person who was injured and cannot be here today?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR DE JAGER: Were you and he together for just about most of the time that evening, or can you not remember?

MR VERMEULEN: I'm not entirely certain, but I know that we helped the people up over the wall, we stood guard there until the others returned, upon which we climbed back into the mini-bus.

MR DE JAGER: So therefore his role and your role were pretty much the same?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chairman, just for the record, in response to that question, that is also my instructions.

CHAIRPERSON: It seems as if the evidence can be given by other witnesses, it might not be necessary to hear evidence from Mr Willemse, we have his application before us, so I think that if you want to see if you can get any other information from this witness, you're at liberty to do so.

271, was that part of his original application, the last page in volume 2?

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chairman, that was a short summary, which was bound in. Unfortunately when the Motherwell issue was heard, the whole application was dissected into millions of pieces, and that is only part of a summary.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I'd like to ask a question arising from that, if he is in a position to answer, and that's about Khanya House. Can he give a date?

MR VERMEULEN: Unfortunately not, Chairperson, I cannot. I was there, yes sir.

CHAIRPERSON: It's been mentioned by various people and I thought we could... (intervention).

MR MPSHE: If Mr Chairman would like to have the date, I have the date here.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh well I've got the letter, so I should have, till I handed it to you, what was the date?

MR MPSHE: 12 October '88.

CHAIRPERSON: 12 October '88.

MR MPSHE: '88.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. There seems to be no further questions, thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I have gone through the document and I do have only one point to make please, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Vermeulen on page 3, I don't know how to identify these documents, but this is your application... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: 268(a), the new one.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, 268(a), you say that Minister Vlok in November attended a function at Vlakplaas and congratulated all of you, do you remember that?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You further say that the congratulations were extended with the success of the Cosatu House operation. We know that no reference was made to any specific operation. However, people made the necessary inferences that they were being congratulated by the former minister regarding determined incidents because they had been involved therein?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And would you agree that this November month would have to refer to November 1988 and not 1987?

MR VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that appears to be all, from what I could glance at, thank you.






DATE: 30TH JULY 1998



DAY : 9


MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, by agreement with my colleagues to the right, we'll proceed with applicant Ras’ application.

MR MPSHE: Mr Chairman, before Mr Ras takes the oath, I just want to get clarity and have it on record, is it given that Douw Willemse is not going to testify, the evidence of Mr Vermeulen will be applicable to Douw Williams, for record purposes?

CHAIRPERSON: We haven't reached that point yet, we don't know if he's going to testify or not, I haven't been told what his present state of his health is. He is the person, isn't he, who was stabbed the other night?

MR ROSSOUW: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I don't know what his health is at the moment, there hasn't been any application making. I was merely suggesting that his counsel might start building up.

MR MPSHE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

M D RAS: (sworn states)

MR JANSEN: Thank you. Mr Chairman, just at the inception, Mr Chairman, the document that has just been handed to you is just a notice of an amendment, the first two pages, and a confirmatory affidavit relating to those amendments.

The first amendment, paragraph 1 of the notice, relates to paragraph 9(a) which you find at page 200 of volume 1, that is obviously just necessitated by the fact the sub-paragraph Roman (i) only refers to the incidents or the offences committed as "ontploffing", and then it's just, that is just given greater detail. The second one just relates to the exact date of Cosatu, of the Cosatu House incident, which has, since the application was drafted, has been established as being 7 May 1987. I then move for these amendments.

CHAIRPERSON: The application is granted.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Mr Ras, you were involved in the Cosatu House incident and your role was to drive the kombi to Johannesburg and back, in which some of the Vlakplaas operatives and some of the explosives experts people were, is that correct?

MR RAS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: Your application regarding this incident appears on paginated pages 195 of volume 1 to 205, 207 rather, is that correct?

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is off.

MR JANSEN: There are certain qualifications ...[inaudible]


MR JANSEN: ...[inaudible] page 201, Roman numeral (iv), you mention that Mr Brood van Heerden and Mr Hennie Kotze were also involved in this incident. It appears from their own applications that they were not involved, it appears that they were not involved in this incident, but only in the Khotso House incident, could you perhaps explain to us how that confusion slipped in?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, perhaps I can correct that, at Cosatu House, Major Hammond was involved, but it's only Kotze who wasn't involved.

ADV DE JAGER: He's not referring to Hammond, he's referring to Brood van Heerden and Kock.

MR DU PLESSIS: Ekskuus tog, goed.

MR JANSEN: Could you perhaps explain to us how that confusion arose?

MR RAS: With the drafting of my application for amnesty, some confusion arose between Khotso House and Cosatu House and I made a mistake by, instead of mentioning Mr Pierre le Roux, I mentioned Hennie Kotze, and that Brood van Heerden was not involved.

MR JANSEN: Right. Could you just place this in context, when you were busy compiling this amnesty application, you were busy refreshing your memory from conversations with some of the other people who were witnesses, or rather gave evidence, and people who were involved in the witness protection unit of the TRC?

MR RAS: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: If you look at page 203, paragraph (b) there, you say that various people were injured or slash you are not aware of any. Could you please explain to us how that apparent contradiction found its way into the papers?

MR RAS: It happened in the same way, I had discussions with other members about certain information and confusion arose between Khotso and Cosatu Houses in those two incidents and they mentioned to me that certain people were injured. I didn't know whether people were actually injured in the Cosatu House incident.

MR JANSEN: But Mr McAdam wasn't there at all, he was not at all involved. Now is he somebody who has something to do with witness protection?

MR RAS: Yes. Directly after I returned from that incident, they helped me to actually draft my application for amnesty.

MR JANSEN: In any event, that part of your application was based on hearsay?

MR RAS: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Something else which needs to be placed in context, you say, referring to the function which Minister Vlok attended, that he congratulated you on the operation of Cosatu House. Cosatu House, was it mentioned by name by the minister?

MR RAS: No, that is the inference which I drew as a result of my involvement in the Khanya and Cosatu House incidents.

MR JANSEN: Would you then also go to your background on page 195 to 200. You are familiar with that background sketch concerning yourself?

MR RAS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: And you confirm that?

MR RAS: Yes.

MR JANSEN: As far as your political motives and motivation is concerned, in paragraph 10 and following, you there confirm, do you confirm the allegations contained in those paragraphs?

MR RAS: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Did you identify the ANC with Cosatu as far as the politics of the country was concerned?

MR RAS: As far as my limited knowledge at the time went, yes.

MR JANSEN: At the bottom of page 205, you there refer to Brigadier Schoon, Minister Vlok and Colonel Eugene De Kock as being the people who gave the orders. The person who personally conveyed the order to you was Colonel De Kock?

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct.

MR JANSEN: I have no further questions, Chairperson. Thank you, Mr Chairman.


MR HUGO: Hugo, on behalf of Mr De Kock.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Mr Ras, could I refer you to page 201 at the bottom of the page, where you say that during this gathering of highly placed people, Colonel De Kock mentioned to us that the Security Branch in Johannesburg approached you to assist. Colonel De Kock says that that is not what he told, that this was an order which came from the top. Would you concede?

MR RAS: Yes, I will concede that.

MR HUGO: I have no further questions.


MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Rossouw on record.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Mr Ras, thank you for the comment that Mr Van Heerden was not involved, as mentioned in the application. Just for final clarity, I would like to put it to you that Mr Van Heerden was not even a member of the South African Police in 1987. That is just to make very sure.

MR DE JAGER: This is not the Mr Van Heerden who is applicant No 6, this is a different Mr Van Heerden?

MR RAS: That is correct. This is the Brood van Heerden that I mentioned, yes, he was not involved there.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, I didn't understand this, applicant No 6 is indeed the Mr Van Heerden that I'm referring to.

MR ROSSOUW: So is this Brood van Heerden?

MR JANSEN: Yes, indeed.

ADV DE JAGER: So he was not involved in which incident?

MR ROSSOUW: Cosatu House.

ADV DE JAGER: Is he an applicant for Khotso House?

MR ROSSOUW: Yes, he is, as well as the Cry Freedom incident. Thank you.


MR LAMEY: Chairperson, a single question to the witness.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Ras, on page 201, you refer to the fact that there was a meeting and you mention the people who were present and you say that it was from that meeting that the order actually emanated. Mr Nortjè's recollection, Mr Nortjè, who is also an applicant for the Cosatu House incident, and he was obviously involved, his recollection is that Colonel De Kock involved people in the carrying out of this order in various stages, and that he was not involved, or he

wasn't present at one big gathering where the motivation for the action was given.

MR RAS: I would just like to add and say that I only became involved in this operation at a very late stage, and the people who were mentioned could also have been involved at a later stage, for instance the evening when we practised our rope work, and I will concede when your client says that perhaps it was discussed on a separate occasion by Mr De Kock.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.
















DATE: 30TH JULY 1998



DAY : 9


MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I think it is my turn now, I beg leave to call the applicant, Mr Nortjè.

MR MPSHE: What is the reference?

MR LAMEY: His application, Mr Chairman, is in volume 2, it starts at page 176 to page 184, and then, Mr Chairman, there's a supplemented application, a relevant portion of which has been distributed to all the legal representatives, as well as I believe to the members of the Committee by the evidence leader. For convenience purpose, I would propose, Mr Chairman, that this supplemented portion, which is actually the major portion that I'm going to deal with in the evidence, be referred to as Exhibit U.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, now I'm confused. We have the hand-written application at page 176?

MR LAMEY: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You then have a typed application?

MR LAMEY: That's correct, Mr Chairman, which was signed on the 22nd of September 1997. Mr Chairman... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: We haven't got that much, and then we've got the other document of two pages.

MR LAMEY: Yes, Mr Chairman, that is an intention to amend certain aspects.

CHAIRPERSON: Now which are you saying should be Exhibit U?

MR LAMEY: I would submit, Mr Chairman, Exhibit U would be the typed portion, which is indeed a supplemented application. It is... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Appearing on page 203, the annexure?

MR LAMEY: No, Mr Chairman, I don't have a reference to page 203.

CHAIRPERSON: Please proceed, I'll find it later, it is here somewhere. Well we'll call that U1 and the other U2.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, could we change that, I think it might be easier to do if we do what we've done with other people and call this not U, but 176(a), so it fits in with the others.

MR LAMEY: Very well, Mr Chairman, I'm in your hands.

CHAIRPERSON: So it will stay with the applications rather than become the... (intervention).

MR LAMEY: It would be then 176(a).

CHAIRPERSON: 176(a), (indistinct) amended (indistinct).

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, shall we call then the amendment then 177(a), or 176(b)?


MR LAMEY: As it pleases you.

W A NORTJè: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Nortjè, in these proceedings you're applying for amnesty for your involvement in the Cosatu House bomb explosion incident?

MR NORTJè: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: You initially handed in a hand-written amnesty application which appears on page 176 and which is dated the 19th of November 1996, and to which was attached an annexure where you, on page 183 to 184 of volume 2 of the bundle, you also give certain particulars about your involvement in the Cosatu House?


MR LAMEY: Since you handed in your initial amnesty application, which I personally dealt with, you obtained legal representation and there is now a supplementary application, and that should be read as a supplement to the first application which you handed in?

MR NORTJè: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortjè, it is then also the position that during the proceedings you discovered that certain aspects were incorrectly stated and have to be amended in the current application, that is in paragraph 6(a) where the words "not applicable" were used, the words "National Party" at paragraph 6(b) "supporter", paragraph 8(a) there's an incorrect reference to December of 1974 when you joined the South African Police, that is a faulty reference, and that should be December 1974?

MR NORTJè: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: During the preparation for your amnesty application, it was your recollection that the incident took place in 1988, but is it true that you accept that it was in 1987 and you request that your application be amended in this regard?

MR NORTJè: Correct.

MR LAMEY: You also specifically referred to, in the involvement of Mr Hennie Rooies Coetzee as part of the Bomb Disposal Unit, who entered the building with you, and you came to the conclusion, during these proceedings, that your reference to him and his involvement was also incorrect?

MR NORTJè: Yes, correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortjè, at the stage when you were involved in this incident, you were a sergeant and you were stationed at Unit C1, Vlakplaas, under the command of Colonel De Kock?

MR NORTJè: Correct.

MR LAMEY: You're applying for amnesty as far as this incident is concerned, and if I may refer you to page 35, that is the document marked 176(a), that is the supplementary portion - I beg your pardon, the reference is wrong there, you're applying for amnesty for your involvement in this incident, specifically malicious damage to property and any other offence or delict which might arise from the incident or your involvement therein?

MR NORTJè: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: In your supplementary application, Annexure A, that's No 176(a), and specifically Annexure A, you also give an overview of your background and training?

MR NORTJè: Correct.

MR LAMEY: You confirm that?


MR LAMEY: You would also like to place it on record that you were with Colonel De Kock in Koevoet in the struggle in the former South West Africa, and that you followed De Kock to Vlakplaas more or less a year later, and that the continuation of the struggle at Vlakplaas, or you saw that as a continuation of the struggle which you waged in South West Africa?

MR NORTJè: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: Your task at Vlakplaas was to help to combat the revolutionary struggle and was aimed against the ANC, PAC and similar liberation movements?

MR NORTJè: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: You've also listened to the evidence in these proceedings, the evidence of General Van der Merwe and Mr Vlok and Mr De Kock. Am I correct if I should say that you agree in essence with what they said, especially the evidence of Mr Vlok and General Van der Merwe regarding the background and the motives which eventually led to this order being given?

MR NORTJè: Yes, I agree with that.

MR LAMEY: At the stage when you received the order from Colonel De Kock, you did not specifically know that the order came from as high up as Minister Vlok?

MR NORTJè: No, I didn't know that.

MR LAMEY: In your application you say that you understood that it was a problem of the Johannesburg Security Branch and that Vlakplaas was involved to assist in a security problem in this struggle, and you also inferred that this order followed the normal change of command and hierarchy and that it came via the Security head office, specifically Brigadier Schoon who was the overall commander of Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJè: Yes, that's how I understood it.

MR LAMEY: The particulars which you gave regarding this incident, as set out on page 35 to page 38, do you confirm that?


MR LAMEY: Your task in this regard was specifically to enter the Cosatu building with members of the Explosives Unit, you made use of bolt cutters to gain access by cutting through bars, and your task was specifically aimed at destroying a printing press which was in the basement of this building?

MR NORTJè: I may just say here, Chairperson, that I was the only one who had the bolt cutters and cut through the bars, and the fact of the printing press, that was information which I had beforehand, we had to destroy that as well, it was just a coincidence that I went with Mr Hammond when he put this device inside the printing press, I was with him, but we knew that there was a printing press and that it formed part of the motive for the operation.

MR LAMEY: Was it also your information that this printing press had been used in that building to print pamphlets and documents and to disseminate these?

MR NORTJè: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: In your application, you also say that according to your recollection, the explosives weighed about 15 kilograms, are you sure about that or could it have been more?

MR NORTJè: It seems to me now, after listening to all the evidence, that it might have been a little bit more, but when I made this statement, I remembered that that was the approximate quantity or weight, I can't remember specifically why I said that, but ultimately it proved to be a bit more.

MR LAMEY: You also say on page 38, that massive damage was actually done to the building, but that the damage was actually more than you had foreseen?


MR LAMEY: Can you comment on any instructions regarding the injury or death of persons? You were also involved in the monitoring and reconnaissance of the building with Colonel De Kock?

MR NORTJè: Correct.

MR LAMEY: Do you also remember that there was an instruction given that precautions should be taken so that nobody be injured or killed as a result of the explosion?


MR LAMEY: In paragraph 9(a), you say, however, that there was information that there might be people present in the very top floor of the building?

MR NORTJè: Yes. What I mean there is that we had seen lights burning in the building on the night that we did the reconnaissance, and we also saw lights in portions of the block of flats, but on that particular night when we went to carry out the operation, I think there were only lights on on the very top floor of the building, but I didn't see any people, but we assumed that there must be people.

MR LAMEY: With the quantity of explosives and also the placement of it in the building, did you foresee that any people might be killed or injured as a result of the explosion?

MR NORTJè: No, not at that stage.

MR LAMEY: And as far as you know, nobody was injured or killed as a result of the explosion?

MR NORTJè: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortjè, on page 39 you also give particulars of the political objective pursued, and you say, amongst other things, that you understood this to be a Stratcom type of operation?


MR LAMEY: Could you perhaps just elaborate on that, why did you come to that conclusion?

MR NORTJè: I can say that at the time when I made this statement, this was 1994, it was the very first one, and I could never understand why I always thought that it was a Stratcom operation. I must have - something must have jogged my memory in that regard, or I must have been told that, and then during the week I remembered that in 1989 I attended a course where a Mr Michael Bellinghan gave a course on Stratcom and in this time it became clear to me that that was their objective. I formed this opinion that it was a Stratcom operation and that's, I'm assuming that that's why I always had this idea in my mind that it was a Stratcom operation.

MR LAMEY: But it was also a bit of a strange type of operation as far as you were concerned, because it was the first time that you were involved in a bomb explosion, a bombing of a legal organisation in the CBD of Johannesburg?


MR LAMEY: Is that also the reason why you came to the conclusion that the objective here was to sow confusion in the ranks of the alliance, of which Cosatu formed part?

MR NORTJè: The fact that nobody was to be injured, and that only the building was to be damaged, that indicated to me that this was not a normal situation, in the sense that the effect of it had to be like a Stratcom operation, to persuade the people and that disinformation would follow and everything that went with that.

MR LAMEY: But as far as the rest of the motivation was concerned, as was testified to by General Van der Merwe and Mr Vlok, that you would not dispute?

MR NORTJè: No, not at all.

MR LAMEY: Your order in this regard you got from Colonel De Kock?


MR LAMEY: And at that stage you were a sergeant and an operator at Vlakplaas?


MR LAMEY: You were also not in a position to question any orders or the motivation therefor, to question this or to verify it, if these orders came from head office?


MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.


MR HUGO: Thank you, Chairperson, Mr Hugo on behalf of Mr De Kock.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Mr Nortjè, will you just look at page 35, paragraph - page three five, I put it to you that Mr De Kock says that that's not the way it happened and that in fact it came from the top, from the president to General Van der Merwe and from then on to Brigadier Schoon, what do you say about that?

MR NORTJè: I would agree with that, but that is how I remember it, I may have been wrong.

MR HUGO: And then in paragraph 2 at the bottom:-

"De Kock told me that it appeared to him that they would not be able to do it themselves and that is why they needed extra help, and the help that they referred to was the Security Branch, Johannesburg."

Mr De Kock says that that was not so, that he received the order directly from Brigadier Schoon?

MR NORTJè: That may have been one of his remarks at some point, but I will agree that that may not be specifically what he said.

MR HUGO: I have no further questions.


MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, Du Plessis.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Nortjè, I just want to ensure that I understand you correctly, do you agree that the only two members of the Bomb Disposal Unit who were involved in this incident were George Hammond and Pierre le Roux?

MR NORTJè: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: I would just like to know what your recollection is. Your evidence is that Pierre le Roux placed the charge near the printing press, and that Le Roux placed, Hammond placed the charge near the (no further interpretation)?

MR NORTJè: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.


MR RADITAPOLE: Mr Chair, I have something to say, however it doesn't relate to the witness. Just before we close it. I'll be very short.

Mr Chair, I'd like to take this opportunity, before I beg leave to leave these proceedings, both to excuse myself and my client, Cosatu, I'd just like to place on record that as far as Colonel De Kock is concerned, that Cosatu is satisfied that full disclosure has been made in relation to the bombing of Cosatu House, and that Cosatu would not be unsympathetic to Colonel De Kock and the operatives under him receiving amnesty in relation to this offence.

However, in relation to the people above Colonel De Kock in the chain of command, there are a number of unanswered questions. As a result, Cosatu is unable to extend the same sympathies. However, we leave that in the hands of the Committee. Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, what does that mean, is he opposing the other people or not opposing?

CHAIRPERSON: Well that is what I was going to ask. The unanswered questions, do you expect or hope that the questions are going to be answered and that you will, at a later stage, be in a position to indicate something? In other words are you asking us to delay a finding in respect of those two people till other hearings have been concluded, or what is the position?

MR RADITAPOLE: No, Mr Chair, I'm simply, I'm not asking you to do anything, I'm just saying that my client's position is that that decision will be in your hands.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Any other questions of this applicant?

MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, no, but just apropos the remark of my learned friend on behalf of Cosatu, if it, can I just get clarity, because there are different branches involved here, such as the technical branch, who were people not, certainly not under the command of Mr De Kock, and also I'm appearing for the commanding officer of the Explosives Section, I would just like to know whether Cosatu intends opposing those applications, or whether my learned friend really refers only to the very top, to wit Minister Vlok and General Van der Merwe, just for clarity's sake, with the Commission's permission?

MR RADITAPOLE: Mr Chair, I'm referring to the, if you like, the chain of command that extends to the political authority, from, I'm referring to Brigadier Schoon and above, to General Van der Merwe, to Mr Vlok, where we would believe there are some questions unanswered, and those are people that have testified, and we are pulling out of the hearings at this stage.