THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

JUDGMENT

Reportable

Case no: J 4390 / 18

In the matter between:

SIBANYE GOLD LIMITED t/a SIBANYE STILLWATER **Applicant**

and

ASSOCIATION OF MINEWORKERS AND

CONSTRUCTION UNION **First Respondent**

PERSONS AS LISTED IN ANNEXURE "A" **Individual Respondents**

Heard: **4 December 2018**

Delivered: **5 December 2018**

Summary: Picketing Rules – section 69 of the LRA considered – Labour Court entitled to grant urgent interim relief where picketing rules ineffective, problematic or breached

Picketing Rules – section 69(12) – considering what is just and equitable – picketing must not be rendered ineffective – balance to be struck between interests of parties

Picketing – violence, unlawful conduct and intimidation – where such conduct exists further tightening of picketing rules justified – compliance with section 69(1) required

Picketing rules – amendment granted as urgent interim relief pending further CCMA conciliation / adjudication proceedings

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JUDGMENT

SNYMAN, AJ

Introduction

[1] It is unfortunately once again necessary for this Court to act as referee in the case of unlawful behaviour, violence and intimidation that takes place during the course of protected strike action, where the employer blames the union and the union says it is not their or their members' fault. This entire state of affairs is unfortunate. Picketing is an essential and integral part of protected strike action under the LRA, and unlawful conduct by striking employees completely undermines it. As was said by Mogoeng CJ in *SA Transport and Allied Workers Union and Another v Garvas and Others*[1]:

> '… Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions.' That is what s 17 of the Constitution promises the people in South Africa.
>
> This means that everyone who is unarmed has the right to go out and assemble with others to demonstrate, picket and present petitions to others for any lawful purpose.'

[2] There are a number of judgments of this Court that expresses reservation about what has become a normal consequence of protected strike action, being that of unlawful conduct by striking employees, and which judgments are highly critical of such occurrences, even flirting with the proposition that such

[1] (2012) 33 ILJ 1593 (CC) at paras 51 – 52.

conduct should render the strike itself unprotected.[2] As said by Van Niekerk J in *Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Montecasino v Future of SA Workers Union and Others*[3]:

> '… But the exercise of the right to strike is sullied and ultimately eclipsed when those who purport to exercise it engage in acts of gratuitous violence in order to achieve their ends. When the tyranny of the mob displaces the peaceful exercise of economic pressure as the means to the end of the resolution of a labour dispute, one must question whether a strike continues to serve its purpose and thus whether it continues to enjoy protected status.'

[3] It is precisely to cater for these kind of occurrence that amendments were introduced to section 69 of the Labour Relations Act ('the LRA')[4] so as to establish some semblance of order and peace by way of readily enforceable picketing rules.[5]

[4] The current application before me is a case in point. It is an urgent application by the applicant in which the applicant in effect seeks a variation of the picketing rules issued in this matter, so as to counter incidences of unlawful conduct by striking employees despite picketing rules having been issued. The application is opposed by the respondents, who contend that the relief the applicant seeks would unduly infringe on their fundamental right to picket as an inherent component of their protected strike.

[5] When this matter was argued before me, urgency was not placed in dispute. I am in any event satisfied that the application is urgent, and has been brought by the applicant at the earliest opportunity. What is sought is urgent interim relief, and there simply is no substitute in the form of other substantial redress for what the applicant is seeking in this respect.[6]

Section 69

[2] See *National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits and Allied Workers and Others v Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd: In re Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits and Allied Workers and Others* (2016) 37 ILJ 476 (LC) at para 37; *Ram Transport SA (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union and Others* (2011) 32 ILJ 1722 (LC) at para 9

[3] (2012) 33 ILJ 998 (LC) at para 13.

[4] Act 66 of 1995 (as amended)

[5] The amendments were introduced by Act 6 of 2014, with effect from 1 January 2015.

[6] For the requirements of urgency see *Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others v Northam Platinum Ltd and Another* (2016) 37 ILJ 2840 (LC) at paras 20 – 26.

[6] Before setting out the facts in this matter, it is perhaps best to first deal with section 69 itself. What is settled is that it is the trade union that initiates the picket, and this can only take place as part of a protected strike.[7] Once this has happened, either the trade union concerned or the employer can refer a dispute to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration ('CCMA') for the purposes of establishing picketing rules.[8] At the CCMA, the parties must first try and reach agreement on picketing rules, and if they are unable to do so, the commissioner will issue picketing rules in line with the Code of Good Practice relating to picketing rules, and after considering the particular circumstances of the *workplace* or other premises where it is intended that the right to picket is to be exercised.[9] In *Verulam Sawmills (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others*[10], the Court said:

> '… Not only are picketing rules there to attempt to ensure the safety and security of persons and the employer's workplace, but if they are not obeyed and violence ensues resulting in non-strikers also withholding their labour, the strikers gain an illegitimate advantage in the power play of industrial action, placing illegitimate pressure on employers to settle. …'

[7] The purpose of section 69 has been described in *SA Airways v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union and Others*[11] as follows:

> '… what is then exactly the purpose of s 69? The code in item 3(1) gives guidance in this respect, and it is clear from the content thereof that actual strike action is contemplated. Therefore, the very purpose of s 69, as read with the code, is to regulate protest action and demonstration during protected strike action, and to ensure it is lawful and peaceful. However, and considering the provisions of s 69(7), the section is further intended to offer striking employees protection against discipline and undue interference (for example by interdicts) where they conduct picketing in terms of s 69, and this picketing would attract the same protection as a protected strike in terms of s 67. …'

[7] See *SA Airways v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union and Others* (2013) 34 ILJ 2064 (LC) at para 49.
[8] Section 69(4).
[9] Section 69(5).
[10] (2016) 37 ILJ 246 (LC) at para 15.
[11] (2013) 34 ILJ 2064 (LC) at para 54.

[8] What has then been introduced by the 2015 LRA amendments, which *inter alia* amended section 69(8), is a new process in terms of which to ensure compliance with picketing rules and the objective behind picketing rules. The section provides:

> 'Any party to a *dispute* about any of the following issues … may refer the *dispute* in writing to the Commission-
> *(a)* an allegation that the effective use of the right to picket is being undermined;
> *(b)* an alleged material contravention of subsection (1) or (2);
> *(c)* an alleged material breach of an agreement concluded in terms of subsection (4); or
> *(d)* an alleged material breach of a rule established in terms of subsection (5).'

[9] In my view, section 69(8) created a further dispensation to deal with unlawful conduct in the course of protected strike action. As stated above, the issuing of picketing rules, which all parties are obliged to comply with, will regulate what will pass as lawful behaviour by striking employees and will serve to convey to all what is expected where it comes to acceptable conduct during the course of the strike, whilst still allowing for peaceful protest as contemplated by the right to picket. I believe section 69(8) was introduced to as to encourage employers to be proactive, and approach the CCMA up front and before the strike even starts to determine the rules of engagement between the parties. If these rules are breached, the employer can then declare a dispute under section 69(8) without having to only resort to the Labour Court to interdict unlawful conduct. This dispute, in the normal course, is conciliated, and following unsuccessful conciliation, referred to the Labour Court for adjudication.[12]

[10] But what if urgent interim intervention is still required whilst the very dispute as contemplated by section 69(8) is still in the throes of conciliation and/or adjudication? In my view, the legislature contemplated this very scenario by way of section 69(12). It provides as follows:

[12] Sections 69(10) and (11).

> 'If a party has referred a *dispute* in terms of subsection (8) or (11), the Labour Court may grant relief, including urgent interim relief, which is just and equitable in the circumstances and which may include-
> *(a)* an order directing any party, including a person contemplated in subsection (6) *(a)*, to comply with a picketing agreement or rule; or
> *(b)* an order varying the terms of a picketing agreement or rule.'

[11] Section 69(12) in my view allows this Court to grant urgent interim relief, if it would be just and equitable to do so, whilst either conciliation of the dispute is still pending, or where adjudication in the Labour Court is still pending. When it may be just and equitable for the Court to do will of course depend on the particular facts, and it will be very difficult to provide a check list approach in this regard. I would however venture to suggest that this kind of urgent interim intervention would be just and equitable where a scenario arises that was not contemplated between the parties when the original picketing rules were agreed to or issued by the commissioner, or where there is a material departure from the picketing rules by one of the parties which may require a further tightening of the rules or specific enforcement by this Court. A further built-in safeguard is of course that this kind of urgent relief would only be an interim measure until the dispute can either be properly conciliated, or adjudicated.

[12] With the above in mind, I now turn to the merits of the application

Relevant facts

[13] The applicant conducts the business of a number of gold mines. These gold mines are divided into three business units, being Driefontein, Kloof and Beatrix. Doornfontein and Kloof are situate in Gauteng and North West, and Beatrix in the Free State. The first respondent is a duly recognized trade union and collective bargaining agent at the applicant, and the individual respondents are members of the first respondent. The National Union of Mineworkers ('NUM') is the other representative and recognized trade union in the applicant. The first respondent represents the majority of the employees at Driefontein, and NUM represents the majority employees at Kloof and Beatrix.

[14] Wages and conditions of employment for the particular sector are negotiated at a central level within the Minerals Council South Africa (previously the Chamber of Mines) that represents various different employers in the sector, including the applicant. On 11 July 2018, negotiations on wages and conditions of employment for the sector, which would apply for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2021, commenced.

[15] Ultimately, a collective agreement on wages and conditions of employment was concluded between the applicant, NUM, and two other representative trade unions, being UASA and Solidarity. No agreement was concluded with the first respondent, and negotiations with it continued. However, and ultimately, no agreement could be concluded.

[16] On 19 November 2018, the first respondent gave notice as contemplated by section 64(1) of the LRA that it would embark upon strike action in respect of the dispute relating to wages and conditions of employment, which strike was to commence on 21 November 2018.

[17] Having received this strike notice, the applicant sought to engage with the first respondent with the view of concluding an agreement on picketing rules, which would apply at Driefontein, Kloof and Beatrix. But unfortunately, no agreement on picketing rules could be concluded. The applicant then referring a dispute to the CCMA as contemplated by section 69(4) of the LRA with the view of establishing picketing rules through that forum.

[18] The strike then started on 21 November 2018, and according to the applicant, was immediately marred by unlawful conduct by the striking employees at all three operations. The applicant sought an interdict from this Court on 22 November 2018 to interdict this unlawful behaviour, which was granted.

[19] The picketing rules dispute referred to the CCMA was heard on 23 November 2018. The applicant and the first respondent both participated in these proceedings, and made submissions. These submissions included designating specific picketing areas, and limiting the number of striking employees entitled to picket from time to time. The parties first tried to conclude an agreement under the auspices of the CCMA, with the respective submissions as a basis, but were not successful in concluding an agreement. The matter was

postponed to 26 November 2018 to allow the parties an opportunity to make further submissions on picketing rules.

[20] Ultimately, and in the absence of an agreement on picketing rules, commissioner Maboya of the CCMA issued picketing rules in terms of section 69(5) on 29 November 2018. I do not intend to burden this judgment by setting out all of the picketing rules. I will suffice by referring to the picketing rules relevant to deciding this matter. Firstly, specific picketing areas were designated for each of the operations at Driefontein, Kloof and Beatrix. Secondly, the number of employees allowed to participate in the picket from time to time was limited. Thirdly, employees were prohibited from engaging in unlawful conduct.

[21] I was informed that this matter does not concern the operations at Driefontein and Kloof, and only concerns the operations at Beatrix. I will thus specify in more detail the relevant picketing provisions for Beatrix, which are:

21.1 Three picketing areas were determined for what was called Beatrix 1, Beatrix 3 and Beatrix 4, in the rules. The areas were demarcated by way of red dots marked on what was clearly Google maps extracted in respect of these sites.

21.2 At Beatrix 1, no more than 400 employees were allowed to participate in the picket at any given time. At Beatrix 3, the number was 500 employees, and at Beatrix 4 it was 300 employees.

[22] According to the applicant, and after the picketing rules were issued, a number of breaches of these rules were committed by what appeared to be the striking employees. The applicant provided some detail of this, including video footage. I do not intend to repeat all the individual instances of these picketing rules violations in this judgment. Suffice it say, and during the period of 30 November to 3 December 2018, it included blockading of roads, the stoning of passing vehicles and persons, the storming of buses, assault of a bus driver and damage to buses, and the use of sling shots on the security personnel and the police. This conduct even included the assault of a police officer and taking her fire arm and video camera.

[23] The main thrust of the problem however appears to be the conduct of striking employees along the R30 road between Welkom and Theunissen. This is a public road which gives access to the applicant's offices, three of the shafts and another mining company, Harmony's Joel Mine. The difficulty is that along the R30 and in essence opposite the applicant's operations, there is a tree line within which the striking employees are able to conceal themselves and move up and down the road, and then attack passing vehicles and persons with stones and sling shots.

[24] The applicant's further complaint is that because of the number of picketing areas, employees then move between the picketing areas, which includes the stretch of the R30 referred to, thus on face value justifying their presence in these areas as well.

[25] According to the applicant, the first respondent is unable to control the striking employees. The applicant proposes, as a result, that the picketing area at Beatrix be limited to one picketing area, and that the number of employees that are allowed to picket be limited to a number of 50, from time to time.

[26] The first respondent disagrees with the contentions of the applicant. According to the first respondent, its members are not involved in the unlawful conduct. It even suggested that it was the security personnel and the police that blockaded the road. It further complained that the applicant only provided limited examples of unlawful conduct, and save only for one of its members that had been arrested, could not establish the involvement of anyone else. The first respondent also argued that the applicant already had the protection of the Court Order of 22 November 2018 and could enforce non-compliance by way of contempt proceedings.

[27] The first respondent argued that the limitations the applicant sought to place on its and its members' right to picket would unduly interfere with these rights and in essence negate the picket to something that has no value. It complained that the applicant was seeking to derail the strike in an underhanded manner.

[28] It is now up to this Court to resolve this impasse between the parties and arrive at a solution that is just and equitable, considering that the applicant has

brought a case to the effect that the picketing rules were not only breached, but the rules relating to picketing areas and number of picketing employees allowed is not workable.

Analysis

[29] The point of departure in deciding this matter has to be the consideration that the 29 November 2018 picketing rules were issued by the CCMA in terms of section 69(5) after consideration of proper and comprehensive submissions by both parties, each setting out their respective positions. The commissioner has access to all the relevant background facts and the legal positions of both parties where it came to picketing, and after having considered this, gave a reasoned outcome when determining the applicable picketing rules. If any of the parties were dissatisfied with the picketing rules so issued, it would have been incumbent on such a party to challenge the picketing rules on review to this Court.[13]

[30] It follows that as a matter of principle, the picketing rules of commissioner Maboya dated 29 November 2018 should be upheld, enforced and applied as it stands. The applicant has sought such a prayer, and there would be no reason not to grant it.

[31] However, Section 69(8) contemplates a dispute not only about a breach of the picketing rules, but also where it is alleged that there has been a material contravention of section 69(1), which provides that a picket must be called for the purposes of peacefully demonstrating. This has to mean that even where there is no actual contravention of the picketing rules as issued by the CCMA, a situation may well arise where the application of the picketing rules as they stand would undermine the objective of peaceful demonstration contemplated by section 69(1). In such a case, it has to be competent for this Court to vary the rules so as to give effect to this objective. My view in this regard is reinforced by section 69(12), which provides that an order varying the terms of picketing rules may be made when adjudicating a dispute under section 69(8).

[13] See *Consolidated Workers Union of SA on behalf of Individual Applicants v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others* (2013) 34 ILJ 2010 (LC) at paras 27 – 30.

[32] In this instance, the gist of the applicant's case to vary the picketing rules relate, as stated above, to the number of employees allowed to picket and the picketing areas. According to the applicant, this is necessary because of the fact that the first respondent in unable to control its members, and the picketing rules as they stand enable the striking employees to abuse the R30 corridor, so to speak, in effecting their campaign of unlawful conduct and violence.

[33] The first respondent's case is that the commissioner properly arrived at a conclusion when issuing picketing rules, and there is no reason to interfere with it. According to the first respondent, a further limitation of the right to picket would unduly infringe on the rights of the first respondent and its members where it comes to their pursuit of protected strike action.

[34] The establishment of picketing rules that serve to ensure that picketing is peaceful, lawful and orderly, but without unduly interfering with the rights of the employees to peacefully protest, is a very delicate balance. In the end, what is needed is a determination that is just and equitable to both parties. As held in *Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others*[14]:

> 'The matrix of permissible conduct that evolves ultimately as the picketing rules is a particular permutation that balances logistics, the nature of the business, the industrial relations history of the enterprise and the union with the impact of the picket so that the rules are determined not too narrowly or too broadly to exacerbate industrial conflict or obstruct the substantive resolution of the dispute. Thus rules that put the pickets 'out of sight and out of mind' of the employer, a phrase coined in this application, could, on the one hand, prevent intimidation of non-striking workers and customers. On the other hand, it can be counter-productive to workplace peace in the longer term if the picketers became increasingly frustrated as they would be if their picket has little impact. The employer's incentive to resolve the dispute substantively could also diminish if the striking employees are out of sight and out of mind.'

[35] I am compelled to agree with counsel for the first respondent that a further limitation of the number of employees that may participate in the picket from

[14] (2006) 27 ILJ 2681 (LC) at para 31.

time to time would cause an undue imbalance. The commissioner decided on the limitation of numbers based on an assessment of the evidence, and the representations by both parties. In arriving at this conclusion, he must have, in my view, appreciated what would constitute a manageable number of picketers that can be controlled by the allocated marshals and security personnel as contemplated by the issued picketing rules. To limit the number of picketers in an undue fashion renders the picket ineffective. The picket must have a sufficient impetus so as to convey to the employer and third party observers, that the striking employees are resolute in pursuit of their demands and perhaps further pressure the employer in acceding to these demands. Considering that the striking employees number in their thousands, it would in fact be insulting if only 50 of them are allowed to picket from time to time. It would certainly unduly detract from the impetus of the picket.

[36] But where it comes to the picketing areas, I prefer to the proposition advanced by the applicant's counsel. It is clear that the allocation of multiple picketing areas causes a number of difficulties, and in fact undermine the objective of peaceful protest in a designated area. I have no reason to doubt the case of the applicant that the multiple picketing areas result in a movement of striking employees, creating the opportunity for unlawful conduct where perpetrators may escape being identified and dealt with. It also causes the marshalling of striking employees and the ability not only of the applicant, but also of the first respondent as responsible trade union,[15] to control the striking employees and ensure adherence to the picketing rules, to be made extremely difficult. A single appropriate picketing area would be a solution removing this difficulty.

[37] I may add that it would be a far more feasible proposition for the first respondent to contend that perpetrators of unlawful conduct are not its members, if its members are all gathered in a single area where it has proper control over them. A single picketing area may thus very well being the interest of the first respondent and its members as well, removing all the complications of later arguments about who did what to whom.

[15] See *Food and Allied Workers Union v In2Food (Pty) Ltd* (2014) 35 ILJ 2767 (LAC) at para 6; *In2Food (Pty) Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union and Others* (2013) 34 ILJ 2589 (LC) at 2591H-I; *Royalserve Cleaning (Pty) Ltd v Democratic Union of Security Workers and Others* (2012) 33 ILJ 448 (LC) at para 7.

[38] The applicant proposes a single picketing area indicated as such on a map which is found at page 204 – annexure “SL1” – of the pleadings bundle. This picketing area right oppose one of the existing picketing area for Beatrix 1 established in commissioner Maboya’s picketing rules, and also adjacent to the R30 on which most of the traffic accessing the applicant’s premises travels. I thus accept that the proposed picketing area resorts in a general vicinity that has been found feasible as location for an effective and proper picket. It is about 300 meters away from the nearest entrance to Beatrix mine and 1 000 metres away from the hostel. It is thus not as if the picket will be moved so far away that it would render the picket impotent.

[39] A single picketing area will in my view remove the ability of striking employees to move from area to area with all the difficulties associated with this. I consider this kind of variation to be just and equitable and to give effect to the requirement of a peaceful demonstration as found in section 69(1).

[40] Applying the above to the facts in this case, I am satisfied that a variation of the picketing rules are called for, but not the extent as sought by the applicant. The only variation that would be just and equitable is that the various picketing areas designated under Beatrix 1, Beatrix 3 and Beatrix 4 in the picketing rules be removed, and then substituted with the single picketing area as designated on page 204 (annexure “SL1”) of the pleadings. This picketing area must be at least 30(thirty) metres back from the road itself, a distance contemplated by the current picketing rules.

[41] However, the permissible number of employees entitled to participate in the picket from time to time must not be tampered with. However, and because four individual Beatrix picketing areas are to be consolidated into one, there must be a consolidation of the numbers. The maximum permitted number of picketing employees from time to time, for Beatrix, and in terms of the existing picketing rules, is 500 (five hundred) employees. This must therefore be the permissible number for the amended area as well.

[42] In conclusion, I am satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for the variation of the picketing rules dated 29 November 2018 to the effect that the designated picketing areas for Beatrix 1, Beatrix 3 and Beatrix 4 be removed, and substituted with the single demarcated picketing area as contained on the

map at page 204 of the pleadings bundle – annexure “SL1”. A total of 500 (five hundred) employees from time to time are entitled to participate in a picket in compliance with the picketing rules in such picketing area.

[43] The applicant has also prayed that the striking employees do not seek to hide their identity during the conduct of the picket. The first respondent’s counsel indicated that the respondents have no issue with this. There is therefore no reason why this order cannot be granted.

[44] As touched on above, the applicant in this case has sought urgent interim relief. As such, the relief granted in terms of this judgment can only apply until the pending dispute in terms of section 69(8) of the LRA is either resolved at conciliation under the auspices of the CCMA in terms of section 69(10), or by way of final adjudication in this Court under section 69(11). In any event, and as said in SA Airways,[16] a particular picketing agreement or picketing rules only applies to a particular strike, and once that strike is resolved, the relevant rules / agreement falls away. The issue is therefore susceptible to be revisited on each and every individual occasion, and does not serve as some or other binding precedent covering all future strikes.

[45] This then only leaves the issue of costs. Both parties have had some measure of success. They also have an ongoing relationship with one another. I also accept that the picketing rules were inadequate, and as such intervention by this Court was needed to rectify matters. I further consider that an issue of costs would only serve to place further strain on the relationship where there is still an ongoing strike. Exercising the wide discretion I have in terms of section 162(1) of the LRA, I believe that this is a case where no costs order would be appropriate.

Order

[46] In the circumstances, I make the following order:

1. The Rules relating to the time limits and manners of service are hereby dispensed with, and the application is heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 8.

[16] (*supra*) at para 43.

2. A *Rule Nisi* is hereby issued calling upon the respondents to show cause on 27 February 2019 at 10h00 or so soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, why a final order should not be granted in the following terms:

2.1 Pending the finalisation of the dispute in terms of section 69(8) between the applicant and the respondents, either by way of conciliation under section 69(10), or adjudication under section 69(11), the picketing rules dated 29 November 2018 are amended as follows:

2.1.1 The designated picketing areas for Beatrix 1, Beatrix 3 and Beatrix 4 is removed, and substituted with the single demarcated picketing area as contained on the map at page 204 of the pleadings bundle – annexure “SL1”; and

2.1.2 A total of 500 (five hundred) of the individual respondents are entitled to participate in a picket in compliance with the picketing rules in the picketing in terms of paragraph 2.1.1 of this order, from time to time.

2.2 The individual respondents are ordered to comply with the picketing rules dated 29 November 2018, as amended by paragraphs 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 of this order.

2.3 The individual respondents are ordered not to wear balaclavas and/or wear or utilize any other means to hide their identity.

3. The *Rule Nisi* issued in terms of paragraphs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of this order, as set out above, shall operate as an interim order with immediate effect, pending the return date.

4. There is no order as to costs.

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Sean Snyman

Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa

Appearances:

For the Applicant:	Advocate M Van As
Instructed by:	ENS Africa Attorneys
For the Respondents:	Advocate A Cook
Instructed by:	Larry Dave Attorneys