VOLUME FIVE

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report
The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was presented to President Nelson Mandela on 29 October 1998.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu  
Chairperson

Ms Hlengiwe Mkhize

Dr Alex Boraine  
Vice-Chairperson

Mr Dumisa Ntsebeza

Ms Mary Burton

Dr Wendy Orr

Revd Bongani Finca

Adv Denzil Potgieter

Ms Sisi Khampepe

Dr Fazel Randera

Mr Richard Lyster

Ms Yasmin Sooka

Mr Wynand Malan*

Ms Glenda Wildschut

Dr Khoza Mgojo

* Subject to minority position. See volume 5.

Chief Executive Officer: Dr Biki Minyuku
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Analysis of Gross Violations of Human Rights</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1: Coding Frame for Gross Violations of Human Rights</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2: Human Rights Violations Hearings</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Interim Report of the Amnesty Committee</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: Amnesties granted</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Consequences of Gross Violations of Human Rights</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Reparation and Rehabilitation Policy</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Findings and Conclusions</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Causes, Motives and Perspectives of Perpetrators</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Position submitted by Commissioner Wynand Malan</td>
<td>436</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response of the Commission to the Minority Position of Commissioner Wynand Malan</td>
<td>457</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

1 The Committee on Human Rights Violations (the Committee) was established on 16 December 1995 at the first meeting of the Commission. It was composed of Archbishop Desmond Tutu (chairperson of the committee), Yasmin Sooka and Wynand Malan (vice-chairpersons), Alex Boraine, Mary Burton, Bongani Finca, Richard Lyster, Dumisa Ntsebeza, Denzil Potgieter and Fazel Randera.

2 At its first meeting, the Committee considered the appointment of ten additional committee members, as provided in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (the Act). Consideration was given to regional needs as well as the wish to ensure the broadest possible representation in terms of skills, culture, language, faith and gender. The following members were appointed to the Human Rights Violations Committee: Russell Ally, June Crichton, Mdu Dlamini, Virginia Gcaban, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Ilan Lax, Hugh Lewin, Yolisa (Tiny) Maya, Ntsikelelo Sandi, Joyce Seroke, and, in the final months, Mothofela Mosuhli.

3 The Committee met at an early date to discuss and begin to implement its duties and functions as laid down in the Act. It was guided by the underlying principles of compassion, respect and equality of treatment in all its dealings with people who were to be defined as “victims of gross violations of human rights”.

4 Its first responsibility was to establish a mechanism by which the “complete picture” of gross violations of human rights was to be drawn. There were enormous expectations, from the public and also from within the Commission, that public hearings would be held which would expose a considerable part of this picture. It was even hoped that a first public hearing could be held as early as February 1996, but it soon became apparent that a great deal of preparatory work had to be done first. Looking back with the wisdom of hindsight from the perspective of July 1998, it is amazing that a public hearing was in fact achieved as early as April 1996.

Information had first to be gathered. A number of sources were available, with substantial documentation that could be accessed from organisations which had endeavoured to keep records of abuses that had taken place during the period under review. These were studied and augmented by submissions later received from such organisations. This information was invaluable for research purposes and was used for the corroboration of statements (although some difficulties were experienced, for example, with incompatible databases). At a later stage in the Commission’s life, a much debated resolution was taken to use these secondary sources for corroboration purposes only, and not for the identification of ‘victims’ for the purpose of reparations.

The public hearings

Thus, the preparation and organisation of the first public hearing became the primary goal of the Committee in the first months. Together with the whole Commission, it had decided that particular emphasis would be placed on hearing the experiences of victims of gross violations from the people themselves. It would seek out all such people, old and young, living in urban or rural areas, and provide a forum for many voices that had previously been silenced.

The first public hearing was held in East London in April 1996. The choice of a centre in the Eastern Cape was no accident, but a deliberate decision to focus attention on an area which had borne the brunt of some of the heaviest repression by the security forces of the previous government, in direct response to some of the most militant resistance.

The four days of hearing set a model for future hearings (later reduced to three days), and it is worth describing in some detail the planning and arrangements that took place.

The selected venue was the East London City Hall, an imposing Victorian-style building in the centre of the city. Stringent security measures had to be put in place, and were provided and maintained by the South African Police Services (as at all subsequent public hearings). Provision had to be made for the media. Food and accommodation had to be provided for the deponents and for at least some of their families who attended to support them. Transport had to be arranged, entailing heavy costs and considerable logistical difficulties, and interpretation services had to be arranged for simultaneous translation into all the languages to be used. The placing of tables for the witnesses and for Commission members received careful attention — witnesses were to take pride of place and there
was to be no suggestion of their being ‘in the dock’ as in a court. They were also always to be accompanied by a Commission ‘briefer’ and, if they chose, by a family member or other supporter. The deponents were brought together during the weekend before the hearings in order to prepare them, and the Committee worked closely with members of the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee in this process.

10 All the hearings were to have a ceremonial aspect: the chairperson’s opening remarks were often preceded by prayer, by the lighting of a memorial candle, by hymns or songs. When Archbishop Tutu presided, he wore his purple robes, lending his own special presence to the occasion. This religious aspect of the hearings was sometimes criticised, especially for its mainly Christian focus. It became clear, however, that this was not inappropriate in a country where a considerable majority of the population is Christian. In later hearings, when Archbishop Tutu himself was not present, other religious leaders were often asked to pray. Often, too, local community groups would introduce songs and ceremony (in the little country town of Hanover a choir sang a song composed specially for the Commission).

11 In East London, a special inter-faith ceremony was held the day before the hearing, and the hearing itself opened to a packed hall humming with anticipation.

12 The four days were extremely emotional and dramatic. The witnesses included the families of the well-known ‘Cradock Four’, community leaders assassinated in 1985; individuals and the families of those who were killed or injured in bombings carried out by revolutionary activists; and people who were detained, tortured, or victimised in other ways. Deponents were sometimes stoical, almost matter of fact, but others succumbed to tears or expressed their anger as they relived their experiences. The panel of commissioners and committee members was visibly overcome. The public sat silent and spellbound during the testimony, but was occasionally moved to angry murmuring. Tea and lunch breaks were marked by singing and chanting of political slogans.

13 The large media contingent included national and international representatives, and filled to overflowing the room provided for them. By the end of the week, awareness of the work of the Commission had burst upon the newspapers, television screens and radio broadcasts in a way that began to change the perceptions of millions of people.

2 As defined the chapter on Methodology in Volume One.
14 Thus was the pattern set for the many hearings of the Commission.³ They were held in large cities or small rural towns, in city halls or educational institutions or church halls. They were made possible by the meticulous work and planning of the various logistical teams in the regions and by the assistance of many people in the local areas.

**Preparations for the hearings**

15 The preparatory work began with the dissemination of information about the Commission and its work, followed by the gathering of statements and background information.

16 Preparatory discussions, during what was usually an eight-week cycle, often coincided with preparations made by the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee to lay foundations for counselling and other assistance which could be obtained from local sources.

**Public information**

17 Public meetings and workshops were held in each area selected for a hearing, organised with the assistance of local municipalities, faith organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civic bodies or any other appropriate grouping. Commissioners would explain the aims of the Commission and the way it would work, and would answer questions and attempt to allay fears or respond to criticism. Announcements would be made about the advent of statement taking in the area, and where statements could be made. The media and communications staff assisted with leaflets, banners and press releases.⁴

**The gathering of statements**

18 The Commission devised a form, referred to as a ‘protocol’ or ‘statement form’, for recording the statements made to the Commission by people who believed they had suffered gross violations of human rights. It appointed and trained ‘statement takers’ to listen to the accounts related by such persons, and to record them in a manner which would facilitate their entry into the Commission’s database.⁵

---

³ See appendix 1 for a list of hearings, including dates.
⁴ See Administrative Report: Media and Communications in Volume One for details of publications and the workshop manual.
⁵ For further details of this process, see the chapter on Methodology and its appendix on the information management system in Volume One.
For thousands of people, statement takers represented their first and often their only face-to-face encounter with the Commission. They were selected for their ability to listen to the stories told by people in their chosen language, to distil the essential facts, and to record them in English (since for practical reasons this was the language the Commission had decided to use). Equally important was their ability to listen with empathy and respect, so that the interview itself became part of the therapeutic and healing work of the Commission. Interviews often took several hours, and involved both the deponent and the statement taker in an intense process of reliving anguishing experiences. Many deponents clearly found this to be a catharsis, but others were still bitterly angry or deeply wounded. Some were referred to supportive organisations for counselling and treatment.

The statement takers thus carried a heavy burden of responsibility and were the front rank of those who gathered the memories of the pain and suffering of the past. They themselves required support as the work took its toll on them, and the Commission made counselling and, if necessary, further therapy available to them.

Statement takers were based in each of the four regional offices of the Commission, and the public was informed about where to find them. They also moved out into surrounding areas, responding to requests or to recommendations from the Research Department or other sources of information. Their numbers were increased by volunteers (who were also trained by the Commission) and at a later stage by a project of ‘designated statement takers’ drawn from community-based NGOs.6

In this way the Commission was able to fulfil its aim of reaching the widest possible number of people located across the entire country, making itself accessible to them, protecting their safety and privacy and allowing them to communicate in the language of their choice.

The selection of witnesses for public hearings

After the statements had been taken and submitted to the information management team for entry onto the database, the Human Rights Violations Committee in the region would select a number of them for public hearing. The criteria used were:

- the hearing should reflect accounts from all sides of the political conflicts of the past;

---

6 The designated statement taker programme is described in the chapter on Methodology in Volume One.
b the entire thirty-four-year mandate period should be covered;

c women as well as men should be heard, and the experiences of the youth should also be considered;

d finally, since not all the people of the area could be heard, there should be an attempt at least to provide an overall picture of the experience of the region so that all people could identify in some way with what was demonstrated.

24 Deponents making statements were always asked whether they would be willing, if invited, to testify in public. The majority of them were willing, even eager, and many were angry or disappointed if they were not selected. The exceptions were people who feared possible repercussions. In fact, it is noteworthy that there were not many such repercussions, and fears of intimidation or retaliatory attacks appear to have been largely unfounded. Where there was any such risk, the Commission’s Witness Protection Programme was available.\(^7\) The bomb threat made to the East London hearing was a sobering illustration of what might come, but such threats were not realised.

The bomb scare

25 The first human rights violations hearing took place in a context that was very antagonistic to the work of the Commission with threats coming, presumably, from the right-wing sector. There was a determined effort to silence the voices of the victims and to stop the Commission from exposing the atrocities that had taken place in the past. It came as no surprise at all when a telephone call from the local police reported that they had been telephoned to warn of a bomb in the East London City Hall which could explode at any time. The consideration of the safety of the public and the victims’ families in particular weighed heavily on the Commission, and the deliberations were adjourned as police came in with sniffer-dogs to inspect the hall. There was no bomb. This experience reinforced the Commission’s concern that stringent security measures needed to be maintained.

Notice to alleged perpetrators

26 Any alleged perpetrator named in a statement had to be given due notice that he/she was thus implicated and given an opportunity to respond. This led to one of the legal challenges to the Commission.

\(^7\) See Administrative Report: Witness Protection Unit in Volume One.
Legal challenge to the public hearing

27 The first legal challenge to the Commission confronted it on the first day of the first public hearing in East London. The lawyers representing Mr Gideon Nieuwoudt et al demanded that the Commission must not hear the testimony of Mr and Ms Mthimkulu about the death of their son, Siphiwe Mthimkulu, a prominent student leader who was detained and tortured several times, allegedly poisoned with thallium and who disappeared in 1982. The lawyers claimed that Mr Nieuwoudt had the right to be represented in a hearing and to defend his good name from being falsely implicated. They threatened to interdict the Commission from hearing Mrs Mthimkulu’s testimony. The Commission finally conceded and requested Mr and Mrs Mthimkulu not to testify - to their great distress. This was the beginning of a number of court challenges faced by the Commission throughout its life. Mr Gideon Nieuwoudt et al subsequently applied for amnesty for the abduction and killing of Siphiwe Mthimkulu whose body they claimed they had burnt to ashes that they afterwards threw into the Fish River.

The impact of the Human Rights Violations hearings

28 For the eighteen-month period during which they were a major part of the work of the Human Rights Violations Committee, the hearings became the public face of the Commission. They captured the imagination of the public and attracted both praise and criticism. The focus on the suffering of individuals and the reminders of the reconciling aspects of mourning and of forgiveness were in some cases a deterrent to people who were unwilling to come forward to make statements. Thus, political activists did not regard themselves as ‘victims’ who needed to weep or to forgive or be forgiven, but rather as participants in the struggle for liberation, who had known they would suffer for their cause.

29 Furthermore, deponents who had made statements but who had not been invited to testify in public felt in some way that they had been overlooked. It required a great deal of effort to assure them that their statements would be equally carefully investigated, and that they would receive equal attention from the Human Rights Violations Committee in terms of making findings in their case.

30 One of the significant features of the hearings was the simultaneous translation into any of the local languages being used. As the months progressed, the interpreters rapidly developed their skills and sensitive understanding. When the Commission ends, they will continue to be a valuable resource to the country.
Nevertheless, the nature of the work meant that they absorbed a great deal of the pain and anger of the witnesses.

31 The public hearings took their toll on all members of the Commission - the staff involved and also the commissioners who served on the panels. Debriefing sessions were provided for those who wished to participate. The impact also spread more widely, to the journalists covering the process and to the wider society.

32 The public hearings were successful in two major aspects. They met one of the statutory objectives of the Commission, that of “restoring the human and civil dignity of such victims by granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of which they are the victims”; and, together with the public hearings of applications for amnesty, they revealed the extent of gross violations of human rights and made it impossible for South Africans ever again to deny that such violations had indeed taken place.

Other public hearings

33 In addition to hearing testimony from victims of violations, the Committee held other public hearings, which allowed it to explore the motives and perspectives of the different role players. A mechanism for this was provided in the Act (from sections 29 to 32), empowering the Commission to require persons to appear before it at open or closed hearings for the purpose of establishing and gathering the facts.

34 The Commission interpreted this provision in the broadest sense and was able to establish forums for a variety of topics. Public hearings were held to enquire into the roles of the state, the liberation movements, the political parties and various different sectors of society. Investigative hearings were also conducted into events of particular significance - the Bisho massacre, the ‘Trojan Horse’ incident (in Athlone, Cape Town, on 15 October 1985), and others. Many more such hearings were proposed, but not all could be held, for lack of time. The purpose of these hearings was to enable the Commission to gain a deeper understanding of the complete context within which violations had been able to take place.

35 These hearings were structured differently from the individual victim hearings, where no cross-examinations took place. In the investigative hearings, people were subpoenaed to appear; they could be questioned by lawyers and victims, as well as by the commissioners and staff.
Where it was necessary, for investigative purposes, or to protect people who might be implicated, hearings were held in camera, but whenever possible they were held in open session. The Committee sought to be as transparent as possible. As an illustration of this, when the closed hearing into the Mandela United Football Club was challenged by the lawyers representing Ms Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and by the Freedom of Expression Institute, they were allowed to argue their case in public. The closed hearing still took place, but a subsequent open hearing was held.

Furthermore, the Commission held open hearings on specific topics which enabled it, and the public, to explore other key sectors of society and to understand the ways in which such gross violations were able to occur.\(^8\)

**The work behind the scenes**

The people who testified in public made up less than one-tenth of all the people who made statements. It is important to stress that all the statements received the same degree of attention by the Human Rights Violations Committee. In order to provide this attention, it became necessary to curtail the public hearings and focus on the mass of statements and on making findings in every case.

**The processing of the information**

Once a statement had been registered on the database, the deponent was sent a letter of acknowledgement, thanking them for having made it, and giving the reference number to be used in the case of any enquiries.

Thereafter, each stage of the process (the corroboration, and later the finding) was captured on the database.\(^9\)

**Corroboration**

Each of the statements had to be investigated so that the Commission could be assured of its veracity. This task was carried out by the Investigation Unit and is fully described in its report.\(^10\)

---

\(^8\) Reports on these hearings can be found in Volume Four.

\(^9\) See chapter on Methodology in Volume One.

The Human Rights Violations Committee relied extensively on the team of investigators to obtain corroborative evidence to substantiate the statements it received. A great deal of this work consisted of seeking documentary evidence—court records, inquest records, police occurrence books, prison registers, hospital or other medical records. All too often, this was not available: either the normal passage of time or deliberate concealment had led to its being destroyed. When such material could not be found, either the deponents themselves or witnesses had to be tracked down and statements obtained from them.

Other difficulties stemmed from decisions to amend the statement form or ‘protocol’, which went through several changes, influenced both by evaluations of the early batches of statements and by the need to obtain information in a format which allowed for its standardisation and capture. At an early stage, it was decided to remove the demand for the statement to be made on oath, since there was a potential for error in the process of its being written down by the statement taker. At a later stage, it was decided to remove the portion providing for a general narrative and to focus instead on capturing multiple violations and many perpetrators. This may have made it easier to systematise the information, but it resulted in the loss of a potentially rich source of broader information which could have enhanced the corroboration process.

In a limited number of cases, no corroboration could be obtained, not even a statement from an eyewitness. For most of these, the Committee was reluctantly obliged to declare that it was ‘unable to make a finding’ and notify the deponent accordingly. Such deponents still had the right to revert to the Commission with any further arguments or documentation they could put forward. In other cases, details of date, place, event and perpetrators were sufficiently accurate and consonant with known incidents to allow a finding to be made on ‘a balance of probabilities’.

In the final, overall national ratification of the findings made (see below), commissioners relied on the principle of inclusivity and concern for the victims, and endeavoured to reach positive findings whenever the circumstances allowed this, even where available information was extremely scanty.

Decisions on policy

Before findings could be made, clarity was required on definitions and criteria.

The founding legislation spelt out the fairly circumscribed nature of human rights violations on which the Commission was to focus: “the violation of human rights
through the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any person” emanating from the conflicts of the past and carried out or planned by any person acting with a political motive.\textsuperscript{11} There were many challenges from outside the Commission about what this should include, and many debates within the Commission and the Human Rights Violations Committee.

### Definition of ‘gross violation of human rights’

48 This definition limited the attention of the Commission to events which emanated from the conflicts of the past, rather than from the policies of apartheid. There had been an expectation that the Commission would investigate many of the human rights violations which were caused, for example, by the denial of freedom of movement through the pass laws, by forced removals of people from their land, by the denial of the franchise to citizens, by the treatment of farm workers and other labour disputes, and by discrimination in such areas as education and work opportunities. Many organisations lobbied the Commission to insist that these issues should form part of its investigations. Commission members, too, felt that these were important areas that could not be ignored. Nevertheless, they could not be interpreted as falling directly within the Commission’s mandate.

49 The Commission recognised that these issues formed part of the broader context within which the specifically defined gross human rights violations had taken place. It sought to give attention to them by receiving submissions from a number of organisations that had been particularly concerned with these issues in the past.\textsuperscript{12} These submissions made a valuable contribution to the section of the final report dealing with the broad context within which the gross violations of human rights took place, although they could not be considered as victim hearings. They gave depth to the larger picture, but they still excluded individuals from recognition and from access to reparations, and many people remained aggrieved.

### The definition of ‘severe ill treatment’

50 As the broadest category provided in the legislation, this was the one that required the most careful consideration. It became extremely difficult to decide exactly what constituted an act of sufficient severity to be included. As statements were received and studied, subtleties arose that influenced the thinking of members of the Committee. Some of the criteria employed are spelt out in the chapter on the mandate of the Commission (in Volume One), illustrating how

\textsuperscript{11} For a full discussion of this, see chapter on The Mandate in Volume One.
\textsuperscript{12} See the appendix to Volume Four, Chapter 1 for a list of submissions to the Commission.
international criteria deriving from the experiences of other countries were used as guidelines. Some decisions arose out of the workings of the committee itself.

51 For example, many accounts spoke of the effects on people of teargas used by the security forces. It would be impossible to say that teargas used in the legitimate control of an unruly crowd constituted a gross violation of human rights. Yet teargas canisters hurled into a hall or a church, or a small room or vehicle, could do serious damage to the health of a young child or elderly person. In such cases, where the damage could be assessed, it could be found that the person had indeed suffered a gross violation of human rights.

52 The discussion about how to decide whether combatants in the political conflict could be defined as victims of gross human rights violations continued for many months. The final decision is also described in the chapter on The Mandate.

53 Damage to property was another very difficult issue, on which the Committee postponed a decision for many months. Arson was a frequent allegation, and at first it did not seem to constitute a gross violation in terms of the Act. The more it was discussed, the more it was seen as a deliberate tool used by political groupings to devastate an area and force people to move away, the more it became necessary to consider it seriously. Eventually a decision was taken: arson would be considered as ‘severe ill treatment’ if it resulted in the destruction of a person’s dwelling to an extent that the person could no longer live there. The motivation for this decision lay partly in the result - the displacement of the person - and partly in the psychological suffering of a person experiencing the total loss of home and possessions. (It did not make it any easier to have to decide that a person who lost cattle or vehicles, which might constitute their entire livelihood, did not qualify as a ‘victim’ of a gross violation).

54 The delay in arriving at this decision meant that, at earlier stages, people wishing to make statements about arson were turned away by statement takers, and in some areas it was impossible to get them back. In some regions, most notably KwaZulu-Natal, a list was kept and people were brought back into the process, but this happened very late and corroboration was extremely difficult.

55 Conflicts which were described as ‘tribal disputes’, or caused by ‘witchcraft’, might have seemed to fall outside the requirement of having a political motive in terms of the conflicts of the past, yet on closer investigation they frequently masked profoundly political issues.
Numerous statements referred to people who had ‘disappeared’. In some cases, it was possible through investigations, through information obtained from the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), or through applications for amnesty, to discover their fate. Some had gone voluntarily into exile and either been killed in combat or died under other circumstances; some had been abducted and killed; but for many others it was not possible to find out any more information.

Other difficult decisions arose from statements about detention, solitary confinement, and capital punishment. The decisions taken in this regard are also recorded in the chapter on The Mandate.

The process of making findings and notifying deponents

Once all corroboration had been completed, the regionally based members of the Human Rights Violations Committee considered them and made ‘pre-findings’ in every case, deciding either that there was sufficient proof to find that a gross human rights violation had occurred, or that it had not. A 10 per cent sample of these pre-findings went through a national check, to ensure that regions were operating on the same criteria so that the findings would be uniform, and also to double-check for possible mistakes.

Again, all decisions were captured on the database, and complete registers were drawn up and referred to the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee.

A Notification Unit was then established, which again brought together the work of the two committees. All deponents were notified by letter of the finding relevant to their statement, and very often it was necessary to notify additional victims who had been mentioned in the statement. When the finding was positive (that is, a decision was made that a gross violation had occurred), such persons were invited to complete and return the application form for reparations.

Some people were identified as victims through the process of amnesty – when they were mentioned by an applicant and a decision was taken by the Amnesty Committee. These were dealt with in the same way.

Where a ‘negative’ finding was made, deponents were also notified by letter and given information about the grounds on which the decision was made. These fell into five broad categories:
a. the event fell outside the mandate period of the Commission

b. there appeared to be no political motive

c. the violation was not sufficiently severe to qualify as a ‘gross violation’

d. the person killed or injured was a combatant on active duty

e. there was insufficient evidence to allow a finding to be made.

63 Deponents were informed that, if they had additional information that might persuade the Committee to review the finding, they should submit it within a period of three weeks.

64 This introduced a new area of work in the last months of the Commission, where a Review Committee was established to deal with such appeals.

Findings concerning perpetrators

65 All alleged perpetrators about whom findings were contemplated were sent letters in terms of section 30 (2) of the Act, giving them an opportunity to respond. Findings in these matters are covered in the chapters on the four different regions (in Volume Three).

Individual findings

66 It was decided that every person found to have been a victim of a gross violation had the right to have their name and a brief account of the violation in the report of the Commission.13

13 The volume of the report containing this section will appear during the course of 1999.
APPENDIX 1

CODING FRAME FOR GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION
The task of the Commission is to identify those people who suffered gross violations
of human rights, defined as KILLING, ABDUCTION, TORTURE and SEVERE ILL
TREATMENT. In addition to these four, there is a fifth category, the ASSOCIATED
VIOLATION. This has not been defined as a gross violation, yet it is important for the
understanding it provides of the context in which violations could and did take place.
Each of the five categories has several sub-headings, which explain how the violation
took place.

The categories of Human Rights Violations
The table below shows the categories of human rights violations (HRV) with their definitions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HRV CATEGORY</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Killing      | KILLING| A killing is when a person dies, in one of three ways:  
Assassination is killing of a targeted person by a person or group who developed a secret plan or plot to achieve this. A person is targeted because of political position.  
Execution is capital punishment (death sentence) imposed and carried out by a legal or authorised body such as court of law or tribunal. Victim is aware of death sentence. Perpetrators are the state, homeland governments, or security structures of political movements.  
Killing is all other deaths, including a killing by a crowd of people. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HRV CATEGORY</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Torture            | TORTURE  | Torture happens in captivity or in custody of any kind, formal or informal (for example, prisons, police cells, detention camps, private houses, containers, or anywhere while the individual is tied up or bound to something).  
Torture is usually used to get information, or to force the person to do something (for example, admit to a crime, or sign a statement), but it is also used for punishment, degradation, and systematic breakdown of an individual.  
It includes mental or psychological torture (for example, witnessing torture, or telling the person that their family is dead). |
| Severe ill-treatment | SEVERE   | Severe ill treatment covers attempted killing and all forms of inflicted suffering causing extreme bodily and/or mental harm.  
It tends to take place outside of custody (for example, injury by a car bomb, or assault at a rally), but a person can be subjected to severe ill treatment in custody too (for example, a single severe beating, or tear gas in the cell). |
| Abduction          | ABDUCTION | Abduction is when a person is forcibly and illegally taken away (for example, kidnapping). It does not mean detention or arrest. Arrest is not a gross violation of human rights (see associated violations).  
If the person is never found again, it is a disappearance. |
| Associated violation | ASSOCIATED | These are not gross violations of human rights, but are important for understanding the context of the violation (for example, detention, harassment, framing, violating a corpse after death). |
The violation types

The tables below show the HRV categories and the types of violations within each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KILLING</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beaten to death</td>
<td>BEATING</td>
<td>Beaten to death by being hit, kicked, punched, specifying description of part of body assaulted, if known (e.g. feet, face, head, genitals, breasts), or object used (e.g. sjambok, baton, gun, rifle, stick, rope, whip, plank, beat against wall).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnt to death</td>
<td>BURNING</td>
<td>Killed in a fire or burnt to death using petrol, chemicals, fire, scalding, arson. This does not include ‘necklacing’ or petrol bombing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed by poison, drugs or chemicals</td>
<td>CHEMICALS</td>
<td>Killed by poison, drugs, or household substance, such as bleach or drain cleaner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed by drowning</td>
<td>DROWNING</td>
<td>Drowned in a river, swimming pool, or even in a drowning bucket of water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed by electrocution</td>
<td>ELECTRIC</td>
<td>Killed by an electric shock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing by death sentence</td>
<td>EXECUTE</td>
<td>Hanged or shot as decided by a formal body (court or tribunal) such as the state, homeland state, or political party. It is the consequence of a death sentence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in an explosion</td>
<td>EXPLOSION</td>
<td>Killed by any manufactured explosive or bomb, but not a petrol bomb (see below). Explosives include dynamite, landmine, limpet mine, car bomb, hand grenade, plastic explosives, detonator, booby-trap, letter bomb, parcel bomb, special device (e.g. walkman).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed by exposure</td>
<td>EXPOSURE</td>
<td>Person dies after being subjected to extremes such as heat, cold, weather, exercise, forced labour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necklacing</td>
<td>NECKLACING</td>
<td>Burnt with petrol and tyre. Necklacing is coded separately from burning, because it featured heavily in the past. It is differentiated from, for example, setting alight with petrol or burning in a house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other type killing</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>All other methods of killing, including being buried alive, strangling, tear gas, decapitation, disembowelling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol bomb</td>
<td>PETROL BOMB</td>
<td>Killed by a burning bottle of petrol. Petrol bombing falls in a category between burning and bombing, so, like necklacing, it is useful to code it separately. Also called Molotov Cocktail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot dead</td>
<td>SHOOTING</td>
<td>Shot and killed by live bullet, gunshot, birdshot, buckshot, pellets, rubber bullet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabbed to death</td>
<td>STABBING</td>
<td>Killed with a sharp object, such as a knife, panga, axe, scissors, spear (including assegai).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicious suicide or accident</td>
<td>STAGED</td>
<td>Died in a suspicious suicide or fatal accident. Examples are: slipped on soap, jumped out of window, fell down stairs, hanged oneself, car accident, booby-trapped hand grenades or explosives, shot oneself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoned to death</td>
<td>STONING</td>
<td>Killed with bricks, stones or other thrown missile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tortured to death</td>
<td>TORTURE</td>
<td>Tortured to death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown cause of death</td>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>Person is dead, but there is no further information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing involving vehicle</td>
<td>VEHICLE</td>
<td>Dragged behind, thrown out of, driven over, put in a boot of car, specifying type of vehicle involved (for example, car, train, truck, van, bakkie, Hippo, Casspir). Not a car bomb (see bombing)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TORTURE CODE DEFINITION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Torture by beating</th>
<th>BEATING</th>
<th>Tortured by being beaten severely or for a long time (for example, hit, kicked, punched), specifying part of body assaulted (for example, feet, face, head, genitals, breasts) and object used in the beating (for example, sjambok, baton, gun, rifle, stick, rope, whip, plank, beat against wall, or if the victim is pregnant or miscarries.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torture by burning</td>
<td>BURNING</td>
<td>Burnt with cigarettes, or fire, for example.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture with poison, drugs or chemicals</td>
<td>CHEMICALS</td>
<td>Tortured with poison, drugs, or household substance, such as bleach or drain cleaner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture by deprivation</td>
<td>DEPRIVE</td>
<td>Tortured by withholding essentials, such as food, or medical attention where there is serious injury or need. (See associated violations for general lack of medical care while in custody).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric shock torture</td>
<td>ELECTRIC</td>
<td>Electric shocks administered to the body, specifying which body part was shocked (for example, genitals, breasts, fingers, toes, ears, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture by exposure to extremes</td>
<td>EXPOSURE</td>
<td>Tortured by subjecting victim to extremes such as heat, cold, weather, exercise, labour, noise, darkness, light (including flashing lights, blinding by light), blind-folding, confinement to small space, smells, immobilisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Torture</td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological or mental torture</td>
<td>MENTAL</td>
<td>Tortured psychologically, mentally or emotionally, for example by simulated execution (includes Russian roulette), solitary confinement, degradation (includes use of excrement, urine, spit), insults, disinformation (for example, telling the person that a loved one is dead), threats, witnessing torture, forced participation in torture, exposure when washing or on toilet, threat of torture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture by bodily mutilation</td>
<td>MUTILATION</td>
<td>Torture involving injuries to the body where parts of the body are partly or wholly cut, severed or broken, specifying body part, for example, genitals, finger nails, ears, hair, etc. It includes amputation of body parts, breaking of bones, pulling out nails, hair or teeth, scalping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other type of torture</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>All other methods of torture, including use of animals (for example, snake, tortoise, baboon), use of vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture by forced posture</td>
<td>POSTURE</td>
<td>Tortured by forcing the body into painful positions, for example, suspension, ‘helicopter’, tied up, handcuffed, stretching of body parts, prolonged standing, standing on bricks, uncomfortable position (includes squatting, ‘imaginary chair’, standing on one leg, pebbles in shoes), forced exercise, forced labour, blindfolding and gagging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture by sexual assault abuse</td>
<td>SEXUAL</td>
<td>Torture using the victim’s gender or genitals as a weak point. (See elsewhere for electric or shock, mutilation or beating.) It includes: slamming genitals or breasts in drawer or other device, suspension of weights on genitals, squeezing genitals or breasts, rape by opposite sex, rape by same sex, gang rape, forced sexual acts (e.g. oral sex, simulating intercourse), introduction of objects into vagina or rectum, sexual abuse using animals, threats of rape, touching, nakedness, sexual comments or insults, sexual enticement, deprivation of sanitary facilities for menstruation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture by suffocation</td>
<td>SUFFOCATE</td>
<td>Torture by stopping a victim from breathing, for example by bag, towel, tube (wet or dry) over head, drowning (head, whole body submerged), choking, strangling, stifling, throttling, teargassing, burying alive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown type of torture</td>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>Tortured by an unknown method.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEVERE ILL TREATMENT</td>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>DEFINITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely beaten</td>
<td>BEATING</td>
<td>Badly or severely beaten, or beaten for a long period. Victim may be hit, kicked, punched, twisted, specifying part of the body (for example, feet, face, head, genitals, breasts), or object used (for example, sjambok, baton, gun/rifle, stick, rope, whip, plank, wall), specifying if the victim is pregnant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured by burning</td>
<td>BURNING</td>
<td>Injured by burning with fire, petrol, chemical, scalding, but not necklacing or petrol bomb (See below), specifying body part if burning is localised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured by poison, drugs or chemicals</td>
<td>CHEMICALS</td>
<td>Poisoned or injured by poison, drugs, household substance (for example, bleach or drain cleaner).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured in an explosion</td>
<td>EXPLOSION</td>
<td>Injured by a bomb or explosives, but not petrol bomb. Explosives include dynamite, landmine, limpet mine, car bomb, hand grenade, plastic explosives, detonator, booby-trap, letter bomb, parcel bomb, special device (e.g. booby-trapped walkman).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological or mental ill treatment</td>
<td>MENTAL</td>
<td>Severe psychological, mental or emotional ill treatment, for example by simulated execution (includes Russian roulette), degradation (includes use of excrement, urine, spit), death threats, threat of torture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Bodily mutilation                    | MUTILATE | Injured by having parts of body mutilated or damaged, specifying body part, (for example, genitals, fingernails, ears, hair, etc.)
<p>|                                      |          | Includes amputation of body parts, breaking of bones, pulling out nails, hair or teeth, scalping.                                          |
| Necklacing                           | NECKLACING| Injured in an attempted necklacing.                                                                                                       |
| Other type of severe ill treatment   | OTHER    | All other types of severe ill treatment, describing method, and including strangling, drowning, spreading of disease.                      |
| Sexually assaulted or abused         | SEXUAL   | All forms of attack on a person using their gender or genitals as a weak point, for example rape by opposite sex, rape by same sex, gang rape, forced sexual acts (e.g. oral sex, simulating intercourse), introduction of objects or substances into vagina or rectum, sexual abuse using animals. |
| Injured in a shooting                | SHOOTING | Injured by being shot with live bullets, gunshot, birdshot, buckshot, pellets, rubber bullet, specifying body part injured, if known.      |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injury Type</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stabbed or hacked with a sharp object</td>
<td>STABBING</td>
<td>Injured with a sharp object, such as a knife, panga, axe, scissors, spear (including assegai).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured in a stoning</td>
<td>STONING</td>
<td>Person is injured by bricks or stones thrown at them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teargassed</td>
<td>TEARGAS</td>
<td>Severe injury caused by teargassing in a confined space (for example, tear gas in a prison van or packed hall).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffocated</td>
<td>SUFFOCATE</td>
<td>Injury or ill treatment by stopping someone from breathing, for example by drowning (head, whole body submerged), choking, strangling, stifling, throttling, teargassing, burying alive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown type of severe ill treatment</td>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>Severe ill treatment by methods that are unclear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injury involving a vehicle</td>
<td>VEHICLE</td>
<td>Injuries caused by being dragged behind, thrown out of, driven over, put in boot of a vehicle, specifying the vehicle (for example, car, train, truck, van, bakkie, Hippo, Casspir).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ABDUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABDUCTION</td>
<td>Forcibly and illegally taken away (for example, kidnapping), but found again, returned or released. It does not refer to detention or arrest (see associated violations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISAPPEAR</td>
<td>Forcibly and illegally taken away and is never seen again. It does not include cases where a person goes into exile and never returns. It does include people who have disappeared for unknown reasons (instead of abduction, they might have run away or been shot and buried). In this case, a finding will be made and the code will be left as it is, or changed to Killing if the person was killed, or found to be out of the mandate of the Commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSOCIATED VIOLATIONS</td>
<td>CODE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beating</td>
<td>BEATING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation after death</td>
<td>CORPSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation</td>
<td>DEPRIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of property</td>
<td>DESTROY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial impropriety</td>
<td>FINANCIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>FRAMING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incarceration imprisonment</td>
<td>INCARCERAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimidation or harassment</td>
<td>INTIMIDATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other type of associated violation</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual harassment</td>
<td>SEXUAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol bombing</td>
<td>PETROL BOMB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Professional misconduct | PROFESS | Subjection to professional misconduct by one of the following: health professionals (including doctors, nurses, orderlies, clinicians, district surgeons, psychiatrists, psychologists and others) who neglect or ignore injuries, collaborate in torture, or conceal the cause of death or injuries; judiciary (magistrates, judges etc.) who ignore torture allegations, for example; police who neglect the case, ignore or tamper with evidence; lawyers who neglect the case, ignore or tamper with evidence, misappropriate funds or fail to hand over damages; businesses which collaborate with perpetrators.

Teargassed | TEARGAS | Victim is teargassed, but not while in custody (see torture).

Theft or stealing | THEFT | Money or possessions stolen from the victim.

Glossary of Terms
Necklacing refers to the practice of placing a car tyre around the neck of a victim and setting it alight.

A panga is a large knife with a flat blade (used for cane cutting).

An assegai is a spear, either short for stabbing or long for throwing.

A bakkie is a light truck or van with a cabin and open back.

Hippos and Casspirs are armoured personnel carriers.

A sjambok is a whip.

An impimpi is an informer or spy.

The ‘helicopter’ technique refers to a method of torture where a victim was suspended from the ceiling, with hands and feet shackled to a stick, and spun around.

The ‘invisible chair’ technique refers to a method of torture where a victim was forced to pretend to sit on a chair while being interrogated.
### APPENDIX 2

**HRV HEARINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE OF HEARING</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>VENUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 15 - 18</td>
<td></td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 22 - 25</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 29 - 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 02 - 03</td>
<td></td>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 07 - 10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21 - 23</td>
<td></td>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10 - 11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kimberley (Northern Cape)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 18 - 19</td>
<td></td>
<td>George (Southern Cape)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 18 - 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Umtata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24 - 26</td>
<td></td>
<td>Worcester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 26 - 27</td>
<td></td>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 02 - 04</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 08 - 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mmabatho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 17 - 19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pietersburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 22 - 26</td>
<td></td>
<td>Soweto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23 - 25</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 22 - 24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Queenstown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 05 - 07</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peninsula (Helderberg/Tygerberg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 05 - 08</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sebokeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12 - 16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12 - 14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beaufort West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12 - 14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Port Shepstone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 26 - 28</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uitenhage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 29 - 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Durban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 02 - 05</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nelspruit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 09 - 11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bisho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11 - 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Newcastle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23 - 26</td>
<td></td>
<td>Klerksdorp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23 - 24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Duncan Village (East London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 02 - 03</td>
<td></td>
<td>Upington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 03 - 04</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thohoyandou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 07</td>
<td></td>
<td>De Aar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 08</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hanover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 09</td>
<td></td>
<td>Colesberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 08 - 10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Welkom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE OF HEARING</td>
<td>VENUE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 14 - 16</td>
<td>Paarl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 21 - 23</td>
<td>Aliwal North</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 24 - 25</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 28 - 30</td>
<td>Alexandra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 04 -06</td>
<td>Empangeni</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 11 - 14</td>
<td>Krugersdorp (West Rand)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 18 - 19</td>
<td>Bisho (East London)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 18 - 21</td>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 26 - 28</td>
<td>Cape Peninsula</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 26 - 28</td>
<td>Tembisa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 02 - 05</td>
<td>Moutse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 4 - 7</td>
<td>Duduza, Benoni, Katorus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10 - 11</td>
<td>Cradock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 24 - 26</td>
<td>Lusikisiki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 7 - 9</td>
<td>Grahamstown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 8</td>
<td>Messina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 9</td>
<td>Louis Trichardt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10</td>
<td>Tzaneen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17 - 18</td>
<td>Vryheid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 28 - 30</td>
<td>Parys</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 6</td>
<td>Zeerust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>Rustenburg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8</td>
<td>Mabopane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 12 - 14</td>
<td>King William’s Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13 - 14</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20 - 21</td>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21</td>
<td>Piet Retief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22</td>
<td>Ermelo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22</td>
<td>Cape Town (Athlone)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 23</td>
<td>Balfour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27 - 29</td>
<td>Mooi River</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 3 - 5</td>
<td>Witbank, Middelburg, Leandra, Ermelo, Piet Retief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9 - 11</td>
<td>Cape Town (KTC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9 - 13</td>
<td>East London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12</td>
<td>Johannesburg (Children’s Hearings)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 17 - 18</td>
<td>Cape Town (Health Sector)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 18</td>
<td>East London (Youth Submissions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24</td>
<td>Bloemfontein (Children’s Hearing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24 - 26</td>
<td>Ladybrand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28 - 29</td>
<td>Johannesburg (Women’s Hearing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 4 - 15</td>
<td>Durban (Caprivi Hearings)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Volume FIVE  Chapter TWO

Victims of gross violations of human rights

■ INTRODUCTION

The list which follows was taken from the database of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission) on 30 August 1998. It contains the names of all those people who, by that date, had been found by the Commission to have suffered a gross violation of human rights. The cut-off date of 30 August was necessary in order that the list could be checked and prepared for inclusion in this report.

If people do not find their name on this list, there is no cause for concern. There are thousands more names to come, because the process of making finding and of dealing with queries, reviews and appeals has continued beyond that date. In addition, there will be further victims of human rights violations who will be identified through applications for amnesty.

It is the intention of the Commission to publish a complete list at a later date, as an addendum to this report. At that stage, the list will include not only names, but a brief summary of the finding made in every case.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARANES, Joseph</td>
<td>BAKESI, Keankeetsi</td>
<td>BALEBANE, Nkixan</td>
<td>BALEN, Laterle</td>
<td>BALEN, Lesego</td>
<td>BALEN, M damitu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARENDSE, John J acobus</td>
<td>BALEN, Tsele</td>
<td>BALEN, Tukela</td>
<td>BALOGU, Stephen</td>
<td>BALOGU, Thando</td>
<td>BALOGU, Zephine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIYA, Zinakile Charles</td>
<td>BALENG, Mdelwa</td>
<td>BALENG, Sibanda</td>
<td>BALKANA, Magqawe</td>
<td>BALKANA, Sulambiso</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tembisa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASMAN, Roockea</td>
<td>BALKAN, Bozile</td>
<td>BALKAN, Hwambo</td>
<td>BALKANA, Ndumiso</td>
<td>BALKANA, Thandla</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASVAT, Abu-Baker</td>
<td>BALKAN, Tsumbo</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSHOSE, Myekeni Given</td>
<td>BALKANY, Ntuli</td>
<td>BALKANY, Thando</td>
<td>BALKAN, Ndumiso</td>
<td>BALKAN, Thandla</td>
<td>BALKAN, Tshabalala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST, Feliswa Lucky</td>
<td>BALKANY, Thando</td>
<td>BALKAN, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST, Sipho</td>
<td>BALKANY, Thando</td>
<td>BALKAN, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST, Thobeka J oyce</td>
<td>BALKANY, Thando</td>
<td>BALKAN, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST, Thobile Morgan</td>
<td>BALKANY, Thando</td>
<td>BALKAN, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZIZ, Haroon Erasheed</td>
<td>BALKAN, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKAN, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
<td>BALKANA, Tshabalala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAARD, Frances Goitsimang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAARDMAN, Tuseto Henry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAART, Nokuzola Gloria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAARTMAN, Angela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAARTMAN, Ben</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAARTMAN, Grace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAARTMAN, Phinda Gladstone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAARTMAN, William</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAAS, J effrey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAAS, Nkele</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAATJIES, Desmond</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAATJIES, Zolile Eric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BABA, Khayalethu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BABA, Mbonambi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BABE, Yvonne Keitumetse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BABUPI, Pule Edward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACELA, Lungile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACELA, Sakhile Lewis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADA, Mohamed Saleem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADELJA, Mzontsundu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADI, Ben Ngqumbo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADI, Eric Fumanekile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADI, Nontsikelelo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADI, Nowinnie Nanyuku</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADI, Vuyokazi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADIMA, Frans Madimeti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAFABANTU, J ohannes Tata</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAGLEY, Martin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAHUME, Nation Nkosana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAIKEDI, Keabaka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAILEY, Quentin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKANE, Sekhomothane Frederick</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKARDIEN, Baderoon Ismail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKAULI, Mandalo Wonder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKAULI, Nodanie Gertrude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKER, Yazeed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKHE, Bongani</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALA, Ivy Nomvuyo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALADZI, Mthavini Langisa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALATA-MALOBOLA, Lilian Mantha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALEMMAGO, Kebogile Freda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALENI, Nomonde Gienda Nokeri Malgas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALOI, Zuka Samuel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALOIYI, BaFana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALOIYI, Daniel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALOIYI, Eddie Simon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALOIYI, J ossph</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALOIYI, Maphantsi J oseph</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALOIYI, Patrick</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALOIYI, Relfoe Doreen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BHENGU, Hlengiwe Mary-Jane
BHENGU, Jotham
BHENGU, Madodenzeni
BHENGU, Michael Thembinkosi
BHENGU, Njabuliso
BHENGU, Nomini Netta
BHENGU, Oralia Ntombenhle
BHENGU, Philda
BHENGU, Senzosenkosi
BHENGU, Tembani Gertrude
BHENGU, Thobelani
BHENGU, Thulani
BHENGU, Zagiya Muzofikayo
BHENGU, Zakhona Doreen
BHENGU, Zitusile Doris
BHENTSWANA, Magaduzela
BHENTSWANA, Makostada
BHILA, Stanley Sipho
BHILISHO, Mzingisi
BHOLA, Zamble Kenneth
BHOTO, Buyiswa Patience
BHUSA, Fephi
BHUSA, Gabisile Buselaphi
BHUSA, Senzeni Ritta
BHUNGANE, Elizabeth Thuku
BHUNKU, Zandise Richard
BHUNU, Evelyn Nontlungu
BHUNU, Hlela
BIBI, Michael
BIGGARS, Clifford Henry
BIGGARS, Leslie Adrian
BIKITSHA, Zwelakhe
BIYASE, Michael Joy
BIYASE, Qondeni Morencia
BIYELA, Alleta Sthembile
BIYELA, Bheki Themba
BIYELA, Bongekile
BIYELA, Bonisiwe
BIYELA, Charlie
BIYELA, Ethel
BIYELA, Ivy Thandi
BIYELA, J Holyce Thuku
BIYELA, Lindiwe Cynthia
BIYELA, Lucy
BIYELA, Mandla Lawrence
BIYELA, Mbonengi Bethel
BIYELA, Mildred
BIYELA, Moses Mjabuliseni
BIYELA, Msebenziwomhle Caiphas
BIYELA, Mshayela Simon
BIYELA, Musawenkosi
BIYELA, Mzikayise
BIYELA, Nonpumelelo Zodwa
BIYELA, Phuleni
BIYELA, Qondeni
BIYELA, Richard Zitha
BIYELA, Sehukene
BIYELA, Sibongile
BIYELA, Sibongile Zibuyisize
BIYELA, Sizeni Sbongile
BIYELA, Thandabezizwe
BIYELA, Vusumuzi
BLAAUW, Andile Phillip
BLAAUW, Buyle Gladstone
BLAAUW, Manetjie Sizwe
BLAUAUW, Miriam
BLAUAUW, Mzwandile Matthews
BLAUAUW, Nosipho Patricia
BLAKE, Stanko
BLAYI, Weile Dindala
BLES, Myamezeli
BLES, Raymond Mhtheleleli
BLOEM, Trevor
BLOM, Ernest
BLOM, Mgcineki Jackson
BLOZL, Bahlamukile Thembeni
BLOZL, Bangiziwe
BLOZL, Bongi japhushi
BLOZL, Florence Lethiwe
BLOZL, Harrie
BLOZL, Hauweleki
BLOZL, Hekisile Thandazile
BLOZL, Kheteyakhe J oh
BLOZL, Lindiwe Vimbephi
BLOZL, Lungile J oyce
BLOZL, Mandlenkosini Michael
BLOZL, Mantombi
BLOZL, Maureen Shila
BLOZL, Mayis
BLOZL, Nonlanhla Bellina
BLOZL, Nonkululeko Sindisiwe
BLOZL, Ntombenhle Lindiwe
BLOZL, Ntombehle Lindiwe
BLOZL, Ntombeviningi Rene
BLOZL, NTombi
BLOZL, Philiwesi Alice
BLOZL, Phumelwa Virginia
BLOZL, Ritta
BLOZL, Seli Letta
BLOZL, Sibongile Isabel
BLOZL, Site
BLOZL, Thandazile Sikina
BLOZL, Yeye
BLOU, Mzukisi Sidwell
BLOU, Ndilama
BOBE, Mandla Christopher
BOBELO, Edward Vuyisile
BOBELO, Mongezi Henry
BOBOTYANE, Wilson
BOCKS, Zo - Marius
BODIBA, Mzukisi Sidwell
BODIBA, Thapelo J acob
BODINGTON, Ian
BOLDANI, Ndim
BOIKANYO, J oseph
BOIKANYO, Kedineetse Memory
BOILANE, Bangiso Petros
BOINAMO, Gqalathile George
BOJ OSI, Grace
BOJ OSI, Tshepo
BOKABA, Solomon Monk
BOKHLE, Buti Herbert
BOKHATS, Lehlohonolo Edward
BOLELWANG, Sojilo Saul Nukuki
BOLOFO, Michael Njanyana
BOLOKA, Matome Philemon
BOL TSWHA, Mcekiwa
BOLTINA, Daniel Thembinkosi
BOMU, David Kanene
BONA, Sithembele Slovo
BONAS, j ohannes Nqabeni
BONGCO, Mpumelelo Washington
BONGISILE, Honey Mzimkhulu
BONGO, Sidwell
BONGOZA, Theophilus Ndlov
BONGWE, J oyce Livhuwani
BONOKO, Thupetsi William
BONTSI, Nositi Daisy
BONTSI, Vunindela
BONYANE, Morongwaotsile Pieter
BOOI Archie
BOOI, Andile Adwin
BOOI, Cele
BOOI, Edward Vuyisile
BOOI, Mzwandile Michael
BOOI, Nomvo
BOOI, Roselinah Notembekile Ndokosa
BOOI, Simpiwe
BOOI, Sindiphile Stanlin
BOOI, Sylvia Mandisa
BOOI, Vuyisi
BOOS, Motshabi Emel
BOOKHOLANE, Thabang Moses
BOOSMAN, Klaas
BOOYSEN, Edw
BOOYSEN, Hercules Benjamin
BOOYSEN, Mbuyesile Poni
BOOYSEN, Queenie
BOOYSEN, Zetembele Arnold
BOPALAMO, Maggie Miriam Chinto
BOPAPE, Dominic
BOPAPE, Mackenzie
BOPAPE, Stanza
BOPAPE, Tsekera Abner
BORENE, Paulina
BOROKO, Lucas
BOROKO, Motlatsi
BOROKO, Phora J acob
BOROKO, Poppie Elizabeth
BOSCH, Zwenlinzima Hamilton
BOSHIGO, j ohannes Mosheku
BOSHIGO, Papi
BOSIAME, Kabelo Harry
BOSMAN, Merriam
BOSMAN, Mission
BOSMAN, Molathlwa Solomon
BOSMAN, Mqolisi Gilbert
BOSMAN, Nzimeni Patric
BOSS, Tanduxolo
BOTA, Hlalatu Theophilus
BOTA, Mladele
BOTA, Zimasisile Joseph
CEBEKULU, Thandanani
CEBEKULU, Thokozile
CEBEKULU, Thomas
CEBEKULU, Bongani Bryan
CEBEKULU, Nkosinathi
CEBEKULU, Tolwaphi Florence
CEBEKULU, Zodwa
CEBISA, Khoto Stephen
CEBISA, Lindinkosi Blessing Links
CEBISA, Zoille Andile Menenja
CECANE, Lawrence Vukile
CECILS, Jurie
CEKISANI, Buyiswa Margaret
CEKISANI, Moki j acob Bonisile
CEKISO, George
CEKISO, Mzwandile
CELE, Abednigo
CELE, Abednigo Vilo
CELE, Adolphus
CELE, Alfred Mfanafuthi
CELE, Alsin Nenezi
CELE, Amon Simo
CELE, Andreas Njabulo
CELE, Badanile Benedicta
CELE, Bafanyana Naphtal
CELE, Bangukufa
CELE, Beatrice Ntombazane
CELE, Bekhukwenza
CELE, Besizani Jannet
CELE, Bhekani
CELE, Bhekani
CELE, Bhekinkosi Samuel
CELE, Bhekinkosi Selekhu
CELE, Bhekiwe Lilliosa
CELE, Bhekumuzi George
CELE, Bongani Cyril
CELE, Bonginkosi
CELE, Bongiwe
CELE, Bonsile Florence
CELE, Bangukufa
CELE, Beatrice Ntombazane
CELE, Bhekani
CELE, Mbekezeli
CELE, Mkhokheli Michael
CELE, Mondli
CELE, Msamisela
CELE, Mtshingiswa j ones
CELE, Mtungu Alford
CELE, Muntuzeulua Gladness
CELE, Musawenkosi Richard
CELE, Mvuseni Michael
CELE, Mzenjani Albert
CELE, Ncani Doreen
CELE, Ncanyiwe
CELE, Ndwangu Peters
CELE, Ngonayo Mayo
CELE, Nicholas Ndoda
CELE, Nkamezi
CELE, Nkosinathi Humphry
CELE, Nobangane Ellen Gigi
CELE, Nokupila Alvin
CELE, Nokwe Virginia
CELE, Nomathamba Cyndy
CELE, Nomza
CELE, Nombuso
CELE, Nompumelelo Iris
CELE, Nomvula Eunice
CELE, Nonhlanehla Evelina
CELE, Nozimphala
CELE, Nsingizi
CELE, Pheukingsa Siphiwe
CELE, Patrick Sipho
CELE, Paul Mandla
CELE, Philmon Bheka
CELE, Phiwani
CELE, Phumzile Idah
CELE, Qalumuzi
CELE, Qamanda Meta
CELE, Qedani
CELE, Qhumile
CELE, Robert Ken
CELE, S’Bongiseni
CELE, Salabenzeni
CELE, Saraphina
CELE, Sbusiso Richard
CELE, Sdumo Goodwill
CELE, Shakes
CELE, Shiabakubo Margaret
CELE, Shivaba
CELE, Simon
CELE, Sipho
CELE, Solani
CELE, Solo
CELE, Thandanam Thobelani
CELE, Thathokwakhe
CELE, Thembalakhe Michael Bhozo
CELE, Thembekile
CELE, Thembekile Irene
CELE, Thembeni Eunice
CELE, Thembeni Margaret
CELE, Thembinkosi Prince
CELE, Thembile Thembani
CELE, Thulani Christopher Chester
CELE, Thulisile Doris
CELE, Timothy Khosela
CELE, Titise
CELE, Tombi Getrude
CELE, Veli
CELE, Vorster Bhutiza
CELE, Vusumzi Prince
CELE, William Ndosi
CELE, Willip Singisi
CELE, Wilson Bonginkosi
CELE, Yakele
CELE, Zibuse
CELE, Zinini Joseph
CELE, Zwelakhe Mdu Emelo
CELEYWAYO, Zamile Jackson
CELEYWAYO, Mzisela
CEWE, Artherstone Buyile Abc
CHABA, Herbert
CHABALALA, Patrick Belelani
CHABELI, Andrew Staki
CHAGI, Khoyo
CHAKA, Patricia Kelebileman
CHAKA, Sebogoba Piet
CHAKALE, Robert Stephen
CHAKA, Siwanana
CHAKOEHE, Tshediso Daniel
CHAMANE, Buhle Monica
CHAMANE, Florence Ntombikile
CHAMANE, Mandla Willis
CHAMANE, Mynah
CHAMANE, Sibusiso Elijah
CHAMANE, Sithembiso
CHAND, Ameen
CHAND, Emraan
CHAND, Hagera
CHAND, Ridwaan
CHAND, Samsodien
CHANZA, j acob Matheka
CHANZA, j ohannes Fish
CHAPO, Elijah Monyane
CHRILLES, Edward Vuyo
CHRILLES, Rodger Neil
CHRILLES, Thozamile
CHARLIE, J ersey
CHARLIE, Mc Donald
CHARLIE, Morwabisi Stanley
CHARLIE, Nombulelo
CHARLIMAN, Ntanyakhe Tommy
CHASO, Stewart Mtyelwa
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DLELAPHANTSI, Nomthetho Prudence</td>
<td>DLEP, Welcome</td>
<td>DONDASHE, Whitey Thozamile Michael</td>
<td>DUB, Thambolini Elizabeth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLEZI, Ganta</td>
<td>DLEZI, Mziwabantu</td>
<td>DONDISA, Thandikosni Sidwell</td>
<td>DUBE, Theobold Dumsani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLEZI, Zandile Irene</td>
<td>DONGWE, Naledi Eugenia</td>
<td>DONGWE, Naledi Eugenia</td>
<td>DUBE, Vusumzi Samuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLHAMINI, Bafana</td>
<td>DONLEY, Esther Nene</td>
<td>DOUGLAS, Dane</td>
<td>DUBE, Yvonne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLODLO, Busisiwe</td>
<td>DOUGLAS, Njenani</td>
<td>DOUGLAS, Njenani</td>
<td>DUBE, Zeblon Mfana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLODLO, Linda</td>
<td>DOUSIE, Soysile</td>
<td>DOYI, Abram Lesley</td>
<td>DUBE, Zibokwakhe Frederick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLODLO, Mbongeni Mqavi</td>
<td>DOYISA, David</td>
<td>DOYISA, David</td>
<td>DUBON, Isaac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLODLO, Theophilus</td>
<td>DOYISA, David Vusumuzi</td>
<td>DOYISA, Phucuyise</td>
<td>DUBULEKWELA, Brenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOKOLO, Mpmomi Melfred</td>
<td>DRAMAT, Anwar</td>
<td>DRAMAT, Anwar</td>
<td>DUDA, Phakamile William</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Albert</td>
<td>DU FREEZ, Peter William</td>
<td>DUDA, Howard</td>
<td>DUDU, Easter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Atwell</td>
<td>DU TOIT, Afrika J ohannes</td>
<td>DUDA, Nester</td>
<td>DUDU, Phoswa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Bhelinah Manje</td>
<td>DU TOIT, David</td>
<td>DUKE, Mimise</td>
<td>DUKU, Kaizer Nimrod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Dongani</td>
<td>DUBAZANE, Mandla Ray</td>
<td>DULCHRAN, Kishorela</td>
<td>DULI, Craig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Dumisani</td>
<td>DUBAZANE, Sindisiwe</td>
<td>DUMA, Bakhaleni Mana</td>
<td>DUMA, Bongani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Eunice</td>
<td>DUBE, Beatrice</td>
<td>DUMA, Bongani joseph</td>
<td>DUMA, Christopher Veli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Khanyisile Mavis</td>
<td>DUBE, Bekizizwe Robert</td>
<td>DUMA, Fihlaphi</td>
<td>DUMA, Kenneth Dumsani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Kololoyase</td>
<td>DUBE, Boneni Grace</td>
<td>DUMA, Lili Gertrude</td>
<td>DUMA, Lilo Gertrude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Mdingiseni</td>
<td>DUBE, Bonisiwe Dorcas</td>
<td>DUMA, Lombo Alson</td>
<td>DUMA, Lonko Mpalimoe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Melta Duduzile</td>
<td>DUBE, Brenda Mbalenhle</td>
<td>DUMA, Mantombi Premrose</td>
<td>DUMA, Mbalekelwa Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Mfanafuthi Moses</td>
<td>DUBE, Dicky</td>
<td>DUMA, Mthokozisi Christopher</td>
<td>DUMA, Musa Agrippa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Mfanafuthi Moses</td>
<td>DUBE, Dina Doshana</td>
<td>DUMA, Musa Agrippa</td>
<td>DUMA, Ntozi George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Mkhanyisi Eric</td>
<td>DUBE, Duduzile Lucy</td>
<td>DUMA, Nobuhle</td>
<td>DUMA, Nqilase Constance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Musawenkosi Mindeni</td>
<td>DUBE, Ellie Mncopeni</td>
<td>DUMA, Ntabi Mavis</td>
<td>DUMA, Ntomi Edeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Nkanyiso Iuen</td>
<td>DUBE, Emily Fikile</td>
<td>DUMA, Nonceba Martha</td>
<td>DUMA, Qondeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Pumuzile Patricia</td>
<td>DUBE, Emmerald Thanda</td>
<td>DUMA, Nkosi Martha</td>
<td>DUMA, Regina Babhekle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Regina</td>
<td>DUBE, Florence Ntombizonke</td>
<td>DUMA, Robert</td>
<td>DUMA, Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Robert Zinszwa</td>
<td>DUBE, Grace</td>
<td>DUMA, Sibongile Promise</td>
<td>DUMA, Sibongile Promise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Sihle</td>
<td>DUBE, Herbert Mduduzi</td>
<td>DUMA, Siyabonga</td>
<td>DUMA, Sibongile Promise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Mabel</td>
<td>DUBE, Hieziphi Sylvia</td>
<td>DUMA, Snando Braveman</td>
<td>DUMA, Solomon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Mabel</td>
<td>DUBE, Isaac</td>
<td>DUMA, Solomon</td>
<td>DUMA, Tende</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, J ohannes</td>
<td>DUMA, Thabisile</td>
<td>DUMA, Thabisile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, J josephine</td>
<td>DUMA, Thulani</td>
<td>DUMA, Zandile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Kedibone</td>
<td>DUMA, Zandile</td>
<td>DUMA, Zephania Hijo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Lina Nesta</td>
<td>DUMA-MTOMO, Mkhathali Buzani</td>
<td>DUMAKUDE, Tembani Sellina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Lucy</td>
<td>DUMAKUDE, Thandi Venetia</td>
<td>DUMAKUDE, Thandi Venetia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Mabandla Amos</td>
<td>DUMANA, Vusumzi</td>
<td>DUMAKUDE, Thembekile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Mandikayise Ahazie</td>
<td>DUMELA, Nobantu Elsie</td>
<td>DUMAL, Vusumzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Mbowe Bhekizwe</td>
<td>DUMELA, Nombulelo</td>
<td>DUMEZWENI, Phikiso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Mgcineni</td>
<td>DUMILE, Zolani</td>
<td>DUMILE, Zolani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Mmiriam Khumhuleni</td>
<td>DUMISA, Mandla Sedrick</td>
<td>DUMISA, Mannal Ndonhla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Mpakanayisa</td>
<td>DUMISA, Dorothy Ndonhla</td>
<td>DUMUSA, Gede</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Mqashelwa William</td>
<td>DUMUSILE, juliet</td>
<td>DUMUSILE, Juliet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Mtholeni</td>
<td>DUNA, Mandile Tawa</td>
<td>DUNJ WA, Bonisile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Mzunzegeni</td>
<td>DUNJ WA, Bonisile</td>
<td>DUNJ WA, Selby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Natalian Nhlanhla</td>
<td>DUNN, Hitler Mzikayifani</td>
<td>DUVENHAGE, Andre’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Ngakeni</td>
<td>DUZANE, Anton Thulani</td>
<td>DUZANE, Anton Thulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Nkosiathni Christopher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Nonkanyiso J ennet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Ntontoza Elia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Olha Ningi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Pelapi Merry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Phendu Annah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Qomeleli Hellen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Rosalia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Sipho</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLOMO, Thoko Zozani Petsros</td>
<td>DUBE, Solomon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Volume 5 Chapter 2 Victims of gross violations of human rights**
VOLUME 5 CHAPTER 2 Victims of gross violations of human rights
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HLAZO, Mariam Nothobile</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Bazothini Lungile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nongenangayeye</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Bennet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLAZO, Nkosinathi Patrick</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Bethuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLAZO, Sandile</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Biziwe Albertina Makhosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLEKANI, Nomalis Doris</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Bongumusa Ndabitheni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLEKWAYO, Bakhokhisile</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Boniswe Lephana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLEKWAYO, Cabangile Doris</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, China Gray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLEKWAYO, Erick Muziwakhe</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Christopher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLEKWAYO, Mfangabazi</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, David</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLEKWAYO, Sphiwe Mpikeni</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Ellias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLEKWAYO, Thulani</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Hlekiwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Bhunu Muzikayise Ellington</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Innocent Mbuso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Calungile Paulina</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, J elsina Qinisile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Ephraim</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Madile Alzinah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Khonzeni Petrinah</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Magwagwa Elias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Maqmu Elphas</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Maria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Mavis Khonzeni</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Ngii Promise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Nkosinathi Emmanuel</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Nokiki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Nomoto Anastasia</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Nomshado Dinah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Ntombenhile</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Nsizwane J ohannes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Philisiwe</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Ntobeko Patrick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Shoti Robert</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Paul Hickson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLELA, Telephi Emigard</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Phakamani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Alice</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Phillip Smaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Basongile</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Phumlani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Bekisisa</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Pretty Elsie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Bongani Richard</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Bongiwe</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Ruth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Clement Mandakayise</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Samuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Edmah Lezi</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Sebenzile Sabhina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Emmanuel Sipho</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Sibusiso Erick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Mhayansi</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Sphiwe Solomon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Ripho Emmanuel</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Sweleni Sibengile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Siyazi</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Thandi Cicillla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLENGWA, Thembo</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Tryphina Thokozile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLEZA, Skhumbozu Enoch</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Vusumoni Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLEZA, Sthuli Godwin</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, Walter Sokesimbome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOBE, Shadrack</td>
<td>HLONGWANE, William</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOKOFI, Benard</td>
<td>HLONGWE, Cenujwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOKWE, Valley Mogale</td>
<td>HLOPE, Arsenius J oseph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOMENDLINI, Alfred</td>
<td>HLOPE, Ellinah Makho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOMUKA, Vusi</td>
<td>HLOPE, Mfihlewa Elliot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Balungile</td>
<td>HLOPE, Mfihlewa Elliot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Dingisono</td>
<td>HLOPE, Zondani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Doris Thembali</td>
<td>HLOPE, Bhekizitha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Gatu</td>
<td>HLOPE, Bongimuzi George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Kheteyakhe</td>
<td>HLOPE, Cosmas Ntando</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Lucky</td>
<td>HLOPE, Dlokawake Eugene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Manala Aaron</td>
<td>HLOPE, Doctor Ndoda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Manala J acob</td>
<td>HLOPE, Emma Nkhehla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Mcpumheli j oseph</td>
<td>HLOPE, Galus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Mdithuthumeni Mkhadi</td>
<td>HLOPE, Isaac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Musawenkosi Richard</td>
<td>HLOPE, j ohannes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Ntombile Happy girl</td>
<td>HLOPE, j justice Bhekisisa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Shadrack Thamsanqa</td>
<td>HLOPE, Lillie Ntombizokwenzani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Sishinghane</td>
<td>HLOPE, Lina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Thembisile</td>
<td>HLOPE, Mayvis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Vusi Victor</td>
<td>HLOPE, Mildred Eunice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Zibuyile Lucia</td>
<td>HLOPE, Mphikeleli Alfred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWA, Zwelethembia</td>
<td>HLOPE, Nhlanhla Goodman Nqeshe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANA, Bekindela Andreas</td>
<td>HLOPE, Nokudiwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Alfred</td>
<td>HLOPE, Nosamonto Sibongile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Anthony</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Bizothe Lungile</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Robert Complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Bennet</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Samuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Bethuel</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Savelle Vusumuzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Biziwe Albertina Makhosi</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Stembiso Eugene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Bongumusa Ndabitheni</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Thandeka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Boniswe Lephana</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Thembisile Philda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, China Gray</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Toloto Christina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Christopher</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Victor J effrey Wuya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, David</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Xolani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Ellias</td>
<td>HLOPHE, Zodwa Lydia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Hlekiwe</td>
<td>HLOTSE, Keku Edwina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Innocent Mbuso</td>
<td>HLOYI, Goliath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, J elsina Qinisile</td>
<td>HLUBI, Bekizizwe Conrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Madile Alzinah</td>
<td>HLUBI, Bernard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Magwagwa Elias</td>
<td>HLUBI, Bhekizizwe Goodluck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Maria</td>
<td>HLUBI, Newellie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Ngii Promise</td>
<td>HLUNGWANE, Reckson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Nokiki</td>
<td>HLWELE, Bonsile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Nomshado Dinah</td>
<td>HLWELE, Muthuthuzeli Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Nsizwane J ohannes</td>
<td>HOARST, Cecilia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Ntobeko Patrick</td>
<td>HOBANA, George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Paul Hickson</td>
<td>HOBANA, Nora Nomonde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Phakamani</td>
<td>HOBIYA, Sivuyile Wellington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Phillip Smaga</td>
<td>HOBO, Lena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Phumlani</td>
<td>HOBOSHE, Nohose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Pretty Elsie</td>
<td>HOBOSHE, Voyswa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Richard</td>
<td>HOBOSHE, Yunguma Priscilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Ruth</td>
<td>HOBODY, Lilo Leonard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Samuel</td>
<td>HOFFMAN, Marius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Sebenzile Sabhina</td>
<td>HOFFMAN, Michael Tim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Sibusiso Erick</td>
<td>HOFFMAN, Mzayilane Naphtale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Sphiwe Solomon</td>
<td>HOGAN, Sarah Susanna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Sweleni Sibengile</td>
<td>HOHO, Acacia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Thandi Cicillla</td>
<td>HOHO, Fana Nelson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Tryphina Thokozile</td>
<td>HOHO, Qonda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Vusumoni Richard</td>
<td>HONOKO, Daniel Molebatse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, Walter Sokesimbome</td>
<td>HOOGAARDT, Spasania Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWANE, William</td>
<td>HOPSHIRE, Roseline Nomhile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLONGWE, Cenujwa</td>
<td>HORN, Nozillo Ellen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Arsenius J oseph</td>
<td>HOTANA, David</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Ellinah Makho</td>
<td>HUGHS, Pat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Mfihlewa Elliot</td>
<td>HUGO, Rosy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Mfihlewa Elliot</td>
<td>HUMA, Sylvia Mono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Zondani</td>
<td>IDLABISE, Alberta Tate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Bhekizitha</td>
<td>IKANENG, J effrey Motsamai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Bongimuzi George</td>
<td>IKANENG, Lerotodi Andrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Cosmas Ntando</td>
<td>INDIA, Nomvulo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Dlokawake Eugene</td>
<td>ISAACS, Abdusalaman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Doctor Ndoda</td>
<td>ISAACS, Clive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Emma Nkhehla</td>
<td>ISAACS, Faleza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Galus</td>
<td>ISAACS, Shanaaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Isaac</td>
<td>ISAACS, Beulin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, j ohannes</td>
<td>ISAACS, David</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, j justice Bhekisisa</td>
<td>ISSEL, J ames Victor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Lillie Ntombizokwenzani</td>
<td>ITUMELENG, Thapelo Ishmael</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Lina</td>
<td>J ABANE, Petro Linda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Mayvis</td>
<td>J ABULANA, Mantombi Kate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Mildred Eunice</td>
<td>J ABULANI, J effrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Mphikeleli Alfred</td>
<td>J ACA, Nkobe J oseph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Nhlanhla Goodman Nqeshe</td>
<td>J ACK, Andile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Nokudiwa</td>
<td>J ACK, Bennet Ndyundyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOPE, Nosamonto Sibongile</td>
<td>J ACK, Gladman Luyanda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JACK, Mkhulisi
JACK, Mthuthuzeli
JACK, Mziwonke
JACK, Rhotsi
JACK, Sterkkie Mzayifani
JACKSON, Kumvusele William
JACKSON, Mayela Zekelo
JACOB, Toko Lernard
JACOBS, Allan
JACOBS, Bernette Bonakele
JACOBS, David Brasilo
JACOBS, Gideon
JACOBS, Mziwonke
JACOBS, Nkosomzi
JACOBS, Ntombomzi Nancy
JACOBS, October
JACOBS, Peter
JACOBS, Paulus
JACOBS, Sarel
JACOBS, Sebenzile
JACOBSON, Peter Maurice
JADA, Lungelo Michael
JADA, Vuyani Ernest
JAFFER, Zubeida
JAFTA, Benjamin Sipho
JAFTA, Kholiwe
JAGGER, Stella
JAKO, Shumikazi
JAKWE, Mompati
JALI, Delani
JALI, Evangelin
JALI, Namajali Ivy
JALI, Ntombenhle
JALI, Savumase
JALI, Swebekile
JALI, Thengela
JALI, Thembekile John
JAMA, Dudu Mirriam
JAMA, Joyce Thoko
JAMA, Lucky
JAMA, Manono
JAMA, Mbongeni
JAMA, Mkhonjwa
JAMA, Nonhlanhla Viola
JAMA, Patric
JAMAAR, Veronica
JAMES, Hilton
JAMES, Khayalethu
JAMES, Mzimthethelo
JAMES, Rocky Abel
JAMES, Sakhumzi
JAMES, Samuel
JAMES, Stanford
JAMES, Thembi
JAMES, Regina
JANGAISO, John
JANKIE, Limakatso
JANNA, Thembinkosi
JANSE VAN RENSBURG, Catharina
JANSE VAN RENSBURG, Tarina
JANSEN, Frederick Casper
JANSEN, Thomas
JANTJIES, Annie
JANTJIES, Boy
JANTJIES, Daniso
JANTJIES, Nomfanelo
JARDINE, Anthony
JAWE, Lulamile Shepherd
JAXA, Mzukisi Candry
JAYILE, Nokuphila Eunice
JAZA, Michael
JEFFERS, Jonathan Joseph
JEKEQA, Nkosizile
JEKEQA, Pindile Albert
JELE, Bafana
JELENKLA, Nontshizana
JENGETA, Bongiwe
JENTE, Mfukuka
JEZA, Richard
JOBE, Hitler
JOBELA, Ntunaye
JOBE, Mthuthuzeli
JOBO, Dalwonga
JOBO, Mziwebango
JOFILE, Lucas
JOHANE, Joseph
JOHANNES, Ben
JOHNSON, Mzimkhulu
JOHNSON, Rafeek
JOHNSON, Thamsanqa
JOHNSON, Vuyiswa Sheilla
JOHNSON, Wana
JOJ, Nothemba
JOKA, Ngeba
JOKAZI, Viela
JOKAZI, Vuyelwa
JOKWA, Walda
JOKWIENI, Tryphina
JOMSE, Xolani
JOMSE, Mbelele
JONGILE, Landile
JONNIE, Sicelo
JOYI, Anderson Dalagubhe
JOYI, Mbeki
JOYI, Mavis
JOYISI, Mavis
JOYI, Nomatshawe
JOYI, Udalashe
JOYI, Mkhwanjwa
JOYI, Nigele
JOYI, Thembekile
JOYI, Zonke
JOYI, Thembekile
JOYI, Thembekile
JOZI, Nomatshawe
JUDA, Mongenzi
JUDA, Ntsikelelo
JULIA, Mchithwa
JULIA, Wellington
JULIES, Abraham
JULIES, Michal
JULY, Ntsikelelo
JUMBA, Lungisa
JUMBA, Nomathewa
JUMP, Victor
JUQU, Fuzile
JUNE, Bonakele
JUZI, Ntunja
JWAMBI, Lungisa
JWAMBI, Nokwakha
JWAMBI, Ngwakha
JWAMBI, Sisipho
JWAMBI, Thanduxolo
JWAXA, Victoria

KABAI, Seabata
KABANYANE, Unknown
KABI, Sekoala
KABINI, Ncube
KABINI, Sam Benzane
KABINI, Walther
Victims of gross violations of human rights

Volume 5

Chapter 2
Victims of gross violations of human rights
VOLUME 5  CHAPTER 2  Victims of gross violations of human rights
LUFUNDO, Catherine Thokozani
LUKAS, Michael
LUKAS, Xolani
LUKE, Mzamo Nelson
LUKHELE, Brian Sipho
LUKHELE, Clarence
LUKHELE, David
LUKHELE, Isaac Vusi
LUKHELE, Moswaila Elizabeth
LUKHELE, Oupa
LUKHELE, Siphiwe Daniel
LUKHELE, Siphiwe Daniel
LUKHULENI, Sipho Marcus
LUKHULENI, Tokie Willie
LUKHULENI, Tokie Willie
LUKREQO, Nonejele
LUKWE, Simon
LUMBO, Mandlakayise Singleton
LUMKO, Tasi j ohn
LUMKO, Tassie
LUND, Ralph Thomas
LUNDA, Nombuyeselo Marie
LUNGWASE, Busisiwe
LUPOHKO, Michael
LURULI, Ntshavheni Abram
LUSHABA, Mence
LUSHABA, Patrick Mfana
LUSHABA, Sbongiseni Caiphas
LUSHABA, Thamsanqa Madoda
LUSIKI, Lindile
LUSIKI, Yoliswa Eurance
LUTHANGO, Tholakele Mara
LUTHANYI, J abulani Christian
LUTHILI, Phillip
LUTHILLI, Azariah
LUTHILLI, Bekile
LUTHILLI, Bili Emmanuelle
LUTHILLI, Bonezi Christina
LUTHILLI, Borgani Mage
LUTHILLI, Bongwiwe Fortune
LUTHILLI, Bongokwakhe Norman
LUTHILLI, Cabangile
LUTHILLI, Delaphi Ncengeni
LUTHILLI, Dumisani Romanus
LUTHILLI, Eric Langa
LUTHILLI, Fela Robert
LUTHILLI, Fortune Nonhlanhla
LUTHILLI, Gamalakhe Elphas
LUTHILLI, Gertrude
LUTHILLI, Henry Vika
LUTHILLI, J abhisile
LUTHILLI, J abulani Pavis
LUTHILLI, J abulani Rogers
LUTHILLI, James
LUTHILLI, Lindwe Thandi
LUTHILLI, Lovejoy Nomusa
LUTHILLI, Madoda J ames
LUTHILLI, Mandla Vincent
LUTHILLI, Mathonto J oyce
LUTHILLI, Mbekeni
LUTHILLI, Mfihleni George
LUTHILLI, Mthintwa Azaria
LUTHILLI, Mtshelewa Pieter
LUTHILLI, Mudi Irene
LUTHILLI, Ndombolozi Sylvia
LUTHILLI, Ngethembis
LUTHILLI, Nicholas Sihe
LUTHILLI, Ntombi Annah
LUTHILLI, Penelope Gugulethu
LUTHILLI, Phayiphile Frans
LUTHILLI, Poza
LUTHILLI, Pumpepi
LUTHILLI, Qondeni Mabongwe
LUTHILLI, Richard
LUTHILLI, Rita Gelasia
LUTHILLI, Sifiso
LUTHILLI, Simon Nkomemhlapho
LUTHILLI, Sizani J ester
LUTHILLI, Thandi Mayvis
LUTHILLI, Thembeka
LUTHILLI, Theofrid
LUTHILLI, Thembikile
LUTHILLI, Thokozile Elsie
LUTHILLI, Victor
LUTHILLI, Vika Henry
LUTHILLI, Wiseman Nkosinathi
LUTHILLI, Zphi Francisco
LUTHILLI, Zihulele
LUTHILLI, Balungile Khonzani
LUTOLO, Fundisile
LUTU, Olga Nomonde
LUTLIL, Alzina Mhlophile
LUTLIL, Fikisewe
LUTLIL, Nomajazi
LUTLIL, Tili
LUTLIL, Tokalela Mara
LUTLIL, Wiseman Madodomzi
LUVATSHA, Themba
LUVUNO, Dennis
LUVUNO, Nonvuyiseko Eudicate
LWANA, Mcpherson
LWANA, Nimrod
LWANA, Xolile Nicholas
LWANE, J oshua
LWAZINI, Nontetho
MABA, Makinta Elizabeth
MAKE, jackson
MAKE, Matome David
MAKO, Tumishi
MAAPE, David Tlhomela
MAARMAN, Sophie Nunusi
MABALANE, Friddah
MABANDLA, Gxakela
MABANGA, Abraham Doctor
MABANGA, Bhekinkosi Moses
MABANGA, Grinace Thembi
MABANGA, Musa
MABANGA, Thengindawu
MABARA, Christina
MABASA, J oyinile
MABASA, Matopi
MABASA, Mmzinyani Moses
MABASA, Mthavani
MABASA, Nomafuze
MABASA, Sizani Lindeni
MABASO, Fana Alpheus
MABASO, Alfred Mhupheki
MABASO, Bafana Leonard
MABASO, Castro Mandla
MABASO, Christopher Sipho
MABASO, David Vusi
MABASO, Dinah
MABASO, Dombi Cathrine
MABASO, Dwana Esina
MABASO, Ernest Themb
MABASO, Francis Khanyisiwe
MABASO, Goodman Sibusiso
MABASO, Gugu Goodness
MABASO, Hlengiwe
MABASO, Hluphekile Ntombizonke
MABASO, J abulisile Caline
MABASO, J ane Makhosazane
MABASO, J ohannes
MABASO, Joseph Sibusiso
MABASO, J oyful
MABASO, Khangwayeni Beatrice
MABASO, Lindiwe Sarah
MABASO, Maqinzi Idah
MABASO, Mcoiy
MABASO, Mgodleni
MABASO, Michael Thulani
MABASO, Mngoma J ohannes
MABASO, Mziu David
MABASO, Mziqawufunwa
MABASO, Njabulo
MABASO, Nkosinathi Augustini
MABASO, Noble
MABASO, Nomhlalo
MABASO, Nomza
MABASO, Ntombakayise Victoria
MABASO, Ouma Sarah
MABASO, Owen Sibuza
MABASO, Raphael
MABASO, Sarah
MABASO, Sibongile Constance
MABASO, Sibusiso
MABASO, Simon Zibani
MABASO, Simphiwe Victor
MABASO, Siphamandla
MABASO, Sipho J eremiah
MABASO, Thamsanqa
MABASO, Themb Vinty
MABASO, Thokozani Simon
MABASO, Thulani Petros
MABASO, Vincent Sibusiso
MABASO, Vusi David
MABASO, Vusi j etro
MABASO, Vusumuzi
MABATHOANA SEKALEDI, Maria
MABATHWANA, Thabang
MABAXA, Vuyani
MABE, Mmatlou Ramakone
MABEBA, Nakedi Charles
MABEKA, David Ryder
MABEHORI, Kweni Edward
MABELANE, Matthews Marwale
MABELANE, Sekomane Samuel
MABELANE, Thokwana Petrus
VOLUME 5 CHAPTER 2 Victims of gross violations of human rights PAGE 48
MAHLABA, Mahlupha
MAHLABA, Mbuyiswelwa Patrick
MAHLABA, Mmakgabo Elias
MAHLABA, Nare Piet
MAHLABA, Nonhlanhla
MAHLABA, Patricia Dolly
MAHLABA, Simangele Gloria
MAHLABA, Xolislile
MAHLABE, Jacob
MAHLAELE, Moses
MAHLALA, Thozamile Tshonyane
MAHLAKULU, Philimon
MAHLALA, Nqatyana
MAHLALELA, Annob Lobi
MAHALMBI, Dumisani George
MAHALMBI, Petros
MAHLAMONYANE, Sobashile
MAHLAMVU, Douglas
MAHLANGU, Magdelina
MAHLANGU, Abram
MAHLANGU, Andrew Sipho
MAHLANGU, Anna Hlamazani
MAHLANGU, Anna Nomqubelo
MAHLANGU, April J an
MAHLANGU, Aubrey
MAHLANGU, Baphelle Linah
MAHLANGU, Bengwabo Daniel
MAHLANGU, Bettie Busisiwe
MAHLANGU, Betty
MAHLANGU, Bhizana J oseph
MAHLANGU, Bikwaphi Martha
MAHLANGU, Boy Simon
MAHLANGU, Collin
MAHLANGU, David
MAHLANGU, Eleanor
MAHLANGU, Elias
MAHLANGU, Elijah
MAHLANGU, Erick Nkosinathi
MAHLANGU, Fanje J oseph
MAHLANGU, Felani Buffel
MAHLANGU, Fikile Patrick
MAHLANGU, George
MAHLANGU, George Bernard
MAHLANGU, George Sompeka
MAHLANGU, Isaac
MAHLANGU, Izek
MAHLANGU, J abulani
MAHLANGU, J acob
MAHLANGU, J an
MAHLANGU, J an Mphele
MAHLANGU, J anthie
MAHLANGU, J im Msebenzi
MAHLANGU, J ohanna Sesi
MAHLANGU, J ohannes
MAHLANGU, J oseph
MAHLANGU, Kedu Simon
MAHLANGU, Koos Mamekwa
MAHLANGU, Kortman Shorty
MAHLANGU, Lahle Rosy
MAHLANGU, Legogolating Piet
MAHLANGU, Litha Andries
MAHLANGU, Lizzy
MAHLANGU, Lucas Silla
MAHLANGU, Mabuti
MAHLANGU, Martha
MAHLANGU, Martin Patrick
MAHLANGU, Mbutuni Simon
MAHLANGU, Mbingweni Maria
MAHLANGU, Mbuyelwa Martha
MAHLANGU, Mentu Piet
MAHLANGU, Mhubhekile Paulos
MAHLANGU, Mlotho J ohannes
MAHLANGU, Mondlina Lina
MAHLANGU, Moses Moti
MAHLANGU, Motsaweledj J ohannes
MAHLANGU, Msili Pinkie
MAHLANGU, Ndinzana Daniel
MAHLANGU, Nomajana Sarah
MAHLANGU, Nomqubelo
MAHLANGU, Notina William
MAHLANGU, Ntshehe Geelbooi
MAHLANGU, Nyumbambo Cornelius
MAHLANGU, Pepe Rhoney
MAHLANGU, Peter Gwayela
MAHLANGU, Phepelaflp elf Ncema
MAHLANGU, Philip
MAHLANGU, Pleilele J ohnna
MAHLANGU, Popi Lena
MAHLANGU, Rampie Ngene
MAHLANGU, Rickie
MAHLANGU, Selaki Langa
MAHLANGU, Senzangakoma J ames
MAHLANGU, Sibongile Maria
MAHLANGU, Sikuukhuni
MAHLANGU, Sikman J ohannes
MAHLANGU, Simon
MAHLANGU, Simon Bangani
MAHLANGU, Solly Muntungwa
MAHLANGU, Solomon Funani
MAHLANGU, Solomon Kalushe
MAHLANGU, Soni David
MAHLANGU, Sophie
MAHLANGU, Sophy Mncane
MAHLANGU, Sprinkie J ohn
MAHLANGU, Sussanah Emmah
MAHLANGU, Tozi Martha
MAHLANGU, Venile Simon
MAHLANGU, Vusi
MAHLANGU, Vusumuzi J eremiah
MAHLANYANA, Andile
MAHLANYANA, Thando Paul
MAHLANZA, Khululwi
MAHLANZA, Nomfumza Albert
MAHLASE, Iphafrus
MAHLASE, Teme Phineas
MAHLASELA, Msebenzi Wellington
MAHLATSANE, Enuel
MAHLATS, Edward Mohaka
MAHLATS, Esau Pule
MAHLATS, Lesego Patrice
MAHLATS, Martha Tsatsane
MAHLATS, William Phera
MAHLENTLE, Nelson Mandla
MAHLENTLE, Nonuzo
MAHLENTLE, Sonwabile
MAHLOBISA, Mbulwelo
MAHLOBO, Bafana Makhafula Cyril
MAHLOBO, Nelson
MAHLOKO, Thabang Samuel
MAHLOMBE, Bafana Cyril
MAHLOMOYANE, James Baselgama
MAHLOMUZA, Jan
MAHLONGWALWA, Gideon
MAHLORON, Thembi Brilliant
MAHLULU, Mzwake Mayford
MAHLULU, Tandisile Collen
MAHOAI, Tsebishe J. John
MAHOBE, Jonas
MAHOKO, Alfred Motlalentoa
MAHOKO, David
MAHOMED, Garett Tony
MAHONE, Joseph Mokgoloa
MAHONGA, Jeanette
MAHURA, Jongile
MAHURA, Tuelo Payment
MAHWEDE, Phillip Libalele
MAJOLA, Cyril Thulane
MAJOLA, Derrick Sunnyboy
MAJOLA, Elizabeth Lindiwe
MAJOLA, Eustace
MAJOLA, J. oana Anna
MAJOLA, Konzapi Eunice
MAJOLA, Mary
MAJOLA, Meshack Boyi
MAJOLA, Muntuza
MAJOLA, Mziwentedumi Getrude
MAJOLA, Mzwandile Guy
MAJOLA, Nketsia
MAJOLA, Nga Simon
MAJOLA, Nomxonileko
MAJOLA, Nzozakhe
MAJOLA, Pius
MAJOLA, Pius Bonginkosi
MAJOLA, Primrose Thandiwe
MAJOLA, Robert Fourie
MAJOLA, Samsan Bhekifa
MAJOLA, Samuel
MAJOLA, Sipho Bridget
MAJOLA, Thelma Nthobolelo
MAJOLA, Themba Howard
MAJOLA, Thembeni Gloria
MAJOLA, Thulani Cyril
MAJOLA, Thulasizwe Fatho
MAJOLA, Vusumuzi John
MAJOLA, Yoshuwa Amson Vuyani
MAJOLA, Zibindaba Faloyi
MAJOLA, Zithulele Nicholas
MAJOLA, Zukuzo Butomkhulu Toto
MAJOLA, Zwanani Terence
MAJOLA, Mzwandile Watson
MAJOLA, Mzamhathi
MAJOLA, Mzi, Bonginkosi Vusi
MAJOLA, Brian
MAJOLA, Christopher Vumazi
MAJOLA, Clemgman
MAJOLA, David Mzomuhle
MAJOLA, Duma
MAJOLA, Dumisani
MAJOLA, Edmond
MAJOLA, Elizabeth Ntombo
MAJOLA, Fani, Beauty
MAJOLA, Maria Manghulu
MAJOLA, Mbizo
MAJOLA, Ngcikizwe
MAJOLA, Ntokozo
MAJOLA, Paulos Lucky
MAJOLA, Promise
MAJOLA, Sbusiso Ewart
MAJOLA, Thembi J. oseph
MAJOLA, WEDE, Phillip Libalele
MAKA, J. Johannes
MAKA, Mfakazi Angelina
MAKAE, Maferong j acob
MAKAFE, Ntombomzi
MAKAI, Lungile Edward
MAKAI, Maluse Adam
MAKALUZA, Ellen
MAKANDA, Nambono Annie
MAKANDA, Ntombentsha J. Jeanette
MAKAPULA, Zwelandle
MAKASI, Manfred Zolile
MAKASI, Miliya Mriam
MAKASO, Thulani
MAKATSI, Pumelele Action
MAKHATHI, Wintombi Bongekile
MAKATSHE, Sampson Sandile
MAKATU, Maladzi Anna
MAKAU, Lebogang Lucas
MAKAULA, Mkwabisi Gladwell
MAKAULA, Sindeki
MAKAYI, Gideon
MAKAZA, Michael Mthetheleli
MAKAZA, Samuel J ames
MAKAZENI, Shuluthu
MAKEBE, Ramakhomane Adam Dipepe
MAKEKE, Michael
MAKENA, Mapoti Stephen
MAKENA, Steven Rakosho
MAKETHA, Elizabeth Mantoa
MAKUWU, Ntukwane
MAGAS, Moses
MAGAS, Moshe Moses
MAGAJ ANE, Maria Dimakatso
MAGALA, Phillip Willie
MAGALE, Christopher Ntshimane
MAGALEMELE, Agnes
MAGALEMELE, Anna
MAGALEMELE, Isaac
MAGALEMELE, Mmaphefo Sinah
MAGALEMELE, Rebecca
MAGALEMELE, William
MAGAYE, Snowball
MAGATA, Nixon Nkowane
MAGATHO, Edward Tsatsi
MAGATHO, Rufus Ramaboya
MAGATI, Mathibe Philemon
MAGOBA, Ramakone Tlou
MAGOBA, Solomon Maphuti
MAGOBATLOU, Johannes
MAGOLO, Victor Manase
MAGOTHI, Henry Gordon
MAGOTLHO, Dikene Joshua
MAKHABANE, Petrus
MAKHALE, Ratselane J. Joshua Moholo
MAKHALEMELE, Goodman
MAKHANYA, Badiwane
MAKHANYA, Beauty
MAKHANYA, Bernard Mlungisi
MAKHANYA, Bhekinkosi Malcolm
MAKHANYA, Busisiwe Mavis
MAKHANYA, Busisiwe Michal
MAKHANYA, Cornish Mmekte
MAKHANYA, Doris
MAKHANYA, Dumisani Micheal
MAKHANYA, Fakazile Khonzephi
MAKHANYA, Fikile Angel
MAKHANYA, Goodnight
MAKHANYA, Ida
MAKHANYA, Mahluilei
MAKHANYA, Mandla Percy
MAKHANYA, Margaret
MAKHANYA, Maxwell J abulani
MAKHANYA, Menzi Michael
MAKHANYA, Mfanukile
MAKHANYA, Mlungisi
MAKHANYA, Nakeni Mitta
VOLUME 5  CHAPTER 2 Victims of gross violations of human rights
CHAPTER 2 Victims of gross violations of human rights
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASHILE, Thaopi Ethel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHILO, Speed Katishi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHILOANE, Tsetsi Anthony</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHIMA, Lucia Tlou</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHIMBYI, Dickson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHIMBYI, Dixon Mkhatchana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHININI, Humphrey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHININI, J lila</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHININI, Leholonolo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHININI, Moeketsi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHININI, Mphikeleli Godfrey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHININI, Nomkhatha Virginia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHININI, Thandi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHISHI, Fulubi Esau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHISHI, Stephen Fani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHITA, Chou J ohannes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHITA, Nkoko Moses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHITENG, Chuene J ohanna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHITENG, Kwenwa Silas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHITENG, Phuti J emrina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHIYA, Oupa George</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHIYA, Sylvia Monica</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHIYA, Tsietsi Dungan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHIYANE, Aaron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHIYANE, Dize Aaron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHIYANE, Mndawe Elijah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHOBANE, Derrick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHOENG, Mpho Desmond</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHOKWE, Moleli Geoffrey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHUMI, Melvin Mluleki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHUMPA, Lucas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHWABANA, Wiseman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHYIANE, J january</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASHYIANE, Lololo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIA, Joseph</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIA, Tebello Gloria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIBA, Mlingiswa J justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIBI, Charles Tjale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIBISE, Isaac Zozo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIGO, Reginald Kenny</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASJ ELA, Masilo Petrus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIKANE, Mhlonganisa William</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIKANE, Mandeni Anton J aguar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIKANE, Ntombana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIKANE, Patrick Vusi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIKANE, Philisiwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIK, Isaac</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIKE, Pitso Andries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIKO, Sara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Ben Andrew</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Booi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Boyana J an</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, J jm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, J onas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Joseph</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Khabonina Leah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Lomatshe Lizzie</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Mafele J oanna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Manike</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Mdasie J ohanna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Skons Petrus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Sophy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Thulani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Thulare Booi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Velaphi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Geelboo Mabothe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Innocentia Tefego</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, J ones Tomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILELA, Solomon Mhauili</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASILWANE, Eliza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIMINI, Nogwebile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIMOLA, Mthunjela Eva</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIMULA, J an</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIMULA, Noyende Paulina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINA, Elias</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINA, Hloniphile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINA, J ohannes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINA, Musa Thomas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINA, Stanley Sandle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINA, Zodwa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINGA, Bongiwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINGA, Lemonade Mkase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINGA, Miriam Nomathimithi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINGA, Thozwana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIPHA, Ananias Bokska</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASITHI, Nyamukamadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASITHI, Thari William</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOEU, Samuel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOGA, Tihong J usccline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOKANYE, Liziwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOKOAMENG, Norah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOLA, J abulance J ames</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOLA, Mthomoren Ephraim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOLENG, Pinkie Sidney</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOMBUKA, Ester Mlfitshana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOMBUKA, Bapalela J ohanna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOMBUKA, Elizabeth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOMBUKA, J ohn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOMBUKA, Josephine Thandi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOMBUKA, Zanele</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASONDO, Mduduzi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASONDO, Siphwe Eric</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASONDO, Zacharia Mlabunzima</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOPA, Elina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOPA, Eunice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOPA, Manta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOPA, Melzina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOPA, Moses Godfrey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOPA, Nompi Elinah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOTE, Sheila</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASOTE, Sheila Segametsi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUDUBELE, Hilda Matshidiso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, Alpheus Zakhele</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, Cliff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, Dumazile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, Ezekiel Oupa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, J acob Samuel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, Madiphoso Esther</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, Phiwainkosi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, Samson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, Samuel Veli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, Thokozile Pm Rejoice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUKU, Thulani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASUNYANE, Mathabo Adelina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASWANGANYI, Aline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASWANGANYI, J oel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASWANGANYI, Tinyiko Believe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATA, Bungane J jackson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATA, Thembisile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATABANE, Peter Itumeleng</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATABOGE, Moitheki Isaac</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATAFENI, Mzuuvukile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATAKANE, Mtutuzeli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATAKANE, David Laka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATALA, Phadishi Erasmus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATASA, Getrude</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATAU, Sefako Frans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCHES, J joseph Mateti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCHES, William</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATCHISI, Mxolisi Gladman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATEKANE, Hendrick Paladi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATELA, Monkane J joseph</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATELA, Samuel Serame</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATELA, Seflara Steven</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATENDE, Dingindawo David</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATENJ WA, Ziphozonde Patrick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATERA, Monwabisizwelingile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATETA, Matome Simon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATETA, Patrick Mphathi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATETA, Phineas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATETE, Mosiekamang Meriam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATETE, Phoka Patriot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATGALA, Mmatlou Alfred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABA, Elnah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABA, Gorden Thembinkosi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABA, Madora Zsezwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABA, Nicholina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABA, Rosemary Pretty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABA, Xolani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABATHA, Paul Maboy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABATHE, Modiegi Constance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABATHE, Moleshewe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABE, Ramasedi David</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABELA, Bhekizizwe Daniel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABELA, Boy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHABELA, Evelyn Kemoneiwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHANG, Josia Booi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHAWENE, Pule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, Anthony</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, Augustine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, Bhekizitha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, Eunice Sishkile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, J joseph Albinó</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, Mishake</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, Petros</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, Reuben Fisokwakhe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, Sibongiseni</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, Sipho Bethuel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHE, Tolakele J udiitha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHEBA, Elizabeth Matu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Charles Baledi Doctor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Collet Mhlamme Piet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Daniel Mankurwana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Godfrey Matekane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Magaruba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Magomothabi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Majadilojho J im</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Matholo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Maxwell Molefe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Mmakgosi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Mmamothalo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Mmapule Elizabeth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Mmusi Moses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATHBE, Mogwape</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VOLUME 5  CHAPTER 2  Victims of gross violations of human rights  PAGE 58
Victims of gross violations of human rights
CHAPTER 2   Victims of gross violations of human rights
MKHWANAZI, Emily Nomvula
MKHWANAZI, Emmanuel
MKHWANAZI, Enock
MKHWANAZI, Fikile Promise
MKHWANAZI, Grace
MKHWANAZI, Inock
MKHWANAZI, J anet Ndala
MKHWANAZI, J ohn Muzikayise
MKHWANAZI, J oseph
MKHWANAZI, J oseph Ngemane
MKHWANAZI, Kateleni Irene
MKHWANAZI, Linah Nonatjie
MKHWANAZI, Mfana Simeon
MKHWANAZI, Michael J abulani
MKHWANAZI, Mungisi Malchus
MKHWANAZI, Mnunzi J effrey
MKHWANAZI, Mziwefa Bethwell
MKHWANAZI, Ndani
MKHWANAZI, Nokuthula Khuluwiwe
MKHWANAZI, Nolwazi
MKHWANAZI, Nombulelo Freida
MKHWANAZI, Phetetsw J effrey
MKHWANAZI, Philaneni Margaret
MKHWANAZI, Princess Lindiwe
MKHWANAZI, Sam Simon
MKHWANAZI, Sbonelo
MKHWANAZI, Sindisiwe Reginah
MKHWANAZI, Sipho Bhekinkosi
MKHWANAZI, Thamsanqa Knowledge
MKHWANAZI, Tholi Francsca
MKHWANAZI, Tshepang
MKHWANAZI, Tholi Francsca
MKHWANAZI, Tshepang
MKHWANAZI, Bajabulisile Beatrice
MKHWANI, M habushitshile J oseph
MKHWANI, Zicelile
MKHWENKWE, Pelepele
MKIZE, Bengani
MKIZE, Eugene Boy
MKIZE, Fikile Mary-J ane
MKIZE, Khelila
MKIZE, Khumbulani Cyprian
MKIZE, Muzikayise
MKIZE, Nokuhlupeka
MKIZE, Nyosi Mvikelwa
MKIZE, Piet
MKIZE, Thulani Pani
MKIZE, Thulasizwe Cyprian
MKIZE, William
MKIZE, ZIPATE
MKOBOSHE, Mteeleli Kingwell
MKOMANE, George
MKOMAZI, Sinyegele Monica
MKONDE, Gamali J anet Mavezi
MKONDE, Goodran Magenqe
MKOKO, Nombekeha Brenda
MKONTO, Sparrow
MKOLA, Nontsikelele Mavis
MKOLA, Patience
MKUMATELA, Nako Likhanyile
MKUNG, Harry Zitha
MKUSANE, Thembekile J ohn
MKUSUSA, Nomsibi Elizabeth
MKWANAZI, Colin
MKWANAZI, George Mkwanazi
MKWANAZI, Henrick Moleleki
MKWANAZI, Paulus Serame
MKWANAZI, Qhikiza Joyce
MKWENA, Elja Bunch
MLABA, Dindzwe Absalom
MLABA, Eric Fanavele
MLABA, Misinga Petros
MLABA, Mziwabantu Edward
MLABA, Nicholas
MLABA, Sipho Lindelini
MLABE, Bavelile Eunic
MAKALAKA, Nomuyiso
MALAMBO, Bheki Emmanuel
MALAMBO, Charles
MALAMBO, Cyril
MALAMBO, Ernest Themb
MALAMBO, Gabali
MALAMBO, J abulani Sibusiso
MALAMBO, Johnson Phillip
MALAMBO, Mabelisa Christopher
MALAMBO, Mandla
MALAMBO, Mxolisi
MALAMBO, Tezane Norah
MALAMBO, Themba
MALAMLA, Meteleti
MALAML, Petulike J ohn
MALANDEWA, Sljumba
MALANGA, David M fana
MALANGI, Agatha
MALANGI, Bhekizizwe Godfrey
MALANGI, Elias
MALANGI, J ohn Pipana
MALANGI, Mandlenkos Simon
MALANGI, Mphohla
MALANGI, Mphikeleli Sydney
MALANGI, Ondelphi
MALANGI, Sipho Solomon
MALANGI, Solomon
MALANGI, Thembia Garnet
MALANGI-MALAKOANE, Maria
MALATA, Misheke
MALATSHENI, Vuyelwa Vivian
MLENZANA, Mxolisi
MLILA, Mathukuthula Alfred
MILILWANA, Lungle
MILILWANA, Vellie Wellington
MILILWANA, Wawi Getrude
MLINDI, Mandonya Amos
MLISANA, Sindiswa Elmina
MLOKOTHI, J okweni Barret
MLOKOTI, Ellen
MLOKOTI, Sthembiso Christopher
MLOLOMB, J anet
MLOMO, Bernard Sizathu
MLOMO, Sandi William Anthony
MLONDu, Bhekinosu
MLONDu, Bokwe
MLONDu, Handsome Lindani
MLONDu, Khethokwakhe
MLONDu, Mbekeni Benson
MLONDu, Ngentabantu Christian
MLONDu, Ntando Wilfred
MLONGO, Zibonginkosi Khulekani
MLONGO, Zilhathe
MLONGO, Mali
MLONGI, Sbusiso
MLONYENI, Timoti Mbuyiselo Pota
MLONYENI, Tshoniswa Elsie
MLOTSHWA, Billy Ramfington
MLOTSHWA, Frank Mfanakatwa
MLOTSHWA, Khethani Thembinkosi
MLOTSHWA, Peter Tsetsi
MLOTSHWA, Prince Zamakuthula
MLOTSHWA, Qondeni J ula
MLOTSHWA, Rose Tshidi
MLOTSHWA, Sapoyana
MLOTSHWA, Thandiwhe Margaret
MLOTSHWA, Tisha
MLOTSHWA, Wilson
MLOTSHWA, Zamokuhle
MLOTSWA, Simon Bhekinosu
MLOTYWA, Mzivukile Andson
MLUNGU, Ledia
MMAKO, Mareka Simon
MMAKO, Peter Moleko
MMAKOHA, Swazile Elizabeth
MMAKOLA, Magoshi Doctor
MMAKOU, Monangeng Patrick
MMALEDIMO, Thomas Tumishi
MMAKUTU, Patrick
MMEFA, Abram Modige
MMELESI, Elizabeth Sojakgomo
MMEFI, Israel
MMITSHANE, Norman
MMOLAHA, Ezekiel Itumeleng
MMOLEDI, Sonnyboy J ochina
MMOTH, Rikana Telza
MNAMATHA, Vukile
MNAMATHELI, Steven
MNCEDI, David Khotso
MNCEDISI, Kaludi
MNCIBI, Charles
MNCIBI, Manyathela
MNC/VE, Nopam
MN/CUBE, Abednego
MN/CUBE, Mpheni Emmanuel
MN/CUBE, Mzoni
MN/CUBE, Thulani Abner
MN/CWABE, Albert
MN/CWABE, Bakulume
MN/CWABE, Bekizwe
MN/CWABE, Betty Bhekimosu
MN/CWABE, Bhekimosu
MN/CWABE, Celestina
MN/CWABE, Clementina Badidile
MN/CWABE, Emmerencia
MN/CWABE, Fana
MN/CWABE, Kwenza Ephraim
MN/CWABE, Mbutelwa J erome
MN/CWABE, Pheteni Clementia
MN/CWABE, Rich Happy Girl
MN/CWABE, Sifiso Thomas
MN/CWABE, Thofu Chashiswe
MN/CWABE, Vusi Derrick
MN/CWANGO, Hiengwe
MN/CWANGO, Ntombi
MN/CWANGO, Tholake Votu
MNGOMA, Zibuysile
MNGOMA, Zibuyisile

MNGOMA, Zibuyisile
MNGOMA, Zibuyisile

MNGOMA, Zibuyisile
MNGOMA, Zibuyisile

MNGOMA, Zibuyisile
MNGOMA, Zibuyisile

MNGOMA, Zibuyisile
MNGOMA, Zibuyisile
MOITSHEKI, Serame Andries
MOITSHELA, Seemole Tshaisha
MOJ AF1, Gasebonwe Daniel
MOJ ALEFA, Pontsho Samuel
MOJ ELA, Bethuel
MOKABA, Daniel Madimetja
MOKABA, Florina Tselane
MOKABA, Maria
MOKABA, Paulina
MOKABA, Tjane Ernest
MOKAKALE, Tironyane Benjamin
MOKALE, Sipho Sydney Eugene
MOKALENG, J abob
MOKATANKA, Abram Boetle
MOKATATA, Buti
MOKATI, Shekeshane J ack Petrus
MOKENA, Ngaka
MOKERI, Edward Dhlayi
MOKETSEPAE, Khabi Virginia
MOKETSEPAE, Sophie
MOKGABUDI, Motsamai J abob
MOKGABUDI, Motsamai J acob
MOKGABUDI, Thato Hlaflu
MOKGMATHA, Elijah
MOKGMATHE, Steven
MOKGANYE, Evelyn Mampo
MOKGATHLE, Glad
MOKGATLANYANE, J ohn Ntoko
MOKGATLE, Zongezile Ziwewe
MOKGATLEYANA, Ntoko
MOKGATUTSI, Thebeltsile Frans
MOKGELE, Boikanyo Donald
MOKGETHI, J erry
MOKGOBU, Ramokone Elizabeth
MOKGOHLWA, Kgadi Philemon
MOKGOKOLO, Nooi
MOKGOME, Boy Samuel
MOKGONYANE, Mmanoko Martina
MOKGONYE, Evelyn Mampo
MOKGOPHA, Ledile Manare
MOKGOSI, Maria
MOKGOSINYANE, Florence
MOKGOTHO, J an Thwakga
MOKGOTHU, Tsebogo Patrick
MOKGOTSI, Lucas
MOKGWENG, Kanetani Elizabeth
MOKHASHANE, Samuel Nkopane
MOKHATHI, Andries Ramapai
MOKHLAMBI, Moses Nnete
MOKHOABANE, Tshedisha
MOKHOBORI, Itumeleng Simon
MOKUDUTLO, Ompie Daniel
MOKOENA, Abel Buti
MOKOENA, Abraham
MOKOENA, Alfred
MOKOENA, Amos Dendeng
MOKOENA, Aubrey
MOKOENA, Basetana
MOKOENA, Busiwiwe
MOKOENA, Dan
MOKOENA, Daniel
MOKOENA, David
MOKOENA, Eliot
MOKOENA, Ephraim Phakiso
MOKOENA, Erick
MOKOENA, Fanyane Sophonia
MOKOENA, Grace
MOKOENA, Herbert Bheki
MOKOENA, Isaack Raditsela
MOKOENA, J ack
MOKOENA, J an
MOKOENA, J ohn
MOKOENA, Joseph
MOKOENA, J ulia Mamasole
MOKOENA, Lefu
MOKOENA, Lettie
MOKOENA, Masilo Johannes
MOKOENA, Mathate David
MOKOENA, Matthews
MOKOENA, Michael
MOKOENA, Molailei Joseph
MOKOENA, Morake Petros
MOKOENA, Ndlela Joseph
MOKOENA, Nkosinathi Christopher
MOKOENA, Patrick Stoffel
MOKOENA, Philemon
MOKOENA, Rebecca
MOKOENA, Samuel
MOKOENA, Silas
MOKOENA, Sonnyboy
MOKOENA, Tlhakho Ishmael
MOKOENA, Thabile Patricia
MOKOENA, Thabiso Victor
MOKOENA, Thamsanga
MOKOENA, Thandi
MOKOENA, Thomas
MOKOENA, Thandi Alfred
MOKOENA, Tshotlheo Michael
MOKOENA, Wali
MOKOENA, Zanile Attretta
MOKOFANE, Sello
MOKOSIA, Dimakatso Dorcas
MOKOKA, Eva Molebogeng
MOKOMA, Edward
MOKONE, Ella Margaret
MOKONE, Daniel Pippie
MOKONE, Isakiel
MOKONE, Johannes Rabogadi
MOKONE, Nhlanhla J eremia
MOKONE, Tabelo Clement
MOKONE, Vivian Teboho
MOKONYANA, Nomvula Paula
MOKOPANE, J ulia
MOKOPANE, Teboho Patrick
MOLETE, Mapaseka Adelisa
MOLETE, Mmatseleng Mirriam
MOLETSANA, Ponki Patricia
MOLETSANE, J ohannes Nteke
MOLETSANE, Peter Pitso
MOLETSANE, Pitso J effrey
MOLEWA, Patricia Malebo
MOLEWA, Victor Thabo
MOLIBOLA, Tsetsi Lazarus
MOLIFE, Thomas
MOLISE, Abia Tshidiso Dyna
MOLISE, Blou J ohannes
MOLISE, Lucas Modise
MOLISIWA, Seun j erry
MOLLO, Moses
MLOAITSI, Bafana Clement
MLOENA, Voeltjie
MLOI, Aaron Kgosiesile
MLOI, Andries
MLOI, Eddie Mpho
MLOI, Elphus
MLOI, J acob
MLOI, J ohanna
MLOI, J oseph
MLOI, Kebane Phineas
MLOI, Malekea Abram Faniki
MLOI, Maria Dimakatso
MLOI, Meshack Sizwe
MLOI, Montgomery Michael
MLOI, Mthoholahlwe Esaah
MLOI, Paulos Lenloa Paulos
MLOI, Samuel Danny
MLOI, Sefako J ohannes
MLOI, Thokozile Genda Yvonne
MLOI, Vusimuzi Samuel
MLOKO, Esthars Tlou
MLOKO, Vermaas J osiah
MLOKOANE, Andronica Kelebogile
MLOKOANE, Barnard Kgatisiwe
MLOKOANE, Barney
MLOKOANE, Maria Puleng
MLOMO, Keresemoso J ohannes
MLOMONYANA, Moses Laki
MLOMONYANA, Rahube Daniel
MLOPO, Geelbooi
MLOPO, Lucas
MLOROSI, Jimmy
MLOSE, Mzwabantu
MLOSIDA, Bella J oyce
MLOSIOA, Tumelo Neville Nicholas
MLOTO, Kitimi J ohannes
MLOTO, Nganyago Elias
MLOTO, Peter Reginald
MLOTO, Raisetja
MLOTO, Ramokone Mokgad
MLOTSI, Esther
MLOTSI, Frederick Sefike
MLOTSI, Irish Pule
MLOTSI, Limakatso Anna
MLOTSI, Ramasoeu Saul
MLOTSI, Tiny Christina
MLOWITZ, J an
MLOUTSI, Selolo Suzan
MMOZA, Michael Steem
MONA, Erick Sihudu
VICTIMS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

CHAPTER 2

VOLUNTEER FORCES

MOTSOANE, J ohn Lehlohonolo
MOTSOENENG, Bikinyana David
MOTSOENENG, Emma
MOTSOENENG, Esther
MOTSOENENG, j eanette Maletsatsi
MOTSOENENG, j oyce
MOTSOENENG, Polediso Hubert
MOTSOENENG, Sello
MOTSOENENG, Virginia
MOTSOENYANE, Petrus Tshieman
MOTSOI, j ohannes Soke
MOTSUMANE, Solomon
MOTSOPI, Bella
MOTSOYANE, j ocelyn Nomqubelo
MOTSUMI, Ephraim j ones Israel
MOTSUMI, Thapelo Martiens
MOTSWADIRENG, Molefi William
MOTSWANA, Eunice
MOTSWANA, Margaret Mapule
MOTSWANA, Phillis
MOTSWANA, Queen
MOTSWENI, Bitana Emma
MOTUMI, Israel Lepekola
MOUKANGOE, Sarah Mantwa
MOUMAKA, Khutsafalo Elizabeth
MOUMAKA, Ntebo
MOUMAKE, Moses Matawa
MOYAKE, Daisy
MOYANA, Sanangele Getrude
MOYANE, Bernadette Disebo
MOYENI, Tembani
MOYI, Sizakele Ephron
MOYISWA, Sikinkili
MOYO, Norman Baye
MPAHUMULO, Samukelo
MPAKATHI, Noluthando Sweetness
MPALALA, Ncedani Samson
MPALWENI, Wellington Uzwakhe
MPAMBANE, Kanyiswa
MPAMBANI, Luvuyo
MPANGASE, Mlandeli Andrias
MPANGE, Maphelo
MPANGELA, Mahlangulisile Sellina
MPANGISA, Nomsa
MPANI, Licence
MPANI, Nobuntu Maud
MPANTSHEWA, Mcingelwa
MPANZA, Bekapi Netha
MPANZA, Bonginkosi
MPANZA, Bongiwe Lucia
MPANZA, Busisiwe
MPANZA, Dingamandla Aloes
MPANZA, j oseph
MPANZA, Kwenzokwabo Hezekial
MPANZA, Madoda
MPANZA, Mathewe j econias
MPANZA, Mpume
MPANZA, Mpumelelo
MPANZA, Nsukwana Wilberforce
MPANZA, Octavia Duduzile
MPANZA, Petros Zakhele
MPANZA, Prince Shile
MPANZA, Sibongile Qhamukile
MPANZA, Sibusiso
MPANZA, Sihle
VOLUME 5  CHAPTER 2   Victims of gross violations of human rights

...
CHAPTER 2  Victims of gross violations of human rights
Victims of gross violations of human rights
VICTIMS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

NGCOBO, Aaron Goli
NGCOBO, Abigail Gugu
NGCOBO, Adelaide Duduzile
NGCOBO, Alice
NGCOBO, Alpheus Bafanyana
NGCOBO, Alvinia Gcinefikile
NGCOBO, Andile
NGCOBO, Andrew Sono
NGCOBO, Anna
NGCOBO, Bahie Florence
NGCOBO, Bajabulle Doris
NGCOBO, Balingile
NGCOBO, Bambileke Qondeni
NGCOBO, Bathini
NGCOBO, Baveni Philemon
NGCOBO, Bawinile Gladys
NGCOBO, Beauty Balekile
NGCOBO, Bele Patrick
NGCOBO, Benjamin Bhekizazi
NGCOBO, BhekanziExcelson
NGCOBO, Bheki Zephania
NGCOBO, Bhekizwe Philemon
NGCOBO, BhizeniIdah
NGCOBO, BhililoAlson
NGCOBO, BonakeleMavis
NGCOBO, BonaniIdah
NGCOBO, Bongebani
NGCOBO, BonginkosiCyrilNgcoveni
NGCOBO, BongiweDaisy
NGCOBO, BonisweAnatoria
NGCOBO, BoyiPetrus
NGCOBO, BululumziJooan
NGCOBO, BusisiweVimbephi
NGCOBO, BusisiweZibuyile
NGCOBO, BuyaphiEddie
NGCOBO, Catherine
NGCOBO, CharlesZenzele
NGCOBO, Christina
NGCOBO, ClementineNomakholide
NGCOBO, ConstanceNtombenyе
NGCOBO, CosmosBona
NGCOBO, DlwkowaneArson
NGCOBO, Dulephi
NGCOBO, DodaMoses
NGCOBO, DombiCatherine
NGCOBO, DonaldSiphewe
NGCOBO, Dooreen
NGCOBO, DorisMathombi
NGCOBO, DubaJohn
NGCOBO, DuduEvangelina
NGCOBO, Dumazile

VOLUME 5 CHAPTER 2 Victims of gross violations of human rights
CHAPTER 2  Victims of gross violations of human rights
NGOBESE, Eric Sithembiso
NGOBESE, Geiile Thembisile
NGOBESE, Gideon Bafana
NGOBESE, Kaledani
NGOBESE, Kethenze Khunde
NGOBESE, Mamita
NGOBESE, Mfanekehliso
NGOBESE, Namam
NGOBESE, Nkosinathi Lucas
NGOBESE, Nzombifuthi
NGOBESE, Phethemphilu Margaret
NGOBESE, Sakhi
NGOBESE, Samson Bekiwa
NGOBESE, Scebengile Celekukhwe
NGOBESE, Sithembiso Ernest
NGOBESE, Skhosiphi
NGOBESE, Thokozile
NGOBESE, Sithembiso
NGOBESE, Sicelimpilo Celokwakhe
NGOBESE, Velephi Florence
NGOBESE, Thoko Jeanette
NGOBESE, Skhosiphi
NGOBESE, Thokozile
NGOBESE, Thembelihle Wilson
NGOBESE, Maureen
NGOBESE, Mavis Mkhosazana
NGOBESE, Mavis Thokozile
NGOBESE, Mildred
NGOBESE, Musa Clement
NGOBESE, Musa Wiseman
NGOBESE, Mzi Musa
NGOBESE, Nonlanhla Lucy
NGOBESE, Ntombenkulu
NGOBESE, Nonlanhla
NGOBESE, Ntombi
NGOBESE, Nontobizanele Eleanor
NGOBESE, Phillipina Beatrice
NGOBESE, Qhikiza Ntombfikile
NGOBESE, Sandile Victor
NGOBESE, Saraphina
NGOBESE, Sayco
NGOBESE, Sidumo Paulinus
NGOBESE, Simon
NGOBESE, Simon Mzungeza
NGOBESE, Sipho Sakhile
NGOBESE, Sizakele Doreen
NGOBESE, Stish P
NGOBESE, Swabe Marry
NGOBESE, Thansiwe Florence
NGOBESE, Thembe
NGOBESE, Thembekile Lillos
NGOBESE, Thembelihle Wilson
NGOBESE, Phuthokozile Nelsiwe
NGOBESE, Tholakele Patricia
NGOBESE, Thulani
NGOBESE, Virginia Kolekile
NGOBESE, Vusumuzi Joseph
NGUBENI, Bafana
NGUBENI, Evelyn Nomangesi
NGUBENI, Gift
NGUBENI, Howick
NGUBENI, Mahotea
NGUBENI, Malefetsane Frank
NGUBENI, Mlambo Michael
NGUBENI, Modcai Lucky
NGUBENI, Sipho Kenneth
NGUBENI, Accaduis Busani Cedric
NGUBENI, Elliot Msongelwa
NGUBENI, Judith Nosisa
NGUBENI, Kenneth Ndodo
NGUBENI, Michael Bayo
NGUBENI, Nhlanhla
NGUBENI, Nkosinathi
NGUBO, Bukani
NGUBO, Busisiwe Francina
NGUBO, Concert Zazi
NGUBO, Daniel Mduzdi
NGUBO, Dingizwe Isaac
NGUBO, Doris
NGUBO, Eric
NGUBO, Ernest Mduzdi
NGUBO, Flora Khosi
NGUBO, Gilbert
NGUBO, J abuille Ntombfuthi
NGUBO, John Mbuza
NGUBO, Joseph Nkankabula
NGUBO, Maggi
NGUBO, Maureen
NGUBO, Mavis Mkhosazana
NGUBO, Mavis Thokozile
NGUBO, Mgwanzeni Daniel
NGUBO, Mdred
NGUBO, Musa Clement
NGUBO, Musa Wiseman
NGUBO, Mzi Musa
NGUBO, Nonlanhla Lucy
NGUBO, Ntombenkulu
NGUBO, Ntombifikile Ellisina
NGUBO, Ntombinkulu Regina
NGUBO, Ntombizanele Eleanor
NGUBO, Phillippina Beatrice
NGUBO, Qhikiza Ntombfikile
NGUBO, Sandile Victor
NGUBO, Saraphina
NGUBO, Sayco
NGUBO, Sidumo Paulinus
NGUBO, Simon
NGUBO, Simon Mzungeza
NGUBO, Sipho Sakhile
NGUBO, Sizakele Doreen
NGUBO, Stish P
NGUBO, Swabe Marry
NGUBO, Thansiwe Florence
NGUBO, Themba
NGUBO, Thembekile Lillos
NGUBO, Thembelihle Wilson
NGUBO, Thokozile Nelsiwe
NGUBO, Tholakele Patricia
NGUBO, Thulani
NGUBO, Virginia Kolekile
NGUBO, Vusumuzi Joseph
NGUBO, Bafana
NGUBO, Evelyn Nomangesi
NGUBO, Gift
NGUBO, Howick
NGUBO, Mahotea
NGUBO, Malefetsane Frank
NGUBO, Mlambo Michael
NGUBO, Modcai Lucky
NGUBO, Sipho Kenneth
NGUBO, Accaduis Busani Cedric
NGUBO, Elliot Msongelwa
NGUBO, Judith Nosisa
NGUBO, Kenneth Ndodo
NGUBO, Michael Bayo
NGUBO, Nhlanhla
NGUBO, Nkosinathi
NGUBO, Ntombizone Rita
NGUBO, Sibusiso Bethuel
NGUBO, Sindile Vincent Sira
NGUBO, Thembisile Lynnet
NGUBO, Victor
NGUBO, Ziayilele Baqiphile
NGUDDLE, Looksmart Khulile
NGUNA, Andile Nobleman
NGUTSHANE, Madoda
NGUZO, Kebefunwa
NGWALE, Nonlanhla Zuzo
Hlomuka
NGWAMB, Musa
NGWANANG, Moffat
NGWANDI, Lucky Brian
NGWANE, Mathuli
NGWANE, Andile Isaac
NGWANE, Babo Michael
NGWANE, Bussiwe Regina
NGWANE, Dolly Tholakele
NGWANE, Joseph
NGWANE, Mlhengi
NGWANE, Nqboniwe Nethwell
NGWANE, Nonlanhla
NGWANE, Sibusiso Abraham
NGWANE, Sizakele Gertrude
NGWANE, Somo
NGWANE, Thembelophelile Goodman
NGWANE, Zibulele
NGWANE, Dennis BonginkosI
NGWANQ, Xola
NGWANYA, Constance
NGWANYA, Thembela Wilfred
NGWASI, Alon
NGWASI, Balungile
NGWASI, Florah Khusi
NGWASI, Florence
NGWASI, Gila Thompson
NGWASI, Gugu Beta
NGWASI, Makhosi
NGWASI, Mbekelwa
NGWASI, Thomson Kopana
NGWASI, Toto Alon
NGWEKAZI, Ndabayakhe
NGWENDU, Ziphilele
NGWENYA, Alex
NGWENYA, Deile Dora
NGWENYA, Elizabeth
NGWENYA, Jobe
NGWENYA, Johannes Rankie
NGWENYA, Joyce Sbongile
NGWENYA, Lahlwe Getrude
NGWENYA, Lerato Alpehus
NGWENYA, Lindiswa
NGWENYA, Lolo
NGWENYA, Madlimbi Jula
NGWENYA, Mary Poneng
NGWENYA, Milushekelwa Moseke
NGWENYA, Molophehi Alex
NGWENYA, Mqotywa Japan
NGWENYA, Mziwakhe Boniface
NGWENYA, Nelsiwe
NGWENYA, Nhlanhla Bernard
VICTIMS OF GENERAL VIOLENT CRIMES

NTANZI, Zodwa
NTANZI, Zothini Halisile

NTEKELE, Natlo Macxon
NTEKISO, Ndipmiwe

NTELELE, Anthony Mpho

NTEMA (MASUSU), Sebata Albert

NTEMANE, Caleb Mojalefa

NTENE, Lilian Matshomo

NTENG, Fikile Tryphina

NTENG, J aburile Leslinah

NTENGENTO, David Samdywida Lamani

NTENGENTO, Thembinkosi Mcdonald

NTENGESHE, Mabhunga Wellington

NTENYANA, Nosipho

NTE, Samuel

NTETHA, Armstrong Thembinkosi

NTETHA, George Nkosana

NTEU, Nwaniki Maria

NTHAKO, Seboelelo Mirriam

NTHETE, Meshack Letshabo

NTHO, Thabiso Samuel

NTHOTSO, Moeketsi Isaac

NTHSANGASE, Siyabonga

NTHUNYU, Mohau Samuel Sam

NTHULI, Christian

NTHULI, Chaka Piecanni

NTHULI, Bonginkosi Musa

NTHULI, Bongani

NTHULI, Bheki

NTHULI, Bhekabantu Mzowomna

NTHULI, Bafana

NTHULI, Advocate Mteteleli

NTHULI, Abel Zwane

NTHULI, Joyce

NTHSWAYI, Sandile Latone

NTSUSA, Zolile Kenneth

NTSUBA, Zabulon Mofokeng

NTSOMI, Zandisile

NTSHANGASE, Sipho

NTSHANGASE, Mxoshe Mafanoyi

NTSHANGASE, Mgbabiselwa

NTSHANGASE, Michael Mteo

NTSHANGASE, Mziwakona Timothy

NTSHANGASE, Nhlanhla Emmanuel

NTSHANGASE, Sibusiso

NTSHANGASE, Thembisile

NTSHANGASE, Zanele

NTSHANGASE, Xolile Daniel Mabhanya

NTSHANGASE, Mthatho Mabhangaly

NTSHANGASE, Biblekuyise

NTSHANGASE, Elizabeth

NTSHANGASE, Lejelang

NTSHANGASE, Nomuthi Makhephu

NTSHANGASE, Wani Mliniva

NTSHANGASE, Mlungisi Lawrence

NTSHANGASE, Velelo Alphius

NTSHANGASE, Bongani Emmanuel

NTSHANGASE, Fraser Thamusanqa

NTSHANGASE, J abulani Eric

NTSHANGASE, Nqobile

NTSHANGASE, Noel

NTSHANGASE, Zikoko

NTSHANGASE, Mqelele

NTSHANGASE, Vellie

NTSHANGASE, Michael Motseki

NTSHANGASE, Boisie Malusi Collem

NTSHETHA, Zacharia Dumile

NTSEWA, Magabgo Agnes

NTSHABA, Mthakashana Elias

NTSHAKO, J ohannes Fusi

NTSHALINTSHALI, Lawrence

NTSHANGASE, Amos

NTSHANGASE, Bhekinkosi

NTSHANGASE, Busisiwe Fikanenala

NTSHANGASE, Daniel

NTSHANGASE, J uletu Tu

NTSHANGASE, Lilian Khethiwe

NTSHANGASE, Makhosi Frida

NTSHANGASE, Mmakwe

NTSHANGASE, Monica Thembisile

NTSHANGASE, Mntonkathandwa

NTSHANGASE, Mxoshe Nheines

NTSHANGASE, Ndendesi Minah

NTSHANGASE, Njabulo

NTSHANGASE, Richard Esfis

NTSHANGASE, Sibusiso Christopher

NTSHANGASE, Simon

NTSHANGASE, Siyabonga

NTSHANGULA, Xolani

NTSHANTSHA, Thokogoni

NTSHANYANA, Nomtholo Valencia

NTSHAPA, Doris Mary

NTSHENG, Kwaene Collen

NTSHENG, Mbululo Collin

NTSHINGA, Danie William

NTSHINGA, Mlumpheli Elias

NTSHINGILA, Duduzile

NTSHINGILA, Mohambi J eremia

NTSHINGILA, Mthobakayise Muriel

NTSHINKA, Monwabisi

NTSHINSILA, Simon Glenn Bongani

NTSHINTSHI, Thembekile Simon

NTSHONGWANA, Alfred Lungisile

NTSHOTA, Mxolisi

NTSHUDE, Maki

NTSHUDU, Andile J oseph

NTSHUNTHSA, Naboath Mandelulwile

NTSIBANDE, Daniel

NTSIBANDE, David

NTSILENI, Mabembe

NTSIZAKALO, Siphiwo Alfred

NTSIZI, Nqobile

NTSOELENGOE, Reginald

NTSOERENG, Stefane Meshack

NTSONI, Zandisile

NTSUBA, Zabulon Mofokeng

NTSUNDU, Meli

NTSUSA, Zolile Kenneth

NTSWAYI, Sandle Lateone

NTULI, J oyce

NTULI, Abel Zwane

NTULI, Advocate Mteteleli

NTULI, Bafana

NTULI, Bhekabantu Mzowomna

NTULI, Bhekki

NTULI, Bongani

NTULI, Bonginkosi Musa

NTULI, Chaka Piecanni

NTULI, Christian
CHAPTER 2   Victims of gross violations of human rights

QABAKA, Mandlonke Sobantu

QALANYOBE, Nomnyaka

QALL, Lennox Sebenzile

QAMBATA, Vaughn Thamsanqa

QANGWE, Zandile

QANKASI, Phelemon Sipho

QANYA, Steven

QATA, Phumavisele Morrison

QATHANA, Bakhulule Siphiwile

QATHANA, Henry Thembekile

QAWULA, Palele Windvoel

QAYI, Nonight Annie

QAYI, Sicelo

QAYI, Zongezile

QAYISO, Pierce

QAZA, Zollile

QEBEYI, Mxolisi Bethwell

QEJ A, Wilson Dalihlanga

QHAMAKOANE, Tabelo Peter

QHANA, Nomalungisa Miranda

QHANQISO, Bylla Miemie

QHAYI, Godfrey Zosyile

QHELISO, Sazise Cyprian

QHENA, Lipuo Primrose

QHINEBE, Philip Haqumia

QHINEBE, Phillip Layunina

QHIWEBE, Emmah Evelinah

QHOBOSHEANE, Teboho Augustine

QHOKIYANA, Samane

QHUTHU, Nomatile

QIHELE, Mzubuzeli Joseph

QINA, Phindile Michael

QINISILE, Sipho Patrick

QOBEDA, Nelson Makhenkeleza

QOBONGOSHE, Nkuleleko Eric

QOBOTWANA, Gelelela

QODASHE, Zukile Sition

QONGWANA, Selina

QONI, Mandla

QOTYWA, Nomazizi Elsie

QOZA, Siyabulela

QOZA, Siwile Jocy

QUBEKA, Elliot Zithembile

QUIN, Phoenix

QULO, Nontokozi

QULU, Glen Lungal

QUMA, Rex Monelli

QUMZA, Patric

QUNQU, Nombulelo Thelma

QUNGUTHO, Telford

QUNTU, Sandle Eric

QUTSU, Khulekleile

QWABA, Msetyenzile

QWABA, Gloria Noxolo

QWABE, Annastacia

QWABE, Babam Aaron

QWABE, Bhekowakhe Muka

QWABE, Leonard Dumisi

QWABE, Mzonjani Michael

QWABE, Nimrod

QWABE, Zondenzi

QWALELA, Boniswa Rosemary

QWATEKANA, Ndabaziphile Myekewa

OWENYA, Didekle Richard

OWESHA, Sithonga Horatius

RAADT, Edward

RABANNYE, Mpe

RABEDE, Paulus

RABILLI, Krishna

RABOROKO, Mapokane Ester

РАБОТАПИ, Грэни

РАБОТАПИ, Лине Патриция

РАБОТАПИ, Тхабанг Самуэль

РАБОТАПИ, Тхокоане Джон

RABULA, Michael

RADAMBA, Mubvathi Samuel

RADEBE, Alfred Molefi

RADEBE, Alison

RADEBE, Alpha Bonda

RADEBE, Anthony Mdeni

RADEBE, Bathobile Princess

RADEBE, Bongani Solomon
RADEBE, Buti William
RADEBE, Cithelile Eunice
RADEBE, Elias Khulu
RADEBE, Ephraim Mzwandile
RADEBE, Graham Sibusiso Boniface
RADEBE, Gretta
RADEBE, Ida
RADEBE, Innocentia
RADEBE, Isaac Nkululeko
RADEBE, J abulani
RADEBE, J abulani Elvis
RADEBE, J abulani Primon
RADEBE, J ames
RADEBE, J erry
RADEBE, J osephine Nana
RADEBE, Khesaya
RADEBE, Lawrence
RADEBE, Linda Aaron
RADEBE, Mandlenkosi Steven
RADEBE, Manelo
RADEBE, Michael Mvula J ekeje
RADEBE, Michael Mzwandile
RADEBE, Mongezi
RADEBE, Mzwandile
RADEBE, Namtungwa J ane
RADEBE, Nelsiwe
RADEBE, Nhlanhla Ernest
RADEBE, Nkonzo Vitalice
RADEBE, Nkosinathi
RADEBE, Nomthandazo Maureen
RADEBE, Nomusa Constance
RADEBE, Nontsokolo Lilly
RADEBE, Obusitsoe Isaac
RADEBE, Patrick Pakiso
RADEBE, Philemon Fiki
RADEBE, Siebongiseni
RADEBE, Sigobongiso
RADEBE, Sophy
RADEBE, Stefaan
RADEBE, Sydwell Phehello
RADEBE, Tamsanqa Wordsworth
RADEBE, Thembeni Athanasia
RADEBE, Thulani Simon
RADEBE, Victor Thulani
RADEBE, Zwelijnani Herold
RADILE, Sebako J ohannes
RADINGOANE, J oseph Sebako
RADITHLARE, Dennis Tefo
RADITSELA, Andries
RADJ, Bonisile Edward
RADZILANI, Ndiamoane William
RADZILANI, Vele
RAFUBE, Mosito Daniel
RAGAVEN, Chengthia
RAGOO, Ramola Devi Meena
RAGOPHALA, Motlhogla Andries
RAIKANA, George
RAISA, Nonobzile Lucy
RAJ O0, Sonny J aggernath
RAKATE, Israel Kabelo
RAKHETSJ, John Khuwanyana
RAKOMANE, Daniel Mosete
RAKOSA, Solomon Kgopi
RAKUDA, David
RAKWENA, Masilo Ephraim
RALANE, Nomphele Getrude
RALIVHESA, Muthuphej el eremia
RAMABULANA, Mehoti Emily
RAMADI, Mavhungu
RAMAGALEA, Frans Ratshilulwela
RAMAHUTA, Henry Billyboy
RAMAINE, Raphael Refiloe
RAMAITE, Moalanwtra Stranger
RAMAJ WE, Mamatshidiso Rebecca
RAMAKABA-LESIEA, Mildred Mhe
RAMAKAU, J ob Molefi
RAMAKAU, Matsoso Paulus
RAMAKGOLO, Ramasela Maria
RAMALEPE, France Ngoako
RAMALEPE, Ngoako Chris
RAMALEPE, Reuben Matome
RAMAN, Boyce
RAMAOAKA, Raisibe Meriam
RAMARA, Kolobe Maria
RAMARA, Mosima Francina
RAMARA, Ramaesela Agent
RAMASEGA, Patrick Alpheus
RAMASHALA, Lethetsa Sonny
RAMASHAMOLA, Machabane
RAMASIMONG, George Ramodiknne
RAMASOBANE, J im
RAMATELETSE, Thoso Stephen
RAMATHE, Wendy Sizeka
RAMATHIBELA, David Basie
RAMATLO, J enifer
RAMATLOTLO, Benjamin
RAMABUE, Amos
RAMABUE, J ohannes
RAMABUE, Solly
RAMESEGA, Kenneth Kgori
RAMESEGA, Kgosiithile J ames
RAMETSI, Mohale Titus
RAMGOBIN, Kush
RAMMLELE, Tshosane Frans
RAMMULUTA, Mac
RAMMUTLA, Makwana
RAMMUTLA, Ramadimetja Sanah
RAMMUTLA, Solomon Maphuti
RAMMUTLA, Tumishi Johannes
RAMMUTLA, Solomon Maphuti
RAMMUTLA, Ranmadimetja Sanah
RAMMUTLA, Makwana
RAMNCWA, Edith Myrtle
RAMNCWA, Elias Masebenza
RAMNCWA, Tiaan Masebenza
RAMNCWA, Tiaan Masebenza
RAMNCWA, Tiaan Masebenza
RAMNOKHOASE, Seline William
RAMNOKHOASE, Sello
RAMNOLENGA, Khehla J acob
RAMNOKONPO, J acob Mzimihlulo
RAMNOKONPO, Ndunana
RAMOKULA, Sheki
RAMOKWATEDI, J ames Butiki
RAMOLLA, Kleinbooi
RAMOLLO, Setlabocho Paulus
RAMOLOBENG, Kwenza J aard
RAMOLORENG, Makwena Ramokone
RAMOLOSO, Majoisi J ohn
RAMONGANE, Monyadzwa Suzan
RAMONTSA, Tsimini J acob
RAMORWAGADI, Edward Gaobusiwe
RAMOSEPELE, Samuel Molemane
RAMOTHATHA, Goodstuff
RAMOTHIBA, Maseb Machuenue
RAMOTHIBA, Boikie J acob
RAMOTHIBA, Damuzile Patricia
RAMOTHIBE, Mapule Sylvia
RAMOTO, Matswene J acob
RAMOTSHOOTSWANA, Bob
RAMOTSA, Pascal Phindi
RAMPA, Betta Mapaseka
RAMPELE, Thomas
RAMPHORE, J ohannes Morapedi
RAMPONE, Mahase Pieter
RAMTSIENG, Ishmael Molifi
RANGAZA, Ntsoako Paul
RANGONG, Moraka J ohannes
RANGULA, Toto Daniel
RANGULE, Siphiwo Simon
RANI, Isaac Ndazenzela
RANGKABO, Geraman
RANTAO, Elvis Mmolo
RANTAO, Lydi Mmasethunya
RANTAO, Mogatlakgomo
RANTAO, Mpho
RANTAO, Nletshe
RANTAO, Poloko
RANTEE, Lefu George
RANTIE, Mahomola Solomon
RANTOBETSE, Hendry Pico
RANUGA, Mabuza Francis
RANYAOA, Kunyamane Arios
RAPETSISOA, Mabileng Williams
RAPHADU, Christina
RAPHELA, Fredwa Maria
RAPHIPHE, Abram
RAPPO, Nthuri Ziphorah
RAPPO, Samson Ramorwa
RAPUDI, Pieter
RAPULENG, Ratsie J oseph
RAPULENG, Ratsie J oseph
RAPULENG, Zacharia
RAS, J acob J ohannes
RASEALA, Lucas Thupetsi
RASEGO, Ezekiel Lefu
RASELETE, Michael
RASENTSOERE, William Thabeng
RASETHABA, Phokela Yasser
RASMAN, Mcthar Mphitziel
RASMANTE, Mimi Themba Sonamzi
RASME, Lena
VOLUME 5 CHAPTER 2 Victims of gross violations of human rights
CHAPTER 2  Victims of gross violations of human rights
CHAPTER 2 Victims of gross violations of human rights
Ndukushayizazi

SIGCAWANA, Molose
SIGEBANGA, Wilson Kwama
SIGUBA, Henry
SIGUDU, Bulelwwa Sylvia
SIGWEBELA, Zodwa Mirriam
SIGWEBO, Nqinisele
SIGWELA, Ezra
SIGWELA, Lennox Mbuyiseli
SIGWELA, Monica Nomonde
SIGWINTA, Motshwa
SIGWINTA, Zongezile Rinkie
SIHLALI, Fortune J abulile
SIHLANGU, Managale Sarah
SIKAKANE, Bhekuyise Christopher
SIKAMA, J ongikhyaya
SIKEMANE, Hendrick Vuyani
SIKENJ NA, Morris
SIKHKANE, Celumuzi Moses
SIKHKANE, Andrinah Thokozile
SIKHKANE, Basil Kelly
SIKHKANE, Bheki Richard
SIKHKANE, Elizabeth Ntombi
SIKHKANE, Gugu Mandy
SIKHKANE, Henry Mfana
SIKHKANE, Lawrence Themba
SIKHKANE, Mandla Caswell
SIKHKANE, Mbongeni Mtuseni
SIKHKANE, Mntomuhle
Ndukushayizazi
SIKHKANE, Mzikayise Phillip
SIKHKANE, Nomkhosi Lima
SIKHKANE, Ntomibkyase R
SIKHKANE, Oscar Khulekani
SIKHKANE, Skafu Busiwise
SIKHKANE, Theadora Ncombebo
SIKHOSIPE, Mselenzela
SIKHOSANA, Elliot
SIKHOSANA, Monono Mavis
SIKHOSANA, Themba Daniel
SIKHOSANA, Thengani
SKITI, Shoni
SKITI, Sipho
SKITI, Zuzeke Regina
SKO, Nomakwezi Georgina
SKO, Thamsanka
SKO, Zukho Belmont Mech
SKOB, Boyi j oseph
SKOB, Mavis Mklazi
SKOB, Mazabiwe
SKOB, Nqakaza
SKOB, Qondeni Irene Makhosi
SKONDE, David Sipho
SIKUKAMANI, Wenzwei Florence
SIKUNANA, Tozama Mary
SIKUTSWHA, Mamanci Tena
SIKUTSWHA, Merrimaa Sipho
SKWEPERE, Lucas Baba
SKWEYIYA, Siznio
SILAOMO, Ntomifikile Anna
SILAOMWE, Babongile Florence
SILAOMWE, Bhulekwana
SILAOMWE, Mhethwa
SILEKU, Themba Simon
SILINDA, Anthony Linda
SILINGA, Wantu
SILLANDS, Colleen
SILLANDS, Margaret
SILO, Dorothy Lulama Kunuse
SILO, Novintwembti Violet
SILOLO, Elizabeth
SILOMO, Pikwee Ennie
SILULWANE, Zukiswa Patricia
SILUMA, Vusi
SILWANE, Tutu
SILWANYANA, Nomkhumbuzo Morina
SIMA FAMILY
SIMA, Fikile Margaret
SIMA, Gcineni
SIMA, Gladis Khethiwe Masima
SIMA, Mzuvekile Wiseman
SIMA, Vusumuzi
SIMUMANE, Nomajongosi Mavis
SIMUMANE, Nomakhosile Dilli
SIMUMANE, Qondui Sylvester
SIMUMANE, Velaphi
SIMUMANE, Vusumuzi Moses
SIMANDLA, Bonisile David
SIMANGA, Enoch Kadimo
SIMANGO, Cynthia
SIMANGO, Khangela Thomas
SIMANI, Goodman
SIMATILE, Code
SIMBANE, J eronimo Vicente
SIMELA, Namkoni Selinah
SIMELANE, Allison
SIMELANE, Bheki
SIMELANE, Bhekuyise Simon
SIMELANE, Bull Peter
SIMELANE, Eunice
SIMELANE, Gwede Enock
SIMELANE, j abulani Kom
SIMELANE, Joe j ohannes
SIMELANE, j ohannes Melehi
SIMELANE, j ohannes Zwelibanzi
SIMELANE, Linah Silukazi
SIMELANE, Milly
SIMELANE, Mpmbe Amos
SIMELANE, Nonozana Anna
SIMELANE, Simon
SIMELANE, Solomon
SIMELANE, Sothini Thembelihle
SIMELANE, Thallina Phumzile
SIMELANE, Zandi Moses
SIMINYA, Mberegeni Marcus
SIMON, Ngubane
SIMPSON, J ames Marren
SINAMA, Nhswencwa
SINCUBA, Zion J eremiah
SINDANE, Bhekizitha J ones
SINDANE, Manel Mthiselwa
SINDANE, Nomgqibelo Sarah
SINDANE, Piet
SINDANE, Thomi j oseph
SINDANE, Manele Mashiselwa
SINDU, Banzi Elphas
SINGQOTO, Alport
SINGWANE, Thomas Velaphi
SINOANE, Singalela J eremiah
SINXOSHE, Nelson
SINYEMFU, Luxolile Ben
SIQAKAZA, Mathopisi
SIQAZA, Archibald
SIQAZA, J essie
SIQAZA, Mathopisi
SIQAZA, Archibald
SIQAZA, Jessie
SIQAZA, Archibald
SIQAZA, Jessie
SIQAZA, Archibald
SIQAZA, Jessie
SIQAZA, Archibald
SIQAZA, Jessie
SIQAZA, Archibald
SIQAZA, Jessie
SIQAZA, Archibald
SIQAZA, Jessie
SIQAZA, Archibald
SIQAZA, Jessie
SIQAZA, Archibald
SIQAZA, Jessie
SIQAZA, Archibald
SIQAZA, Jessie
CHAPTER 2  Victims of gross violations of human rights

...
TSHABALALA, Rejoice Nompumelelo
TSHABALALA, Rosetta Dumazile
TSHABALALA, Sarah
TSHABALALA, Sizakele Maria
TSHABALALA, Stanley Mbuso
TSHABALALA, Thamsanqa Cliford
TSHABALALA, Thandumuzi Samuel
TSHABALALA, Thomas
TSHABALALA, Thulani Lloyd
TSHABALALA, Vusumuzi Joseph
TSHABANGU, David Lucas
TSHABANGU, J ama j ohannes
TSHABANGU, Matilda Nomthandazo
TSHAKA, Miena Boniswa
TSHAKALA, Solomon
TSHAKAZA, Macdonald M dojiyana
Mpitshi
TSHALI, Phumzile Robert
TSHANDA, Mdodi
TSHANGA, Simon Mkulu
TSHANGANA, Cifi
TSHANGELA, J ackie
TSHANGELA, Mama Fennie
TSHARANE, Alle Samuel
TSHAUKE, Timothy Mandla
TSHAZI, Makutuza Shalestica
TSHAZIBANA, Wellington Mlungisi
TSHEGARE, Andrew
TSHEGARE, Philemon
TSHEHLA, Ngkgekgeti j ohn
TSHKEOSELE, Kagos j ames
TSHLEANE, David Baruti
TSHEMESE, Fansile
TSHEMESE, Geelboy Vakele
TSHEMESE, Lena
TSHEMESE, Silingo Simon
TSHEMESE, Witness
TSHIPO, Ramokoni
TSHETU, Nceba Wellington
TSHIWI, Bhungweni
TSHIWI, Siyabulela
TSHIWI, Thomeka
TSHIWI, Tozama
TSHIBAVALEMBA, Nkheteni Reginald
TSHIBE, Bangilize
TSHIEAME, Daniel Ramankwane
TSHIKALANGE, Rangozi Gilbert
TSHIKANE, Manyele Lucas
TSHIKAHISA, Elsie
TSHIKHUDO, Elmon
TSHIKILA, Archie Wellie
TSHIKILA, Lungelo Alyiff
TSHIKILA, Mskoli Apollo
TSHIKILA, Walter Zifonzoke
TSHIKORO, Ramaano Selwyn
TSHIPI, Motseoien Ben
TSHISHONGA, Robert Mmbotch
TSHITAHE, Nntshembedzi A.
TSHIVHASE, Samuel Mugivhela
TSHO, Mkhize
TSHO, Zondi
TSHOBA, Abel Piliki
TSHOBA, Benjamin Zanephi
TSHOBA, J an
TSHOKELA, Gladman M zwandile
VOL U M E  5   C H A P T E R  2   Victims of gross violations of human rights
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VEYI, Popayi</td>
<td>VUMAZONKE, Yogi Euginia</td>
<td>XABA, J ohn Njinga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEZI, Agnes Bashadile</td>
<td>VUNDLA, Dumazi Themb</td>
<td>XABA, J oseph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEZI, Agrippa Sibusiso</td>
<td>VUNDLA, Thembinkosi Bonganani</td>
<td>XABA, J oseph Mbownikul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEZI, Khulekalwe Smallman</td>
<td>VUNGAYI, Mhutshwa</td>
<td>XABA, Khehla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEZI, Sibusiso Agrippa</td>
<td>VUSANI, Mgcineni</td>
<td>XABA, Lawrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEZI, Sipho Chrisentos</td>
<td>VUSO, Mathembia</td>
<td>XABA, Mandla Vincent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEZI, Xolani Sipho</td>
<td>VUTHELA, Nzimeni J ohannes</td>
<td>XABA, Marita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIDIMA, Dumisani</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Mchozo Nathaniel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIDIMA, Mshungwini</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Monster Ntsietsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIDIMA, Toakele Flora</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Moses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Abraham</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Mthandazo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Bonginkosi Isaac</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Ndoda Anthony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Bukani</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Nkosinathi Salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Christina</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Nolutshando</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Clifford Qeduwazi</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Nomvula Sanna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Dudu Elsie</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Nonhlanhla Ctythlia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Dumisani Paulos</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Ntombizodwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Enerstina</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Robert Mphikelei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Goli</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Shampiyoni Josiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, J abulani Samuel</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Sibongiseni Eric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, J alf</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Simon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Lina Landubase</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Sina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Makhiseni</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Taku Annah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Manda J effrey</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Thandeka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Mandlenkos Mathews</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Thembani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Matsheni J ulius</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Themb Patience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Mazwi</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Thulani Innocent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Ngicuphile</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABA, Totell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Nominini Mary</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABANDLINI, Zuko Gow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Poppy Mathilda</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABANISA, Harriet Nomonde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Qeduwazi Clifford</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABENDLINI, Heerboy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Raymond Bonginkosi</td>
<td></td>
<td>XABENDLINI, Pumile Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Robert Gabangani</td>
<td></td>
<td>XAKA, Malikole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Sibusiso Michael</td>
<td></td>
<td>XAKISA, Mntunaye Wellington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Simanga</td>
<td></td>
<td>XAKWE, Simon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Solani Nokuthula</td>
<td></td>
<td>XALUVA, Zongezile Matthews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Sphamandla</td>
<td></td>
<td>XAM, Lalala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Thamari Maria</td>
<td></td>
<td>XAM, Nowezile Florence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Thebizile Ntoy</td>
<td></td>
<td>XAM, Pungutyaña</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Thulani</td>
<td></td>
<td>XATULA, Leo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Twodays Cecelia</td>
<td></td>
<td>XEGO, Malgas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Victoria Ntombi</td>
<td></td>
<td>XEGO, September Sikhathile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, Wami Enoch</td>
<td></td>
<td>XEGWANA, Lindela Alfred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI, William</td>
<td></td>
<td>XEKELA, Samson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILAKAZI-TSHABALALA, Desmond</td>
<td></td>
<td>XEKETWANA, Eric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOSES</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHAKANA, Rubin Shomboto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILANCULO, Raul Respeito</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHAMFU, Ndoyisile Albert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLANE, Sihlangu J offrey</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHOBA, Aubrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLJ OEN, Sarah J aine</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHOBA, Bashintshile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIMNECEMBE, Andrew</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHOBA, Khiphekhile Relith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VINGER, Ronald</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHOBA, Ncisihwe Alva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VININDWA, Violet Nofikile</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHOBA, Nonhlanhla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VISAGIE, Cleoton Darryl</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHOBA, Sinqobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VISAGIE, Dewald J acabus</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHOBA, Winile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VISAGIE, Getrude</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHOBISO, Xola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VISER, J acabus Raymond</td>
<td></td>
<td>XHOLA, Thembisile Martin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vogel, Clasina J ohanna Salomina</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIMBA, Gane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOYIYI, Funeka</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIMBA, Mpiyakhe Mandlekosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRIES, Andries Basil</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIMBA, Mziwenkosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUMAZONKE, Dora</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIMBA, Ndondile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUMAZONKE, Gerald Zolle Bonisile</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIMBA, Phala Rose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUMAZONKE, Mahlwa</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIMBA, Siphamandla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUMAZONKE, Olga</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIMBA, Sonny Mduduzeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUMAZONKE, Paulus</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIMBA, Themba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUMAZONKE, Phindile Ronald</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIMBA, Thembinkosi Mziwakhe Elphus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
XIMBA, Welcome Siphiwe
XOBOLOLO, Siphiwo Alfred
XOFA, Nozisipho Eunice
XOKISO/O JOHNSON, Goodman Tatasi
XOLILI, Sam
Xolisile, Clifford
Xolo, Landwile Mambhele
Xolo, Muzikawupheli Eric
Xolo, Safa Vincent
Xolo, Tanana
Xolo, Thembisile Esther
Xolo, Thumani Eunicie Mambdeko
Xongo, Ntombizanele Princess
Xoseni, Zamani David
Xulu, Agnes
Xulu, Bella
Xulu, Bisisiwe Thombe
Xulu, Christopher Musa
Xulu, Dumisani
Xulu, Halalani Samuel
Xulu, J oel Msizi
Xulu, Khanyisile Lephina
Xulu, Mbongeleni
Xulu, Mkhobiseni Herron
Xulu, Mzonomje Phinehas
Xulu, Nicholas
Xulu, Nqobizwe Anderson
Xulu, Ntombizanele Constance Thandeka
Xulu, Sipho Aubrey
Xulu, Sipho Brigitte
Xulu, Thembani
Xulu, Thembani
Xulu, Thembani
Xulu, Thembani
Xulu, Thembani
Xulu, Thembani
Xulu, Thembani
Xulu, Thembani
Xulu, Thembani
Xulu, Thembani
Xula, Mandla
Yabo, Sidney
Yaka, Mbangomuni
Yali, Khayalethu
Yalo, Bikwé
Yalo-lo-booyen, Geoffrey Yali
Yamani, Nomeyi Nomarket
Yanta, Mathews Sindle
YantoLO, Skepi Tom
Yaphi, Aweni
Yaphi, Illias
Yaphi, Wellie
Yasin, Ridwaan
Yawa, Bonisile Moses
Yawa, Themibile
Yawa-NcISana, Alfred Xolle
Yawu, Stanley
Yaya, Enoch
Yayi, Eric Zimasiile
Yebi, Lungsile William
Yekani, Wazina
Yekani, Zongile
Yekela, Ntabankulu
Yeki, Hillbrow N
YelanI, D avid Mbulelo
YelanI, Sipho Pleare
Yende, Joseph MzaneMphie
Yende, Matha Phelo
Yende, Thoko
Yengana, Siphiwe
Yengeni, Mayosi Morrison
Yengeni, Tony Sithembiso
Yengwa, Bhekizazi Ernest
Yengwa, Felizwe
Yengwa, Khalelani
Yengwa, Mnje
Yengwa, Nkosiyokuthula Bongani
Yengwa, Phumapi
Yengwa, Zintle
Yeni, Gugu Phyllis
Yeni, Thabani Almon
Yeni, Venon Basil
Yika, Maxwell Nick
Yika, Saule Zillo
Yiliwe, Mvuzo Wages
Yimba, Winnie
Yokwana, Matse J acob
Yona, Godfrey Xolle
Yona, Stomberg Xolela
Yose, Mandla Elby
Yose, Mantunge Prichard Ngculazi
YoYo, Mfene Simon
YoYo, Wilby Macebo
Zaca, Mandla Bethwell
Zaca, Mlotho Solomon
Zaca, Muhle Elijah
Zaca, NhloMia
Zaca, Ntombilezi Irene
Zaca, Sonnyboy Ernest
Zaca, Thulani
Zadunge, Gavu Mkhize
Zahela, Nomthetho J eanette
Zakhe, Khayalethu
Zakwe, Dumisani
Zakwe, Kubakwakhe
Zakwe, Ntombihini Patience
Zakwe, Simon Zonke
Zali, Monde Mendly
Zama, Ivan Bhekizilha
Zama, Thamsanqa Mata Linock
Zama, Zwelakhe Albert Mqashioyi
Zambodla, Mzwandile Leonard
ZamelA, Nosipho
Zamisa, Bongani Phikingkani
Zamisa, Ian Phumuzu
Zamisa, Mandla Lucas
Zamisa, Mathiya Albert
Zamisa, Miriam Ncane
Zamisa, Phineas Veni
Zamisa, Victor Dumisa
Zamisa, Vusi Nelson
Zamisa, Zandile Benedicta
Zamkana, Nodida J an
Zandle, Sonwabo
Zanelo, Msongelwa Michael
Zanqini, Hloko
Zantoranta, Mzimasi Michael
Zantsi, Sonnyboy Willie
Zawana, Sandle
Zawukana, Nolutu
Zazayokwe, Israel Makhosonke
ZeKana, Nocawa Dorah
Zekvu, Nobakabonwa
Zenane, Victor Charles
Zenani, Cordelia
Zenani, Mbulelo
Zengetwa, Luleka
Zengetwa, Moses Mnyamezeli
Zengetwa, Nhiskelelo
Zenze, Thandi J abu
Zenzile, David
Zenzile, Ndaphi
Zenzile, Siphelele Isaac
Zibane, Innocent Bernard
Zibane, J abulani Edward
Zibane, Jomo J ohn
Zibane, Mzukayise Blessing
Zibane, Sebenzile
Zibane, Vusumuzi
Zibani, Bokhethile
Zibani, Dingeni
Zibani, Freedom Mkhombe
Zibani, Mzukayise
Zibani, MziwenkosI
Zibani, Thendeke
Zibani, Thembani
Zibani, Thembinkosi
Zibani, Tude Minah
Zibi, Vuyani Victor
Zibonele, Shweni
Zibula, Bongani
Zibula, Dumisani
Ziegler, Grace
Zikalala, Phakokwakhe Fanweli
Zikalala, Sibusiso Governer
Zikhali, BhekumzI
Zikhali, GabiIsile Princess
Zikhali, Sibongile
Zikhundla, Maradere Bellina
Zikode, Buyiswa J osephinE
Zikode, Lungisani
Zikode, Thobezweni
Zikode, Zibuki Alfred
Zima, Emmerenica Benzani
Zimo, Tshokolo Ernest
Zimu (Mbanga), Phondo Nellie
Zimu, Bhekinkosi Godfrey
Zimu, Mduduzi
Zimu, Mfanoza Fraser
Zimu, Thulane PetroS
Zimu, VukanI Rodgers
Zindela, Gwentu
Zindela, J anet Poni Majitsheyi
Zingo, Vusi J ames
Zingxondo, Ntombizanele Elsie
Zinyosini, Mnyenjwa
Ziqubu, Bheki Edward
Ziqubu, Danki Harriet
Ziqubu, Emmanuel
Ziqubu, Ethel Thokozile
Ziqubu, Fikile
Ziqubu, Isaac Mjele
Ziqubu, Martha
Ziqubu, Nonhlnhla Linah
Ziqubu, Phetheni Catherine
Ziqubu, Thembela
Ziqubu, Violet
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Sipho David</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Sizwe Moses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thabane Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thandi Henriethah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Themba Petronella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thembani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thembileke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thembelihle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thembeni Faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thembli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thembinkosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thembinkosi Enock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thobile Muriel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thulani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Thulasizwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Umbuso Errol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Vusumuzi Petros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Yani Zana Bethah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Zantombazana Beslina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Zephetheni Alexia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZULU, Zimphi Hlengwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Andreas Bongi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Batsokole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Beatrice Makhosazane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Bhekile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Bongani Petros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Bonginkosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Christopher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Christopher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Dingaan Job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Dinguyise Nicholas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Dudu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Ephraim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Evelyne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Florence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Jabolani Phillip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Jacob Maxwell Mthokozisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Jeremiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Jhn Nkosinathi Fana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Makholwa Elliot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Mandla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Maria Nontombi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Mbali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Mbambowehashi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Mduduzi Linus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Michael Sipho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Mishack Md</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Mkheshwe Cashina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Mkholuleni Caiphas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Ngxeleni Gertrude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Nomakholef Norah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Nongilandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Nontethelelo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Nora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Nosihle Viola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Ntombiyakise Gladys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Patrick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Paulos Bonginkosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Phumele Eugenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Pintshi Elias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Scebi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Siboniso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Sifiso Philip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Thabile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Thandekile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Thembani Doris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Thembekile Annatoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUMA, Tshelubani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Emily Mpolai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Maude Nonhlaha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Andretta Lilly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Angelone Nokuzola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Anna Dutchhulwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Bangani Thandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Bonakele Qondeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Boy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Cynthia Ntombifuthi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Dankie Makhosonke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Ethel Busisiwe Thandile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Evens Zikhauleni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Khulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Lucky Nhlaha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Lucky Raphael</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Mangaliswe Simangele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Mbongeni Absolom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Mhambiseni J eremiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Mholeni Amon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Mlungisi Russel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Msizi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Ngitholiwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Ntandoyethu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Qinisile Gabazile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Sabani J ongo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Shayizandla Mfaniseni J ames</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Thuleleni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Toti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Veronica Vuyelwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Victor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Vokotwaca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNGA, Yawuza Isaac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUZA, Zelpha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUZANI, Desmond Lungelo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWAKALA, Maqhubela Shadrack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Aaron Mndlenkosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Aubrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Austin Xolani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Bekile Gladys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Bhekani J ohannes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Bhekzi Patrick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Bongani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Botati Samuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Busisiwe Alice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Buti Petro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Charles Bongani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Dorothy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Elijah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Elphas Mbongeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Hlohe G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, J ohannes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Josiah Zwelakhe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Khathazile Ivy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Kutshwa J ohanna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Lenah Tshidile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Linda William</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Lindwe Princess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Lucas Boy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Mndlenkosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Maureen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, May Precious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Michael Mzikayifani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Mqiniseni Simon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWANE, Ncheteke Stelco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interim Report of the Amnesty Committee

I INTRODUCTION

1 The Amnesty Committee (the Committee), one of three statutory committees of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission), was established in terms of section 17 of the Act.¹ This provision was amended on three occasions in order to provide for the extension of the Committee. The principal function of the Committee is to decide applications for amnesty received from perpetrators of offences or delicts associated with a political objective within the mandate period.²

2 At the time of reporting the Committee consisted of seventeen members,³ whose principal function is to decide applications for amnesty either in chambers or at a public hearing, sitting in panels of at least three members, which is the statutory quorum.

3 At the time of reporting, a considerable part of the Committee’s workload was incomplete.⁴ The life span of the Committee has been extended to enable these outstanding matters to be finalised, while the rest of the Commission was suspended on 31 October 1998. Provision has been made for a further report to be submitted after the finalisation of the outstanding amnesty applications. The present chapter is intended to give a broad overview of the Committee’s activities in the interim and will be followed by a more detailed report which covers the rest of the period and will contain a full list of all matters decided by the Committee.

II FORMATION AND COMPOSITION

4 The head office of the Committee was established in Cape Town, which was also the seat of the Commission.

¹ Acts 18 of 1997, 84 of 1997 and 33 of 1998. The various increases in the number of members are dealt with later.
² The term “act associated with a political objective” is defined in sections 20(2) and (3) of the Act. The mandate period was initially 1 May 1960 - 5 December 1993 which was later extended to 10 May 1994 by a constitutional amendment on 29 August 1997.
³ The members are identified in the Administrative Report of the Amnesty Committee in Volume One.
⁴ An audit of the work of the Amnesty Committee is contained in the chapter on Administrative Reports of the Statutory Committees: Amnesty Committee in Volume One.
The various versions of section 17 reflect the changes effected to the composition of the Committee from time to time. In its original form, section 17 provided for a single entity consisting of five members under the chairpersonship of a serving or retired judge of the High Court. The section provided that two members of the Committee should be commissioners appointed in consultation with the Commission. The two commissioners nominated and appointed to the Committee are both qualified lawyers and legal practitioners.

The others were appointed by the President and no formal process for such appointments was provided for in the section. In exercising this prerogative, the President appointed three judges together with the two Commissioners nominated by the Commission, to the Committee. It is clear from a reading of the Act that the Committee is required to perform a largely judicial function. This made it expedient to appoint three judges to the Committee, although the section only explicitly made provision for the appointment of one judge to chair the Committee.

There were considerable delays in appointing the members of the Committee, which resulted in the loss of valuable time in putting the work of the Committee into operation.

**ESTABLISHING AN INFRASTRUCTURE**

The Committee was faced with similar logistical problems as those experienced by the rest of the Commission. It had to set up offices and establish an infrastructure out of nothing. The Committee was initially allocated one whole floor in the building occupied by the Commission. This was converted into offices as well as a hearings room. Given the rapid expansion of the Committee, further accommodation was subsequently taken on another floor in the Commission offices.

The Committee also had to engage in the process of recruiting the requisite staff. The Act provides only for the office of an executive secretary for the Committee. In the absence of any specific guidelines, the Committee decided that, in order properly to perform its functions, it would be necessary to appoint a complement of suitably qualified lawyers and a complement of appropriate administrative staff. The professional services personnel were referred to as leaders of evidence, a term that reflects one of their principal functions – namely the leading of evidence at public hearings of the Committee. The Committee initially appointed a core staff consisting, inter alia, of an administrative secretary and two leaders of evidence.

---

5 The present chairperson, Mr Justice Hassen Mall, retired from active service as a judge during the course of his tenure of office as chairperson of the Committee.
one of whom doubled as the executive secretary of the Committee, significantly increasing the workload of the chief leader of evidence who was called upon to perform these functions as well. Both the professional staff complement as well as the administrative staff complement was gradually expanded as the workload of the Committee increased. In view of the novelty of the process, considerable time had to be invested in the training of staff on an ongoing basis.

10 One of the other urgent tasks of the Committee was to formulate and publish an application form for the purpose of amnesty applications. Logistical delays were experienced in formulating the amnesty application form and having it considered, approved and printed by the government. This led to additional pressure on the amnesty process in that there was a twelve-month period calculated from 15 December 1995 within which amnesty applications had to be submitted. It was, of course, not possible to apply for amnesty until the prescribed application form became available.

11 In view of the time limitations for the submission of applications, as well as their confidential nature, it was necessary to exercise strict control over all applications received and to keep accurate records thereof. Some logistical problems were occasioned by the fact that applications were received in a decentralised fashion in that it was open to applicants to submit their applications at the various regional offices of the Commission. This was in fact done on a significant scale. It was an important aspect of making the process of the Commission in general and the Committee specifically, accessible to the public. In practice, however, this resulted in duplication and an added workload on the Commission in that records of applications submitted at the regional offices were kept at the relevant regional office, and again registered in the central register at the head office of the Committee. A more detailed exposition of the process followed in registering and processing applications, in both narrative and diagrammatic form, is contained in the administrative report of the Amnesty Committee in Volume One.

12 One of the early problems resulting from the absence of a full staff complement was that members of the Committee had to engage in analysing and processing applications for amnesty, in addition to their principal duty of considering and deciding on the applications.
COMMUNICATION AND ACCESSIBILITY

13 In conjunction with the rest of the Commission, it was necessary to engage in a co-ordinated process of communicating the nature of amnesty and the process for submitting applications. The purpose was not only to publicise the process, but also to ensure that that proper applications were submitted, obviating the need for the Committee to spend time ensuring that applicants complied with the procedural requirements. The Commissioners on the Committee assumed the responsibility of communicating the process and, in particular, the procedural requirements to the public. This entailed visiting various centres, including several prisons, and engaging in public talks. Particular emphasis was placed on issues such as who qualified for amnesty, how application forms should be completed and where assistance could be obtained in completing application forms. In general, this contributed towards the enhanced formal quality of applications received, although a large percentage of applications fell short of the formal requirements.

14 A further aspect of rendering the amnesty process more accessible was to design the application form in an easily understandable and user friendly format and to ensure that it was available in all of the official languages, in considerable supplies at accessible points. All of the Commission offices were in a position to respond adequately to any request for application forms.

15 In addition and as part of the communication campaign, an appropriate interpretation service was provided both to members of the public and to the parties participating in public hearings of the Committee. Steps were also taken to ensure that members of the media were given full access to hearings and were positioned so they could report fully on the proceedings. The Committee initially had some reservations concerning the presence of television cameras at the public hearings. It was feared that this might have an inhibiting effect on the proceedings and on the willingness of applicants to come forward and submit applications for amnesty. It was, however, accepted that it would amount to unfair treatment of the electronic media - and indeed an inconsistency in the process - if only the print media and radio had access. It was also accepted that there was an overriding necessity to communicate the process to everyone through every conceivable means. The original fears proved unfounded and television coverage became and remains a standard feature of all of the Committee’s public hearings.

16 The issue of amnesty turned out to be a very controversial one in most of the public discussions concerning the Committee and the Commission in general.
The immunity from criminal or civil proceedings that results from the granting of amnesty was one of the main reasons or grounds for opposition raised by direct victims of politically-motivated acts or their next of kin. One of the early legal challenges to the Commission was an attack upon the constitutionality of the amnesty provisions by the Azanian Peoples Organisations (AZAPO) and some prominent families who had suffered human rights violations at the hands of the security forces under apartheid. The Constitutional Court eventually decided this matter against the applicants, upholding the constitutionality of amnesty. This case is more fully discussed in the chapter on Legal Challenges in Volume One.

Most South Africans have, over time, come to accept the necessity of amnesty for the overall objective of national unity and reconciliation in the country.

PRIORITISING APPLICATIONS

The Act enjoins the Committee, wherever possible, to give priority to the applications of people in custody and to prescribe procedures to give effect thereto. This was a further source of the initial delays that resulted from difficulties in formulating and publishing appropriate regulations in this regard. By far the majority of applications, particularly the initial ones, were received from prisoners. This category also constitutes the majority of applications rejected for falling outside of the mandate of the Committee.

It was, however, also important to deal with applications that gave a broader and more balanced perspective of the past political conflict - which is indeed the subject matter of the work of the Commission. There were initially very few applications from persons falling into this latter category. It was considered important to encourage as many of the important role players in the conflict as possible to come forward and apply for amnesty. To serve this objective, at an early stage the Committee heard an important application from a group of security police members.6

For the above reasons, the Committee endeavoured as far as possible to maintain a balance between considering applications from those in custody and those who are not.

The above-mentioned approach of focussing on representative or window cases resulted in the receipt of a significant volume of amnesty applications from

---

6 The application of Cronje & Others Nos.
important role players in the conflict. This in turn assisted the Commission in pursuing its objectives of, inter alia, establishing the broadest possible picture of the past conflict and formulating recommendations to avoid such a situation from developing in future.

22 It is also important to point out that the Committee has been in contact and discussion with various leadership figures of the main political groupings and that considerable assistance was given to the Committee in this regard. This has been an ongoing process and the Committee has endeavoured to identify and respond to difficulties experienced by various groupings in order to facilitate their participation in the amnesty process. The Committee obtained valuable assistance and co-operation from the various submissions of political parties to the Commission and from individual leaders.

■ PROCESS

23 Once most of the initial administrative and logistical problems had been overcome, the Committee was in a position to introduce a process for dealing with applications. One of the fundamental aspects which had to be attended to in this regard was the categorisation of applications into those it was compelled to deal with at public hearings and those which could be dealt with by the Committee in chambers. The categorisation of an application determined the various preparatory steps that had to be taken in order to render the application ripe for a hearing or decision (see further Volume One).

24 The other important step was to obtain all relevant information and material required to supplement omissions or outstanding aspects of the application. This required the obtaining of official records like court transcripts, judgements, charge sheets and the like. It was also necessary to obtain further particulars from the applicant where this was needed.7

25 Once all of the information and material had been obtained, it was taken into account in deciding whether the application would amount to a chamber matter or to a matter for public hearing. This was regulated by the provisions of the Act, which compelled the Committee to hear all applications concerning a gross violation of human rights (as defined), at public hearings and gave the Committee the discretion as to how it would deal with all other matters. In practice, most of the applications not involving gross human rights violations were dealt with in chambers.

7 Section 19(1) of the Act makes provision for obtaining further particulars from applicants.
Chamber matters would then be allocated to a panel and a decision taken by a majority of the panel. In view of the fewer formalities involved in processing chamber matters, the majority of the early decisions of the Committee were taken in chambers. Consequently, all of the chamber matters had been finalised before the writing of this report.

26 A number of additional steps were necessary to prepare hearable matters for a public hearing. A lot of this entailed logistic work. First, a hearing date had to be allocated to the matter in consultation with all of the interested parties or their legal representatives. Included in this process was the issue of obtaining an appropriate venue for the hearing. In view of the importance of accessibility, every endeavour is made to obtain a venue that will be most convenient for most of the interested parties, particularly victims. In addition to this, it is also important that the most essential facilities should be available at the venue. Regard is also given to the issue of safety and security.

27 It is also necessary to give statutory notice of the hearing to all of the interested parties including victims. The Act explicitly entitles any party to the proceedings to have legal representation. A legal assistance scheme was created in terms of the Act to render assistance in appropriate cases to parties who are unable to afford legal representation. This is important issue in ensuring the fairness of the proceedings before the Committee and is linked to the question of accessibility.

28 Insofar as the hearing itself is concerned, the Act empowers the Committee either to promulgate rules of procedure which are generally applicable to hearings or alternatively to determine the procedure to be followed at a particular hearing. To avoid overly formalising the process and to retain the degree of flexibility necessary to ensure the fullest possible participation within the limited time available, the Committee decided against prescribing a set of generally applicable rules of procedure. This decision was partly based upon an acceptance by the Committee of the Commission’s approach: that its process should not be equated to that of a court of law and should not be overly regulated. However, the proceedings of the Committee are largely judicial in nature and include in particular the right of cross-examination within reasonable bounds. All parties are allowed to adduce relevant evidence and to address argument to the hearings panel concerning all issues that have to be decided. The proceedings are recorded and the Committee gives reasoned decisions on each application. The Commission publishes these decisions. Within these parameters, the Committee endeavoured to conduct its proceedings in such a manner as to ensure that all parties are treated fairly.
A further important provision that assists in rationalising the work of the Committee is the provision of the Act, which allows the Committee to hear jointly all matters relating to the same incident. This is being used extensively by the Committee in order to expedite finalisation of its work.

EXTENSION OF THE COMMITTEE

As the deadline for the submission of applications approached, the volume of amnesty applications dramatically increased. It became apparent that it would be impossible to finalise all of the applications within the limited life span of the Commission unless the number of members of the Committee was increased to allow for more than one hearings panel. Therefore, section 17 of the Act was amended to provide for the appointment of a larger number of committee members. Following this amendment, two further members were appointed to the Committee, creating the possibility of simultaneous hearings by two hearings panels.

After the extension of the cut-off date of the Commission's mandate period from 5 December 1993 to 10 May 1994, it became possible for persons involved in a whole range of matters not previously covered to apply for amnesty in respect of their conduct. This in turn led to a new influx of amnesty applications, further increasing the mounting pressure on the Committee to finalise an overwhelming workload within the limited life span of the Commission.

Further amendments of section 17 followed, allowing for the appointment of at first nineteen and finally of an unlimited number of Committee members. The Committee was extended to its present number of seventeen members, following these amendments.

Notwithstanding all these measures, it was not been possible to finalise all of the hearable amnesty applications by the time of reporting. This has resulted in the extension of the life span of the Committee beyond 30 October 1998. On
this date, the rest of the Commission goes into suspension, pending finalisation of its work by the Committee. No date has presently been specified for the completion of the work of the Amnesty Committee. Provision is made for the President to determine the date for completion of amnesty work by proclamation in the Gazette.

34 It should be noted in this regard that a great deal of time is required for the preparation, actual hearing and the deciding of hearable matters. It was not possible to anticipate any of the logistic and other delays and difficulties experienced in finalising hearable matters at the time when the Commission was formed. This necessitated all of the legislative amendments to cater for the realities and practicalities of administering the amnesty process.

### CHALLENGES

35 The main challenges that confronted the Committee were as follows:

36 One of the main challenges faced by the Committee was dealing with the various causes of delays in the process. Numerous difficulties are occasioned in this regard by the applications of prisoners and persons who are not legally represented. This resulted in the Committee taking various steps to ensure that the cases of such persons were properly and fully placed before the Committee. Some of the particular problems experienced were incomplete or improperly completed applications, difficulties in communicating with applicants and difficulties in investigating such cases. This meant that these cases took considerably longer to become ripe for a hearing or decision. In order to address this difficulty, the Committee has prevailed upon the Commission to ensure as far as possible that legal representation is provided to persons in these categories. This has been put into effect.

37 Considerable time is taken up by the actual hearing of applications, since it is open to affected or interested parties to participate in the proceedings to the extent of their interests therein. By the nature of things, opposed applications took much more time than other matters to complete. In many cases, interested parties and victims appeared but, rather than actively oppose the application, either kept a watching brief or abided by the proceedings. Following directions given by the Committee, it was also made possible for interested parties to submit written representations to the hearings panel or to place their views on record at the hearing through the services of the leader of evidence. The Committee
has endeavoured to limit the time spent in sittings by controlling unnecessary and time-consuming cross-examination or argument, the submission of irrelevant documentation or the leading of irrelevant evidence. In appropriate cases, pre-hearing conferences are held in order to limit or properly define the issues to be decided at the hearing. This involves all the parties to the matter and is conducted by the Committee.

38 Other delays during hearings resulted from unforeseen circumstances like a lack of time to complete matters within the period for which they had been set down or the granting of postponements to parties so they could properly prepare new material or evidence or to enable them to attend the proceedings. The availability of a preferred legal representative often caused delays in finalising matters. In spite of all these circumstances, the Committee has largely succeeded in curbing any abuse of the process and streamlining the hearings with the assistance and co-operation of most parties.

39 A further cause for some concern is the inequality in legal representation afforded to various parties. This has a negative affect on victims particularly. This concerns the vexing question of severe constraints on public resources or even the lack of such resources. This affects the issue of legal representation because the Commission’s legal assistance scheme operates on a very limited budget, which prescribes tariffs for legal services very much in line with the government’s legal aid scheme. These tariffs are notoriously low compared to the fees lawyers are able to demand on the open market. The more highly skilled lawyers are thus not easily attracted to work involving such limited tariffs. Most of the victims who participate in hearings are compelled to rely on the Commission’s legal assistance scheme, since they are unable to fund legal representation from their own resources. This also applies to indigent applicants for amnesty. On the other hand, present or former state employees or members of liberation movements qualify for legal assistance by the state in terms of a special dispensation. The appearance of such persons before the Commission or its Committees is funded by the State and the State Attorney arranges their legal representation. Lawyers who appear on these instructions are allowed substantially higher tariffs than those provided for by the Commission’s legal assistance scheme. These lawyers also have better resources at their disposal to prepare for hearings and represent their clients. In many instances, senior counsel handles these cases. The inherent inequality and unfairness of this situation is self-evident. Although the Committee is grateful to the many legal representatives who have, despite these hardships,
rendered a splendid service to the indigent, particularly victims, it remains disturbing to realise that there may be instances where justice was not done in respect of indigent amnesty applicants or victims at amnesty hearings.

CONCLUSION

40 In view of the judicial nature of the Committee’s work and the fact that its decisions are subject to judicial scrutiny, it would be inappropriate for the Committee to comment on or indulge in an analysis of its decisions on the novel and interesting legal and other questions surrounding the amnesty process or the concept of amnesty in general. A list of all amnesty applications granted to date is contained in the appendix to this chapter. The Committee’s decisions are made public. In order to avoid fragmentation, a full list of all decisions taken will accompany the report of the Committee that will be submitted upon completion of its work.
## APPENDIX

### AMNESTIES GRANTED AT TIME OF REPORTING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AM</th>
<th>APPLICANT</th>
<th>MANNER</th>
<th>DECISION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6210/97</td>
<td>ANDERSON, FB</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/09/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8077/97</td>
<td>ANDERSON, GP</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/04/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101/96</td>
<td>BAM, ME</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2878/96</td>
<td>BATZOFIN, S</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4118/96</td>
<td>BESTER, P</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0105/96</td>
<td>BHEQEZI, S</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1190/96</td>
<td>BHILA, A</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0041/96</td>
<td>BLEKI, SL</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/05/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0057/96</td>
<td>BOTHA, DP</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/09/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1703/96</td>
<td>BOTHA, JJC</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/12/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6422/97</td>
<td>BRAND, C</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1298/96</td>
<td>BUSAKWE, E</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/03/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1548/96</td>
<td>CARD, DJ</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0554/96</td>
<td>CHOLOTA, DB</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6610/97</td>
<td>CHRISTIE, MJ S</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0063/96</td>
<td>COETZEE, D</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2478/96</td>
<td>CROWE, RJJ</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/12/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2337/96</td>
<td>DE BEER, JJ</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3375/96</td>
<td>DE J ONGH, NW</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0081/96</td>
<td>DIALE, B</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/08/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4019/96</td>
<td>DLADLA, MA</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/05/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3905/96</td>
<td>DLAMINI, BP</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2466/96</td>
<td>DYANTI, WM</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4133/96</td>
<td>ELS, WJ</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>APPLICANT</td>
<td>MANNER</td>
<td>DECISION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0214/96</td>
<td>FAKU, NM</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/05/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0483/96</td>
<td>FIETIES, C</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/09/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0395/96</td>
<td>FRONEMAN, LH</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/07/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3514/96</td>
<td>GELDENHUYS, HC</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3515/96</td>
<td>GELDENHUYS, HP</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4139/96</td>
<td>GERBER, TH</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4140/96</td>
<td>GEYSER, FH</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0106/96</td>
<td>GOLA, AN</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4141/96</td>
<td>GOUS, AZ</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0949/96</td>
<td>GQOMFA, H L</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1289/96</td>
<td>GSINISIZWE, D</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/01/23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0148/96</td>
<td>GXEKWA, N G</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3275/96</td>
<td>HARMSE, PJ</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/07/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779/96</td>
<td>HLOPE, MJ</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4480/96</td>
<td>HLUBI, SS</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5961/97</td>
<td>HOWELL, A</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3613/96</td>
<td>HURTER, W</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0919/96</td>
<td>JACK, TWO BOY</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/05/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0496/96</td>
<td>JAMESON, R</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6178/97</td>
<td>JARDINE, HS</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5240/97</td>
<td>JUDEEL, PJ</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5619/97</td>
<td>KHOTLE, LA</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3443/96</td>
<td>KHOTLE, MI</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0632/96</td>
<td>KLAAS, MM</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2893/96</td>
<td>KRIEL, AS</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5180/97</td>
<td>KUBUKELI, P</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6440/97</td>
<td>KULA, MS</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0312/96</td>
<td>LEBONA, P</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/03/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1297/96</td>
<td>LEKITLANE, TS</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/03/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4072/97</td>
<td>LETELE, MR</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1004/96</td>
<td>LOTTERING, CJ</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>APPLICANT</td>
<td>MANNER</td>
<td>DECISION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5931/97</td>
<td>MABALA, Z P (Heidelberg Tavern)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5178/97</td>
<td>MABITSA, J T</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6077/97</td>
<td>MADASI, V B (Heidelberg Tavern)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0038/96</td>
<td>MADELA, M</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0865/96</td>
<td>MADODA, T</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/07/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6438/97</td>
<td>MAKAPELA, Z Z</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0080/96</td>
<td>MAGALE, C</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/08/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0087/96</td>
<td>MAKOM, J</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0164/96</td>
<td>MAKOMA, G</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0362/96</td>
<td>MAKROS, T</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2567/96</td>
<td>MAKWENKWE, W</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880/96</td>
<td>MASEKO, AN</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6439/97</td>
<td>MATI, L S</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2467/96</td>
<td>MATOMELA, WS</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7016/97</td>
<td>MATSHAYA, MD</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1283/96</td>
<td>MAXAM, P (Housebreaking)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/07/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0180/96</td>
<td>MAY, LJ</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/10/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0102/96</td>
<td>MBEHEBE, DE</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4309/96</td>
<td>MDALANA, NJ</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0103/96</td>
<td>MDYOGOLA, N</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0015/96</td>
<td>MENERA, NJ (Murder-4 counts)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2586/96</td>
<td>MITCHELL, BV</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/12/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1290/96</td>
<td>MKHONTWANA, TP (Att murder-Mhlambiso)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/01/23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6140/97</td>
<td>MKHUMBUZI, BM</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7596/97</td>
<td>MLAMBISI, T</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4483/96</td>
<td>MNGUNI, MS</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3998/96</td>
<td>MOALOSI, SP</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0116/97</td>
<td>MOHAPI, PT</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0097/96</td>
<td>MOILWANYANE, D</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4060/97</td>
<td>MONTOELI, TA</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3902/96</td>
<td>MOTAUNG, SW</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>APPLICANT</td>
<td>MANNER</td>
<td>DECISION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2469/96</td>
<td>MOTSOPI, A</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7110/97</td>
<td>MPANZA, B</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/09/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0104/96</td>
<td>MPHAMBANI, SV</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6656/97</td>
<td>MPIYAKHE, LS</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0012/96</td>
<td>MPONDO, J P</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/12/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1249/96</td>
<td>MTJ IKELYO, TP</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0638/96</td>
<td>MTSHALI, N G</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0118/96</td>
<td>MXHOSANA, VW</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/10/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0435/96</td>
<td>MZIMELA, C</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/07/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0048/96</td>
<td>MZOMBA, FEP</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0121/96</td>
<td>NCUBE, J T</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/01/23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8080/97</td>
<td>NDABA, S</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/04/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6692/97</td>
<td>NDABAPHI, M</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/12/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3802/96</td>
<td>NDINISA, CS</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/07/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4058/96</td>
<td>NDLOVU, NW</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/05/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1702/96</td>
<td>NDLOVU, P</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/04/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0184/96</td>
<td>NDLUMBINI, PM</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/05/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5051/97</td>
<td>NDZAMELA, IN</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100/96</td>
<td>NGWENDU, MR</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759/96</td>
<td>NGWENYA, DA</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/05/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3813/96</td>
<td>NIEUWOUDT, J A</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/09/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0826/96</td>
<td>NKUNA, C</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0812/96</td>
<td>NKUNA, H J</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5282/97</td>
<td>NOFEMELA, E M (Amy Biehl)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0064/96</td>
<td>NOFEMELA, BA (Murder-Mxenge)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6657/97</td>
<td>NOMASHIZOLO, ST</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0003/96</td>
<td>NONGONGO, OT</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/05/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4734/97</td>
<td>NTAMO, S N (Amy Biehl)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6658/97</td>
<td>NTIKINCA, LL</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0677/96</td>
<td>NTSHOBANE, TR</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/05/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1323/96</td>
<td>NTSITSI, SO</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4481/96</td>
<td>NYAKANE, TJ</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6624/97</td>
<td>NYEMBEZI, M</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3095/96</td>
<td>NZIMANDE, MA</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/10/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>APPLICANT</td>
<td>MANNER</td>
<td>DECISION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5177/97</td>
<td>OLIPHANT, ST</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5188/07</td>
<td>PENI, N A (Amy Biehl)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6612/97</td>
<td>PETE, AD</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0027/96</td>
<td>PETRUS, RR</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/12/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0660/96</td>
<td>PHAKAMISA, M</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/05/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3641/96</td>
<td>PHOSWA, MT</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/10/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1288/96</td>
<td>POPANE, MM</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/01/23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5179/97</td>
<td>PYPER, C R</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7168/97</td>
<td>RADEBE, TM</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/09/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2758/96</td>
<td>ROBINSON, RK</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/12/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0094/96</td>
<td>ROUX, GPD</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/12/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7158/97</td>
<td>SALOJEE, R</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/10/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1567/96</td>
<td>SAMBO, J</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3670/96</td>
<td>SCHUTTE, SM</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/03/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1701/96</td>
<td>SEBILOANE, WMM</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/06/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4482/96</td>
<td>SEKERE, MD</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0143/96</td>
<td>SEROALO, PT</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5939/97</td>
<td>SHICEKA, A (Crazy Beat Disco)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3903/96</td>
<td>SIBISI, NJ</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3904/96</td>
<td>SITHOLE, J M</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6139/97</td>
<td>SIYOLO, NM</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/07/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3387/96</td>
<td>SKOSANA, DM</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1002/96</td>
<td>SLIPPERS, HJ (Att. murder)</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0056/96</td>
<td>SMUTS, A</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/09/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0193/96</td>
<td>SOLO, AS</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/08/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0069/96</td>
<td>STEYN, HJ</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/05/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4394/96</td>
<td>STOLS, D</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>APPLICANT</td>
<td>MANNER</td>
<td>DECISION</td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5784/97</td>
<td>THANDA, WF</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Crazy Beat Disco)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4245/96</td>
<td>THERON, PJ</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/09/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3844/96</td>
<td>THOABALA, WO</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0077/96</td>
<td>THOBA, KE</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0078/96</td>
<td>THOMPSON, WR</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0030/96</td>
<td>THULO, MP</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/12/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0637/96</td>
<td>TOVELA, AA</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909/96</td>
<td>TRYSTMAN, KJ</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7711/97</td>
<td>TSHABALALA, AC</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/09/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0065/96</td>
<td>TSHIKALANGE, D</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/08/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Murder-Mxenge)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7983/97</td>
<td>TUTU, TAT</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/11/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0079/96</td>
<td>VAN DER MERWE, AF</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/04/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3718/96</td>
<td>VAN DER MERWE, CWA</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/02/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1730/96</td>
<td>VAN DER WESTHUIZEN, J</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/08/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2759/96</td>
<td>VOLSCHENK, CG</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>96/12/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7253/97</td>
<td>VORSTER, O</td>
<td>CHAMBER</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>97/12/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2997/96</td>
<td>WA-NTHOBA, J N</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2084/96</td>
<td>WHEELER, J</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/07/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1215/96</td>
<td>XHIBA, J M</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5864/97</td>
<td>ZULU, J M</td>
<td>HEARING</td>
<td>GRANTED</td>
<td>98/06/02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Consequences of Gross Violations of Human Rights

II CONSEQUENCES OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ON PEOPLE’S LIVES

1 The apartheid system was maintained through repressive means, depriving the majority of South Africans of the most basic human rights, including civil, political, social and economic rights. Its legacy is a society in which vast numbers of people suffer from pervasive poverty and lack of opportunities. Moreover, those who were directly engaged in the armed conflict (whether on the side of the state or of the liberation movements) suffered particular kinds of consequences.

2 The consequences of repression and resistance include the physical toll taken by torture and other forms of severe ill treatment. The psychological effects are multiple and are amplified by the other stresses of living in a deprived society. Hence, lingering physical, psychological, economic and social effects are felt in all corners of South African society. The implications of this extend beyond the individual - to the family, the community and the nation.

3 When considering the consequences of gross human rights violations on people’s lives, it is hard to differentiate between the consequences of overt physical and psychological abuses and the overall effects of apartheid itself. This makes it difficult to make causal links or to assume that violations are the result of a particular experience of hardship. In many instances, however, violations undoubtedly played the most significant role as, for example, when a breadwinner was killed or when the violation caused physical disabilities, affecting individual and family incomes.

4 It must also be remembered that human rights violations affect many more people than simply their direct victims. Family members, communities and societies themselves were all adversely affected. Moreover, the South African conflict had effects far beyond those who were activists or agents of the state; many victims who approached the Commission were simply going about their daily business when they were caught in the crossfire. Human rights violations can also trigger
a cascade of psychological, physical and interpersonal problems for victims that, in their turn, influence the functioning of the surrounding social system.

5 This chapter addresses some of the consequences of gross human rights violations that were reported to the Commission. It attempts to report on the patterns and trends in relation to psychological effects, physical consequences and how these have affected families and communities in South Africa. In order to obtain a full picture, it should be read in combination with the chapters on Children and Youth and Women.

### METHODOLOGY

6 Numerous sources were used in compiling this chapter, including national and international literature, testimony presented at various hearings of the Commission, statements, interviews with statement takers and briefers and input from Commissioners and staff.

**Use of statistics**

7 Statistics cited were generated from statements made to the Commission. Out of a total of some 21 300 statements, 2 000 were selected as a sample, proportionally weighted according to region. The sample was randomly selected and focused on the consequences of the violation(s), as perceived by deponents, as well as on expectations of the Commission.¹

8 It must be borne in mind that information generated from the sample reflects the consequences and expectations as expressed in the entire statement of the deponent and that the majority of statements do not reflect the experience of one individual only. Often deponents referred to a violation of a person or persons other than or in addition to themselves - for example, other family members, comrades and friends. A deponent might, for instance, refer to the death of her son, but highlight the consequences for her grandchild’s education, her daughter’s emotional state and her own financial situation. This reflects the communal consequences of gross human rights violations and the ripple effects they have on families and communities.

**Questionnaire bias**

9 Another factor that needs to be taken into account is that of statement taker and questionnaire bias. In the ‘expectations’ section of the questionnaire in particular,

¹ Percentage figures have been rounded off.
suggestions were included to guide the deponent. These suggestions included items such as peace parks, memorials, medals and other similar forms of reparation. However, although often guided by these requests, deponents also listed individual or family needs. An example of this is reflected in the statement by Mr Buzifa Mbambo who requested “housing, employment, clinics and treatment for my elbow.”

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

10 South Africa’s history of repression and exploitation severely affected the mental well-being of the majority of its citizens. South Africans have had to deal with a psychological stress which has arisen as a result of deprivation and dire socio-economic conditions, coupled with the cumulative trauma arising from violent state repression and intra-community conflicts.

11 Trauma has both a medical and psychological meaning. Medically it refers to bodily injury, wounds or shock. In psychological terms, it refers to “a painful emotional experience or shock, often producing lasting psychic effect.”

12 Exposure to extreme trauma can lead to a condition known as post-traumatic stress disorder. This may be caused by:

a direct personal experience of an event involving actual or threatened death, serious injury or other threat to physical integrity;

b witnessing an event that involves death, injury or threat to the physical integrity of another person;

c learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or close associate.

13 Perpetrators of human rights violations used numerous tactics of repression, with both physical and psychological consequences. These found their expression in the killing, abduction, severe ill treatment and torture of activists, families and communities. Psychological damage caused by detention was not merely a by-product of torture by state agents. It was deliberate and aimed at discouraging further active opposition to apartheid. Jacklyn Cock says:

---


Torture is not only considered as a means of obtaining information on clandestine networks at any price, but also a means of destroying every individual who is captured, as well as his or her sense of solidarity with an organisation or community.4

14 Mr Mike Basopu, an activist during the 1980s, was arrested in 1986. At the Mdantsane hearing, he told the Commission that activists were aware of the possibility that they might be tortured:

As the freedom fighters, we were struggling; we knew the consequences. What I am trying to say is that, when we were fighting against the whites - when we were fighting against the Boers - we knew that we were going to be harassed.

15 This awareness did not, however, protect Mr Basopu from the physical strains he experienced when he was detained in Fort Glamorgan Prison. He recognised that the role of torture and ill treatment was to inflict permanent damage on activists and limit their future activities. “These prison warders were trying to treat us [so] badly that if we were released from prison we would not be able to continue with our struggle.”

16 Psychological abuse in torture can be divided into four types:

a communication techniques such as verbal abuse;

b attempts to weaken mentally through, for example, solitary confinement or drugs;

c psychological terror tactics, including threats against families or witnessing the torture of other detainees;

d humiliation, such as being kept naked or undergoing vaginal examinations.5

17 The South African security forces and third force agents used a combination of these techniques.

18 The intention of torture was not to kill victims but to render them incapable of further activities on their release. Mr Mapela became aware of this during his detention and goaded the police to kill him. In 1964, after being arrested by


police who wanted information about a colleague, he was severely tortured and hung on the bars of the cell with handcuffs. He told the Commission about his continued resistance in prison:

There would be Boers coming in and out with a gun. They would put it against my neck. I would ask them to pull the trigger. They refused. Some of them would come and hold a knife against my neck. I would ask them to cut my head off. They would refuse.

19 In 1981, Brigadier Rodney Goba Keswa was arrested and detained by the Security Police in the Transkei and was subjected to mental torture. At the Lusikisiki hearing, he described his first view of his cell the morning after his first bitterly cold night in detention:

When dawn eventually broke, I had the first opportunity of looking around my cell. What I saw still haunts me to this day. The wall on the one side of my cell was smeared with faeces. The spot where the night soil bucket stood was a pool of urine ... The blankets were old, threadbare, smelly, dusty, coarse, with tell tale signs of perverse sexual acts. I tried walking towards the door, but I staggered about sick to the bottom of my gut ... I remembered stories about tactics of killing someone without laying a finger on them.

Psychological problems

20 Internationally, the best-documented psychological consequences of human rights violations relate to the effects of torture. Torture can lead to wide ranging psychological, behavioural and medical problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder whose symptoms include “re-experiencing of the traumatic event, persistent avoidance stimuli associated with the event and persistent symptoms of increased arousal not present before the traumatic event.”

21 Post-traumatic stress disorder is not, however, the only consequence of torture and human rights violations. Other problems include depression, anxiety disorders and psychotic conditions. The effects are multidimensional and interconnected, leaving no part of the victim’s life untouched. Exposure to trauma can lead to sleep disorders, sexual dysfunction, chronic irritability, physical illness and a disruption of interpersonal relations and occupational, family and social functioning.

In many statements made to the Commission, deponents described symptoms of psychological disturbance. Although many deponents and victims referred to their symptoms, it was not possible to diagnose actual disorders or problems based on the statements and testimony at hearings. However, the following examples illustrate the kinds of psychological problems that resulted from gross human rights violations.

In 1987, after he refused to join the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League, Mr Bhaki George Morake’s house in Botshabelo township was burnt down. He described the effects of this on his wife at the Bloemfontein hearing:

From 1987, my first wife had lost her mind - until the 1994 elections when we separated ... She might have suffered some anxiety, because she didn’t really act like a normal person ... When our house was petrol bombed, the bomb fell on the bed on which she was sleeping. Then I noticed thereafter that she was quite depressed.

Mr Sizwe Kondile went into exile in response to constant harassment by the police. In 1981, he was arrested and killed in detention. At the East London hearing, his mother, Ms Charity Nongqalelo Kondile described the effects on the family:

Lindiwe and Sizwe have been very close, were very closely placed. Lindiwe never reconciled. She never accepted the fact that her brother [had] been killed. Until recently she suffered from depressive psychosis which the doctors at the hospital referred to as some depression that has been bottled up for a long time, and I feel that this [was] the result of all that she has been bottling up for all these years.

Ms Elizabeth Sizane Mduli was shot and paralysed while attending a school boycott gathering in Nelspruit in 1986. From being a fit athlete, she became physically disabled and has since suffered from psychological problems:

My mind, my mental state, is unstable. At times I just stop thinking ... I realise that it seems as if I am a bit insane.

Many victims reported problems of memory loss and emotional numbness.

Mr Morgan Sabatha Phehlani was a councillor whose home and business were burnt down by youth in the course of a community conflict in 1991. Mr Phelani’s
son was eleven years old when he witnessed the stabbing and burning of his mother. Since this incident, he has suffered psychologically:

You know, he goes and forgets. He forgets, now and then he forgets. You must always remind him. That’s the trouble we’re having with him.

Ms Nobuthi Winnie Ncaca’s sixteen-year-old son, Mawethu, was shot and killed by the police in Cradock in 1986. Since his death, Ms Ncaca has been suffering from psychological problems. At the Cradock hearing, she told the Commission:

My memory was affected, if you tell me something I just forget. I always forget.

Mr Johannes Petrus Roos spoke of the death of his wife and son in a landmine explosion in 1986. He and his other two children witnessed the explosion. He described the effects on his daughter at the Nelspruit hearing:

It was not easy, an easy time for my five-year old daughter who had turned six, who had to go to school the following year without her mom. It was not easy to explain all this to her. That child never cried. That child doesn’t cry today either.

Mr Mthembeni Sipho Magwaza was attending a peace rally when members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) abducted him and five of his friends. One of his friends and five other people were shot and killed. His shop was later looted and destroyed. He described his psychological state:

I am a living zombie; psychologically and emotionally, I am dead.

Jose Saporta and Bessel van der Kolk have identified two common consequences of traumatic events.

a The first is incomprehension, where the sense of the experience overwhelms the victim’s psychological capacity to cope. Traumatic experiences cannot be assimilated because they threaten basic assumptions about one’s place in the world. After the abuse, the victim’s view of the world and self can never be the same again.

b The second feature is what is called disrupted attachment. This is often exacerbated by an inability to turn to others for help or comfort in the aftermath of trauma. It thus represents the loss of an important resource that helps
people to cope. Traumatic rupture is an integral part of the torture experience. Victims are kept in isolation and their captors threaten them with the capture and death of family and friends. If they are then forced into exile, they feel further alienated and estranged. Traumatised individuals often show enduring difficulties in forming relationships. They tend to alternate between withdrawing socially and attaching themselves impulsively to others.⁷

32 The torture of Mr Abel Tsakani Maboya’s wife resulted in her psychological breakdown and subsequent social withdrawal. Mr Maboya’s cousin was a member of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), based in Tanzania, and was sent on missions to South Africa. Both Mr Maboya and his wife were arrested with a view to extracting information about the cousin’s activities. Ms Mboya was tortured and suffered psychological damage as a result. At the Venda hearing in October 1996 Mr Maboya told the Commission that their marriage had not survived these experiences:

She is a sensitive person actually. I think there are some other people, people that would believe that now we are not free. Those nightmares are still there. She can’t face crowds like this. I tried by all means for her to make a statement so that people will - she was beautiful to me, I don’t know what happened to her.

33 Feelings of helplessness also undermine people’s sense of themselves as competent and in control of their fate.⁸ This makes them incapable of picking up the pieces of their previous lives.

34 Mr David Mabeka was a youth activist who was arrested and tortured in Barkly West in 1986. He described the consequences of his experience at the Kimberley hearing:

In 1993, I went back to school to do my standard nine. It was not easy ... I would forget things most of the time... The life that I’m leading now is a bit difficult. I cannot cope because of this Double Eyes and Rosa and their friend [those who arrested and tortured him]. I don’t know why should I live with this pain, knowing that I was defenceless.

35 Mr Lebitsa Solomon Ramohoase was shot in the 1960 massacre at Sharpville. He told the Commission at the Sebokeng hearing that he sustained permanent injuries to his leg and had subsequently struggled to find employment:

---

My life changed. I led a miserable life. You know my feelings changed altogether. But I didn’t know what kind of help I [could] give myself and I was satisfied. I said I have to be satisfied because it is something that happened to me. I am helpless; I can’t do anything for myself.

36 Political activists were less prone to post-traumatic stress disorder, owing to their commitment to a cause and their psychological preparedness for torture. Mr Mike Basupo (see above) was arrested for his activities in 1986. He referred to the strength that may be drawn from such commitment:

The circumstances I was under and many people were subjected to was very painful. However, we must remember that, even if you were released from detention under such circumstances, you would not give up. You would continue with the struggle for liberation.⁹

37 International studies have shown that non-activists, even if subjected to lower levels of torture, display significantly more severe symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. The less the psychological preparation for the trauma of torture, the greater the distress during torture and the more severe the subsequent psychological problems.¹⁰ The Commission’s statistics provide evidence of this phenomenon.

38 Psychological re-experiencing of the event can have debilitating consequences for survivors trying to rebuild their lives.

39 Mr Mike Wilsner is a friend of Father Michael Lapsley, a member of the ANC who was injured in a parcel bomb explosion in Harare on 28 April 1990. He told the Commission about Father Lapsley’s condition after the bombing.

He would wake up at night, screaming, re-living the bomb. I wanted to touch him but everywhere you looked - everywhere over his body was red and swollen and painful. There was nowhere to touch him. We were grateful that he was alive, but we were very aware that his life would be changed irrevocably from that moment on.

40 At the Johannesburg hearing Ms Hawa Timol spoke of her pain after the death of her son, Ahmed Timol, at the hands of the security forces:

I told them [the police] that if my body had a zip they could open the zip to see how I was aching inside.

41 Another son, Mr Mohammed Timol, described her enduring pain:

I think it’s an indication, from what you see here, she has lived through this every day of her life for the last twenty-five years.

42 Ms Doreen Rousseau was shot and injured during an attack on the Highgate Hotel in 1993. At the second East London hearing, she described the lingering effects of trauma:

I still have terrible nightmares. I wake up in the night and I see this man standing in my doorway with a gun.

43 Recurring thoughts of traumas that have been experienced continued to invade the lives of many South Africans. Mr Madala Andres Ndlazi’s sixteen-year-old son was shot by the police on 16 June 1986. At the Nelspruit hearing, he told the Commission that memories of his son’s death haunted him to that day:

I found my child brought to the home. I found him in the dining room. He was lying dead there in the dining room. When I looked at him, it was very painful for me to see how injured he was - and I controlled myself together with my wife as Christians. We knew very well that we will have to die one day but we know there are many ways to pass away from this earth. But the way in which my son, Sidney Ndlazi, was injured, it makes me very painful. I cannot forget this. It is almost ten years now.

44 Many members of the state forces, both conscripts and career officials, also described their experiences of post-traumatic stress disorder. Some perpetrators may also be considered victims of gross human rights violations and there is a need to address their struggle to live with the consequences of their experiences and actions. Others found themselves caught up in and traumatised by situations over which they had no control. Mr Sean Callaghan told the Commission at the health sector hearing:
[I was] confronted with a patient who had no arms or legs, was blind and was deaf. [He] had been in a mortar pit launching 80mm mortars when one of them exploded in the pipe. That was the first patient I ever saw in the operational area.

Right there and then I realised that, as an eighteen year old, I am not going to be able to handle this after six months of training. I had applied for medical school ... and I went for an interview with Wits medical school during [my] leave, and said to them, “I don’t want to be a doctor anymore, not after what I’ve seen” ...

I was hyper-vigilant. I was having screaming nightmares every night for at least six months. I was very anti-establishment, anti-social. I was cold. Whenever I heard a loud noise, I would dive to the ground. When I heard helicopters, I would look for somewhere to hide.

45 The tendency for the original trauma to reactivate after many years is a troubling and challenging aspect of post-traumatic stress disorder and reveals its persistence. The long-term relationship between physical disease and post-traumatic stress disorder in torture survivors is complex and presents a challenge for researchers in the field.

46 High rates of co-morbid (simultaneous) symptoms have also been found, including major depression, dysthymic disorder (a less severe form of major depressive disorder), antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse. Surprisingly, few deponents referred to alcohol or substance abuse as an outcome. This could be due to the high levels of acceptability of the use and abuse of alcohol in South African society or a lack of probing by the Commission’s statement takers.

Treatment in the South African context

47 In South Africa, the area of mental health has been historically neglected. There are few trained psychologists and clinical social workers, and few attempts have been made to provide culturally appropriate mental health care to all South Africans. At the time of reporting, mental health care still consisted largely of institutionalisation.

12 See chapter on Institutional Hearings: Health
Moreover, dire social circumstances have made it difficult for individuals to deal with past psychological traumas. At times, current problems are merely symptoms of long-term traumatisation, compounded by impoverished living conditions. In South Africa, successful therapeutic interventions are difficult, because of the inability to protect the individual from further trauma.13

Mr Lennox Mbuyiseli Sigwela was paralysed during a police shooting and attack by Witdoeke vigilantes in Crossroads in 1986. Once the family breadwinner, he became dependent on family members. His situation provides an example of the interconnectedness of psychological, physical and economic consequences of human rights violations. At the KTC hearing, he told the Commission:

We are struggling, we are struggling. The children at my home are suffering for new school uniforms, for clothes. That is why I will never - although I have accepted this - I will never, I will never forget what happened because, when I look at the way we struggle at home, sometimes I feel like committing suicide.

It is therefore difficult to distinguish between the response to the psychological effects of the violation and other stressful events in the life of the victim. Studies do, however, provide evidence that, in some individuals, exposure to violence has psychological effects independent of other associated factors causing stress.

It is also suspected that diagnoses of mental illness were also used to silence activists or opponents by condemning them to institutions where they were under the control of the state. Doctors and mental health professionals are alleged to have advised torturers on how to identify potential victims, break down their resistance and exploit their vulnerabilities.

The above factors led to resistance to seeking formal psychological treatment. Statement takers found that the suggestion of a referral for psychological treatment was often met with a rebuttal such as, “I am not mad”. Mr Robert David Norman Stanford, a victim of the attack on the King William’s Town Golf Club on 28 November 1992, agreed that there is a reluctance to recognise that one is psychologically damaged. He described the difficulties he had experienced in connection with his psychological problems at the East London hearing:

No one is prepared to accept that you’re not quite normal. And you tend to fight against it and you tend to try and uplift yourself; you tend to try and

show that you’ve returned to a state of normality whereas, in fact, you haven’t done so.

53 Others who sought treatment found difficulty in obtaining it\(^{14}\). Mr Sean Callaghan (see above) told the Commission:

Around that time, I remember phoning my mother and telling her that I wasn’t sure if we were actually going to survive the night because we had got to the point of being completely suicidal. We had come to the end of our tether. We had been involved in that kind of thing - seeing patients, seeing people killed for twelve months already - and all I wanted to do was go and heal people and not kill them ...

We went to see the local psychiatrist who was resident in Oshakati and the major in charge of South African Medical Services up there, and we were basically told to grow up and carry on; there was nothing wrong with us ... There was no debriefing. There was no “what happened to you?” There was no “this is what you can expect when you go home. This is how you should try and integrate yourself back into society.”

I do remember a letter, I think, being sent to our parents with ten points on it, saying something like: “You had better lock your alcohol and your young girls away because these young boys are coming back home”. But that was the extent of the support we got ...

I saw a psychiatrist ... He declared me fit for battle and sent me home [saying] that there was nothing wrong with me. The point is that I wasn’t fit to be a father and I wasn’t fit to be a husband, but I was certainly fit to pull the trigger of a gun.

Essentially, I think I am pretty healed. I think I have come to the point of being whole. I have my emotions back. I am a father. I am a husband and I can do those things pretty well. But no thanks to the SANDF or SADF for helping me.

54 In order to heal, trauma victims must ultimately put words to their experience and thereby integrate the traumatic experience in order to find new meanings for themselves and their place in the world. An essential feature of recovery from trauma is re-establishing and normalising relationships of attachment with others.

\(^{14}\) See chapter on Institutional Hearings: Health.
Yet, while many victims of violations spoke of psychological problems that resulted from trauma, many others spoke of the strength and resilience they drew from friends and comrades in times of hardship. Courage, love and support networks kept many families and communities functioning and intact.

**PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS**

Physical injuries and disabilities caused by torture or severe ill treatment exact an immense toll on the individual, community and society. Physical scars and disabilities have been described by one survivor as: “a tattoo, a permanent physical reminder of what was done to us, a symbol that in many cases brings shame.”

Most physical injuries caused by torture result from blows to the body. An increased risk of infectious diseases, malignancies, cerebrovascular accidents and heart disease has also been reported in survivors of torture or prolonged arbitrary detention.

Ms Evelyn Masego Thunyiswa was arrested on her way to attend the funeral of Steve Biko in 1977. At the Mmabatho hearing she told the Commission that she had been beaten and shocked on her genitals:

> After torturing me like that, they trucked us off the road. When I tried to urinate, I was urinating blood. Because I left on my own - it was not through the permission of my parents - I was scared to even tell my mom where I had been to because of the whole situation. I stayed like that for a month or two. I remember I went to the doctor in the beginning of November and then I said to my mother I have tonsils, because I realised this sickness of mine was getting worse and worse.

Despite receiving treatment, Evelyn reported recurring symptoms.

In 1992, the pains came back. The pain that I felt when I was tortured came back in 1992. That was the same pain that I felt when I was tortured. As I [told] you, when it attacks me I stay three or four days not going outside and I cannot even urinate. I have never given birth since that time and I am a married wife.

15 Sister Dianna Ortiz, 'Survivor’s Perspective: Voices from the Centre' in National Institute of Mental Health, 1998
16 Basoglu, M, J Jaranson, R Mollica, M Kastrup. ‘Torture and it’s consequences’ in National Institute of Mental Health, 1998
Physical injuries and disabilities were also sustained in shooting incidents, physical attacks and beatings, as well as in failed assassination attempts by hit squads. Father Michael Lapsley (see above) described the extent of his physical injuries:

It blew off my hands. I lost an eye, my eardrums were shattered ... I’d faced the possibility of my own death and I had never - I’d never - sorry, but I’d never faced the possibility of major permanent disability.

He articulated the devastation that he felt:

I thought maybe it would have been better to have died when I realised I had no hands. I’d never met another human being with no hands. I didn’t know whether life would be life in any meaningful sense. They didn’t know whether I would ever see properly again. I lost one eye - [I] couldn’t see properly out of the other. I couldn’t hear properly because the eardrums were shattered. I was burnt extensively.

Mr Neville James Clarence was blinded in the Church Street bombing at the Air Force Headquarters in Pretoria on 20 May 1983. He described his physical rehabilitation at the Pretoria hearing:

I was able to slot in with ... a course presented by the National Council for the Blind, a rehabilitation course which I duly did attend a few months later. And I was taught to read and write Braille, to touch type on a typewriter. I was also taught various skills of daily living: how to pour a glass of water without spilling; how to dress myself; how to ... recognise various things around the house simply through touch. I also received training in the use of a long cane - a white stick in other words - and how to walk around town and how to orientate and find myself in case I get a bit lost walking in town.

Physical disabilities fundamentally alter the victim’s life. Ms Elizabeth Sizane Mduli was an eighteen-year-old student during the 1986 school boycotts in Nelspruit. During a protest gathering, she was shot by the police. At the Nelspruit hearing, she told the Commission:

What worries me, and what actually made me feel very painful, it is because I am not a member of any organisation and I am not actually a person who is affiliated to any movement. But today I am crippled because it is just [that] I was found at school. That was my sin.
She described her deteriorating health since the incident.

I have a problem with my chest. At the back, I am always tired. I have a problem with my bladder. I am sickly at all times. I have a pain that keeps haunting me every day. There are times when I urinate blood. I was fit, I have to tell you; I was an athlete at school.

Physical disabilities may exacerbate psychological problems, as the victim suffers not only from pain and other afflictions, but may also suffer a loss of independence and dignity. On 4 June 1987, Mr Namadzavho Phanuel Davhula was shot in a case of mistaken identity. The wound to his shoulder resulted in a permanent physical disability. He described his anguish at the Venda hearing:

I hope that everyone who is here is able to realise that the government really did malicious damage to me because I can’t even wash myself. People have to bath me. But in the past, I used to bath myself. This is painful.

At the first East London hearing, Mr Karl Webber told the Commission:

I lost my left arm. It was amputated at the elbow, below the elbow. I’ve got 80 per cent use of my right arm plus three fingers are not in operation. It took me plus/minus a year to teach myself how to get dressed, to feed myself. There are things I can’t do. I can’t get to the right hand side of my face because of the fixtures in my elbow. I need assistance when I need to be shaved. I need assistance when I need to be bathed. And there are many other things that I need to be helped with which I can’t do. I’ve tried to sort of cope on my own, but it’s a bit difficult. So, there is someone that assists me, helping me with things.

I can’t accept charity for the rest of my life. I can’t accept to be looked after for the rest of my life. I want to be independent, and I want to lead a normal life again.

Random shootings by the police into demonstrating or fleeing crowds resulted in many physical injuries. A number of victims who came to the Commission were blinded in such shootings. When Ms Sibonisile Maloma was a fifteen-year-old student in Nelspruit, she was shot by the police while returning home from a school boycott:
We took different directions to go home. And when we approached the corner I saw a Hippo\textsuperscript{17} and a gun was pointed at me, they shot me with this pellet gun, and I was unconscious.

68 Ms Maloma was blinded as a result of this attack and had to halt her education. According to her father:

Today my daughter doesn't see. She has lost everything, her future as well.

69 Such incidents were echoed in many statements made to the Commission. Ms Amina Elizabeth van Dyk told the Commission at the Pollsmoor hearing that she had been shot with birdshot by the police in 1985:

I lost my one eye and it bothers me because I get these sharp pains in my eye. I get migraines and then sometimes I want nothing to do with my children because of the pain. This has caused me to lose my job, my house and my medical aid benefits and I have got absolutely no income.

70 There is also evidence that people exposed to trauma, even indirectly, are more likely to develop stress-related illnesses such as heart disease and high blood pressure. Ms Daseko's son Sam was a student activist who died in detention in 1990. She described the effects of his death on her own health at the Bloemfontein hearing:

There is a lot of difference because, at times, I would feel my heart shaking and sometimes - so many things have changed in my life. I get terrible headaches at times.

71 In 1989, Mr Modise Elias Moiloa's brother was killed in an attack by members of an organisation called Dikwankwetla. He told the Commission at the Bloemfontein hearing that his parents manifested physical symptoms of the stress:

My mother and father, after the death of my elder brother, both of them suffered from high blood. They are still very sick.

72 Thus, physical injuries have multiple effects, not only on the individual but also on the family and community as a whole. Physical injuries and disabilities cause or exacerbate psychological, economic and social problems, substantially altering the lives of victims and those around them.

\textsuperscript{17} A hippo is an armoured personnel carrier.
Disruptions to Family Life

In 1984, Mr Anton Lubowski became a publicly declared member of the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO). This marked the beginning of a road that led to tragedy, pain and suffering, not only for him but also for his wife, his children and his loved ones. At the Heideveld hearing, his mother, Ms Molly Lubowski, said he became a social outcast and was treated as if he had some kind of contagious disease. Mr Anton Lubowski was assassinated on the 12 September 1989.

As a core structure in society, the family should be protected and supported by the state. Apartheid generated a crisis in South African family life. Group areas legislation and forced removals have both been linked to disruptions in healthy family functioning, and the migrant labour system also deprived people of family life. Children were denied fatherly guidance and support during their formative years and the fact that women were obliged to take on domestic work meant that children were denied the care of their mothers. In trying to deal with these problems, extended family networks came into play.

The pressure on families was relentless. They experienced poverty and the degradation of living conditions in the townships, rural areas and informal settlements. Malnutrition was rife. Migrant labour policies meant that many fathers were away from their children for long periods and, perhaps more seriously in a patriarchal society, separated mothers from their children for long stretches. Even those parents who were able to live with their children worked long hours, sometimes leaving before the children went to school and coming home after they were in bed. In many cases, a traumatised child was simply an extra burden on the family; yet another problem for his or her already overburdened parents.

In South Africa, the roots of violence were partly political, but were also exacerbated by demographic and socio-economic circumstances. Socio-political factors, such as the structural, economic, cultural and racial inequalities imposed by the former state, led to and exacerbated violence: According to McKendrick and Hoffman (1990):

18 Presentation by Ann McKay at the hearing on children and youth, Durban 12 June 1997.
The objective conditions of inequality make it clear that South Africa is a highly stratified society, characterised by intense structural and institutional injustice and violence.

77 Constant exposure to violence may lead to desensitisation, a situation where a person may deny his or her feelings. Responding to conflict with violence became a typical, rather than an isolated, phenomenon. Violence in South African society is also reflected in domestic violence such as wife and child abuse.

78 The particularly grim situation in KwaZulu-Natal was described by Ms Nosimelo Zama at the Durban hearings on children and youth.

The stress on family life created by the constant pressure of the violence in this province cannot be underestimated. Children of depressed mothers would end up running away from home, because at home they are being neglected because their mothers are too depressed and sad to take care of them. Parents were separated in the violence; others were taken by the police and, up until today, they have never come back home. Children are now living with grandparents or sisters, and these people who are caregivers are facing problems because they can’t provide all the needs for these children.

79 The social pressures caused by apartheid and the repression associated with it have resulted in changes to the family structure in South Africa. Some families have been unable to withstand the pressure, whilst others have harnessed support and nurture from extended family networks to ensure their survival.

Invasion of homes

80 The invasion of homes by the police and security forces in house-to-house searches affected families badly. Homes were neither private nor secure and parents were unable to protect their children.

81 The police displayed flagrant disrespect for homes and families in their quest to suppress opposition. Ms Edith Mjobo, whose children were activists in 1985, described the regular invasion of her home at the Gugulethu hearing:

In 1985, the police were after my twins, Zandisele and Zanisele. They were looking all over for them. They would come to my home looking for them and they would be all around the house searching for them, and they would keep the doors with their guns, and my twins would go out of the backdoor and run.
The police had a sense of their own omnipotence and sometimes even seemed to view other people’s homes as their own territory. Ms Mjobo told the Commission:

Sometimes they used to come in the morning and they stayed in the house for the whole day ... and my husband couldn’t even go to work because of this.

Even families where activists had gone into exile were not free from harassment by the security forces. Mr Leon Meyer was an MK activist who was killed in Lesotho in a South African Defence Force (SADF) cross-border raid in 1985. At the Mdantsane hearing, his brother, Mr Christian Meyer, told the Commission about the harassment his family endured before Leon’s death:

He was definitely regarded as an enemy to the apartheid regime. My late parents’ house was frequently visited and on some occasions searched by the East London Security Branch policemen.

After Leon’s exile, “the harassment of my parents, who were both suffering from cancer at the time took on a new dimension”. In 1985, Christian’s mother passed away. Five months later, his brother and sister-in-law were assassinated during the raid in Lesotho.

Vigilante attacks also affected entire families. Many of these attacks were conducted in and on people’s homes. Mr Modisi Elias Moyhilwa (see above) testified:

On that very same night, they attacked my aunt’s home and my brother was there. When they were asked what the problem was, they said they were looking for comrades. My aunt never wanted to open the door; she refused. Thereafter they kicked the door. They bored holes into the door. It was no longer a door... when my brother came out, they chopped his head with a panga.

Arrest of family members

Detentions and restrictions had devastating effects on families, communities and society at large. The effects of detention are extremely dehumanising as the detainee becomes powerless and his or her life is no longer predictable. Detention separates the individual from family, friends, comrades and colleagues. A general sense of impotence and low self-esteem may result. Added to these stresses are fears and worries about the welfare and safety of family and friends. Mr

---

20 A large, broad-bladed knife, used for cutting cane.
Tshabalala’s cousin, Edward Viyu Charles, was a United Democratic Front (UDF) activist in Welkom. He was constantly harassed and, in 1987, was killed by the police. At the Bloemfontein hearing, Mr Tshabalala described how the entire family was threatened:

They were people who kept on harassing him. Those were the law people. They were using death threats and they threatened that they would wipe the whole family out.

87 In this repressive context, people lost their individuality in the eyes of the security forces, who saw them simply as symbols of resistance or political affiliation. Family members were regularly detained in order to extract information about the whereabouts of wanted persons, as an enticement for wanted persons to come forward or confess or to provide an example to other possible dissenters. Three of Ms Edith Mjobo’s (see above) sons were activists in the Cape in 1985:

As they were looking for my son, they used to arrest my husband. And they used to cover his face with black plastic bags, asking him where my twin [son] was. They were torturing him all the time and they were torturing his genitals. And he became sick because of this. He couldn’t continue working. So, he was not working at this time. One day when I looked at him, his ears were bleeding and he suffered a lot until he died.

88 Mr Trayishile Samuel Zwelibanzi was arrested by the Ciskei police in 1984, in connection with the murder of a police officer. After two years of torture, they arrested his mother, at which stage he finally confessed to the killing. At the Mdantsane hearing, Mr Zwelibanzi described his experience:

They said that they are going to destroy my family members because they ... said they are not going to allow terrorists in this area. They went to fetch my mother. Baleni took me from the prison cell to show me my mother. My mother was in that cell. She was naked. There was blood all over that prison cell. I then admitted to the killing.

89 Mr Zwelibanzi’s sister, Ms Nosisi Florence Giya, spoke of the ripple effects of his arrest on the family:

What my brother has already said is that we suffered a lot. My mother was arrested. My mother was staying with my daughter and my brother’s girl-
friend. The girlfriend was pregnant at the time. A child came to the house saying that the police have arrested my mother. This child had also been assaulted by the police. The child was injured. Again the police came and they took my son, Amos Giya. They assaulted him. As a result of this, he ... is mentally disturbed.

90 The search for children who had been arrested also placed a heavy burden on mothers and other family members, who often went from one police station to another at great emotional cost.

The effect on the mothers was devastating. The feeling of impotence was regarded as a failure on their part to protect their child and most certainly affected inter-generational relationships of dependence, trust and security.\textsuperscript{21}

91 Upon their release, many already stressed individuals were freed into a stressed society. Others faced the additional burden of restrictions - including house arrest, being prohibited from participating in the activities of organisations and being prevented from attending meetings. Restrictions made recovery from detention more difficult, as the individual had to deal with the after-effects of detention, as well as the effects of the restrictions. Social networks suffered and the isolation of the restricted person continued outside the cell. Many victims came from families that were already under financial pressure and whose economic welfare had been affected by the detention of one of its members. Moreover, the costs of transport to and from the police station in order to report in accordance with the restriction order added to other demands on the family budget. Restriction orders also made it difficult to obtain employment or to continue with schooling or studies.

Separation of families

92 Arrests, detentions, abductions, restrictions and exile of family members affected the cohesion of families, with negative effects on family relationships. Ms Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge’s political activism began in the 1970s when she became an organiser and chairperson of the Natal Organisation of Women. At the Durban hearing, she told the Commission that: “like many women who joined the struggle against apartheid, I was harassed by the police and detained a number of times.” She described the disruptions this caused to her family and the impact on her children:

\textsuperscript{21} Audrey Coleman of the Detainees Parents Support Committee, 12 June 1997.
My first child is now fourteen; [he] grew up before his time. At two years of age, he saw his father detained, tried and sentenced to a prison term of ten years. Although he has grown up to [be] a gentle young man, at that tender age he had learnt to hate. When I took him to visit his father at Johannesburg maximum security prison, he shocked me one day when he said, “Mama I hate the police”. He said, “I hate them because they locked up my father”. He was five years old when I was detained myself and taken away from him. My mother tells me that during that time he used to complain of pain, physical pain, for which there was no physical explanation.

Separations in families often altered family relations, especially if the detained person was a parent. Sometimes other family members took over the role of head of the family or breadwinner and did not wish to relinquish this status when the detainee was released. Very young children sometimes regarded released family members as strangers. Adaptation could be difficult if the released person was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.\(^{22}\)

**Sowing distrust in the community**

A part of the state strategy in suppressing communities was to undermine the unity of resistance through a system of informers (both real and alleged). This was highly effective in creating a climate of suspicion and breaking down trust both within and between families and communities. Ms Edith Mjobo (see above) told the Commission that:

They [the police] used to come to try and bribe the person, the people in the township, because they told the people in the township that my son was a ‘terrorist’ and if someone could come and tell the police where he was, they would get money.

The consequences of being exposed as an informer were social isolation and, sometimes, physical danger. Communities were constantly on guard against informers in their midst. Moreover, being falsely accused could have extremely distressing consequences for the affected person and his or her family. Mr Simon Lufuno Mariba was arrested and tortured on suspicion of participating in a witch burning in Venda. After being severely beaten, he finally convinced the police of his innocence and was released. His early release sparked suspicion in the community. He told the Commission at the Venda hearing:

---

\(^{22}\) Human Rights Commission, ‘Violence in Detention’ in People and Violence in South Africa, Oxford University Press, 1990
The parents of the people who were involved, since I didn’t know their names, thought maybe I was there when such activities [took place] and regarded me as a spy - and I was labelled as a spy. And I was unaccepted; people never wanted to accept me ... I couldn’t even concentrate on my studies since everybody was hating me and that really affected me so much that I never passed my matric.

**Inter-family conflicts**

96 Conflicts that arose because of the apartheid system led to tension within some families, sometimes spilling over into violence. At the Pietermaritzburg hearing (19 November 1996), Father Timothy Smith told the Commission that Mr David Ntombela, a feared induna (headman) in the Pietermaritzburg area, is alleged to have killed his own brother in full view of members of the community.

97 Ms Ndamase described how she left home to go to Durban in search of a job and joined the forces against apartheid. When she returned home in 1991 with the intention of launching a branch of the South African Communist Party (SACP) in her village, she was arrested. She described the consequences at the Lusikisiki hearing:

My children are uneducated; I abused them by joining the struggle. But today I don’t see anything happening to me. There was conflict in my family because of all of this. The government is doing nothing for me.

98 Politics entered the Phillips family home because of divisions between the ANC and IFP. Mr Moses Ntsokolo Phillips, an ANC member, was hit in the face with the butt of a gun by his cousin, an IFP member. He was then taken to the home of his uncle who was also an IFP member and further assaulted.

99 Other family conflicts were intergenerational. Parents did not support their children’s activism because they feared for their lives. Often, too, they were concerned about disruptions to their children’s education. Misunderstandings and conflicting interests strained intergenerational relationships. Mr David Ryder Mabeka was a youth activist in Barkly West in 1986. At the Kimberley hearing, he spoke about the tensions between some of the politically active students and their parents:

I realised that many parents at that time thought that I ... didn’t want to go to school. And they thought that I would take their children out of school.
There were lots and lots of allegations from the parents. I think it's because they didn't understand quite well the political situation at that time.

Intergenerational conflicts also occurred in white families involved in defending the apartheid status quo. Mr John Deegan, a South African Police (SAP) Security Branch conscript and later a member of Koevoet, described his attempts to communicate his traumatic experiences to his more conservative father:

Although I tried to tell him that there were incidents that I was involved in that caused me great guilt and remorse, he would not believe that his son could have been involved in anything so dishonourable.23

Emerging young leaders challenged traditional patriarchal hierarchies and elders increasingly lost control over the activities of younger people. Mr Morgan Sabatha Phehlani was a councillor whose home and business were burnt down by youth in intra-community conflict in 1991. In his view:

That's the trouble that we are having in the smaller towns, you know, that you find these youngsters - they call themselves ... young leaders; they are leading a section. But looking at them, you find they are so terrible; they are hooligans; they are undisciplined.

The emotional and financial pressure experienced by families sometimes led to strained relations with young activists in the home. Detention and political activism gave some young detainees a sense of independence and autonomy, and they found themselves unable to revert to their earlier roles in the family. Others felt that their families would not understand what they were doing or why, and wanted to protect them from the knowledge of their activism. The reality that parents often did not know what their children were doing was reflected time and again during hearings and in statements. At the Bloemfontein hearing, Ms Pumla Marina Mashoang, whose son was killed by the security forces for his role in the South African National Students Congress (SANSCO) in 1988, said she was not clear about her son's role:

I believe he was holding a prominent position because he had a van that he had been given, so I think he was organising for the Free State.

23 Interview with Marius Van Niekerk, part of submission to the Commission.
At the same hearing, Ms Daseko, whose son was killed in detention, also said she was not acquainted with her child’s activities outside of the home:

Sam used to tell me that he was going to meetings, but I couldn’t understand ... which meetings was he going to. I think [he] was fond of the ANC.

Ms Evelyn Masego Thunyiswa was detained and severely tortured. At the Mmabatho hearing, she told the Commission that, despite her suffering, she was unable to tell her parents of her predicament:

Our parents used to hate politics during that time. My mother was actually not in favour of politics. If you said anything about politics, she would tell you that you are against the law.

Owing to her inability to communicate with or draw support from her parents, the only person Evelyn confided in was her husband:

This has been my secret for quite a long time and I am glad that the Truth Commission is here and I am now talking this out. It is only my husband who knows this whole story.

When asked at the Nelspruit hearing whether his son was a member of an organisation, Mr Madala Ndlazi (see above) replied:

There is nothing that I can say because really they don’t tell you. They just disappear from home. You don’t know what they are doing on the other side.

Thus, in many families, even where activism did not generate outright conflict, a shroud of secrecy often affected intergenerational relationships. In some families, political activism was seen as operating in a sphere outside of family life. This was sometimes linked with parents’ feelings of helplessness about the public realm of politics. This lack of communication was aggravated by disruptions to family life, caused by the absence of parents who worked as migrant labourers, domestic workers, or because group areas legislation and other apartheid laws prevented them from living with their families.
Family killings

108 In some families more than one family member died, with tremendous implications for the survivors. The Manyika family was awakened on the night of the 17 June 1992 by a vigilante attack in Sebokeng. Although the children managed to escape, both parents were killed:

We have lost our parents. As I’m talking, we are only the kids at home. My sisters and my brothers, especially the two boys, had to quit school because there was no breadwinner at home. We had to go and look for some jobs.

109 Their survival became a terrible struggle:

The ones who were still going to school were four. One of them was Mavis but she has completed standard ten. The other one is Anna, she’s in standard ten and Elizabeth, she’s in standard four and Godfrey, he’s in standard three. And Godfrey hardly ever passes at school. Especially after this event he’s not performing well at school.

110 Also in Sebokeng, Mr Ernst Sotsu spoke of a triple family killing. After surviving years in the underground, Sotsu finally settled in the Vaal area and joined the Vaal Civic Association which was vehemently opposed to black councillors. When the IFP emerged on the political scene, the conflict escalated. He and his wife were both intimidated by the police and the IFP:

On the 3 July 1991, whilst attending an African National Congress meeting in Durban, my family was attacked. My wife Constance, my daughter Margaret and grandson Sabatha were shot dead with AK47’s at close range ... Two of my grandchildren, Vuyani and Vusi narrowly escaped death but were seriously injured with bullet wounds.

111 This attack affected the entire family, resulting in the deaths of family members across three generations.

The burden of death

112 The death of family members has many negative consequences. The effects of the loss are exacerbated by the responsibility of having to inform other family members of the loss as well as by the financial burden of funeral expenses. At
the Heideveld hearing, Mr Kama described the anguish of his family after the police killed his brother-in-law:

> Who would contribute to his funeral, where would his funeral be held and how would we take the body home? ... And even then, we were still left with the burden of informing the mother plus the burden of knowing what to do with the body.

113 The low value many police officers placed on black people’s lives was evident in the death of Ms Nobeki Mbalula, who was shot and killed in a random police shooting in Cradock. When the family confronted the police and told them that they had shot a woman who was breast feeding a baby, the police response was, “the corpse can breast feed the baby.”

114 After killing Nobeki, the police continued to harass the family.

> On the Monday, they came to the house. They kicked down the door; they ate food; they took food from the fridge and ate.

115 The death led to additional burdens on the extended family.

> I had this baby to look after. Because I had no help, I had to take these children to my sister-in-law’s ex-husband.

116 The distress caused by the death of a family member was, in some cases, exacerbated by a sense of betrayal by trusted forces, such as the liberation movements. At the hearing on prisons, Mr Joseph Seremane gave testimony about the execution of his brother, Chief Timothy, in the ANC camp known as Quatro.

> I come here on behalf of my family. I come here to express my feeling of betrayal by compatriots and comrades. I come here to express our disappointment and the way we feel cheated of a dear little brother, a promising young man, a brilliant young man.

117 For other families, the pain of the loss of a loved one was perpetuated because the opportunity for appropriate rituals for grieving was denied. Mr Tshabalalala (see above) described the indignity suffered after his cousin’s death. “Amongst all other things when he was being buried, he was buried by the police. I believe they just buried him like a dog or a puppy.”
In other cases, uncertainty about the fact of death itself - as where victims simply disappeared - led to long-term psychological and practical problems. Ms Susan van der Merwe's husband disappeared on 1 November 1978. It was established much later that he had been murdered by a group of MK soldiers, to whom he had offered a lift.

The uncertainty and the utter feeling of helplessness that was caused by the disappearance of my husband was probably worse than receiving news of his death, one time. If I could put it this way, it would have been better for me just to hear that he had an accident with a gun or he had a car accident. It would have been better for me to digest the news. But the fact that there was no body even to bury led to the fact that there was no official evidence of his death.

This led to me not being able to conduct financial transactions such as buying a house. The Transvaal Education Department, which I was working for, and the financial institutions did not regard me as a breadwinner as such. My whole life was then an uncertainty ...

My story ... is but a story of a woman who could not bury her husband because there was no corpse.

Many who were able to bury their family members had the funeral terms dictated by those who had killed them. Ms Tony Lillian Mazwai's son died in 1988 while he was in exile. She described the atmosphere at his funeral.

I was informed that my son was a well-trained guerrilla and that the people who attend the funeral have to be limited to 200 in number ... They insisted there should be no speeches, no freedom songs, nothing. It was like a war. It seemed as if it was a battle. There's a big gate next to Josa. There was a convoy, police, soldiers, hippos, everybody.

The lack of respect for traditional rituals around death caused many people a great deal of pain. Not only were funerals disrupted, graves were also not respected. At the Nelspruit hearing, Mr Mtsorombane Carlson Ngwenyama described events that took place in 1964 when his community was being forcibly removed:

In 1964, the message came to us that the graves were to be exhumed. The owners of these graves were not even informed ... As I am a parent today, I
am having twelve children but they don’t know the grave of my mother ... As blacks this is a problem to us because it is our tradition that they must know; they must worship their elders.

121 Thus, there was a lack of respect not only for the living but also for the dead, with repercussions for generations to come.

**Economic consequences**

122 Loss of social or occupational status and abilities because of prolonged imprisonment, physical disability or psychological problems may result in difficulties in finding employment and thus contribute to social and economic hardships.

123 Father Michael Lapsley (see above) discussed the difficulties he experienced trying to resume his work after his return from hospital:

> I returned to Zimbabwe to joblessness in that the Bishop who was supposed to employ me had said, ‘well you’re disabled now, what can you do?’

124 Mr Lebitsa Solomon Ramokhoase was shot in the 1960 massacre at Sharpville. The injuries he sustained resulted in chronic pains which impinged on his ability to retain employment.

> When I was now working, I wouldn’t stay a long period in the employment. I would tell them my problem and they would say, if we knew before we would never employ you. And I realised that I have to pack my clothes now; there is nothing I live on. I have to go out and go and seek for another employment. But every time I got a new employment I wouldn’t tell them that I was shot but as soon as they discover that I had been shot, they let me go. And every time I would lose my job. Now this leg was really destroying my future. My children were starving.

125 Psychological problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder and depression, may cause significant social upheaval and undermine chances of finding employment. Memory and concentration difficulties may reduce the capacity for learning and impair work performance. Avoidance of feared situations may cause work, social and family dysfunction. Another factor affecting earning ability is the tendency to develop physical symptoms and a preoccupation with bodily complaints.
126 Disability and illness affect the ability to work. People lose time and become ineffective at work, at school and in the household. Thus, illness causes undeniable loss to individuals, families, communities and the entire society. \(^{24}\) Figures from the Commission's database revealed immense economic loss due to the perpetration of gross human rights violations. Twenty-nine per cent of deponents who made statements to the Commission reported a loss of income as a direct result of their violation. Fifty-four per cent of those who coped through the assistance of family members and friends also reported a loss of income because of the violation. These factors placed an additional burden on the extended family.

127 Economic hardships can cause disruptions in relationships. Fifty-one per cent of those who reported problems in their relationships also identified loss of income because of their violations. Moreover, financial losses are not confined to one generation, a fact reflected in 51 per cent of statements which demonstrated a disruption to education and a loss of income.

128 Ms Mpehelo’s husband was shot by unknown assailants during political conflict in the Eastern Cape. At the first East London hearing, she described the consequences for her family:

> After my husband’s death, many things befell me, one after the other. I never enjoyed life anymore. As I’m sitting here, I’m asking the Commission, my children want to learn. I have an elder son, he was at technikon in Port Elizabeth, and he was forced to stop studying. You know even now the lawyers are running after me to get money that was left behind.

129 Ms Koloti’s son died in exile in Tanzania in 1990. At the East London hearing, she described the consequences for her family:

> We, as the parents of those who did not come back due to different reasons, are affected because the children who came back are supporting their families. If my child was here in 1986, he promised to do certain things for me and our home. But unfortunately now he passed away and I don’t know who is going to fulfil his promises to me.

130 Mr Willem Petrus de Klerk, whose wife Annetjie de Klerk was a victim of the MK ‘Volkskas siege’ in Pretoria on 25 January 1980, described the emotional and financial impact of his wife’s death on the family at the Pretoria hearing:

My children were denied the love of a mother and I, of course, had to raise them. Financially I suffered as my wife’s salary was no longer there, which meant that, after completing my police duties at night, I would have to take other tasks in order to look after my children. In the meantime, my three children were left alone at home without a mother and father and, as a result of that, even today, even though I am a pensioner now, I am still forced to do other work in order to supplement my income.

131 Other largely unmeasured costs included the value of time contributed by family members to caring for sick relatives. Many had to leave the labour market to care for family members. Others had to enter the labour market to pay for health costs. These added to the stresses on the family. Of those who reported that they were attempting to cope financially by doing odd jobs such as hawking or with the assistance of a pension or disability grant, 47 per cent also reported symptoms of anxiety, depression and difficulty in coping.

Family violence

132 Domestic violence is associated with social strain and disintegration and often with a weakening or disruption of traditional norms governing interpersonal behaviour in families. Studies demonstrate that war experiences or prolonged detention may result in problems in marital relationships. This may be due to the direct effects of trauma-coping behaviour, the inability of trauma survivors to function in expected family and social roles, and/or conflicts associated with changes in gender and family roles resulting from prolonged detention or migration. Family disintegration, such as the death of a parent or parent-in-law, also means the removal of those who would traditionally have mediated such conflict.25

133 The effects of exposure to trauma have been linked to domestic violence in the home. At the Venda hearing, Mr Abel Tsakani Maboya alluded to domestic violence by an activist. His cousin, who was in the underground movement in Tanzania and had endured numerous detentions, committed suicide after a dispute with his wife.

He used to quarrel with his wife every time, that is the information that I got … I don’t know what made him to fight with his wife, maybe it comes from what he experienced from jail or some other things.

Mr John Deegan described the problems he experienced in taking up his role in the family after returning from service on the Namibian border in the early 1980s:

I had a lot of anger and I couldn’t relate to people in the RSA at home any more ... I just burst out into rages with my family and with my fiancée ... [I] started to do weird stuff like that.\(^{26}\)

THE CONSEQUENCES OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON COMMUNITIES

Apartheid's racial and ethnic-based social engineering resulted in both the construction and destruction of communities. Legislation such as the Group Areas Act, the Land Act and influx control laws were all attempts to define and regulate communities. Apartheid created communities that were racially, linguistically and ethnically determined. Resources for the development of these state-defined communities were differentially allocated resulting in the deprivation, particularly, of African communities. These racial categories were adopted by communities themselves, resulting in generally understood divisions between white, African, Indian and coloured groups.

Clearly, differences of various kinds existed within these groups. However, in the period under the focus of the Commission, some of these internal differences were masked. The white community generally shared a common sense of defending and maintaining the status quo while the black community united in a common resistance to their oppression. The state therefore viewed communities as homogeneous and polarised entities.

From the mid-1980s, intra- and inter-community violence began to emerge and differences between communities along class, ethnic, linguistic and political lines led increasingly to violence. The security forces manipulated these differences through the recruitment and collaboration of vigilantes, which generally represented the more conservative elements in black communities.

Black communities

In 1960, the year that marks the starting point of the Commission’s mandate, the state embarked on the rigid enforcement of apartheid legislation, in particular the Group Areas Act. It was an era characterised by mass forced removals and the

\(^{26}\) Interview with Marius Van Niekerk, part of submission to the Commission.
consequent dislocation of communities. Resistance to forced removals generated fierce conflicts which resulted in grave human rights abuses as the state violently enforced its policies.

139 The townships and residential areas constructed in this period were grossly underserviced. Many were without basic services such as water, electricity, adequate housing, roads, schools and clinics. Lack of services and appalling living conditions generated tensions that laid the ground for much of the conflict that was generated in South Africa’s contemporary history. From rural farming areas to homeland settlements to urban townships, living conditions and economic deprivation provided fertile ground for conflict. The battle for national liberation and civil and political rights cannot, therefore, be separated from countless localised battles rooted in socio-economic deprivation.

140 Many communities mobilised around issues relating to poor living conditions such as inadequate housing, water, infrastructure and the lack of services. The death of three Robertson residents in 1990 bears testimony to the kinds of violations experienced as a result of such protest by communities. At the funeral of these young men, a pamphlet was produced and circulated. It read:

Their death is due to police action before, during and subsequent to community protests against those unacceptable living conditions in the community despite several efforts and memorandums from the community to the local Municipal authorities to improve these conditions.27

141 At the Mmabatho hearing, Ms Florence Madodi Nkosi told the Commission why her activism was rooted in community issues:

We wished that Huhudi could undergo changes, because at that time we were using bucket systems for the toilets and people were forced to go to Pudumo and didn’t also want to go to Pudumo.

142 Community mobilisation influenced the state’s view of entire communities as homogeneous entities. This often resulted in the arrest, detention, torture or killing of individuals who were seen as symbols of the resistance. Thus, according to the construction of communities as ‘us’ and ‘them’, and articulated in the South African context in racial terms, the white state constructed black South Africans as the enemy. Mr Anderson Lizo, a youth from Upington, was a victim of this indiscriminate persecution. In 1985, while waiting for friends after a rugby game

27 Testimony by Sarahline Joseph, Commission hearing in the Boland, 26 June 1996
at school, he was picked up by the Commanding Officer of Upington, known as the Rooi Majoor (Red Major). It was assumed that he had information on the organisers of resistance in the local township, Paballelo. Although only fifteen years of age at the time, he was repeatedly thrown off a high bridge into a river in an attempt to elicit information.

143 Such attacks by the police and security forces undermined the dignity and sense of security of communities. Testimonies of random shootings and arrests dominated hearings. Victims of these violations included women, children, elderly people and residents of communities going about their daily business. Pastor Dyantyi told the Commission at the Oudtshoorn post-hearing workshop that:

You would see a Jeep from the police launching teargas all over the township. As you can imagine, the township is so clustered - this teargas would be blown all over the township.

144 Police and defence force violence wreaked havoc in communities and destroyed the natural flow of life, evidenced by the fact that young people commonly died before their parents or grandparents. The killing of Ms Anna Maria Sam’s grandchild was one such case. At the Upington hearing, Ms Sam told the Commission that Ms Beulin Isaacs was fifteen years old and about to give birth to her first child when she was shot dead. She had been buying milk for her grandmother, Thus, in some communities, daily activities such as buying bread or visiting friends meant risking one’s life. The situation was exacerbated when police turned community rituals of grieving (after incidents caused by police violence) into further traumatic incidents. Police harassment at funerals and denying families the right to see the bodies of their loved ones were common. Ms Xoliswa Stella Lumkwana said at the Upington hearing that, after the police shot her brother:

they decide when to bury him and where and as to how must he be buried and yet they are the ones who were wrongdoers.

145 Funerals became both a symbol of the effects of the repression and an opportunity for mobilisation. Consequently, the state sent police to monitor and disrupt many funerals, perpetuating the cycle of violence. More killings occurred at funerals, and then there were more funerals. This was a particularly brutal manifestation of the South African conflict, especially in the light of the importance of funeral rituals in the black community.
The sense of powerlessness experienced by communities was increased by the culture of impunity within which the police and security forces operated. Ms Anna Sam described how the Commanding Officer of Upington, Rooi Majoor, “could go into your house and shoot somebody but nobody could stop him” 28. This perception of omnipotence was used by the state to undermine communities and discourage resistance and counter-mobilisation. Indiscriminate victimisation was intended to serve as a warning of the dangers of dissent.

Persistent poverty, economic hardship and unemployment, together with various forms of torture, made it possible for the state to manipulate communities through the recruitment of informers and collaborators. This manipulation exploited existing inter-community rivalry - including rural/urban divides and conservatives who feared progressives - and was usually articulated through intergenerational conflicts which pitted ‘fathers’ against the ‘comrades’. The exploitation of these divisions lay at the heart of the destabilisation strategy adopted by the state in the late 1980s.

**Inter and intra-community violence**

By the 1980s, international pressures and local resistance forced the state to adopt alternatives to brute force. However, the introduction of reforms was accompanied by a destabilisation strategy that relied on collusion between elements within black communities which were beneficiaries of the status quo and elements within the state. According to Jacklyn Cock:

> The reliance on vigilantes as a disorganising force represents a shift away from a reliance on the SADF and SAP to suppress black resistance. It is crucial to appreciate that this shift is part of a military strategy. 29

From the late 1980s, vigilantism and inter-community violence became a feature in many communities.

Destabilisation was adopted as a tactic on both sides of the conflict. In communities around the country, people mobilised around the slogan ‘Forward to People’s Power’. Forms of opposition included the removal of illegitimate authorities and included strategies for destabilising the government at all levels. The call to make the townships ungovernable was heeded by activists who attempted to mobilise

---

28 ‘The Mental Health Consequences of Torture and Related violence and Trauma,’ National Institute of Mental Health, March 1998

communities and replace what were described as ‘illegitimate’ structures with block committees, street committees, self defence units and people’s courts.

151 Community councillors became the fated symbols of the spiralling social problems within communities. Overcrowding, inadequate housing, limited sewerage and water facilities coupled with unemployment, poor education facilities and a host of other problems were aggravated by the provocative rise in service charges and rentals. Mr Mkiwane, a former councillor in Sebokeng, aptly described the mood of the day when he said, “their cup of dissatisfaction was full to the brim.”

152 Councillors were perceived as collaborating with the state and came to be seen as symbols of oppression and exploitation. This was one of the premises upon which so-called ‘black on black’ violence was founded. Community councillors came to be seen as the ‘faces’ of the system, thereby reducing the visibility of the state in the conflict.

153 At the Sebokeng post-hearing workshop, Mr Mkiwane described conditions in Sebokeng in 1984:

> All hell broke out. Property was destroyed, houses were burned and belongings were either destroyed by fire or carried away by the very same people who elected us. Some of our colleagues who were found at home were brutally killed.

154 For councillors, the consequence was banishment from their communities. Those who left their posts found it difficult to find subsequent employment and many were unable to return to their previous homes for fear for their lives. Mr Maseko, a former councillor from Wesselton, was forced out of his community. At the Sebokeng post-hearing workshop, he said:

> As a result, I still do fear for my life and I feel that I no longer have the dignity that I had at that time ... I still have this problem of not trusting my community.

155 There were also consequences for councillors’ wives and children. At the Worcester hearing, Mr Malinge Zweni, the son of a councillor who was killed in Ashton in 1986, described the community hostility his family faced.

> We were called impimpis [spies]; we were called informers by the community. Children would throw stones and children would persecute us in the street.
He contemplated leaving Ashton because, “I had no friends and they were thinking that I was an informer as well.” Other children of councillors were afraid to go to school. Mr Mkiwane appealed for assistance from the Commission, saying, “we feel that something has to be done to bring us back into the community.”

The Vaal area was particularly badly affected by the destabilisation tactics of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The government sponsored dissident groups in places like Sebokeng, Boipatong and Sharpville. At the Sebokeng post-hearing workshop, Father Photolo commented:

In the broad community, these operations, characterised by mass and indiscriminate killings, became part of everyday life in the community in the Vaal and perpetrators were never brought to court.

Once again, the abnormal became normal as violence, fear and insecurity engulfed communities in South Africa. In the Vaal, from March 1992 to February 1993, about 1 650 murders took place; 2 900 violent confrontations involving weapons other than firearms and 6 700 cases of assault were reported. According to Ms Joyce Seroke, violence was experienced in the form of random IFP/ANC violence in the community, drive-by shootings, third force attacks and train massacres.

Many youth were recruited into vigilante groups, which enjoyed the protection and support of the police. This led to further polarisation of communities. Reverend Khumalo of Ermelo told the Commission how the church attempted to intervene:

There [was] a group of young men who were called the Black Cats. There was a time when it was said they were being protected by the police and they were living at the police station. We went there as a group of pastors and we talked to the policemen of the danger of separating these young men from their community.

In KwaZulu-Natal, inter- and intra-community violence degenerated into near civil war and communities were torn apart. The conflict was characterised by assassinations, attacks on entire families and the burning down of family homes. Thousands of people were forced to flee their homes and took refuge in forests, squatter settlements or with relatives.
161 The aftermath of the ‘Seven Days War’ conflict, when IFP impis attacked the non-IFP areas of Elandskop in Pietermaritzburg, was described by Father Smith at the Pietermaritzburg hearing:

Even today, you can see the aftermath of the violence that took place in 1990. The houses, the shops were burnt down. The schools were also burnt down. You will see the place where a number of people were staying, and they are no longer there at this present moment.

162 According to Mr Mbanjwa, a resident of Elandskop at the time: “that is the thing that killed the community, that people were forced to join Inkatha”.

163 The consequence has been the shattering and dislocation of communities. Many people are still unable to return home due to the destruction of their houses and fear of continued violence. Suspicion, mistrust, anger and revenge lingered after the overt conflict subsided.

164 The manifestations of intra-community violence through attacks on and in homes resulted in many people being left homeless. Lifetime investments in homes and material goods were lost in the conflict. Of those who reported violations because of intra-community violence, 43 per cent reported that they were homeless as a result. Of these, 36 per cent spoke of disruptions to their own or their children’s education. A further 42 per cent of those who were displaced reported that their forced relocation was a result of intra-community violence, and 59 per cent of those displaced reported psychological problems of anxiety, depression and difficulties in coping. Thus, homelessness and displacement have multiple consequences. Homelessness in KwaZulu-Natal affected three times as many people as in any other region and has particular implications for communities in KwaZulu-Natal.

RURAL COMMUNITIES

165 Much of the media and literature on human rights violations and its consequences published to date have focused on the urban areas. The Commission’s human rights violation hearings and post-hearing workshops allowed for a unique insight into opposition, violations and consequences experienced in rural communities. In many ways, these have mirrored events at the national level.
Rural communities have been characterised by stark racial polarisation and unequal power relations. They have been described as the most conservative and the most neglected in South Africa.

Rural areas were subject to the rigid enforcement of apartheid legislation. For example, in Oudtshoorn, from 1961 until the early 1970s, the Group Areas Act resulted in the removal of thousands of coloured and African people from the town. In 1966, a new township called Bongolethu was proclaimed. This allowed for the destruction of Klippies Eiland and the removal of Africans to the new area. As Oudtshoorn fell within the ‘coloured labour preference’ policy area, African people were allowed only limited access to Oudtshoorn. Apartheid was enforced through measures such as forcing the residents of Bridgeton, a neighbouring coloured township, to obtain permits to visit relatives and friends in Bongolethu.

In rural communities, racism and conservatism entrenched vastly unequal social and economic relations. These were entrenched through the awesome power wielded by the small white communities, who were able to control and regulate black lives from the cradle to the grave. People who grew up on farms were often regarded as the farmers’ possessions. Many breadwinners lost their jobs because they became involved in politics and were seen as troublemakers. For farm workers, the loss of a job often threatened homelessness for the entire family. Thus, political activity generated divisions within families, as some attempted to maintain their fragile existence through acquiescence in the oppressive situation and others continued to resist, regardless of the consequences. At the Worcester hearing, Father Michael Weeder said that, when he first arrived in the Boland, he observed this fear of challenging the system.

What I mistook for apathy and submissiveness was just another means of coping, of surviving ... people leading quiet lives of desperation.

He said that resistance against the white community could have repercussions not only for the individual, but also for other family members who risked losing their jobs or ending up in jail.

Resistance did, however, occur. In Oudtshoorn, for example, there was a growth in community organisations between 1973 and 1983. Those in leadership positions were under constant police surveillance, and suffered arrest and harassment. In 1985, open conflict broke out and, on 2 May, SADF troops moved into Bongolethu township. The conflict escalated and anyone associated with the state became a community target.
In 1990, the residents of Ashton embarked on a series of non-violent actions that set in motion an irreversible process of change. According to Father Michael Weeder:

Many months later they emerged bloodied and brutalised but immensely proud ... they knew for themselves that the days of baasskap [white supremacy] were over and they had helped bury it.

Resistance generated pride in oppressed communities which, through their opposition to the system fought, not only for justice, but also to reclaim their dignity.

**Resistance to homeland incorporation**

Rural community opposition was often characterised by complex constellations of state repression, ethnic tensions and resistance to incorporation into ethnically defined homelands. In a submission to the Amnesty Committee at Phokeng, Mr Brian Currin spoke of the resistance of the Baphokeng tribe to incorporation into Bophuthatswana:

Resistance, both organised and spontaneous to the formation and continued existence of the homelands, has long been a feature of South African politics. In Bophuthatswana itself, political struggles were waged by rural communities and political organisations against the issues of forced incorporation.

This conflict was linked with tribal conflicts as non-Tswanas were evicted and persecuted in Bophuthatswana soon after independence.

In rural areas, the nature of reprisals against those who were seen as collaborators differed from that in urban areas, owing to the frequent dominance of traditional leaders. The state and homeland leaders attempted to co-opt supportive leaders and, where this failed, the legitimate chiefs were replaced. This was the case in Baphokeng, where Chief Molokele refused to acknowledge Lucas Mangope’s leadership and suffered harassment and detention as a result. Following Chief Molokele’s exile to Botswana, President Mangope appointed his brother, George Molokele, to the position. The tribe fiercely opposed this. The community continued to mobilise against its incorporation into Bophuthatswana and the illegitimacy of Molokele’s appointment.

Thus, the system of apartheid and the accompanying construction of ethnically defined homelands resulted not only in resistance, but also in the polarisation of
communities. In this instance, those who opposed Mangope's rule were subsequently forced to mobilise against a member of their own community who attempted to capitalise on the repression.

177 The theme of collaboration also emerges in the rural context. This was illustrated by the state's use of kitskonstabels\textsuperscript{30} who, after only six weeks of training, were deployed in communities. They proved to be ill disciplined and a law unto themselves.

178 Vigilantism was also a feature in rural communities. In Zolani in Ashton, the Amasolomzi patrolled the streets as the henchmen of local councillors. Their unregulated activities resulted in many human rights violations. Mr Nthando Mrubata, who testified at the Worcester hearing, was a victim of the Amasolomzi: “It was due to the police and the vigilantes that I am now a cripple.”

179 Intra-community violence extended beyond the activities of the state and vigilante groups to inter-party conflict. Mr Jim Bonakele Yanta, an ANC Youth League member in Upington, spoke of the Upington hearing of conflict between ANC and National Party supporters. This conflict led to displacement as “some of the ANC members who lived in the location had to actually move out of the location, out of the Red Block and they had to come to live in E'Thembeni because they were constantly being threatened.” He alleged police complicity with the NP supporters.

180 The consequences of these conflicts are extremely complex, with spiralling and contradictory implications. It is clear that gross human rights violations have ripple effects that extend beyond the individual into the heart of communities.

\section*{WHITE COMMUNITIES}

181 Apartheid policies resulted in the division of South African communities along racial lines. At a post hearing workshop of the Commission, Mr Tjol Lategan said:

\begin{quote}
Politics beset every fibre of our community, in our schools, in our churches, in our agricultural unions, in our cultural organisations, every bit of the community got politicised and polarised.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{30} Or special constables, nicknamed 'instant' constables because they were incorporated into the police after only a very short training course.
182 Through apartheid, the white community retained political and economic power. The unequal distribution of resources meant that white communities benefited through well-serviced suburbs, accessible education, access to government and other employment opportunities and countless other advantages. Whilst only a minority of white people engaged in the direct perpetration of violence, many gross human rights violations were committed in order to retain these benefits.

183 The mobilisation of members of the white community to uphold the system began when they were still children. The state-owned media presented a distorted view of South Africa. Militarisation of young white males began at school through the system of cadets, which was a training ground for their subsequent conscription. This militarisation has had many negative consequences - not least with regard to the level of violence prevalent in contemporary society.

184 Many perpetrators worked in a context in which the end was seen to justify the means. Attacks on white targets by the liberation movements further strengthened this resolve. Many white communities felt a sense of fear and insecurity, which was legitimised through landmine attacks in the rural areas and other incidents such as the Church Street and Magoo’s Bar bombings.

185 Many who are now seen as perpetrators viewed themselves as defenders of their nation and were, at the time, showered with praises and rewards for achieving their goals. Their actions appeared justified in what they viewed as a war context.

186 Former leaders subsequently distanced themselves from those who were doing the work of the state. As Eugene de Kock said in mitigation of sentence, “One would now believe that I was the only individual who fought the ANC.” Once loyal subjects of the former government expressed the view that their leaders had abandoned them. This has exacerbated fear of the Commission. At a workshop in Ermelo, Dominee Gerhard Barnard described the sentiments in some white communities:

> The people don’t see it as a reconciliation commission but as a punitive commission; somebody has to be punished and this is where our Afrikaners had to take their punishment ... I realised that the fear which arose is not the fear of confessing, but the fear of what is going to happen to the evidence? In what ways will people be punished in the future?
This reflects the fact that different communities have different perceptions of the Commission. Many victims, mainly from black communities, have criticised the Commission for being too soft and accommodating of perpetrators through the provision of amnesty. Perpetrators, on the other hand, appear to view the Commission with fear because of its perceived retributive powers.

The majority of individual white South Africans did not actively engage in the perpetration of gross human rights violations. At the same time, they did not overtly resist the dehumanising system within which these violations took place. Some white South Africans have recognised their bystander complicity. This has generated a sense of guilt, shame or denial. At a post-hearing workshop, Ms Lesley Morgan, a white South African housewife, described these feelings:

There is a sense of complicity, a terrible feeling of failure ... the choices I made in the past to avoid what I perceived in my fear and cowardice as having consequences too dangerous to deal with have resulted in consequences worse than I ever feared.

Fears of an imminent civil war resulted in many white South Africans leaving the country. Emigration, although a voluntary activity, had widespread consequences for families and communities. In some ways, these mirror the experience of exile in that they result in the scattering and dislocation of families. Emigration also had economic consequences for the country, as it was those with skills who were most likely to emigrate.

The absence of white South Africans at the Commission hearings has been disappointing. If true reconciliation is to take place, white communities will have to take responsibility and acknowledge their role as beneficiaries of apartheid. The consequences of this lack of participation are likely to perpetuate the polarisation of South African communities and further obstruct processes of reconciliation.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has tried to assess the effects of thirty-four years of oppression and resistance. It has addressed some of the psychological and physical consequences of gross violations of human rights as reported to the Commission. The Commission heard testimony from a broad range of people, many of whom testified about violations experienced by others. Mothers, sisters, fathers, brothers, relatives and friends came forward to speak of their pain and anguish. Their testimonies spoke
of the ripple effects on families and communities of the system of apartheid and the oppressive manner in which it was implemented.

192 People came to the Commission to tell their stories in an attempt to facilitate, not only their own individual healing processes, but also a healing process for the entire nation. Many of those who chose not to come to the Commission heard versions of their own stories in the experiences of others. In this way, the Commission was able to reach a broader community.
Reparation and Rehabilitation Policy

INTRODUCTION

1 During the period under review, the majority of South Africans were denied their fundamental rights, including the right to vote and the right to access to appropriate education, adequate housing, accessible health care and proper sanitation. Those who opposed apartheid were subjected to various forms of repression. Many organisations and individuals in opposition to the former state were banned and banished, protest marches were dispersed, freedom of speech was curtailed, and thousands were detained and imprisoned. This gave rise to tremendous frustration and anger amongst the disenfranchised. Soon, each act of repression by the state gave rise to a reciprocal act of resistance. The South African conflict spiralled out of control, resulting in horrific acts of violence and human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict. No section of society escaped these acts and abuses.

WHY REPARATION?

2 Victims of human rights abuses have suffered a multiplicity of losses and therefore have the right to reparation. Without adequate reparation and rehabilitation measures, there can be no healing or reconciliation.

3 In addition, in the context of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, reparation is essential to counterbalance amnesty. The granting of amnesty denies victims the right to institute civil claims against perpetrators. The government should thus accept responsibility for reparation.

The legal basis for reparation

4 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (the Act) mandates the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee of the Commission to provide, amongst other things, measures to be taken in order to grant reparation to victims of gross human rights violations (see below).
5 The legal authority for reparation is further entrenched in domestic law by the judgement in the case of the AZAPO and Others v The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (1996(8) BCLR 1015 (CC), in which the applicants sought an order declaring section 20(7) of the Act unconstitutional. Section 20(7) states that a person who has been granted amnesty shall not be criminally or civilly liable in respect of that act. The court held that section 20(7) is not unconstitutional. In arriving at such decision Didcott J held at paragraph 62:

Reparation is usually payable by states, and there is no reason to doubt that the postscript envisages our own state shouldering the national responsibility for those. It therefore does not contemplate that the state will go Scot-free. On the contrary, I believe an actual commitment on the point is implicit in its terms, a commitment in principle to the assumption by the state of the burden.

6 He stated further at paragraph 65:

The Statute does not, it is true, grant any legally enforceable rights in lieu of those lost by claimants whom the amnesties hit. It nevertheless offers some quid pro quo for the loss and establishes the machinery for determining such alternative redress. I cannot see what else it might have achieved immediately once, in the light of the painful choices described by Mohammed DP and in the exercise of the legislative judgement brought to bear on them, the basic decision had been taken to substitute the indeterminate prospect of reparations for the concrete reality of legal claims wherever those were enjoyed. For nothing more definite, detailed and efficacious could feasibly have been promised at that stage, and with no prior investigations, recommendations and decisions of the very sort for which provision is now made.

Review of the Act

7 The Preamble to the Act, stipulates that one of the objectives of the Commission is to provide for:

the taking of measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity, of victims of violations of human rights.

8 Pursuant thereto, section 4(f) states that one of the functions of the Commission shall be to make recommendations to the President with regard to:
the policy which should be followed or measures which should be taken with regard to the granting of reparation to victims or the taking of other measures aimed at rehabilitating and restoring the human and civil dignity of victims; measures which should be taken to grant Urgent Interim Reparation to victims.

9 Furthermore, section 25(b)(i) stipulates that the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee may:

make recommendations which may include urgent interim measures as contemplated in section 4(f)(ii), as to appropriate measures of reparation to victims.

10 In terms of section 42, the State President, in consultation with the Ministers of Justice and Finance, will establish a President's Fund. All money payable to victims in terms of regulations promulgated by the President shall be disbursed from this fund.

**International legal framework**

11 The right of victims of human rights abuse to fair and adequate compensation is well established in international law. In the past three years, South Africa has signed a number of important international instruments, which place it under an obligation\(^1\) to provide victims of human rights abuse with fair and adequate compensation. The provisions of these instruments, together with the rulings of those bodies established to ensure compliance with them, indicate that it is not sufficient to award ‘token’ or nominal compensation to victims. The amount of reparation awarded must be sufficient to make a meaningful and substantial impact on their lives. In terms of United Nations Conventions, there is well established right of victims of human rights abuse to compensation for their losses and suffering. It is important that the reparation policy adopted by the government, based on recommendations made by the Commission is in accordance with South Africa’s international obligations. The reparation awarded to victims must be significant.

12 What follows is a brief review of international law in this regard.

**Universal Declaration of Human Rights\(^2\)**

13 Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that:

---

1 Once a treaty has been signed, a country is obliged, according to article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to ‘refrain from acts which would defeat the objects and purpose of such treaty’. South Africa is therefore bound by the provisions and jurisprudence of those treaties it has signed.

2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been accepted as customary international law.
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

14 The use of the words “effective remedy” underscores the point that the reparation awarded must be meaningful and substantial.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights\(^3\)

15 Section 3(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads:

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.

16 The Human Rights Committee established under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to consider alleged breaches of the Covenant has considered a number of cases relating to the right to compensation arising from gross violations of human rights.\(^4\) In all these cases, it has been held that, where the state or any of its agents is responsible for killings, torture, abductions or disappearances, it is under a legal obligation to pay compensation to the victims or their families. The fact that, in the majority of instances, the Committee has used the term ‘compensation’ implies that the award to victims should be substantial.

The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment\(^5\)

17 The Committee against Torture, established to ensure compliance with the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, has found that complaints relating to acts of torture which occurred before the Convention entered into force are inadmissible because the Convention cannot be applied retroactively. Consequently, the Committee declared inadmissible a series of complaints by Argentinean citizens who alleged that they had been

---

3 Signed by South Africa on 3 October 1994.
4 See Bleier v Uruguay (Case No. 30/1978); Camargo v Columbia (case No. 45/1979); Derrit v Uruguay (Case No. 84/1981); Quinteros v Uruguay (Case No. 107/1981); Baboerem v Suriname (Case Nos. 146/1983 & 148-154/1983); Muiyo v Zaire (Case No. 194/1985). Scores more cases can be referred to. See generally the T Van Boven Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, (Report submitted to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2 July 1993).
5 Signed by South Africa on 29 January 1993.
tortured before the Convention had come into force. Despite this rather technical finding, the Committee stressed in its communication to the government of Argentina that it should, in order to comply with the spirit of the Convention against Torture, ensure that victims of torture receive “adequate compensation”. This is another example of an international body requiring, not just token, but significant reparation to be made to victims of human rights abuse.

The Inter-American Conventions on Human Rights

18 The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights contains provisions that grant victims of human rights abuse a right to compensation. In the famous Velasquez Rodriguez case, the Inter-American Court held that a state is under an obligation to “provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violations [of the rights recognised by the Convention]”. On numerous other occasions – most recently in 1992 with respect to the governments of Uruguay and Argentina – the Inter-American Court has reasserted its view that victims of human rights abuse are entitled to compensation.

The moral argument

19 The South African conflict produced casualties. Many people were killed, tortured, abducted and subjected to various forms of severe ill treatment. This not only destroyed individual lives, but also affected families, communities and the nation as a whole. As a result, the new South Africa has inherited thousands of people whose lives have been severely affected. If we are to transcend the past and build national unity and reconciliation, we must ensure that those whose rights have been violated are acknowledged through access to reparation and rehabilitation. While such measures can never bring back the dead, nor adequately compensate for pain and suffering, they can and must improve the quality of life of the victims of human rights violations and/or their dependants.

20 The present government has accepted that it is morally obliged to carry the debts of its predecessors and is thus equally responsible for reparation. Implementation of reparation will afford all South Africans an opportunity to contribute to healing and reconciliation.

---

7 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 29/92 (October 2 1992); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 28/92 (October 2 1992).
8 See chapter on Consequences of Gross Human Rights Violations.
Without adequate reparation and rehabilitation measures, there can be no healing and reconciliation, either at an individual or a community level. Comprehensive forms of reparation should also be implemented to restore the physical and mental well-being of victims.

The following policy proposals and recommendations in respect of both urgent interim reparation and reparation itself are, therefore, submitted to the State President for his consideration in terms of sections 27 and 40(1)(d) of the Act.

WHAT CONSTITUTES REPARATION AND REHABILITATION

Section 1(1) (xiv) of the Act defines reparation as including: “any form of compensation, ex gratia payment, restitution, rehabilitation or recognition.”

The proposed reparation and rehabilitation policy has five components:

Urgent Interim Reparation

Urgent interim reparation is assistance for people in urgent need, to provide them with access to appropriate services and facilities. It is recommended that limited financial resources be made available to facilitate this access.

Individual Reparation Grants

This is an individual financial grant scheme. It is recommended that each victim of a gross human rights violation receive a financial grant, according to various criteria, paid over a period of six years.

Symbolic reparation/legal and administrative measures

Symbolic reparation encompasses measures to facilitate the communal process of remembering and commemorating the pain and victories of the past.

Amongst other measures, symbolic reparation should entail identifying a national day of remembrance and reconciliation, erection of memorials and monuments, and the development of museums.
Legal and administrative measures will also be proposed to assist individuals to obtain death certificates, expedite outstanding legal matters and expunge criminal records.

**Community rehabilitation programmes**

The Commission consulted with relevant government ministries in preparing its proposals for the establishment of community-based services and activities, aimed at promoting the healing and recovery of individuals and communities that have been affected by human rights violations.

During the life of the Commission, a number of victims were referred to the relevant government departments for assistance. It is recommended that this process continue after the Commission closes.

**Institutional reform**

These proposals include legal, administrative and institutional measures designed to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses.

### WHO IS ENTITLED TO REPARATION AND REHABILITATION?

It is recommended that the recipients of urgent interim reparation and individual reparation grants should be victims as found by the Commission, as well as their relatives and dependants who are found to be in urgent need, after the consideration of a completed prescribed application form, according to the proposed urgency criteria.

For the purposes of this policy, the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee (chapter 1 of the Act) defines relatives and dependants of a victim as:

- a parents (or those who acted/act in place of a parent);
- b spouse (according to customary, common, religious or indigenous law);
- c children (either in or out of wedlock or adopted);
- d someone the victim has/had a customary or legal duty to support.
35 It should be noted that, if the victim died as the result of the violation, the definition of relatives and dependants will apply to the situation at the time of the victim’s death. If the victim is alive, the definition will apply to the situation as at 14 December 1997.

**REPARATION AND REHABILITATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT**

36 In formulating these policies and recommendations, the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee collected information from a variety of sources. Specifically, the Committee collected information from victims and survivors, representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community based organisations (CBOs), faith communities and academic institutions. Consultative workshops were held throughout the country. The information collected from deponents was processed and coded in the Commission database and assisted the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee to:

a. establish harm suffered;

b. determine the needs and expectations of victims;

c. establish criteria to identify victims in urgent need;

d. develop proposals regarding long term reparation and rehabilitation measures.

37 The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee was also guided by internationally accepted approaches to reparation and rehabilitation:

a. redress: the right to fair and adequate compensation;

b. restitution: the right to the re-establishment, as far as possible, of the situation that existed prior to the violation;

c. rehabilitation: the right to the provision of medical and psychological care and fulfilment of significant personal and community needs;

d. restoration of dignity: the right of the individual/community to a sense of worth; and
e reassurance of non-repetition: the strategies for the creation of legislative and administrative measures that contribute to the maintenance of a stable society and the prevention of the re-occurrence of human rights violations.

38 Policy development was also informed by the work and recommendations of other Truth Commissions, in particular the Chilean Commission, which awarded a ‘pension’ to the families of the dead and disappeared; by the decision of the United Nations to award financial compensation to the victims of the Iran-Iraq war; and, most pertinently, by the conclusions of the Skweyiya and Motsuenyane Commissions.

39 The Skweyiya Commission\(^9\) recommended that victims of “maltreatment during detention” should receive monetary compensation, appropriate medical and psychological assistance, assistance in completing interrupted education and compensation for property lost. The Motsuenyane Commission\(^10\) also recommended compensation to those who suffered human rights violations and assistance with medical expenses.

40 In the process of developing policy, the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee was faced with a number of decisions. Perhaps the most important of these was whether reparation should be financial and, if so, how much money should be given.

41 The alternative to a financial grant would be a ‘service package’. Offering a service package has a number of pitfalls:

a The costs of administering the process might reduce the amount available to victims.

b Victims’ needs change over time. Thus, a service package tailored to meet present needs could well be inappropriate after a period.

c Dependants’ needs (and status) also change over time.

d Giving preferential access to services to select individuals in a community could give rise to tensions.

e The way in which a distant implementing body chooses to service a need may not be the way the individual would have chosen him or herself.


The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee decided that a well-structured monetary grant would be preferable to a services package, providing it took two things into account:

a. It should enable reasonable access to essential basic services.

b. It should generate opportunities to achieve a dignified standard of living within the South African socio-economic context.

A monetary package also gives freedom of choice to the recipient. He or she can use the money in a way that is most appropriate to redress the injustice experienced. Because a monetary package provides government with a set of predictable, limited expenses, it makes fiscal management more feasible. An appropriately organised package requires minimal bureaucratic oversight.

The final, and most important factor in favour of an individual monetary grant, was that analysis of a representative sample of statements revealed that most deponents requested reparation in the form of money or services that money can purchase (see Figure RR1). The highest expectation of the reparation process was for monetary assistance. Compensation, bursaries, shelter, medical care and tombstones occupied third to seventh places respectively in the most frequent requests (the second most commonly requested intervention was for investigation of the violation).

For all these reasons, it was decided to recommend the provision of urgent interim reparations and individual reparation grants in the form of money.
PRINCIPLES OF REPARATION AND REHABILITATION POLICY

Development-centred

46 This policy is development-centred. Central to the approach is a focus on resources, knowledge and choice. Development is not about provision of resources to passive individuals, but rather about actively empowering individuals and communities to take control of their own lives. In adherence to this principle, it is essential to provide individuals with sufficient knowledge and information about available resources and to help them utilise those resources to their maximum benefit.

47 Implementation must be a participatory process. This strengthens collective community development and local reconstruction and development initiatives.

Simplicity and efficacy

48 The policy should be simple, efficient and fair to ensure that the allocated resources are utilised to the maximum benefit of the recipients.

Cultural appropriateness

49 The services developed as a result of this policy should be responsive to the religious and cultural beliefs and practices of the community in which the services are provided.

Community-based

50 In consultation with appropriate ministries, community-based services and delivery should be strengthened and expanded to have a lasting and sustainable impact on communities.

Capacity development

51 Those community resources that are developed should focus not only on delivery of services, but also on local capacity building, to ensure sustainability of programmes.
Promoting healing and reconciliation

52 The activities that emerge from this policy should aim to bring people together, to promote mutual understanding and reconciliation.

53 The Act provides for two stages in the process of Reparation and Rehabilitation, namely, Urgent Interim Reparation and Final Reparation Measures.

**URGENT INTERIM REPARATION**

54 Urgent Interim Reparation is the delivery of reparative measures to victims who are in urgent need. During the life of the Commission, urgent interim reparation was granted to certain victims. It was further recommended that all applicants be considered for this grant while awaiting final reparation.

**Benefits**

55 It was recommended that beneficiaries be entitled to the following:

a Information about and or referral to appropriate services (government, non-government and/or private sector), depending on type of need.

b Financial assistance in order to access and/or pay for services deemed necessary to meet specifically identified urgent needs. Payment will be based on a sliding scale according to number of dependants and need. Thus:

**NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN NEED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of People in Need</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One (i.e. applicant only)</td>
<td>R 2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One plus one</td>
<td>R 2 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One plus two</td>
<td>R 3 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One plus three</td>
<td>R 4 530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One plus four</td>
<td>R 5 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One plus five or more</td>
<td>R 5 705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intervention categories and eligibility criteria

56 Victims or their relatives and dependants who have urgent medical, emotional, educational, material and/or symbolic needs will be entitled to urgent interim reparations.

57 Urgency will be determined in each of the above categories using a detailed set of criteria available to the Committee and the proposed government implementing structure.

Implementation

58 The promulgation of government regulations on urgent interim reparation took longer than expected, which resulted in a delay in making this relief available. The time it would have taken for a multi-disciplinary implementing body (as originally envisaged) to be set up would, in turn, have meant further delay in delivering tangible reparation to victims.

59 The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee thus took responsibility for disseminating, receiving and assessing reparation application forms. Two committee members recommended a cash payment and made suggestions about appropriate services that the applicant could access. This information was forwarded to the President's Fund in Pretoria. The President's Fund made payment to the applicant, either via electronic bank transfer or a cheque posted by registered mail and, through a network of nodal points in provincial governments, informed applicants of available services.

60 While this system was being implemented (first payments were made in July 1998), ongoing discussion took place about the constitution of the implementing body that would eventually take over from the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee. This matter had not been finalised at the time of reporting.

Implementation of Urgent Interim Reparations before the date specified by the President in terms of section 43(1)

61 This section outlines the different ways in which urgent interim relief policy was implemented before the date specified by the President in terms of section 43(1).
Regional Human Rights Violations Committees made preliminary findings on victim statements gathered from their areas. Preliminary regional findings were considered by the national Human Rights Violations Committee and were either accepted or rejected. If the Human Rights Violations Committee found that a gross violation of human rights had occurred and was of the opinion that a person was a victim of such a violation, it referred the statement of the person concerned to the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee. Moreover, if the Amnesty Committee granted amnesty in respect of any act and was of the opinion that a person was a victim of that act, it referred the identified individual to the Human Rights Violations Committee which, if it concurred, referred the matter to the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee. In addition, if the Amnesty Committee did not grant amnesty for an act and was of the opinion that the act was a gross violation of human rights and that a person was a victim in the matter, it referred the matter to the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee through the Human Rights Violations Committee.

Any person referred to the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, in terms of the steps outlined above, was entitled to apply for reparation on the prescribed form that was sent to them.

The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee applied its mind to the information contained in the prescribed application form and other evidence or information of possible relevance in order to determine whether the applicant was a victim (that is, whether he or she had suffered harm in terms of section 1(1)(xix) of the Act), whether s/he was in urgent need and to identify the nature of the urgency. The final decision was based on the information contained in the prescribed application form. If the applicant was found to be both a victim and in urgent need, the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee conveyed this decision and all other relevant information regarding this application to the President’s Fund.

Delivery of urgent interim reparation by the President’s Fund involved the following steps:

a  Receiving decisions from the Commission’s Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee.

b  Referring victims to appropriate service/s.

c  Making payment according to the approved sliding scale and/or type of need.
66 It is recommended that all those found to be victims will be eligible for final reparation, regardless of urgency of need.

### INDIVIDUAL REPARATION GRANTS

67 In acknowledgement of victim’s rights to reparation, it is recommended that final reparation involve an amount of money, called an individual reparation grant, to be made available to each victim (if he/she is alive) or equally divided amongst relatives and/or dependants who have applied for reparation (as defined above) if the victim is dead. The amount of the grant will be based on the formula outlined below. The formula is based on three components, namely an amount to acknowledge the suffering caused by the gross violation that took place, an amount to enable access to services and facilities and an amount to subsidise daily living costs, based on socio-economic circumstances.

#### Rationale

68 The individual reparation grant is an acknowledgement of a person’s suffering due to his/her experience of a gross human rights violation. It is based on the fact that survivors of human rights violations have a right to reparation and rehabilitation. The individual reparation grant provides resources to victims in an effort to restore their dignity. It will be accompanied by information and advice in order to allow the recipient to make the best possible use of these resources. Thirty-eight per cent of the Commission’s deponents requested financial assistance to improve the quality of their lives. In addition, over 90 per cent of deponents asked for a range of services which can be purchased if money is made available – for example, education, medical care, housing and so on.

#### Formula for calculating Interim Reparation Grants

69 The monetary package is based on a benchmark amount of R21 700, which was the median annual household income in South Africa in 1997. The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee believes that this is an appropriate amount to achieve the aims of the individual reparation grant – that is to enable access to services and to assist in establishing a dignified way of life. The poverty line of R15 600 per annum was rejected as a benchmark, as this would be condemning victims to a life of near poverty, rather than one of minimum dignity.

---

11 The Commission acknowledges the assistance of the University of Cape Town Budget Project in this regard.
The actual amount that each victim receives will be based on an easily administered formula, which differentiates according to three criteria:

a. an acknowledgement of the suffering caused by the violation (#1);

b. an amount to facilitate access to services. Because services are less accessible in rural areas, those living in rural communities will receive a premium in this part of the grant. The difference is based on the assumption that accessing services in rural areas is 30 per cent more expensive than in urban areas (#2);¹²

c. an amount to subsidise daily living costs. This will be differentiated according to numbers of dependants and/or relatives, which will be capped at nine. In addition, because the cost of living is higher in urban areas, people living in urban areas will be favoured in this portion of the grant. The difference is based on the assumption that the cost of living in urban areas is 15 per cent higher than in urban areas (#3).

Each portion of the formula is given a weighting or ranking as follows:

\[
\text{\#1} = 50\%, \quad \text{\#2} = 25\%, \quad \text{\#3} = 25\% \quad \text{of total Interim Reparations grant.}
\]

The actual variation in amounts payable according to the formula and differentiation criteria is shown in the table.

Using the proposed projections, no individual will receive more than R23 023 per annum (the maximum individual reparation grant). This maximum amount would apply to an individual, living in a rural area, who has nine or more dependants.

The annual individual reparation grant should be calculated for each beneficiary and paid as 50 per cent of the total every six months. The annual payments will continue for a period of six years.

**Administration/President’s Fund**

The grant will be funded and administered by the President’s Fund. The President’s Fund will accrue resources through allocations from the national fiscus, international and local donations and earned interest on the funds. Based on the given policy and formula, and estimating 22 000 victims, the total cost of this policy will be R477 400 000 per annum or R2 864 400 000 over six years. The figure of 22 000 victims needs to be re-determined by standard census delineation.

¹² Rural versus urban to be determined by standard census delimitation.
victims is based on the Commission’s Human Rights Violations Statement as the only point of entry.

76 It is recommended that the President's Fund functions on an interdepartmental or interdisciplinary basis as a dual structure with:

a. an administrative capacity to disburse the money which has been allocated;

b. a multi-disciplinary Reparation Panel to assess application forms and to advise appropriately. While the Commission is still in existence, members of the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee may sit on this panel.
## Reparation Payment Schedule (Per Annum Per Victim)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#1</th>
<th>#2</th>
<th>#3</th>
<th>TOTAL ANNUAL REPARATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement of Violation</td>
<td>Access to Services</td>
<td>Daily Living Costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Rural

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Size</th>
<th>0.25 x 21 700 = 10850</th>
<th>0.25 x 24 630 = 61 57.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 169</td>
<td>18 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 396</td>
<td>19 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11 152</td>
<td>19 796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>13 640</td>
<td>20 418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15 946</td>
<td>20 994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>18 117</td>
<td>21 537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>20 181</td>
<td>22 053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>22 158</td>
<td>22 547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>+24 063</td>
<td>23 023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Size</th>
<th>0.25 x 18 771 = 4 693</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9 660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>12 831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>15 693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>18 347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>20 844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>23 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>25 494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>+27 685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 The rural/urban difference for this category is based on the assumption that accessing rural health is 30 per cent more expensive in rural areas.

14 The rural urban difference for this category is based on the assumption that the cost of living is 15 percent lower in rural areas and the differences within rural and urban categories reflect differences in household size. Concerning household size, the calculations assume that a seven-person household will receive R21 700 on average. Households with less than seven members receive less than the anchor and larger households receive up to a maximum set by a nine-person household. It is also assumed that each additional household member costs the household slightly less than the preceding family member.
**SYMBOLIC REPARATION / LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTERVENTIONS**

78 Symbolic reparation measures are aimed at restoring the dignity of victims and survivors of gross human rights violations. These include measures to facilitate the communal process of commemorating the pain and celebrating the victories of the past. Deponents to the Commission have indicated that these types of interventions are an important part of coming to terms with the past.

**Individual interventions**

79 The following services will be made available:

**Issuing of death certificates**

80 Many people making statements to the Commission highlighted the fact that they did not receive death certificates for deceased relatives. It is recommended that mechanisms to facilitate the issuing of death certificates be established by the appropriate ministry.\(^{15}\)

**Exhumations, reburials and ceremonies**

81 In a number of cases, the need for exhumations and reburials became evident. It is recommended that mechanisms to expedite this process be established by the appropriate ministries. Alternative culture-specific ceremonies should similarly be facilitated. Costs associated with exhumations, reburials and alternative ceremonies will be met from the individual reparation grant.

**Headstones and tombstones**

82 In a number of cases, deponents asked for tombstones and headstones to be erected on the graves of the deceased. It is recommended that these will be paid for from the individual reparation grant.

**Declarations of death**

83 In many cases of disappearances reported to the Commission, people have not formally been declared dead. It is recommended that mechanisms to facilitate the declaration of deaths be established and implemented in those cases where

\(^{15}\) See Recommendations.
the family requests an official declaration of death. This is an obligation of the Commission according to section (k) of the Act.

**Expunging of criminal records**

84 Many victims received criminal sentences for political activities. It is recommended that mechanisms to facilitate the expunging of these records be established by the appropriate ministry.

**Expediting outstanding legal matters related to the violations**

85 A careful analysis of statements indicates that there are still many outstanding legal matters that deponents would like to have resolved. Mechanisms to facilitate the resolution of outstanding legal matters which are directly related to reported violations, should be established within the President’s Fund.

**Community interventions**

86 It is recommended that the following measures be taken:

**Renaming of streets and facilities**

87 It is recommended that streets and community facilities be renamed to reflect, remember and honour individuals or events in particular communities. Local and provincial authorities should be informed about these requests.

**Memorials/monuments**

88 It is recommended that monuments and memorials be built to commemorate the conflicts and/or victories of the past. These monuments and memorials should be built in consultation with local government structures. Local and provincial authorities should establish the necessary mechanisms in this regard.

**Culturally appropriate ceremonies**

89 It is recommended that specific needs of communities regarding remembering and/or celebrating be honoured through culturally appropriate ceremonies. This, according to requests, could include cleansing ceremonies. Local and provincial authorities should establish the necessary mechanisms in this regard, in close co-operation with the appropriate faith communities and cultural and community organisations.
National interventions

90 The following measures need to be taken:

Renaming of public facilities

91 It is recommended that, after careful consideration and consultation, public facilities should be renamed in honour of individuals or past events. The necessary mechanisms should be put in place by the appropriate ministries.

Monuments and memorials

92 In response to the requests of many victims and the broader community, the erection of appropriate monuments/memorials should be considered. The appropriate ministries should put the necessary mechanisms in place to plan and implement this.

A day of remembrance

93 In response to the requests of many victims and the broader community, it is recommended that the government declare a National Day of Remembrance. The appropriate ministries should facilitate this, in close liaison with the different faith communities and cultural organisations in the country.

COMMUNITY REHABILITATION

94 Individuals eligible for individual reparation grants are members of communities that have been subjected to systemic abuse. Entire communities suffer the adverse effects of post-traumatic stress disorder, expressed by a wide range of deponents to the Commission. It is therefore recommended that rehabilitation programmes be established both at community and national levels.

95 Rehabilitation programmes should form part of a general initiative to transform the way in which services are provided in South Africa. Such programmes can also promote reconciliation within communities. The following possible rehabilitation programmes have been identified with reference to the needs expressed by deponents in their statements. For community rehabilitation programmes to have the desired positive effect and to be sustainable, relevant government ministries should facilitate their development, in consultation with other partners.
like representatives of organised businesses, victim support groups, NGOs, faith communities and so on.

**Health and social services**

**National demilitarisation**

96 Because of ongoing exposure to and involvement in political violence, young people have become socialised to accept violence as a way of resolving conflict. This issue needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

97 The demilitarisation programme should be systematic and assist in demilitarising youth, who have for decades been involved in violent activity to effect political change. Secondary and tertiary educational institutions and sporting bodies should be involved in the implementation of this programme. The programme should consist of a combination of social, therapeutic and political processes and interventions, appropriate to the area in which they are being implemented.

**Dislocation and displacement**

98 South Africa has thousands of ‘internal’ refugees, who have been driven from their homes by political conflict. Displacement can lead to psychological distress, unemployment and trauma.

99 It is recommended that a multi-disciplinary programme, involving all relevant ministries and departments (such as health, welfare and housing) be put in place to resettle displaced persons and address the problems of displaced communities.

**Appropriate local treatment centres**

100 Victims and survivors of gross human rights violations have complex physical and emotional needs which can be most appropriately addressed by multi-disciplinary teams - taking cultural and personal preferences into account - at accessible local treatment centres. It is recommended that the Department of Health establish such centres.

**Rehabilitation for perpetrators and their families**

101 Perpetrators and their families need to be reintegrated into normal community life. This is essential to create a society in which human rights abuses will not
Individual and family rehabilitative systems need to be instituted to assist individuals and families in coming to terms with their violent past and learning constructive and peaceful ways of resolving conflict without resort to violence.

**Mental health services**

102 Prevailing negative perceptions of therapy and its practice prevent people from accessing mental health services. Individuals and communities should be educated about the link between mental health and conflicts of the past. Appropriate mental health initiatives should be linked with developmental projects, for example, the Reconstruction and Development Programme and Masakhane. Mental health cannot be seen in isolation from socio-economic development.

**Community-based interventions**

103 It is recommended that self-sustaining, community-based survivor support groups be established, staffed by trained facilitators from the community. This method of support and treatment is not a unique concept and enjoys success where facilitators focus on therapy. The support group method represents a cost effective, accessible, non-threatening way in which people can access counselling.

**Skills training**

104 Community members should be trained in a variety of skills to enable them to assist victims of human rights abuses. These should include crisis management, critical incident briefing, trauma awareness training, referral skills and knowledge of available resources.

**Specialised trauma counselling services**

105 Specialised emotional trauma counselling services should be established. A national strategy to train trauma counsellors should be developed.

**Family-based therapy**

106 The impact of gross human rights violations on the family is often underestimated. To address this issue, it is recommended that training programmes for health care workers, aimed at improving their skills in the family systems approach be instituted by the relevant ministries.
Education

107 The standard of black education was appalling and this aspect of the legacy of apartheid is likely to be with us for a long time to come. Education is ripe for reform and the possibilities for its transformation are exciting. However, one of the effects of the past is that it has resulted in a strong culture of often pointless conflict around education matters. The desire to learn in a disciplined environment no longer seems to prevail.

Assistance for continuation of studies

108 It is recommended that the establishment of community colleges and youth centres be prioritised, to facilitate the re-integration of affected youth into society.

109 Specific accelerated adult basic education and training (ABET) programmes should be established to meet the needs of youth and adults who are semi-literate and have lost educational opportunities due to human rights abuses.

Building and improvement of schools

110 Rebuilding of demolished schools, particularly in rural and disadvantaged areas should be prioritised.

Special educational support services

111 Remedial and emotional support should be included in mainstream educational programmes.

112 Mainstream educational facilities should provide skills based training courses in order to respond to the needs of mature students and to help them find employment.

Housing

Housing provision

113 It is recommended that specific attention be given to establishing housing projects in communities where gross violations of human rights led to mass destruction of property and/or displacement. The appropriate ministry should put the necessary mechanisms in place.
Institutional reform

114 One of the functions of the Commission is to make recommendations on institutional legislative and administrative measures designed to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses in the future. \(^{16}\)

115 The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee recommends that the measures and programmes outlined in the chapter on Recommendations become part of the operational plans and ethos of a wide range of sectors in society including the judiciary, media, security forces, business, education and correctional services.

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND RESPONSIBILITY

116 The nature and structure of the body which implements Final Reparation will need to be debated and will obviously depend on the decisions taken by Parliament about the form that final reparation will take. Based on present policy proposals, the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee believes that the following issues must be considered:

a Implementation must take place at national, provincial and local levels.

b The national implementing body should be located in the office of the State President or Deputy President. The body should not be allocated to one particular ministry, as its functions will require access to the resources, infrastructure and services of a number of ministries (such as housing, health, welfare, and education).

c The national body should be headed by a National Director of Reparation and Rehabilitation, who will be advised by a panel or board of trustees, composed of appropriately qualified members from relevant ministries and human rights organisations.

117 The national body will have the following functions:

a Implementing and administering any financial reparation policy.

\(^{16}\) See chapter on Recommendations.
b Maintaining regular contact with relevant ministries, to ensure appropriate service provision.

c Establishing provincial reparation desks.

d Facilitating the formation of partnerships with NGOs, the private sector, faith communities and other appropriate groupings, in order to meet victims’ needs.

e Promoting fund raising and communication strategies.

f Monitoring, evaluating and documenting the national implementation of reparation and rehabilitation.

g Reporting to the Inter-Ministerial Committee.

118 Provincial reparation desks should be established within existing provincial government structures.

119 Provincial reparation desks will have the following functions:

a Ensuring that reparation recipients are linked to appropriate service providers.

b Monitoring dispersal of financial reparation and providing suitable financial counselling to recipients.

c Taking particular responsibility for community reparation and symbolic reparation at a local level.

d Monitoring, evaluating and documenting implementation of reparation at a provincial level.

e Reporting to the National Director of Reparation and Rehabilitation.
Findings and Conclusions

■ INTRODUCTION

1 The Promotion of National Reconciliation and Unity Act (the Act) was a contested piece of legislation. Its protracted passage through cabinet and Parliament and its final form mirror the many different interests, fears and perspectives in South African society (see further Volume One).

2 The new government settled on a compromise. Focusing not only on those violations committed by the former state, the Act chose instead to focus on violations committed by all parties to the conflict. It eschewed notions of vengeance or retribution, and instead created a mechanism for the granting of amnesty for politically motivated actions, providing full individual disclosure was made.

3 It is the view of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission) that the spirit of generosity and reconciliation enshrined in the founding Act was not matched by those at whom it was mainly directed. Despite amnesty provisions extending to criminal and civil charges, the white community often seemed either indifferent or plainly hostile to the work of the Commission, and certain media appear to have actively sought to sustain this indifference and hostility. With rare individual exceptions, the response of the former state, its leaders, institutions and the predominant organs of civil society of that era, was to hedge and obfuscate. Few grasped the olive branch of full disclosure.

4 Even where political leaders and institutional spokespersons of the former state claimed to take full responsibility for the actions of the past, these sometimes seemed to take the form of ritualised platitudes rather than genuine expressions of remorse. Often, it seemed to the Commission, there was no real appreciation of the enormity of the violations of which these leaders and those under them were accused, or of the massive degree of hurt and pain their actions had caused.

5 In making its findings, the Commission drew on a wide range of evidence. Apart from over 21 000 statements on violations of human rights, it considered the
evidence contained in numerous submissions, amnesty applications and other documents to which it had access.

**Submissions to the Commission**

6  Political parties, institutions and sectors were asked to make submissions to the Commission about their role in the conflict and their motives and perspectives.

7  A number of party leaders, some prominent past politicians, and representatives of institutions of the former state – the South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defence Force (SADF) – made submissions to the Commission. The usefulness of these submissions varied widely, but they were generally disappointing and did little to further the work of the Commission. Frequently, they consisted of little more than recitations of the policies under which these groups operated and often unconvincing apologies for excesses committed.

8  The appearance before the Commission of former President FW de Klerk as spokesperson of the National Party (NP) perspective was a particular disappointment to the Commission. As one who had done so much to turn the tide of South African history, his evasiveness and unwillingness candidly to acknowledge the full burden of the NP’s responsibility seemed to the Commission to be a missed opportunity to take the reconciliation process forward.

9  Other former NP leaders were, however, more forthcoming. Former Foreign Minister ‘Pik’ Botha submitted responses to the Commission’s questions that were rich in detail, while former Ministers Roelf Meyer and Leon Wessels frankly acknowledged the wrongs of the former ruling party’s past. Mr Wessels cast doubt on the argument by members of the former cabinet and State Security Council (SSC) that they had been unaware of the excesses of the security forces. Wessels concluded with an apology rare in its eloquence and sincerity:

> I am now more convinced than ever that apartheid was a terrible mistake that blighted our land. South Africans did not listen to the laughing and the crying of each other. I am sorry that I had been so hard of hearing for so long.

10 While some members of the former state displayed half-heartedness and reluctance to make full disclosure, others seemed intent on obstructing the work of the Commission. In this respect, the Commission refers particularly to former State President PW Botha.
11 The facts pertaining to the PW Botha case and his conviction are well known and require little comment. The irony in the fact that the man who took the state into the realms of criminality should have himself chosen to incur a criminal record at the hands of its democratic successor has not been lost on the Commission.

12 Much was made by Mr Botha’s defence team of his willingness to co-operate with the Commission by way of written responses to questions. Despite this, it took ten months for his state-sponsored legal team to supply these answers, reflecting a disdain for the Commission and its work. Furthermore, although Mr Botha’s answers were comprehensive and, at points, informative as to detail, they failed to engage frankly with the issues that had been raised.

13 Former generals of the SAP, under the banner of an organisation called the Foundation of Equality before the Law, submitted a lengthy submission to the Commission. While the submission provided extensive details about the atrocities allegedly committed by forces opposing the state, it did not even attempt to deal with those committed by the former SAP. It was left to scores of amnesty applicants to provide the details so clearly absent in the generals’ submission.

14 The first submission by the SADF was so insubstantial that the Commission asked for a second, more comprehensive, submission. This too, however, reflected the enormous – perhaps unbridgeable – chasm between the perspectives of those who wielded power in the apartheid era and those who suffered at their hands. Nowhere was this more clearly illustrated than in the opening remarks of General Viljoen’s submission on behalf of the SADF at the Commission’s armed forces hearing:

The former SADF was politically neutral whilst your Commission is highly politicised ... The governing party of the former government did not demonstrate interest in the former SADF. You really erred in your assumption, and the expectations you created in public, that the SADF was guilty of gross violation of human rights on a substantial scale.

15 In the light of the Commission’s findings that the security forces, including the SADF, were responsible for the commission of gross violations of human rights on a massive scale, this statement seemed to the Commission to epitomise the overarching sense of denial which seems to have enveloped so many of those who were the leaders and beneficiaries of the former state.
16 In late 1996, a set of questions was submitted to the SADF. Only after considerable prodding did it respond - and then only in piecemeal fashion over a period of months. While some of the data relating to structural and organisational detail was useful, it demonstrated a studied determination to oppose the Commission’s efforts to prise open the lid on the SADF’s past.

17 The appearance of the African National Congress (ANC) national leadership before the Commission was marked by the fact that, in contrast to the National Party, it took collective responsibility for the human rights violations of its membership and dealt frankly with the Commission’s questions. The ANC also made the reports of the various enquiries conducted into its alleged excesses at Quatro and elsewhere freely available to the Commission.

18 This spirit of openness was not, however, always translated into participation by other echelons, and frequently membership, of the ANC. The Commission received few statements from ANC leaders, past or present. Almost none of the ANC’s senior leaders in exile came to the Commission to give first-hand details of what had led them into exile or of their experiences at the hands of cross-border intruders. No one who survived the raids at Matola, Maseru or Gaberone, or individual assassination attempts, made submissions on these experiences. Few Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) cadres or underground activists, aside from those who applied for amnesty, made statements to the Commission.

19 Thus, while the Commission tapped a rich seam of experience from rank and file supporters of the ANC, its knowledge of those who led and those who worked in its structures for lengthy periods of time is largely non-existent. This has severely constrained the Commission’s capacity to provide the “full and complete” picture that the Act demands. Particularly regrettable was the non-appearance of those who are the remaining repositories of important historic details about the 1960s, on which very few submissions were made to the Commission. The Commission accepts that its framework may have been problematic to some. Many refused to regard themselves as victims. The consequence is, however, that the historical record of violations in this country and outside it has suffered grievous omissions, particularly in regard to the 1960s and, more broadly, in relation to torture.

20 One ANC member who did experience a close encounter with the Commission did not do so voluntarily. Ms Winnie Madikizela-Mandela’s contempt not only for the Commission but for the notion of accountability was palpable to the millions who followed the hearing in which she appeared.
The Commission’s experience of the ANC’s major internal ally, the United Democratic Front (UDF), was also unsatisfactory. The Commission erred in that it did not identify early enough the importance of soliciting a formal and separate submission from this grouping, which largely permitted the ANC to speak for it. The Commission’s attempts to rectify this error were extremely frustrating, not least because the UDF was no longer in existence and its former leadership no longer constituted a coherent working body. Scarcely any former UDF regional or local leadership figures gave statements to the Commission. In some areas they were openly cynical. The UDF played a central role for a significant part of the 1980s, the period which saw a considerable intensification of conflict and abuses. Thus again, an important and crucial input has been denied to the Commission.

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) made no pretence of co-operating with the Commission. Its submission to the Commission consisted largely of a lengthy exposition of how the president of the IFP had been ‘vilified’ by his political enemies over the years. It also included a list of IFP office-bearers who had allegedly been killed by UDF/ANC members over the past fifteen years. It contained a muted apology, in little more than a sentence, for any hurt that Inkatha members may have caused others in the political conflict. Considering the overwhelming evidence that Inkatha/the IFP was the primary non-state perpetrator, and that it was responsible for approximately 33 per cent of all the violations reported to the Commission, its submission was singularly unforthcoming, evasive and defensive.

The IFP’s very public opposition had the effect of dissuading thousands of ordinary IFP supporters from coming forward to the Commission. This had a number of consequences for the Commission and for the IFP. From the Commission’s point of view, the consequence was that it received few first-hand accounts of violations committed against the IFP to draw on in the preparation of its report. It was thus forced to resort to secondary sources in an attempt to produce a balanced report on the virtual civil war that has raged in KwaZulu-Natal for many years.

The repercussions of the IFP’s opposition to the Commission are even more serious for its own members. If and when financial reparation is made available by the government to those that the Commission has found to be victims of human rights violations, only those very few IFP members who flouted their party’s opposition and made statements to the Commission will qualify. This may well exacerbate existing tensions between IFP and ANC members in the region and, ironically, contribute to more bloodshed and violence.
25 The Commission was further disturbed by the fact that high-ranking office-bearers of the IFP visited the party’s members in prison to persuade them not to apply for amnesty, for fear that their applications would reveal collusion by senior IFP leaders in gross violations of human rights. The Commission finds it difficult to accept that the IFP appeared willing to allow certain of its members to remain in prison in order to protect the leadership.

26 Although refusing to participate in the process, the IFP nonetheless complained that the Commission appeared not to take seriously its claim that 400 of its office-bearers had been killed in the violence of recent years. In fact, the investigation into this list was one of the most intensive of the many investigations undertaken by the Commission.

27 Before leaving this question, the Commission wishes to put on record its disappointment at the flimsiness and lack of coherence displayed by the leadership of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) when it appeared before the Commission. The PAC’s interaction with the Commission was characterised by, on the one hand, repudiation of the Commission and, on the other, its complaint that its members’ amnesty applications were not being dealt with speedily enough.

28 The Commission also received submissions from organisations representing various sectors of civil society, such as media, health, business and the judiciary. While these varied in their openness and frankness, they were generally characterised by defensiveness and a failure to come to terms with the role these sectors had played in supporting the status quo, whether by commission or omission.

29 As regards the Commission’s hearings on the legal system, it must be noted with great regret that judges refused to appear before the Commission on the basis that this would negatively affect their independence and would harm the institution of the judiciary. The Commission fails to understand how their appearance would have undermined such independence. The Commission was a unique occurrence and therefore unlikely to create a precedent. Furthermore, when one considers the historic significance of the Commission and its envisaged role in the transformation of South African society into a caring, humane and just one, the judges’ decision is all the more lamentable. In effect, the Commission was denied the opportunity to engage in debate with judges on how the administration of justice could adapt to fulfil the tasks demanded of it in the new legal system. The intention was not to dictate or bind them in the future, but to underline the urgent need to re-evaluate the nature of the judiciary.
Similarly, few magistrates responded to the Commission’s invitation. The Commission found this stance deplorable given the previous lack of formal independence of magistrates and their dismal record as servants of the apartheid state. Both they and the country lost an opportunity to examine their role in the transition from oppression to democracy.

Amnesty applications

Given the difficulties and constraints in accessing information, the Commission relied, to a large extent, on a different form of submission – amnesty applications.

In reviewing its efforts to uncover the deeper truth behind the violations of the apartheid era, the Commission frankly acknowledges that much of its success is due to the fact that large numbers of security police members grasped at the possibility of amnesty in exchange for full disclosure. The Commission is not, however, so naïve as to believe that it was this alone that persuaded them to ‘blow the whistle’ on their past actions. The fact is that they would have preferred the cloak of silence. The ironic truth is that what brought them to the Commission was the fullness of the disclosures made by an individual often painted as the arch-villain of the apartheid era – Mr Eugene de Kock. Whatever his motives, the Commission acknowledges that it was largely he who broke the code of silence.

It is unfortunate, in the Commission’s view, that a comparable ‘whistle blower’ did not emerge from the ranks of the SADF. Nevertheless, some of the information provided by former members of Military Intelligence (MI) and Special Forces helped the Commission to obtain a clear insight into the role played by the SADF in respect of cross-border target identification and operations, as well as providing a broader insight into the role of the SADF in the formulation of security policy.

The Commission received not a single amnesty application from members of the former National Intelligence Service (NIS). Former members of NIS consistently maintained that, although they had provided information about specific individuals and activists and had passed these on to operational units in the SAP and SADF, they were not responsible for the actions that arose as a result. The Commission rejects this position.

In line with its overall approach, the ANC and MK leadership applied for amnesty, accepting collective responsibility for the actions of members and operatives. Perhaps because of this, not all MK operatives applied for individual amnesty.
This is unfortunate because it denied the Commission the kind of rich and specific detail about individual operations that it gleaned, for example, from Security Branch operatives. The bulk of ANC applications were for the post-1990 period and were received from former members of self-defence units (SDUs).

36 Most IFP amnesty applications were from people convicted of serious crimes committed with a political motive. In spite of pressure brought to bear on convicted prisoners by senior IFP office-bearers, a handful of key members did apply for amnesty, giving the Commission important insights into the workings of IFP hit squads, as well as details and names of senior IFP officials implicated in hit squad activities.

37 Most of the PAC and Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) applications related to their major period of activity – the post-1990s.

**Accessing information from role-players**

38 Aside from submissions, the Commission required ongoing access to documentation and information held by primary role-players.

39 It needs to be stated at the outset that the former state deliberately and systematically destroyed state documentation in an attempt to ensure that a new democratic government would be denied access to incriminating evidence. Hundreds of thousands of classified records – literally scores of tons – were destroyed. Much of this documentation related to the inner workings of the security forces and intelligence agencies, covert projects, informer networks, personnel records of security force members, and material confiscated from institutions and individuals. The destruction of this documentation deprived the Commission and the country as a whole of a rich and valuable source of material for its investigation into the conflicts of the past. (See further Volume One.)

40 With regard to the former security forces, specific personnel were assigned to ‘nodal (liaison) points’ to respond to ongoing requests by the Commission. The SANDF nodal point was staffed entirely by former SADF members. In respect of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Commission staff were required to go through lengthy procedures of security clearance. Thus, despite the fact that the Act stipulated that the Commission should have access to whatever records and documentation were required, it was, in this respect, subjected to a series of filters and blocks rather than the free and open access envisaged by the Act.
Overall, the Commission concluded that the SANDF nodal point, rather than facilitating its work, appeared at times to act as gatekeeper to the SADF’s secrets and military archives for close on two years. Access was granted, in an extremely limited form, only towards the end of the time available for sustained research. Of even more concern to the Commission was the fact that the nodal point appears to have played a similar screening role when channelling the requests of its former members who wished to apply for amnesty. The Commission is aware of at least one case in which a former member of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), who in the Commission’s view should definitely have applied for amnesty, was advised not to do so.

The Commission is of the view that the role of the nodal point was decided at the highest (present and past) officer level. Appeals to the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence for assistance bore little or no fruit and led the Commission to conclude that it had erred in not conducting a search-and-seizure raid on the archives.

The ANC established a ‘TRC desk’ that was intended to function as a point of reference both for its members and for the Commission. While the Commission is unable to comment on whether it performed a useful service for its own members, the desk was not always helpful to the Commission. To give just one example, not one of the 250 requests submitted by the Commission’s Johannesburg office received a response from the ANC TRC desk.

Legal challenges

The Commission also faced a number of legal challenges, which it met successfully – with the exception of the matter brought against it by two former members of the security police (see further Volume One). In April 1996, Brigadier du Preez and Major General Nic van Rensburg sought to restrain the Commission from receiving or allowing any evidence during its hearings which might adversely affect them. The court ruled that the Commission had an obligation to furnish the applicants with sufficient facts and information to enable them to identify the events and incidents involved as well as the people proposing to lead detrimental evidence.

The Commission appealed against this decision to a full bench of the Cape High Court in June 1996. That Court held that, in the context of the objectives of the Commission and the limited time frame within which it had to complete its work, the Commission was not obliged to give prior notice to any person who might be implicated in a human rights violations hearing. It did, however, stipulate that
when a negative or detrimental finding against an implicated person was being contemplated, the implicated person had to be given prior warning and an opportunity to submit representations to the Commission. It also concluded that the Commission was obliged to supply the implicated person with the relevant evidence on which the contemplated finding was based, to enable him or her to answer the allegations.

46 In a further appeal to the Appellate Division in regard to this latter aspect, the Commission argued that the limitations imposed on it by the Cape Court would severely hamper its work. The Commission drew on arguments of such renowned international jurists as Sir Richard Scott and Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC to the effect that there are fundamental and significant differences between enquiries and litigation, and the adversarial procedures adopted in the legal system were wholly inappropriate to an enquiry.

47 In his judgement, Chief Justice Corbett relied on common-law principles, requiring persons and bodies to observe the rules of natural justice. He ruled that implicated perpetrators were entitled to timeous notice of the allegations against them, details by way of witness statements or other documents to enable them to identify the person making the allegations, the date and place of the alleged incidents where appropriate, and the right to cross-examine witnesses at hearings.

48 The judgement imposed a huge administrative and logistic burden on the Commission, requiring it to employ further staff and allocate further resources to identifying and tracing implicated persons. In most instances, the alleged perpetrators were no longer in the same employment as previously, and their addresses were not easily available. In addition, the Commission had to contend with alleged perpetrators demanding to be heard at the same hearings as victims and demanding the right to cross-examine witnesses.

49 It was, however, only when the public hearings had been completed that the full impact of the judgement became clear. In order for the Commission to make detrimental findings against persons for inclusion in its final report, implicated persons had to be notified of the contemplated decision and afforded the opportunity to make written representations – a huge administrative task. In essence, the Corbett ruling obliged the Commission to give alleged perpetrators a prior view of its findings. Other commissions of enquiry in this country, such as the Goldstone Commission, were never hampered or restricted in this way.
In seeking to fulfil the Appellate Division's ruling, the Commission was obliged to delete from this report the names of a large number of alleged perpetrators, whose whereabouts were not known and who could not be traced. Consequently, the incidents or events in which they were allegedly involved are either not recorded or not fully described. In many instances, the Commission's report contains the names of fewer alleged perpetrators than are contained in recently published South African books on political and so-called third force violence.

In a final and supreme irony, the two original applicants, Van Rensburg and Du Preez, who effectively hamstrung the Commission in its work, applied for amnesty for the very act they had for so long succeeded in preventing the Commission from hearing about – the murder of political activist Siphiwe Mthimkulu.

The Commission's shortcomings

The Commission also wishes to acknowledge some of its own failings and constraints. Chief among these were the following:

**Its failure to identify early enough a number of areas to which it should have devoted more time and energy.**

In particular, the Commission failed to make significant breakthroughs in relation to violence in the 1990s. The events in question were extremely recent and few leads emerged from groups operating at the time. Thus few entry points for investigation were opened up and a great deal of further investigation is required.

Further, while the Commission believes that it broke new ground in its probes into the SSC and the elimination of political opponents, the Chemical and Biological Warfare programme and the activities of the Caprivi-trained hit squad, its investigation into the role of MI and Special Forces in the target identification process was conducted too late for adequate follow-up.

**Its failure to call before it certain key actors, most notably Mangosuthu Buthelezi**

Following an invitation to the Commission, Chief Buthelezi made a submission and thereafter publicly stated that he had nothing more to add. Given its stance in regard to Mr PW Botha, the Commission is thus vulnerable to the charge of double standards. The only defence that can be offered is that the issue was
intensely debated by the Commission, which ultimately succumbed to the fears of those who argued that Buthelezi’s appearance would give him a platform from which to oppose the Commission and would stoke the flames of violence in KwaZulu-Natal, as indeed he himself promised. In retrospect, it was probably an incorrect decision.

**Its failure to spread wide enough its examination of civil society’s complicity in the crimes and misdeeds of the past.**

56 The Commission should, for example, have investigated those who administered black municipal and local government structures of the apartheid period. Similarly, educational institutions (in particular universities) and state-funded research bodies such as the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, the Human Sciences Research Council and the Medical Research Council should have been subjected to the same scrutiny as the business, legal and other sectors.

**Its failure to deal with significant geopolitical areas, and the violations that occurred in those areas, in sufficient detail.**

57 The substantial violations that were perpetrated, primarily by security force members, in areas such as Venda, Lebowa and Bophuthatswana are dealt with only cursorily. In short, the Commission did not have the resources or sufficiently qualified personnel to make a significant research or investigative impact in these regions. If one considers that the northern areas of the country included seven homelands, each with their own security forces and vigilante groupings, and were served by the modest resource capacity of the Johannesburg office of the Commission, the omission is understandable.

**The constraints imposed by its investigative capacity**

58 The Commission recognised early on that it would not be able to investigate all the cases before it. It decided, therefore, to focus on specific ‘window’ cases – representative of a far larger number of violations of a similar type and involving the same perpetrator groupings.

59 One of the reasons for this decision was the necessity to corroborate and verify allegations made to the Commission by victims of gross human rights violations, particularly in the light of the decision to pay financial reparations. Payment could be made only to those who had been clearly verified by the Commission
as being victims of gross violations of human rights. This left little time for proactive investigations into unsolved apartheid-era violations.

60 The Investigation Unit (IU) was also severely restricted in its inability to access military archives and classified records.

61 The Commission also acknowledges that, in view of its reliance on members of the police and the non-governmental organisation (NGO) and private sectors to make up the IU, it was difficult to develop, in a short space of time, the highly effective, closely knit unit required for the enormous task it faced. Divergent approaches led to tensions. Despite these drawbacks, the Unit functioned remarkably efficiently and can claim credit for large numbers of successful and high-profile investigations, not least the numerous exhumations of extra-judicially executed political activists.

62 The Commission can only plead that, when it began its work, it entered uncharted waters. Not only was it unique in this country’s experience, but there were few international role models. Its entire existence was a steep learning curve and, even with the extensions to its life, there was insufficient time for all the things it should have done or wished to do.

HOW THE FINDINGS WERE MADE

63 It should be noted that the findings that follow focus largely on institutions or structures of society and in only a few cases on major political figures. A number of other findings - which are not repeated here and which deal with particular events or perpetrators - are to be found in Volumes Two, Three and Four. The names of those in respect of whom individual victim findings are made appear elsewhere in this volume. Further details on these will be available at a later stage.

64 Some of those in respect of whom the Commission has made adverse findings may complain of the untested nature of some of its evidence. The point to note here is that the Commission is not a court of law. It was set up as a commission of enquiry and, as such, was not bound by the same rules of evidence as are the courts. In order to make a finding, it had to operate within the framework of a balance of probabilities, which is the standard criterion used in civil litigation. Its conclusions are therefore findings rather than judicial verdicts.
The Commission’s position on responsibility and accountability

65 In evaluating the role played by those who were involved in the conflicts of the past, the Commission was guided, in particular, by section 4 of its enabling Act, the relevant portions of which read as follows:

The functions of the Commission shall be to achieve its objectives, and to that end it shall -

(a) facilitate and where necessary initiate or co-ordinate, inquiries into ...

(iii) the identity of all persons, authorities, institutions and organisations involved in [gross violations of human rights]

(iv) the question whether such violations were the result of deliberate planning on the part of the State or a former state or any of their organs, or of any political organisation, liberation movement or other group or individual; and

(v) accountability, political or otherwise, for any such violations.

66 In the light of the above and of the evidence received, the Commission is of the view that gross violations of human rights were perpetrated or facilitated by all the major role-players in the conflicts of the mandate era. These include:

a The state and its security, intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, the SAP, the SADF and the NIS.

b Groups and institutions which, to a greater or lesser extent, were affiliated or allied to the state in an official capacity. These include homeland governments and their security forces as well as groups and institutions informally allied to the state or receiving financial or logistic assistance from the state in order to oppose and/or withstand the liberation movements and their internal allies. Groups falling into this category include the IFP and conservative surrogate organisations and groupings like the witdoeke, AmaAfrika and the Eagles.

c White right-wing organisations which, while actively opposing the state, actively and violently took action to preserve the status quo in the 1990s. These include the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), the Afrikaner Volksfront and the Boere Bevrydingsbeweging.

d Liberation movements and organisations which sought to bring about change through armed struggle and which operated outside South Africa and by covert and underground means inside the country.
e Organisations which sought to bring about change by non-violent means prior to and post-1990, including the United Democratic Front; and

f Non-state paramilitary formations such as the ANC’s self-defence units and the IFP’s self-protection units (SPUs).

67 Evidence before the Commission indicates that all of the above were responsible for gross violations of human rights – including killing, attempted killing, torture and severe ill treatment – at different stages during the mandate period and that, to varying degrees, such violations entailed deliberate planning on the part of the organisations and institutions concerned, or were of such a nature that the organisations are accountable for them.

68 At the same time, the Commission is not of the view that all such parties can be held to be equally culpable for violations committed in the mandate period. Indeed, the evidence accumulated by the Commission and documented in this report shows that this was not the case. The preponderance of responsibility rests with the state and its allies.

69 Even if it were true that both the major groupings to the conflicts of the mandate era – the state and its allies and the liberation movements – had been equally culpable, the preponderance of responsibility would still rest with the state.

70 The mandate to investigate and report on violations committed by all parties to the conflict placed a responsibility on the Commission to work in a balanced and even-handed way. This is an issue with which the Commission grappled long and hard and in respect of which it has been repeatedly criticised. In attempting to develop a framework in which to exercise such a responsibility meaningfully, the Commission was guided by three broad principles:

71 In the first place, as argued in the chapter on The Mandate, the Commission followed the internationally accepted position that apartheid was a crime against humanity. Accordingly, it upheld and endorsed the liberation movements’ argument that they were engaged in a just war. Further, the Commission was also guided by international humanitarian law, and specifically the Geneva Conventions, in its evaluation of the concept of a ‘just war’. Just war does not legitimate the perpetration of gross violations of human rights in pursuit of a just end. Hence the Commission believes that violations committed in the course of a just war should be subjected to the same rigorous scrutiny as violations committed by
the former state. The Commission’s position in this regard is clearly articulated in the chapter on The Mandate. A just cause does not exempt an organisation from pursuing its goals through just means. Moreover, the evidence shows that the perpetration of gross violations of human rights by non-state actors often took place in circumstances where they were acting in opposition to the official state ideology and the policy of apartheid. In this sense, it was the state that generated violent political conflict in the mandate period – either through its own direct action or by eliciting reactions to its policies and strategies.

72 Secondly, the Commission is of the view that the measures used to assess the actions of a legally constituted and elected government cannot be the same as those used in the case of a voluntary grouping of individuals who come together in pursuit of certain commonly agreed goals. A state has powers, resources, obligations, responsibilities and privileges that are much greater than those of any group within that state. It must therefore be held to a higher standard of moral and political conduct than are voluntary associations operating within its political terrain – particularly where they operate underground with limited communication and less-developed structures of accountability.

73 Third, the Commission has always been violation driven. Its task in this respect was to identify those responsible for gross human rights violations. Having identified the former state and the IFP as undoubtedly responsible for the greatest number of violations, the Commission directed its resources towards the investigation of those bodies.

74 It would, however, be misleading and wrong to assign blame for the gross violation of human rights only to those who confronted each other on the political and military battlefields, engaged in acts of commission. Others, like the church or faith groups, the media, the legal profession, the judiciary, the magistracy, the medical/health, educational and business sectors, are found by the Commission to have been guilty of acts of omission in that they failed to adhere or live up to the ethics of their profession and to accepted codes of conduct.

75 It is also the view of the Commission that these sectors failed not so much out of fear of the powers and wrath of the state – although those were not insignificant factors – but primarily because they were the beneficiaries of the state system. They prospered from it by staying silent. By doing nothing or not enough, they contributed to the emergence of a culture of impunity within which the gross violations of human rights documented in this report could and did occur.
These then are, in summary, the main findings of the Commission, while more specific findings appear in the body of the report. The Commission’s case in regard to the primary actors to the conflicts of the past is developed below.

### PRIMARY FINDING

On the basis of the evidence available to it, the primary finding of the Commission is that:

**THE PREDOMINANT PORTION OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WAS COMMITTED BY THE FORMER STATE THROUGH ITS SECURITY AND LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.**

**MOREOVER, THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE IN THE PERIOD FROM THE LATE 1970S TO EARLY 1990S BECAME INVOLVED IN ACTIVITIES OF A CRIMINAL NATURE WHEN, AMONGST OTHER THINGS, IT KNOWINGLY PLANNED, UNDERTOOK, CONDONED AND COVERED UP THE COMMISSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS, INCLUDING THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS AND OTHERS, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA.**

**IN PURSUIT OF THESE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES, THE STATE ACTED IN COLLUSION WITH CERTAIN OTHER POLITICAL GROUPINGS, MOST NOTABLY THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY (IFP).**

### FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF THE STATE AND ITS ALLIES

I further do not believe the political defence of ‘we did not know’ is available to me because in many respects I believe we did not want to know. (Mr Leon Wessels, State Security Council hearing.)

The Security Forces will hammer them, wherever they find them. What I am saying is the policy of the government. We will not sit here with hands folded waiting for them to cross our borders. We shall carry out ongoing surveillance. We shall determine the correct targets and we shall settle the hash of those terrorists, their fellow-travellers and those who help them. (General Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence, parliamentary speech, 4 February 1986.)

All the powers were to avoid the ANC/SACP achieving their revolutionary aims and often with the approval of the previous government we had to move outside the boundaries of our law. That inevitably led to the fact that the capabilities of the SAP, especially the security forces, included illegal acts. (General Johan van der Merwe, former commissioner of police, armed forces hearing.)

There was never any lack of clarity about ‘take out’ or ‘eliminate’, it meant that the person had to be killed. (Brigadier Alfred Oosthuizen, former head of Security Branch intelligence section, armed forces hearing.)
As previously stated, the Commission’s evidence indicates that the state – in particular its security agencies and affiliated policy and strategy formulation committees and councils (such as the SSC) – was responsible for the greatest number of gross violations of human rights committed during the thirty-four-year mandate period.

The Commission concluded that, at a certain point in the mandate period, the state resorted to unlawful ways of dealing with challenges to its authority. The period during which the South African state ventured into the realm of criminal misconduct stretches from PW Botha’s accession to power in 1978 into the early 1990s, including a part of the period in which his successor held office.

At the beginning of the mandate period, the system of government in the country was undoubtedly an unjust and discriminatory one, but it was still essentially a system of laws, albeit unjust laws. In the course of the first two decades of the mandate period, the rule of law was steadily eroded and the system of public administration purged of its remaining democratic substance. By the time President Botha took power, the system was characterised by severe repression. It had not yet, however, adopted a policy of killing its opponents.

This is not to suggest that prior to 1978 the state did not kill its opponents. Indeed, it had just recently killed hundreds in its suppression of the Soweto uprising. The mandate period itself began with a massacre of protesters at Sharpville in 1960. These two sets of killings, and numbers of other routine killings of demonstrators, occurred in the course of the SAP’s public-order policing policy involving, in the Commission’s view, an unjustifiable use of deadly force.

Deplorable and racist though this security policy was (and the Commission has made a finding declaring it to have been a gross violation of human rights), it did not at that time involve the systematic targeting of certain categories of political activists for killing by high echelons of state. Evidence placed before the Commission indicates, however, that from the late 1970s, senior politicians – as well as police, national intelligence and defence force leaders – developed a strategy to deal with opposition to the government. This entailed, among other actions, the unlawful killing, within and beyond South Africa, of people whom they perceived as posing a significant challenge to the state’s authority.

Killing is the most extreme human rights violation. Any legally constituted state that executes people outside of its own existing legal framework enters the realm of criminality and must, from that point on, be regarded as unlawful.
Findings on the SSC and the policy of elimination

84 The basis for the following finding can be found in Volume Two of this report, in particular in the sections that deal with the killing of MK operatives and other political opponents. Because of the seriousness of this charge, a summary of the arguments and reasons for the adoption of the finding is included here.

85 Volume Two charts the intensification of the conflict during the 1980s, and the development of a ‘total strategy’ by senior politicians and security force personnel to meet what was considered a ‘revolutionary onslaught’. It has been noted that, for the first five to seven years of the Botha administration, the security forces engaged in various forms of counter-revolutionary warfare with the states it perceived as a threat to the existence of that administration. With the intensification of conflict inside South Africa in the mid-1980s, tactics that had worked externally began to be applied on the domestic front.

86 The domestic application of an essentially military counter-revolutionary strategy was a significant landmark. Whereas the SADF had previously directed its military operations at external targets, it now began to play an increasing role in support of the SAP inside South Africa. The policing of internal resistance became militarised.

87 Military operations aim at eliminating enemy personnel, weaponry and bases. Hence, as a military approach to policing gained ascendancy inside South Africa from the mid-1980s, so too did the incidence of killing or ‘eliminating’ activists, which had already become an established practice outside the country.

88 This application of a more military-style approach to opposing internal dissent was the expressed policy of the SSC, perhaps the most influential body in South Africa at the time. Although the SSC was merely an advisory body to cabinet and had no executive powers of its own, its decisions were almost always accepted or adopted by cabinet. All the key cabinet ministers sat on the SSC, as did the leadership of the security forces. The SSC also formed the pinnacle of a vast network of joint security structures in the form of the National Security Management System (NSMS), which extended from national to local level. Thus the SSC carried enormous influence. Its decisions both reflected and influenced the perceptions and mindsets of senior politicians and security force personnel. Members of the security forces who participated in SSC- or NSMS-linked structures, and to whom decisions or policy were communicated, would have regarded those decisions as specific instructions or general authorisation.
It seems highly improbable to this Commission that the members of the SSC did not foresee the possible consequences of such a shift in counter-revolutionary strategy. Indeed, their increasingly strident language and rhetoric on both public platforms and in documents was laced with phrases such as:

‘elimineer vyandelike leiers’ (eliminate enemy leaders)
‘neutralise intimidators by using formal and informal policing’
‘destroy terrorists’
‘fisiese vernietiging – mense, fasiliete, fondse, ens’ (physical destruction – people, facilities, funds, etc)
‘uithaal’ (take out),
‘neutraliseer’ (neutralise),
‘uitwis’ (wipe out),
‘verwyder’ (remove/ cause to disappear),
‘maak ’n plan’ (make a plan),
‘metodes ander as aanhouding’ (methods other than detention),
‘onkonvensionele metodes’ (unconventional methods).

This rhetoric made no distinction between persons engaged in military operations or acts of terrorism and those who opposed apartheid by lawful or peaceful means. The word ‘terrorist’ was used constantly, but never defined. Nor was a distinction drawn between activists and those who only supported or associated with them. All were lumped together as one target – a single category of persons to be killed. Whether one carried a gun, or only shared a bed or offered food and shelter to the combatant, seems to have been a matter of indifference to the total strategists. In the opinion of the Commission, the kind of rhetoric employed by politicians and SSC functionaries was reckless, inflammatory and an incitement to unlawful acts.

This led to a blurred distinction in the minds of the security forces between persons who posed a real danger to public safety and those who simply opposed the policies of the government, and consequently between those who might be legitimate targets of military action and those who were not. The sheer scale of resistance, the time-consuming and resource-intensive nature of prosecutions and the widespread reluctance of ordinary people to testify in courts of law resulted in a shift to unlawful methods of combating resistance. This shift was
conceeded by numerous high-ranking security force members, including former police commissioner Johan van der Merwe (see above quotation).

92 At the Commission’s hearings on the SSC, senior politicians and some senior military and intelligence heads argued emphatically that although what they referred to as “ambiguous language” might or could have been interpreted as authorising illegal conduct, it was not the intention of the SSC or the cabinet that any illegal acts or actions should be undertaken.

93 This view was in sharp contrast to that of security force operatives who said that the word ‘eliminate’ could, in certain circumstances, mean ‘kill’, or that they interpreted it as meaning ‘kill’. General Johan van der Merwe, himself a member of the SSC during his period of office as police commissioner, testified thus:

If you tell a soldier “eliminate your enemy”, depending on the circumstances he will understand that means killing. It is not the only meaning, but it is specifically one meaning. (Armed forces hearing, transcript, p. 32.)

94 He said that the use of this language at the SSC did cause security forces to take actions that resulted in the death of activists:

Commission: ... I am saying would you agree that that unfortunate use of that language, "vernietig", "uitroei", "uit te wis", "elimineer" [destroy, eradicate, to wipe out, eliminate] and so on, ... resulted in deaths, would you agree with that?

General van der Merwe: Yes Mr Chairman. (Ibid, p. 34.)

95 It is in this context that one must evaluate the use by the SSC of words such as ‘elimineer’, ‘neutraliseer’, ‘uitwis’, ‘verwyder’ in relation to steps to be taken against members of the ANC and their sympathisers.

96 Consequently, the Commission cannot accept that members of the security forces serving on the SSC, and ministers in charge of security portfolios, did not reasonably foresee that such words could be interpreted by members of the security forces as authorisation under certain circumstances to kill persons involved in resistance.

97 The Commission makes this assertion for a number of reasons:

a If the decisions or recommendations of the SSC and its plans were intended to authorise only lawful steps, as alleged by members like Mr de Klerk,
General Magnus Malan and Dr LD (Niel) Barnard, these should have been explicitly spelt out. If the intention was to detain, restrict, arrest, ban or deport, it is incomprehensible that such words were not used rather than words such as ‘elimineer’ and ‘verwyder’. It is also incomprehensible that senior politicians and other members of the SSC did not, where they considered the instructions vague or imprecise, alter any of the documents submitted to them and replace them with words whose meaning was perfectly clear.

b Words such as ‘elimineer’ and ‘neutraliseer’ are used in earlier SSC documents with the unambiguous meaning of ‘kill’ or ‘assassinate’.

c All military and police structures operate on a basis of clear and precise instructions and have conventions of service writing that stress the necessity of operatives knowing and understanding exactly what is required and expected of them. Given that the SSC was central to an essentially militarily driven strategy, one must conclude that these words were intended to mean exactly what they said.

d The Commission does not believe it possible that senior politicians and generals in charge of the security forces could be so out of touch with the mindsets and discourses of the period that they did not anticipate, understand and foresee the consequences of the decisions they took in the SSC. The Commission’s view is that they must have foreseen that security police and SADF operatives would interpret expressions as ‘take out’, ‘wipe out’, ‘eradicate’ and ‘eliminate’ as meaning ‘kill’. Indeed, it is the Commission’s view that SSC documents represent a perfect illustration of the notion of plausible deniability. The Commission rejects attempts by politicians to phrase instructions in a way that causes their subordinates to take responsibility for acts of which the politicians are the intellectual authors.

e A further basis for concluding that members of the SSC did foresee that the use of words such as ‘eliminate’ would result in deaths is that there is no evidence of any attempt by the SSC to set in motion any substantive or comprehensive investigation into the killing of political opponents once this began to happen. Although there were police investigations after each killing, these were often manifestly inadequate and often took the form of cover-ups. Neither did the SSC at any stage issue any statement or directive clarifying its orders and strategies to the effect that they should under no circumstances be interpreted

---

\[1\] See, for example, SADF ‘Conventions of Service Writing’ or the SAP’s guidelines for writing reports, both of which stress the importance of using language that cannot be misinterpreted given the long chains of command through which instructions, orders and policy must pass.
as authorisation for illegal activities. This failure is aggravated by the fact that Dr Niel Barnard, former head of NIS and a member of the SSC, did draw to the attention of the chairperson of the SSC, Mr PW Botha, that he had received information that there were ‘misunderstandings’ by the security forces and that he was concerned that they might be engaged in unlawful activities.

98 There was extensive coverage of the deaths of prominent anti-apartheid activists in both the international and local media and, in many instances, strong suspicion was directed at the security forces. Despite this, there was a consistent failure to devote sufficient attention to this information or to heed the protests of persons drawing attention to abuses by the security forces. This is summed up in the words of a former Minister of Law and Order, Mr Leon Wessels, to the effect that ‘we did not wish to know’.

99 It is on these grounds that the Commission finds in relation to members of the SSC, that:


THE COMMISSION THEREFORE FINDS THEM TO BE PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH DID OCCUR AND, FURTHERMORE, THAT THE SSC WAS AN INSTITUTION INVOLVED IN GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS [IN TERMS OF SECTION 4(A)(III) OF THE ACT].

CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE SSC (PARTICULARLY THOSE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SECURITY MATTERS) DID NOT FORESEE THAT THE USE OF THESE WORDS WOULD RESULT IN KILLINGS, BUT NEVERTHELESS REMAIN POLITICALLY AND MORALLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE DEATHS THAT OCCURRED [IN TERMS OF SECTION 4(A)(V) OF THE ACT] FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS. THEY FAILED TO EXERCISE PROPER CARE IN THE WORDS THEY USED; THEY FAILED PROPERLY TO INVESTIGATE KILLINGS THAT OCCURRED AND THEY FAILED TO HEED COMPLAINTS ABOUT ABUSE. THROUGH THEIR USE OF MILITANT RHETORIC, THEY ALSO CREATED A CLIMATE WHERE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WERE POSSIBLE. THEY ARE THEREFORE GUILTY OF ‘OFFICIAL TOLERANCE’ OF VIOLATIONS AND ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR SUCH VIOLATIONS.

Findings on the state and unlawful activities

100 This finding forms a major part of the Commission’s overall conclusion that the South African state in the 1980s and early 1990s engaged in or undertook a range of unlawful activities. Other evidence to support this assertion is, in brief:
a The admission by both senior security force officers and security police operatives that they were ordered by either the then State President or senior members of the government to:

• commit criminal acts of sabotage by blowing up such public facilities as the diplomatic mission of the ANC in London, the offices of the South African Council of Churches (SACC – Khotso House), the South African Catholic Bishops’ Conference (Khanya House) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU);

• undertake a ‘false-flag’ operation in the form of the placing and uncovering of an arms cache in order to provide a pretext for the state’s armed forces to attack targets in an independent neighbouring state, in a clear violation of international law.

b Evidence presented to the Commission that certain sections of the security police, such as the Soweto Intelligence Unit, undertook illegal acts such as sabotage and arson, within and outside the country, in order to give credibility to their agents.

c Evidence from security police members that, in the latter 1980s, they sometimes deliberately circumvented what they saw as negative or adverse court decisions by, for example, killing alleged political activists acquitted in political trials.

d Evidence presented to the Commission under oath and by way of amnesty applications that, on the instruction of their senior officers, security police members abducted MK cadres, executed them when they refused to co-operate and buried them secretly on farms owned or rented by the police.

e Evidence presented under oath to the Commission by the former secretary of a state structure, the Joint Management Centre (JMC), that he was instructed by a senior police officer to arrange and facilitate the attack on a suspected UDF house in Trustfeeds, KwaZulu-Natal, in which eleven people were killed, and that the subsequent investigation into the killing was covered up at the highest level.

f Evidence presented under oath to the Commission that the South African government authorised and financed the formation of a clandestine security force unit (the CCB) whose objective was to “inflict maximal damage to the enemy”\(^1\) including, among other actions, the killing of political opponents.

---

\(^{1}\) Hendrik Christoffel Nel in section 29 hearing, dated 18 May 1998, p51 (quoting CCB planning document for 1987).
Evidence made available to the Commission that, after 1990, MI devised an official plan to abduct and/or assassinate Mr Chris Hani and Mr Bantu Holomisa.

Evidence presented to the Commission of covert assistance given by the SADF to the IFP to establish, train, arm and pay an offensive para-military unit or hit squad to be deployed against mutual enemies of the state and the IFP.

Evidence in the possession of the Commission that it was state policy to foster division between communities and organisations, and that security force and state officials gave material and other support to conservative groupings which frequently engaged in violent attacks on political opponents of the government.

Evidence made available to the Commission that the South African government armed, trained, financed and in other ways assisted foreign nationals to undertake military operations against neighbouring governments in violation of international law and the sovereignty of those states; and further that these domestically generated foreign wars and military operations resulted in the gross violation of the human rights of non-South African nationals on a vast scale.

Evidence presented under oath to the Commission that the weapons used in a state-planned massacre of alleged government opponents were given over to a state corporation (ISCOR) for smelting in order to destroy the evidence of a crime.

Evidence presented under oath to the Commission that high-ranking members of a state corporation (ESKOM) attempted to make available or sell a portion of its armoury to a political party engaged in a civil war – in the knowledge that those weapons could or would be used against alleged ANC supporters. This was authorised and done with the knowledge of the commissioner of police. The ESKOM deal formed only a small part of a wider practice of covert shipment of arms by state operatives to groups engaged in violent activities against opponents of the government.

Evidence presented under oath to the Commission that air hostesses of the state carrier, South African Airways, were required or put under pressure to eavesdrop on passengers’ conversations and to report those of a suspicious nature to the security police.
n Evidence made available to the Commission that state or public vehicles, such as ambulances, were used to transport weapons supplied by the state to surrogates for use against opponents of the state.

o Evidence presented under oath to the Commission that members of the security police placed explosives in cinemas showing the film Cry Freedom, thus committing serious criminal offences. Earlier, the state had tried unsuccessfully to obtain a ruling from another state body prohibiting the screening of the film. This action reflects an attitude that the security police would not be impeded by the law in the pursuit of their objectives.

p Evidence presented under oath to the Commission that on a number of occasions, and usually at the behest of their superiors, members of the security forces presented false testimony at court inquests, including those dealing with the deaths in detention of Mr Stanza Bopape and Mr Steve Biko, as well as to trials of alleged political offenders and state commissions like the Harms Commission. The Commission also received evidence of deliberate falsification and/or destruction of evidence, and of widespread and deliberate cover-ups of investigations including the hiding of persons accused of killings, in SADF bases.

q Evidence presented under oath by former Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok, and in other amnesty applications, that strategic communication (Stratcom) activities transgressed the law.

r Evidence presented to the Commission of a widespread system of covert funding of secret operations, involving the expenditure of more than R2.75 billion in the period 1978–94. Though the funding system was not illegal in terms of existing statutory law, there is evidence that portions of those funds were used in the pursuit of unlawful activities, such as those undertaken by the CCB. In a report submitted to the Commission on secret state funding, the Auditor-General stated that certain secret projects of the SADF were never subjected to a full audit. Access to the operational files of the CCB was consistently denied by its so-called managing director, who was a high-ranking Special Forces officer. The Commission regards the following statement made to the Commission by the Auditor-General as significant:

The Office has always maintained and has publicly reported that the audit assurance obtained from auditing secret funds is lower than would normally be the case. It is with regret that, because of the inherent limitations of any audit as well as the particular circumstances set out earlier, the Office must
accept that expenditure audited by it may have been incurred, or assets may have been acquired, from the relevant secret funds for the purpose of committing gross violation of human rights.

This Commission believes it can be more emphatic than the Auditor-General in asserting that some of these funds were used for unlawful activities. The CCB is a clear instance. Project Echoes involved the spreading of disinformation about ANC and MK leaders in the post-1990 period and amounted in large part to an exercise in criminal defamation.

101 Arising from the above, and from evidence presented in Volume Two of this report, the Commission makes the following findings in respect of the state’s involvement in gross violations of human rights during the period 1960–94:

THE COMMISSION ENDORSES THE POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT APARTHEID AS A FORM OF SYSTEMATIC RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND SEPARATION CONSTITUTED A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY.

WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT:


- IN THE APPLICATION OF THE POLICY OF APARTHEID, THE STATE IN THE COMMISSION’S MANDATE PERIOD WAS INCREASINGLY AUTHORITARIAN IN NATURE AND INTOLERANT OF DISSENT. THIS WAS MANIFESTED, INTER ALIA, IN A HOST OF LEGISLATIVE MEASURES WHICH SEVERELY ABRIDGED THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND LIMITED THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

- THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL ORDER IN THE MANDATE PERIOD WAS FACILITATED BY A CULTURE OF IMPUNITY WHICH EMERGED AS A RESULT OF LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER MEASURES BY THE STATE, AND BY THE FAILURE, LARGELY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF STATE PRESSURE, OF ORGANS OF CIVIL SOCIETY - POLITICAL PARTIES, THE MASS MEDIA, FAITH, BUSINESS, LEGAL, MEDICAL AND OTHER GROUPS - TO OBSERVE AND ADHERE TO THE CODES AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT INTEGRAL TO THEIR PROFESSIONS.

AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THESE FACTORS, THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE STATE PERPETRATED, AMONG OTHERS, THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AND/OR SOUTHERN AFRICA:

- TORTURE, INCLUDING NOT ONLY THE INTENTIONAL INFLICION OF PAIN BUT ALSO DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT;
- ABDUCTION, INVOLVING THE FORCIBLE AND ILLEGAL REMOVAL OR CAPTURE OF PEOPLE, OFTEN FROM BEYOND THE BORDERS OF SOUTH AFRICA;
- THE UNJUSTIFIED USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN SITUATIONS WHERE LESSER MEASURES WOULD HAVE BEEN ADEQUATE TO CONTROL DEMONSTRATIONS OR DETAIN OR ARREST SUSPECTS;
- THE DELIBERATE MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL DIVISIONS IN SOCIETY WITH THE INTENTION OF MOBILISING ONE GROUP AGAINST ANOTHER, RESULTING, AT TIMES, IN VIOLENT CLASHES;
- THE ARMING, FUNDING AND TRAINING OF FOREIGN NATIONALS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE REGION;
- INCURSIONS ACROSS SOUTH AFRICA’S BORDERS WITH THE INTENTION OF KILLING OR ABDUCTING OPPONENTS LIVING OUTSIDE OF SOUTH AFRICA;
- JUDICIAL KILLINGS, INVOLVING THE EXECUTION OF OPPONENTS FOR OFFENCES OF A POLITICAL AND NOT A CRIMINAL NATURE;
- EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS IN THE FORM OF STATE-PLANNED AND EXECUTED ASSASSINATIONS, ATTEMPTED KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES, ABDUCTIONS AND SO-CALLED ‘ENTRAPMENT KILLINGS’, WHERE INDIVIDUALS WERE DELIBERATELY ENTICED INTO SITUATIONS;
- THE COVERT TRAINING, ARMING AND FUNDING OF OFFENSIVE PARAMILITARY UNITS OR HIT SQUADS FOR DEPLOYMENT INTERNALLY AGAINST OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

Finding on former President PW Botha

102 Mr PW Botha presided as executive head of the former South African government (the government) from 1978 to 1984 as Prime Minister, and from 1984 to 1989 as Executive State President. Given his centrality in the politics of the 1970s and 1980s, the Commission has made a finding on the role of former the State President:

DURING THE PERIOD THAT HE PRESIDED AS HEAD OF STATE (1978-1989), ACCORDING TO SUBMISSIONS MADE TO, AND FINDINGS MADE BY, THE COMMISSION, GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER UNLAWFUL ACTS WERE PERPETRATED ON A WIDE SCALE BY MEMBERS OF THE FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE (SAP) AND THE FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE (SADF), AMONG OTHERS. SUCH VIOLATIONS INCLUDED:
• THE DELIBERATE UNLAWFUL KILLING, AND ATTEMPTED KILLING, OF PERSONS OPPOSED TO THE POLICIES OF THE GOVERNMENT, WITHIN AND OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA;

• THE WIDESPREAD USE OF TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF SEVERE ILL TREATMENT AGAINST SUCH PERSONS;

• THE FORCIBLE ABDUCTION OF SUCH PERSONS WHO WERE RESIDENT IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES;

• COVERT LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO ORGANISATIONS OPPOSED TO THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANC AND OTHER LIBERATION MOVEMENTS BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF SOUTH AFRICA, ENABLING THOSE ORGANISATIONS TO COMMIT GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ON A WIDE SCALE WITHIN AND BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THIS COUNTRY;

• ACTS OF ARSON AND SABOTAGE AGAINST THE PROPERTY OF PERSONS AND ORGANISATIONS OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT, WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY.

DURING THE PERIOD 1979–89, MR PW BOTHA CHAIRED THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL (SSC), ESTABLISHED TO ADVISE THE GOVERNMENT ON NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES WHICH WERE, OR WERE PERCEIVED TO BE, A THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT. UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP, THE SSC –

• PLACED GREAT PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT’S SECURITY FORCES TO ENGAGE ROBUSTLY AGAINST ORGANISATIONS AND PERSONS OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT, IN THEIR PERCEIVED ONSLAUGHT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT;

• USED LANGUAGE IN ITS MEETINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WAS HIGHLY AMBIGUOUS AND WAS INTERPRETED BY PERSONS WITH ACCESS TO THE MEETINGS, THEIR MINUTES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, AS AUTHORISING THE KILLING OF PEOPLE;

• FAILED TO RECOMMEND TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT APPROPRIATE STEPS BE TAKEN AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES WHO WERE INVOLVED IN OR WHO WERE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THUS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PREVAILING CULTURE OF IMPUNITY;

• RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IMPOSE STATES OF EMERGENCY, UNDER WHICH GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTED AGAINST PERSONS OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT INCREASED, AND ASSISTED THE GOVERNMENT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATES OF EMERGENCY;

• RECOMMENDED THE ADOPTION OF PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE WHICH LED TO THE INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL UNITS OF THE SADF IN SUPPORT OF THE SAP IN SOUTH AFRICA, RESULTING IN A SHIFT OF FOCUS IN POLICING FROM ARRESTING AND CHARGING OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO ELIMINATING OPPONENTS AND THEIR BASES;

• RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT COVERT PROJECTS AIMED AT OPPOSING AND DESTABILISING THE GOVERNMENTS OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WHICH WERE SUPPORTIVE OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS;

• RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT COVERT PROJECTS TO HELP DESTABILISE AND OPPOSE ORGANISATIONS AND PEOPLE OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT.
AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE SSC CREATED A POLITICAL CLIMATE THAT GREATLY FACILITATED THE GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IN WHICH SUCH VIOLATIONS OCCURRED ON A WIDE SCALE.

MR BOTHA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ORDERING FORMER MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER ADRIAAN VLOK AND FORMER POLICE COMMISSIONER JOHAN VAN DER MERWE UNLAWFULLY TO DESTROY KHOTSO HOUSE IN JOHANNESBURG, (A BUILDING OCCUPIED BY ORGANISATIONS CONSIDERED BY BOTHA TO BE A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE GOVERNMENT), THEREBY ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF PEOPLE IN AND AROUND THE BUILDING. THIS DECISION GREATLY ENHANCED THE PREVAILING CULTURE OF IMPUNITY AND FACILITATED THE FURTHER GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES.

FOR THE REASONS SET OUT ABOVE AND BY VIRTUE OF HIS POSITION AS HEAD OF STATE AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE SSC, BOTHA CONTRIBUTED TO AND FACILITATED A CLIMATE IN WHICH THE ABOVE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS COULD AND DID OCCUR, AND AS SUCH IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR SUCH VIOLATIONS.

Finding on former State President FW de Klerk

103
Findings on the destruction of documents by the former state

Reference has already been made to the extensive destruction of documents by the former state (see Volume One). The following is a summary of the Commission’s finding with regard to this issue:

THE FORMER GOVERNMENT DELIBERATELY AND SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYED STATE DOCUMENTATION OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. THIS PROCESS BEGAN IN 1978, WHEN CLASSIFIED RECORDS WERE ROUTINELY DESTROYED, SUPPOSEDLY IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD STATE SECURITY. BY THE 1990S THE PROCESS OF DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS HAD BECOME A CO-ORDINATED ENDEAVOUR, SANCTIONED BY THE CABINET, WITH THE AIM OF DENYING A NEW GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO INCriminating EVIDence AND SANITISING THE HISTORY OF THE Apartheid ERA.

THE DESTRUCTION PROCESS TOOK PLACE AS FOLLOWS:


• IN 1988, THE BULK OF THE CLASSIFIED RECORDS OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA TERRITORY FORCE WERE DESTROYED.


• IN NOVEMBER 1991, THE NIS ATTEMPTED TO COLLECT ALL NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NSMS) RECORDS, IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT SELECTIVE DESTRUCTION.


• ON 2 JUNE 1993, CABINET APPROVED GUIDELINES FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ‘STATE SENSITIVE’ RECORDS ACROSS ALL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. THE GUIDELINES WERE SUBMITTED TO CABINET BY THE SSC AND INCORPORATED THE PRINCIPLES OF THE 3 JULY 1992 AUTHORISATION REFERRED TO ABOVE. THE SADF AND OTHER GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IMMEDIATELY BEGAN SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION PROGRAMMES.

• IN JULY 1993, THE SECURITY SECRETARIAT ADVISED GOVERNMENT OFFICES TO DESTROY CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF CLASSIFIED RECORDS. WIDESPREAD IMPLEMENTATION FOLLOWED.
THE MASS DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS OUTLINED ABOVE HAS HAD A SEVERE IMPACT ON SOUTH AF RICA’S SOCIAL MEMORY. VAST AMOUNTS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION, PARTICULARLY AROUND THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE STATE’S SECURITY APPARATUS, HAVE BEEN OBLITERATED. MOREOVER, THE APPARENT COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF ALL RECORDS CONFISCATED FROM INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANISATIONS BY THE SECURITY BRANCH OF THE SAP HAS REMOVED FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S HERITAGE A VALUABLE DOCUMENTATION OF EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID.

THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION HAS SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF THIS WHOLESALE DESTRUCTION. NUMEROUS INVESTIGATIONS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WERE SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE ABSENCE OF DOCUMENTATION. ULTIMATELY ALL SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE SUFFERED THE CONSEQUENCES, IN THAT THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND HEALING THROUGH A DISCLOSURE OF THE PAST HAS BEEN DELIBERATELY CURTAILED.


### FINDINGS ON THE ROLE OF ALLIES OF THE STATE

#### The homelands

106 As has been stated above, the state was not acting alone in its strategies involving gross human rights violations. It had the active and passive support of numerous other elements in society. One of these was the white electorate which returned the National Party to power in one election after another. Others were the institutional creations of the apartheid system and the political parties that operated largely within these creations. The homeland or bantustan system gave rise to a set of semi-autonomous security and law-enforcement structures and such political groupings as the Inkatha Freedom Party.

107 So-called independent and semi-autonomous homelands emerged on the political landscape of South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. From the outset, they were sites of steadily escalating resistance and repression. All forms of human rights abuse (torture, extra-judicial killings, unjustifiable use of deadly force etc) which occurred within so-called white South Africa were also found in the homelands arena. Indeed, such factors as a lack of public attention or scrutiny, little media interest and weak civil society structures, created an environment in the homelands that was even more conducive to gross violations of human rights than the wider South African society.
In consequence, human rights were grossly violated on a vast scale. The great majority of those who suffered human rights abuses in South Africa in the mandate period were the victims of black perpetrators, acting in many cases as surrogates for the South African government. Nowhere is this more true than in Natal and KwaZulu. It is for this reason that the IFP is the only homeland-based party and the KwaZulu Police (KZP) the only homeland security structure singled out by the Commission for specific findings.

Before focusing on those two entities, the Commission has made the following general finding on the homelands system:

THE FORMER STATE’S POLICY OF ESTABLISHING ETHNICALLY SEPARATE RESERVATIONS LAY AT THE CORE OF ITS POLICY OF TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL SEPARATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE. THE POLICY WAS AN EXTENSION OF A COLONIALLY ESTABLISHED PRACTICE OF ‘DIVIDE AND RULE’ AND HAD THE DUAL AIM OF SEEKING TO INHIBIT OR DIVERT THE STRUGGLE BY AFRICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING AND PRESERVING THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PRIVILEGES OF THE WHITE MINORITY.

THE ADMINISTRATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS THAT PRESIDED OVER THE VARIOUS HOMELANDS WERE, ACCORDINGLY, A CORNERSTONE OF THE STATE’S POLICY OF APARTHEID IN THAT THEY PURPORTED TO GRANT FULL POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS TO BLACK CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC GROUPINGS, BUT ONLY WITHIN DEFINED LIMITED GEOGRAPHIC AND ETHNICALLY EXCLUSIVE ENCLAVES. ECONOMICALLY, THEY REMAINED NON-VIABLE, WHICH LEFT THEM LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO COLLABORATE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE ON SECURITY AND RELATED MATTERS, AND FUNCTION AS EXTENSIONS OF THAT STATE AND AS INSTRUMENTS OF ITS SECURITY FORCES. THIS DOES NOT, HOWEVER, EXONERATE THEM OR THEIR LEADERS FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS PERPETRATED IN THE HOMELANDS.

HOMELAND GOVERNMENTS IMPLEMENTED SYSTEMS OF RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION WHICH LED TO WIDESPREAD ABUSES AND GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AS DID THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL CODES BY CHIEFS AND HEADMEN.

HOMELAND GOVERNMENTS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLICE FORCES AND, IN THE CASE OF THE ‘INDEPENDENT’ HOMELANDS SUCH AS TRANSKEI AND CISKEI, DEFENCE FORCES CHARACTERISED BY INCOMPETENCE, BRUTALITY, AND POLITICAL BIAS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY -

- DISPLAYED BIAS AND PARTIALITY TOWARDS MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE HOMELAND GOVERNMENTS, BOTH THROUGH ACTS OF COMMISSION, WHEN THEY WORKED OPENLY WITH PRO-HOMELAND GOVERNMENT VIGILANTES AND/OR COVERT ARMED GROUPS, AND THROUGH ACTS OF OMISSION WHEN THEY FAILED TO PROTECT OR SERVE THOSE WHO DID NOT SUPPORT THE HOMELAND GOVERNMENTS;

- WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR LARGE NUMBERS OF KILLINGS AND ATTEMPTED KILLINGS AS WELL AS ACTS OF INCITEMENT AND CONSPIRACY TO KILL, SEVERE ILL TREATMENT, ABDUCTION, TORTURE AND ARSON, THE VICTIMS OF WHICH WERE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY NON-SUPPORTERS OF HOMELAND GOVERNMENT;
• WERE INVOLVED IN COVERING UP CRIMES COMMITTED BY SUPPORTERS OF THE HOMELAND GOVERNMENTS. THESE PRACTICES INCLUDED NEGLECTING BASIC INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND DELIBERATELY TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE.

IN KWAZULU SPECIFICALLY, THE HOMELAND GOVERNMENT AND POLICE FORCE (KZP) WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR:

• ENSURING THAT SUSPECTS IN MATTERS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE WERE CONCEALED, OFTEN FOR LENGTHY PERIODS, IN SADF AND OTHER TRAINING CAMPS;

• ISSUING FALSE POLICE CERTIFICATES AND IDENTITY DOCUMENTS TO SUPPORTERS OF THE HOMELAND GOVERNMENTS WHO WERE INVOLVED IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, IN ORDER TO PREVENT THEIR ARREST AND CONVICTION AND TO FACILITATE THEIR CONTINUED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY;

• TAKING PART IN KILLINGS AND PURPORTING TO INVESTIGATE THE VERY CASES IN WHICH THEY HAD BEEN INVOLVED AS PERPETRATORS;

• COLLABORATING WITH MEMBERS OF THE SAP'S SECURITY BRANCH AND SADF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (MI) SECTION IN COVERT ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTS AIMED AT DESTABILISING POPULAR OPPOSITION TO STATE AND HOMELAND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THE HOMELAND SECURITY FORCES ACCOUNTABLE NOT ONLY FOR THE GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS PERPETRATED BY THEIR MEMBERS BUT ALSO FOR THOSE PERPETRATED BY MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE HOMELAND GOVERNMENTS' RULING PARTIES, AS A RESULT OF THE SECURITY FORCES' FAILURE TO ACT AGAINST SUCH MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS. THAT FAILURE ENGENDERED A CLIMATE OF IMPUNITY THAT FACILITATED SUCH GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

AT A POLITICAL LEVEL, THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CITED ABOVE RESTS JOINTLY WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE HOMELANDS.

Findings on the Inkatha Freedom Party

As stated above, gross violations of human rights occurred in all the homelands. In some, like Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and KwaZulu, they occurred on a vast scale. There is, however, one significant difference between KwaZulu and the other three. In the latter, the perpetrators were almost invariably members of the homeland security forces. This was not the case in KwaZulu. Whilst the KwaZulu homeland’s security arm, the KZP, committed large numbers of human rights violations, a far larger number of violations was committed by members, supporters and office-bearers of the IFP itself. It is for this reason that the IFP has been singled out for special attention.

The IFP was the only one of the various homeland political parties to develop a substantial mass base, and whereas in other homelands it was the governments
and their security forces that dominated the political landscape, in KwaZulu it was Inkatha, renamed in 1990 to the Inkatha Freedom Party. The IFP dominated the KwaZulu government – both its executive and its bureaucracy – to the extent that the government and the IFP became interchangeable concepts. The organisation effectively ruled KwaZulu as a one-party state. It further used KwaZulu government resources and finances to fund its party political activities as well as actions constituting gross violations of the human rights of non-Inkatha persons.

112 Both South African government officials and IFP politicians regularly failed to distinguish between the KwaZulu government and the IFP. Vice Admiral Andries Putter, former chief of staff intelligence of the SADF told the Commission:

As far as I can remember, I never myself drew a distinction between Inkatha and the KwaZulu government. In practice ... I did not realise that one could distinguish between Inkatha and the KwaZulu government. It was basically the same organisation.

113 Former IFP National Council member, Mr Walter Felgate, told the Commission:

The interests of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government were indistinguishable. There was never a conflict of interest. I can bring to mind no conflict between Inkatha and the KLA (KwaZulu Legislative Assembly) on any matter of principle, any matter of strategy. They were just one amalgam with operating bases and nexuses of people.

114 A former member of a KZP hit squad, now serving a number of life sentences for murder, told the Commission:

There was no difference between the KwaZulu Police, the IFP and the KwaZulu government. In my opinion they were one entity. I received instructions [to kill people] from Captain Langeni (KZP), Mr MZ Khumalo (KwaZulu government) and [Mr Daluxolo] Luthuli (IFP).

115 As early as 1982, Inkatha began to foster the concept of paramilitary training, particularly among its youth movement. This led to a process by which violence became institutionalised in KwaZulu, with the result that Inkatha supporters turned inexorably to violence and militaristic methods. In the period after July 1990, IFP violence spread to other regions, particularly the Transvaal. The Commission received evidence from thousands of people about attacks and massacres perpetrated by IFP supporters over the twelve-year period from April 1983, the date of the killing of Mr Msizi Dube by hired Inkatha hit-men, to the 1994 pre-election...
killing by an IFP headman of seven members of the Independent Electoral Commission for handing out pamphlets on how to vote.

116 These included:

a the killing by Inkatha members in Hambanathi of members of the Hambanathi Residents Association in August 1983;

b the killing of UDF supporters from 1983–89 by members of the Inkatha-supporting Chesterville ‘A Team’ vigilante group;

c the killing of four students at the University of Zululand in October 1983 (the so-called Ngoye massacre) by some 500 Inkatha Youth Brigade members;

d the killing of fourteen people by Inkatha supporters at the Umlazi Cinema memorial service for Victoria Mxenge in August 1985;

e the establishment in early 1986 of a covert, offensive paramilitary unit trained, armed and paid by Military Intelligence, and their deployment throughout KwaZulu until September 1990, during which the ‘Caprivi trainees’ killed large numbers of people and permanently altered the political landscape in the areas in which they were deployed (see separate finding below);

f the December 1988 joint Inkatha-SAP operation in Trust Feeds which resulted in the death of eleven people;

g the killing of over 100 people and the destruction of 3 000 houses in the March 1990 armed incursion by IFP supporters into the Edenvale area near Pietermaritzburg in what is referred to as the Seven Day War (see finding in regional profile, Volume Three);

h the killing of thirty-four people in two armed attacks by IFP supporters in Bruntville township, Mooi River, in November and December 1990;

i the deployment of a joint KZP-IFP hit squad in Esikhawini township in 1990, and the resultant killing of over 100 people (see separate finding below);

j the deployment of the IFP-based ‘Black Cats’ hit squad in Wesselton and Ermelo in 1990, and the resultant killing of large numbers of people;

k the Sebokeng massacres of July and September 1990, in which seventy-seven people in all were killed by Inkatha supporters;
I the Alexandra night vigil massacre of March 1991, in which fifteen people were killed by Inkatha supporters;

m the Swanieville massacre of May 1991, in which twenty-seven people were killed by Inkatha supporters;

n The Boipatong massacre of June 1992, in which forty-five people were killed by armed groups which included Inkatha supporters;

o the Phola Park and Kathlehong massacres in August 1990, in which forty people were killed by Inkatha supporters;

p the Sebokeng massacre of January 1991, in which forty-five people were killed by IFP supporters;

q the joint IFP/AWB attack and killing at the Flagstaff police station in 1993;

r the 1994 pre-election killings by an IFP Youth League leader in A Section, KwaMashu and an Inkatha headman in Ndwedwe.

117 The above incidents represent iconic events over the past twelve years in which IFP office-bearers, members and supporters were involved in acts of serious political violence. They do not purport to be a complete list of such incidents. However, the most devastating indictment of the role of the IFP in political violence during the Commission’s mandate period is to be found in the statistics compiled by the Commission directly from submissions by victims of gross human rights violations. These established the IFP as the foremost perpetrator of gross human rights violations in KwaZulu and Natal during the 1990–94 period. Indeed, IFP violations constituted almost 50 per cent of all violations reported to the Commission’s Durban office for this period, and over one-third of the total number of gross human rights violations committed during the thirty-four-year period of the Commission’s mandate. The statistics also indicate that IFP members, supporters and office-bearers in KwaZulu and Natal were responsible for more than 55 per cent of all violations reported to the Commission’s Durban office for the period between July 1993 and May 1994.

118 Other statistics derived from the Commission’s database show that Inkatha/the IFP was responsible, in the mandate period, for some 3 800 killings in the Natal and KwaZulu area compared with approximately 1 100 attributed to the ANC and some 700 to the SAP. The IFP remains the major perpetrator of killings on a national scale, being allegedly responsible for over 4 500 killings compared to 2 700
attributed to the SAP and 1 300 to the ANC. These statistics suggest that the IFP was responsible for approximately 3.5 killings for every one killing attributed to the ANC. A graph included in the Natal regional profile (Volume Three) illustrates that in 1987-88 the IFP exceeded even the SAP in terms of numbers of people killed by a single perpetrator organisation.

119 It must be noted here that, for much of the period in which the Commission was able to accept human rights violations statements, the IFP discouraged its members and supporters from making submissions to the Commission. The result is that only about 10 per cent of all statements taken in KwaZulu-Natal came from people linked to the IFP. The significant point is that the statistics derived from the Commission’s database do not diverge from those published by other national and international bodies. All of these are consistent in identifying the IFP as the primary non-state perpetrator of gross human rights abuse in South Africa from the latter 1980s through to 1994.

120 The description of the KwaZulu government and the IFP as state allies derives largely from the covert collaboration of senior Inkatha/IFP office-bearers with senior members of the SAP Security Branch and SADF Military Intelligence. This factor distinguished the IFP from other homeland-based perpetrators, particularly in the 1990s. At a time when it portrayed itself nationally and abroad as a liberation movement, the IFP, through the intervention of its senior members, was receiving direct financial and logistical assistance from the highest echelons of the apartheid state’s security apparatus. Evidence before the Commission indicates that Inkatha’s opposition to the South African government’s policies had changed to covert collaboration by the latter half of the 1980s, and the two had united against a common enemy, the UDF/ANC and their affiliates.

121 The formal finding of the Commission in regard to the IFP is set out below:

DURING THE PERIOD 1982-94, THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY, KNOWN AS INKATHA PRIOR TO JULY 1990 (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS “THE ORGANISATION”) WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTED IN THE FORMER TRANSVAAL, NATAL AND KWAZULU AGAINST:

- PERSONS WHO WERE PERCEIVED TO BE LEADERS, MEMBERS OR SUPPORTERS OF THE UDF, ANC, SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY (SACP) AND COSATU;
- PERSONS WHO WERE IDENTIFIED AS POSING A THREAT TO THE ORGANISATION;
- MEMBERS OR SUPPORTERS OF THE ORGANISATION WHOSE LOYALTY WAS DOUBTED.
IT IS A FURTHER FINDING OF THE COMMISSION THAT SUCH VIOLATIONS FORMED PART OF A SYSTEMATIC PATTERN OF ABUSE WHICH ENTAILED DELIBERATE PLANNING ON THE PART OF THE ORGANISATION.

THE COMMISSION BASED THIS FINDING ON THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS OF THE IFP:

- SPEECHES BY THE IFP PRESIDENT, SENIOR PARTY OFFICIALS AND PERSONS ALIGNED TO THE ORGANISATION’S IDEOLOGY, WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF INCITING SUPPORTERS OF THE ORGANISATION TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE;

- ARMING THE ORGANISATION’S SUPPORTERS WITH WEAPONS IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ARMS AND AMMUNITION, AND EXPLOSIVES AND DANGEROUS WEAPONS ACTS;

- MASS ATTACKS BY SUPPORTERS OF THE ORGANISATION ON COMMUNITIES INHABITED BY PERSONS REFERRED TO ABOVE, RESULTING IN DEATH AND INJURY AND THE DESTRUCTION AND THEFT OF PROPERTY;

- KILLING OF LEADERS OF THE POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS AND PERSONS REFERRED TO ABOVE;

- COLLUSION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT’S SECURITY FORCES TO COMMIT THE VIOLATIONS REFERRED TO ABOVE;

- ENTERING INTO A PACT WITH THE SADF TO CREATE A PARAMILITARY FORCE FOR THE ORGANISATION, WHICH WAS INTENDED TO AND DID CAUSE DEATH AND INJURY TO THE PERSONS REFERRED TO ABOVE;

- ESTABLISHING HIT SQUADS WITHIN THE KZP AND THE SPECIAL CONSTABLE STRUCTURE OF THE SAP TO KILL OR CAUSE INJURY TO THE PERSONS REFERRED TO ABOVE;


- CONSPIRING WITH RIGHT-WING ORGANISATIONS AND FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT’S SECURITY FORCES TO COMMIT ACTS WHICH RESULTED IN LOSS OF LIFE OR INJURY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE REFERRED TO ABOVE;

- CREATING A CLIMATE OF IMPUNITY BY EXPRESSLY OR IMPLICITLY CONDONING GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND OTHER UNLAWFUL ACTS COMMITTED BY MEMBERS OR SUPPORTERS OF THE ORGANISATION.

CHIEF MG BUTHELEZI SERVED SIMULTANEOUSLY AS PRESIDENT OF THE IFP AND AS THE CHIEF MINISTER OF THE KWAZULU GOVERNMENT AND WAS THE ONLY SERVING MINISTER OF POLICE IN THE KWAZULU GOVERNMENT DURING THE ENTIRE THIRTEEN-YEAR EXISTENCE OF THE KWAZULU POLICE. WHERE THESE THREE AGENCIES ARE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COMMISSION OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS, CHIEF MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI IS HELD BY THIS COMMISSION TO BE ACCOUNTABLE IN HIS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AS THE LEADER, HEAD OR RESPONSIBLE MINISTER OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED.
Other findings related to the IFP and/or KwaZulu government

122 The Commission also made comprehensive findings with regard to a number of key incidents involving members of the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal, all of which are dealt with in more detail in the Natal regional study in Volume Three of this report. The Commission has also made a finding on the KZP, which has been dealt with in the chapter on Homelands in Volume Two.

Operation Marion

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT IN 1986, THE SADF CONSPIRED WITH INKATHA TO PROVIDE THE LATTER WITH A COVERT, OFFENSIVE PARAMILITARY UNIT (OR “HIT SQUAD”) TO BE DEPLOYED ILLEGALLY AGAINST PERSONS AND ORGANISATIONS PERCEIVED TO BE OPPOSED TO BOTH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND INKATHA. THE SADF PROVIDED TRAINING, FINANCIAL AND LOGISTICAL MANAGEMENT AND BEHIND-THE-SCENES SUPERVISION OF THE TRAINEES, WHO WERE TRAINED BY THE SPECIAL FORCES UNIT OF THE SADF IN THE CAPRIVI STRIP.

THE COMMISSION FINDS FURTHERMORE THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PARAMILITARY UNIT IN KWAZULU LED TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING KILLING, ATTEMPTED KILLING AND SEVERE ILL TREATMENT.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE, AMONG OTHERS, ACCOUNTABLE FOR SUCH VIOLATIONS; MR PW BOTHA, GENERAL MAGNUS MALAN, CHIEF MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, MR MZ KHUMALO, MR PIETER GROENEWALD, VICE ADMIRAL ANDRIES PUTTER, MR LOUIS BOTHA, MR CORNELIUS VAN NIEKERK AND MR MIKE VAN DEN BERG.

Esikhawini hit squad


The Mlaba self-protection unit camp

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT DURING THE PERIOD 1993–94, THE INKATHA SELF-PROTECTION UNIT (SPU) PROJECT, BASED PRIMARILY AT MLABA CAMP, PROVIDED TRAINING FOR 5 000 TO 8 000 PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH OFFICIALLY PLACED WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE PEACE ACCORD AND CONTAINING AN ELEMENT OF SELF-PROTECTION, THE PROJECT WAS ALSO INTENDED TO FURNISH THE IFP WITH THE MILITARY CAPACITY TO PREVENT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT/INDEPENDENT
ELECTORAL COMMISSION BY FORCE FROM HOLDING ELECTIONS WHICH DID NOT ACCOMMODATE THE IFP’S DESIRES FOR SELF-DETERMINATION. SUCH ARMED RESISTANCE WAS TO ENTAIL THE RISK OF UNLAWFUL DEATH AND INJURY TO PERSONS AND THUS CONSTITUTED A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.


Right-wing opposition groups

123 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of Afrikaner right-wing groups became active in the political arena. They operated in a loose coalition intent on securing the political interests of conservative Afrikaners through a range of activities seemingly intent on disrupting the negotiations process then underway. Operating both within and outside of the negotiations process, members of these groups undertook actions which constituted gross violations of human rights.

124 In regard to these groups, the Commission makes the following findings:


THE COMMISSION BASED THIS FINDING ON:

• SPEECHES AND ORDERS BY THE MOVEMENT’S SENIOR LEADERS WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF INCITING ITS SUPPORTERS TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS PERCEIVED TO BE THE ENEMY OF THE AFRIKANER;

• THE ARMING OF SUPPORTERS WITH WEAPONS IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE LAW;

• RANDOM ATTACKS BY MEMBERS ON BLACK PERSONS;

• CLANDESTINE COLLUSION WITH MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND/OR THE IFP EITHER TO COMMIT THE VIOLATIONS CITED ABOVE OR TO TRAIN PARAMILITARY FORCES TO COMMIT ACTS WHICH RESULTED IN DEATH OR INJURY;
• THE TRAINING OF SUPPORTERS TO UNDERTAKE VIOLENT ACTIONS DESIGNED TO PREVENT ELECTIONS FROM BEING HELD IN 1994;

• THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A VOLKSLÉER AND OTHER PARAMILITARY GROUPINGS TO THREATEN INSURRECTION AND REVOLUTION WITH A VIEW TO DERAILING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

BY VIRTUE OF THEIR LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE MOVEMENT, THE COMMISSION FINDS THE FOLLOWING TO BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY SUPPORTERS OF THE MOVEMENT: GENERAL CONSTAND VILJOEN, GENERAL PIETER GROENEWALD AND MR EUGENE TERREBLANCHE.

125 Broadly similar findings are made against three other groupings, namely, the Orde van die Boerevolk, the Boere Weerstandbeweging and the Afrikaner Weerstands beweging (AWB).

Finding on the ‘third force’

126 The early 1990s saw unprecedented levels of violence: more people died in political conflict during this time than for the whole of the earlier mandate period. Numerous allegations were made that a ‘hidden hand’ or ‘third force’ was involved in orchestrating and fomenting such violence in order to derail the negotiation process. This ‘third force’ was seen to involve covert units of the security forces acting in concert with other individuals or groupings, such as the IFP and various right-wing paramilitary structures.

127 Regarding security force involvement in ‘third force’-type activities, the Commission found evidence of –

a involvement by members of the security forces in the provision of weapons and training to the IFP;

b a cover-up, following the arrest of Transvaal IFP youth leader Themba Khoza with weapons on the scene, of the identity of perpetrators of the Sebokeng massacre;

c the involvement by MI operatives and structures in destabilisation in the homelands, including the development of a plan to invade the Transkei;

d an official plan by MI to abduct and/or assassinate Mr Chris Hani and Mr Bantu Holomisa in the Transkei;

e the existence of SAP hit-squads;
f sustained efforts to conduct disinformation campaigns both against the liberation movements generally and against particular individuals;

g the activities of high-level security branch sources such as the ANC’s Sifiso Nkabinde and the IFP’s David Ntombela, who were deeply implicated in violence in the Richmond and Pietermaritzburg areas respectively.

128 In addition, the Commission found some evidence regarding the involvement of security force operatives and IFP members in train violence and in right-wing agendas and structures, possibly including the establishment of some right-wing groupings; the involvement of an MI source, Prince Gobingca, as a key player in several sites of violence in the western and eastern Cape; and the existence of alliances between certain security force operatives, the right-wing and sectors of the IFP, who clearly believed they were arming and training people for a full-scale war.

129 While little evidence exists of a centrally directed, coherent and formally constituted ‘third force’, on the basis of the above:

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT A NETWORK OF SECURITY AND EX-SECURITY FORCE OPERATIVES, OFTEN ACTING IN CONJUNCTION WITH RIGHT-WING ELEMENTS AND/OR SECTORS OF THE IFP, FOMENTED, INITIATED, FACILITATED AND ENGAGED IN VIOLENCE WHICH RESULTED IN GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING RANDOM AND TARGETED KILLINGS.


THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT SUCH NETWORKS, AT TIMES, FUNCTIONED WITH THE ACTIVE COLLUSION AND/OR KNOWLEDGE OF SENIOR SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL, AND THAT THE FORMER GOVERNMENT, EITHER DELIBERATELY OR BY OMISSION, FAILED TO TAKE SUFFICIENT STEPS TO PUT AN END TO SUCH PRACTICES.

THE COMMISSION ALSO FINDS THAT THE SUCCESS OF ‘THIRD FORCE’ ATTEMPTS TO GENERATE VIOLENCE WAS AT LEAST IN PART A CONSEQUENCE OF EXTREMELY HIGH LEVELS OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE, FOR WHICH BOTH THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND OTHER STRUCTURES SUCH AS THE IFP ARE HELD TO BE MORALLY AND POLITICALLY ACCOUNTABLE.

THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

130 This section includes the Commission’s findings on the ANC, PAC, UDF and on ANC national executive member, Ms Winnie Madikizela-Mandela.
In reviewing the activities of the ANC and PAC, the Commission endorsed the position in international law that the policy of apartheid was a crime against humanity and that both the ANC and PAC were internationally recognised liberation movements conducting legitimate struggles against the former South African government and its policy of apartheid.

Nonetheless, as indicated previously, the Commission drew a distinction between a ‘just war’ and ‘just means’ and has found that in terms of international conventions, the ANC and its organs (the National Executive Council, the National Working Committee, the Revolutionary Council, the Secretariat and its armed wing, MK, as well as the PAC and its armed formations Poqo and APLA, committed gross violations of human rights in the course of their political activities and armed struggles, for which they are morally and politically accountable.

The Commission also wishes to note that the fact that the Commission makes a more detailed finding and comments more extensively on the ANC than on the PAC should not be interpreted as suggesting that the Commission finds it to have been more responsible for gross violations of human rights than the PAC. This is not the case. Instead, what it reflects is the far greater degree of openness to the Commission of the ANC than the PAC. The ANC made two full submissions to the Commission, answered its questions on the exile camps and made available to the Commission its various enquiry reports into alleged human rights abuses in exile. By contrast, the PAC offered very little by way of information on any of its activities, including exile abuses, and supplied no documentation.

The Commission has taken note that of the three main parties to the armed struggle - the state, the ANC and the PAC - only the ANC signed the Geneva Convention in regard to the conduct of wars of national liberation, and made the most conscious effort to conduct its armed struggle within the framework of international humanitarian law. While actions were undertaken which violated the ANC’s guidelines - and the Commission has made adverse findings on them - the Commission acknowledges that it was in general not ANC policy to target civilians. By contrast, the PAC consciously targeted certain categories of civilians, and whites in general, and the Commission has made findings in this regard.

The Commission acknowledges the comparative restraint with which the ANC conducted its armed struggle, at least in terms of its identification of targets, and the fact that the ANC leadership instructed its MK cadres to abandon the landmine campaign when it became clear that innocent civilians were being killed and hurt by it.
Findings on the African National Congress

Our conference itself will be remembered by our people as a council of war that planned the seizure of power by these masses, the penultimate convention that gave the order for us to take our country through the terrible but cleansing fires of revolutionary war to a condition of peace. (OR Tambo, Tambo Speaks.)

To the extent that the Motsueneanye Commission found that some detainees were maltreated and recommended that the ANC should apologise for these violations of their human rights, the ANC does so without qualification, within the context of the standards it sets for itself - standards it wishes our country to attain and maintain, now and in the future. (First ANC first submission to the Commission.)

‘The political and operational leadership of the movement is ready to accept collective responsibility for all operations of its properly constituted offensive structures, including operations ... that might have been outside of the established norms. (Mr Thabo Mbeki, Ibid.)

Violations committed in the course of the armed struggle

The ANC has accepted responsibility for all actions committed by members of MK under its command in the period 1961 to August 1990. In this period there were a number of such actions - in particular the placing of limpet and landmines - which resulted in civilian casualties. Whatever the justification given by the ANC for such acts - misinterpretation of policy, poor surveillance, anger or differing interpretations of what constituted a ‘legitimate military target’ - the people who were killed or injured by such explosions are all victims of gross violations of human rights perpetrated by the ANC. While it is accepted that targeting civilians was not ANC policy, MK operations nonetheless ended up killing fewer security force members than civilians.

WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS COMMITTED DURING THE ARMED STRUGGLE, THE COMMISSION MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS:

IN THE COURSE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE THERE WERE INSTANCES WHERE MEMBERS OF MK CONDUCTED UNPLANNED MILITARY OPERATIONS USING THEIR OWN DISCRETION, AND, WITHOUT ADEQUATE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION AT AN OPERATIONAL LEVEL, DETERMINED TARGETS FOR ATTACK OUTSIDE OF OFFICIAL POLICY GUIDELINES. WHILE RECOGNISING THAT SUCH OPERATIONS WERE FREQUENTLY UNDERTAKEN IN RETALIATION FOR RAIDS BY THE FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT INTO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, SUCH UNPLANNED OPERATIONS NONETHELESS OFTEN RESULTED IN CIVILIAN INJURY AND LOSS OF LIFE, AMOUNTING TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE 1985 AMANZIMTOTI SHOPPING CENTRE BOMBING IS REGARDED BY THE COMMISSION IN THIS LIGHT.

IN THE COURSE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE THE ANC, THROUGH MK, PLANNED AND UNDERTOOK MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH, THOUGH INTENDED FOR MILITARY OR SECURITY FORCE TARGETS, SOMETIMES WENT AWRY FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, INCLUDING POOR INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE. THE CONSEQUENCES IN THESE CASES, SUCH AS THE MAGOO’S BAR AND DURBAN ESPLANADE BOMBINGS, WERE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN RESPECT OF THE INJURIES TO AND LOSS OF LIVES OF CIVILIANS.


INDIVIDUALS WHO DEFECTED TO THE STATE AND BECAME INFORMERS AND/OR MEMBERS WHO BECAME STATE WITNESSES IN POLITICAL TRIALS AND/OR BECAME ASKARIS WERE OFTEN LABELLED BY THE ANC AS COLLABORATORS AND REGARDED AS LEGITIMATE TARGETS TO BE KILLED. THE COMMISSION DOES NOT CONDONE THE LEGITIMISATION OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS AS MILITARY TARGETS AND FINDS THAT THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS CONSTITUTED GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT, IN THE 1980S IN PARTICULAR, A NUMBER OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WERE PERPETRATED NOT BY DIRECT MEMBERS OF THE ANC OR THOSE OPERATING UNDER ITS FORMAL COMMAND, BUT BY CIVILIANS WHO SAW THEMSELVES AS ANC SUPPORTERS. IN THIS REGARD, THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE ANC IS MORALLY AND POLITICALLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR CREATING A CLIMATE IN WHICH SUCH SUPPORTERS BELIEVED THEIR ACTIONS TO BE LEGITIMATE AND CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE BROAD PARAMETERS OF A ‘PEOPLE’S WAR’ AS ENUNCIATED BY THE ANC.

Gross violations of human rights committed by the ANC in exile

The Commission has studied the reports of the Stuart, Skweyiya, Sachs and Motsuenyane commissions of enquiry appointed by the ANC, as well as that of the Douglas Commission, into various forms of human rights abuse in exile. It also took evidence both from alleged victims of abuse in the camps and from those
in positions of command or authority. The Commission has also heard evidence from the ANC on persons executed in exile for a variety of different offences.

ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IT, THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE ANC, AND PARTICULARLY ITS MILITARY STRUCTURES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TREATMENT AND WELFARE OF THOSE IN ITS CAMPS, WERE GUILTY OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES AND AGAINST TWO CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS, NAMELY SUSPECTED ‘ENEMY AGENTS’ AND MUTINEERS.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT SUSPECTED ‘AGENTS’ WERE ROUTINELY Subjected TO TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF SEVERE ILL TREATMENT AND THAT THERE WERE CASES OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS BEING CHARGED AND CONVICTED BY TRIBUNALS WITHOUT PROPER ATTENTION TO DUE PROCESS, SENTENCED TO DEATH AND EXECUTED. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUALS SO AFFECTED WERE GROSSLY VIOLATED. LIKEWISE, THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE PROPERLY WITH THE FAMILIES OF SUCH VICTIMS CONSTITUTED CALLOUS AND INSENSITIVE CONDUCT.

THE COMMISSION ALSO FINDS THAT ALL SO-CALLED MUTINEERS WHO WERE EXECUTED AFTER CONVICTION BY MILITARY TRIBUNAL, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY WERE AFFORDED PROPER LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND DUE PROCESS OR NOT, SUFFERED A GROSS VIOLATION OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS.


THE COMMISSION FURTHER FINDS THAT ADEQUATE STEPS WERE NOT TAKEN IN GOOD TIME AGAINST THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH VIOLATIONS.

Gross violations of human rights committed by the ANC after its unbanning

138 While the Commission accepts that the violent conflict which consumed the country in the post-1990 period was neither initiated by nor in the interests of the ANC, the ANC must nonetheless account for the many hundreds of people killed or injured by its members in the conflict. While the ANC leadership has argued that its members were acting in self-defence, it is the Commission’s view that at times the conflict assumed local dynamics in which proactive revenge attacks were carried out by both sides. This situation was exacerbated by high levels of political intolerance among all parties, including the ANC.
Further, the Commission contends that the leadership should have been aware of the consequences of training and arming members of SDUs in a volatile situation in which they had little control over the actions of such members.

THE COMMISSION THEREFORE FINDS THAT IN THE PERIOD 1990–94, THE ANC WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR:

• KILLINGS, ASSAULTS AND ATTACKS ON POLITICAL OPPONENTS INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE IFP, PAC, AZAPO AND THE SAP;

• CONTRIBUTING TO A SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY THROUGH THE CREATION AND ARMING OF SELF-DEFENCE UNITS (SDUS). WHILST ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IT WAS NOT THE POLICY OF THE ANC TO ATTACK AND KILL POLITICAL OPPONENTS, THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE COMMAND STRUCTURES AND IN THE CONTEXT OF WIDESPREAD STATE-SPONSORED OR -DIRECTED VIOLENCE AND A CLIMATE OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE, SDU MEMBERS OFTEN ‘TOOK THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS’ AND COMMITTED GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.


Findings in regard to Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and the Mandela Football Club

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT MS MADIKIZELA-MANDELA WAS CENTRAL TO THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FORMATION OF THE MANDELA UNITED FOOTBALL CLUB, WHICH LATER DEVELOPED INTO A PRIVATE VIGILANTE UNIT OPERATING AROUND MS MADIKIZELA-MANDELA AND FROM HER HOUSES IN BOTH ORLANDO WEST AND DIEPKLOOF. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE COMMUNITY ANGER AGAINST MS MADIKIZELA-MANDELA AND THE FOOTBALL CLUB MANIFESTED ITSELF IN THE BURNING OF THE MANDELA HOME IN ORLANDO WEST IN JULY 1988, WHICH LED TO POLITICAL, COMMUNITY AND CHURCH LEADERS REQUESTING THAT SHE DISBAND THE FOOTBALL CLUB.

THE COMMISSION FURTHER FINDS THAT THE MANDELA UNITED FOOTBALL CLUB WAS INVOLVED IN A NUMBER OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDING KILLING, TORTURE, ASSAULTS AND ARSON IN THE COMMUNITY. IT IS THE COMMISSION’S VIEW THAT MS MADIKIZELA-MANDELA WAS AWARE OF THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND THE DISQUIET IT CAUSED IN THE COMMUNITY, BUT CHOSE DELIBERATELY NOT TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS EMANATING FROM THE FOOTBALL CLUB. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THOSE WHO OPPOSED MS MADIKIZELA-MANDELA AND THE MANDELA UNITED FOOTBALL CLUB, OR DISSENTED FROM THEM, WERE BRANDED AS INFORMERS, AND KILLED. THE LABELLING BY MS MADIKIZELA-MANDELA OF OPPONENTS AS INFORMERS CREATED THE PERCEPTION THAT THEY WERE LEGITIMATE TARGETS. IT IS THE FINDING OF THIS COMMISSION THAT MS MADIKIZELA-MANDELA HAD KNOWLEDGE OF AND/OR PARTICIPATED IN THE ACTIVITIES OF CLUB MEMBERS, AND/OR THAT THEY WERE AUTHORISED AND/OR SANCTIONED BY HER.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT MS MADIKIZELA-MANDELA FAILED TO ACCOUNT TO COMMUNITY AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES. FURTHER THAT SHE IS ACCOUNTABLE, POLITICALLY AND MORALLY,
FOR THE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTED BY THE MANDELA UNITED FOOTBALL CLUB. THE COMMISSION FINDS FURTHER THAT MRS MADIKIZELA-MANDELA HERSELF WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING SUCH GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

Findings in regard to the Pan Africanist Congress

The enemy of the liberation movement of South Africa and of its people was always the settler colonial regime of South Africa. Reduced to its simplest form, the apartheid regime meant white domination, not leadership, but control and supremacy. The pillars of apartheid protecting white South Africa from the black danger, were the military and the process of arming of the entire white South African society. This militarisation, therefore, of necessity made every white citizen a member of the security establishment. (Brigadier Mofokeng, armed forces hearing)

139 Within the context of the international position on apartheid and the recognition of the PAC as a liberation movement, the Commission makes the following findings:

Violations committed by POQO in the early 1960s


- MEMBERS OF THE POLICE, PARTICULARLY THOSE LIVING IN BLACK TOWNSHIPS;
- THE SO-CALLED ‘KATANGESE’, DISSIDENT MEMBERS OF THE PAC WHO OPPOSED THE CAMPAIGN AND WERE SUBJECTED TO PHYSICAL ATTACKS AND ASSASSINATIONS BY OTHER POQO MEMBERS;
- REPRESENTATIVES OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE HOMELANDS, THAT IS, CHIEFS AND HEADMEN;
- WHITE CIVILIANS IN NON-COMBAT SITUATIONS.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THE PAC ACCOUNTABLE FOR SUCH VIOLATIONS.

Gross violations of human rights committed by the PAC during its armed struggle

140 While the PAC proclaimed a military strategy of a protracted people’s war, which involved the infiltration of guerrillas into the country to conduct rural guerrilla warfare
and attacks in the townships, in actuality the primary target of its operations were civilians. This was especially so after 1990 when, in terms of its ‘Year of the Great Storm’ campaign, the PAC/APLA targeted whites at random, and white farmers in particular.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE TARGETING OF CIVILIANS FOR KILLING WAS NOT ONLY A GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF THOSE AFFECTED BUT A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW. THE COMMISSION NOTES BUT REJECTS THE PAC’S EXPLANATION THAT ITS KILLING OF WHITE FARMERS CONSTITUTED ACTS OF WAR FOR WHICH IT HAS NO REGRETS AND APOLOGIES. TO THE CONTRARY, THE COMMISSION FINDS PAC ACTION DIRECTED TOWARDS BOTH CIVILIANS AND WHITES TO HAVE BEEN A GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FOR WHICH THE PAC AND APLA LEADERSHIP ARE HELD TO BE MORALLY AND POLITICALLY RESPONSIBLE AND ACCOUNTABLE.

**Gross violations of human rights committed by the PAC against its own members**

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT NUMBERS OF MEMBERS OF THE PAC WERE EXTRA-JUDICIALLY KILLED IN EXILE, PARTICULARLY IN CAMPS IN TANZANIA, BY APLA CADRES ACTING ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF ITS HIGH COMMAND, AND THAT MEMBERS INSIDE THE COUNTRY BRANDED AS INFORMERS OR AGENTS, AND THOSE WHO OPPOSED PAC POLICIES, WERE ALSO KILLED. ALL SUCH ACTIONS CONSTITUTED INSTANCES OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS FOR WHICH THE PAC AND APLA ARE HELD TO BE RESPONSIBLE AND ACCOUNTABLE.

**Findings in regard to the United Democratic Front (UDF)**

Having looked at this question long and hard among us, we conceded that the language used by some of us from time to time could have provided the reasonable basis for some of our members to infer that violence or even killing was acceptable. (Mr Azhar Cachalia, UDF appearance before the Commission.)

... we accept political and moral responsibility. We cannot say these people have nothing to do with us. We organised them, we led them. (Mr Murphy Morobe, UDF appearance before the Commission.)

141 The UDF, launched in August 1983, was a loose federation which brought together a large number of social, civic and political organisations of differing class backgrounds, racial constituency and political orientation. The UDF was intended as a vehicle to bring together under a single umbrella the various political opponents of race-based government reforms. It sought to achieve a non-racial, democratic and unitary South Africa. Although its founding document stated that it was not a front for banned liberation movements, the UDF was increasingly supportive of the ANC.
Because of its organisationally based membership, the UDF was the rallying point for a wide range of affiliates comprising youth and civic organisations, scholar and student organisations, church and welfare societies, trade unions, sporting and cultural organisations, and political and quasi-political organisations. It was able to mobilise very large groups of people for rallies and meetings, which were characterised by powerful oratory and wide-ranging demands for political change.

From 1985, the UDF sought to dismantle government and security force control and administration. It further sought to promote and enact the concept of ‘people’s power’, which envisaged administrative, welfare and judicial functions in the townships being assumed by community-based and sectoral organisations. This included the establishment of forums to administer civil and criminal justice through ‘people’s courts’.

The Commission makes the following findings in respect of the UDF:

THE COMMISSION ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT WAS NOT THE POLICY OF THE UDF TO ATTACK AND KILL POLITICAL OPPONENTS, BUT FINDS THAT MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF UDF AFFILIATE ORGANISATIONS OFTEN COMMITTED GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF WIDESPREAD STATE-SPONSORED OR -DIRECTED VIOLENCE AND A CLIMATE OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE.

THE UDF FACILITATED SUCH GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THAT ITS LEADERS, OFFICE-BEARERS AND MEMBERS, THROUGH THEIR CAMPAIGNS, PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES, ACTED IN A MANNER WHICH HELPED CREATE A CLIMATE IN WHICH MEMBERS OF AFFILIATED ORGANISATIONS BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE MORALLY JUSTIFIED IN TAKING UNLAWFUL ACTION AGAINST STATE STRUCTURES, INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF STATE ORGANISATIONS AND PERSONS PERCEIVED AS SUPPORTERS OF THE STATE AND ITS STRUCTURES. FURTHER, IN ITS ENDORSEMENT AND PROMOTION OF THE ‘TOYI-TOYI’, SLOGANS AND SONGS THAT ENCOURAGED AND/OR EULOGISED VIOLENT ACTIONS, THE UDF CREATED A CLIMATE IN WHICH SUCH ACTIONS WERE CONSIDERED LEGITIMATE. INASMUCH AS THE STATE IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE USE OF LANGUAGE IN SPEECHES AND SLOGANS, SO TOO MUST THE MASS DEMOCRATIC AND LIBERATION MOVEMENTS BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT FACTORS REFERRED TO IN THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE LED TO WIDESPREAD EXCESSES, ABUSES AND GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY SUPPORTERS AND MEMBERS OF ORGANISATIONS AFFILIATED TO THE UDF. THESE ACTIONS INCLUDE:

- THE KILLING (OFTEN BY MEANS OF ‘NECKLACING’), ATTEMPTED KILLING, AND SEVERE ILL TREATMENT OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS, MEMBERS OF STATE STRUCTURES SUCH AS BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND THE SAP, AND THE BURNING AND DESTRUCTION OF HOMES AND PROPERTIES;

- THE VIOLENT ENFORCEMENT OF WORK STAY AWAYS AND BOYCOTTS OF, AMONG OTHERS, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC TRANSPORT AND PRIVATE RETAIL SHOPS, LEADING TO KILLING, ATTEMPTED KILLING, AND SEVERE ILL TREATMENT;
• POLITICAL INTOLERANCE RESULTING IN VIOLENT INTER-ORGANISATIONAL CONFLICT WITH AZAPO AND THE IFP, AMONG OTHERS;

THE UDF AND ITS LEADERSHIP:

• FAILED TO EXERT THE POLITICAL AND MORAL AUTHORITY AVAILABLE TO IT TO STOP THE PRACTICES OUTLINED ABOVE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH PRACTICES WERE FREQUENTLY ASSOCIATED WITH OFFICIAL UDF CAMPAIGNS SUCH AS CONSUMER BOYCOTTS OR CAMPAIGNS AGAINST BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITIES. IN PARTICULAR, THE UDF AND ITS LEADERSHIP FAILED TO USE THE FULL EXTENT OF SUCH AUTHORITY TO BRING AN END TO THE PRACTICE OF NECKLACING, COMMITTED IN MANY Instances BY ITS MEMBERS OR SUPPORTERS.

• FAILED TO TAKE APPROPRIATELY STRONG OR ROBUST STEPS OR MEASURES TO PREVENT, DISCOURAGE, RESTRAIN AND INHIBIT ITS AFFILIATES AND SUPPORTERS FROM BECOMING INVOLVED IN ACTION LEADING TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AS REFERRED TO ABOVE;

• FAILED TO EXERT SANCTIONS OR DISCIPLINARY ACTION ON MEMBER ORGANISATIONS WHOSE MEMBERS WERE INVOLVED IN THE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS DESCRIBED ABOVE, OR FAILED TO URGE SUCH MEMBER ORGANISATIONS TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS AGAINST THEIR MEMBERS

THE COMMISSION NOTES THAT THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UDF HAS ACCEPTED POLITICAL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF ITS MEMBERS. ACCORDINGLY THE UDF IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTED IN ITS NAME AND AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ITS FAILURE TO TAKE THE STEPS REFERRED TO ABOVE.

Finding in respect of the killing of IFP office-bearers

145 The IFP submitted a list of over 400 alleged office-bearers who, according to the IFP, had been deliberately targeted and killed by structures of the ANC and its affiliates. The IFP’s submission made it clear that it believed that the killings were part of a deliberate pattern of behaviour on the part of the ANC - or in the words of the IFP, “serial killing”. The Durban office of the Commission conducted an intensive investigation into those incidents that occurred in former Natal and KwaZulu and produced an extremely detailed and comprehensive report.

146 A significant percentage of the incidents on the list fell outside of the Commission’s mandate, in that they occurred after the cut-off date of April 1994, and the Commission was thus not able to investigate these. However, it would be safe to assume, from the nature of the information supplied by the IFP, that the trends and patterns with regard to these incidents would be similar to those which the Commission was able to investigate. As indicated above, those incidents occurring in the Transvaal also fell outside of the scope of this investigation, owing to a limited investigative capacity.
The Commission investigated 289 incidents. Of these it was unable to corroborate 136. In many of these cases, despite searches of inquest court records, police dockets and government departments supplying birth and death certificates, no trace whatsoever of the individuals could be found. In each of these cases, further information was sought from the IFP, without any success.

With regard to the remaining 153 incidents, the Commission did not verify as to whether the deceased were, in fact, office-bearers of the IFP, and accepted the bona fides of the IFP in this regard. However, in a small number of incidents, death certificates show that the deceased were children, and were patently not office-bearers.

The Commission was able to identify the perpetrators or their political allegiance, or both, in ninety of the 289 incidents.

a UDF/ANC-aligned paramilitary structures were implicated in the killing of thirty-nine IFP office-bearers.

b UDF/ANC community members or youth were implicated in the killing of thirty IFP office-bearers. These killings took place within the context of the ongoing IFP/ANC conflict.

c MK cadres were implicated in the killing of seven IFP office-bearers.

d UDF/ANC-aligned extra-judicial tribunals (people’s courts) were implicated in the killing of eight IFP office-bearers. The primary reasons found for these killings concerned matters such as witchcraft, personal relationships and crime.

e Members of the SAP were implicated in the killing of four IFP office-bearers, in the course of confiscating illegal weapons.

f IFP members were implicated in the killing of six IFP office-bearers due to internal rivalry within the IFP.

g Non-political criminals were implicated in the killing of four IFP office-bearers, in the course of ordinary criminal activities such as burglary.

h In three incidents, the deceased died in motor vehicle accidents or as a result of personal/domestic disputes.

i In four incidents, investigations proved that the ‘deceased’ were not in fact dead.
Accordingly, investigations reveal that ANC, UDF or MK structures were responsible for the killing of seventy-six IFP office-bearers during the period 1985 to 1994. In only two of the incidents did the perpetrators hold leadership positions in the UDF, ANC or MK. In eight of the incidents, the killings were administered by people’s courts and it was not possible to establish whether IFP members had been targeted because of their IFP membership. However, given the history of the conflict, it would seem safe to assume that membership of the IFP would have been a factor.


### CIVIL SOCIETY

It is therefore not only the task of the security forces to examine themselves and their deeds, it is for every member of the society which we served to do so. Our weapons, ammunition, uniforms, vehicles, radios, and other equipment were all developed and provided by industry. Our finances and banking were done by bankers who even gave us covert credit cards for covert operations. Our chaplains prayed for our victory, and our universities educated us in war. Our propaganda was carried by the media, and our political masters were voted back in power time after time with ever-increasing majorities. (Mr Craig Williamson, armed forces hearing.)

The Commission sought and received a number of submissions from organisations representing specific sectors of civil society. These sectors, while generally not directly involved in gross violations of human rights, were structurally part of an overall system designed to protect the rights and privileges of a racial minority. Many, such as the media and organised religion, exerted immense influence, not least of which was their capacity to influence the ideas and morals of generations of South Africans. In a society organised not only along lines of race but of class as well, professional bodies representing lawyers and doctors were frequently seen to be the custodians of scientific knowledge and impartiality. As such, their failure to oppose the injustice around them vociferously and actively, contributed in no small way to an ethos and climate that supported the status quo and isolated those who did oppose injustice.
152 It should be noted that in almost every sector, complicity relates both to the continuing perpetuation of race-based systems and structures and to a failure to speak out against the gross violations of human rights occurring throughout the society.

153 The Commission also notes that within these sectors, there were pockets of individuals, sometimes organised into formal structures, that did indeed resist apartheid and other injustices, and sometimes paid dearly for their stance. Many of these structures were isolated by the mainstream bodies and were frequently cast as ‘fringe’ elements. There were not many who chose this path. Had their number been greater, and had they not been so harassed and isolated by both government and the professions, the moral bankruptcy of apartheid would have been more quickly and starkly exposed. To their credit, most representatives of the various civil society sectors who appeared before the Commission acknowledged their omissions and failures and apologised for them.

154 The following are the main findings of the Commission in respect of the health, faith, media and judicial sectors. It should be noted that more comprehensive and specific findings are contained in the various sector reports in Volume Four. Finally, the Commission had neither the time nor the resources to explore the area of civil society exhaustively. As indicated earlier, a number of crucial sectors, such as education, were not subjected to scrutiny. Many of the findings set out below apply in general terms to such sectors.

The health sector

155 Little evidence was found of the direct involvement of health professionals in gross violations of human rights. However, the health sector, through apathy, acceptance of the status quo and acts of omission, allowed the creation of an environment in which the health of millions of South Africans was neglected, even at times actively compromised, and in which violations of moral and ethical codes of practice were frequent, facilitating violations of human rights.

THE COMMISSION THEREFORE FINDS THAT:

THE FORMER GOVERNMENT, AND MORE SPECIFICALLY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE HEALTH CARE FACILITIES TO BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS.

PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL BODIES AND ASSOCIATED STRUCTURES FAILED TO FULFIL THEIR PROFESSIONAL DUTY AND STATED AIM OF PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF PATIENTS, BY NEGLECTING TO DRAW ATTENTION, AMONGST OTHER THINGS, TO THE EFFECTS OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF APARTHEID ON THE HEALTH OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS.

SEGREGATED HEALTH CARE AND UNEQUAL BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS WERE DETRIMENTAL TO THE PROVISION OF HEALTH CARE IN QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE TERMS AND RESULTED IN GROSS INEQUALITIES IN TERMS OF FACILITIES, RESOURCES AND TRAINING.

SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IS A FORM OF TORTURE, AND DETENTION HAD A SEVERE IMPACT ON THE HEALTH OF CHILDREN DETAINEES. THE MEDICAL PROFESSION FAILED TO TAKE A SUFFICIENTLY ROBUST STAND AGAINST SUCH PRACTICES.

THE STATUTORY COUNCILS AND PROFESSIONAL BODIES REPRESENTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY THE WHITE MALE MINDSET, THUS IGNORING THE NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF MILLIONS OF SOUTH AFRICANS. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM AND IMPROVE REPRESENTIVITY.

STATUTORY COUNCILS AND PROFESSIONAL BODIES FAILED TO CONDUCT PROPER INVESTIGATIONS INTO ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT BY DOCTORS AND NURSES AGAINST POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES.

DISTRICT SURGEONS, WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, FAILED TO RECORD COMPLAINTS AND/OR REPORT ALLEGATIONS AND EVIDENCE OF TORTURE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL DETAINEES, THUS ENABLING SUCH PRACTICES TO CONTINUE UNABATED FOR YEARS.

TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EDUCATION OF HEALTH PROFESSIONALS FAILED, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, TO ENSURE THAT STUDENTS ENGAGED WITH AND INTERNALISED ISSUES OF ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN HEALTH CARE.

THE LIMITATION OF THE COUNCILS’ ABILITY TO INSTIGATE PROACTIVE INVESTIGATIONS INTO MISCONDUCT OFTEN ENABLED SUCH MISCONDUCT TO CONTINUE UNCHECKED. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONFRONT THIS PROBLEM.

Faith communities

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT CHRISTIANITY, AS THE DOMINANT RELIGION IN SOUTH AFRICA, PROMOTED THE IDEOLOGY OF APARTHEID IN A RANGE OF DIFFERENT WAYS THAT INCLUDED BIBLICAL AND THEOLOGICAL TEACHING IN SUPPORT OF APARTHEID; ECCLESIASTICAL APARTHEID BY APPOINTING MINISTERS TO CONGREGATIONS BASED ON RACE, AND THE PAYMENT OF UNEQUAL STIPENDS; A FAILURE TO SUPPORT DISSIDENT CLERGY WHO FOUND THEMSELVES IN CONFRONTATION WITH THE STATE; AND A FAILURE TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THOSE MOST SEVERELY AFFECTED BY APARTHEID.

THE FAILURE OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES TO GIVE ADEQUATE EXPRESSION TO THE ETHICAL TEACHING OF THEIR RESPECTIVE TRADITIONS, ALL OF WHICH STAND IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO APARTHEID, CONTRIBUTED TO A CLIMATE WITHIN WHICH APARTHEID WAS ABLE TO SURVIVE. THE FAILURE OF THE CHURCHES IN THIS REGARD CONTRIBUTED TO THE PERPETUATION OF THE MYTH, PREVALENT IN CERTAIN CIRCLES, THAT APARTHEID WAS BOTH A MORAL AND CHRISTIAN INITIATIVE IN A HOSTILE AND UNGODLY WORLD.

IT IS THE FINDING OF THE COMMISSION THAT RELIGIOUS PROSELYTISING AND RELIGIOUS-BASED NATIONALISM HAVE NOT ONLY SOWN THE SEEDS OF INTER-RELIGIOUS SUSPICION, DISTRUST AND STRIFE, BUT THEY HAVE ALSO CONTRIBUTED DIRECTLY TO RELIGIOUSLY INSPIRED CONFLICT. RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES MUST TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF THEIR FOLLOWERS IN THIS REGARD.

The business sector

156 Business was central to the economy that sustained the South African state during the apartheid years. Certain businesses, especially the mining industry, were involved in helping to design and implement apartheid policies; the white agriculture industry benefited from its privileged access to land. Other businesses benefited from co-operating with the security structures of the former state. Most businesses benefited from operating in a racially structured context.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT:

THE DENIAL OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS TO BLACK WORKERS CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST TRADE UNIONS BY THE STATE, AT TIMES WITH THE COLLUSION OF CERTAIN BUSINESSES, FREQUENTLY LED TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE BUSINESS SECTOR FAILED, IN THE HEARINGS, TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS INVOLVEMENT IN STATE SECURITY INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO SUSTAIN APARTHEID RULE. SEVERAL BUSINESSES, IN TURN, BENEFITED DIRECTLY FROM THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE COMPLEX WEB THAT CONSTITUTED THE MILITARY INDUSTRY.

The media

157 State restrictions on the freedom of the media played an important role in facilitating gross violations of human rights. These restrictions grew in intensity until more than 100 laws controlled the right to publish and broadcast. Although not themselves a gross violation of human rights, the restrictions denied South Africans the right to a free flow of information and ideas. At their worst, particularly during the successive states of emergency after 1985, the restrictions amounted to
The longevity of apartheid was in part due to the superficial adherence to the ‘rule by law’ by the National Party, whose leaders sought and relied on the aura of legitimacy which ‘the law’ bestowed on unjust apartheid rule. During the period 1960 to 1990, the judiciary and the magistracy and the organised legal profession collaborated, largely by omission, silence and inaction, in the legislative and executive pursuit of injustice. Furthermore there are examples where they and the legal profession actively contributed to the entrenchment and defence of apartheid through the courts. Examples of such acts include:

a Adherence to race-based systems as evidenced by the Pretoria Bar’s refusal to admit black members and other bar councils’ dishonourable stance towards black colleagues seeking chambers in ‘white group areas’ through a race-based permit system.

b Collusion with the police regarding the torture of detainees and those in police custody, as evidenced by: prosecutors who knowingly colluded with police who had been involved in torture of accused persons; judges and magistrates who routinely rejected evidence of assault and torture - even when this was supported by medical evidence – and accepted uncritically the evidence of police witnesses over that of the accused; judges and magistrates who uncritically accepted the evidence of police witnesses at inquests, and routinely found no one to be responsible for injuries and deaths in detention.

c Failure to take effective measures to make justice accessible to those who could not afford it and those who were involved in anti-apartheid activities, for fear
of social ostracism or loss of lucrative commercial clients. This is contrasted by the willingness of advocates and attorneys to appear for the government in civil actions where some of the basic building blocks of apartheid, such as racial classification or influx control or group areas, were being attacked as the unreasonable and invalid exercise of executive discretion. Similarly, organised professional bodies were frequently obsequious in their attitudes to government policies, striking off and hounding those of their members who fell foul of the political system, or who chose to confront it.

d  The participation of judges in producing the highest capital punishment rate in the ‘western’ world, an execution rate which impacted overwhelmingly on poor black male accused.

THE COMMISSION REJECTS THE ARGUMENT MADE PARTICULARLY BY JUDGES OF THEIR IMPOTENCE IN THE FACE OF THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY A SOVEREIGN PARLIAMENT. THE COMMISSION REGARDS THIS AS A FLAWED ARGUMENT ON THE BASIS THAT PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW WORK HAND IN HAND, AND ARE PREMISED ON A POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH IS FUNDAMENTALLY REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL THE PEOPLE SUBJECT TO THAT PARLIAMENT. THIS SITUATION NEVER APPLIED IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE SITUATION THEREFORE REQUIRED SOMETHING MORE BY WAY OF RESPONSE FROM THE JUDICIARY AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

JUDGES HAD A CHOICE OTHER THAN THE ULTIMATE BUT HONOURABLE COURSE OF RESIGNATION FROM THE BENCH. THEY COULD HAVE RESISTED ENCROACHMENTS TO BASIC RIGHTS AND FAIRNESS, USING THE SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE WHICH THEY POSSESSED, ARGUING FROM COMMON-LAW PRINCIPLES. A CONCERTED STAND BY A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF JUDGES COULD HAVE MOVED THE GOVERNMENT FORMALLY TO CURTAIL THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS, THEREBY LAYING BARE THE DEGENERACY OF ITS POLICIES MORE DEVASTATINGLY.


FURTHER FINDINGS

Children and youth

159  The Commission endorses the international position that children and youth under the age of eighteen are entitled to special protection from government and society. As the Commission’s statistics have shown, the greatest proportion of victims of gross violations of human rights were youth, many of them under eighteen.
With regard to children and youth, the Commission finds that:


THE POLICY OF APARTHEID RESULTED IN THE DELIVERY OF INFERIOR, INADEQUATE EDUCATION TO BLACK CHILDREN AND DEPRIVED THEM OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOP IN MIND AND BODY. THIS DEPRIVATION CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE BANNING BY THE GOVERNMENT OF STUDENT AND YOUTH ORGANISATIONS DENIED YOUNG PEOPLE AN AVENUE FOR DISCUSSION AND PROTEST AND RESULTED IN THE CRIMINALISATION OF LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY, THUS ENCOURAGING YOUTH TO TURN TO VIOLENT FORMS OF PROTEST. THE STATE IS FURTHER ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE POLITICAL REPRESSION WHICH FORCED YOUNG PEOPLE TO GO INTO EXILE, LEAVING THEIR FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES. EXILE DISTORTED THE NORMAL SOCIALISATION OF YOUTH AND NORMAL FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS.

THE STATE IDENTIFIED AND TARGETED SCHOOLS AS CENTRES OF RESISTANCE. SCHOOLS WERE OCCUPIED, AND STUDENTS AND TEACHERS INTIMIDATED AND ARRESTED. THIS CREATED A CLIMATE WITHIN WHICH UNNECESSARY VIOLENCE OCCURRED. AS A RESULT, EDUCATION WAS SEVERELY DISRUPTED. MANY CHILDREN WERE UNABLE TO COMPLETE THEIR SCHOOLING AND/OR ADVANCE TO TERTIARY EDUCATION.


THE STATE, THROUGH ITS SECURITY FORCES, EXPLOITED AND MANIPULATED DIVISIONS IN SOCIETY AND ENGAGED IN THE INFORMAL REPRESSION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH BY IDENTIFYING YOUTH LEADERS, ISOLATING THEM AND, THROUGH VIOLENCE OR FINANCIAL INDUCEMENT, INDUCING THEM TO ACT AS INFORMERS OR VIGILANTES.

IN CERTAIN CASES, PROACTIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE SECURITY FORCES DURING THE 1980s INCLUDED INFILTRATING YOUTH AND STUDENT STRUCTURES, POSING AS MEMBERS OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, RECRUITING YOUNG PEOPLE FOR MILITARY TRAINING AND THEN KILLING THEM.
THE STATE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MILITARISATION OF YOUNG WHITE MALES THROUGH CONSCRIPTION.


THE FAILURE BY THE ANC AND THE IFP AFTER 1994 TO REINTEGRATE YOUTH TO ENABLE THEM TO BECOME VALUED MEMBERS OF SOCIETY AND TO DEVELOP A SENSE OF SELF-ESTEEM, HAS LED TO THEIR CRIMINALISATION AND CREATED THE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

Women

Many of the statements made to the Commission by women detail the violations inflicted on others - children, husbands, siblings and parents - rather than what they themselves suffered. Undoubtedly the violation of family members had significant consequences for women. However, women too suffered direct gross violations of human rights, many of which were gender specific in their exploitative and humiliating nature.

THE COMMISSION THUS FINDS THAT:

THE STATE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SEVERE ILL TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY IN THE FORM OF HARASSMENT AND THE DELIBERATE WITHHOLDING OF MEDICAL ATTENTION, FOOD AND WATER.

WOMEN WERE ABUSED BY THE SECURITY FORCES IN WAYS WHICH SPECIFICALLY EXPLOITED THEIR VULNERABILITIES AS WOMEN, FOR EXAMPLE RAPE OR THREATS OF RAPE AND OTHER FORMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE, THREATS AGAINST FAMILY AND CHILDREN, REMOVAL OF CHILDREN FROM THEIR CARE, FALSE STORIES ABOUT ILLNESS AND/OR DEATH OF FAMILY MEMBERS AND CHILDREN, AND HUMILIATION AND ABUSE AROUND BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS SUCH AS MENSTRUATION AND CHILDBIRTH.

WOMEN IN EXILE, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN CAMPS, WERE SUBJECTED TO VARIOUS FORMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE AND HARASSMENT, INCLUDING RAPE.
Conscription

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT:

THE STATE’S POLICY OF CONSCRIPTION WAS IMMORAL AND DENIED CONSCRIPTS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO SERVE IN THE SADF.

THROUGH THE POLICY OF CONSCRIPTION, THE STATE AND THE SADF USED YOUNG MEN TO ASSIST, IMPLEMENT AND DEFEND THE POLICY OF APARTHEID, TO MAINTAIN THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA AND TO WAGE WAR AGAINST NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES.

THE STATE’S VILIFICATION OF CONSCRIPTS WHO REFUSED TO SERVE IN THE SADF BY LABELLING THEM “COWARDS AND TRAITORS” CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

SOME CHURCHES (IN PARTICULAR MAINSTREAM AFRIKAANS CHURCHES) OPENLY SUPPORTED THE POLICY OF CONSCRIPTION, THUS CREATING A CLIMATE IN WHICH GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS COULD TAKE PLACE.

CONCLUSION

162 The findings outlined above, to a greater or lesser extent, touch all the major role-players who were party to the conflict that enveloped South Africa during its mandate period. No major role-player emerges unscathed although, as already stated, a distinction must be made between those who fought for and those who fought against apartheid. There are many who will reject these findings and argue that they fail to understand the complexities and historical realities of the time, and of the motives and perspectives of those who perpetrated gross violations of human rights. In this regard it needs to be firmly stated that, while the Commission has attempted to convey some of these complexities and has grappled with the motives and perspectives of perpetrators in other sections of this report, it is not the Commission’s task to write the history of this country. Rather, it is the Commission’s function to expose the violations of all parties in an attempt to lay the basis for a culture in which human rights are respected and not violated.

163 It should also be noted – as will be obvious from the content above – that the Commission’s findings have focused mainly on events and violations that occurred inside South Africa in the 1960–94 period. There are obvious and good reasons for that, but it represents something of a historical distortion. It is the view of the Commission that, in terms of the gross violations of human rights, most of these occurred not internally, but beyond the borders of South Africa, in some of the poorest nations of the world. It was the residents of the Southern African region who bore the brunt of the South African conflict and suffered the greatest number of individual casualties and the greatest damage to their countries’ economies and infrastructure.
Finally, in the context of a society moving towards reconciliation, South Africans need to acknowledge this country’s divided history and its regional burden; to understand the processes whereby all, citizens included, were drawn in and are implicated in the fabric of human rights abuse, both as victims and perpetrators - at times as both.

The primary task of the Commission was to address the moral, political and legal consequences of the apartheid years. The socio-economic implications are left to other structures - the Land Commission, the Gender Commission, the Youth Commission and a range of reform processes in education, social welfare, health care, housing and job creation. Ultimately, however, because the work of the Commission includes reconciliation, it needs to unleash a process that contributes to economic developments that redress past wrongs as a basis for promoting lasting reconciliation. This requires all those who benefited from apartheid, not only those whom the Act defines as perpetrators, to commit themselves to the reconciliation process.
INTRODUCTION

1 The Act governing the work of the Commission requires not only that it establish as complete a picture as possible of activities during the years falling under its mandate and that it identify perpetrators of gross human rights violations, but also that it establish the “antecedent circumstances, factors and context of [gross human rights] violations as well as the causes, motives and perspectives of the persons responsible”.  

2 Who were the perpetrators and what ‘made’ them, moved them or contributed to their behaviour? It is essential to examine perpetrators as multi-dimensional and rounded individuals rather than simply characterising them as purveyors of horrendous acts. Building on the factual history presented in earlier chapters, and utilising research developed in relation to the Holocaust and other situations of sustained oppression that gave rise to systematic acts of gross human rights violations, this chapter attempts to explain why and how these violations transpired, as a basis for informing the debate concerning reconciliation and recommendations to prevent violations in future. A diagnosis of persons and institutions responsible for gross human rights violations is of paramount importance in seeking to prevent future gross human rights violations.

3 It could be argued that prevention is only effective in the early stages of the development of a culture of gross human rights violations, and that signs and symptoms of the ‘syndrome’ should be made known widely. Itzhak Fried has suggested that:

> Individuals in most societies know that a constellation of high fever and coughing may indicate pneumonia. In the same sense, people might become aware that symptoms of an emerging obsessive ideology, hyper-arousal, diminished affective reactivity, and group dependent aggression,
directed at members of other sub-groups may signify a situation which needs immediate political, social, and social scientific attention.

4 The tale to be told in this chapter is incomplete and in some respects premature for, although the Commission heard evidence over two and a half years, the bulk of this material came from victims. The work of the Amnesty Committee, which involved hearing testimony from alleged perpetrators, was incomplete at the time of reporting and was scheduled to continue for approximately another twelve months – until July 1999. Hence, a complete picture would emerge only when that task was done and the testimonies thoroughly studied to reveal the full pattern of motives and perspectives of all perpetrators. Even then the tale will be incomplete, since not all categories of perpetrators, for instance ‘necklace’ murder cases, are likely to be fully represented.

5 Further limitations of this chapter need to be clearly stated. The Commission is aware that the quotations in this chapter are not necessarily even-handed extracts from all parties concerned. Quotations are used to illustrate the processes described and the perspectives of various groups. This could result in allegations of bias. However, in some instances, this was unavoidable. Not all groups or parties co-operated equally with the Commission. As a result, comprehensive searches through documents revealed few instances of statements from Inkatha perpetrators, from township ‘vigilante groups’, from torturers or from African National Congress (ANC)-aligned self-defence units (SDUs). Documentary evidence is thus only partly available. Furthermore, the precise question of motives of perpetrators was often not fully canvassed by amnesty panels, nor by special hearings of the Commission. These shortcomings should be attributed to partial failings of the Commission itself, rather than to systematic bias.

6 As a premature effort, the chapter draws on a wide-ranging literature, from local as well as international sources, in an attempt to understand the position of perpetrators. It would be helpful to understand this chapter as being in the form of an agenda for future research and verification rather than a closed book. Nonetheless, partial understandings may be better than none.

7 The chapter begins with a general perspective on patterns of violence, with examples drawn from the information given to the Commission. This is followed by a discussion on the problem of perspectives on the conflict and its participants. It then explores various possible explanations of causes and motives of perpetrators, giving attention both to the political context of the violations and to individual
psychological explanations of perpetrators’ actions and the situations in which violations occurred. Consideration is then given to the role of language, the existence of secret societies and silences in the conflict. The information set out above will then be applied to two case examples, exploring the causes, motives and perspectives of torturers and of participants in crowd violence. The chapter concludes with some ideas for the future prevention of atrocities.

A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE ON PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE

8 A number of general patterns are discernible from the huge body of materials collected by the Commission. A description of these general patterns is essential to an understanding of the particular – that is, the acts of individual perpetrators. Acts of violence are in many ways quite different from each other: they range from careful calculated intentional actions to unintentional, unplanned acts that occurred because things ‘went wrong’.

Intentional military actions: “We were at war.”

9 As is apparent from the testimony of the former head of ANC special operations, Mr Aboobaker Ismail, in the amnesty hearing on the Church Street bombing of the South African Air Force headquarters (in which nineteen people were killed and over 200 injured), many acts were carefully calculated actions of war:

   Special operations were set up in 1979 to undertake high-profile acts of sabotage on key economic installations. This structure reported directly to [then ANC president] OR Tambo.

10 Later, in terms of a shift in ANC policy which resulted in the inclusion of military personnel as justifiable targets, the Church Street operation in Pretoria was carried out (with the stated approval of Mr Tambo) on 20 May 1983. The operation was conducted –

   ... in the wake of the SADF cross-border raid into Lesotho, killing forty-two ANC supporters and Lesotho civilians, and also in the wake of the assassination of Ms Ruth First in Maputo by the security forces.

   In terms of stated ANC policy, military targets including personnel [were] justifiable, even if these entailed limited loss of civilian life.
Acts such as these were quite clearly rational, intentional and thoroughly planned (although mistakes did occur; for example, the two ANC operatives in the Church Street bombing were themselves killed in the attack). Often, as indicated above, they occurred in retaliation against state security violence. Following the Church Street bombing, the South African Defence Force (SADF) conducted various attacks, including air raids on Maputo. The sequential nature of such calculated attacks constituted something of a ‘dialogue’ or a ‘spiral of violence’.

As a further illustration of calculated attacks, Mr Ismail described the Dolphin Unit, established in 1982, which “had been established inside the country to carry out operations within the broad mandate of the ANC and MK [the ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto weSizwe]”. In an amnesty hearing in May 1998, Mr Mohammed Shaik, head of the Dolphin Unit, described thirty-two carefully planned operations against police, embassy, magistrate’s court and state department targets within South Africa. Mr Shaik stated in conclusion that:

At all times I acted within the policy and guidelines laid down by the ANC; I was comprehensively briefed on the modus operandi of special operations in MK. I accordingly attempted to avoid or minimise civilian casualties whenever I conducted operations. To this end, whenever circumstances permitted, I timed my operations after hours, when targeted buildings had been vacated by civilians. I accept that, in the end, there was always a possibility of civilian casualties.

Where there were civilian casualties these were never at any stage intended to be targets, but were rather caught in the crossfire. To the extent that there were civilian casualties, I express my deep regret to those who experienced pain and suffering. The apartheid state left us no choice but to take up arms.

These rational and calculated acts of violence were justified on each side by the statement that “we were at war”. General Andrew Masondo was national political commissar of the ANC between 1977 and 1985, and earlier a Robben Island prisoner. In a section 29 hearing, when responding to enquiries about atrocities, including executions in the Angolan Quatro camp, he repeatedly stated that “we were at war”:

You remember I said we were at war ... There might be times that I will use third degree, in spite of the fact that it is not policy.

People who it was found that they were enemy agents, we executed them, and I wouldn’t make an apology. We were at war.
General Constand Viljoen, former chief of the SADF, expressed it this way in a public Commission debate on the notion of a ‘just war’:

The liberation struggle used revolutionary methods to coerce. This was a new kind of total war, not total in its destructiveness but total in its means of applying different ways of coercion: political, psychological, economic, propaganda. It was a new kind of war.

This war, if it could be called a war, is so unique that the traditional ‘just war’ theory cannot be easily applied.

Even the conflict between Inkatha and the ANC was repeatedly described as a war situation. Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) amnesty applicant Mr Victor Mthembu stated:

If it had not been a war situation between the IFP and the ANC, I would not have participated.

In a situation regarded as war, violent actions were undertaken with pride rather than with distress and embarrassment. In this regard former senior security force member Major Craig Williamson said:

The psychological effect of fighting such a counter-revolutionary war should not be underestimated, especially when this entailed long periods of covert operations. The members of the security forces, especially in covert units ... saw themselves as the elite frontline troops in a critically important theatre of the overall war. Security force successes ... produced praise, pride and relief from pressure.

Even a self-confessed torturer such as Captain Jeffrey Benzien admitted to pride in his work when cross-examined by Mr Tony Yengeni (ANC) whom he had tortured. After saying, in respect of a particular torture method, that “I applied it well and with caution”, Captain Benzien went on to make this extraordinary statement:

Mr Yengeni, with my absolutely unorthodox methods and by removing your weaponry from you, I am wholly convinced that I prevented you and your colleagues ... I may have prevented you from being branded a murderer nowadays.
Denial: the gap between authorities and followers

From a range of different quarters, there was denial from senior persons in authority that they knew what was happening, or denial that they gave specific orders, even while their supporters or followers were claiming to have acted under instructions. In other words, there was a gap between the perceptions of leaders and followers. In the second National Party (NP) submission, Mr FW de Klerk said:

... but things happened which were not authorised, not intended, or of which we were not aware ... I have never condoned gross violations of human rights ... and reject any insinuation that it was ever the policy of my party or government.

In contrast, there is the perception of convicted Vlakplaas killer Colonel Eugene de Kock in the closing pages of his book:

Yet the person who sticks most of all in my throat is former State President FW de Klerk. Not because I can prove, without a shadow of doubt, that he ordered the death of X or cross-border raid Y. Not even because of the holier than thou attitude that is discernible in the evidence he gave before the [Commission] on behalf of the National Party.

It is because, in that evidence, he simply did not have the courage to declare: "yes we at the top levels condoned what was done on our behalf by the security forces. What’s more, we instructed that it should be implemented. Or - if we did not actually give instructions we turned a blind eye. We didn’t move heaven and earth to stop the ghastliness. Therefore let the foot soldiers be excused”.

From another side of the conflict comes the position of the president of the IFP, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

On no occasion has the IFP’s leadership ever made any decision anywhere at any time to use violence for political purposes. I have always abhorred violence now and will die abhorring violence. I personally have never made any decision to employ violence anywhere for any purpose whatsoever.

By contrast, here are extracts from statements by Inkatha members applying for amnesty on grounds of numerous murders:

---

Mr Wills: Now what was the purpose of this training?
Mr Hlongwane: It was to protect IFP or areas controlled by Chiefs, as well as to kill the ANC.

22 IFP member, Mr Dlamini, said:
I will say that it is painful to me that after all these activities that we committed that people should deny our existence and call us criminals. When I went for training at Caprivi, nobody called me a criminal. When I killed people here, I was not called a criminal. Today they do call us criminals and deny knowledge of our activities and ourselves. No IFP leader is prepared to stand before this Commission and admit to these activities. We decided among ourselves to expose these activities. We in fact were not mad persons who just took weapons and started shooting people at random. Therefore it hurts me very much for the IFP to desert us and say that they do not know anything about us - when they know that they were in fact responsible for all these things.

23 In yet another context, in the section 29 hearing into the violent activities of the Mandela United Football Club, Ms Winnie Madikizela-Mandela repeatedly denied, in the face of allegations of her awareness, that she had knowledge of events:

I knew nothing about these activities.

I did not monitor them when they were in and out of my house.

I did not know who recruited who into the Mandela United.

I knew nothing about who took what decision. I had nothing to do with the activities of the boys.

24 The gap between leadership and foot soldiers, particularly amongst the youth, was also described in the United Democratic Front (UDF) submission to the Commission. A gap of this sort means there were possibilities of misinterpretation that led to atrocities on the part of youthful activists.

In this context, many activists interpreted statements by the UDF and its allies making reference to the breaking down of apartheid to mean that this should be done by means of violence.
Regarding questions about the brutal enforcement of labour, consumer and student boycotts that involved gross violations of human rights, the UDF submission argued that such acts should be seen against –

... the background of emergency when most of the UDF leadership was in detention or on the run. The acts were committed by youths acting on their own, even though some may have believed that this was being done in the interests of the struggle.

Similarly, within the ANC and MK, although for different reasons (not least of which was the physical distance between leadership in exile and operatives within South Africa), there was recognition of a gap, a distance, between top and bottom. In this case, it is not expressed as a denial but as a concession of problems caused by this gap. An MK leader testified at an amnesty hearing as follows:

There were long and insecure lines of communication, command and control. Many of the established MK units had been allowed a degree of initiative in executing operations, as long as these remained within policy guidelines. In contrast with the conventional military force in which planning takes place at headquarters levels, in guerrilla warfare most of the detailed planning takes place at the lowest level ... There is no so-called hot-line to higher structures to ask for guidance. Communication could and at times did result in deaths, given the degree to which communication lines were monitored.

Overall, across different parties in the conflict, the above quotations indicate that, although particular contexts varied, a common problem existed in terms of a distance between top authorities and field soldiers, supporters or followers. Atrocities, it is suggested here, emerged precisely because of this gap, opening up possibilities of miscommunication, misinterpretation and possibly, as Mr FW de Klerk suggested, male fides.

What went wrong? “We made mistakes.”

Different parties to the conflict admitted that there were errors, mistakes and unintended consequences. Several parties contended that violence occurred precisely because of the grey areas that developed.

At one of the hearings on children and youth, Mr George Ndlozi, reporting on the activities of SDUs, said things “went wrong” because they –
had to depend on criminals and people took advantage of the situation. They ended up operating out of personal gain.

30 Mr Niel Barnard, former head of National Intelligence, said at the hearings on the State Security Council:

It is true that instructions and mandates were sometimes vague and were communicated poorly [and] ... in large bureaucratic institutions such as the public sector there is a danger that decisions and instructions are not formulated, conveyed and interpreted in a correct way.

31 Mr Johan van der Merwe, former commissioner of police, said at the State Security Council hearings that “we had to move outside the boundaries of our law”, leading to all sorts of blurred distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable methods. This point was also conceded by Mr FW de Klerk in the NP submission.

32 General Andrew Masondo, former political commissar of the ANC, admitted that they “could have made mistakes” as a result of disinformation or when they had to rely on young, inexperienced people in authority in the Quatro camp.

33 Mr FW de Klerk, answering questions on widespread torture during the 1980s in the second NP submission, said:

I’m not saying we were perfect ... I’m not saying we didn’t make mistakes. Detailed operationalisation (of security policy) takes place at a much lower level ... that is where, either through over-zealousness or a male fide approach, where things get out of hand.

History has subsequently shown that, as far as the policy of apartheid was concerned, they were deeply mistaken.

None of these unconventional projects was intended to lead to any gross violations of human rights ... but ... they did create an atmosphere conducive to abuses.

34 Former MK leader Mr Ronnie Kasrils, speaking during the Commission’s public debate on the notion of 'just war', said: “I’m not saying that there weren’t certain departures, certain aberrations”. Similarly, the ANC submission to the Commission reported concern in late 1987 regarding an increase in “attacks which did not
accord with ANC policy”, conceding that “some incidents not entirely consistent
with ANC policy did take place”. In its second submission, the ANC repeated
that “mistakes were made”. In similar vein the UDF stated that the –

... activities of the UDF and its allies, while making invaluable contributions to the
democratisation of South African society, had many regrettable consequences.

35 Even in the details of operations of bomb attacks, things could go wrong, mistakes
were made. Regarding the explosion at the Krugersdorp magistrate’s court
adjacent to a “notorious security police branch”, Mr Mohammed Shaik told the
amnesty hearing:

I prepared two charges; one being a decoy which I placed in the toilet used
by police officers in the court complex, the other being a car bomb. The decoy
was to have exploded first, drawing out police officers, who in a few minutes
would have cordoned, cleared and secured the area. Their presence would
have been very near to the car bomb which was to explode minutes later.
Unfortunately the decoy failed to explode due to some malfunction. The car
bomb detonated as planned. The intended aim of a large number of enemy
personnel being killed, injured was not achieved. A civilian and two security
branch members were killed.

36 In the Freedom Front submission, General Constand Viljoen also reported on
mistakes of the former government. Referring to the NP government, in which
he was chief of the defence force, he testified:

Forty years of governmental control made them power-drunk. Expediency,
manipulation, propaganda ... and in the end the ruthless tactics of an
unconventional sort to retain power – all these things are not necessarily
part and parcel of the original concept of differentiation that prevailed within
Afrikaner political thinking. The original motivation of the Afrikaner was not to
rule others.

37 He argued further that errors were made due to the arbitrary powers given to
ministers and “even officials in the security forces” during the states of emergency.

... because of the absence of normal checks and balances that would avoid
misuse of these powers ... most cases of gross violations of human rights
resulted from these practices and they had the serious additional effect of
keeping the public in the dark on these activities and creating a sense of fear and bondage in general that was not conducive to free and responsible citizenship.

38 The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), in its submission to the Commission, also admitted to mistakes. Reporting on “a new pattern in the 1990s where civilians within the white community were attacked”, the PAC submission stated:

In the nature of guerrilla war, which is unlike conventional warfare, detailed plans could not be made from Dar-es-Salaam. The actual targets were decided by local commanders ... In the militarised environment in our country in the 1990s ... internally based operatives often made errors that APLA [the Azanian People’s Liberation Army] had earlier avoided. These are the causes of the departures in the 1990s.

39 Specifically on the murder of Ms Amy Biehl, the PAC submission regretted its error, stating that:

PASO was not a part of APLA. They are a component part of the PAC not involved in armed struggle. They wrongly targeted and killed Amy Biehl. We expressed our regret and condolences.

Lack of discipline/restraint: “Us and them”

40 A lack of discipline exercised by the state over its security officials, and by other parties over their activists, could clearly have contributed to the escalating spiral of violence. The Commission specifically questioned the leading parties in the conflict regarding their tolerance for violent acts among their own members, and efforts they made to discipline transgressors. Psychological factors appear to have played a role in the general pattern, on all sides, of condoning lack of restraint in their own members, and the relative absence of tough discipline regarding violent offenders. The UDF submission, in an honest attempt to get to grips with what they admitted was a “dilemma”, put the case most clearly:

The way we approached this question is like a father, like parents would approach, let’s say, an aberrant child: that child is part of your family, these were people who were oppressed people, part of this history. Now if a child misbehaves and hopefully [the parent] disciplines that child
and shouts at the child and does what is possible within the limits of the family ... alright, but they don’t disown these people. For us to disown these people would mean that we don’t understand the history of these people [who] tended to do these sort of things.

So they were undisciplined in some instances. When they did that they were not acting within the UDF policy - but we own them, they are part of us, and they are part of our history and we accept them as part of our family.

41 The dilemma posed for the UDF, and similarly for other organisations, is highlighted in the response to a question about the ‘young lions’. The UDF expressed pride in the efforts of this generation:

In general, the generations of young people from 1976 onwards have been ... should be amongst the most admired citizens of this country. They laid down life and limb to wage the struggle ... Generally the young lions were doing a wonderful piece of work.

42 Although various efforts were made to impose restraint and discipline in all parties concerned (for example, the ANC and MK developed codes of conduct, and attempted to discipline conduct through political education), evidence before the Commission showed that all parties fell short, in some respects, in imposing restraints and discipline on their own members, followers and supporters. The dilemma, as clearly indicated in the UDF quote above, is that harsh discipline imposed on “our own” (even where it was feasible to track down transgressors) would have risked alienating their own supporters.

43 This phenomenon is exacerbated in a highly conflictual war-like situation. Militaristic authorities were clearly at times covertly proud of the violent actions of ‘their own’.

44 Sometimes, this pride was not even covert. Colonel Eugene de Kock was awarded numerous medals for his actions. It is claimed that the former Minister of Law and Order, Mr Adriaan Vlok, attended a party with Vlakplaas operatives after they had blown up Khotso House.
THE PROBLEM OF PERSPECTIVES

45 It is important to state from the outset that emotions may run high when considering the actions of perpetrators, and that perspectives may differ sharply, leading to difficulties with reconciliation. Some will tend to blame, condemn and feel bitterness towards perpetrators while others are able to demonstrate empathy, understanding, sympathy or even praise for those who did some of these deeds. Given the divisions of the past, such varying perspectives towards perpetrators from the varying sides of the struggle are not surprising. It is neither simple nor easy to take a neutral or wholly objective stance towards perpetrators of evil deeds. Nevertheless, this part of the report needs to provide an understanding of dreadful deeds, without condemnation. At the same time, as Browning, a leading Holocaust scholar, puts it: “Explaining is not excusing, understanding is not forgiving”\(^5\). The Commission, in this chapter, is seeking to fulfil its objective to –

... promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past.\(^6\)

46 In an effort to grasp and understand, rather than to condemn or excuse the actions of perpetrators, it is important to be aware of difficulties of perspective.

The problem of perspectives

47 The Act makes a clear distinction between “the perspectives of victims and the motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the violations”\(^7\). Baumeister, in a recent major study\(^8\), describes this as the “magnitude gap”: the discrepancy between the “importance of the act to the perpetrator and to the victim”. This magnitude gap has a number of features:

a The importance of the act is usually far greater for the victim. Horror of the experience is usually seen in the victim’s terms; for the perpetrator it is often “a very small thing”.

b Perpetrators tend to have less emotions about their acts than do victims. This may be illustrated in the recent book by Vlakplaas operative Colonel Eugene de Kock\(^9\), where repeated acts of violence are described in a matter-of-fact manner:

---

6 Section 3(1).
7 Section 3(1)(a).
9 De Kock (1997).
I continued to shoot at him. He finally fell down dead.

Nortje shot him in the temple ... he died instantly.

I took the decision to kill them because I was convinced they were armed.

We beat him very badly and for a long time. He was a broken man by the time we were finished.

I shot him with a .38 Special revolver. He died instantly.

The body was destroyed ... Mabotha was utterly blown up.

I reduced the charges to about 60kg to 80kg. They were placed in the cellar. The explosion shook Johannesburg and we celebrated at Vlakplaas with the Minister of Police, Adriaan Vlok. [On blowing up Khotso House.]

c The magnitude gap manifests in different time perspectives. The experience of violence typically fades faster for perpetrators than for victims. For victims, the suffering may continue long after the event.

d Moral evaluations of the events may differ: actions may appear less wrong, less evil, to the perpetrator than to the victim. While victims tend to rate events in stark categories of right and wrong, perpetrators may see large grey areas.

e Discrepancies exist between victims and perpetrators regarding the question of motives and intentions, the crucial question of why? Victims’ accounts show two versions, one which emphasises sheer incomprehensibility – the perpetrator had no reason at all – and the other which presents the perpetrator’s action as deliberately malicious, as sadistic, as an end in itself. By contrast, the vast majority of perpetrators, even if they admit wrongfulness, provide comprehensible reasons for their actions, and almost never admit to being motivated by sheer maliciousness or the wish to inflict harm as an end in itself.

48 This perspective gap may be illustrated by the case of Mr John Deegan, a former member of the Security Branch and a Koevoet operative responsible for various atrocities. In a testimony dated 30 June 1996, he reports as follows on the recent death of his father:
He was cold-bloodedly shot dead and his murderers escaped. I cannot come to terms with his death in that it was a senseless act of violence in the pursuit of greed. This is the first time that my family and I have come so close to experiencing the horror of violence so directly in this country.

49 Here is the perspective of the victim. But this is the same man who, in a report dated 23 August 1993, appeared as perpetrator, a Koevoet member in then South West Africa, dealing with a wounded SWAPO\textsuperscript{10} operative:

Even at that stage he was denying everything and I just started to go into this uncontrollable rage and he started going floppy ... and I remember thinking "how dare you" and then - this is what I was told afterwards - I started ripping. I ripped all the bandages, the drip which Sean had put into this guy ... pulled out my 9mm ... put the barrel between his eyes and fucking boom ... I executed him. I got on the radio and said to Colonel X ... "We floored one ... we are all tired and I want to come in."

50 From the point of view of the victim, violence is a “senseless act” and he experiences it with horror (the first time he claims to have had such an experience), yet as the perpetrator he has reasons and strong emotions, even expressing outrage (a moral stance) at the apparent defiance of his captive. The magnitude gap is a discrepancy between two quite different and irreconcilable positions.

Third parties: the perspective of the Commission

51 There is a third perspective: that of the onlooker, the outsider, the observer, the recorder, the evaluator, the scientist. That is the position of the Commission. Neither victim nor perpetrator, but charged with the task of understanding such acts of evil and helping to prevent them in future, it is a difficult stance. From the observer's difficult position, it is both helpful and instructive to grasp the notion that the perspectives of victims and perpetrators may differ sharply.

52 While its overall aim is to be even-handed and as objective as possible, to view the Commission as homogeneous, as all of one piece, is a rather oversimplified approach. The Commission is made up of many people with different perspectives. Members have had sympathy with the victims not least because of the harrowing process of hearing month after month of testimony from victims. In addition, some Commission members have shared the perspectives of victims in their own past experience. Depending on the context, members may also have had some empathy.

\textsuperscript{10} South West African People's Organisation.
with perpetrators, perceiving them to some extent also as victims. This is not to
decry the efforts of the Commission to be objective. It is an honest admission that
the perspective of the Commission and its members is a complex one.

Perpetrators as victims?

53 A further problem of perspective is the thorny question of whether perpetrators
may also be viewed as victims. Although one may wish to have a clear-cut
position on perpetrators, its is possible that there are grey areas. Perpetrators
may be seen as acting under orders, as subjects of indoctrination, as subjected
to threats, as outcomes of earlier doctrinaire education. In the most pernicious
situation, askaris (former ANC cadres who were ‘turned’, frequently through
torture, threats and brutality, into state agents) are themselves transformed into
killers and torturers. Military conscripts could view themselves in part as victims
of a state system. Kitskonstabels (special constables) could see themselves as
victims of poverty, in need of a job.

54 To understand these potential grey areas involves being drawn into a position of
some sympathy with the perpetrator. The dangers of this are twofold: first to forget
and ignore the suffering of victims of abuse, and second, to exonerate the doer
of violent deeds. From the third perspective of the Commission, difficulties are
once again manifest. Two statements may be fruitful. First, it is important to
recognise that perpetrators may in part be victims. Second, recognition of the
grey areas should not be regarded as absolving perpetrators of responsibility
for their deeds.

55 The position of the Commission regarding accountability and responsibility is quite
clear and was repeatedly stated by the chairperson of the Commission. While
acts of gross violations of human rights may be regarded as demonic, it is
counter-productive to regard persons who perpetrated those acts as necessarily
demonic. The work of the Commission towards reconciliation would be useless
if such a stance were to be upheld.

Violence of the powerful and the powerless

56 As Frantz Fanon recognised some forty years ago, violence of the powerful and
the powerless is not equivalent. An unhappy characteristic of oppression is that
violence is often committed by the powerless against other oppressed groups.
Bishop Peter Storey expressed this succinctly in a Commission hearing into the
activities of the Mandela United Football Club:
The primary cancer ... will always be the apartheid oppression, but the secondary infection has touched many of apartheid's opponents and eroded their knowledge of good and evil.

57 The phenomenon whereby the oppressed turn their violence against each other was expressed in many forms in South Africa: between the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) and the UDF, between township vigilante groups and more youthful 'comrades', between township groupings in the enforcement of boycotts, in the case of the gruesome 'necklace' murders which numbered many hundreds from the mid-1980s onwards, in the case of violence by the Mandela United Football Club, in the case of askaris, and most prominently in the murderous violence between Inkatha on the one hand and Charterist groupings – ANC, UDF, SDUs – on the other, all of which often took the form of cycles of revenge. An IFP amnesty applicant in respect of the Boipatong massacre, Mr Victor Mthembu, expressed it as follows:

We would not have done these things if the people of Boipatong did not terrorise IFP members, if the comrades had not killed IFP members. If it had not been a war situation between the IFP and the ANC I would not have participated.

58 Violence among the oppressed has often been described as 'black on black' violence. This is an unfortunate and potentially racist depiction since it camouflages the role of the state in orchestrating or steering such divisions. It is common knowledge that the state provided covert support for homeland leaders and for Inkatha. The security police gave support for conservative, anti-UDF 'vigilante' groupings. In its submission to the Commission, the UDF said:

The State repeatedly distributed leaflets all around the country in the names of various organisations with the aim of causing confusion and fermenting violence between the UDF and AZAPO. Unfortunately we say that this sometimes succeeded in doing precisely that.

... attitudes of intolerance ... had to be seen against the background of a climate of suspicion and intolerance that was created by the regime ... People who are constantly fearful of attack or arrest not surprisingly develop attitudes that are not only intolerant but also undemocratic in such a climate.
Even-handedness

59 There is a final major area regarding the problem of perspective: the question of even-handedness in understanding perpetrators from the multiple and varied sides of the struggle. Perpetrators of gross violations of human rights came from all sides: the security forces, military conscripts, the liberation movements and their armed wings, Inkatha and the UDF, from askaris and kitskonstabels, from township vigilante groups, youth organisations, from torturers and assassination squads, from the far-right, and from township crowds responsible for ‘necklace’ killings. It is probably not possible to provide a neat, tidy or exhaustive classification of perpetrators.

60 In this respect, the Commission wishes to state that:

a It is important to recognise unequivocally that perpetrators came from all sides of the struggle.

b The motives and causes of violence are not the same for the different groupings; understanding the actions of perpetrators requires recognition that the multiple forms may have differing explanations.

c Perhaps most significantly, it is vital to state that, although the Commission recognises perpetrators from all sides, it simultaneously recognises that it was not an equivalent struggle - in terms of forces deployed, members, or justice11. To be even-handed in understanding the motives of perpetrators also requires full recognition that violence of the powerful, the South African state, was not necessarily equal with violence of the powerless, the disenfranchised, oppressed and relatively voiceless black majority. While each side may put forward reasonable and quite understandable explanations or justifications for such actions, the task of the third perspective, that of the Commission, is to recognise that these accounts are not necessarily equivalent. This non-equivalence means that protagonists in the thirty-year conflict were motivated by quite different political perspectives.

EXPLANATIONS OF MOTIVES AND CAUSES

A political understanding of causes

61 To understand perpetrators’ actions, it is essential to locate them within a particular pattern or sequence of events. One aspect stands out above all others

11 See Mandate chapter.
when one looks back at the patterns of numerous atrocities over the twentieth century. They begin under certain political configurations, increase rapidly in scope, diversity and spread, peak, then decline quite rapidly when political circumstances change. In the South African case, this pattern spanned the historical period 1960 to 1994, although the majority of violent acts occurred mainly towards the tail-end of this period, between 1983 and 1994. This means that the motives of perpetrators need to be understood primarily in historico-political terms; that is, psychological explanations and motives, while not irrelevant, are secondary.

None of this means, however, that there were no atrocities beforehand. Historical circumstances build over a long period and, in South Africa, conflict goes back to the initial appearance of invader-settlers. Nor does it mean that atrocities decline entirely following a change in political dispensation. There have, indeed, been isolated incidents of violence from far-right-wing groups and ominous recent attacks against farmers. Violence continues in KwaZulu-Natal and, of course, criminal violence and violence against women have not abated.

Yet the pattern is different. Atrocities are widespread and rampant at particular times, then decline and dribble away to sporadic cases. Types of violence change; hit squads, torture, abductions, cross-border raids, assassinations, guerrilla bombings decline and disappear. Criminal activities, and violence against women, have different motives.

The primacy of the political motive

The primacy of the political context as an explanation for violence was persuasively put by General Constand Viljoen in the submission of the Freedom Front to the Commission. Regarding accountability, General Viljoen said:

I still maintain it is unfair that the operators be exposed as the chief perpetrators of atrocities and violence in general when the politicians and strategy managers hide behind their status and positions. The iniquity of our past was of a political nature first, and mainly in that way a moral problem on an individual level.

Mr FW de Klerk also confirmed the primacy of the political in creating the overall climate for subsequent violence. In the NP’s submission statement to the Commission in May 1997, he said:

Let me state clearly that the National Party and I accept full responsibility for all our policies, decisions and actions. We stand by our security forces who
implemented such policies. We accept that our security legislation and the state of emergency created circumstances which were conducive to many of the abuses and transgressions against human rights ... We acknowledge that our implementation of unconventional projects and strategies likewise created such an atmosphere.

**Contexts of political motives**

What were the political motives? While apartheid, rooted in colonialism, may be the primary context for the struggle, two other, wider, contexts combined to produce the particularly volatile mix in South Africa.

**The cold war context**

The first was the international climate of cold war, in particular the virulent form of anti-Communism and anti-Marxism that took root after the 1948 election victory of the NP. According to former Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok at the Commission hearing of 14 October 1997:

> The mother organisations of the liberation movements, the ANC-PAC, were seen with justification as fronts and tools of the Marxist-Communist threat against the country ... I believed and still believe that if the forces of Communism and Marxism since the 1950s were allowed to take over South Africa, our country would today be destroyed, impoverished and a backward country with an atheist communist ideology as the government policy ... I saw it as part of my duty to fight against such thoughts, programmes or initiatives and to ensure that these objectives were not successful.

Not only leaders but countless foot-soldiers were fed on a diet of this sort of propaganda over a long period. In the same testimony, Mr Vlok says clearly:

> We actually still referred to them as the enemy in those days; the enemy was doing this that and the other.

**The anti-colonial context**

The second wider context was the anti-colonial resistance movement in Africa, particularly in the neighbouring territories of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. This occurred over the same period and became deeply entangled
with the South African struggle. Although the liberation movement was dominated by the non-racialism of the ANC and anti-racism of other movements such as Black Consciousness, some organisations interpreted it as a struggle against whites. Mr Ntobeki Peni, a member of the Pan Africanist Students’ Organisation (PASO) who was involved in the murder of Ms Amy Biehl in Gugulethu in August 1993, expressed it thus:

These speeches were closed with the slogan “one settler, one bullet”. I understood this slogan to apply to every white person who came into the line of fire during an APLA operation, or an operation to support APLA, or where we, as PASO members were to assist in making the country ungovernable.

70 While both the ANC and the PAC made it clear in their political submissions that their primary motives were in response to the apartheid regime, it is also clear in their joint campaign and their alliance with others in the front-line states, together with their involvement in organisations such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation for African Unity, that the local struggle was part of the wider anti-colonial movement in Africa. The PAC submission stated:

When the Organisation of African Unity was formed in May 1963, it gave support to armed struggle through its Liberation Committee based in Dar-es-Salaam. Many countries in Europe and Asia channelled their aid to our people through the OAU Liberation Committee.

71 The ANC submission quite succinctly identifies anti-colonialism as the central political motive:

At the root of South Africa’s conflict was the system of colonial subjugation. Like other colonial countries, South Africa was victim to the rapacious licence of an era that defined might as right, an epoch of international morality that justified dispossession and turned owner into thief, victim into aggressor, and humble host into ungodly infidel.

72 Further on, the ANC submission states:

Thus ranged against one another, in intensifying conflict, were the oppressor and the oppressed, the owners of wealth of the country and the dispossessed, the rightless and the privileged. The ANC was a product of this history and this conflict, not their creator.
The issues surrounding resistance to colonial domination in South Africa were further complicated by the perception on the part of many of the dominant political forces that the Afrikaner population, too, had been injured by attempts at colonial subjugation by the British. This perspective was carefully laid out in the political party submission of the Freedom Front. Describing the effects of the discovery of South Africa’s mineral wealth, General Constand Viljoen states:

It invited the greedy attentions of colonialist powers, particularly Great Britain who in its imperialistic drive soon had second thoughts on its endorsement of the independence of existing Boer republics ... The result was war and trauma of a sort that have in a way not yet been resolved.

For it conditioned the white tribe of Africa – the Afrikaners – to consolidate in a nation around the dangerous sentiments of a collective sense of injustice, discrimination and deprivation.

In the first Freedom Front submission, General Viljoen suggests:

We may have redirected our quarrel with the British to our compatriots in South Africa.

The apartheid context

The third and most direct political context was the NP policy of apartheid, long rooted in colonialism and segregation, but increasingly from 1948 – and particularly after the banning of the PAC and the ANC in 1960 – involving a direct struggle between oppressed and oppressor: an armed conflict which gradually intensified over the subsequent years. Here of course the political perspectives differed widely. For the PAC the conflict was:

A national liberation struggle against settler colonialism for the restoration of our land to its rightful owners – the African majority.

For the ANC, apartheid was, quite starkly: “a crime against humanity”.

By contrast, for supporters of the NP, ‘separate development’ was a defensible policy fashioned in order to solve local problems. The NP submission to the Commission on 21 August 1996 states that:
We thought we could solve the complex problems that confronted us by giving each of the ten distinguishable Black South African nations self-government and independence in the core areas that they had traditionally occupied ... The underlying principle of territorial partition to assure self-determination for different peoples living in a common area was widely accepted.

Further on, the same NP submission says:

The great majority of those who served in the security forces during the conflict were honourable, professional and dedicated men and women. They were convinced that their cause was just, necessary and legitimate.

The perception of those on the side of the Government was accordingly that the installation of an ANC Government would lead to Communist domination. They believed that in conducting their struggle against the ANC, they were playing an important role in the West’s global resistance to the expansion of Soviet Communism.

How did the purported idealism of the apparently righteous struggle of the Afrikaners for self-determination go wrong? Here again, not surprisingly, there are differing political perspectives. For Mr FW de Klerk, who repeatedly stated that he had no knowledge of NP or cabinet authorisation of gross human rights violations, things went wrong because:

You cannot fight that type of thing in the normal way.

The result, according to the NP submission, was:

... more authority to the security people to fight a very specific kind of war, and across the world where this type of war occurred there have been these aberrations.

The version of the Freedom Front submission was that Afrikaners, rooted originally in the ideals of ‘freedom from bondage’, gradually lost their way and, during this process, the NP denied “on a racial basis, democratic rights to others” and found themselves “far removed from their traditional value systems”. According to General Constand Viljoen, the NP –

started slipping and they had to resort to unconventional devices, propaganda and group force in order to keep political control.
The ANC submission puts a different argument:

Apartheid oppression and repression was therefore not an aberration of a well-intentioned undertaking that went horribly wrong. Neither was it, as we were told later, an attempt to stave off the ‘evil of communism’. Its ideological underpinnings and the programmes set in motion constituted a deliberate and systematic mission of a ruling clique that saw itself the champion of a ‘super-race’. In order to maintain and reproduce a political and social order which is premised upon large-scale denial of human rights, far reaching and vicious criminal, security and penal codes were necessary ... the system increasingly relied upon intimidation, coercion and violence to curb and eliminate the opposition that apartheid inevitably engendered.

Racism, as a central ideological ingredient at the core of the political struggle, was unfortunately underplayed in the NP submission. Racism as an ideology, a means of domination and oppression, provided the central grounds for the systematic exclusion, segregation and denigration of the black majority. Racism is a systematic ideological doctrine which creates the ‘other’ as essentially different. In South Africa this was the rhetorical basis for apartheid and ‘separate development’: blacks required development, but at their own, slower and different pace, since (as the argument went) they were essentially different from the more civilised, developed people of European origins. Not only politicians but also leading academics, scientists, theologians and churches such as the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) provided constant fuel to bolster such ideological positions. Racism, it hardly bears reminding, also served to distance and to dehumanise the black ‘other’, a process which opened the way for violence. In the practice of torture, for instance, black people were more severely brutalised in the main than white people.

These three political frameworks, the cold war, anti-colonialism and the racist and oppressive apartheid regime, ideologically fuelled by Christian-Nationalism and increasing militarism, provided the arguments and justifications, the passions and the furies for the eventual commission of dreadful deeds. If political frameworks provide the fuel for atrocities, they must also form the focus of primary attention for future prevention. Political contexts do not, however, provide the full set of explanations.
OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF MOTIVES

Individualistic psychological explanations

85 In a comprehensive analysis of many and varied forms of evil deeds, Baumeister distinguishes between four main clusters of motives underlying the actions of perpetrators. In this section, a slightly different but overlapping scheme is followed, also listing four main forms of explanation. It ends with an enquiry as to which forms of explanation best fit the South African situation and which apply best to particular forms of violent action – for example, torture and ‘mob’ killings. Both the popular and more scientific understandings of perpetrators are interrogated. In addressing motives, it is important to be mindful that reasons are likely to be pluralistic, overlapping, multi-layered and contingent on particular and local circumstances.

86 Popular accounts sooner or later raise the suggestion that violence is due either to deep, ingrained aspects of human nature (“it is in our nature to be violent” or “he is inherently evil”) or to various forms of psychological malady (“these actions are crazy, mad or mindless” or “these torturers must be sadists”). Since these everyday examples are so widespread and commonplace, they warrant asking questions about the substance of such claims. Much of the social psychological evidence points against these hypotheses, however.

Human nature

87 Let us examine the first claim, that violence is in our human nature. The notion is usually couched in some form of evolutionary or biological explanation – that we have descended from animals, that current violence is a throwback to more primordial, primitive or regressed forms, or that there are particular biological mechanisms (genes, primitive brain stems, hormones) that predispose us to repeated episodes of atrocities. Against this, one should consider the following. Why is it that mass atrocities appear only at certain historical times and not others? Why is it that some societies or cultures are in the main peaceful? Why is it that half of humanity, women, are not particularly violent and are seldom involved in large-scale atrocities? Even if one could identify atavistic predisposing factors, this would not explain the plain fact that large-scale killings (as in Rwanda, Bosnia, the Holocaust, the cultural revolution in China and Cambodia) occur over relatively brief historical periods and then cease. Atavistic accounts are simply not adequate.

12 These are listed as follows: (i) as means to an end, (ii) egotism and revenge, (iii) true believers and idealists, and (iv) joy of hurting.
The claim that violence is due to psychological dysfunction appears to warrant more attention. Nevertheless, the bulk of the international literature on atrocities and perpetrators\textsuperscript{13} reports little evidence of severe abnormality. Even in regard to sadism (Baumeister's final potential motive of perpetrators: pleasure in hurting others), the general consensus is that, while it cannot be entirely dismissed, only about 5 per cent of all types of perpetrators (for example, serial killers, torturers, rapists) may be classed as sadists, and furthermore that this motive is gradually and slowly acquired over time. It is not inherent, but a consequence rather of earlier perpetration of violence. Although there is scant evidence that perpetrators suffer from major or severe psychological pathologies, other studies suggest that perpetrators may experience severe stress and anxiety along with denial, disassociation, ‘doubling’ and other defence mechanisms\textsuperscript{14}.

In the South African case, some submissions to the Commission have made claims of post-traumatic stress disorder among some perpetrators. However, the diagnostic manual on post-traumatic stress disorder attributes this state to victims, not to perpetrators. Furthermore, post-traumatic stress disorder, even if diagnosed among perpetrators, is far more likely to be a consequence of appalling actions, not primarily a causal factor. There is sizeable evidence that perpetrators experience severe stress reactions, and take to heavy bouts of drinking and drug-taking: but these are consequences.

An extract from the written statement of Koevoet member Mr John Deegan states:

\begin{quote}
I really had bad dreams ... I have dreams of bodies, or parts of bodies ... like an arm ... this is a recurring dream I still have now ... an arm sticking out of the ground and I’m trying to cover it up and there were people around and I know that I killed them, whatever is down there and its been down there for weeks ... and it is this intense feeling of guilt and horror that this thing has come out of the ground again ... and I had a dream that I actually met a guy that I shot.
\end{quote}

While it is premature for the Commission to draw any final conclusions on this matter, the considerable bulk of international literature, and also the testimony submitted to the Commission, suggests that severe psychological dysfunction is not a primary cause of atrocities. Instead, most commentators have emphasised


the ordinary, rather unexceptional character of perpetrators, typified in Hannah Arendt’s celebrated phrase, the “banality of evil”, or in Browning’s term “ordinary men”\textsuperscript{15}. In this regard, it is instructive to quote Colonel Eugene de Kock, the Vlakplaas multiple killer who distances himself from psychological accounts that put the blame on childhood experiences, another form of explanation which seeks dysfunctions.

I know it has become fashionable to blame a person’s adulthood on his childhood … But such an approach makes me uncomfortable. I do not believe my childhood was especially bizarre. To be sure, my father was the proverbial hard man and he drank too much. So what? Many sons had hard men and drinkers for fathers … I find it unacceptable to blame my father and my home life for me.\textsuperscript{16}

Along similar lines, in explanation of ANC-inspired SDUs in Gauteng townships, the Commission heard testimony that such persons were not dysfunctional but quite dutiful citizens. At the special hearing on children and youth, the Commission heard that –

… far from being a bunch of undisciplined comrades or the last generation, SDUs were in many ways the backbone of defence in certain townships.

Rather it was the social system and wider context that changed people. Mr Jimmy Nkondo, who joined an SDU at age thirteen –

… changed from a carefree young man who enjoyed school and sport to a person with no mercy. Instead of being nurtured in the family home he became a killing machine. There was no choice, it was kill or be killed.

**Authoritarianism**

Before leaving individualistic psychological explanations, it is worth asking whether perpetrators are not self-selected, that is, people with particular kinds of personality predispositions who are drawn to certain careers and circumstances to emerge as killers and torturers. The theory of the authoritarian personality presents such a view. Rooted in earlier thinking from the 1920s, the authoritarian thesis was made famous in a major book published in 1950\textsuperscript{17}. A particular kind of person,

\textsuperscript{16} De Kock (1998) p. 45.
the ‘authoritarian personality’, it was claimed, emerged from rigid and punitive family structures. Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, it was argued that children of such families split off and repressed feelings of hostility and resentment towards their parents and projected these hostile feelings towards members of weaker and stigmatised groups. As Adorno once put it, authoritarians metaphorically resemble cyclists: “above they bow, below they kick”. Authoritarians as a type also manifest a particular pattern of social attitudes: ethnocentrism (or favouritism towards their own group), prejudice towards out-group members, anti-democratic views and a propensity towards conservatism and fascist ideology.

95 There is solid and reliable recent evidence that authoritarianism was manifest among white South Africans, that it was correlated with anti-black prejudice and anti-democratic tendencies, and was more prevalent among Afrikaans rather than English-speakers, and among those who regarded themselves as conservative.

96 In recent years, the theoretical base of authoritarianism has been revised. It is no longer seen as rooted primarily in either intrapsychic conflict or in strict, hierarchical and rigid family socialisation. Rather, it is a set of beliefs expressing strong and loyal identification with one’s own social or cultural group – ethnic, national, racial, religious – with strong demands on group togetherness (cohesion). Respect and unconditional obedience is given to own-group leaders and authorities (an attitude of bowing to the top) while authoritarian aggression reflects negative prejudice, intolerance and punitiveness towards out-group members (the kicks below). Authoritarianism in this view is a form of social identity rather than a particular personality type. It is nevertheless a modality of identity with tendencies towards hostility towards ‘others’ – expressed in South Africa as the intolerance and hostility of whites towards blacks and those on the left. It is certainly not far-fetched to argue that such people may be drawn towards lives in the police and the army, themselves rather rigid and hierarchical institutions, which then reinforce authoritarian tendencies that are already present. Hence, self-selection on psychological grounds is quite feasible.

97 But does this offer an explanation for a predisposition to commit atrocities? Evidence is really rather thin. There is no direct evidence that shows that authoritarian identities are actually more violent in terms of behaviour. Research of this sort has shown evidence of expressed intolerance, prejudice, racism and anti-democratic tendencies but not direct evidence of murderous actions. It is dubious in the additional sense that there may be many authoritarians in a given social order,

but far fewer perpetrators of violent deeds. Therefore the links to violence are neither direct nor proven.

98 However, authoritarianism may form a contributing factor in the propensity towards violence in that both central elements of the authoritarian personality - obedience and loyalties to in-group authorities, and hostile distancing from others (a tendency towards dehumanisation of the ‘enemy’) - have been directly implicated in aggression. It is a feasible link in the chain; it is not the whole story.

99 In evidence before the Commission it would seem that many perpetrators, particularly from the security forces and right-wing organisations, would fit rather closely the description of authoritarian identity. Certainly there is evidence that security force training, perhaps particularly of the sort found in South Africa prior to 1994, may facilitate such tendencies. Here again are extracts from Mr John Deegan’s testimony, describing police training:

During police training at the college in Pretoria, the ‘code of silence’ was soon inculcated into new recruits through various methods of indoctrination and brainwashing and reprisals for not being one of the group. If one person stepped out of line, no matter how trivial the offence, the whole platoon or company would be punished. Individualistic behaviour was punishable not only by the system of instructors, trainers and officers, but by your peers as well - fellow trainees eventually through fear of punishment would punish fellow students before infringements came to the notice of superiors ... I learnt early on in my training that individualism was out.

100 It should be apparent from the above that violence is not a matter of individual psychology alone. It is the combination of personal biographies interwoven with institutional forms (organisations, military structures, hierarchical arrangements of power) and an escalation of events in historical terms that provides the assemblages or configurations that produce awful deeds. It is not a mechanistic formula. Since authoritarianism in this view is a particular form of identification, social identity frameworks as potential motives for violence will now be examined.

Social identities: Preconditions for violations

101 Put most simply, people do not act only due to personal or individual attributes. We also act in terms of the norms, values, standards of groups that provide us with social identities (racial, national, ethnic, gendered). When groups are in
hostile, suspicious relations with each other, we are capable of acting towards others in a dehumanised fashion, treating them as the enemy, as described in Mr Adriaan Vlok’s statement:

We also have to remember that we were engaged in war and that makes it even more difficult to really do what you ought to do. And we made a mistake, we should have listened to people ... but we were engaged in a war, we had all been indoctrinated not to listen to each other ...

102 In such situations, people act primarily in terms of their social identities rather than personal attributes. What implications does this have for explaining violence? The critical implication is that the psychological dynamics of inter-group relations are of a different order from those of interpersonal relations. Perpetrators’ actions are instances of inter-group rather than interpersonal relations, and require a different order of psychological explanation. A range of possible options may make the contrast clear.

103 One class of account places the emphasis on a loss of personal identity, or a loss of moral restraints. This understanding is common enough in everyday descriptions such as “killing frenzy”, “mob madness” “war brutalisation” or “losing control”. This “loss”, or dysfunctional, class of understanding is also prevalent in formal psychological theorising such as de-individuation, extreme stress, frustration, aggression and the like. These versions imply a move away (disintegration) from a normal personal rationality into a mode of irrationality, or a regressed, more ‘primitive’ state.

104 A second class of understanding motives explains violence as a product of personal or interpersonal psychology. Violence is due either to an intrinsic personality trait or type such as a sadist, psychopath, Machiavellian or authoritarian type, or conversely an inner psychological state or mood (rage, jealousy, frustration, revenge, provocation induced via interpersonal processes and interactions). Such explanations do not account adequately for violence against categories of people with whom we have little or no interaction, as in the case of warfare. The two domains, interpersonal and inter-group, are controlled by different processes.

105 A third class of explanations is located at an inter-group level. We act towards or against others because they are construed as members of other groups/categories: the ‘enemy’ or the out-group. Processes which contrast group differences, stereotype the other and promote ethnocentrism all serve to differentiate, distance
from and ultimately dehumanise members of other groups. This goes hand in hand with strong feelings. This is put very succinctly by Mr Adriaan Vlok in his testimony to the Commission:

I believe that most policemen who found themselves in such a situation, where he found himself obliged to act in an illegal way, probably did this by virtue of his position as a policeman and not from personal considerations.

106 Numerous and multiply overlapping influences reinforce and manufacture these particular social identities. Here again is former Minister Vlok:

There was a plethora of various influences on a typical Afrikaans-speaking conservative, Christian person, for instance teachers at schools, parents and the way they brought up their children, professors and teachers at university, eminent people in society by means of statements and documents, the press, politicians in their statements and policies and the ministers in their churches.

107 The generalised categorisation and dehumanisation of the other was chillingly expressed by amnesty applicant Victor Mthembu when asked why children as young as nine months of age were attacked. He replied: “a snake gives birth to another snake”. While the expressed aim was given as an attack against the ANC and particularly the SDUs organised by the ANC, Mr Mthembu said: “… we did not discriminate, it was not discriminated against as to who was attacked”.

108 It may be noted that social identity theory does not explain violence itself, but the preconditions of violence. It is employed here in order to emphasise the necessity of locating explanations of mass violence at the inter-group rather than the interpersonal or intrapsychic levels alone. It is obvious enough that racialised identities loomed very large on the South African landscape. There is plenty of evidence of racialised prejudice, stereotyping and distancing. Here are three examples from reports to the Commission:

I’d say that Apartheid turned me from being a human being into a white man, and so for me the motivation of joining the struggle against Apartheid was to seek to recover my own humanity I’d been robbed of by Apartheid … under Apartheid I found it impossible to be a neighbour to a person of a different colour … I was locked into the relationship of oppressors and oppressed. (Father Michael Lapsley, victim of a parcel bomb.)
At the time of the killing we were in very high spirits and the white people were oppressive, we had no mercy on the white people. A white person was a white person to our eyes. (Mr Ntombeki Peni, granted amnesty for the murder of Amy Biehl.)

... the Lord wished separate peoples to maintain their separateness (Apartheid) ... respect for the principles of Apartheid had God’s blessing. (DRC’s submission to the Commission.)

109 While racial and ethnic identities (which also promoted division among black people) were made particularly salient as a systematic part of apartheid and Christian-National ideology, these were not the only pertinent identities. Religious identities, for instance, became intertwined with the military defence of apartheid:

Through the idea of the total onslaught, the Church immediately became an ally in the war. The total onslaught concept assumed that only twenty per cent of the onslaught was of military nature, eighty per cent was directed against the economical and spiritual welfare of the people ... the Church was now totally convinced that we were fighting a just war. Almost every synod of the DRC during this time supported the military effort in their prayers. (Reverend Neels du Plooy, during the hearings on compulsory military service.)

110 An additional form of salient identity, often ignored in explanation of mass atrocities, is that of masculinity. It is most surprising to find, in masses of literature on atrocities of many kinds, the sheer neglect of a simple fact: most of these acts are committed almost exclusively by men. Few women were found among perpetrators in the South African case. Although this is a matter which requires further investigation, this pattern of overwhelming male predominance among perpetrators appears to be confirmed in the preliminary analysis of the period under review by the Commission.

111 What is the relation between masculinity and violence? There have been many and varied efforts to explain male aggression: genes, hormones, socialisation, roles, essence, archetypes, peer pressure, status, careers, warrior mythology, the Oedipal complex and more. Patriarchy, the ideology of male domination, portrays men as protectors and defenders of women, property, territory and nation. Patriarchy is a significant explanation of the male’s apparent propensity towards violence, but patriarchy as ideology itself requires explanation. It is beyond the scope of this report to explore the issue fully, but it remains an important part of the
understanding of violence. In South Africa, it is clear that patriarchy and the cult of masculinity has been embedded deeply in each of the various cultural streams: black, Boer, British. Its significance as a contributing factor should not be undermined.

112 Masculinity intertwines with other identities, for instance those forged in military establishments. Baumeister lists egotism (self-pride or group-pride, bordering on self-aggrandisement) as one of the key motives of perpetrators. Masculinity intertwined with militarism jointly act as constituents of potentially lethal forms of egotism. Here again is Mr John Deegan, later a Koevoet operative, talking about police training. Apart from fear, discipline and propaganda there was also pride.

Pride was also worked into the equation and in the closed smallness of our lives under training, pride became of paramount importance. Pride in ourselves and our platoons. Pride in the company of platoons. Pride in the college. Pride in the police force, the nation, the country, the flag. Pride and patriotism. By the end of our training we were fully indoctrinated in the functions of the established system ... they strip away your individuality and they make you a man, kind of thing.

113 Here is a more stark statement given at the special hearing on compulsory military service:

Action, especially for young national servicemen, is often a thrill, an ego-trip. There is a tremendous sense of power in beating someone up - even if you are the most put-upon dumb sonofabitch, you are still better than a kaffir and can beat him up to prove it.

114 This last quote is a stark example of the intertwining of multiple identity forms to produce violence. A threatened sense of masculinity is interwoven with a racialised identity and militarism to effect a volatile mixture. It bears repeating that it is not merely a single identity form that leads to violence. Multiple social identities such as masculinity and racial, militaristic and national patriotism combine with religious, ethnic and political identities to render people quite willingly capable of murderous deeds in the play of egotism and pride. If the construction of particular identities provides the preconditions for violence, it is the contradictory pushes and pulls, sequences and spirals of situations that provide the triggers.
Situations: triggers of violence

115 If there is a single dominant message emerging from psychological research over the past fifty years, it is a tale that emphasises the persuasive power of the immediate situation. While it is dangerous to regard situational forces as inevitable since there are always possibilities of resistance, it would be as much of an error to see resistance to situational forces as merely freedom of choice, strength of character or individual moral maturity. We are social creatures, and resistance to situational powers is also a matter of positioning in relation to others. For instance, resistance to the powers of group pressure is easier if you are part of a small group standing together, than on your own.

116 The literature in this area is quite technical and complex and a more detailed account is given in Foster’s paper to the Commission. Centrally at issue here is a question of the motives involved in ‘binding people’ into groups and to authority. There are three main motivational processes: compliance, identification and internalisation.

Binding forces

a Compliance is a process of going along with a group because we wish to avoid censure (avoid sticking out like a sore thumb) or gain approval, and because groups provide us with information, they shape reality.

b Identification is a second process of binding a person to authority, in which one ‘goes along’ because one feels the same identity (group, culture, racial, national) as the authority. This is the version of social identity theory, given above.

c Internalisation is a process in which one goes along, complies with a particular institutional authority because it is consonant, in agreement with one’s values.

117 While these three processes begin to explain why we become bound into groups, institutions and authorities, they do not yet suggest violence. Stanley Milgram’s experiments, in which ordinary people gave high levels of electric shocks to innocent people in a laboratory, point out further processes in the steps towards violent actions.

---

Two intertwined sets of processes are discernible from Milgram’s work. On the one hand, there are those forces that bind the person into the situation. On the other hand, there are processes that distance us from the victim. These two operate in tandem. The ‘binding in’ processes turn on the hierarchy, surveillance and legitimacy of authority. Obedience to authority even to the point of acting violently is more likely when authorities are powerful, act as a group (consensually), are regarded as legitimate and have increased surveillance. On the other side, the greater the degree of psychological distance from the victim, and the more the perpetrator is reduced to a link in the chain of orders (the bureaucratic process), the more substantial is the degree of violence. Obedience to authority is not inevitable however. When circumstances were so arranged that two peers rebelled together, obedience dropped dramatically. Milgram commented as follows:

Revolt against malevolent authority is most effectively brought about by collective rather than individual action. (1974, p. 116.)

Two further aspects are pertinent to an understanding of the binding to authority. Both refer to subtle, almost imperceptible, but powerful ‘rules’ that operate in everyday life. The first refers to the sheer embarrassment involved in refusal. It requires making a scene, disruption, argument, making a fuss. The second process involves sequencing: a step-by-step interactive spiral that draws the person in – by volunteering in the first instance, by accepting the early steps, by being drawn into the experimenter’s definition of the situation and by ‘tuning in’ to the authority rather than the victim.

These two processes, working together, operate in subtle, quite normal ways to suck a person into a positioning of obedience, rendering refusals and resistance difficult. Regarding this process of sequencing, here we extract from John Deegan’s story.

Slowly the artistic side started slipping away and I started getting into the kind of conventional, macho world of things.

I really didn’t understand the function of the Special Branch until I was in it ... I thought I could still hold onto the real person in me, the artist, the sensitive idealist ... I thought I could actually do good within the police force ... but the system changed me, and it was a long process of erosion and mixing with these people and becoming part of the culture.
121 As Bauman stated in his study of the Holocaust: “Cruelty is social in its origins much more than it is characterological”\(^\text{21}\). Other studies have shown that it is particular roles and positions that people are placed in, rather than their personal characters, that lead to abusive actions. Perpetrators themselves may be in part victims of their circumstances; lines may blur and grey areas appear.

122 Crimes of obedience occur due to three main reasons, reiterating themes already discussed above.

a Authorisation is the process in which authorities order, implicitly encourage, or tacitly approve of violence. The impulse to obey orders, to follow rules even with pride (to do one’s duty) propels perpetrators forward.

b Routinisation is understood as a sequence in which events are organised as routine, repetitive, programmed: little in the way of serious thinking or decision is required.

c Dehumanisation is a process in which victims are transformed into creatures to whom normal morality does not apply.

123 Although the top political structures of the apartheid government repeatedly denied giving orders, as in the words of former Minister Vlok, “I never gained the impression anybody proposed an instruction or issued and instruction with such a sinister objective”, it is also quite clear that in the minds of operatives such as Colonel Eugene de Kock, they were acting under orders. There seems to be ample evidence of such orders in De Kock’s recent book. It is also clear from De Kock’s account that all these factors implicated in crimes of obedience – that is, authorisation, routinisation, and dehumanisation – systematically became part of the security force culture.

**Language and ideology**

124 It is commonplace to treat language as mere words, not deeds, therefore language is taken to play a minimal role in understanding violence. The Commission wishes to take a different view here. Language, discourse and rhetoric does things: it constructs social categories, it gives orders, it persuades us, it justifies, explains, gives reasons, excuses. It constructs reality. It moves certain people against other people.

Apartheid discourse constructed socialised categories, enshrined in the language of laws, which forged differences and distance between groups. As the spiral of conflict escalated and the ANC and PAC turned to armed struggle in the 1960s, so the language of the apartheid security apparatus broadened. From the late 1970s onwards, the language of ‘total onslaught and total strategy’ enmeshed people increasingly in a discourse of militarism, side-taking and construction of ‘enemies’. From the side of the liberation movements, the apartheid regime was similarly constructed as the ‘enemy’. A spiral of discourses increasingly dehumanised the ‘other’, creating the conditions for violence.

Language calls people up, motivates people for action. Mr Clive Derby-Lewis testified in his amnesty application for the murder of ANC leader Mr Chris Hani:

Dr Treurnicht had called us up for the third freedom struggle, Mr Chairman, which in Afrikaner history means only one thing.

Language instructs and advises people. Here again is Mr Clive Derby-Lewis:

In terms of the Bible teachings ... we as Christians are told that it is our duty to fight the anti-Christ in whichever way we can ... the impression I got from Dr Treurnicht was that under certain circumstances it would be permissible to even kill in the battle against the anti-Christ.

Former Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok noted with some surprise in hindsight that language could potentially construct a climate of violence, but he conceded eventually that this could be so.

It is a fact that our country, especially during the conflict of the past, was plunged into a war psychosis where ... words and expressions which were derived from the military became part of the vernacular, just as other expressions with the same import became part of the revolutionary language. At that stage there was nothing unnatural or unusual in the use of these expressions. It is however so, as already said, that with the benefit of hindsight, it is an indisputable fact that there wasn’t necessary consideration of the perspectives in interpretations of other people who did not attend those meetings.

I realise with shock now, with shock and dismay that this language usage obviously and apparently gave rise to illegal actions by policemen whereby not only victims were prejudiced but from which also certain negative results came for policemen and their families.
I don’t know how the man on the ground saw the position. Perhaps because of the greater pressure we exerted on them, they experienced greater pressure to act illegally ... and perhaps then ... we pressurised them to such an extent that it led to people being killed and that policemen landed up in problem situations. Once again it was a case of perceptions which we perhaps had a hand in creating because I said to the policemen and the men on the ground, you have to achieve and perform, you have to solve this problem and this matter. So perhaps, if that led to that kind of pressure, I’m sorry.

129 If Minister Vlok is surprised at the manner in which language could create impressions, Eugene de Kock is quite adamant about the meaning of certain expressions. In testimony, De Kock indicated that orders were usually given in the form of euphemisms such as “go for a drive” (a person wouldn’t return), “had to be removed”, “neutralise” “make a plan with these people”. De Kock laconically commented that the phrase “take them out” did not mean that “you had to take the person out and entertain them”. Referring to the orders to bomb Khotso House, De Kock expressed surprise that in this case the orders were quite clearly to “blow up”. Usually, he said, the instruction would be “to shake up a little” or “to put a couple of cracks in the wall”. Although the link between language and violence in the South African case has not yet been studied sufficiently and must form part of a future research agenda, the above examples point to the importance of the topic.

130 In the UDF submission to the Commission, the question of language and violence is discussed as follows:

The usage of militant language within the Front took place against a background of increasing struggle and general escalation of violence. We were concerned about this development and discouraged the use of militant rhetoric. But, having looked at this question hard and for a long time among us, we concede that the language used by some of us from time to time could have provided the reasonable basis for some of our members to infer that violence and even killing was acceptable.

131 Ideology is a form of power in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain and reproduce relations of domination. Language, in its many and varied forms, is the central element in ideology as power. As language, ideology ‘does things’. In the South African context, it is important to understand how multiple discourses combined, intersected and intertwined to create climates of violence. In this
respect, the ideologies of racism, patriarchy, religions, capitalism, apartheid and militarism all intertwined to ‘manufacture’ people capable of violence. Ideologies in these sorts of combinations provide the means and grounds for people to act violently and yet, ironically, believe they are acting in terms of worthy, noble and morally righteous principles. Thus some Afrikaner nationalists could claim a ‘just war’ not against black people, but against Communism. There are examples of such rhetoric above. On the other side, with greater legitimacy, the liberation movements could justify violence as a means to a greater end, ‘freedom and democracy’. Although that has indeed been the result, the language and slogans deployed could nonetheless justify atrocities of various forms.

132 In this sense, the language of violence takes a form akin to a dialogue, an arrangement of sequences and spirals that enmesh each side and in turn increase the likelihood of violent acts. These steps and sequences have been described as a process of “ideological acceleration”. People in political movements take a series of steps which increasingly commit them to their ideological arguments and lead them to distance themselves from outsiders.

The sequence consists of acts of increasing violent contempt for outsiders. It may start with words and uniforms and end in killing.\(^\text{22}\)

133 It is sufficiently plain that language, discourses and ideological processes are important factors in the understanding of the motives of perpetrators. Human beings act in terms of the meanings of particular situations.

## TWO NEGLECTED FACTORS

134 It is frequently unremarked that violence is perpetrated mainly by men. While it needs more research, this chapter has dealt with this neglected area above. Two further factors are also often neglected. The first is the place of special organisations, the second the role of secrecy and silence. Taken together, attention to these matters may enhance understanding of particular contexts of atrocities as well as pointing towards possible remedial actions.

Special organisations

135 Surely it is only some people, not others, and then only a relatively small number, who actually committed atrocities in South Africa. One may be tempted back to characterological explanations, but these, as we have seen, generally run into

infertile ground. More fertile soil presents itself in the form of special organisations. People join up or are recruited, and are then selectively drawn deeper into the organisational culture in sequential steps of training, specialised allocation and ‘ideological acceleration’. South African history is littered with special groupings of a semi-secretive nature, designed to do either ideological work (the Broederbond) or repressive work, or sometimes both.

136 The military and the police are habitually semi-closed establishments, but within them, given the specialised divisions of labour of modernity, some sections are given even more clandestine tasks: the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), the State Security Council (SSC), the National Security Management System (NSMS), the National Intelligence Service (NIS), Joint Management Centres (JMCs), the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) – a euphemism if ever there was one – Koevoet, Vlakplaas, the Roodeplaat Research Laboratory, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), C10, Stratcom and others that may yet be unearthed. On the other side of the struggle, for somewhat different reasons, there were also specialised organisations. Not least of these were the armed wings, such as MK and APLA, as well as SDUs, which also operated in clandestine ways. Special organisations within Inkatha, such as the Caprivi-trained group, as well as numerous township vigilante groups (such as witdoeke), constitute further examples. Within many of these organisations, yet smaller groups were given the task of special operations. According to John Deegan:

... becoming part of the culture ... you have the police force culture and the plainclothes culture ... and then you have the Special Branch and within the Special Branch you have still smaller and smaller cliques and inner circles and really there is such clandestine stuff.

137 There is appreciable evidence of the involvement of these organisations and special operations groups in atrocities. Further investigation is needed to explore the modus operandi of such special groups: methods of training, recruitment, hierarchical responsibilities, psychological profiles and the like. Until the work of the Amnesty Committee is complete, final conclusions would be premature. The role and place of specialised groupings in murderous deeds remains an important avenue for future research.

Secrecy and silence

138 Secrecy was particularly characteristic of apartheid rule. The massive curtailment
of press freedom, restrictions on academic freedom, a considerable increase in censorship, the banning of organisations – all these went hand in hand with secrecy of the security apparatus and even of cabinet and parliamentary procedures. Along with secrecy went silence, and much of the country’s populace was silent, through fear, apathy, indifference or genuine lack of information. Finally, some of the victims were silenced – through death, being killed because they knew too much, or through imprisonment, detention, threats and torture. Collaborators, spies and double agents did their work in secrecy and silence. The silence of the media, the state and collaborators, along with the secrets held inside sequestered special organisations, all helped to jog the terrible process onwards. Much has emerged through the Commission; the amnesty process is still in progress. Yet many secrets and silences remain in various closets.

The antidotes are simple and clear. Open, transparent, accountable government should remain a central priority. Academic freedom and freedom of the press should be inviolable principles. Security forces should be prised open; their operations, budgets and methods of training opened to public scrutiny. Non-accountable vigilante groupings should be regarded with suspicion and concern. If atrocities thrive in the soil and climate of silence and secrecy, one must remove the conditions in which they flower. Much has already been effected through the new Constitution. More remains to be done to cultivate a climate favourable to human rights, in all social institutions.

■ TWO CASE EXAMPLES: TORTURERS AND ‘MOBS’

Having considered the array of motives, perspectives and explanations outlined above, let us speculatively apply them in the case of two rather different forms of human rights abuses. Perpetrators’ actions cannot necessarily be understood in terms of the same set of factors.

Torturers

Although some torture took place at the hands of liberation movements, the bulk of torturers were members of the security police – paid state officials using state powers, including draconian laws providing for protracted periods of detention for purposes of interrogation. In such cases, victims were almost entirely at the mercy of their captors. It was a closed system of state powers, governed by

---

the legal apparatus. As such, it involved forms and paperwork, working shifts, possibilities of job promotion, and lines of hierarchical authority going up, in principle, to ministerial level. Despite the official lines of authority, it was, due to its secrecy, also open to falsification, fabrication of documents, lies and distortions, as evidenced by the operations of Vlakplaas. Senior officials, while ultimately responsible, did not always want to know the details. As Eugene de Kock put it in testimony to the Commission:

They [senior officials] would have a document that, should anything happen, that “this was only a suggestion, we never did it”. In other words by means of [euphemistic] language, they removed themselves from the death, from the attack itself. And I’m not trying to place a burden on people, I’m just telling you how it worked in those days.

142 How to describe the motives of torturers? From testimony to the Commission it is clear that most, deeply informed by the ideologies and discourses of apartheid, total onslaught rhetoric, and the masculine and militarised culture of the Security Branch, believed that they were doing their duty. Clearly they perceived themselves as authorised from above. Such people were praised, promoted and received awards for such activities (Eugene de Kock was, for instance, repeatedly decorated). Compliance with the norms of police culture constituted additional binding practices. Egotism and pride in doing the task added positive emotions. Only a minority would have been ‘true believers’ and only a minority would have learned to become sadists - experiencing joy out of hurting; more would have enjoyed the sense of power in such situations. It was not a job done unwillingly.

143 The perspective of torturers and victims would have been grossly discrepant. For the latter, the situation would be engulfed in fear, helplessness and terror. For the torturer, the situation would have been a means to an end (breaking a ‘bolshie’ victim, extracting information, exerting power, doing the job) and somewhat routinised and banal, done in shifts. A combination of such factors, differing to various extents among individuals, would have been sufficient to lead to repeated atrocities. There was little evidence before the Commission that any such perpetrators were suffering from severe psychological abnormalities. Stress, certainly quite commonly expressed, would have been a consequence rather than a cause. Many may have felt shame, remorse and regret. Under entirely changed circumstances, there would be little likelihood of the recurrence of such actions.
Crowd violence

144 This constituted a very different situation. In the majority of cases of ‘necklace’ murders, for instance, victims were members of the same community. Events were fast-paced, apparently emotionally charged and relatively spontaneous. No legal apparatus, bureaucracy and hierarchical authorisation was involved. Perpetrators were, in the main, young men, aligned to liberation movements and linked to youth organisations, bearing the social identities of ‘comrades’. Targets of attack were repeatedly people seen as linked to the apartheid system (councillors or their families, police, sell-outs) and invariably rumoured to be, or identified – whether justifiably or not – as impimpis (informers).

145 The dominant explanation of such atrocities is that of the ‘crazed mob’; of people who are out of control, irrational, over-emotional; in the formal nomenclature of psychology, in a state of deindividuation. Violence is apparently due to a loss, a lack, a reduction or regression to more ‘primitive’ forms of behaviour. There is however an alternative picture of crowds: the sequence of action was far more patterned, directed and limited than usually depicted. Crowd violence was invariably preceded by a series of violent incidents, mostly at the hands of security forces and often leading to the deaths of community members. Crowd violence was directed only at particular targets: people believed to be impimpis, or places symbolic of apartheid oppression – beer halls, local council buildings, police vehicles. It was not simply random violence.

146 A better explanation comes from social identity theory. While there certainly is a switch that makes people see, think and act in a manner quite different from that of an isolated individual, it is a shift from personal to social identity rather than from individual rationality to a loss of identity or control. Crowd violence is an instance of inter-group action in which particular, local identities (for example, ‘comrades’ versus ‘sell-outs’) become salient. People act violently not because they are out of their minds, but because they are acting in terms of a social frame of reference. Emotions ran high because the struggle against apartheid was seen in strongly emotional terms of taking sides against the ‘enemy’ or against the ‘system’ of oppression. Lives, quite literally, were on the line. Within such situations, perpetrators became bound and ‘sucked in’ by the sequences and meanings of the particular events, but it is the salience of local identities, on different sides, that structure the situation. Again it is not psychological dysfunctions that account for the actions. Social explanations are both more plausible and more coherent. Implications are that with changed circumstances, perpetrators are not likely to commit such offences again.
If the above descriptions of motives and explanations have merit, then steps towards prevention of future atrocities are quite clear. If political circumstances – literally power arrangements in a social order – constitute the primary explanation, such circumstances must be changed. In South Africa this has already been effected. The dramatic changes which have ushered in the new principles of democracy, non-racialism, non-sexism, and equal opportunity citizenship in a unified state are major steps in the right direction. However, until real economic inequalities are eliminated, until equal opportunities become feasible realities, such noble ideas and principles remain under partial threat.

As an important first step towards the prevention of future possibilities of crimes of obedience, the South African Constitution states in Chapter 11, section 199, that:

The security services must act, and must teach and require their members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law.

No member of any security service may obey a manifestly illegal order.

If secrecy and silence and clandestine organisations provide fertile ground for evil deeds, then solutions lie in open, transparent and accountable social institutions. Since security forces, private armies and vigilante groups constitute particular sites of recruitment, training, propaganda and promotion of violence, these sites demand special scrutiny. Open scrutiny by the public seems the most powerful rehabilitation device. Freedom of the mass media, academic freedom, and the role of civil society as watchdogs are all vital.

Since ideologies, discourses and language codes are the constituent grounds for social identities of difference, disparagement and disgust and for inter-group cleavages based on hostility, resentment, suspicion and revenge, these factors demand sharp vigilance and radical change. The various Commissions recently established provide a good start. The vigorous promotion of a culture of human rights, of equality and mutual respect in every sector, is of paramount importance. Particular attention needs to be given to language codes that promote, quite subtly, images of hatred, distance and disparagement between groups.

Obedience to authorities, compliance with group norms and the power of the immediate situation were all identified as dangers. Encouragement of dissent,
the power of minor influence and the promotion of dialogue, negotiation and multi-vocality all constitute steps toward prevention.

152 If crowds are a potential seedbed for violence, they require adequate channels for expressing voice and opening dialogue. The new Regulation of Gatherings Act is a vast improvement. This Act will require further education and promotion to establish freedom of association, the right of protest and effective channels for dialogue as part of the daily bread of the fledgling democratic order.

153 These few ideas, neither too lengthy nor too cumbersome, would seem to be but a limited burden to effect the future prevention of atrocities.
COMMITMENT TO RECONCILIATION AND UNITY

The Commission, believing that reconciliation is a process vital and necessary for enduring peace and stability, invites fellow South Africans to:

- accept our own need for healing;
- reach out to fellow South Africans in a spirit of tolerance and understanding;
- work actively to build bridges across the divisions of language, faith and history;
- strive constantly, in the process of transformation, to be sensitive to the needs of those groups which have been particularly disadvantaged in the past, specifically women and children;
- encourage a culture of debate so that, together, we can resolve the pressing issues of our time;
- initiate programmes of action in our own spheres of interest and influence, whether it be education, religion, business, labour, arts or politics, so that the process of reconciliation can be implemented from a grassroots level;
- address the reality of ongoing racial discrimination and work towards a non-racial society;
- call upon leaders in local, provincial and national government to place the goal of reconciliation and unity at the top of their respective agendas.

In order to give expression to this commitment, we request the President of South Africa to call a National Summit on Reconciliation, not only to consider the specific recommendations made by the Commission, but to ensure maximum involvement by representatives of all sectors of our society in the pursuit of reconciliation.
The Summit should be held towards the end of 1999. In this way South Africa, on the eve of the new millennium, should re-commit itself to a future characterised by reconciliation and unity by:

- re-looking at the haunting memories of conflicts and division;
- opening our eyes to the legacies of the past.

**INTRODUCTION**

1. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (the Act) required the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission) to make recommendations with regard to the creation of institutions conducive to a stable and fair society and the institutional, administrative and legislative measures which should be introduced to prevent the commission of human rights violations.¹

2. However, the Act goes further and grants the Commission powers to make recommendations concerning any matter with a view to promoting or achieving national unity and reconciliation. It is with this in mind that this chapter begins with a statement entitled “Commitment to Reconciliation and Unity”. It is the conviction of the Commission that the goal of reconciliation remains elusive and deserves central importance. This section of the report will also incorporate specific recommendations which, in the opinion of the Commission, contribute to the common search for reconciliation and unity.

3. These are followed by a series of recommendations related to specific areas of the public and private sectors that the Commission believes could assist in the consolidation of democracy and the building of a culture of human rights. Although separately itemised, all the recommendations in this chapter should be seen as part of a whole and as contributing to the quest for overall stability and peace in South African society. It is important to state explicitly that there is a need for sensitivity to the particular issues pertaining to women and children.

¹ Sections 3(1)(d) and 4(h) of the Act.
A common criticism of the Commission is that it has been strong on truth but has made little or no contribution to reconciliation.

History will judge whether or not this particular criticism is accurate. It is, nevertheless, worth making two points in this regard. The first is that, while truth may not always lead to reconciliation, there can be no genuine, lasting reconciliation without truth. Certainly, lies, half-truths and denial are not a desirable foundation on which to build the new South Africa. Second, it is readily conceded that it is not possible for one commission, with a limited life-span and resources, on its own to achieve reconciliation against the background of decades of oppression, conflict and deep divisions.

The Commission accepts that, if reconciliation and unity are to become a reality in South Africa, the energy and commitment of all of its people will be required. While the Commission may have made a small contribution to laying some foundation stones, proactive steps from all institutions, organisations and individuals will be required if the building is to be completed.

During the life of the Commission, Commissioners and staff travelled the length and breadth of South Africa. Hearings were held in rural towns and urban cities - in small church halls and large, dignified city halls, in the offices of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), school classrooms, town halls and magistrates’ courts. Sometimes attendance was quite small - an intimate community huddled together in grief and memory. On other occasions, halls have been packed to overflowing. The largest audience, in a Port Elizabeth township, consisted of three and a half thousand people, with long queues of people waiting to take the places of those who left. Most times the mood was sombre and dignified; at others, there was an undercurrent of anger. Yet always there was an awareness of a spirit of compassion and acceptance which enabled victims to talk freely and in their own language.

Above all, the Commission tried to listen, really to listen - not passively but actively - to voices that for so long had been stilled. And as it listened to stories of horror, of pathos and of tragic proportion, it became aware again of the high cost that has been paid by so many for freedom. Commissioners were almost overwhelmed by the capacity of human beings to damage and destroy each other. Yet they listened, too, to stories of great courage, concluding often with
an astonishing generosity of spirit, from those who had for so long carried the
burden of loss and tragedy. It was often a deeply humbling experience.

9 The Commission also listened to perpetrators describing in awful detail the acts
of terror, assassination and torture that they inflicted on so many over so long a
period. Here the mood was very different. Encouraging, though, were the
expressions of remorse and a seeking for forgiveness on the part of some of
those who applied for amnesty.

10 In this complicated process of conflict and pain, the Commission often became
aware that one of the most destructive legacies of the past is the labelling of
sometimes innocent people as ‘informers’ or collaborators. Individuals and their
families were killed, assaulted, harassed and ostracised as a result of this
stigmatisation. Many people still live with the daily experience of rejection because
they were identified as informers during the period of the Commission’s mandate.
The problem is complex and not readily resolved and the Commission was unable,
in the vast majority of cases, to prove or disprove such allegations. However, the
ongoing persecution of these so-called informers is a serious hindrance to the
process of reconciliation.

11 After so long a journey with so many different and challenging experiences, the
Commission concluded that all of South Africa – rural, urban, black, white, men,
women and children – had been caught up in oppression and resistance that left
no one with clean hands. Reconciliation is necessary for all, because all need to
be healed.

12 These experiences and conclusions reinforced the view that reconciliation is not
something that the Commission alone can achieve. The Commission believes that
reconciliation without cost and pain is cheap, shallow and must be spurned.
Those who, through the Commission, witnessed the scars on so many human
bodies and spirits as well as the deep scars on the country as a whole, found
themselves unable to remain onlookers. They came to acknowledge their own
complicity, their own weakness, and accepted their own need for healing.

13 It is in this spirit of listening, sharing and acknowledging its own need for
reconciliation, that the Commission invites its fellow South Africans to share a
commitment to reconciliation and unity.
PREVENTION OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE FUTURE

One of the essential goals of the Commission was to ensure that there would be no repetition of the past. For reconciliation to have any chance of success, it is imperative that a strong human rights culture be developed. The Commission recognises, however, that for such a culture to become a reality, a number of simultaneous actions will have to take place.


IN REGARD TO THE CREATION OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES, THE COMMISSION APPRECIATES THAT THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE. TWO AREAS WHICH THE COMMISSION ASKS GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER ARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE CORPS AND A MORE FOCUSED EMPHASIS ON PUBLIC WORKS WHICH, BY DEFINITION, WOULD BE LABOUR INTENSIVE.

IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CREATE A MEANINGFUL HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE WITHOUT HIGH PRIORITY BEING GIVEN TO ECONOMIC JUSTICE BY THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS. RECOGNISING THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR ALONE TO FIND THE RESOURCES REQUIRED TO EXPEDITE THE GOAL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE, THE COMMISSION URGES THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN PARTICULAR TO CONSIDER A SPECIAL INITIATIVE IN TERMS OF A FUND FOR TRAINING, EMPOWERMENT AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE DISADVANTAGED AND DISPOSSESSED IN SOUTH AFRICA.

FURTHER, THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS THAT A SCHEME BE PUT INTO PLACE TO ENABLE THOSE WHO BENEFITED FROM APARTHEID POLICIES TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY. IN SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COMMISSION, A WEALTH TAX WAS PROPOSED. THE COMMISSION DOES NOT, HOWEVER, SEEK TO PRESCRIBE ONE OR OTHER STRATEGY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT URGENT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN BY GOVERNMENT TO HARNESSING ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES IN THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY.

RECOGNISING THAT RACISM UNDERLIES MANY OF THE RIFTS AND DIVISIONS STILL PRESENT IN SOCIETY, THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS THAT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AS WELL AS THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO OVERCOME RACISM. SUCH MEASURES SHOULD INCLUDE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF TRANSFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT WITH REGARD TO STRUCTURES, CULTURE AND ATTITUDES.
ONE FACTOR MILITATING AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE IS THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF SERIOUS CRIME. SECURITY OF PERSON AND PROPERTY IS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT. TO ADDRESS THE UNACCEPTABLY HIGH RATE OF SERIOUS CRIME, GOVERNMENT IS REQUESTED TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE INTRODUCTION OF COMMUNITY POLICING AT ALL LEVELS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

ANOTHER BARRIER TO THE CREATION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA IS THE EXTENT OF WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN BOTH THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS. IF THERE IS TO BE AN ENTHUSIASTIC RESPONSE BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC TO THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY AND CRIME, THERE HAS ALSO TO BE A CORRESPONDING RUTHLESS STAND AGAINST INEFFICIENCY, CORRUPTION AND MALADMINISTRATION AT EVERY LEVEL OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS.

THE RULE OF LAW – THAT PRINCIPLE WHICH ENSURES THAT NO EDICT OF STATE MAY OVERRULE THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, IS NOW SPECIFICALLY PROTECTED IN THE CONSTITUTION. EVEN IF CONDITIONS REQUIRE THE PROCLAMATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY, NO ONE SHOULD BE ABLE TO BE HELD INCOMMUNICADO AND WITHOUT BEING CHARGED, OR IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THEY ARE VULNERABLE TO TORTURE AND SEVERE ILL TREATMENT. IN ADDITION, GOVERNMENT SHOULD NEVER AGAIN PASS LEGISLATION INDEMNIFYING THE POLICE OR OTHER SECURITY FORCES AGAINST PROSECUTION OR CIVIL CLAIMS FOR ILLEGAL ACTIONS CARRIED OUT IN SUPPORT OF THE STATE, EVEN UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY.

Where human relations are strained by war, meaningful human rights enforcement requires constant vigilance, and an unyielding commitment to sanctions - no matter how worthy the cause for which one is fighting.²

ACCOUNTABILITY

WHERE AMNESTY HAS NOT BEEN SOUGHT OR HAS BEEN DENIED, PROSECUTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHERE EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT AN INDIVIDUAL HAS COMMITTED A GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION. IN THIS REGARD, THE COMMISSION WILL MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES INFORMATION IN ITS POSSESSION CONCERNING SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS (EXCLUDING PRIVILEGED INFORMATION SUCH AS THAT CONTAINED IN AMNESTY APPLICATIONS). CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO IMPOSING A TIME LIMIT ON SUCH PROSECUTIONS.

ATTORNEYS-GENERAL MUST PAY RIGOROUS ATTENTION TO THE PROSECUTION OF MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE (SAPS) WHO ARE FOUND TO HAVE ASSAULTED, TORTURED AND/OR KILLED PERSONS IN THEIR CARE.

IN ORDER TO AVOID A CULTURE OF IMPUNITY AND TO ENTRENCH THE RULE OF LAW, THE GRANTING OF GENERAL AMNESTY IN WHATEVER GUISE SHOULD BE RESISTED.

HEALING AND REHABILITATION

15 Recognising that victims and perpetrators alike need healing, the Commission recommends that all possible steps be taken to achieve this:

SEVERAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS) EXIST TO ASSIST VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS, AND THESE SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND HELPED TO EXTEND THEIR SERVICES AND SHARE THEIR SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE.

CLINICS AND APPROPRIATE SERVICES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO FACILITATE THE REHABILITATION OF PERPETRATORS. SUCH CLINICS WOULD ASSESS THE NEED FOR PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COUNSELLING AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH TREATMENT TO BE ADMINISTERED. (THE COMMISSION NOTED THAT THERE WAS A SERIOUS LACK OF SUCH FACILITIES.)

Reintegration and rehabilitation

16 Recognising that the promotion of national unity and reconciliation will require the rehabilitation of people of all political perspectives and their reintegration into society, the Commission recommends that:

STRATEGIES BE DEVISED FOR REINTEGRATING PERPETRATORS INTO SOCIETY. IN THIS REGARD THEY MAY ASSIST IN COMMUNITY-BASED PROJECTS INVOLVING THE COMMUNITIES WHO WERE WRONGED, OFFERING EITHER DONATIONS OR THEIR SKILLS AND TIME.

WHERE PEOPLE WERE ACCUSED OF HAVING BEEN COLLABORATORS OR INFORMERS, AND HAD THEIR LIVES DESTROYED AS A RESULT, A PROCESS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHEREBY THEIR SITUATION CAN BE REMEDIED. POLITICAL PARTIES, COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS AND OTHER BODIES INVOLVED SHOULD TAKE ACTION, POSSIBLY IN THE FORM OF CEREMONIES OR MEDIATION, TO FACILITATE A PUBLIC PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION AND FORGIVENESS.

COMMUNITIES SHOULD BE ASSISTED IN PREPARING TO ACCEPT SUCH PERSONS BACK INTO THEIR MIDST.

Lustration

17 The Commission gave careful consideration to the possibility of lustration as a mechanism for dealing with people responsible for violations of human rights. As used in several Eastern European countries, lustration (from the Latin meaning to illuminate or to purify by sacrificing or purging) involves the disqualification of such persons from certain categories of public office, or their removal from office. Other international and South African commissions have commented on this matter. For example, the report of the Skweyiya Commission recommends
that “no person who is guilty of committing atrocities should ever again be allowed to assume a position of power”.3

18 The current opinion in International Law is that lustration should be limited to positions in which there is good reason to believe that the subject would pose a significant danger to human rights, and that it should not apply to positions in private organisations.

19 The Commission decided not to recommend lustration because it was felt that it would be inappropriate in the South African context.

**Commercial publications**

20 Those who publish works for commercial sale which have drawn or will draw substantially upon the statements, testimony and submissions of victims of violations of human rights have a responsibility towards such victims.

**THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS THAT A PORTION OF THE PROFITS DERIVED FROM SUCH PUBLICATIONS BE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PRESIDENT’S FUND FOR REPARATIONS AND REHABILITATION.**

**Promotion of a human rights culture**

21 To enhance the development of a human rights culture, which is a cornerstone of reconciliation, the Commission recommends that:

**THE GOVERNMENT RECOMMIT ITSELF TO REGULAR AND FAIR ELECTIONS.**

**THE GOVERNMENT RECOMMIT ITSELF TO OPEN, CLEAN AND TRANSPARENT GOVERNANCE.**

**THE GOVERNMENT RE-EXAMINE THE REFORM AND STRENGTHENING OF STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ORDER TO REINFORCE THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BUREAUX IN GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES AND TO INCREASING THE RESOURCES GRANTED TO INDEPENDENT WATCHDOGS, ESPECIALLY THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR.**

**HUMAN RIGHTS CURRICULA BE INTRODUCED IN FORMAL EDUCATION, SPECIALISED EDUCATION AND THE TRAINING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL. THESE CURRICULA MUST ADDRESS ISSUES OF, AMONGST OTHERS, RACISM, GENDER DISCRIMINATION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN.**

**THE GOVERNMENT GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF INCLUDING THE YOUTH, GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN A SINGLE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SO AS TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY, CO-ORDINATION AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS; ALSO**

---

3 The Skweyiya Commission of Enquiry into complaints by former African National Congress prisoners and detainees, August 1992.
THAT SUCH A BODY BE ADEQUATELY FINANCED AND EQUIPPED TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY AND INDEPENDENTLY, WHILE COMPLYING WITH PRINCIPLES OF OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY.

AS THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS REPORT ARE VITAL RESOURCES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT ENSURE THAT THE CONTENTS OF THE REPORT ARE MADE AS WIDELY AVAILABLE AS POSSIBLE TO ALL SECTORS AND LANGUAGE GROUPS OF OUR COUNTRY. THIS COULD BE DONE IN PARTNERSHIP WITH CIVIL SOCIETY AND SHOULD INCLUDE AUDIO AND VIDEO TAPES, TO ENSURE THAT THOSE WHO CANNOT READ OR WRITE HAVE ACCESS TO THE REPORT.

ACADEMICS, JOURNALISTS AND RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS BE ENCOURAGED TO UNDERTAKE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES OF THE DATA GIVEN TO THE COMMISSION AS A BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MOTIVES AND PERSPECTIVES OF THOSE ENGAGED IN THE CONFLICTS OF THE PAST. RESEARCH AND FIELD-BASED INITIATIVES AIMED AT PROMOTING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT PERSUASIONS SHOULD ALSO BE ENCOURAGED.

■ REPARATIONS AND REHABILITATION

22 The granting of reparation awards to victims of gross violations of human rights adds value to the “truth-seeking” phase by:

a enabling the survivors to experience in a concrete way the state’s acknowledgement of wrongs done to victims and survivors, family members, communities and the nation at large;

b restoring the survivors’ dignity;

c affirming the values, interests, aspirations and rights advanced by those who suffered;

d raising consciousness about the public’s moral responsibility to participate in healing the wounded and facilitating nation-building.

23 Thus the Commission recommends that:

A STRUCTURE BE DEVELOPED IN THE PRESIDENT’S OFFICE, WITH A LIMITED SECRETARIAT AND A FIXED LIFE-SPAN, WHOSE FUNCTION WILL BE TO OVERSEE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPARATION AND REHABILITATION POLICY PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED SECRETARIAT WILL REQUIRE CO-OPERATION WITH A NUMBER OF MINISTRIES WHICH HAVE A LONG-TERM MANDATE TO INTEGRATE SERVICES AND ACTIVITIES. THE SECRETARIAT WILL ALSO APPLY ITSELF TO:

• FACILITATING MECHANISMS FOR FINANCIAL REPARATION;
• FACILITATING THE ISSUING OF DEATH CERTIFICATES BY THE APPROPRIATE MINISTRY;
• EXPEDITING EXHUMATIONS AND BURIALS BY THE APPROPRIATE MINISTRY;

4 See also Volume Five Chapter 5: Reparation and Rehabilitation Policy.
• Facilitating the issuing of a declaration of death in those cases where the family members request it;
• Facilitating the expunging of criminal records where the political activity of individuals was criminalised;
• Facilitating the resolution of outstanding legal matters related to reported violations;
• Facilitating the renaming of streets and community facilities in order to remember and honour individuals or significant events;
• Facilitating the building of monuments and memorials and the development of museums to commemorate events of the past.

The government declare a national day of remembrance.

The president, in consultation with organised business and civil society at large, establish a trust fund whose finances will support reparation and restitution initiatives as prioritised by different ministries and civil society.

### Organisation, Administration and Management

24 To build, protect and maintain a new human rights culture in line with the new dispensation in South Africa, the Commission recommends that:

**Corporate and government structures commit themselves to the transformation process with renewed vigour. The Commission welcomes the principles encapsulated in the employment equity act, while recognising the need for government, business and labour to find viable ways to implement its provisions, prior to the promulgation of the act. The principles of affirmative action and employment equity are essential to the transformation process. To facilitate this, training in career development and professional skills for all sections of South African society need to be given priority. Special attention, in this regard, needs to be given to the eradication of inefficiency and the promotion of a culture of hard work and honesty.**

**The government must ensure that the rule of law, human rights practice, transparency, accountability and the rooting out of corruption and other forms of criminality at all levels of society are seriously addressed.**

### Prisons

25 Apart from the need for greater security at all our prisons, it is the view of the Commission that the bureaucratic organisation of the Department of Correctional Services makes it particularly difficult to institute the appropriate initiatives to promote transformation. The relatively closed institutional culture of Correctional
Services also makes it difficult to ensure that the moral and legal imperatives of law are implemented at the level of daily practice. The authority of prison officers and even that of heads of prisons tends, in practice, to derive from the prison hierarchy and an entrenched culture within which gross violations of human rights occurred in the past, rather than the norms of prison law, human rights law and the Constitution.

Training of prison personnel

26 The Commission recommends that:

**PRISON OFFICERS RECEIVE HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING, AS A BASIC GUIDE FOR TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PRISON SYSTEMS.**

**PRISON STAFF BE ADEQUATELY TRAINED IN PRISON LAW, THEIR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, ETHICS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION.**

**PRISON STAFF RECEIVE TRAINING IN CREATIVE AND HUMANE WAYS OF MOTIVATING PRISONERS TO REGAIN THEIR HUMAN DIGNITY AND CO-OPERATE WITH THE REHABILITATION PROGRAMMES IN PRISONS.**

**ALL PRISON STAFF INVOLVED IN THE HEALTH CARE OF INMATES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE TRAINING TO ENABLE THEM TO UNDERSTAND AND DEAL WITH THE MENTAL STRESS OF IMPRISONMENT.**

Rehabilitation of prisoners

27 The Commission recommends that:

**SKILLS TRAINING FOR PRISONERS BECOME A PRIORITY.**

**ALL INMATES BE INFORMED OF THEIR BASIC RIGHTS AND RECEIVE A COPY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE LANGUAGE OF THEIR CHOICE. THEY SHOULD ALSO HAVE ACCESS TO INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE.**

**ALL PRISON WARDERS RECEIVE TRAINING WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO RECOGNISE THE BASIC NEEDS OF PRISONERS IN THIS REGARD.**

**PRISONERS RECEIVE TRAINING IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-VIOLENT WAYS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.**

**COUNSELLING BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALL PRISONERS.**

**PRISONERS HAVE ACCESS TO LITERACY CLASSES AND SKILLS TRAINING. WORK SESSIONS SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO PROMOTE REHABILITATION, RATHER THAN SIMPLY BEING PUNITIVE HARD LABOUR.**
Health care

28 The Commission recommends that:

PRISONERS BE ALLOWED ACCESS TO MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS OF THEIR CHOICE (AT THEIR
OWN EXPENSE).

International standards

29 The Commission recommends that:

THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES PUBLICLY REAFFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF PENAL REFORM AND ENCOURAGE THE PUBLIC TO ENSURE
THAT THESE STANDARDS ARE UPHELD.

SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND OTHER FORMS OF ISOLATION, DEPRIVATION OF FOOD AND EXERCISE,
AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT BE ELIMINATED. IN THIS REGARD,
THE COMMISSION NOTES WITH CONCERN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MAXIMUM SECURITY
FACILITY KNOWN AS C-MAX, WHERE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AMOUNT TO ALMOST COMPLETE
SENSORY DEPRIVATION.

Public awareness and monitoring

30 The Commission recommends that:

LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL WATCHDOG ORGANISATIONS BE ENCOURAGED TO MAKE
INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON PRISON CONDITIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE AND
RECOMMEND STRATEGIES FOR PENAL REFORM.

AN INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY, WITH STATUTORY POWERS, BE INTRODUCED TO MONITOR
ALL PRISONS, POLICE CELLS AND OTHER PLACES OF DETENTION. THIS BODY SHOULD REPORT
TO PARLIAMENT ON A REGULAR BASIS.

RESTRAINTS ON MEDIA COVERAGE OF PRISONS BE RECONSIDERED TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY
ABOUT THE CONDITIONS IN AND MANAGEMENT OF PRISONS.

31 Responsibility for developing and implementing these recommendations, and
for monitoring their implementation, rests primarily with:

a The Department of Correctional Services;

b The Department of Health;

c Professional organisations representing health professionals;

d Unions representing prison staff;

e Organisations representing the interests of prisoners.

5 See also section on The Health Sector, below.
FAITH COMMUNITIES

32 Faith communities enjoy a unique and privileged position in South African society. They are widely respected and have far-reaching moral influence. As such, they should play a key role in healing and reconciliation initiatives.

Healing

33 The Commission recommends that:

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES ORGANISE CEREMONIES DESIGNED TO ENABLE PEOPLE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF THE PAST. THESE SERVICES SHOULD BE HELD AT DENOMINATIONAL, ECUMENICAL AND INTER-FAITH LEVELS AND SHOULD BE ORGANISED LOCALLY, REGIONALLY AND NATIONALLY.

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINING WITH OTHER ORGANISATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SETTING UP TRAUMA CENTRES AND COUNSELLING INITIATIVES.

Redistribution of skills and resources

34 The Commission recommends that:

RELIGIOUS GROUPS UTILISE THE SKILLS ENJOYED BY MANY OF THEIR MEMBERS, TO PROVIDE TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP SKILLS TO DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES.

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES FROM DIFFERENT RACIAL AND CLASS GROUPS SEEK WAYS OF SHARING MATERIAL RESOURCES.

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES UNDERTAKE A ‘LAND AUDIT’, IDENTIFYING LAND IN THEIR POSSESSION (INCLUDING GLEBES) WHICH CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE LANDLESS POOR.

WHERE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES HAVE ACQUIRED LAND AS A RESULT OF APARTHEID LEGISLATION, THIS LAND BE RETURNED TO ITS RIGHTFUL OWNERS.

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES CONSIDER CREATING A GENERAL FUND, TO BE FINANCED IN PROPORTION TO THEIR RESOURCES, THAT CAN BE USED FOR THE VICTIMS OF PAST ABUSES.

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES EXPLORE WAYS, IN CONSULTATION WITH GOVERNMENT, OF RESUMING THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AS PART OF A COMMITMENT TO NATION BUILDING.

Reconciliation

35 The Commission recommends that:

DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS GROUPS SEEK WAYS TO COMMUNICATE WITH ONE ANOTHER AS A BASIS FOR ELIMINATING RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND PROMOTING INTER-RELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING.
RELIGIOUS GROUPS SEEK WAYS OF INCORPORATING MARGINALISED GROUPS INTO THEIR COMMUNITIES AS A WAY OF ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS CONTRIBUTING TO VARIOUS FORMS OF ASOCIAL BEHAVIOUR.

FAITH COMMUNITIES PROMOTE A CULTURE OF TOLERANCE AND PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.

FORMS OF WORSHIP BE EXPLORED WHICH TRANSCEND LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES.

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO EXPOSE MEMBERS FROM PREDOMINANTLY WHITE AND BLACK COMMUNITIES TO ONE ANOTHER.

RELIGIOUS GROUPS, IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER NGOS, ESTABLISH INSTITUTIONAL FORUMS TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION. SPECIFIC ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE CORPS, NOT ONLY AS A MEANS OF HELPING COMMUNITIES IN NEED, BUT ALSO FOR DEVELOPING THE SKILLS OF LESS PRIVILEGED YOUTH. SUCH A BODY COULD ALSO BE USED TO EXPOSE MORE PRIVILEGED MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO THE NEEDS AND THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICANS. GIVEN THE RACIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT PREVALENT IN THE COUNTRY, THE PEACE CORPS SHOULD INCLUDE CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEMAKING AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ITS CURRICULUM.

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES DEVELOP THEOLOGIES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION AND A TRUE SENSE OF COMMUNITY IN THE NATION. PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION COULD TO BE GIVEN TO:

- THE ROLE OF WHITES AS THE BENEFICIARIES OF Apartheid, with regard to reconstruction and reconciliation;
- THE EMPOWERMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE AND THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO MOVE BEYOND ‘VICTIMHOOD’ IN REGAINING THEIR HUMANITY;
- THE ARTICULATION OF A GLOBAL ETHICAL FOUNDATION WHICH IS IN KEEPING WITH THE MAJOR BELIEFS OF THE VARIOUS RELIGIONS.

Relationship with the state

36 Given the strained relations which existed between at least some churches and the security forces concerning the chaplaincy services, and what was effectively the absence of chaplains of other faiths, the Commission recommends that:

THOSE AGENCIES OF THE STATE WHICH EITHER RECEIVE OR APPOINT CHAPLAINS, MEET WITH ALL FAITH COMMUNITIES IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING CONCERNS:

- THE INDEPENDENCE OF RELIGIOUS CHAPLAINS, ESPECIALLY IN THE MILITARY AND POLICE SERVICES, TO TEACH THE TENETS OF THEIR FAITH IN AN UNHINDERED MANNER;
- THE DUAL LOYALTY WHICH CHAPLAINS HAVE TRADITIONALLY HAD TO THE AGENCY THEY ARE REQUIRED TO SERVE AND THE RELIGIOUS ORGANISATION TO WHICH THEY BELONG;
• WAYS OF ENSURING THAT NO PARTICULAR FAITH ENJOYS PRIVILEGES NOT OFFERED TO ALL FAITHS;
• OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS;
• THE CREATION OF AN AGREEMENT DESIGNED TO AVOID CHAPLAINS BEING IDENTIFIED TOO CLOSELY WITH THE INSTITUTION TO WHICH THEY ARE APPOINTED. TO ENSURE THIS, CHAPLAINS SHOULD NOT WEAR THE UNIFORM OF THE STATE INSTITUTION WHICH THEY SERVE, NOR HOLD MILITARY OR OTHER INSTITUTIONAL RANK;
• THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT ALL THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS LITERATURE BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FAITH COMMUNITIES, PROVIDED IT PASSES SCRUTINY BY AN INTER-FAITH BODY TO ENSURE THAT IT DOES NOT CONTAIN DEROGATORY MATERIAL ABOUT OTHER FAITHS.

37 Responsibility for developing and implementing these recommendations, and for monitoring their implementation, rests primarily with:

a Faith communities, both individual members and congregations, and overseeing bodies, e.g. general assemblies, synods etc;

b The South African National Defence Force (SANDF);

c The SAPS.

■ BUSINESS

38 The huge and widening gap between the rich and poor is a disturbing legacy of the past, which has not been reduced by the democratic process. It is morally reprehensible, politically dangerous and economically unsound to allow this to continue. Business has a particularly significant role to play in this regard.

Restitution

39 The Commission recommends that:

CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE MOST APPROPRIATE WAYS IN WHICH TO PROVIDE RESTITUTION FOR THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED FROM THE EFFECTS OF APARTHEID DISCRIMINATION, FOR EXAMPLE AS A RESULT OF RACISM, GENDER DISCRIMINATION, JOB RESERVATION, GROUP AREAS LEGISLATION, THE EFFECTS OF THE MIGRANT LABOUR SYSTEM, INFERIOR WAGES AND INADEQUATE OR NON-EXISTENT SOCIAL BENEFITS.
THE FEASIBILITY OF THE FOLLOWING AS A MEANS OF EMPOWERING THE POOR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED:

- A WEALTH TAX;
- A ONCE-OFF LEVY ON CORPORATE AND PRIVATE INCOME;
- EACH COMPANY LISTED ON THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE TO MAKE A ONCE-OFF DONATION OF 1% OF ITS MARKET CAPITALISATION;
- A RETROSPECTIVE SURCHARGE ON CORPORATE PROFITS EXTENDING BACK TO A DATE TO BE SUGGESTED;
- A SURCHARGE ON GOLDEN HANDSHAKES GIVEN TO SENIOR PUBLIC SERVANTS SINCE 1990;
- THE SUSPENSION OF ALL TAXES ON LAND AND OTHER MATERIAL DONATIONS TO FORMERLY DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REPAYMENT OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT’S ‘ODIOUS DEBT’ BE CRITICALLY RECONSIDERED. INTEREST AND CAPITAL REPAYMENTS ON THIS DEBT ARE A CRIPPLING BURDEN ON THE NATIONAL FISCUS. THIS MONEY COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR PURPOSES OF REPARATION AS WELL AS RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT.

THE MINISTER OF FINANCE INVESTIGATE THE VIABILITY OF THE SASRIA FUND (CONTRIBUTED TO BY BUSINESS AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST MATERIAL LOSS DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE APARTHEID YEARS) BEING USED AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR REPARATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT.

Land

40 The Commission recommends that:

THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, TOGETHER WITH LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT, IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE LAND COMMISSION, UNDERTAKE AN AUDIT OF ALL UNUSED AND UNDER-UTILISED LAND, WITH A VIEW TO MAKING THIS AVAILABLE TO LANDLESS PEOPLE. LAND APPROPRIATED OR EXPROPRIATED PRIOR TO 1994 SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN THE AUDITING PROCESS, WITH A VIEW TO COMPENSATING THOSE WHO LOST THEIR LAND.

Special fund

41 The Commission recommends that:

A “BUSINESS RECONCILIATION FUND” BE ESTABLISHED. THE TRUSTEES OF THIS FUND WOULD BE REQUIRED TO GENERATE RESOURCES TO BE USED, ON A TARGETED BASIS, TO INITIATE, SUPPLEMENT OR COMPLEMENT OTHER DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS. BASED ON CRITERIA RELATED TO SPECIFIC EPISODES OF PAST SUFFERING OR THE PARTICULARLY HARMFUL EFFECTS OF APARTHEID, THE FUND COULD PROVIDE NON-REPAYABLE GRANTS, LOANS AND/OR GUARANTEES TO BUSINESS-RELATED FUNDING FOR BLACK SMALL ENTREPRENEURS IN NEED OF EITHER SPECIFIC TRAINING SKILLS OR CAPITAL FOR THE LAUNCHING OF A BUSINESS. THE FUND SHOULD NOT SEEK TO REPLACE OR COMPETE WITH EXISTING SCHEMES OF A SIMILAR NATURE,
BUT RATHER TO AUGMENT THEM. IT SHOULD HAVE A SMALL, EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION, HAVE A LIMITED LIFE-SPAN AND BE FUNDED FROM PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESOURCES. FOREIGN DONORS SHOULD ALSO BE APPROACHED FOR FUNDING. BUSINESS SHOULD PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SKILLS REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE INITIATIVE.

Banking

42 The Commission recommends that:

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE RESERVE BANK BE PROTECTED. THE BANK NEEDS TO BECOME MORE TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC BY REPORTING DIRECTLY TO PARLIAMENT ON AN ANNUAL BASIS.

THE BANKING INDUSTRY DEVELOP A SUBSIDISED LOAN SCHEME FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL BUSINESSES AND LABOUR INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES.

THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO FUNDING PROGRAMMES OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, WITH A VIEW TO CORRECTING THE IMBALANCES OF THE PAST.

THE LAND BANK PRIORITISE LAND DEVELOPMENT WHICH FAVOURS THE DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND TO LANDLESS PEOPLE.

Affirmative action and skills training

43 The Commission recommends that:

BUSINESS GIVE PRIORITY TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SKILLS TRAINING AND MENTORING PROGRAMMES, TO ENSURE WELL-PLANNED CORRECTIVE ACTION WITH REGARD TO EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES. THE COMMISSION SUPPORTS THE PRINCIPLES ENCAPSULATED IN THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT.

Other socio-economic legacies of apartheid

44 Limitations imposed by the Act forced the Commission to take the view that the loss of business and/or income as a result of a politically motivated act did not constitute a gross violation of human rights. However, in the course of our work, we became aware that such losses were significant. The Commission therefore recommends that:

THE STATE CONSIDER SOME FORM OF COMPENSATION FOR PERSONS WHO LOST THEIR BUSINESSES OR OTHER MEANS OF INCOME DURING THE UNREST PERIOD OF THE 1980s AND 1990s, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO WERE NOT INSURED AGAINST SUCH LOSS. SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE PLIGHT OF BLACK BUSINESS PEOPLE WHO LOST THEIR ENTIRE MEANS OF INCOME AS A RESULT OF THE UNREST.
WHERE THE COURTS OR OTHER STRUCTURES RULE IN FAVOUR OF STRIKING WORKERS, THOSE CONCERNED BE ADEQUATELY COMPENSATED. THE BUSINESS SECTOR SHOULD GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRUST FUND FOR THESE PURPOSES.

RECOGNISING THAT SO-CALLED “SINGLE-SEX” HOSTELS FOR WORKERS ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN A PART OF THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, A REPRESENTATIVE COMMISSION BE APPOINTED TO:

• UNDERTAKE AN AUDIT OF ALL HOSTELS IN THE COUNTRY TO ESTABLISH THE STATE OF THE BUILDINGS CONCERNED, THE NUMBER OF PERSONS BEING ACCOMMODATED AND THE NATURE OF THE FACILITIES BEING OFFERED;

• MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO IMPROVING HOSTEL FACILITIES AND INVESTIGATING THEIR LONG TERM DESIRABILITY.

Children and youth

45 The Commission recommends that:

CHILD LABOUR IN ALL FORMS BE ELIMINATED THROUGH APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION.

PROVISION BE MADE FOR ADEQUATE HOUSING AND EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN; 6

TAX INCENTIVES FOR BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS CONTRIBUTING TO BURSARY FUNDS BE INCREASED.

TAX DEDUCTIONS BE ALLOWED TO THOSE WHO PAY THE PRIMARY, SECONDARY AND TERTIARY EDUCATION FEES OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH OF FORMERLY DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES.

THE GOVERNMENT GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPOSING AN APPROPRIATE GRADUATE TAX ON THE SALARIES OF EMPLOYED GRADUATES OF TERTIARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AS A MEANS OF PROVIDING A SCHOLARSHIP FUND FOR STUDENTS.

The environment

46 The Commission recommends that:

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR ENSURE THAT PLANS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION INCLUDE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AS A KEY INGREDIENT. THE STATE HAS AN OBLIGATION TO CONSIDER THESE MATTERS AT A LEGISLATIVE LEVEL AND BUSINESS SHOULD REGULARLY INFORM THE PUBLIC OF ITS INVOLVEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INITIATIVES THROUGH ITS ANNUAL REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS OR IN SOME OTHER WAY.

6 While the above two recommendations should be regarded as primarily the responsibility of the state, business should seek ways of supporting facilities that protect the rights of the child.
Responsibility for developing and implementing these recommendations, and for monitoring their implementation, rests primarily with:

a The Department of Trade and Industry
b The Department of Finance
c The Department of Labour
d The Department of Environmental Affairs
e The private business sector

**LEGAL AND JUDICIAL**

47 In spite of the various clauses contained in the Constitution relating to the judiciary, and in spite of the substantial steps taken since 1994 by the Ministry of Justice to review the justice system, serious problems still remain with regard to access to justice and the general administration of justice.

48 The Commission has analysed the various submissions by members of the judiciary and magistracy, NGOs and government with regard to these issues, and has incorporated these, where appropriate, into the following recommendations. These recommendations are brief and merely direct attention to the most important areas requiring attention.

**Access to justice for victims of crime**

49 The victims of crime are the most neglected and disempowered of the role-players in the legal system. They are not being adequately served by the criminal justice system for a number of reasons, including:

- the absence of a professional, motivated and appropriately staffed national police service;
- the inability of the prosecutorial system to prosecute effectively and ensure criminal convictions in a manner that will change the current perception of criminals and potential criminals that their wrongdoing is unlikely to be detected and punished;
- the inability of the Department of Correctional Services to carry out its role of effectively incarcerating awaiting-trial and convicted prisoners.
The Commission thus recommends that:

**THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A SERIOUS CRIMES COMPENSATION FUND, AS EXISTS IN COUNTRIES LIKE AUSTRALIA, BE EXAMINED.**

**A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PROSECUTORS BE DRAWN UP, TO ENSURE IN PARTICULAR THAT THE INTERESTS OF VICTIMS ARE PROPERLY CONSIDERED. THE CODE OF CONDUCT SHOULD BE AIMED AT ASSISTING AND EMPOWERING VICTIMS BY:**

- **ADVISING THEM ON COMPLAINTS AND REMEDIES;**
- **ADVISING THEM ABOUT THE MERITS AND DEMERITS OF THEIR PARTICULAR CASE;**
- **INFORMING THEM OF THEIR RIGHTS TO COMPENSATION UNDER SECTION 300 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, IN TERMS OF WHICH FINANCIAL COMPENSATION MAY BE PAYABLE BY A CONVICTED PERSON TO A VICTIM;**
- **UPDATING THEM REGULARLY CONCERNING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE;**
- **PREPARING THEM TO GIVE EVIDENCE IN COURT, AND FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION; ENABLING PROSECUTORS TO CARRY OUT AN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT PROSECUTION.**

### Access to justice for accused persons

Although accused persons have a constitutional right to legal representation, the way in which this is implemented is often unsatisfactory. Legal representation is one of the most important protections against abuse of suspects by the police and criminal justice system. The Commission thus recommends that:

**FURTHER ATTENTION BE GIVEN TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE LEGAL AID BOARD AND THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS, TO ENSURE THAT AT LEAST A CONSISTENT MINIMUM STANDARD OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION IS EXTENDED TO ACCUSED PERSONS.**

**PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES BE SET UP IN ALL THE MAIN CENTRES IN THE COUNTRY.**

**THE OPTION OF COMPULSORY COMMUNITY SERVICE FOR LAW GRADUATES, AND STUDENT PRACTICE RULES FOR LAW CLINICS, BE EXPLORED TO AUGMENT THE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAM.**

**PUBLIC DEFENDERS BE INDEPENDENT FROM THE PROSECUTION ARM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SO AS NOT TO COMPROMISE THEIR SERVICES.**

**LEGISLATION WHICH RESTRICTS THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS TO BAIL BE RESISTED.**

**LEGITIMATE CONCERNS ABOUT THE INAPPROPRIATE GRANTING OF BAIL TO ACCUSED PERSONS WHO HAVE PREVIOUSLY COMMITTED OFFENCES WHILE ON BAIL, BE ADDRESSED THROUGH THOROUGH POLICE INVESTIGATION OF THE STATUS OF THOSE APPLYING FOR BAIL AND THE PROPER TRAINING OF MAGISTRATES AND PROSECUTORS IN THE APPLICATION OF BAIL PROCEDURES, RATHER THAN BY AMENDING THE LAW.**
PROSECUTORS, MAGISTRATES AND JUDGES DISALLOW EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH UNLAWFUL METHODS.

CO-ORDINATION AND SUPERVISION

52 The Commission recommends that:

LAW STUDENTS WORKING IN LAW CLINICS BE ENTITLED TO ADMISSION UNDER STUDENT PRACTICE RULES, TO ASSIST THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL AID SERVICES IN THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE'S COURT.

Training and education

53 The effective administration of justice demands training, not only to facilitate the efficiency of prosecutorial and other duties, but also of a more general nature, to ensure that judicial officers understand and uphold the values and principles contained in the Constitution. The Commission thus recommends that:

ALL PERSONNEL WITHIN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (FROM CLERKS TO JUDGES) UNDERGO INTENSIVE TRAINING IN THE VALUES OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION AND IN THE REQUIREMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STANDARDS, INCLUDING THE UNITED NATIONS BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY. ONGOING TRAINING SHOULD INCLUDE SENSITISATION TO HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING GENDER-SPECIFIC ABUSE AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSES. CARE MUST BE TAKEN THAT THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES IS NOT COMPROMISED BY ANY TRAINING PROCESS.

TRAINING OF PROSECUTORS AND MAGISTRATES BE UNDERTAKEN BY BOTH THE JUSTICE COLLEGE AND LOCAL UNIVERSITIES.

TRAINING OF MAGISTRATES BE UNDERTAKEN SEPARATELY FROM THAT OF JUDGES.

TRAINING OF JUDGES BE CONDUCTED BY JUDGES TOGETHER WITH ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS, RATHER THAN BY THE JUSTICE COLLEGE. JUDGES ALREADY TRAINED IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES SHOULD ASSIST WITH THE TRAINING.

MAGISTRATES BE PROPERLY TRAINED TO APPLY THE NEW BAIL PROCEDURES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION, TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC ARE BALANCED AGAINST THOSE OF THE ACCUSED.

54 The manner in which the legal profession develops in South Africa is to some extent determined by how those at its entry point are introduced to the system. Creative use of senior law students, e.g. as public defenders for unrepresented accused, could ensure that students graduate with appropriate practical experience. The Commission thus recommends that:

LAW SCHOOLS REVIEW THEIR COURSES TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERESTS OF ALL SOUTH AFRICANS ARE SERVED. CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO INCREASING PRACTICAL TRAINING
AND/OR THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY COMMUNITY SERVICE AS REQUIREMENTS FOR GRADUATION.

LAW STUDENTS BE GIVEN A GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND MORE INTENSIVE TRAINING IN LEGAL ETHICS.

THE MAGISTRATES’ COMMISSION ATTEMPT TO ATTRACT PRIVATE PRACTITIONERS TO THE BENCH, SO THAT IT IS NO LONGER DOMINATED BY MAGISTRATES WHOSE TRAINING IS MAINLY IN THE AREA OF PROSECUTIONS.

ALL POLICE OFFICERS BE IMBUED, THROUGH TRAINING AND THE INTRODUCTION OF A CODE OF ETHICAL PRACTICE, WITH AN ETHOS OF SERVICE IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE AND UNDER A CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

INVESTIGATING OFFICERS BE TRAINED IN PROPER FORENSIC INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES, TO REPLACE THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF EXTRACTING CONFESSIONS UNDER DURESS, THROUGH VIOLENCE AND BY OTHER IRREGULAR AND UNORTHODOX METHODS.

THE WORK OF THE DETECTIVE ACADEMY BE EXPANDED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

THE STANDARD OF TRAINING OF COURT INTERPRETERS BE IMPROVED. TERTIARY ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS SHOULD DEVELOP MULTI-DISCIPLINARY UNDERGRADUATE TRAINING COURSES (INVOLVING, AMONGST OTHERS, APPLIED LINGUISTICS DEPARTMENTS AND LAW FACULTIES), TO ENSURE THAT MORE HIGHLY SKILLED COURT INTERPRETERS ARE TRAINED. SALARIES MUST BE COMMENSURATE WITH SKILLS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

PEOPLE WHO HAVE PARALEGAL DIPLOMAS BE CERTIFIED BY A PARALEGAL INSTITUTE. ONCE CERTIFIED, THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO APPEAR IN THE LOWER COURTS ON BASIC MATTERS SUCH AS BAIL APPLICATIONS AND REMANDS, AND SHOULD ALSO HAVE PRISON VISITING RIGHTS. PARALEGALS SHOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE PROPOSED LEGAL AID BOARD SCHEME.

SPECIALIST PROSECUTORIAL TASK TEAMS BE ESTABLISHED TO ADDRESS SERIOUS ENDEMIC CRIME, SUCH AS TAXI VIOLENCE, DRUG TRAFFICKING, CAR THEFT AND LICENSING SYNDICATES AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE. SUCH UNITS SHOULD HAVE SIMILAR POWERS AND INDEPENDENCE TO THOSE OF THE INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS DIRECTORATE. THE WORK OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS, E.G. THE INVESTIGATIVE TASK UNIT IN KWAZULU-NATAL, IS NULLIFIED IF THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS ARE NOT APPROPRIATELY PURSUED IN THE PROSECUTORIAL PHASE.

Witness protection

Protection of complainants

In many cases victims are unwilling to lay charges because of fear of reprisals from the persons whom they implicate. The current system of witness protection is dysfunctional and inhibits successful prosecutions. The establishment of a fair, efficient and all-embracing programme is seen as a matter of urgency.
Protection of other state witnesses

56 The exposure of politically motivated human rights abuses has only been possible as a result of perpetrators coming forward and “blowing the whistle” on their organisations’ activities. Similarly, if organised crime is to be combated, those involved in crime syndicates will have to come forward. This is only likely if such persons are assured of comprehensive witness protection.

Juvenile offenders

57 A growing number of accused persons appearing on a daily basis in South African courts are juveniles. The Commission thus recommends that:

MORE EXTENSIVE PROBATION SERVICES BE MADE AVAILABLE, TO ENSURE THAT JUVENILES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE SENTENCES.

SECURE PLACES OF SAFETY FOR AWAITING-TRIAL JUVENILE OFFENDERS BE CONSTRUCTED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

THE POLICE MAKE PROPER EFFORTS TO TRACE THE RELATIVES OF JUVENILES WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES OUTSIDE THE MAGISTERIAL DISTRICTS IN WHICH THEY LIVE.

THE POSSIBILITY OF LAW STUDENTS ACTING AS PUBLIC DEFENDERS TO REPRESENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN COURT BE EXPLORED, EVEN BEFORE THE INTRODUCTION OF STUDENT PRACTICE RULES.

Representivity

58 The Commission recommends that:

IMBALANCES IN THE RACIAL AND GENDER COMPOSITION OF JUDGES IN THE HIGH COURT BE URGENTLY ADDRESSED.

A FAST-TRACK JUDICIAL TRAINING PROGRAM BE INTRODUCED FOR BLACK AND WOMAN ADVOCATES, ATTORNEYS OR ACADEMICS WHO ASPIRE TO JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT.

AN ATTEMPT BE MADE TO ATTRACT MORE PRIVATE PRACTITIONERS TO AN APPOINTMENT ON THE BENCH.

IMBALANCES IN THE GENDER COMPOSITION OF THE MAGISTRACY BE ADDRESSED.

BECAUSE MOST MAGISTRATES PRESENTLY SITTING HAVE ONLY STATE PROSECUTION EXPERIENCE, MAGISTRATES BE APPOINTED FROM PRIVATE PRACTICE.
Courts of chiefs and headmen

59 Many civil legal matters in South Africa are decided by bodies outside the formal court structure, namely tribunals administered by chiefs in the former homeland areas, under laws dating from the colonial period. The Commission thus recommends that:

**AN URGENT AUDIT OF THESE COURTS AND THEIR PERSONNEL BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE PROVINCIAL MINISTRIES OF TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS.**

**DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH COURTS DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, THE DE FACTO POSITION IS THAT, IN MANY AREAS, THIS RIGHT HAS BEEN ASSUMED AND CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND OTHER ILLEGAL SANCTIONS ARE ROUTINELY IMPOSED. THIS PRACTICE MUST BE ENDED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.**

**THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CAREFULLY MONITOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AT THIS LEVEL.**

**IT BE ENSURED THAT THESE TRIBUNALS RESPECT THE RIGHTS ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. CODES OF PRACTICE, INCLUDING RULES PERTAINING TO WRITTEN RECORDS, MUST BE IMPLEMENTED.**

Informal courts

60 Informal courts or “people’s courts” were established in many townships, especially during the 1980s, partly in response to the perceived illegitimacy of the state-sanctioned court system. In general they were repressive and did not comply with the basic requirements of the rules of natural justice. There is ample evidence of a reversion to alternative structures for exacting “justice” as delays in the criminal justice and policing systems increase. The Commission thus recommends that:

**STEPS BE TAKEN TO INHIBIT THE REAPPEARANCE OF THE “PEOPLE’S COURT” PHENOMENON, AND THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SHOULD, AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, ESTABLISH CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MEDIATION STRUCTURES AT COMMUNITY LEVEL.**

61 Responsibility for developing and implementing these recommendations, and for monitoring the implementation thereof, rests primarily with:

a The Ministry and Department of Justice;

b The Ministry and Department of Safety and Security;

c The Law Society of South Africa;
d Tertiary academic institutions;

e NGOs involved in the law;

f Professional organisations representing the legal profession.

# SECURITY FORCES

## Intelligence services

62 The Commission had little success in its efforts to access the archives of the former National Intelligence Service. It is therefore the recommendation of the Commission that:

**A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS BY INDEPENDENT RESEARCHERS BE UNDERTAKEN INTO BOTH THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE REMAINING ARCHIVAL HOLDINGS OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF ALL DIVISIONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES.**

**ONCE SUCH AN ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COMPLETED, THESE DOCUMENTS BE SUBJECT TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT NO 43 OF 1996 (THE ARCHIVES ACT) AND BE TRANSFERRED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES.**

**THESE STRUCTURES BE REQUIRED TO DELIVER AN ANNUAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT REGARDING THEIR ACTIVITIES.**

**ALL EXPENDITURE BY THESE SERVICES BE SUBJECT TO REGULAR AUDITS BY THE AUDITOR GENERAL.**

**THE MINISTERS TASKED WITH THE OVERSIGHT OF THE RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ALL GATHERING OF INTELLIGENCE IS DONE IN TERMS OF THE ACT GOVERNING SUCH ACTIVITIES, AND THAT NO INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING IN RELATION TO LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY BE TOLERATED.**

**THAT THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE (NICOC) ENSURE THAT ALL INTELLIGENCE IS SHARED OPENLY AND THOROUGHLY BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE DIVISIONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES.**

**THAT ALL MANUALS USED BY THE SECURITY FORCES BE REVIEWED AND ALTERED TO CONFORM TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION.**

## South African National Defence Force

63 The Commission's hearings into activities of the SADF showed that the secrecy with which the SADF operated provided the basis for operations and programmes that led to gross human rights violations. The Commission therefore recommends that:
MEMBERS OF THE SANDF SHOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO ENGAGE IN ANY COVERT ACTIVITIES NOT SPECIFICALLY AUTHORISED BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE AS WELL AS A MINISTER WITH AN UNRELATED PORTFOLIO, AND THAT SPENDING ON SUCH COVERT ACTIVITIES BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME AUDITING PROCESS AS OTHER EXPENDITURE.

A JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY BE ESTABLISHED WITH REGARD TO PROJECT COAST, TO INVESTIGATE THE FOLLOWING MATTERS:

• WHETHER THE STREET DRUGS PRODUCED BY COMPANIES RELATED TO THE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (CBW) PROGRAMME, AS WELL AS THE DRUGS PURCHASED OUTSIDE OF SOUTH AFRICA, WERE DESTROYED OR WHETHER THEY ENDED UP ON THE STREETS OF SOUTH AFRICA;

• WHETHER THE DIRECTORS OF COMPANIES LINKED TO PROJECT COAST WERE PARTY TO FRAUDULENT ACTIVITIES USING STATE FUNDS;

• WHETHER INFORMATION RELATING TO THE CBW PROGRAMME WAS COPIED ONTO OPTICAL DISKS THAT ARE CURRENTLY IN A SAFE IN PRETORIA, AND WHETHER UNAUTHORISED COPIES OF THESE DISKS EXIST;

• ANY OTHER ISSUES NOT FULLY CANVASSED BY THE COMMISSION OR THE CRIMINAL TRIAL OF DR BASSON.

THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE CBW PROGRAMME STILL IN EXISTENCE BE DISMANTLED AND ALL ACTIVITIES BE DISCONTINUED, AND THAT THE MANUFACTURE AND RESEARCH OF SUBSTANCES INTENDED FOR USE AS CROWD CONTROL MECHANISMS BE CEASED.

THAT AN APPROPRIATE POLICY BE PUT IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE MILITARY ARE REGULARLY AUDITED.

THAT THE SANDF CEASE TO MAKE USE OF FRONT COMPANIES FOR THEIR OPERATIONS.

64 The civil education programme that has been proposed in the Defence White Paper is a positive initiative to prevent future human rights abuses by members of the security forces and to encourage and instil an understanding of human rights values in the population at large.

THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS THAT THIS PROGRAMME BE IMPLEMENTED RIGOROUSLY.

65 The onus is on government to ensure that any members of the security forces found to have committed human rights abuses or engaged in criminal activity of any kind are decisively dealt with through the justice system.

66 The Commission has had little success in its efforts to access the archives of the former South African Defence Force (SADF), despite the fact that significant holdings still remain in the custody of the SANDF. The limited access that the Commission did manage to obtain was controlled, selected and censored by the
SANDF nodal point. These problems of access have been detailed elsewhere in this report and have led the Commission to conclude that its research and investigation into the activities of the former SADF were insufficient and constrained by such lack of access. Commission investigations have, however, established that the former SADF, contrary to its submission to the Commission, was significantly involved in the perpetration of gross human rights violations.

67 It is therefore the recommendation of the Commission that:

A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS BY INDEPENDENT RESEARCHERS BE UNDERTAKEN INTO BOTH THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE REMAINING ARCHIVAL HOLDINGS OF THE FORMER SADF.

ONCE SUCH AN ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COMPLETED, THAT THESE DOCUMENTS, PRESENTLY WITHIN THE ARCHIVES OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, BE SUBJECT TO THE ARCHIVES ACT AND BE TRANSFERRED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES.

Policing

68 The Commission found that members of the SAPS were responsible for a substantial proportion of human rights violations committed during its mandate period. These recommendations are based on the Commission’s understanding of the role played by the South African Police (SAP) in the past and the concern that, despite all efforts to reform the SAPS and improve police performance, reports of torture, coerced confessions, deaths in custody and other human rights violations remain common occurrences. More than 370 deaths in police custody or as a result of police action were reported in the six-month period from April to September 1997. While reform within the SAPS is obviously essential, this must be accompanied by appropriate independent monitoring and proper accountability.

Provincial police services

69 The Commission thus recommends that:

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS NOT BE PERMITTED TO EXERCISE UNFETTERED POWER OVER PROVINCIAL POLICE SERVICES.

The Independent Complaints Directorate

70 The Commission recommends that:

THE INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS DIRECTORATE (ICD) BE GOVERNED BY NEW LEGISLATION, INDEPENDENT OF GENERAL POLICE LEGISLATION.
The ICD be genuinely independent of the Ministry for Safety and Security.

The ICD have powers to compel the SAPS and others to comply with its requests related to conducting an investigation, including powers of search and seizure.

The ICD be given the authority to bring to the attention of relevant officials any failure on the part of the SAPS to respond to ICD recommendations to take disciplinary or legal action.

The ICD be mandated to investigate corruption within the SAPS, rather than this task being allocated to a unit within the SAPS.

The ICD be given the capacity, resources and authority to conduct proactive investigations and evaluations of overall policing policies and practice, as well as to respond to complaints.

**Public order policing**

71 Undue use of force by security forces in controlling crowds was one of the most significant causes of deaths and injuries reported to the Commission. To address this issue, the Commission recommends that:

**All members of the SAPS dealing with public order incidents receive the required training, and that training standards with regard to the policing of crowds be maintained at international standards in future. Improved training will lead to greater confidence on the part of those policing crowds and gatherings, which should result in less reliance on force.**

**Public order policing be decentralised and integrated into the normal structures of the SAPS (as provided for in the new policy), and that the tendency to centralise and militarise this function be avoided in future.**

**Public education (and training of local authorities) with regard to the provisions of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, concerning rights and responsibilities in respect of gatherings, be continued and expanded, especially for elections, public holidays and other regular public events.**

**Any person or party who contravenes the Regulation of Gatherings Act be prosecuted to ensure compliance with the new approach.**

**The police establish an inspectorate, either internally or within the secretariat for safety and security, as well as at provincial level, to check adherence to new national standards, and to investigate the policing of particular incidents.**

**The police be issued with new equipment and apparel to improve their safety and protection - the more protected the police officials feel, the less likely they are to use force or act aggressively.**

**The SAPS enhance internal procedures to ensure accountability for the storage and use of weapons and ammunition.**
POST-INCIDENT INVESTIGATION BECOME STANDARD PROCEDURE IN ALL CASES WHERE FORCE WAS USED.

THE SAPS CREATE, EQUIP AND TRAIN CAMERA TEAMS TO FILM EVERY INCIDENT WHERE THE POLICE ARE DEPLOYED FOR CROWD MANAGEMENT. THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL DEVICE FOR IMPROVED ACCOUNTABILITY AS WELL AS FOR DEBRIEFING AND TRAINING OF THE POLICE OFFICIALS THEMSELVES.

THE LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE CARRYING OF WEAPONS IN CROWDS SHOULD BE FULLY ENFORCED AT ALL TIMES.

THE PUBLIC ORDER POLICING COMPONENT OF THE SAPS BE ENCOURAGED TO IMPLEMENT A MEANINGFUL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION STRATEGY TO IMPROVE REPRESENTIVITY AT SENIOR LEVELS.

CASE STUDIES OF PAST INCIDENTS OF BAD PRACTICE BY THE FORMER SAP AND HOMELAND POLICE IN THE POLICING OF GATHERINGS BE USED IN TRAINING.

**Police involvement in crimes**

72 Where it is alleged that a serious crime was carried out by or with the acquiescence of police, the Commission recommends that:

POLICE OFFICERS FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA INVOLVED BE BROUGHT IN TO INVESTIGATE.

PROPER DISCIPLINARY MEASURES BE TAKEN AGAINST POLICE WHO ABUSE THEIR POWERS.

INDEMNITY FOR POLICE WHO ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF THE STATE, EVEN DURING A STATE OF EMERGENCY, BE ERADICATED.

ATTORNEYS-GENERAL RIGOROUSLY PROSECUTE SAPS MEMBERS WHO ARE FOUND TO HAVE ASSAULTED, TORTURED OR KILLED PERSONS IN THEIR CUSTODY, AND THAT ANY MEMBERS OF THE SAPS FOUND TO HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN ACCUSED OF HAVING USED FORCE IN THE QUESTIONING OF SUSPECTS OR ANY PERSONS IN THEIR CUSTODY, BE SUBJECT TO AN INTERNAL INVESTIGATION, WHICH MAY RESULT IN PROSECUTION.

**Recruitment and training**

73 The Commission recommends that:

PROFESSIONALISM AND MOTIVATION BE ENHANCED, AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORRUPTION AND UNLAWFUL PRACTICES BE MINIMISED, BY PROMOTING EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES THAT ENCOURAGE MORE EDUCATED, LITERATE AND PROFESSIONAL CANDIDATES TO APPLY FOR EMPLOYMENT AND TO REMAIN IN EMPLOYMENT WITH THE SAPS. PARTICULARLY, IMMEDIATE ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SALARY ISSUES TO ENCOURAGE BETTER CANDIDATES TO APPLY FOR AND REMAIN IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE SAPS.

ALL POLICE OFFICERS BE IMBUED, THROUGH TRAINING AND THE INTRODUCTION OF A CODE OF ETHICAL PRACTICE, WITH AN ETHOS OF SERVICE IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE AND UNDER A CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS BE TRAINED IN PROPER FORENSIC INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES, TO REPLACE THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF EXTRACTION OF CONFessions UNDER DURESS, BY VIOLENCE AND OTHER IRREGULAR AND UNORTHODOX METHODS.

THE WORK OF THE DETECTIVE ACADEMY BE EXPANDED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

The SAPS and correctional services

74 To maintain control and continuity in the dealings between the SAPS and the Department of Correctional Services, the Commission recommends that there be closer liaison between the two departments. For example, at present, sentenced prisoners are paroled at the discretion of the Department of Correctional Services.

75 It is recommended that:

THE RELEASE OF SUCH PERSONS SHOULD BE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE COURTS THAT SENTENCED THEM.

76 In addition, it is recommended that

• A SOCIAL WORKER BE RESPONSIBLE FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT INTO WHICH THE PRISONER IS TO BE RELEASED;

• THERE BE AN ASSURANCE THAT THE PRISONER WILL HAVE A MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD;

• A RECORD OF COMPLETE REHABILITATION IS MADE AVAILABLE;

• THE GOVERNMENT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING OF PRISONERS AND TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE EQUIPPED FOR LIFE OUTSIDE THE PRISON;

• THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES CHECK WHETHER THE PRISONER HAS BREACHED ANY PAROLE CONDITIONS IN THE PAST;

• THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER, MAGISTRATE AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES OFFICIAL EXAMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRISONER TO BE PAROLED.

Security companies

77 The Commission recommends that:

THE RELEVANT PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE REVIEW AND INVESTIGATE THE STATE OF THE SECURITY INDUSTRY WITH THE AIM OF INCREASING CONTROLS ON THE INDUSTRY AND ENSURING AN INDUSTRY-WIDE CODE OF CONDUCT.
Improved control over ownership and use of guns.

78 Noting that many deaths and injuries reported to the Commission, as well as many occurring after the end of the mandate period, were caused by guns, the Commission recommends that:

EXISTING CONTROLS OVER THE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF GUNS BE EXTENSIVELY REVIEWED.

THE HEALTH SECTOR

79 Millions of South Africans were denied access to appropriate, affordable health care during the period under review. Health care workers, through acts of commission and omission, ignorance, fear and failure to exercise clinical independence, subjected many individuals and groups to further abuse. Fundamental reforms in the health care delivery system, legislative controls, monitoring and accountability mechanisms, and the training of health professionals are required.

Legislation

80 The Commission recommends that:

ALL LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO HEALTH CARE FOCUS ON PRIMARY HEALTH.

PRESENT HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION BE REVIEWED, AND FUTURE LEGISLATION DEVELOPED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY, EVALUATION AND MONITORING, THE RIGHTS OF SERVICE USERS AND THE PRIMACY OF CONFIDENTIALITY.

Professional standards of conduct

81 The Commission recommends that:

A UNIFORM CODE OF CONDUCT FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONALS BE DEVELOPED, IMPLEMENTED, AND TAUGHT IN ALL HEALTH SCIENCE FACULTIES.

THE STATUTORY COUNCILS ENSURE THAT ALL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS REGISTERED WITH THOSE COUNCILS ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS TO WHICH THEY MUST ADHERE. HEALTH PROFESSIONALS MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE IF THEY VIOLATE THESE STANDARDS.

HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ENGAGE IN “SELF-AUDITS” OF THEIR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY MEETING REGULARLY IN SMALL FACILITATED GROUPS TO DISCUSS ETHICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DILEMMAS.
The Commission recommends that:

**Health Science Faculties Establish Programmes**

Health Science faculties establish programmes aimed at increasing the number of black under- and postgraduate students. This may require bridging programmes, financial assistance, tutors, mentoring etc.

Training in human rights be a fundamental and integral aspect of all curricula for health professionals. This training should address factors affecting human rights practice, such as knowledge, skills, attitudes, and ethical research practices. Knowledge of and competence and proficiency in the standards (both national and international) to which doctors will be held accountable should be a requirement for qualification and registration.

The content of the oaths pertaining to health care and the ethical principles embodied in them be taught as part of undergraduate training from the earliest opportunity possible. This facilitates an interaction with the principles espoused and an opportunity to question and implement them during the training period.

Continuing medical education programmes include a review of human rights and ethical issues and developments.

**Safeguards for vulnerable health professionals**

In order to ensure that health professionals who work in situations in which they have dual loyalties are not complicit in committing human rights abuses, the Commission recommends that:

Appropriate ongoing training in institutional health care and human rights be mandatory for all health professionals working in public facilities.

Training be developed for non-medical prison staff, SANDF members and police, to facilitate a mutual understanding of the duties and obligations of health professionals working in those environments. This will support professional and ethical health practices.

Standards and norms that uphold human rights be developed for institutional health care. These need to be put into operation via regular independent audits.

The Department of Health assume de jure and de facto control of prison and detainee health care, military health care, state mortuaries and forensic services. (Those responsible for forensic services should not also be responsible for providing health care to prisoners and detainees, as is presently the case.) In other words, health professionals working in these environments must be employed by, report to and be professionally accountable to the Department of Health.
Health care services in prisons

84 The Commission recommends that:

THE ROLE, RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HEALTH CARE OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES, BOTH IN PRISONS AND POLICE CELLS, BE CLEARLY DEFINED AND ACCEPTED BY ALL POLICE AND PRISON STAFF.

AN AUDIT OF DISTRICT SURGEONS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH BE CARRIED OUT, TO ENSURE THAT THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN OR COLLUDED WITH HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE PAST ARE NO LONGER IN A POSITION TO OFFER TREATMENT TO DETAINEEs AND PRISONERS. (NOTE: THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION THAT SUCH PEOPLE SHOULD NO LONGER BE ALLOWED TO PRACTISE, ONLY THAT THEY BE REMOVED FROM SITUATIONS IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE VULNERABLE TO COLLUSION.)

THE MEDICAL RECORDS OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES BE INACCESSIBLE TO NON-MEDICAL PRISON STAFF AND/OR POLICE, UNLESS THE HEALTH PROFESSIONAL IN CHARGE DEEMS SUCH ACCESS TO BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PATIENT.

MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES TAKE PLACE IN PRIVATE, UNLESS THE PATIENT OR THE HEALTH PROFESSIONAL PERFORMING THE EXAMINATION REQUESTS OTHERWISE.

REGULAR INDEPENDENT REVIEWS OF HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS AND OTHER PLACES OF INCARCERATION, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND MENTAL INSTITUTIONS BE CONDUCTED.

AN INDEPENDENT LINE OF AUTHORITY BE ESTABLISHED TO ADVISE, GUIDE AND SUPPORT DISTRICT SURGEONS AND OTHER PRISON HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL FACING CONTROVERSIAL ETHICAL DECISIONS.

COMPULSORY REFRESHER COURSES FOR PRISON HEALTH CARE WORKERS FOCUS ON ETHICS, MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SPECIFIC HEALTH NEEDS OF PRISONERS.

THE FORMAT OF DOCUMENTATION COMPLETED BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS PROVIDING HEALTH CARE FOR PRISONERS AND DETAINEES SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE SECTIONS ON ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE OR ABUSE, EVIDENCE OF SUCH ABUSE AND HOW THE ALLEGATIONS ARE BEING INVESTIGATED. ALL ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE MUST BE REPORTED TO AN INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY. FAILURE TO REPORT ABUSE SHOULD BE A DISCIPLINARY OFFENCE.

Medico-legal services

85 The Commission recommends that:

THERE BE UNIFORM STANDARDS OF TRAINING FOR ALL STAFF REQUIRED TO PERFORM POST MORTEMS OR OTHER FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS.

CUSTODIAL CARE AND FORENSIC SERVICES BE SEPARATED. TO PREVENT A CONFLICT OF INTERESTS, PROFESSIONALS WHO PROVIDE HEALTH CARE TO PRISONERS AND TO OTHERS INCARCERATED OR DETAINED SHOULD NOT HAVE FORENSIC RESPONSIBILITY.

THE LEGISLATION GOVERNING FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY BE REVISED, THE SECRECY CLAUSE RELATED TO FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY BE LIFTED, AND FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY SERVICES BE REVIEWED.
THE STATE FUND AN INDEPENDENT FORENSIC SERVICE FOR THE USE OF THE FAMILY OF ANYONE WHO DIES IN CUSTODY. THE FAMILIES BE INFORMED OF THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE AN INDEPENDENT FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST PRESENT AT A POST MORTEM.

THERE BE REGULAR INDEPENDENT AUDITS OF THE POLICE MORTUARIES AND FORENSIC PATHOLOGY LABORATORIES.

POLICE MORTUARIES AND FORENSIC LABORATORIES BE ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED. THE ABSENCE OF X-RAY FACILITIES, FOR INSTANCE, IN THE MAJORITY OF MORTUARIES IS NOTED WITH CONCERN.

**Mental health**

86  The Commission recommends that:

MENTAL HEALTH BE GIVEN PRIORITY AS A NATIONAL CONCERN AND BE BROUGHT INTO THE PRIMARY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM.

MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES BE ACCESSIBLE TO ALL SOUTH AFRICANS, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE RURAL AREAS.

THE FOCUS OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES BE SHIFTED FROM THE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ONE-ON-ONE THERAPY MODEL, TO BECOME COMMUNITY BASED. DIFFERENT CARE AND THERAPY MODALITIES BE EXPLORED AND INSTITUTED, PARTICULARLY TRADITIONAL AND INDIGENOUS MODES OF TREATMENT. COMMUNITY COUNSELLORS AND FAMILY MEMBERS BE INVOLVED IN CARE PROVISION. SERVICE USERS MUST BE INCLUDED IN DECISIONS ABOUT SERVICE PROVISION.

THE QUALITY AND TYPE OF CARE PROVIDED IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS BE MONITORED BY AN INDEPENDENT BODY.

PSYCHOMETRIC TESTS WHICH ARE CULTURALLY APPROPRIATE IN ALL ASPECTS BE DEVELOPED AND APPROPRIATELY APPLIED.

APPROPRIATE MODELS FOR TRAUMA COUNSELLING IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT BE DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED.

MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION BY ALL APPROPRIATE MINISTRIES, FOR EXAMPLE HOUSING, CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, EDUCATION, AND SAFETY AND SECURITY, IN THEIR PLANNING PROCESSES.

MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES HAVE A DEVELOPMENTAL FOCUS.

THERE BE INCREASED RESEARCH INTO THE CONSEQUENCES OF TRAUMA RELATED TO THE EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENCE. THE GROWING BODY OF RESEARCH ON POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD) NEEDS TO BE MORE WIDELY SHARED AND PRACTICALLY APPLIED IN SOCIAL SETTINGS. KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS OF PTSD SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED IN INSTITUTIONS, COMMUNITIES AND THE FAMILY.
The organised medical profession

87 The Commission recommends that:

THE STATUTORY COUNCILS GOVERNING THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS BE PROACTIVE IN PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE STATUTORY COUNCILS BE GIVEN A PROACTIVE CAPACITY TO INVESTIGATE UNETHICAL/UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, WITHOUT HAVING TO DEPEND ON THE SUBMISSION OF A FORMAL COMPLAINT.


THE DISCIPLINARY “ARMS” OF THE COUNCILS BE BODIES WHOSE MEMBERS HAVE A CORE OF APPROPRIATE KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE; DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND SANCTIONS BE IMPLEMENTED IN A CONSISTENT, FAIR MANNER; THE FULL COUNCILS HAVE THE POWER TO REVIEW OUTCOMES OF DISCIPLINARY ENQUIRIES AND THE SANCTION(S) IMPOSED.

POLITICAL AND FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE OF STATUTORY COUNCILS BE ENTRENCHED.

THE COUNCILS ENSURE THAT NO LEGISLATION OR POLICIES VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OR DIGNITY OF PATIENTS, CLIENTS OR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS.

HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS WHO OPPOSE OR DRAW ATTENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BE ACTIVELY SUPPORTED AND PROTECTED BY STATUTORY COUNCILS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATIONS.

Checks and balances for state-run organisations

88 The Commission recommends that:

A BODY ON HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS BE ESTABLISHED, CONSISTING OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS, HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS, CONSUMER REPRESENTATIVES AND LEGAL EXPERTS. THIS BODY COULD BE APPROPRIATELY LOCATED WITHIN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. IT SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT, PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND STATUTORY COUNCILS, BUT WOULD OBVIOUSLY WORK IN CO-OPERATION WITH THESE.

THIS BODY BE RESPONSIBLE, AMONGST OTHER THINGS, FOR:

• IMPLEMENTING HEALTH SECTOR-RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY PARLIAMENT AS A RESULT OF THIS COMMISSION’S REPORT;

• MONITORING INSTITUTIONAL HEALTH CARE;

• ADVISING ON CURRICULA IN HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION;
• RECEIVING AND DEALING WITH REPORTS AND COMPLAINTS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS;

• CREATING THE POSITION OF AND OVERSEEING THE WORK OF A “MEDICAL PUBLIC PROTECTOR” OR OMBUDSPERSON;

• IMPLEMENTING AN ENQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL, ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL POSITION OF HEALTH PERSONNEL IN THE MILITARY, AND DEVELOPING CLEAR GUIDELINES TO AVOID CONFLICT BETWEEN MILITARY LAW AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.

THIS BODY HAVE A MECHANISM TO ALLOW FOR ONGOING CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS.

Service users

89 The Commission recommends that:

CURRENT EFFORTS TO CREATE A PATIENTS’ RIGHTS CHARTER BE ENCOURAGED. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, STATUTORY COUNCILS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATIONS BE REQUIRED TO ENGAGE IN ONGOING PROGRAMMES TO INFORM USERS OF HEALTH SERVICES OF THEIR RIGHTS AND OF WAYS IN WHICH COMPLAINTS CAN BE LODGED.

State health organisations (Department of Health and South African Medical Services)

90 The Commission recommends that:

THE DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION BE REDRESSED, WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE URBAN AREAS AND TOWNSHIPS, AS WELL AS BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS. THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH A ONCE-OFF TAX, OR SLOWLY OVER TIME.

ALL EMPLOYEES OF STATE-RUN INSTITUTIONS BE MADE AWARE OF THEIR DUTIES, OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS.

HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS EXERCISE THE PRIVILEGE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF HAVING FINAL AUTHORITY REGARDING DECISIONS AFFECTING THE HEALTH OF PATIENTS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN SITUATIONS WHERE THE PATIENT IS INCARCERATED.

THE SANDF PROVIDE APPROPRIATE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH CARE FOR THOSE SUFFERING FROM THE EFFECTS OF SADF ACTIONS OR PARTICIPATION IN THEM. SIMILARLY, SERVICES ARE NEEDED FOR THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN AND SUFFERED THE RESULTS OF OTHER STATE-SPONSORED OR LIBERATION MOVEMENT VIOLENCE.

ALL HEALTH CARE FACILITIES HAVE POLICIES THAT PROTECT AND PROMOTE:

• DOCTOR–PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

• CLINICAL INDEPENDENCE
Research and publications

91 The Commission recommends that:

THE PROFESSIONAL BODIES, STATUTORY COUNCILS, AND THE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS BODY (REFERRED TO ABOVE) MONITOR RESEARCH PRACTICES, ESPECIALLY AMONG VULNERABLE POPULATIONS Whose members may be unaware of their rights.

THERE BE A PROHIBITION AGAINST RESEARCH INTO SCIENTIFIC METHODS OF INTERROGATION AND TORTURE.

SOUTH AFRICA ADHERE RIGOROUSLY TO ALL THE STIPULATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY THOSE PERTAINING TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN MEDICAL JOURNAL (SAMJ) HAVE EDITORIAL INDEPENDENCE FROM ANY INTEREST GROUP SUCH AS THE STATE, THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA (MASA) ETC.

THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE SAMJ BE BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE AND INCLUDE COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES.

92 Responsibility for developing and implementing these recommendations, and for monitoring their implementation, rests primarily with:

a The Department of Health – national and provincial;

b The statutory councils;

c Professional organisations;

d The SANDF;

e Health science faculties;

f The Human Rights Commission;

g NGOs involved in health.
State restrictions on the freedom of the media played an important role in facilitating gross violations of human rights during the period covered by the Commission’s mandate. While these restrictions were not in themselves a gross violation of human rights as defined in the Act, they denied South Africans the right to a free flow of information and ideas, and created conditions conducive to the perpetration of gross human rights violations by a range of forces. Laws and restrictions controlling the media created an atmosphere conducive to self-censorship in the white-controlled media. As a result, most journalists failed to delve thoroughly enough into allegations that gross violations of human rights were occurring, or to speak out strongly enough when evidence was uncovered.

Legislation

The Commission thus recommends that:

THERE BE LESS LEGISLATION CONTROLLING THE MEDIA, RATHER THAN MORE.

SECTION 205 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, WHICH COMPELS THE REVELATION OF SOURCES, BE REPEALED. THIS IS IN LINE WITH THE CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF JOURNALISTS, WHICH STRESSES THAT THE JOURNALIST SHOULD OBSERVE PROFESSIONAL SECRECY ON SOURCES OF INFORMATION OBTAINED IN CONFIDENCE. THERE MAY BE A NEED TO DEVISE A NEW FORMULATION, WHICH WOULD ASSURE THE MEDIA’S RIGHT TO PROTECT A SOURCE AND ITS INTEGRITY, AS WELL AS THE STATE’S NEED FOR INFORMATION, FOR INSTANCE WHEN STATE SECURITY IS THREATENED.

A THOROUGH REVIEW OF ALL LAWS BE UNDERTAKEN WITH A VIEW TO REDUCING RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION, ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ON DIVERSITY OF OPINION. THERE SHOULD BE NO INTERFERENCE FROM GOVERNMENT IN EDITORIAL MATTERS.

RECRUITMENT OF AGENTS AMONG, OR PAYMENTS FOR INFORMATION FROM, THE RANKS OF JOURNALISTS AND OTHER MEDIA WORKERS BY ANY STATE INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY AGENCIES BE PROHIBITED BY LAW.

Independence

The Commission recommends that:

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, FROM BOTH GOVERNMENT AND COMMERCIAL PRESSURES, BE ESTABLISHED AND RETAINED.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY FROM GOVERNMENT BE MAINTAINED.
Alternative media

96 The Commission recommends that:

THE STATE PROMOTE A MULTIPLICITY OF MEDIA VOICES IN SOCIETY BY ESTABLISHING A LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT AND STATE SUBSIDIES TO ENCOURAGE THE GROWTH OF GRASSROOTS PUBLICATIONS AND LOCAL BROADCASTING STATIONS.

THE ESTABLISHED PRESS PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN HELPING TO ENCOURAGE A VARIETY OF MEDIA SOURCES BY, FOR INSTANCE, FUNDING AND RESOURCING ALTERNATIVE PUBLICATIONS. COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED ALONG THE LINES OF LOCAL, PROVEN GRASSROOTS MODELS LIKE GRASSROOTS, SOUTH AND SAAMSTAAN. MODELS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS ZIMBABWE AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA SHOULD ALSO BE EXPLORED.

Media self-regulation

97 The Commission recommends that:

THE ESTABLISHED PRESS TAKE STEPS TO WIDEN THE DIVERSITY OF OPINIONS AND INFORMATION PUBLISHED IN ITS NEWSPAPERS BY ESTABLISHING LOCAL EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDS FOR ITS NEWSPAPERS AND BY NEGOTIATING EDITORIAL CHARTERS WITH ITS JOURNALISTS.

THE PRINT MEDIA AND BROADCASTERS INTRODUCE A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE CONTRACTS OF JOURNALISTS AND OTHER MEDIA WORKERS MAKING IT A DISMISSIBLE OFFENCE TO TAKE PAYMENT FROM ANY STATE INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY AGENCY IN EXCHANGE FOR INFORMATION.

JOURNALISTS’ ORGANISATIONS AND EDITORS DEBATE THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT IS PERMISSIBLE FOR JOURNALISTS, IN THE COURSE OF NEWS GATHERING, TO HAVE CONTACTS AND SHARE INFORMATION WITH OPERATIVES OF STATE INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY AGENCIES. (IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT, AT THE VERY LEAST, SUCH CONTACTS FOR NEWSGATHERING PURPOSES OUGHT TO BE DECLARED IN WRITING TO EDITORS.)

MEDIA EMPLOYERS REQUIRE JOURNALISTS TO DECLARE PAST RECEIPT OF PAYMENTS FROM STATE INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY AGENCIES, AND REMOVE SUCH JOURNALISTS FROM COVERING THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE OR SIMILAR AGENCIES IN THE FUTURE.

Labour and employment issues

98 The Commission recommends that:

MEDIA EMPLOYERS INTENSIFY PROGRAMMES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN AND BLACK MEDIA WORKERS WITHIN THE MEDIA, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING THAT MORE, BETTER-SKILLED AND QUALIFIED BLACK PEOPLE ARE EMPLOYED IN ALL NEWSROOMS AND THAT THERE IS A PROPER GENDER BALANCE AT ALL LEVELS, MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL.
THE DIFFERENT MEDIA UNIONS STRIVE FOR A UNIFIED STRATEGY AND APPROACH TOWARDS THE MEDIA INDUSTRY.

99 Responsibility for developing and implementing these recommendations, and for monitoring their implementation, rests primarily with:

a The Department of Posts and Telecommunications;

b The South African Broadcasting Corporation;

c The Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA);

d Publishing houses: Independent Newspapers, NasPers, TML;

e The Newspaper Press Union;

f Trade unions: The South African Union of Journalists, The Union of Black Journalists;

g NGOs.

ARCHIVING COMMISSION MATERIAL AND PUBLIC ACCESS

100 One of the key aspects of the Commission’s work has been its commitment to transparency and public scrutiny. Its records, which are in the form of documents, video and audio tapes, pictures and photographs as well as a computerised database, are a national asset which must be both protected and made accessible.

101 Sections 11(2) and 13(2)(a), of the Archives Act stipulate that no public record may be disposed of (transferred from one office to another, erased, destroyed or disposed of in any other manner) without the written authorisation of the national archivist.

102 The Archives Act further requires that public records with enduring value must be transferred into the custody of the archives only when they have been in existence for twenty years. The national archivist is, however, empowered to identify records which should be transferred to the National Archives sooner, after consultation with the head of the governmental body concerned.

7 The Commission acknowledges the contribution of Ms Trudy Huskamp Peterson of UNESCO for her expert assistance in formulating these recommendations.
The Commission thus recommends that:

ALL COMMISSION RECORDS BE TRANSFERRED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES WHEN THE CODICIL TO THE FINAL REPORT IS MADE PUBLIC.

ALL COMMISSION RECORDS BE ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC, UNLESS COMPELLING REASONS EXIST FOR DENYING SUCH ACCESS, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE INDIVIDUAL’S RIGHTS TO PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND RELATED MATTERS MUST BE RESPECTED. IN THIS REGARD, PARTICULAR ATTENTION NEEDS TO BE GIVEN TO THE RELEASE OR WITHHOLDING OF DETAILS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS STATEMENTS IN CASES WHERE INDIVIDUALS FEEL THEIR SAFETY IS PREJUDICED.

VICTIMS HAVE THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THEIR OWN FILES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THESE ARE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE OR NOT. VICTIMS SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH A COPY OF THEIR FILE IF THEY SO WISH.


THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES BE USED TO DETERMINE ACCESS TO COMMISSION RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES:

• BECAUSE COMMISSION RECORDS ARE LESS THAN TWENTY YEARS OLD, ACCESS TO THESE RECORDS BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVIST IN TERMS OF SECTION 12(1) OF THE ARCHIVES ACT.

• IN THE CASE OF RECORD CATEGORIES IDENTIFIED AS REQUIRING PROTECTION, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVIST REFER REQUESTS FOR ACCESS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. IN THE CASE OF ALL OTHER RECORD CATEGORIES, A POLICY OF UNRESTRICTED PUBLIC ACCESS SHOULD BE APPLIED.

• THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, WHICH IS ALREADY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, BE MADE AVAILABLE AS SOON AS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC: TRANSCRIPTS OF HEARINGS; REASONS FOR AMNESTY DECISIONS; PUBLIC STATEMENTS ISSUED BY THE COMMISSION; ALL OTHER MATERIAL ALREADY AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC ON THE COMMISSION’S INTERNET WEBSITE (www.truth.org.za).

• THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES TAKE OVER THE COMMISSION’S INTERNET WEBSITE, CONTINUE TO MAKE EXISTING MATERIAL - INCLUDING THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION - AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC, LOCALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, ON THE WEBSITE, AND EXPAND THE WEBSITE IN CREATIVE WAYS (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT MANY COMMISSION RECORDS ARE STORED IN COMPUTER FILES).

THE GOVERNMENT ALLOCATE ADEQUATE ADDITIONAL FUNDING TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES TO PRESERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RECORDS OF THE COMMISSION. TO THIS END, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SHOULD PREPARE A COMPREHENSIVE BUDGET PLAN ON THE COSTS OF ADMINISTERING THE COMMISSION’S RECORDS.

THE GOVERNMENT GIVE SPECIAL SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES TO FACILITATE THE CREATION OF DECENTRALISED, NATION-WIDE ‘CENTRES OF MEMORY’, AT WHICH MEMBERS OF...
THE PUBLIC WHO DO NOT HAVE PERSONAL ACCESS TO COMPUTERS CAN ACCESS DETAILS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION, INCLUDING TRANSCRIPTS AND SOUND AND VIDEO CLIPS OF HEARINGS.

104 Responsibility for developing and implementing these recommendations, and for monitoring the implementation thereof, rests primarily with:

   a  The Department of Arts and Culture, Science and Technology;

   b  The Department of Justice.

### DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

105 Measures must be implemented to prevent the destruction of records which form part of our history, however unpleasant. Particularly cynical is the deliberate destruction of records which may incriminate individuals or groups in power. To prevent such destruction, appropriate legal powers must be given to the state’s public archives service. The Archives Act provides the necessary legislative framework, but requires rigorous implementation.

#### Legislation

106 The Commission thus recommends that:

   THE GOVERNMENT ENSURE THAT FUTURE PROVINCIAL ARCHIVAL LEGISLATION EMBODIES THE FEATURES OF THE NATIONAL ACT.

   THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDE THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES WITH THE RESOURCES IT REQUIRES TO IMPLEMENT THE ACT. THE POWER TO INSPECT GOVERNMENTAL BODIES, FOR INSTANCE, IS RENDERED MEANINGLESS IF THE RESOURCES TO EXERCISE THIS RIGHT ARE NOT MADE AVAILABLE.

   THE GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES FUNCTIONS AS THE AUDITOR OF GOVERNMENT RECORD-KEEPING. THIS REQUIRELS THAT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES BECOMES AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY, RATHER THAN REMAINING A SUB-COMPONENT OF A SINGLE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT (PRESENTLY THE DEPARTMENT OF ARTS AND CULTURE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY). CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CREATING A NATIONAL ARCHIVES UNIT IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OR DEPUTY PRESIDENT.

   THE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT NOT BE ALLOWED TO BYPASS THE OPERATION OF THE ACT. WHILE A SPECIAL STATUS APPROPRIATE TO THE SENSITIVITY OF ITS RECORDS WOULD BE LEGITIMATE, IT SHOULD REMAIN FULLY SUBJECT TO THE PROFESSIONAL SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES.
Implementation of legislation

107 The Commission recommends that:

THE MINISTRY OF SAFETY AND SECURITY TRANSFER ALL SURVIVING SECURITY BRANCH RECORDS TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND SOUTH AFRICAN SECRET SERVICE TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO FINALISE THE SECURING OF ALL DOCUMENTATION PRE-DATING 1995 IN THEIR CUSTODY, AND THAT SUCH DOCUMENTATION BE SUBJECT TO APPRAISAL BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES.

NO STATE RECORDS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BE DESTROYED WITHOUT THE EXPRESS APPROVAL OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVIST, EVEN IF OTHER DISPOSAL AUTHORITIES AUTHORISE SUCH ACTION.

THE SANDF COMPILE A COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF ALL NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NSMS) RECORDS IN ITS CUSTODY, FOR SUBMISSION TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVIST.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT, IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED ARCHIVAL PRINCIPLES, THE EXTANT RECORDS OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA TERRITORY FORCE (CURRENTLY IN THE SANDF ARCHIVES) PROPERLY BELONG IN NAMIBIA AND MUST BE RETURNED TO THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT. (IT MUST BE NOTED THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT COVERING EQUIVALENT CIVILIAN RECORDS IS ALREADY IN PLACE.)


THE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT MAKE EVERY ATTEMPT TO LOCATE AND RETRIEVE DOCUMENTS REMOVED WITHOUT AUTHORISATION BY OPERATIVES OF APARTHEID SECURITY STRUCTURES.

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES BE ENABLED TO FILL THE GAPS IN OFFICIAL MEMORY, THROUGH THE COLLECTION OF NON-PUBLIC RECORDS AND THE PROMOTION OF ORAL HISTORY PROJECTS (IN TERMS OF SECTION 3(D) OF THE ARCHIVES ACT).

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES BE GIVEN THE NECESSARY RESOURCES TO TAKE TRANSFER OF, PROCESS PROFESSIONALLY AND MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC, THE RECORDS OF THE COMMISSION (WHICH IN THEMSELVES FILL MANY GAPS IN SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIAL MEMORY).

108 Responsibility for developing and implementing these recommendations, and for monitoring their implementation, rests primarily with:

a The Department of Arts and Culture, Science and Technology;

b The Department of Justice;

c The Department of Defence, particularly the SANDF;
The National Intelligence Agency;

The Department of Safety and Security, particularly the SAPS;

The Department of Foreign Affairs.

THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

109 The Commission notes that, while the liberation movements were motivated by a just cause in the struggle against apartheid, they nevertheless committed gross violations of human rights both inside and outside of the country.

110 The Commission notes further that, in this conflict, the African National Congress was the only party which signed the Geneva Convention and its protocols regarding the conduct of national wars of liberation, that it made a conscious effort to conduct itself within that framework, and that it instituted several commissions of enquiry into its conduct.

111 The Commission therefore recommends that:

THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS ISSUE A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL APOLOGY TO:

• EACH VICTIM OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN EXILE;

• THOSE DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL AND THOSE DETAINED, TRIED AND FOUND TO BE INNOCENT.

THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WITHDRAW ALL ALLEGATIONS AGAINST AND PUBLICLY CLEAR THE NAMES OF THOSE DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL AND THOSE DETAINED, TRIED AND FOUND TO BE INNOCENT.

THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS SEEK TO RECONCILE WITH AND REINTEGRATE THE VICTIMS OF ABUSES.

THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS SEEK TO ESTABLISH THE WHEREABOUTS AND FATE OF ALL THOSE WHO WENT MISSING IN EXILE, AND REGULARLY PUBLISH INFORMATION ABOUT PROGRESS IN THESE INVESTIGATIONS.
International human rights instruments

112 The Commission recommends that:

**SOUTH AFRICA RATIFY, IN PARTICULAR:**

- **THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR) AND BOTH ITS PROTOCOLS;**

- **THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS;**

- **THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT.**

**THE GOVERNMENT ENGAGE IN AN INTERNAL REVIEW OF POLICY – SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW) AND THE ATTENDANCE OF A HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT DELEGATION AT THE 1995 UNITED NATIONS FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, HELD IN BEIJING, CHINA – TO DETERMINE WHETHER SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND PRACTICE CONFORM TO INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.**

**RENEWED INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO:**

- **THE WAY IN WHICH LIBERATION WARS AND CIVIL WARS ARE CONDUCTED.**

- **THE TREATMENT OF PARTICIPANTS IN ARMED COMBAT IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF WAR, CIVIL WAR, REVOLUTIONS, INSURGENCY OR GUERRILLA WARFARE.**

**IN THIS ERA OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IT IS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE WHETHER IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR DESERTERS OR TRAITORS TO BE EXECUTED, EVEN IF THEY HAVE BEEN TRIED BY A TRIBUNAL. IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT IN MANY SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR TRIBUNALS TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS SHOULD BE DEVISED, GOVERNING CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AND FAIR TRIALS. THE COMMISSION FOUND THE GENEVA CONVENTION AND ITS VARIOUS PROTOCOLS TO BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE, BUT BELIEVES THERE IS STILL MORE THAT COULD BE ADDED.**

Apologies to neighbouring states

113 The Commission received a number of statements from citizens of neighbouring countries, including Namibia, alleging that they had suffered gross violations of their human rights as a result of actions of representatives of the previous South African government. The Commission, lacking the resources and time to address such claims, has not made findings on such violations, nor is it recommending that reparations be paid to the victims. However, the Commission recommends that:
THE SUFFERING OF SUCH PERSONS BE CONSIDERED IN GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

A PUBLIC APOLOGY BE MADE TO THE PEOPLE OF OUR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES FOR PAST VIOLATIONS.

IMMEDIATE AND APPROPRIATE SYMBOLIC REPARATIONS BE CONSIDERED, IN THE FORM OF STATUES OR MONUMENTS, SCHOLARSHIPS OR OTHER FORMS OF RECOGNITION, DEMONSTRATING SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENS’ EMPATHY WITH THE SUFFERING OF THE CITIZENS OF OUR NEIGHBOURING STATES AND APPRECIATION OF THEIR SOLIDARITY.

Prosecutions for apartheid as a crime against humanity

114 The definition of apartheid as a crime against humanity has given rise to a concern that persons who are seen to have been responsible for apartheid policies and practices might become liable to international prosecutions. The Commission believes that international recognition should be given to the fact that the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, and the processes of this Commission itself, have sought to deal appropriately with the matter of responsibility for such policies.

■ CONCLUSION

115 This chapter concludes where it began. Reconciliation is a process which is never-ending, is costly and often painful. For this process to develop, it is imperative that democracy and a human rights culture be consolidated. Reconciliation is centred on the call for a more decent, more caring and more just society. It is up to each individual to respond by committing ourselves to concrete ways of easing the burden of the oppressed and empowering the poor to play their rightful part as citizens of South Africa.
INTRODUCTION

1 The Commission sought to highlight the deep damage inflicted by past gross human rights violations on human relationships in South Africa. While the main conflict was between a state representing a white minority and an oppressed black population, the conflict found expression in various ways and involved different sections of the population, exploiting and creating divisions within and between communities. The young and the old, men and women, members of the same family or organisation, neighbours, different ethnic and racial groups often turned against each other. People were victimised in different ways and a range of gross human rights violations was committed. The result demands extensive healing and social and physical reconstruction at every level of society. Sometimes these different needs themselves compete with one another, leading to fresh conflicts. This makes reconciliation a complex, long-term process with many dimensions.

2 With its short lifespan and limited mandate and resources, it was obviously impossible for the Commission to reconcile the nation. The following selected moments from the life of the Commission do, however, express significant steps in the reconciliation process. Some are beacons of hope. Others warn of pitfalls. Together they constitute signposts on the long road towards making individual, communal and national reconciliation a living, lasting reality in South Africa.

3 Clearly, everyone who came before the Commission did not experience healing and reconciliation. However, extracts from testimonies before the Commission illustrate the varying ways and degrees in which people have been helped by the Commission to restore their human dignity and to make peace with their troubled past. They include cases where an astonishing willingness to forgive was displayed, where those responsible for violations apologised and committed themselves to a process of restitution, and where the building or rebuilding of relationships was initiated.

4 This chapter underlines the vital importance of the multi-layered healing of human relationships in post-apartheid South Africa: relationships of individuals with
themselves; relationships between victims; relationships between survivors and perpetrators; relationships within families, between neighbours and within and between communities; relationships within different institutions, between different generations, between racial and ethnic groups, between workers and management and, above all, between the beneficiaries of apartheid and those who have been disadvantaged by it. After a visit to Rwanda, Archbishop Tutu said:

We must break the spiral of reprisal and counter-reprisal... I said to them in Kigali “unless you move beyond justice in the form of a tribunal, there is no hope for Rwanda”. Confession, forgiveness and reconciliation in the lives of nations are not just airy-fairy religious and spiritual things, nebulous and unrealistic. They are the stuff of practical politics.

II  TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY: VICTIMS

Healing through truth-telling and official acknowledgement

5  At a follow-up post-hearing workshop in Reiger Park, Anglican Bishop David Beetge said:

[The Commission] has given the opportunity for people to tell their story, stories which [could] never be told before... There were so many unhealed wounds before the [Truth and Reconciliation Commission] began its work. The evidence of those who have given witness [is] that, by telling their story, they have shared a burden and found a new sense of peace. This is very obvious from the sheer look of some of them as they walk out of the meetings of the Commission. Archbishop Tutu has said truth will ultimately come out; it cannot be concealed forever. It is in its very nature to reveal, to throw light, to clarify what is hidden. There are ways and ways of telling our stories and we are not encouraging people to relive and retell their stories endlessly and promiscuously - never moving forward, never leaving the past behind.

We retell our painful stories so that we shall remember the years that lie behind with all their struggles and terror as the way that led to new life...

6  Not all storytelling heals. Not everyone wanted to tell his or her story. Many, on the other hand, were able to reach towards healing by telling the painful stories of their pasts. The healing potential of storytelling, of revealing the truth before a respectful audience and to an official body, is illustrated by the following testimonies:
At a Commission hearing in Heideveld, Cape Town, Mr Lukas Baba Sikwepere was given the opportunity to relate, in his own language1, his account of the human rights violations of which he had been a victim. During a political conflict in KTC (one of the informal settlements around Cape Town) on 31 December 1985, police allegedly began shooting at a number of people gathered around a police vehicle.

I decided to walk, because I knew that if you run, you were going to be shot... When I arrived at the place – when I thought, now I am safe, I felt something hitting my cheek... I felt my eyes itching... I was scratching my eyes, I wasn’t quite sure what happened to my eyes....

Mr Sikwepere described to the Commission how he was shot in the face and lost his sight. He also told of how, two years later, the police beat him with electric ropes, suffocated him, forced him to lie in an empty grave and tortured him in other ways.

When a Commissioner asked Mr Sikwepere how he felt after having delivered his testimony, he replied:

I feel that what has been making me sick all the time is the fact that I couldn’t tell my story. But now it feels like I got my sight back by coming here and telling you the story.

Quite often, witnesses revealed far more in oral testimony than they had in their written statements. This is illustrated by the testimony of a middle-aged woman, Ms Yvonne Khutwane, at the Worcester hearing:

I was just alone at the back of the Hippo2 and they [two South African Defence Force members] were just driving. It was pitch dark outside. They alighted [from] the Hippo and then they came to take me out of the Hippo. One of them said to me, can I see what I have put myself in, and then they asked me when did I last sleep with a man. I was so embarrassed by this question. And I felt so humiliated. I informed them that I have nobody. I didn’t have a partner. And then they asked me with whom am I staying. I informed them that I was with my family.

The other question that they asked me is, how do I feel when they – when I am having intercourse with a man. This was too much for me because they were repeating it time and again, asking me the same question, asking me what do I like with the intercourse, do I like the size of the penis or what do I enjoy most.

---

1 As required by the Act.
2 An armoured vehicle used by the SAP and SADF to patrol the black townships.
So the other one was just putting his hand inside me through the vagina. I was crying because I was afraid - we have heard that the soldiers are very notorious of raping people. This one continued putting his finger right through me, he kept on penetrating and I was asking for forgiveness and I was asking them what have I done, I am old enough to be your mother. But why are you treating me like this. This was very, very embarrassing. It was so painful. I couldn’t stand it, because these kids were young and they were still at a very young age, they had all the powers to respect and honour me. They were just the same age as my children and look what were they doing to me.

11 In her written statement, Ms Khutwane had made no mention of this sexual assault. In her debriefing session, she said that this was the first time she had spoken of it and that she felt tremendously relieved.

12 Mr Tim Ledgerwood, a former conscript in the South African Defence Force (SADF), went absent without leave in 1981 and later tried to join the African National Congress (ANC) military wing, Umkhonto weSizwe (MK). He was caught and severely tortured by the security police. At a special hearing on conscription in Cape Town on 23 July 1997, he said:

The [Commission] has deeply affected my life in a short space of time that has elapsed since I first came to their offices here in Cape Town and told my story to one of the investigators. It has begun a healing process in all sorts of relationships in my family and has enabled me to begin on my own road to inner healing. Having gone to the [Commission] with my story, it is almost as if it is all right to talk about it now. Slowly things are changing. As if I’ve been freed from a prison in which I have been for eighteen years. It is also as if my family has been freed.

My brother, who worked for Armscor [manufacturing military equipment for the apartheid state] for five or six years in the 1980s, is all of a sudden much softer, more human and more able to talk to me ... It is almost as if the silence is ending, as if we are waking up from a long bad nightmare.

13 Storytelling activities, inspired by the work of the Commission, also took place outside the Commission itself. In the Western Cape, for example, the ‘Religious Response to the TRC’ held a number of ‘Healing of the Memories’ workshops. In different regions of the country, important work was done by, amongst others, the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and Khulumani, a victim support group facilitated by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in Johannesburg.
In June 1997, at the workshop that followed the human rights violation hearing in Sebokeng, Mr Duma Khumalo, representing Khulumani, expressed his appreciation of the Commission’s contribution:

We, as the Khulumani Support Group, the group that is mainly composed of victims based in the Vaal Triangle, would like to thank the Centre for Study of Violence for having considered the people of Vaal and, in that sense, having helped us to form this group that is existing today with a membership of more than 200 victims. I should say the Khulumani Support Group is very much aware of the objective of the [Commission], which is to promote healing, reconciliation and rehabilitation. We needed to consider the fear that was within the people in the Vaal Triangle of coming forward to tell of their experiences concerning the events and the incidents of the apartheid era. The [Commission] helped many of our people to break the shells of their griefs and fear that they had lived with in the past many years.

It’s the intervention of the [Commission] that brought about the dignity of the people that was lost during the political era in our country. People had no one to listen to their griefs or pay attention to some of those griefs until the establishment of [Commission] came into being. Then many of the victims came forward and started, for the first time, to talk about their past griefs...

The diversity of individual experiences was significant, certain of which vividly highlighted the long, difficult road to healing.

Ms Eleanor Juqu told the Commission about the killing of her son, Fuzile, by the police. Mr Juqu then testified about his painful search for his son:

**Mr Juqu:** I started at Tygerberg. I went through all the wards but I couldn’t find him there. I came back. I told myself, my wife, that I couldn’t find him. So, I went to Salt River. There I went to the police station. I asked them. They said no, they don’t know anything. They said no; you’re wasting our time. They said just go and sit over there. When I got to the police station, I was told that my son is in the mortuary... I saw him. Actually, he was lying on his stomach. His whole back was full of bullet holes. This policeman was a white man. I don’t even know his name. I don’t even want to know his name because I was already hateful towards him.

**Commissioner Ntsebeza:** When you identified him, was he already dead?

**Mr Juqu:** Yes, they just told me that here he is, what do you think I should do?
Commissioner Ntsebeza: How did you feel during that moment when he said that?

Mr Juqu: If I had anything in front – in front of me or anything – any, any stick or any, any arm at all I will just throw it at him because my son was just lying there dead ... [His clothes] looked like [they were] eaten by mice, and it was full of blood. There were many, many bullets. He had blood coming out of his nose. He was – he was just shot at the back by very many, many bullets.

Commissioner Ntsebeza: Were you called in to any court? Maybe in Wynberg?

Mr Juqu: Yes sir, I was called at Wynberg... They asked me, is this your son? I said, yes he is. He said, ja he is dead. So I said, so what should I do? He said: Oh! We are very sorry. So, I said, what are you sorry about? At that time I was already confused but I told myself no, let me just stand here and listen and this. [The] magistrate said, okay, there is nothing we can do. So I just turned around and I left. I didn’t give a damn what he was thinking about me, and I simply left.

Commissioner Ntsebeza: Do you know who can be blamed for this?

Mr Juqu: No. They just told me that they are sorry that my son has been shot; there is nothing then they can do. I said: Oh! Is that what you say? They said, yes, that’s what we say. So I just turned around and left.

17 When Mr Juqu was asked if the Commission could be of any help, his response was:

Ma’am, I am not here to get any compensation, I am just – I feel very hurtful for my shot son. It is the Commission that will see what it can do, but I am not here to tell the Commission what to do. I am not here to gain anything about that. I just feel very sore inside. My heart is broken. There is nothing else I am going to say now.

18 There were also, of course, people who were critical of the human rights violations hearings. These included survivors, who demanded justice and retribution, and activists who saw themselves as heroes rather than victims. Some psychologists and others expressed concern that adequate professional support was not provided after the hearings. The latter view was voiced by Ms Thenjiwe Mtintso, former Chairperson of the Commission on Gender Equality and currently Deputy Secretary General of the ANC, at the Commission hearing on women in Johannesburg:

I know, Chairperson, that the Truth Commission has got a programme of therapy, but I hope it can be sustained, because my own experience in the
few months has been that some of the women whose wounds you opened – we did not pay enough time or give them enough opportunity to heal once they left these halls.

I have been to Cape Town where there were hearings, Chairperson. I have been to Port Elizabeth. I have been to King William’s Town. There are wounds that have been left gaping. It may not be the duty of the [Commission] alone; it may be the duty of the public, of all of us; but those wounds, they need to be addressed, Chairperson. You cannot open them in this hall and leave them gaping. Somebody has got to take responsibility.

19 A further cause of concern was the inevitably long delay between victims’ testimony at hearings and the implementation by the state of the Commission’s recommendations on reparations and rehabilitation. In a submission to the health sector hearing in Cape Town, Professor M Simpson, a psychiatrist specialising in post-traumatic stress disorder, raised a further concern:

There has been far too little genuine debate about the nature of social healing and what surely promotes it. Truth is one essential component of the needed social antiseptic which could cleanse the social fabric of the systematised habit of disregard for human rights, but it needs to be an examined truth; it needs to be considered, thought about, debated and digested and metabolised by individuals and by society. Failure to comprehend recent suffering is too often, in the studies I have made, the seed of future suffering.

Decriminalisation

20 Individual and social healing are lengthy, complex processes, of which the restoration of human dignity must be seen as an essential part. One of the most important contributions of the Commission was to help decriminalise the actions of the majority of those victims who opposed the former state. During the uprisings in the 1980s, in particular, thousands of young people were sentenced to prison for arson, public violence or attempted murder. An extract from a Ministry of Foreign Affairs secret memorandum to all members of the State Security Council (SSC), dated 12 November 1984, is significant in this regard – illustrating some of the ways in which political opposition was criminalised as part of the ‘total strategy’ against the ‘total onslaught’:
Unrest situations: suggested terminological guidelines for official spokesmen

1. Goals

1.1 To withhold positive political/social recognition, credit and publicity from the organisers (UDF\textsuperscript{3} et al) of riots, boycotts etc.

1.2 To channel the anger of the innocent masses against 
\textbf{criminal activities}.

1.3 To educate local and international opinions about the 
\textbf{criminal} nature and uselessness of these activities.

2. The Conceptual Framework for the Terminology

From the abovementioned goals it is clear that the main emphasis should fall on \textbf{specific common law crimes} and that references to crimes with political connotations should mostly be avoided, for example:

\textit{arsonists, looters, murderers, muggers}

Where it is not practically possible to refer to specific common law crimes, descriptions such as “rioters”, “boycotters”, “protesters” should rather be avoided and replaced where applicable with descriptions such as:

\textit{hooligans, vandals, thugs}

Where the instigator is associated with widespread actions/unrest his status is enhanced. As a guideline, it is suggested that militant organisations (ANC, UDF etc.) should rather be linked to individual atrocities (e.g. car bombs) than to mass actions.

3. Innocent victims of criminal actions

It is of the utmost importance that publicity should be given to the victims of violent activities. The “human dimension” is the key factor which must be used to foment sympathy and condemnation...\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{3} United Democratic Front.

\textsuperscript{4} Drawn up by the Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, DJL Nel, after consultation with the South African Police and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). He recommended that the “systematic use” of these guidelines should receive high priority. The memorandum also states explicitly that these guidelines should apply to the SABC.

21 The ideas contained in the memorandum illustrate the official mindset at that time – frequently appropriated by the media and promoted by many who were themselves directly involved in perpetrating gross violations of human rights. The guidelines provide some context for a statement by a mother of one of the seven activists killed in Gugulethu. After the second day of police testimony at the...
Commission’s hearing on the ‘Gugulethu Seven’, she told Commissioner Mary Burton that she felt much more comforted and reconciled; not, she said, because she was yet feeling forgiveness, but because “people now know that our sons were not criminals, but freedom fighters”.

22 After Mr Jacob Nombiba’s testimony at the human rights violation hearing in Grahamstown on 7 April 1997, the chairperson, the Reverend Bongani Finca, captured this point as follows:

We found that many parents are not aware whether their children died as heroes because at that time you couldn’t go home and tell your parents what you were involved in. You did not want them to expect you to be shot and to be in jail. I think this is one of the important things in this Commission, that old people like you, at last, would find out the truth, the truth about the struggle of their children, because they did not tell them what was happening.

What is important to me is that maybe the Commission will give out a report that will help you to go to your children’s graves, to talk to your children – that you were not aware that they were fighting for their country – so that you can salute them.

23 Mr Richard Steele, a conscientious objector during the apartheid era, confirmed the healing power of decriminalisation at the special hearing on compulsory military service in Cape Town:

On the 25th of February 1980, I was sentenced by a military court in Pretoria to twelve months in military prison for refusing to be conscripted into the SADF. Although that day was scary because I knew that by nightfall I would be in prison, it was also one of the most powerful days in my life. On that day, I publicly and practically said ‘no’ to the whole system of apartheid and military conscription, both of which were anathema to my principles.

I can say that today, the 23rd of July 1997, is one of the most powerful days of my life as well, when I have the opportunity to publicly celebrate my survival through that year in prison and to say ‘yes’ to a society based on truth and reconciliation.

24 Thus on many occasions, the Commission was able to help restore the dignity of victims and their loved ones by respectfully acknowledging their contribution to the struggle against apartheid. Archbishop Tutu’s response to testimony by family members of the ‘Cradock Four’ at the East London hearing provides an example of this:
I wanted to say this when Miss Mhlawuli was here – but perhaps I should speak and you will tell her. I said after Ms Mazwai that I was deeply proud of the fact that I was black and that we had people of her calibre. We are proud to have people like you and your husbands, and the reason why we won the struggle is not because we had guns; we won the struggle because of people like you: people of incredible strength. And this country is fortunate to have people like you... We have a tremendous country, which has tremendous people, and you are one example of why we make it in this country. And that she, your daughter, should say, “I want to forgive, we want to forgive”, after what she has experienced and seen what happened to her mother and to her father, and she says, “we want to forgive, but we want to know who to forgive”. We give thanks to God for you, and thank you for your contribution to our struggle, and thank you, even if it was reluctant in a sense, rightly, thank you for sacrificing your husbands.

The work of the Commission also highlighted the impact of decriminalisation on those who always believed that the security forces were upholding the moral order and legitimately enforcing law and order against ‘terrorists’, ‘hooligans’, ‘vandals’, ‘arsonists’ and ‘murderers’. Those who supported the previous state or were conditioned by ‘total onslaught’ propaganda needed to come to terms with the painful truths uncovered by the Commission. This is illustrated in the following extract from an interview with a white Afrikaner victim of the St James Church massacre:

Coming from the apartheid era at my age, forty-three, I was never a supporter - an active supporter - of apartheid. But it’s something that you grew up with, and things changed quite fast in the last couple of years. All of a sudden you start hearing from the blacks how they’ve been ill-treated, exploited, all kinds of words, and all of a sudden you start seeing the bad side of it, and I think the media ran away with it. I think the media, from the one extreme, they went to the other extreme where we were hearing this on a constant basis. At first, it was an eye-opener to hear of it then, after a while, my feeling was, gee! when are they going to stop moaning? We’re just hearing the same type of thing all the time. It’s just sort of the names [that] change, but it’s the same thing all the time and was it really that bad?

You know, coming from a background where everything was fine for all these years, now all of a sudden the picture [is] changing, that the police were the ‘baddies’.
I don't have a lot of contact with blacks myself in every day life, so your perceptions aren't always a hundred per cent correct, and you tend to believe what the media tells you. And all of a sudden, the media turns around and [makes] the white guy, the police ... the bad guy.

I started questioning the whole [Commission process], I think the role of the media - I think they went overboard and that created the impression that they just want to keep on highlighting that side of things. Yes, I think that's why I called it a circus; that's why I wasn't keen on going at first. But then, because of my personal involvement, I thought, “no, let me just see”.

And I think it was a sort of initial resistance that came about, which I think if I think of my friends and so on, it's a fairly natural reaction.

26 It was even more difficult for those who were directly involved in the security forces to reconcile themselves with the decriminalisation of their former enemies. This difficulty was articulated by Ms Trudy de Ridder, a psychologist who had recently worked with a number of ex-SADF conscripts struggling to cope with their involvement in the war on the Namibian border during the 1970s and 1980s. In her written submission to the Commission, Ms de Ridder said:

Central to most of these testimonies [by ex-conscripts] is the notion that the present has destroyed the foundations of ‘meaning’ these conscripts adopted to cope with their traumatic experiences. It is easier to cope with having killed someone you believe to be the sub-human agent of forces that wish to destroy everything you hold dear than it is to cope with having killed a normal man, woman or child that history happened to cast as ‘your enemy’.

This crisis is greatly intensified when it is revealed to you that the person you have killed is a ‘hero’ or ‘freedom fighter’ or ‘innocent civilian’ – which the South African transformation correctly described him or her to have been. Most of these conscripts have, up until now, silently considered themselves victims (of neglect and manipulation) but are now publicly portrayed as perpetrators (of apartheid military objectives or even of gross human rights violations)...

The Truth Commission has helped break the silence of past suffering, atrocities and abuses. In so doing, it has both released some traumatised ex-conscripts from the prison of silence and trapped them in the role of perpetrators of apartheid. For some, the contradictions of their experience might prove intolerable; for others, the process of revealing the truth about the past might allow them to confront and deal with their experiences.

5 See also report on special hearing on Compulsory National Service.
The complexity of the impact of decriminalisation on different communities was illustrated by the testimony of Mr Chris van Eeden, president of a mainstream Afrikaner youth organisation, the Junior Rapportryers Beweging (J RB) at the Commission’s special hearing on children and youth, in Johannesburg:

In our organisation, there are a couple of thousand of young men. More than 50 per cent of them were national servicemen; the rest were too young. In my work in the J RB, I see most of these people during the year and we talk to each other.

I don’t want to blame the [Commission] – the media is inclined to look at these atrocities. But the same names, the same police are repeatedly referred to, while there is no mention made of the majority of people who were in the police and the Defence Force who weren’t involved in the atrocities.

They provided a service for the country, because they loved the country. This is still the case at present and they would probably do it again.

Commissioner Malan: Could I just interrupt you here, because I think we’ve got the message. I refer to the other part, you hear the same names and things but those are things that you didn’t hear when you were in the army? That is my question.

Mr Van Eeden: I can honestly say to you that these kinds of acts, no one can approve of. It makes you furious and angry because that is not what myself and thousands of young Afrikaner men got involved to do.

Commissioner Malan: Can I take the question a bit further and the answer. I know is very difficult for people to understand who look at this whole history from a different perspective... How is it possible that you didn’t know anything of it or did anything about it? Do you have a perspective on that?

Mr Van Eeden: War as such is a crime against humanity; there are no victors. I had personal knowledge because I saw it, of certain of these actions that took place. I saw the result of bodies being burnt. I had knowledge of that. I didn’t have knowledge of orchestrated efforts of forces that I served to incite such incidents...

Commissioner Malan: You say that you saw bodies that were burnt. What did you think was the reason for that? Who burnt them?

Mr Van Eeden: I didn’t have to think of what the reason was; it was quite clear. I did my service in Vaal Triangle in the 1990s and it was black on black violence. That it could have been incited from another force, well we have evidence for that now. But I have personal knowledge of, well, let’s refer to it as violence between ethnic groups, black ethnic groups in the Vaal Triangle, I saw that.
Commissioner Malan: You never saw some kind of an orchestrated effort from government?

Mr Van Eeden: No, I never experienced it as such and I think the evidence came as a shock.

28 The testimony of Ms Beatrice Sethwale on the death of her son, a black police officer, also drew attention to the difficult challenge of reconciliation within black communities: between those who fought against the apartheid system and those who were seen as ‘collaborators’ because they participated in state structures (black councillors) or helped to enforce the apartheid system (black police, ‘kitskonstables’ 6). At the human rights violation hearing in Upington, Ms Sethwale said:

On the 13th November 1985, it was a Wednesday morning. My son was driven out of the house by a crowd of people who were stoning the house. We were in the house, 405 Philani Street. He was driven out of the house, and shortly afterwards, he was killed and burnt.

Briefly, what I would like to say is that the effect of my son’s death has been great. I have been scarred by my son’s death. Shortly afterwards, I had to remove my children from Upington, and I had to enrol them at schools elsewhere.

In 1986 December, I went back to my home, and I tried to pick up the pieces of my life again. Thereafter, I had to hear from the people in the Paballelo community that I had shopped my son to the police, that I had betrayed him to the police and that I had been paid for doing so – that I had been paid for my child’s murder.

I went through a great deal of pain through all these years. It is now ten years and ten months and forty-three days ago that he died, but the pain is still with me. It still lives inside of me because the ‘whys’ and the ‘wherefores’ I still don’t know. Although there are some people who pretend that nothing happened; there is a peace on the surface. The pain which I suffered, well I think my second eldest son, the one just after the deceased, I think his drinking problem is the result of the death of his brother.

During the time that I suffered so much, I felt like I had been ostracised from the community, that I had been rejected by the people. I felt that I could not look the world in the eye. I should just accept things as the world accepted me. It was a great pain for me to move in amongst the other women in the women’s associations and groups to go and pray. It was always, it felt to me as if I was accused of this ‘Upington 26’ case. It didn’t matter to them what was

6 ‘Instant’ constables, so called because they underwent a very short period of training before being admitted to the police.
happening to me. Their prayers were always plaintive. I always had to hear about the food that they were dishing out to their loved ones, never mind the ones who had died. Even the ministers were the same. Not one, I didn’t hear one minister praying for the deceased’s mother who had also suffered a loss, who had also lost a son. The pain has been living with me through all these years.

The court case was a long protracted one, and I had to suffer a lot of prejudice, and people swearing at me, insults that I had to endure. But the fact that I am sitting here today does not mean that I want to accuse anybody in Paballelo of anything. I was quite sincere when I spoke to you during the Court case after I gave evidence. I was given the opportunity to speak to you and I am, I still say to you, I am extremely disappointed in you people of Paballelo community. Paballelo is a small community. We know each other. We know each other very, very intimately, and when we speak of each other, we immediately know who is being referred to and I still say to you, “I am disappointed in you”.

But there is nothing in my heart. I thought I just had to endure the pain and suffering that I was going through, but I still maintain that my faith in my fellow human beings has been scarred for life. I will, can never violate anybody else’s rights because you knew my son, Tsenolo Lukas. Some of you were his friends. But that means nothing. Talk will not bring him back.

My pain and suffering is still a reality, and that played a major role in that household because I don’t have a child in the Paballelo school. I would also have wanted my child to go to school there. I had to remove my children, and I had to go and live with other people. The hardship, the songs that you sang for me, that really affected me badly. It happened not that long ago. The last song was u-Jetta and that was such a bitter thing for me because some of you who sang that song, you go to the same church as I do, and some of you have very high posts, as you sit here. Some of you didn’t know what exactly took place that day, but you just felt that you could just ride roughshod over my feelings. You felt that you could sing that song, but when you saw me walking across the street you started singing this u-Jetta song. I laughed at you. I answered you and said Jetta didn’t hurt you, he is dead and that is nothing less than the truth.

Paballelo community, the community killed my child and they burnt him to death. That is the truth. Lastly, I would like to say thank you very much to the South African Police (SAP) who looked after me and my children as well during that time. Thank you very much. For the ‘Upington 26’ group I want to say it was a low blow, it was a heavy blow, but I picked myself up again, I survived. Thank you…
**Commissioner Wildschut:** [That is] why we felt it is important that you too have the opportunity to tell your story today. I think that many people say, looking back they acknowledge the fact that they didn’t give you that opportunity and didn’t recognise your pain and your grief. People are saying today that it is important for reconciliation and for healing to take place; that we begin to acknowledge that you too went through a lot of suffering. How do you feel about the fact that people are now beginning to say that they would like to work towards reconciliation first by beginning to acknowledge that you yourself have suffered?

**Ms Sethwale:** I feel I am already dead and that this process will be a very long and time-consuming one. It will take a lot of effort to make me entirely normal again because I have actually become quite used to my pain and place where I find myself currently. I don’t bear any grudges against anybody. But if you lose your confidence and your faith in other people, it is very hard to restore. My faith in my fellow human being has been shattered, but I don’t bear anybody any grudges.

**Exoneration**

29 A particularly complex healing process is involved in restoring trust where someone has been falsely accused of being a spy or an informer. In a number of cases, the Commission helped to restore the dignity of those who were thus falsely accused. This is illustrated by the testimony of Ms Evelina Puleng Moloko on the ‘necklacing’ of her sister, Maki Skosana, after the latter was suspected of being involved in the killing of a number of youths when booby-trapped hand grenades blew up in their hands. Ms Moloko told her story at the Duduza human rights violations hearing:

Maki was a Comrade. She was politically active. We woke up, and we saw quite a number of corpses around the place lying on the ground. Maki went to have a look at these bodies because we were preparing to go to work on that particular morning. Maki came back, and she was in tears when she came back, and she was in shock. She also mentioned the names of the people or the bodies that were lying around on the ground. She said they were Ngungun Yani, Lucky and others. After that incident, we heard that there were rumours around the location, and it seemed it was common knowledge that Maki had a hand in the killing of those youths...

I spoke to Maki as a sister, and I told Maki that it was better for her to run away, and she told me that she was not going to run away because whatever they
said she had done, she had not done. She was innocent. Maybe they will realise later on that they were making a mistake. That is when Maki decided to stay at home and not hide...

We knew that Maki was an innocent victim, and today it has come to the surface. Mamasela [former security police agent/askari\(^7\)] has also spoken that he was involved in giving the youths hand grenades. Now it has surfaced that Maki also took part, and she was also politically active. I also spoke to some of the survivors of the hand grenade, and they told me that they never, ever had Maki in their meetings, and Maki did not know of their plans on that particular day. There was absolutely nothing that she knew, and they were also surprised as to why Maki was killed. Now, this is a very painful situation because there were a lot of rumours flowing around, they branded us a family of informers...

We were hearing rumours that informers have a lot of money, but Maki did not have any. There is quite a number of rumours as well as lies that were disseminated with regard to my sister. They said that the Government had bought us the coffin. We collected our own money in order to conduct the funeral. The Government did not help us in any way... after Maki’s funeral there were also rumours that were circulating that they had killed the wrong person...

**Chairperson:** Puleng Moloko and the family, we would like you to note that the death of Maki was a national shame. South Africa was looked upon internationally, more especially those who were fighting against apartheid, as beasts, as carnivores and that the family managed to stand by Maki even at a time when everybody was saying, away with that family. We salute you... Maki and the family have emerged, after all these disclosures, as heroes. I would say this hearing and this hall have witnessed, who have witnessed this testimony, are witnesses of how noble Maki was, and I will, without shame, request this house to stand and observe a moment of silence. Can we all rise. Thank you.

**Exhumation and reburial**

30 Victims regularly requested the Commission to help them find loved ones who had disappeared or to locate the bones of those who died in the conflicts of the past. The Commission was, through intense investigation, able to uncover the truth in more than fifty cases.\(^8\) For example, the body of Ms Phila Portia Ndwandwe (MK alias, Zandile) was exhumed on 12 March 1997. Ms Ndwande

\(^7\) Informer ‘turned’ by the police.

\(^8\) Details of these cases are discussed elsewhere in this report.
was the acting commander of Natal MK activities initiated from Swaziland. She was abducted from Swaziland by members of the Durban Security Branch but refused to co-operate with the police. It seems that the police did not have admissible evidence against her, but felt they could not release her. She was kept in custody and tortured. Eventually she was killed and secretly buried on a farm in the Elandskop area, near Pietermaritzburg. When she was exhumed, her pelvic bones were covered with a plastic supermarket packet with which she had tried to protect the dignity of her naked body.

31 The Commission provided financial and logistic assistance to the relatives of those victims whose remains were exhumed, so that dignified reburials could take place. These exhumations and reburials were sad occasions, but the families expressed their relief at the end of many years of uncertainty.

32 There were, sadly, still at least 200 such cases outstanding when the Commission’s work ended in June 1998. There were also requests and demands that the programme of exhumation be extended to neighbouring and other foreign countries.

TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY: PERPETRATORS

33 Reconciliation meant that perpetrators of gross human rights violations must be given the opportunity to become human again. Ms Cynthia Ngewu, whose son was killed by the police in the ‘Gugulethu Seven’ incident, confirmed this crucial insight. At the forum on Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Economic Justice in Cape Town on 19 March 1997, Ms Ngewu was asked how she saw the notion of reconciliation. She responded as follows:

**Ms Ngewu:** What we are hoping for when we embrace the notion of reconciliation is that we restore the humanity to those who were perpetrators. We do not want to return evil by another evil. We simply want to ensure that the perpetrators are returned to humanity.

**Ms Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela:** Many people in this country would like to see perpetrators going to prison and serving long sentences. What is your view on this?

**Ms Ngewu:** In my opinion, I do not agree with this view. We do not want to see people suffer in the same way that we did suffer, and we did not want our families to have suffered. We do not want to return the suffering that
was imposed upon us. So, I do not agree with that view at all. We would like to see peace in this country... I think that all South Africans should be committed to the idea of re-accepting these people back into the community. We do not want to return the evil that perpetrators committed to the nation. We want to demonstrate humaneness towards them, so that they in turn may restore their own humanity.

34 Similar sentiments were echoed at the amnesty hearing of Mr Brian Gcina Mkhize, a former Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) hit squad commander in the Esikhawini area on the KwaZulu-Natal north coast. Mr Mkhize was serving a life sentence for two murders. He applied, together with six other members of a Caprivi-trained hit squad, for amnesty for more than fifty-six incidents of violence. At the amnesty hearing in Richards Bay, Mr Mkhize drew attention to the need for the many IFP and ANC “foot soldiers” who committed gross human rights violations to “become human again”:

We represent IFP prisoners in reconciliation with ANC prisoners... There are a lot of people who are in prison who are responsible for actions similar to ours. But organisations today are not interested in those people. They are speaking about peace processes, but are not concerned about the foot soldiers who carried out these activities...

We need counselling because this affects you mentally, psychologically. Nobody has come forth to suggest how we can get this counselling; how the element of criminality can be rooted out; how we can become human again.

35 Testimony to the Commission underlined the profound challenges faced by perpetrators and victims in the light of the violations perpetrators had committed against their fellow human beings. The restoration of their dignity would be a painful and difficult process. The following testimony was given at the gross human rights violations hearings in East London:

**Ms Bawuli Mhlawuli:** After my father’s death, we went back to Oudtshoorn. That’s where my mother was teaching. There was this particular morning when we were all sleeping in one room... they would just kick it open you know, and my mother just thought there was nothing else she could do. She just went to open the door. She led them into the house, and as usual they came in and were searching for things that we didn’t know. They came across one big poster titled ‘Freedom Now’ and they took it. And they saw some sympathy cards from people who were very sympathetic and sent the stuff from all over the world... This one policeman whose name was Kroeter,
he came across those, and he was making fun of them saying, "Dit is die kaarte van die doeie man" [These are the cards of the dead man], and they were kind of making a joke out of it, out of the death.

After that, this man Kroeter was like harassing my mother; he was screaming and yelling at her, asking whose belongings are these, why does she say everything belongs to my father? And my mother said, “because the stuff does belong to him”, and he doesn’t necessarily do what he does with her, because he was like barking, like talking to a dog. My mother said, "I’m a human being, so are you, so you don’t need to speak the way you do."

This man said, "The truth will come out one day", and that was very ironic because here we are today in the Truth Commission talking about this truth. And I mean I never expected him to say that because the truth that is coming out is based on him now, not us. We’re the victims. He’s the one that committed all this pain to us, you know. And after that my mother said, "I agree with you very much, I strongly agree with you. The truth is definitely coming out one day." And this man sat down, and for once ever since he entered the door, he sat down, and he asked my mother if he could smoke. My mother said, "Okay fine", he could smoke. He lit a cigarette and he sat down and smoked. He looked quite withdrawn after that. And they had arrived at our house around about twelve midnight, and now it was around about six in the morning.

Mr Smith: So they were there for the whole evening?

Ms Mhlawuli: For the whole evening.

Mr Smith: Kept you out of sleep?

Ms Mhlawuli: Yes, and we never got to go back and sleep; we just had to get ready to go to school.

Mr Smith: How old was your younger brother at the time?

Ms Mhlawuli: He was three years.

Mr Smith: Three years! How was he affected by this?

Ms Mhlawuli: We used to go to town with my mother or just go out, but my brother, immediately he saw the policeman or a white person, or he saw whoever was non-black, he would say, "Here are these dogs who killed my father".
with themselves, their families, their victims and the rest of society. Amongst those who questioned Captain Benzien was Mr Tony Yengeni, one of his victims, who asked him to demonstrate his torture methods:

**Captain Benzien:** It was a cloth bag that would be submerged in water to get it completely wet. And then the way I applied it was: I get the person to lie down on the ground, on his stomach normally on a mat or something similar with that person’s hands handcuffed behind his back.

Then I would take up a position in the small of the person’s back, put my feet through between his arms to maintain my balance and then pull the bag over the person’s head and twist it closed around the neck in that way, cutting off the air supply to the person.

**Chairperson:** What happens to the person while he is being choked? Can you describe [it]?

**Captain Benzien:** There would be movement. There would be head movement, distress. All the time there would be questions being asked: do you want to speak? And as soon as an indication was given that this person wanted to speak, the air would be allowed back to this person to say what he wanted to say.

**Mr Tony Yengeni:** Would the person groan, moan, cry, scream? What would the person do?

**Captain Benzien:** Yes, the person would moan, cry, although muffled; yes, it does happen.

**Mr Tony Yengeni:** And you did this to each and every one of us?

**Captain Benzien:** To the majority of you, yes.

**Mr Tony Yengeni:** But were there any ... was there any physical condition that would make you to release the bag on the part of the person who is tortured?

**Captain Benzien:** On occasions people have I presume, and I say presume, lost consciousness. They would go slack and every time that was done, I would release the bag...

**Mr Tony Yengeni:** What kind of man uses a method like this – one of the wet bag, to people, to other human beings, repeatedly and listening to those moans and cries and groans and taking each of those people very near to their deaths – what kind of man are you? What kind of man is it that, that can do that kind of - what kind of human being is that Mr Benzien?
I want to understand really why, what happened? I am not talking now about the politics or your family. I am talking about the man behind the wet bag? When you do those things, what happens to you as a human being? What goes through your head, your mind? You know, what effect does that torture activity done to you as a human being?

Captain Benzien: Mr Yengeni, not only you have asked me that question. I - I, Jeff Benzien, have asked myself that question to such an extent that I voluntarily - and it is not easy for me to say this in a full court with a lot of people who do not know me ... approached psychiatrists to have myself evaluated, to find out what type of person am I.

I had the fortune or misfortune of growing up in a white environment in Cape Town. I did not, either through my own stupidity or ignorance, as long as I was one of the whites, the privileged whites who had an education, who had a house, I couldn’t see it being taken away. If you ask me what type of person is it that can do that, I ask myself the same question.

37 Ronnie Kasrils spoke of the appeal he had made to the soldiers who had fired on marchers at Bisho:

I would like to say a few words about the Ciskeian soldiers who opened fire on the march. An irony of this rainbow nation of ours, as you’ve coined it Archbishop, is that, with all the strange things happening, Raymond Mhlaba is now here at Bisho where Oupa Gqozo used to lord it. Here I am, a Deputy Minister of Defence in this democratic government, and I have a responsibility to the soldiers of this country including [these] and to the members of former SADF who trained and commanded them. We are creating a new defence force of seven former antagonistic forces, and we can only do this on the basis of reconciliation, which is vital to the well-being of our society and our future.

Can we blame any of the - any individual in their rank? I’ve had to meet them, old SADF, former Ciskei. I’ve been to the barracks here at Bisho – on a tour of inspection with Minister Modise, trying to create this new defence force which must defend and guard the freedom and the sovereignty which the Archbishop referred to, and I have had to grapple with my conscience. They were products of an evil system that conditioned them to fear the manifestations of democracy, and they were programmed to believe that we were devils incarnate.

As I have mentioned, they must have been worked up ... to believe that we were a threat to their lives. As recently as this past Friday I visited Defence Headquarters here in King William’s Town and, through the commanding officers, I encouraged them all to seek indemnity because they did commit a
heinous crime. They must expunge their guilt by telling the truth and seeking forgiveness from their victims. They can shed light on what actually happened and need to be encouraged to seek indemnity because this is the key thing: they have been afraid to tell the truth. And I have been told stories about this officer and that commander, and this one who is suicidal and this one who is drinking himself to death, and I must tell you that I have feeling for them, which is why I am making this statement, and I have sent back this message to tell them they’ve got nothing to fear if they come forward.

But that’s not the only thing. It’s not the only thing in creating a new defence force, because anyone in our new defence force now must demonstrate by their actions as soldiers that they wish to serve and protect the people of our country and our democratic system.

### FORGIVENESS

38 Despite the terrible stories told by victims, the Commission heard some remarkable evidence of a willingness to forgive. At the human rights violations hearing at Beaufort West, Mr Alwinus Ndodiphela Mralasi made the following statement:

**Alwinus Mralasi:** Thequewe Willie Manene was a member of the Methodist Church, and he accused me, together with his brother and another brother of his. I must tell you everything that I thought about him so that one could make a story out of this.

I hated him for five years. I even wanted to stab him to death ... stab him because he had hurt me, and he implicated me, and said I was there in that meeting. And he said I was ... we were hiding. There was a lamp that was hidden under a table, and this is an indication that this was a real lie.

I saw him in King Williams Town in 1972, and I was with my children. And my children were not succeeding at school, so I decided to send them to King William’s Town because I was working then. I took them to King William’s Town and that is where things went better for them, even in Somerset.

That is where I met Willie Manene who was working in a showroom where they sell cars. And one of my children pointed him and said there he is. So I asked for my knife, I opened it, I put it into my pocket ... I went close to Willie Manene. This is God’s work because His works are wonderful.

I had intentions to stab him. I opened the door, and I saw a white man who asked me whether I wanted a car. Then I said, no. I had last seen Willie in 1968, in court. At the time, he was wiping the car, and he saw me as I was
moving slowly towards him. In fact, a person who was guilty will always spot you, and you know this is the truth.

So I went and greeted him, and I asked him how he was, and I asked him to go out with me. We went outside, and he stood there, and he had some difficulty to talk. And I was surprised [and wondered] what was wrong with him, and I looked at him and I could see there was real change in him. He had gone through a lot of suffering, I could see. It showed on his face. And I asked: “why are you like this? Do your people know that you are like this?” Then he said, “no”.

I asked him about Frans Manene, Samuel Manene. Then I asked him if I could see Samuel to give him some messages. Then he ... said he was suffering from high blood pressure, he had pains on his hip and his son too was ill-treating and beating him. I could see he was finished, I then called my wife and even that one who was born when I was detained. I called all them - all of them - and I said Willie: “here are your children”, because we had the same clan name. So, he greeted them.

Then I said: “these are your children, you can see they are old”. Then he said: “Are you still going on with this?” Then I said to my wife: “Look at this person, how he looks like”. And I asked my wife to take out one pound and give it to this man so that he could buy food for himself. And that was the last I saw of him. He never went back to his house. He never went to see his family. He went to hospital and that was the end of his life. So, when he asked me how I had come there, I said I had come in a car...

This is the man who was trying to drown me and, as I was driving [away] ... he lifted his hand, trying to wave. And I also waved back ... I kept on waving for a long time, hooting, and then I drove off to Mdantsane. That was the last I saw of him, because he died thereafter. So, even the hatred I had just faded away. So that’s why I say, God is there and God is with us – we are parents but things may not do – people may not do bad things to others because we’ve got children. We have got children who we are bringing up.

So today, you have allowed me to say everything to you, and everything that has been locked in within my heart now, you have allowed me to have a clean breast of – so I am not even embarrassed today. You can go to my house. You will be surprised because God is like those old bottles of wine that used to be closed with a cork. And if you were to fill ... a bucket with water and then you take that cork and put it into that water, it will not sink, it will float. Thank you. I thank you for all you have done for me.
Ms Beth Savage gave this evidence to the Commission:

**Beth Savage:** On the 28th of November 1992, I attended our annual Christmas Party. It was our wine tasting club... We were seated at one long table... David did his usual thing by coming around and greeting us all, and he was squatting, chatting to Bob and me when I suddenly became aware of something that sounded like firecrackers. I saw Rhoda Macdonald throw back her arms and die, and I did exactly the same thing. I swung around to look at the door to see what was happening, and I saw a man there with a balaclava on his head (but not over his head) with an AK-47, and my immediate reaction was, "Oh my goodness, this is a terrorist attack!" After that I blacked out, and I don’t remember anything else until I was on the helicopter being flown to Bloemfontein...

I spent a month in ICU [intensive care unit]. It was quite traumatic. I had to learn to walk again. When I came home, my children were unbelievable. They used to fight over who is to bathe me, who was to dress me, who was to feed me. I don’t know whether I could ever have made it without them.

I had open-heart surgery, I had a hole in the aorta, and I actually stopped breathing but, through the work of Dr John Pennel, they managed to get me to live. And I also had half my large intestine removed. I’ve got really very ugly scarring up the middle, and I have a damaged thumb from the shrapnel. I’ve still got shrapnel in my body, but all that means is that all the bells ring when I go through the airport; that makes life exciting. And I have an injury on the knee.

But all in all, what I must say is, through the trauma of it all, I honestly feel richer. I think it’s been a really enriching experience for me and a growing curve, and I think it’s given me the ability to relate to other people who may be going through trauma...

The bomb blast took its toll on my family. I believe I’m a very strong person, but I did have a complete breakdown after six months. My daughter also had a breakdown ... she was ... well all the children tried to be mother, father, sister, brother, husband, everything to me. They really carried me. They picked me up and carried me.

My son has had his problems as well. I think psychologically it affected my family in terms of them just being able to believe that it could actually happen to me... I had really a wonderful childhood, and my parents actually put a lot of young African people that worked for them, four that I can remember, that they actually educated, and my father was a person that was really anti-apartheid. I think of all the people affected by the bomb blast, it affected my dad the worst. He just went into a very deep depression, and he died about...
six months ago. When I was ill, he just used to sit next my bed and cry and say, "You know, I can’t believe this".

I feel bad because you know I’m not the only victim, but that is how it affected us ... and then my mum, she couldn’t carry on without him, and she died two months later. Basically, it just broke his heart.

**Ms Crichton:** Beth, what are you actually feeling towards the perpetrators at this time?

**Ms Savage:** It’s a difficult question, but I honestly feel that, there but for the grace of God go I. I really don’t know how I would have reacted if I had been in their situation. I know ... that’s about all I can say.

**Ms Crichton:** Is there – and this is my last question to you – is there anything that you were hoping the Commission will do for you?

**Ms Savage:** Really there’s nothing in particular that I would like the Commission to do for me. I think it’s fantastic that we’re having the Commission. I think the idea that speaking out causes healing – I think that is really a wonderful idea ... and I really hope that healing comes to everybody. You know there are people here who have had far worse problems that I could ever have.

**Panel Member:** Is it important for you to have the identity – if the Commission can assist you to do so, to find out – is it important for you to have the identity of the people who are responsible?

**Ms Savage:** It’s not important to me, but – and I’ve said this to many people - what I would really, really like is, I would like to meet that man that threw that grenade in an attitude of forgiveness and hope that he could forgive me too for whatever reason. But I would very much like to meet them.

**Archbishop Tutu:** Thank you, I just want to say, we are, I think, a fantastic country. We have some quite extraordinary people. Yesterday, I had spoken about how proud I was to be black in seeing the kind of spirit that people showed in adversity, and now we’re seeing another example, and I think it just augers so wonderfully well for our country. We thank you for the spirit that you are showing and pray that those who hear you, who see you will say, "Hey, we do have an incredible country with quite extraordinary people of all races".

Ms Savage’s wish was fulfilled in April 1998 at the amnesty hearing of Mr Thembelani Xundu, the former Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) commander responsible for her injuries. In a newspaper interview, she said that, after meeting with Xundu, currently a major in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), she no longer had nightmares about the attack.
Mr Nundlal Rabilall gave testimony on the death of his brother, Krish, who died in Mozambique in the 1981 Matola cross-border raid. At the East London human rights violations hearing, he said:

This had a traumatic effect on the entire family. I will briefly relate the effect it had on me, because it symbolises what - the same kind of effect it had on other members of the family. I became bitter towards white people, and the fact that the majority of them voted for the National Party election after election. I could never understand how they could sleep with an easy conscience at night, knowing that black children were dying in the homelands, when black people were given the most menial jobs, and that the Government they voted for used every conceivable kind of dirty trick and brutality to suppress the legitimate resistance of black people against the oppression of apartheid.

In short, I became anti-white, and this attitude was reinforced by an incident I also had when I was travelling in a train to Durban. I had accidentally walked into a white compartment, and the white conductor came and swore at me, called me a ‘coolie’, and told me as soon as the train stops at the next station I must get into the next coach, which I had to do.

I taught at an all-Indian school and had no white friends. I became ecstatic whenever a black boxer knocked a white boxer down, or when the South African rugby team lost its rebel tour matches. This anti-white obsession grew, and I would dream about burning down white businesses and farms, but it was sheer fear that prevented me from doing these things. I then began to fantasise and, while this may seem laughable, I sincerely prayed to God to make me invisible for just one day so that I could do the things I dreamed of, and when God did not comply, I reduced the time to one hour, and in that one hour I was determined to go to Parliament and shoot every one cabinet minister.

As time passed, however, I realised that this would negate everything that my brother stood for, his ideal of a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa. I grew to realise that hate is a boomerang that circles back and hurts you. The turning point came when I read in Martin Luther King’s book called Strength to Love - now, I cannot remember the exact words used in the book, but it goes something like this: “Hate for hate multiplies hate. Darkness cannot destroy darkness, only light can do that. Hate cannot destroy hate, only love can do that.” I also started reading books on Mahatma Gandhi...

So, I changed my philosophy of life. I realised that I could not hate white people. It dawned on me that most white people were to a large extent by-products of apartheid, just as much as the freedom fighters were. I learned also that
there were many white people who sincerely hated the obnoxious system of apartheid, and that some of them had lost their lives fighting it. I admired people like Rick Turner, Neil Aggett, Joe Slovo and Beyers Naudé. I also realised that I wasn’t being true to my religion if I hated somebody. Knowing the power of vengeful thoughts, Mahatma Gandhi had said, "Fight without malice". This meant a great deal to me. We have the right to fight injustice without hating the personalities or circumstances involved and, to taste the sweetness of life, one must have the power to forget the past.

Mr Johan (Hennie) Smit gave testimony at the human rights violations hearing in East London:

Ms Seroke: You live in Pretoria, and you are the parents of Cornio Smit who at the age of eight years in 1985 was killed in a bomb blast in Amanzimtoti. At the time, he had gone to Natal with his grandparents for a holiday, and, whilst they were shopping, two days before Christmas at the Sanlam Shopping Centre in Amanzimtoti, this bomb blast occurred. Can you tell us, how did you get the news and what happened?

Mr Smit: I got a phone call from my uncle who stayed in Malvern in Durban, and he told me that my son was in an accident; and I had to come down and see him. I thought that it might be a car accident because he didn’t explain what type of accident it was ... We only found out that it was a bomb blast when we arrived in Durban in the hospital. I can’t remember the name of the hospital. They told us that my son’s not there, but they know of a little boy who was in the mortuary. By that time it was very late; the mortuary was already closed, and I went to my uncle’s house ...

We went to see him the following morning, but I didn’t want to believe that it was my son that was lying there. I asked them to take him out of the glass case so that I could see his chin. Under his chin, he had a small little cut which he got when I accidentally dropped him when he was a child. I still really didn’t want to believe it, and my wife and my father had to convince me it was my child.

Then after that, we came up to Pretoria. We buried him in Pretoria. I told newspapers that I thought my son was a hero because he died for freedom for people that (I would prefer to speak Afrikaans). He died in the cause of the oppressed people. A lot of people criticised me for this. They thought that I was a traitor, and they condemned me, but I still feel that way today...

Ms Seroke: You had the opportunity to meet the parents of the boy who planted the bomb.
Mr Smit: That’s true.

Ms Seroke: How did you and Annamarie feel during this meeting with his parents?

Mr Smit: I’ve got no grudge against them. I mean it was actually a rebellion. It was war. In war things happen that the generals don’t plan. Nobody plans it. It just happens. You don’t always - it may happen that the troops become a little bit over-zealous and start making their own terms and do things that they weren’t given orders to do, but in a war you just obey orders. You don’t question and ask why you should do certain things. So, I accept that it was an order that was given which this person or persons executed by planting the bomb.

Ms Seroke: How did you feel receiving these parents of this boy in your own house and what took place there?

Mr Smit: It was a great relief seeing them and expressing my feelings towards them that I felt glad that I could tell them that I felt no hatred for them. I bore them no grudge. And there was no hatred in my heart...

Ms Seroke: When your son was bomb-blasted you said, in the midst of acute grief, that you wished that these killings would stop and that the Nationalist Government could negotiate with the ANC for peace. That was a very profound statement. Hennie, what did your family think when you said that?

Mr Smit: Like I said, they couldn’t understand it; some of them still don’t understand it. They can’t see my point of view. They are not as liberal as I am. They really don’t understand it. Like my mum was in the same bomb blast, and she doesn’t feel the same way that I feel. So, there are different viewpoints on the subject...

Mr Malan: Did you find peace in the knowledge of what had happened? Did that bring reconciliation for you?

Mr Smit: Yes, it gave me peace because I knew what was happening. I thought that if I placed myself in the other person’s shoes, how would I have felt about it. [How] would I have liked not to be able to vote, not to have any rights, and that kind of thing? So I realised that I would not have liked it, so I realised how it must have felt for them.

Chairperson (Archbishop Tutu): My Afrikaans is not that fluent, but I would like to say this in your mother tongue. The people of this country are incredible, and the testimony that you have just given is something which people really admire. ... [we take] our hats off to you, and we would really like to express our appreciation and thanks to God that he created people like yourself, and
that the reason why we still have this hope that reconciliation will triumph in
the end is because there are people like yourself.

We would like to say how much we appreciate what you have done, and I
really hope that all the people in this country, and you’ve referred in your
statement to this fact, that we must forget about skin colour and that we
must not apply reverse racism in the new South Africa. I do hope that our
people will heed your appeal.

On behalf of all of us here and also on behalf of the whole nation, I can say there
has been so much pain and suffering in this country. On behalf of all of us, I
would just like to say thank you very, very much for what you have said here
today and for what you have suffered and experienced with your family at a time
when nobody would have wanted to believe that such a thing was possible.

A number of statements emphasised the importance of truth in the reconciliation
process between victims and perpetrators: in other words, knowing whom to
forgive and why the violation(s) took place:

At the Empangeni human rights violations hearing in November 1996, Ms J Msweli
testified about the killing of her son, Simon Msweli:

They took them to SAPPI to a certain corner... I think they were assaulted
until they died because we couldn’t even identify him. His eyes had been
gouged out. He was never shot. He was tortured. He was violated. He was
also mutilated. We could not identify him. I only identified him through his
thumb. There was a certain mark on his thumb.

She continued:

I want the people who killed my sons to come forward because this is a time
for reconciliation. I want to forgive them, and I also have a bit of my mind to
tell them. I would be happy if they could come before me because I don’t have
sons today. Their father died at an early age, and I put them through school.
Now, they’ve never been criminals. They’ve never had any problems, even with
the neighbours. They were Christians. I also want to speak to [my sons’ killers]
because I want to speak to them before I forgive them. I want them to tell me who
sent them to come and kill my sons. Maybe they are my enemies, maybe they are
not. So, I want to establish as to who they are and why they did what they did.

At the Port Elizabeth human rights violations hearings, an unnamed witness testified:
Chairperson: Thank you very much for taking the trouble to come to us. Our sympathy goes to you for all the hurt that you had to go through. What we are going to try and do according to the powers that we have, we are going to find the truth and medicine that will heal our country to make us one – something that will unite all of us and make us one, so that we can have reconciliation. Thank you very much for having sympathy for other people while you have your own problems and your own hurt. That is called humanity. Something that we are trying for our country to have, and everybody should have humanity. That is what we are trying to have now so that everybody can stop being selfish. Thank you very much.

Witness: Thank you, Bishop, but I am sorry there is something else that I would like to ask. Do not take me wrong my Bishop, you cannot make peace with somebody who does not come to you and tell you what he has done. We will have peace only when somebody comes to you and says, this is what I did. I did this and this and that and that. If they do not come, if we do not know who they are, we would not be able to. But now I will forgive somebody who has. That is the whole truth, sir. We take it that the people who are listening and the people who are coming to the Commission will be touched as well. Their conscience will tell them that if they want forgiveness they should come and expose themselves so that they can also get the healing that the victims are getting.

Unidentified: This is why we are trying to investigate the truth. Thank you.

Witness: Thank you, Bishop, but there is something more. I do not want to lie to this house. Yes, Bishop, you are my Bishop. I will not be able to forgive anyone until I know who they are. Then I will shake their hands. Otherwise, I will not be able to forgive somebody that I do not know.”

47 At the youth hearings in East London, the Inter-Church Youth (ICY) made the following statement:

We on our side were violated brutally, and we therefore plead with those who were involved in violating our own rights whether they were actively involved or otherwise, to humble themselves and confess to those who suffered in the atrocities of the past. Mr Chairperson, Sir, we are saying we were mostly wronged, but we are prepared to forgive people if they come and tell us what they have done. Surely, this hall here today is full of those people who were mostly sinned against. But where are those people that were involved in the atrocities. If they can come to us and tell us what they have done and start owning up the to process ... But instead what we are finding in this country is that those who were involved in the process of violating other people’s
human rights are starting to disassociate themselves with the acts of terror. And those people do that publicly because they are political figures, and they say they were not involved. But on the other hand, they call themselves committed Christians who are committed to nation building. We question that.

Coming forward here with a submission as the sinned-against group is an explanation of what type of people we are as black people. We are notoriously forgiving and up against what the missionaries have been saying in statements that are written down in books, implied that we are a non-religious community. I want to say that we are more religious than many a nation. It is because we are notoriously religious that we are notoriously forgiving. So said Dr Weli Mazamisa.

In conclusion, I want to say again that we are more than just religious. We are a peace-loving people and, if the Bible says, “blessed are the peacemakers”, we might have had so many blessings if and only if these people will come forward. The people we want to make peace with are not coming to tell us what they have done so that at least we can forgive them. Please people, we need to be blessed by God for the peace, but they are deciding to run away. They are not just running away with themselves, but they are running away with our long overdue blessings. We want our blessing please. People we urge you to bring back our blessings. I thank you Mr Chairman.

Testimony at the Alexandra human rights violations illustrated that forgiveness is not cheap, and the journey towards overcoming deep feelings of anger and humiliation is a long one:

**Ms Margaret Madlana:** After my child’s death, these white policemen came, and they came to one house where there was a tent, and they were running after some children. The children ran towards the house, and got into the house. When they arrived and entered the house I asked them (I didn’t know that they understood Zulu and I asked in Zulu) what are they looking for because they have already killed my son. And one of the white men answered me, and he said to me, we are looking for the young kids. There were so many people in my house, and they [the police] said they are going to take me and kill me in the house. However, the people tried to ask them not to kill me ...

I would like to apologise before God ... if ever I was to be employed, I was going to poison the white man’s children. The way they killed my son hitting him against a rock, and we found him with a swollen head. They killed him in a tragic manner, and I don’t think I will ever forgive in this case, especially to these police who were involved, and who were there ...
This Sindani came to me to tell me that he has not finished the killings – they are still going to kill – and Mtebi himself came to say the very same words. They said they are coming to kill all the young kids and the dogs, and they are also coming to kill the leaders. Therefore, I don’t think there will be any reconciliation or forgiveness because today the police in Alexandra, they promote crime because they eat together with these criminals. They are crooks. They are still doing the very same things that they used to do, and therefore I don’t think I will ever forgive police. [Witness upset] ...

What will make me to forgive is if Sindani and Mtebi, these two policemen, come and tell us why he killed these sons of the wars and also ask for forgiveness before the mothers of these children. It is then that I can forgive him. I am so surprised to find out that today that Mtebi is today a reverend and which children is he preaching to and which parents is he preaching to if he killed the children of the wars.

I would like Sindani and Mtebi to come and ask for forgiveness. Thereafter I might consider forgiving them, together with his fellow white people who came to kill our children. They just killed these defenceless children with their machine guns. They brought their dogs and hoses running after young children with machine guns with the aim of killing the black nation, the black race underneath the sun. I will say that I will never forgive because this was my last born. Maybe if he was still alive, he was going to be married by now [and] have some children and a wife. But because they have killed him, I will never rest ...

I used to go out and go and sleep on top of his grave because even today I still go there and pray in his grave. I will never forgive them if they don’t come before the Commission...

I would like to say that for me to forgive, and I don’t see the opportunity of me forgiving anyone, I suffered a lot because of this because I didn’t understand why the children were killed. But there is just one important thing I would like to say before the Commission, before our children and the whole country.

At the beginning of the struggle - the struggle started at Wits\textsuperscript{9} University within the white community where white students threw away their books [and] not even a single of them was teargassed or killed. However, when black children started fighting for their liberation, they were shot by guns. We had to bury a lot of people killed by these guns and I would like to say I have buried a lot. I am only left with four children. However, when their children started to fight for their rights, they were not killed. However, our children when they started the very same thing, they were killed since from 1976 up to 1986. They never buried any-

\textsuperscript{9} University of the Witwatersrand.
one, or where we find them coming to a mass funeral saying that these white people were on strike, and we shot them or killed them. Even today, they still do that, they fight for their rights but they are not teargassed or killed.

Things like that we can find out that there was this apartheid system working within the black community. We were taken as dogs, baboons and all such things. These dogs and baboons which work for them, which bath their children, cook for their children, however, they are still content to kill them.

### Apologies and Acknowledgements

49 The Commission heard acknowledgements from a range of individuals and representatives of various institutions about their direct and/or indirect involvement with gross human rights violations. Many offered unqualified apologies for their acts of commission and/or omission and asked for forgiveness. The response of others was qualified. In the process, the role of sincere apologies in the reconciliation process emerged. While insincere apologies add insult to injury, honest apologies encourage forgiveness by “helping to pour balm on the wounds of many”\(^\text{10}\).

50 At the ‘Bisho massacre’ event hearing in Bisho, the following statements were made:

**Colonel Schobesberger (former Chief of Staff, Ciskei Defence Force):** From my point of view and for the soldiers of the Ciskei Defence Force I can speak. I say we are sorry. I say the burden of the ‘Bisho massacre’ will be on our shoulders for the rest of our lives. We cannot wish it away - it happened - but please I ask ... the victims not to forget (I cannot ask this), but to forgive us, to get the soldiers back into the community, to accept them fully, to try to understand also the pressure they were under then. This is all I can do.

**Major Mbina (former captain, Ciskei Defence Force):** Some people shot, probably shot without having been given orders, knowing that at the end it’s the boss that will answer. That is what I want to make clear. I also ask for forgiveness. I empathise with families that lost their members. I ask forgiveness on behalf of the Ciskeian Defence Force, especially those that were involved. We ask forgiveness. We will be very glad if the Commission would forgive us. To the community, we ask for forgiveness.

51 The testimony of Major General Marius Oelschig, head of the Ciskei Defence Force at the time of the ‘Bisho massacre’, highlighted some of the difficulties with public apologies. At the time of the hearing, Major General Oelschig was

\(^{10}\) Archbishop Tutu in response to the submissions of former NP ministers Meyer and Wessels at the State Security Council Hearing, 15 October 1997.
serving as Director of Transformation Management in the SADF:

I repeat that I have been a soldier, a professional soldier of 35 years’ standing. I do not know how else to express myself than in purely professional terms...

A commander grieves on his own and he grieves quietly. You learn through the years to accept it as such. I apologise if the Commission expected me really to open my heart and to put it out for public display. That, that is my grief, that is my concern that I live with as I have during my professional career and as I will until the end of my days. I am a committed, loyal South African. I feel very, very deeply about everything that has happened in our country, and I have made my contribution where I could. I have done my very best as an officer and as a South African, to promote what is happening in this country today...

I would like to conclude by insisting that I be allowed to grieve the way I grieve, and if, in my professional language of expressing my regret that loved ones have been lost and injured, if that is not sufficient, I apologise for that, but that is how I feel. I am a soldier, and I have been taught to hide my tears, and I have been taught to grieve on my own.

52 A submission at the East London youth hearing stated:

This past week, we met in Burgersdorp to do what we call a reconciliation service where we were going to cleanse ourselves of the past deeds. We’d slaughter a goat and cleanse ourselves with the blood that is shed. In a symbolic sense we’d cleanse ourselves of the wrong deeds, even if they were justifiable... The following were acknowledged. That we as the Inter-Church Youth or the church within the youth have, in one way or the other, killed people or at least were involved in the process of killings. That we were involved in demolishing people’s property... That we informed on others who ended up being tortured severely and who died in the process. We watched hopelessly whilst people were being ‘necklaced’. If we didn’t do the ‘necklacing’, we would have gone to buy petrol, arrange tyres and be part of making petrol bombs etc.

We were part of this as the church youth. One needs to emphasise that this was justifiable for the cause of the liberation of ourselves.

We want to say we believe that 70 to 80 per cent of the young people who died during the period of the struggle, most of them were church going youth or were young people who believed in Christ, or who were baptised in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit as it were. These people were all disappointed by the church. We are here to say that we take full responsibility for any human rights violations committed by our members. To families who
perhaps had no idea that ICY members were involved, we are [unqualifiedly] apologising to you all.

In May 1998, at the hearing on the United Democratic Front (UDF) in Cape Town, Mr Patrick ‘Terror’ Lekota, former UDF leader and currently chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, had the following to say about ‘necklacing’ by UDF activists:

We accept political and moral responsibility. We cannot say these people have nothing to do with us. We organised them; we led them. When we were taken into prisons, they were left without leadership and many of them, angry even at our arrest, did things which were irrational.

At the human rights hearing in Upington, on 2 October 1996, local community leader and minister Aubrey Beukes apologised to the mother of the murdered municipal constable, Lukas ‘Jetta’ Sethwale (see above):

We were silent on the pain of the mother, the family of Jetta. As someone actively involved in campaigning for the release of the Upington 14 (those sentenced to death), I would like to say to Ms Sethwale and the family of Jetta: please forgive us that we allowed you to suffer in silence amid all the media attention. We were all victims. Forgive us the times when we drove past your house, showing journalists and foreign people where Jetta stayed and telling them our stories, and not inviting them to make some time to listen to your pain.

A spokesperson for the Stellenbosch Presbytery of the Dutch Reformed Church made the following statement at the human rights violations hearing in Paarl:

[We] are not doing this presentation on behalf of the Dutch Reformed Church – only the Synod has this right to do this. But what we are doing here this afternoon is the deepest conviction of the Presbytery of Stellenbosch ...

In looking back, we realise that there have been times in the history of Stellenbosch when we as a Presbytery (and also as separate congregations) either failed wholesale or made only the most timid of efforts to fulfil the prophetic responsibility the Lord has given us.

We think especially of the past forty years during which the official policy of apartheid radically impaired the human dignity of people all around us and resulted in gross violations of human rights. Within the borders of our Presbytery, there were those who actively developed and defended the ideological framework by which these violations and actions were justified.

At times, standpoints and decisions taken within this Presbytery itself functioned within this ideological framework.
There were voices among our own ranks and within our church that condemned apartheid and sought to call our church to its senses and who witnessed against injustice within society. However, the testimony and the protest of many of these people were, time and again, suppressed or ignored, also from within our own ranks. Others were maligned and some were even personally wronged...

Various factors contributed to this lack of a strong, unified witness from within our Presbytery. The nationalist ideology deeply influenced the way in which local Christians thought and read the Bible. This made us insensitive to the injustice and suffering inflicted by the policy of apartheid on those living around us. Other factors which aggravated the situation were the privileged position occupied by most members of our church and the fact that apartheid increasingly isolated people from each other’s lives and experiences.

As a result of the growing ecumenical isolation and the lack of meaningful church unity, we became deaf to the protest and the cries for help by many of our brothers and sisters in faith. Many church members and church ministers therefore often uncritically accepted that, because many of them were also members of our church, political leaders could be trusted to do what is right. This further reinforced the widespread belief that apartheid or separate development was truly in the best interest of all groups in the country.

Misinformation and a lack of exposure to other people’s suffering are other factors that contributed to this omission.

We cannot and do not want to deny that behind such factors there often was a large measure of selfishness and an unwillingness to listen sincerely to God’s word and to fellow Christians. The result has been that we in Stellenbosch did not speak out enough against injustice in our society: did not speak out enough against racist attitudes among our church members; did not speak out enough against the violation of people’s rights and human dignity.

During the Soweto riots of 1976 and the countrywide unrest that followed, general decisions were taken concerning the situation in the country, but very little protest was made against the gross violations of people’s rights taking place at that time.

When forced removals were carried out in our town, when people were forced to leave their historic neighbourhoods and had to resettle elsewhere, little or no protest was voiced by the Presbytery. These removals constituted a violation of human rights, which invariably went hand in hand with severe personal trauma, financial loss and social disruption. Tragically, as a result of the great separation brought about in South Africa by apartheid, we of the Presbytery often were not even aware of this suffering.
Over many years, people of our town [were] shut out from important decision-making positions simply because of the colour of their skin. More decisions were made about them than with them. Also in the church and amongst individual Christians there was often insensitivity to how grievously people's human dignity was violated in these and many other ways...

Eventually we did begin to see the error of our ways. And this is why the Lord brought us to these insights. That is why, in a formal resolution adopted in 1985, the Presbytery confessed our guilt for our actions during the apartheid era. Now that the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is confronting us once again with the pain and grief endured by fellow citizens and fellow believers under the previous political dispensation, we feel the need to confess our guilt once again before God and before people. We feel the need to make this confession specifically at this session of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, because it is here that people from our own vicinity are sharing the pain and grief that they have to live through.

We confess that we kept silent at times when we should have spoken out clearly in testimony. We confess that although we did at times try to protest against the unjust treatment of people, we often did so only with great timidity and circumspection. We did at times comment critically, but we often in doing so were not prepared to speak out against the system itself. What is more, we often gave way to the opposition we encountered. At the very times when we should have continued to speak out clearly for the truth and against injustice, we grew tired and gave up protesting.

Today we confess these things anew before the many people of Stellenbosch and vicinity who suffered injustice because of that. We confess these things before the youth and the children of our own church and our own congregations who feel that through our actions we have failed them...

56 At the faith communities hearing in East London on 17 November 1997, Anglican Bishop Michael Nuttall made the following apology on behalf of the Church of the Province of Southern Africa (CPSA):

[T]he CPSA acknowledges that there were occasions when, through the silence of its leadership or its parishes, or their actions in acquiescing with apartheid laws, where they believed it to be in the interest of the church, deep wrong was done to those who bore the brunt of the onslaught of apartheid. What aided and abetted this kind of moral lethargy and acquiescence was the fact that, in many respects, our church had developed, over many years, its own pattern of racial inequality and discrimination. It was all too easy to pass
resolutions or make lofty pronouncements condemning apartheid. It was all too easy to point a morally superior finger at Afrikaner nationalist prejudice and pride. English pride and prejudice was no less real and it was never very far below the surface of our high sounding moral pronouncements. The Anglican Lord Milner must be as problematic to Afrikaner Christians as DF Malan, the dominee, is to us.

In a strange way, I think many white Anglicans in the CPSA owe an apology to the Afrikaner community for their attitude of moral superiority. I became aware of this need when, as Bishop of Pretoria from 1976 to 1981, I got to know such fine Afrikaner Christians as David Bosch and Piet Meiring. Perhaps, Chairperson, I could ask Professor Piet Meiring in his capacity as a member of the [Commission] kindly to receive this expression of apology from a Bishop of ‘die Engelse kerk’ [the ‘English’ (Anglican) Church]. (Applause.)

But our chief expression of apology must be to our own black membership, and I am using the word ‘black’ inclusively. Here we are speaking of the overwhelming majority of the CPSA, both in Southern Africa as a whole and in South Africa particularly. Interestingly, our black membership increased significantly in the early apartheid years, especially on the reef where the witness against the new ideology was strong. Ours is primarily a black church; it has been and still is in many ways, a suffering church. Suffering at the hands of the church itself.

Chairperson, our so-called white parishes, like white businesses (and I am thinking of last week’s [Commission] hearings), have unquestionably benefited from apartheid and its political predecessors. In their church facilities, including housing and transport for their priests, they have been bastions of relative privilege. So-called black parishes by contrast, like black businesses, have been decidedly disadvantaged in these respects. Within the black Anglican community, there has been a further disparity in that, very often, as in the secular apartheid scenario, the African church has been worse off than the coloured, and the coloured church worse off than the Indian.

At the health sector hearing in Cape Town, the following apologies were made:

**Medical Association of South Africa (MASA):** Our written submission details the many failures and compromises that occurred along the way, failures of will and courage, compromises founded on expediency, many of these occurring even in the years since 1989. It’s not possible in the time available today to explore in detail all the misdeeds of commission and especially of omission that have been detailed in our written submission. However, I can assure the
Commission that we have made every possible effort to provide as complete and as honest a disclosure as it lies in our power to do.

I plead with you and with the nation, that this submission be accepted with respect for the truth which it embodies. It is vital for the Association, at this point in its development, [for] its renewal and its transformation, to achieve reconciliation, and this can only happen if there has been full disclosure and full acknowledgement of all the wrongs of the past. If there are gaps or omissions in this submission, they are unintentional. We would welcome any input in this regard from whatever quarter it may come.

The transformation of MASA of which I speak is an ongoing process. A significant event along the way was the unconditional apology for the past wrongs of the Association that was made in June 1995. We stand by every word that was spoken in that apology. However, there are those who understood this apology to be an attempt on the part of the Association to achieve what they termed blanket amnesty and to sweep everything else from our past under the carpet. This was far from the intention of that apology. The apology was a necessary step along the road we are travelling, but it was only a step. Our wholehearted participation in the work of this Commission is yet another step on this road, but again only a step.

In terms of the way forward, there is much that we have done to make sure that the wrongs perpetrated in the past by doctors can never occur again, but there is much that remains to be done. We intend to participate fully in the work of the proposed over-arching Health and Human Rights Organisation. We propose to enlarge and to strengthen the office and the activities of our ombudsman, our public protector. Our peer review system has already been sharpened and structured much more effectively than it ever was before. We are currently engaged in a programme designed to promote structured ethics education in all the medical schools in this country, and we are planning formal structured training for prisons’ health service personnel.

However, in all these efforts, we still find ourselves hampered by the huge baggage of past wrongs that the Association has had to drag along with itself and from which it has found it impossible to free itself. It will only be through the process of truthful disclosure and reconciliation that we will finally be freed from the burden of this baggage.

58 In a written submission to the Commission presented at the institutional hearing on the legal profession, the following apologies were made:
LWH Ackermann, Constitutional Court Judge: It is difficult, if not impossible, for me as a white South African to draw a clear or steady line between my personal and my professional failures in regard to addressing wrongs of racism generally and institutionalised professional racism in particular. I failed as an advocate, in terms of my ethical, moral and religious beliefs, by not speaking out sooner, and when I did, not sufficiently powerfully or persistently, against the Pretoria Bar’s colour bar and, in general, against the discriminatory treatment meted out to blacks by the justice system, and by not trying to motivate the organised profession to protest against all such discrimination, particularly as it affected black colleagues. I did not do enough to resist the pervasive institutional culture and to dismiss my fears that, if I did speak out, my career would be jeopardised at a Bar where, soon after joining, I was as branded as a liberal.

I similarly failed on the Bench, prior to my resignation, by not pursuing the avenues ... soon enough, vigorously enough or at all. Of course, my failure to combat racism more vigorously extends beyond my profession and legal career...

I acknowledge and regret these failures. I am deeply saddened by the consequences of these failures on the lives of black people, and I wish to apologise for my role in denying them their full and equal humanity.

GL Grobler SC, Chairperson Pretoria Bar: We apologise to our colleagues, to the judiciary, the attorneys’ profession, the public at large and in particular the victims of unjust laws for these failures. As is the case with the apology which we tendered in regard to the racial discrimination which our Bar practised until 1980, we should have offered our expression of regret at a much earlier stage. We apologise for this remissness. We are grateful for the opportunity which our fellow bars and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have given us to set the record straight in public.

At the business sector hearing in Johannesburg, the following was said:

Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (Afrikaans Chamber of Commerce) (AHI):
What cannot be denied ... is that apartheid disadvantaged black business. Many whites owned land and they accumulated capital by realising profits on the selling of this land. Until fairly recently, blacks were denied that opportunity and, in this way, one of the most important ways of building capital was denied them.

Even though the Land Act in the period under review ... had the net result of increasing the total area of land held by blacks, the tribal system, which was maintained as part of the policy of separate development, sterilised land as a source of wealth for the individual who is the mainstay in market-driven economy.
Restrictions on trading and commercial activities also prevented blacks from establishing and operating business when they saw opportunities to do so. Latent entrepreneurship, potential skills and hidden talents: none of these assets in the black community could be used.

The practice of job reservation denied the black community access to skills and progress and thus prevented fair competition in the job market. It is also a fact that the mobilisation of the savings of the white [inaudible] produced remarkable results in terms of economic growth empowerment of the white Afrikaans-speaking community.

If we look at [the section in our submission on] ... omissions and commissions, it is clear from the submission, if we look back with the benefit of hindsight, that the AHI committed major mistakes.

Firstly, we deal with support for separate development. As explained before, the AHI supported separate development in the belief that it would bring about acceptable results for all in the country. This it didn’t do. Separate development in the end meant social engineering with brutal human costs and enormous wastage of resources.

As a business organisation, we should have appreciated much earlier that moral and economic realities militate conclusively against even the loftiest interpretation of separate development. This failure was without doubt one of the worst mistakes the AHI made.

Then we look at the lack of critical evaluation of policies – another major mistake that was committed and that was one of omissions. No moral and economic objections to apartheid were lodged for many years. At the time, there was sufficient appreciation for the hardship and suffering caused by the policy. Whether those hardships were shacks being demolished in the wet and cold of the Cape winter, or of people being shot whilst protesting or the consequences of bombs which killed civilians in Church Street in Pretoria as part of the struggle against apartheid – all of which was seen on our TV screens - the AHI could not have escaped the impact of these policies.

[Point] 5.3 [of the submission] deals with insensitivity into issues involving human rights, although there were frequent references at AHI conferences to the importance of good labour relations, training, proper wages and productivity.

There was for many years an acceptance of the absence of a proper labour relations law that makes provision for workers’ rights for all and of the lack of training and other discriminatory measures. This is also regrettable. There was
support for the later developments under Professor Nic Wiehahn. A similar omission occurred in regard to discrimination against women. The AHI should have helped to remove the barriers for women much earlier.

For its part in these omissions and commissions, the AHI firstly accepts moral responsibility. Secondly, admits that fellow South Africans were gravely wronged by these actions or inaction. Thirdly, we wish to express our sincere regret for these failings and, lastly, we apologise to all of those affected as a consequence hereof.

In doing so, the AHI earnestly wishes to contribute to reconciliation in our country and the building of a South Africa in which we all can grow and prosper.

A number of amnesty applicants also expressed remorse, even though this was not required by the Act. This was, indeed, a controversial feature of the legislation, and some argued strongly that contrition should have been another precondition for amnesty. Others, however, said that this saved the process from lies and faked apologies.

At the amnesty hearing of the ‘Pebco Three’, Mr Kimpani Peter Mogoai, a former askari was questioned:

Advocate Lamey: Mr Mogoai, at this hearing you are aware that the – let me just say this – at this hearing you are aware that the family members of Mr Hashe, Godolozi and Galela are present. Is there anything that you would like to convey to them?

Mr Mogoai: ... I know that they are present, but I don’t know them well...

These are the words which I want to say. I have written them down. They come from my heart, which I wanted to address them before this Commission, before the members of the deceased and then before the audience and those who are not present here. I have written them in English, Mr Chairperson.

Advocate Lamey: You can proceed.

Mr Mogoai: I have taken this opportunity to speak the truth and to express my torturing regrets about wasted years and my shame about a mean and petty past.

As I regard myself today as a disgrace to my mother, my family and my relatives. My friends and the families of the Pebco Three and the nation as such, it is with my deepest remorse that I ask for forgiveness and hopefully wish to be reconciled with everybody once more and be part of a better and brighter future of South Africa.
I say it now here today, as I could not have done so in the earlier days of this realisation for obvious reasons. I thank you.

**TOWARDS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN VICTIMS/SURVIVORS AND PERPETRATORS**

62 Although it was not part of the Commission’s mandate to effect reconciliation between victims, the community and perpetrators, there were a number of significant instances where the Commission directly facilitated the beginning of this complex process.

**Neville Clarence and Aboobaker Ismail**

63 Fifteen years after he was blinded in the Church Street bomb in Pretoria, Mr Neville Clarence, a former South African Air Force captain, shook hands with the man who planned the attack aimed at the South African Air Force headquarters. During the amnesty hearing, Mr Aboobaker Ismail (former head of the special operations unit of the ANC’s military wing MK and currently head of policy and planning in the Defence Secretariat) told the Committee that he regretted the deaths of civilians in the course of the armed struggle. In a face-to-face meeting before the start of the hearing, Ismail told Clarence: “This is very difficult, I am sorry about what happened to you.” Clarence said that he understood, adding, “I don’t hold any grudges”. Both agreed that they should meet again, and they exchanged telephone numbers. “Talking about it is the only way to become reconciled”, Ismail said.

64 Afterwards, Clarence told reporters that he could not comprehend the full extent of the healing that had taken place at the meeting.

> I came here today partly out of curiosity and hoping to meet Mr Ismail. I wanted to say I have never felt any bitterness towards him. It was a wonderful experience... Reconciliation does not just come from one side. We were on opposite sides and, in this instance, I came off second best.

65 According to an editorial in the Sowetan, “Clarence’s magnanimous gesture will no doubt stand out as a symbol of hope for a society that remains deeply divided”. The editor of another major newspaper saw the meeting between Clarence and Ismail as a lesson that:

> Despite ‘our war’ (or perhaps because of it) we can live together. That is possible because people on both sides possess magnanimity of spirit. This
is not a call to naivety and the creating of a ‘new’ South African nation will not happen overnight. But looking at other parts of the world – be it the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Somalia, Rwanda – we should never forget our ability to forgive.11

Ivy Gcina and Irene Crouse

66 At the human rights violation hearing in Port Elizabeth, veteran activist and ANC MP Cikizwa Ivy Gcina gave harrowing testimony on her torture in detention in 1985. Ms Gcina also had praise for a warder at North End Prison, Ms Irene Crouse:

The same night I saw a light at night and my cell was opened. I did not see who was opening my cell. I did not look at the person. She said to me, "Ivy, it is me. I am Sergeant Crouse. I have fetched your medicine". She rubbed me. She made me take my medicine. I told her that I could not even hold anything but I can try. I told her I was going to try by all means. She said "It is fine, do not worry yourself. I will help you." So she made me take the medicine and then she massaged me. Then after that I could at least try and sleep.

67 A few days later the local newspaper, the Eastern Province Herald, carried a front page, full size picture of Ivy Gcina hugging Irene Crouse, under the main headline: “Ivy meets her Angel of Mercy. Now here’s what reconciliation is all about”. The report read:

Tortured activist Ivy Gcina was yesterday reunited with her Angel of Mercy - the kind jailer who held her hand and tended her wounds after hours of brutal interrogation by security police. “I never thought you’d remember me”, said Irene, 37, as the two women threw their arms around each other on the stoep [verandah], crying and laughing at the same time. Ivy, 59, replied: “But after I was assaulted it was you who was there to help me, who entered my cell at night. Can you ever forget someone like that?”

68 Both women said the Commission hearings had brought out necessary, though painful, details about the country’s past - but equally important, it had brought them together. “We met as human beings, as women,” Ivy recalled. “There was such communication there. Ensuring I had a clean towel, asking me how I was. The relationship was so good.” Irene felt she was “only doing her duty” when she helped Ivy.

11 As reported in The Star, 6 May 1998. See also reports in the Sowetan, Cape Times, Beeld, and Pretoria News.
At the Eastern Cape hearing, chairperson Revd Bongani Finca said the Commission was not only bent on discovering the hurt that had been done, but also those who had “risen above the system. It is wonderful that even in a system like that there were people who rose above it. I salute Ms Crouse that in such a situation she was able to show kindness”.

Brian Mitchell and the Trust Feed Community

Trust Feed is a rural community situated north-west of Pietermaritzburg in KwaZulu-Natal. It is a freehold area with a hierarchical structure of landowners and tenants. The area has a long history of peaceful co-existence that changed in the mid-1980s as a result of political tensions between the UDF and the IFP. Threatened by the activities of the UDF, the local police unit colluded with the IFP to wipe out UDF members. This led to a sequence of atrocities culminating in the Trust Feed massacre in December 1988.

The massacre was directly related to the clandestine activities of Captain Brian Mitchell, Station Commander at the New Hanover police station at the time. On his orders, eleven people were killed and two others wounded at a night vigil following the death of a relative. Five of them were men and the rest were women and children. None were UDF members. In April 1992, Captain Mitchell was sentenced to death eleven times for his role in ordering the attacks. His sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment in 1994. After serving a prison term of about five years, Captain Mitchell was granted amnesty by Commission in 1997.

The Trust Feed community (though they had not reportedly opposed amnesty) was enraged and seemed not to have forgiven Captain Mitchell. The hurt was profound, and the community went through a process of re-experiencing the original anger and pain. Captain Mitchell expressed remorse and asked for forgiveness. He pledged to honour the community request to help reconstruct the community he had polarised and destroyed through his clandestine operations.

In this way, two parties, divided by negative feelings of hostility and rage, were able to come together with the common purpose of reconciliation. For Trust Feed, polarised and divided by destructive forces, it offered an opportunity to help restore broken relationships and create a stronger sense of community.

Some of the essential and necessary elements for reconciliation were already in place. Captain Mitchell had made a confession. He appeared to repent of his own
atrocious deeds and had made a request for forgiveness. He had also reconciled
himself with God and was a member of the Rhema Church. At the same time, the
community of Trust Feed was still in pain and needed time to heal its wounds. It
had, however, indirectly paved the way for forgiveness by asking Captain Mitchell
to commit himself to playing a part in the reconstruction of the Trust Feed community
as an overt act of repentance.

75 The Commission facilitated the various stages of the process. Initial contact was
made with Captain Mitchell who, accompanied by a Minister from Rhema Church,
once again declared his intention to reconcile with the Trust Feed community.

76 This was followed by series of meetings with a special committee representing the
Trust Feed community. Since the committee had a strong ANC bias, attempts were
made to invite IFP members to join. This was followed by a community meeting that
proved to be a cathartic experience. Community members were able to work
through their feelings to the point where they were willing to meet Captain Mitchell.

77 This in turn paved the way for a reconciliation meeting between the Trust Feed
community and Captain Mitchell. The meeting presented a major challenge to the
Commission and the community. All efforts were made to mobilise professional
expertise, including the services of mediation consultants.

78 The reconciliation meeting was held in July 1997 and was well attended by the
Trust Feed community – including both ANC and IFP members. The community
was given enough time to express its feelings and ask direct, clarifying questions of
Captain Mitchell who was also given an opportunity to express his feelings and ask
for forgiveness. A process of mediation followed, focusing on Captain Mitchell’s
offer to participate in community reconstruction and try to meet the community’s
expectations of him.

79 Following careful deliberations, all parties agreed that a committee should be
formed to look into the needs of the relationship with Captain Mitchell. The meeting
ended emotionally. As Captain Mitchell was driven away from the community he
had so grossly violated, he was followed with parting calls of “Bye-bye, uhambe
kahle [go well] Mitchell”.

80 The reconciliation meeting was a considerable success and the spirit of goodwill
and willingness to forgive by the Trust Feed community was very touching. The
community’s sense of trust is still very fragile and will need to be sustained by
Captain Mitchell's long-term commitment to his offer. The fact that the community opened its heart to Brian Mitchell made it vulnerable to secondary violation and traumatisation should Mitchell fail to honour his offer of reconciliation. Thus, the meeting was simply the beginning of a long process of reconciliation. The community and Brian Mitchell carry the major responsibility for ultimate reconciliation.

81 Reconciliation at the meeting went beyond this, however, and led to a healing of community tensions between ANC and IFP members. During the meeting, leaders of both parties expressed a great willingness to work together as a united community and committed themselves to follow-up meetings.

82 There were, however, problems. The overseas press sought to sensationalise the reconciliation initiatives by talking to Mitchell and a few selected families from the Trust Feed community. This created divisions and renewed feelings of mistrust. The situation was, however, well managed by the Trust Feed committee. In addition, the heavy police presence at the meeting did not create an ideal environment for conciliation. On the other hand, in the light of the potentially explosive nature of the situation, the role of the police force in helping to maintain a contained and controlled environment seemed necessary.¹²

Reconciliation in Esikhawini, Northern KwaZulu-Natal

83 Journalist Ken Daniels describes the process of reconciliation in Esikhawini in northern KwaZulu-Natal:

Hit squad members reconcile with community they terrorised

The people of Esikhawini township near Richards Bay on the KwaZulu-Natal North Coast for the past two weeks relived the horror that befell their community six years ago and at the end of it all on Friday, somehow found it in their hearts to forgive the men who had subjected them to a living hell.

The residents had, before this month's Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Committee hearings in Richards Bay, been in the dark as to who attacked them mercilessly on a daily basis. They were finally able to confront the seven members of an Inkatha Freedom Party hit squad that has admitted carrying out random attacks on the community of Esikhawini in an attempt to eliminate any support for the African National Congress.

When the community sat down on Thursday afternoon to hear pleas for forgiveness from the row of men that made up their nightmare, they found it had

¹² Reported by Professor AS Magwaza, member of the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee.
a human face. They saw it in Daluxolo Wordsworth Luthuli’s resemblance to his Nobel Peace Prize-winning grandfather Albert Luthuli. They saw it in Brian Gcina Mkhize who had been stern throughout the two week hearing but let a faint smile slip across his face as he watched a young child wander playfully amongst applicants and victims oblivious to the shocking loss of life being discussed around him. And they saw it in the face of Romeo Mbambo whose face suddenly became awash with tears when he came face to face with a young woman he had crippled.

The victims found it hard to believe these were their tormentors – stripped of their balaclavas and blazing guns – who sat ready to take everything the community was willing to throw at them and then ask for forgiveness. The community and their former tormentors came together in an informal hearing that did not form part of the Truth Commission proceedings and was aimed at giving locals a chance to ask the applicants about particular incidents.

With the emotion drained from everyone after the applicants’ harrowing testimony, the final performance took on a different complexion as perpetrator and victim discussed the mechanics of the political process which brought about a season of bloodletting in the previously peaceful community.

A thin old man with flashing eyes and upright stance indignantly asked Romeo Mbambo why he had killed his neighbour’s son who was not at all involved in politics. Mbambo, recalling the incidents instantly, replied that it had been a mistake and that on the night in question he had been searching for an ANC activist but the assassins had attacked the wrong house and killed the young man along with three of his friends. The old man listened to the account and, as he walked away, he said sorrowfully that his own son had been one of the four killed that night.

Another elderly gentleman walked up to the microphone and in a booming voice questioned Hlongwane’s version to the Amnesty Committee about an attack the old man had suffered. The tough old warrior with grey-tinged beard and hair and the young hit man then engaged in a lengthy discussion about their life and death battle on the night in question. At times the old man smiled as he told Hlongwane how he had avoided the bullets and the blows during the attack.

Finally, the old man told Hlongwane he was lucky that he had not succeeded in his mission, because then he would apologise to him now.

A young woman who had earlier reduced tough hit man Mbambo to tears sat in her wheelchair throughout the proceedings. Nokuthula Zulu was a 20-year-old student when Mbambo and his colleagues fired a shot into her side,
paralysing her from the waist down. After the hearing she said she now felt more healed by the experience of confronting her assailants and she had overcome her anger at not being able to walk or to complete her studies.

At end of the meeting, the residents took a unanimous vote to forgive the members of the hit squad. All parties embraced and shook hands. For the residents of Esikhawini the nightmare was finally over.13

Reconciliation in Upington, Northern Cape: Nicholas ‘Oupa’ Links and the Jonga family

84 The house of Mr Nicholas Links, a municipal police officer, came under attack by youths in December 1986. When his daughter’s head was injured by a stone hurled by the four youths attacking his house, he fired a shot which fatally wounded twenty-one year old Matan Jonga.

85 Links gave testimony at the human rights violations hearing in Upington on 2-3 October 1996. He related that he was congratulated by his superiors for his first murder and offered further lethal weapons and one hundred rounds of ammunition. This only had the effect of making him feel extremely guilty, especially since the victim was so young.

86 Mr Links left Upington as he could not live with his guilt in the town. He returned only in 1991 and claims to have been well received by the community. At the hearing, he expressed the wish to publicly apologise to the family for causing the death of their son and relative.

87 Despite having apologised, when the hearing team returned to the Upington for the follow up meeting, Mr Links again, in an extremely emotionally charged meeting, asked the family to forgive him. He referred to the fact that it was difficult for them to come to terms with the death of the son, as it was such a senseless killing. He acknowledged that receiving forgiveness from them would not return their son to them, but their acceptance of his apology would free him of the guilt he had carried for so many years.

88 Most of the people in the meeting had by this time been reduced to tears. Mr Links, who was speaking from the front of the church hall, asked a representative of the family to come forward if they were prepared to forgive him. An aunt came forward to accept the apology. However, she pointed out that the matter could

not be completely resolved in such a forum and that a meeting of the elders of both sides of the family should be called. She seemed reluctant to be the spokesperson for the family.

89 Those present from the Commission had the impression that a process of reconciliation had started for these two families and for the community as a whole. The clergy at the meeting suggested that a reconciliation service be held, culminating in a communion mass and community feast.

Reconciliation in Ashton, Western Cape

90 In the late 1980s, the town of Ashton and the neighbouring town of Zolani were the sites of intense conflict between community members. A group of vigilantes called the Amasolomzi, allegedly supported by the police, terrorised residents believed to be engaged in anti-government protest or other political activity. It was believed that the Amasolomzi used the Langeberg-Koo factory as their ‘headquarters’ and that many of its members were on the staff at the factory.

91 The Amasolomzi were held responsible for numerous beatings, shootings and deaths. A number of residents told the Commission that Amasolomzi members also accompanied police on raids and other operations in Zolani and Ashton.

92 Almost a decade later, Ashton and Zolani were relatively peaceful. However, many of those who participated in Amasolomzi activities were still living in the town and while, on the surface, all seemed to be well, there was still a significant amount of distrust and anger between previous Amasolomzi members and other residents. These feelings resurfaced in the course of statement taking in the area and because of testimony given at hearings in Worcester. For example, Zolani residents told the Commission that they would only give statements to Commission staff from Cape Town, not to specifically trained Ashton or Zolani inhabitants, as no one knew who could be trusted.

93 It became evident that some sort of conflict resolution was needed in the area. Residents approached the Commission saying that they had decided to hold a service of reconciliation. The Commission was asked if it could help with the organisation of the service and attend it. The Cape Town Reparation and Rehabilitation co-ordinator worked with the Trauma Centre Satellite Clinic (based in Zolani) to help facilitate the process of bringing people from different factions together. In August 1996, a large inter-denominational church service was held
at which residents committed themselves to reconciliation and peaceful co-
existence. Obviously, peace and reconciliation were not achieved overnight, but
the service seems to have been the start of a process in which township residents
reached a stage of acceptance of the past and tolerance of each other.

RECONCILIATION WITHOUT FORGIVENESS

The above-mentioned emphasis on peaceful or non-violent co-existence suggests
that a weak or limited form of reconciliation may often be the most realistic goal
towards which to strive, at least at the beginning of the peacemaking process.
This applied to relationships between former enemies within communities, but also
to the network of relationships between communities, ethnic and racial groups
at regional and national levels. This form of reconciliation, without apologies by
those responsible or forgiveness by victims, is also reflected in the following
individual testimonies:

At the Parys human rights violations hearing in April 1997, Ms Mathabiso Marie
Sekhopa said:

In 1990, it was in September on the twenty-second. It was on Sunday. I was
in the house. My husband was working outside. I was staying with my two
children. The other two were not inside the house. It was at about half past
three. The Mangesi family – their shop is next to my house – Alina Matsimela,
Senela Mangesi and Popo Mangesi. When they come, they were having
stones. They threw stones at my house. They broke all my windows. I was
in the kitchen then. I took my children and put them under the table, and then I
was looking. They broke, then from there, they went to the shop. They came
again and threw stones at my house up to half past three.

After that, they went back. I didn’t see where they went. I took my children. I
said to my daughter she must go and fetch a blanket for me so that I’ll be able
to carry the small one. Afterwards we went outside the house to my next-door
neighbour. I sought accommodation at my neighbour. Then I said to my
neighbour, "I don’t know what is happening. I don’t know where I am going
to sleep." She said, "I will give you accommodation up to the following day
in the morning".

Whilst I was still at her place up to the morning, before then, whilst I was still
there, my daughter went outside and then she drank water, then returned
and said, "Our house is burning." When I looked through the window, I could
see that the house was burning. There were some boys whom we were with
at my neighbour. While we were outside, I heard somebody say: "Here they come." We returned to my neighbour's house. Then I said to those people I was with in the house that they leave my house to burn, otherwise we will be at risk. We were even afraid to go outside.

96 When Ms Sekhopa was asked whether there is now peace in the Rouxville township and how she was getting along with the family which destroyed her house, she said:

Yes, there's peace now... Yes, we have reconciled because they are our neighbours.

97 At the Duduza human rights violations hearing on 12 February 1997, Ms Evelina Puleng Moloko testified thus:

**Ms Seroke:** Puleng, the people who killed Maki, what happened to them thereafter?

**Ms Moloko:** The people who killed Maki were arrested. That is the people who appeared on the video taking part in the killing. They were convicted, but I do not remember quite well as to what sentences were meted out. Some got five years, some ten respectively, and some got a life sentence, but all of them are here at the present moment. They are out.

**Ms Seroke:** Do you ever meet these people?

**Ms Moloko:** Yes, I do.

**Ms Seroke:** Do you talk?

**Ms Moloko:** Yes, I do talk to some others, and I work at a crèche, and there were two who came to bring their children at that crèche, and if you bring your child there you are supposed to speak to me. I am the one who is responsible with regard to admissions, and they had brought their children. I spoke to them as if nothing happened. We accepted their children, and there is nothing amiss. Everything is just as usual.

### RESTITUTION OR REPARATION

98 The previous two sections illustrated the healing potential of sincere apologies. A sure sign of sincerity is a commitment to restitution or reparation. The following statements from the Commission’s hearings capture the vital importance of restitution as part of the reconciliation process. At the public announcement of
the Reparation and Rehabilitation policy recommendations in October 1997, Archbishop Tutu said:

Much of what we are about is saying as a nation ‘we are making acknowledge-
ments to people’. The [reparation] amount is going to be symbolic... the nation is saying sorry.

99 At the forum on Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Economic Justice in Cape Town on 19 March 1997, Ms Cynthia Ngewu, mother of one of the ‘Gugulethu Seven’ said:

In my opinion, I think the best way to demonstrate a truthful commitment to
peace and a truthful commitment to repentance is that perpetrators of acts of violence would make a contribution, a financial contribution to the families of victims and, in that way, they would then cleanse themselves of their own guilt, and they will then demonstrate with extreme confidence that in fact they are sorry about what they did.

100 A few amnesty applicants did seem sensitive to this need for restitution. Colonel Eugene de Kock devoted the royalties from the sale of his autobiography to a trust fund for victims. Mr Sakkie van Zyl saw his participation in the clearing of landmines in Angola as a form of restitution. Mr Brian Gcina Mkhize risked his own life by co-operating with the authorities to expose clandestine operations in KwaZulu-Natal during the years of conflict. The challenge is to involve much larger numbers of those who received amnesty and other perpetrators of gross human rights violations in the process of restitution.

101 The following extract from the ‘Bisho massacre’ hearing shows that perhaps an even greater challenge may be to involve people on a broader scale: for example, those who gave the orders or voted for the previous government and/or continue to benefit from past human rights violations.

Dr Ramashala: My question relates [not to] Bisho [specifically], but to the gross human rights violations in general which were supported by the then government of the day... We have been very successful in killing. We have been very successful in maiming and leaving people crippled for the rest of their lives. We have been very successful in leaving children without parents and without a future. Have there been any discussions at all within the National Party about these children... We all point to statistics, we all point to who has done what, but I really have never heard any discussions from the political parties about these children and our future, because these are our future South Africa...
Mr Roelf Meyer: Chairperson, I would like to thank the Commissioner again also for raising this issue, and I think, may I first of all say I think you have made an appeal to us – but not only to us, the three of us who are here, not only to our Party - I think you have made an appeal to the whole of South Africa, to all political parties, but also civil society in general, the community out there, everybody in South Africa...

I can say, yes, we are in various ways within the National Party attending to this question and related questions. What I would like to suggest is that we have a responsibility to come back to the Commission on this very question...

But I think, Madam Commissioner, if I may say, you have raised with us an issue which is probably the most important one in the final instance of the work of the Commission. Because if we can’t find an answer to the very question that you have put, then the work of the Commission, with all respect, is not going to be in the long term worth anything.

May I say that I don’t think it’s only those that have suffered directly, but there are many, many South Africans, thousands of South Africans who have also indirectly suffered through apartheid, that we have to consider within the whole spectrum of what we want to do in the future. So it’s not only a question of the specific terms of reference of the Commission - namely how to address human rights violations of the nature that has been described in your terms of reference - but it is, in the final instance, we as politicians, as political parties, that have to give direction as to how we are going to rectify the wrongs that flowed from apartheid in a very general sense.

Dr Ramashala: Chairperson, may I ask Mr Meyer and his team that, as you prepare that submission, you consider the following comment from the communities, particularly the greater black communities, and I want to quote: "They get amnesty. They get the golden handshake, (meaning rewards). They get retirement pensions worth millions. And we get nothing. And on television they smirk or they smile to boot."

As you address that submission, please address the question of the perpetrators on your side. The other parties will deal with the perpetrators on their side. But the perpetrators on your side who, so far, when they apply for amnesty and present themselves, and even say they are sorry. None of them has said: “This is my contribution. I would like to do the following.” It stops with, “I am sorry”. None of them has said: “As a demonstration, perhaps of how sorry I am, this is what I would like to do”. None of them have done that. So as you prepare that submission, could you please address that, because that is the more
102 The following statements illustrate this vital need for broad participation, especially by those who have been unjustly privileged in the past, together with some of the obstacles to restitution. Dr Laurie Nathan, director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution and former Chairperson of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), said at a special hearing on compulsory military service in Cape Town:

I want to end by addressing the question of how, in the light of this history, we should manage the past, and I want to address these comments in particular to the white community. The white community tends to take one of three positions in this regard.

First, they say they are shocked by the revelations of the [Commission]. Had they only known about the atrocities at the time, they would surely have objected. This is a self-serving myth. It is patently dishonest to claim today that any of us were unaware of apartheid; unaware of forced removals and pass laws; unaware of deaths in detention or unaware of the killing of children in our streets.

The second response from the white community is that, well we knew what was happening, and we did everything in our power to object. This is also a myth. The truth of the matter is that a tiny minority of whites voiced any opposition and then mostly in conditions of relative safety and comfort. An even smaller minority of whites participated directly in the campaigns, in the daily struggle of the black community.

The third position comes from whites who say, let bygones be bygones. Rehashing the past will only perpetuate divisions and inhibit reconciliation. Let us concentrate instead, they say, on building a new future. In my view, this position adds insult to injury. It’s a monumental deceit. Whatever the individual talents and efforts of whites, our lives of privilege today are the product of a grand historical act of theft. We stole the land, the labour, the dignity and, in countless instances, the lives of the black people of our country. The majority of blacks still live with the consequences, and the majority of whites still enjoy the fruits of our acts of violence. The past is present. It is present in our suburbs and in our townships. It’s present in our individual and national psyche. White domination may have been eliminated in the political arena but it still prevails at an economic level and in forums like universities and the media which have a powerful impact on the ideas and the debates of broader society.
White racism is alive and kicking. It no longer takes the form of legislated supremacy, but it continues to manifest itself in crude and subtle ways. The most insidious is the assumption that white values are universal and by implication superior to those of other groups. The most offensive is the endless complaining about corruption, inefficiency and falling standards. This is one of the bad jokes of the new South Africa. The previous government set unsurpassed standards for corruption, incompetence and neglect.

There is a fourth position which is seldom heard and which I believe is the appropriate response. The white community should confront its pervasive racism, and stare our ugly history and its long shelf life in the face. We should acknowledge collective responsibility for our efforts and our acquiescence in constructing and maintaining a wretched system of discrimination, exclusion and repression. To invoke theological terminology, we should confess and engage in meaningful acts of contrition.

These acts of contrition could take many forms: establishing or funding memorials like those which commemorate the holocaust in Nazi Germany, funding bursaries for black students or basic facilities for pupils, providing medical supplies to amputee hospitals in Mozambique and Angola, church actions such as fasts and others, training in respect for human rights and multi-cultural diversity for teachers and pupils. These are only some examples. These and other actions are forms of reparation, but it’s critical that they are undertaken, not as charity, but in partnership with black communities...

Let me say in closing that whites who interpret this argument to mean that they should become passive and sycophantic have misunderstood the nature of the challenge. The challenge is to become self-critical not uncritical, to acquire some humility, not be submissive; to become empathetic, not paternalistic. The challenge has nothing to do with self-flagellation or wallowing in guilt. It has everything to do with accepting responsibility for our actions and our lack of action.

103 At the hearing on conscripts in Cape Town on 23 July 1997, Mr Craig Botha talked about his involvement in the SADF as a conscript in the Navy during the late 1970s and early 1980s. He spoke honestly about his participation in the war:

As I look back upon this period, it is with deep shame and regret that I took part in these acts of sabotage and violent destabilisation. The struggles that our neighbouring states have had to undergo, even to this time, are partially attributable to these missions.
Most of his testimony, however, was devoted to his current attempts to be an agent of reconciliation as a pastor in the Jubilee Community Church in the Western Cape:

Along with our church, we also began to work actively towards reconciliation involving seeking forgiveness for the evil of apartheid and making financial restitution. To cut a long story short, we are at present extensively involved in Khayelitsha in the Western Cape. We have planted a non-racial church. The white folk that are part of this church have committed themselves to racial reconciliation in a practical way, not just in theory. We are involved in two pre-schools and are seeking to launch projects to empower the community. We are also involved in a housing project in Tambo Square, Tambo Village and have seen the hand of God really moving in terms of bringing together white and black and healing the divisions and enmity of the past.

I did not feel I needed to apply for amnesty for I personally did not kill anyone. I do feel, however, that I was part of the overall strategy of destabilisation during the apartheid years; and it was because of that, that I’ve come forward with this account. And I’ve also made the information available because I have been very disappointed to see the lack of courage that has been shown by many in the defence force in terms of owning up to deeds like this in the past.

I really feel that as a South African and as a Christian pastor that there’s a tremendous hope for this nation if individuals can find the grace to speak the truth and be agents of reconciliation as we face the future together.

He went on to make the important point that a lack of restitution might not be because people are insensitive and indifferent, but because there is a lack of specific advice and concrete guidelines about how ordinary people could get involved in restitution and reconciliation:

We went through a stage when we were quite overwhelmed by the whole situation and didn’t really know what to do or how to proceed, and we consulted people in the community, and we also did some soul-searching and some homework ourselves and realised that it would be good to target a particular community to see something established in a particular area. We therefore got this fund going through our church where people could put finances into that fund, knowing that it would be going to a specific community for upliftment and to build a centre in the area of Khayelitsha, and people responded to that in an overwhelming way.

So, I think if one could create channels, even simple channels and people know that there’s an end product that it’s not just going into a fund somewhere,
but it’s helping a particular community in a particular place. I think people want to give to that so that’s what we did and it worked, and people are still wanting to give, not just money but also themselves as well. Obviously there are those that are still apprehensive about going to the townships but will give finances into a fund to help with things like that, so that also helps towards uplifting communities and so on...

What we’ve found is, despite what we’ve been through as a nation, there are a lot of people looking for places and areas they can go to in order to experience practical reconciliation. And I think what has happened is that, within the church we’ve been involved with and the project, I think it’s provided an arena where people can come in and begin to work through issues and begin to meet people from different backgrounds and language groups and start a process together which is very exciting. That’s been good just being a part of facilitating that.

106 At the faith community hearing in East London from 17 to 19 November 1997, Chief Rabbi Harris described some of the concrete work that members of the Jewish community are engaged in, born of a sense of shared responsibility for past wrongs while at the same time being sensitive to the pitfalls of patronising charity:

In the Jewish community, we are developing a programme called Tekun. There [was] a great deal of hot air yesterday and this morning about what ought to be done, but there have been very few practical examples which are influencing the grassroots ... Tekun is a Hebrew word meaning repairing, trying to put things right. It is a wonderful exercise; we are trying to apply Jewish resources, skills, expertise and know how, to be of maximum benefit to the upliftment programme. One instance is food: the Jewish housewife, when she shops, is asked to buy an extra tin or extra packet. She is buying half a dozen tins, buy a seventh tin. A dozen packets of something – buy a thirteenth packet. That goes in a separate part of the trolley, goes to the nearest Synagogue...

We have many projects. I give you one instance on welfare. Nokatula, which is a home for the physically and mentally handicapped in Alexandra township, is constantly visited by the Selwyn Segal Centre, which is a similar home for physically and mentally handicapped people in Johannesburg. We share expertise and facilities, and we all go together to Camp David at Magaliesberg. May I point out that here we are not being patronising. I know it sounds terribly patronising. We are trying to empower people to help themselves, and that’s why we are handing over the skills. We have a major agricultural project at Rietfontein. It is an educational experience in farming, based on the success
in Israel. Many of our projects, I mention this not, God forbid, to make a political point! I mention it because the state of Israel has expertise in things like water conservation, solar energy and all forms ... helping at the moment seventeen African countries, and we feel very proud that the Israelis want to help us with some of our projects. And they are helping us with this Agricultural Education Centre at Rietfontein. Two weeks ago 100 000 spinach seedlings (I love spinach because it's good ... spinach gives you energy Mr Chairman!) - spinach seeds were planted, and we are all helping with this exercise. We have very many educational projects. We have enrichment programmes which SADTU [South African Democratic Teachers’ Union] and COSAS [Congress of South African Students] have co-operated with us. Sometimes they have requested, sometimes we have gone to them. Our King David Schools in Johannesburg and the schools in Cape Town are helping in the townships with computer literacy programmes. It’s where I’m computer illiterate, but the youngsters, bless them, have to be computer literate. And we’re helping in East Bank High School for example, in Alex, with many adult education programmes. Basic literacy courses. Ossac is a black adult education school in Killarney, run in the Oxford Synagogue. We get over 100 every evening. The ages range from 20 to 60. There are domestic workers, security personnel, shop assistants, and unemployed people. They do the IEB tests in English and Maths, and we have a 95% success rate, and there is nothing more joyous in the world than seeing somebody over fifty who has been denied an education actually coming every night and studying, and the glow on that person's face when they hold their certificate. It is wondrous to behold. We are encouraging education in many ways. Our Union of Jewish Women has programmes in Soweto in HIPPI (home instruction for pre-primary youngsters which is geared to the mothers) and MATAL (upgrading the qualifications of pre-school teachers).

We are using the expertise of ORT, which is an international Jewish organisation, and we have at Midrand a college of Science and Technology, which is again wonderfully successful. We are doing things for employment and there is a very wonderful lady called Helen Leiberman, in the Cape, who does Ikamva La-Bantu, it’s making toys and bead decorations, and they are sold all over the world – in Paris, London and New York. And it’s a way of getting [people], including blind people, who can be taught how to string the beads and by the touch on a colour system, and it’s a marvellous thing. We have sporting activities, Maccabi goes in, and we have soccer in Soweto and they love it. And we have cultural activities. We have joint choral concerts. We have the black choir of Soweto, the Johannesburg Jewish Choir and something called
the Welsh Male Choir. We are trying to build bridges. We are going across the board.

I have only given you, Mr Chairperson, dear, dear friend – I have only given you a few examples. I know it’s a drop in the ocean, but we are trying to galvanise our Jewish community in order that we can actually help. It is our responsibility to be of help.

107 At the hearing on the legal system in Johannesburg, the Natal Law Students said:

One of the more significant ways in which those who enjoyed the benefits of the past could make amends is to provide service to the community whom they allowed to be subjugated. As students, we can say that we do not want the money of these practitioners, we do not want them to go on their hands and knees and beg for forgiveness, we do not want any more platitudes and token gestures. The apology of the Pretoria Bar, amongst others, is noted. However, we need to go beyond this and ask ourselves, what are we going to do in concrete terms to redress the imbalances, to demonstrate that we really are sorry?

The law clinic suggests that these practitioners share their skills and resources. In concrete terms, all it requires is for each governing body to co-ordinate a programme where private practitioners volunteer their time to university law faculties, university law clinics and other community service organisations. If each governing body were to organise such an effort to ensure that more pro bono work and a greater degree of community service are carried out, then we would have gone beyond platitude to really transforming our society, to ensure that resources are shared, skills are shared and that human dignity is restored and protected.

108 In concluding this section, it is important to highlight, once again, the historical and moral basis for the above-mentioned demands for widespread reparations beyond the limited group of victims on which the Commission was required to focus. At the business sector hearing in Johannesburg on 11 November 1997, Professor of Economics, Sampie Terreblanche, listed the following seven reasons why “political supremacy and racial capitalism impoverished Africans and enriched whites undeservedly”:

Firstly, the Africans were deprived of a large part of land on which they conducted successful traditional farming for centuries. White farmers on the other hand had the privilege of property rights and access to very cheap and docile African labour, my father included.
Secondly, for decades, millions of Africans were paid exploitative wages, in all sectors of the economy but mainly in gold mining and agriculture. The fact that the Africans were politically powerless and economically unorganised might make them easy prey for super-exploitation [in favour of] the white workers.

Thirdly, a great variety of discriminative legislation not only deprived Africans of the opportunity to acquire skills, but also compelled and humiliated them to do really unskilled work at very low wages. While discriminatory measures were often to the disadvantage of business, they were very much to the advantage of white employees.

Fourthly, perhaps the greatest disadvantage which the prevailing power structures had for Africans is that these structures deprived them of opportunities to accumulate human capital, the most important form of capital in the twentieth century. For the first three quarters of the century, social spending, on education, pensions etcetera, on Africans, was per capita more or less ten to eight times smaller than on whites. In 1970, the per capita spending on white education was twenty times higher than the per capita spending on Africans.

Fifthly, the fact that a legal right to own property and to conduct a business was strongly restricted in the case of Africans also deprived them of the opportunity to accumulate property and to develop entrepreneurial and professional capabilities. The position of whites was again the complete opposite. They enjoyed property rights, they deprived Africans of their land, they had access to capital and the opportunity to develop business organisations, entrepreneurial capabilities, and etcetera.

Sixthly, the liberation struggle and the resistance against it had a devastating effect on the poorer 60 per cent of the African population. Their income, already very low in 1975, decreased by more or less 35 per cent from 1975 until 1991. The fact that the poorer 40 to 50 per cent of the total population, more or less eighty million people, cannot satisfy their basic human needs on a regular basis, makes it so much more urgently necessary to do at least something meaningful to improve the quality of their poverty.

Seventhly, it was not only individuals that have been impoverished and destroyed by the racist system, but also African societies, while it also prevented the South African people from becoming a society. We can put forward a strong argument, that the depravation, the repression and the injustices inherited in the racist system not only impoverished the African population but also brutalised large numbers of Africans. After decades of apartheid and the struggle against it, South African society is a very disrupted and divided society; not only along racial and ethnic lines but also because of seemingly irreconcilable values and attitudes.
THE WAY FORWARD

109 During the life of the Commission, other issues relating to national unity and reconciliation were highlighted. Important aspects of reconciliation at a community level as well as the need for a deep, practical commitment by ordinary citizens to the reconciliation process were also emphasised.

Towards national unity and reconciliation: building a culture of democracy and respect for human life

110 A statement by Archbishop Tutu at the opening of the 'Bisho massacre' hearings in Bisho on 9 September 1996 serves as a reminder that the Commission’s attempts to help restore human dignity had a dual purpose: to restore the dignity of victims of past violations and to prevent future violations of human dignity.

111 One of the things the Commission was mandated to do was to make recommendations on ways to ensure that things of this kind never again happen in South Africa.

We will be looking to see how we might be able to inculcate, instil in all of us in this land, a deep reverence for human life against the prevalent cheapness that we see, for instance, in the high level of criminal violence that is happening at the present time in our country. We hope that as we listen to those who are not statistics but human beings of flesh and blood, that you and I will be filled with a new commitment, a new resolve that our country will be a country where violations of this kind will not happen, that the context will be inhospitable for those who seek to treat others as if they were nothing.

112 Addressing an angry audience at the same hearing, Archbishop Tutu made it clear that national unity and reconciliation are based on a difficult commitment to democratic values:

Chairperson: Colonel Peter, please have the podium. I am going to give you [the audience] a warning... I don’t know what you have come for – but we came here because we have been given a job to do which is to hear every point of view. Whether we like that point of view or not, that is not the point. We have to hear everything so that we are able to describe as fully as we can what it was that happened... If your strong feelings affect how we listen here, we are then going to ask you to take your feelings and leave with them...

It is a democracy that we are trying to build up and many of us are believers, and believers say that it is possible for all kinds of people, all of us, to
change and be different. That is why we are talking about reconciliation. You
don’t get reconciled with someone you agree [with]. You get reconciled with
someone with whom you disagree; otherwise there would be no point in having
reconciliation. You do not reconcile with someone whom you have no discordance
with. We would not have a Commission if there were reconciliation already.

This Commission exists because all kinds of painful things have happened on
all sides, and we are being asked to do a small job in a process [indistinct].
It is all of us who have to accept the pain of what happened in the past, to
try to move into the future. I will then ask you – please I beg you – will you
give everybody a fair chance and don’t let anybody feel under pressure.

113 These sentiments were echoed by Mr Joseph Seremane, chairperson of the
Land Claims Commission, at the special hearing on prisons in Johannesburg on
22 July 1997.

There is one thing that is messing up our country; it is the lack of sincerity in
our country. It is the lack of recognising other people’s contribution if they
don’t belong to your camp, if they don’t belong to your tribe, if they don’t
belong to your race. We are still victims of fragmentation. We have achieved
very little until we have changed...

We have been tested; we can forgive, we can reconcile; yet we are also capable
of forming third forces to hit back. But that is not what we want. We are looking
forward to a better South Africa – a South Africa that will respect the integrity of
everybody, irrespective of their colour, creed, tribe, too, and social standing
for that matter. And worse still, we must get out of this ideological straight-
jacket that we can only think of people, only as they belong to your straight-
jacket; outside your straightjacket, they are expendable commodities that you
can wipe off as you please. Commissioner Wynand Malan emphasised the
importance of seeing national unity and reconciliation as the embodiment of
both a human rights culture and a democratic culture... A shared under-
standing of the past may well go a long way towards reconciliation, yet an
understanding of the other person’s perspectives and motives will immensely
increase the capacity to live with and manage the other and oneself, even with
different understandings of the past persisting... A true human rights culture
is a democratic culture. At the heart of a democratic culture is tolerance of
divergent views and understandings of the past, present and future... National
unity and reconciliation is a society with its members relaxed, a nation
democratically at peace with itself.
Towards national unity and reconciliation: giving priority to the needs of children and youth

Ms Anne McKay, from the KwaZulu-Natal Survivors of Violence Project, made the following statement at the children/youth special hearing in Durban:

I think the stress on family life created by the constant pressure of the violence in this province cannot be underestimated. We've heard mothers in Bhambayi saying that they are literally too tired to take care of their children, even now in 1997, because their minds are full of the violence and they have no hope for the future. So they are not able to give that emotional nurturing and support to their children years after the violence has finished, because they have never received support; they have never received any place where they can feel safe enough to deal with their emotions so that they are emotionally available for their children...

[As] the adults that are in a sense the representatives of our society, we need to acknowledge to young people what has happened to them. We actually need to admit to ourselves that we have millions of children who either have left school, or are reaching the end of schooling, and there are no jobs for them to go to. We have to acknowledge that. We cannot wait for the RDP [Reconstruction and Development Programme] and the Macro Economic Plan to come up with economic growth. They are unemployed at the moment. They are at a loose end and not knowing where to go with their futures at the moment. I think the previous speakers spelt it out clearly. They wanted training. They wanted skills training. They want youth programmes. They want the Youth Commission to do something about their problems. They want youth centres, where recreational and intellectual development opportunities are available in their townships, because they don’t have money to travel to town and visit the museums, and so on and so forth, here.

Many of them left school at a very early age, and intelligent, interested, intellectually stimulated youth are walking around with standard five or standard seven education, with no one to recognise their potential. Other countries have increased the schooling available so that ex-combatants can go back to school and be educated with people of their own age, not sitting twenty-five-year-olds in the same classroom as fifteen-year-olds. They want proper adult education programmes whereby they can complete their schooling and go forward to fulfil their intellectual development.

I think that the demands are very simple and very practical, but much of the psychological relief would come from having these problems acknowledged, and having them on the debate and on the agenda.
The vital role of faith communities in the field of education – helping to nurture a
democratic culture and becoming more directly involved in formal teaching –
was emphasised at the faith community hearing in East London:

Mr Tom Manthata: Bishop, I’m not asking any new question. This has been
raised by Brigalia when she was addressing the issue of poverty … That is the
issue of education and the moral decay. My simple question is: does the
Anglican Church consider reviving or establishing schools at community level?
Because that is where this country will begin to address the issue of moral
decay. It is at that level that we can begin to address even issues of crime.
Does the church begin to say we can revive church schools at community level?

Bishop Michael Nuttall: Chairperson, I think that what Mr Tom Manthata has
raised is of enormous importance. I am not sure what the pattern is throughout
the life of our church, but certainly, I think there is a desire to move in this
direction. We have recently, in the diocese that I come from, seen the estab-
ishment of half a dozen schools at local community level, initiated by parishes
as a result of a synod resolution asking for exactly that to take place. Together
with the foundation of two new bigger ventures than local community ventures,
schools more like the ones that you have just mentioned. So we are following
up on that tradition and the whole idea is to try and fill that vacuum that has
existed ever since the Bantu Education Act came into being and we lost our
schools for one reason or another as a result of that legislation and a sense
of the need for the church to re-engage in a whole new creative way in the
whole education process. And certainly, that will be one of the areas in which
we will try to exercise our influence in regard to the spiritual and moral life of
the nation.

May I just add in that regard that for me in regard to moral reconstruction, one
of the most crucial things as I see it is for people to be helped, young and older
people alike, particularly the young, to be helped in this new dispensation of
freedom in which we find ourselves to make responsible choices. There are
some who seem to want to return to earlier tyrannies and censorship of the
past. I say no. We need to accept the reality of the new atmosphere of freedom
under which we now operate. But it lays upon us an even heavier responsibility
to assist one another, and particularly the young, in the making of responsible
choices and earning and living by those choices.

And so there is a new set of r’s. We talked about the three r’s of reading,
writing and arithmetic. The three r’s of rights, responsibilities and relationships.
Rights with responsibilities exercised in the context of affirming relationships.
That is where the making of responsible choices really begins to come in and have some impact. And certainly as part of that process we need to be engaging as much as we can with the schooling process.

116 At the special hearing on children and youth in Johannesburg, Mr George Ndlozi gave testimony on the activities of young people involved in self-defence units (SDUs) on the East Rand during the early 1990s. He insisted that “far from being a bunch of undisciplined comrades or the lost generation, SDUs were in many ways the backbone of defence in Katorus. If it were not for them, many of us would not be sitting here today.” His submission and those of many of the other young people who testified at the hearing made it clear “that youth involved in SDU activities have suffered a loss that can never be replaced, their childhood”.

117 He also sketched the extremely difficult conditions they faced and the challenges presented by their reintegration into society:

[At] that stage there was a lot of confusion. You didn’t know what to do, you prayed and you thought your prayers - God is not there, prayers are not answered. You do everything, you cry, you do whatever, and there is no answer to the solution.

And at the end of the day when you heard someone has died, and you just smile or laugh and say oh, our comrade is gone.

And if one can understand that confusion, then one would be able to understand that the Commanders and other political leaders were in another state in which they sort of failed enough to concentrate on how to convince younger people from not getting involved.

And there was a situation where you had to choose in which way do you go. It is either you come on this side or you become on the other side, because you cannot be neutral in that area. It was not possible for you to be neutral. If the attacks were launched, you are also affected and your family would be killed.

So what I will say is yes, things went wrong and we will actually like to ask the Commission to make sure if it had powers, that in future younger people are not getting exposed to this kinds of things because at the end of the day they get a disease that is called post stress disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, which if you look back to some of them, they went back to school, but they can’t cope any more. They can’t cope and they come back and they just leave school. There are a lot of them in the township.
Some of them have made requests to the [Commission] that the [Commission] organise vocational training for them and some of them can't go back to schools, because when they left school they were about thirteen years and some of them left school when they were in standard six, and now they are today about twenty-one, some of them.

Some of the SDU and SPU [self-protection unit] members were incorporated into the police service. One never believed that these two groups will work, you know, without problems with each other. But through the series of discussions that took place amongst them, today the crime around that area is decreased looking at the police statistics. Although not all of them were incorporated, there were some projects that also came [into existence] and there are some security companies which trained other people around there to have certificates so that they could get jobs.

And there are a lot of youth groupings trying to formulate themselves into some kind of a club. For instance I can mention Ithembalethu, which is existing in Katlehong, trying to bring all the youth who were affected by the violence, together and think about things that they might do to try and develop the community, to try and restore a dignity of the youth, to try and sort of, restore culture of living because the most problematic thing is going to school.

Although we might say there are some of the people today who have decided to become criminals, but there are a very few. You can name them, there are about four, five. And the question of the community discussing issues, I think they can find a remedy to that situation.

118 And at the youth hearing in Cape Town on 22 May 1997, Mr Riefaat Hattas, a political activist since the age of fifteen, placed this challenge before the Commission and the youth of today:

These are only the comrades that ... worked close with me. There are thousands of other comrades; I call them the forgotten comrades. Nobody took notice of us; nobody took notice of them. I would like the [Commission] to remember those people and I hope one day all the street children that must still attend school and those people who are sitting here who is coming from high schools, you have a responsibility towards us to try to reach your full potential and you must make the most of your normal lives that you have, because we are not able to do it. We have been messed up... Please, I beg of you, to make the best of your lives. You owe it to us.
Towards national unity and reconciliation: bringing the veterans together

119 At the special hearing on compulsory national service in Cape Town, Commissioner Mary Burton placed the following difficult challenge on the agenda:

We heard from people who were opposed to conscription from the beginning or who, through their experiences, were brought face to face with things that changed their minds. But there are many, many citizens of South Africa who did their military service and who still view themselves as having fought a good fight, as having upheld the safety of the State, as having opposed communism in a broad sense and who are still part of our country and who have to be taken into account as we move into a process of reconciliation and unity. Their views also need to be part of the whole stream of coming together. And when we talk about where we go forward we have to be knowledgeable of that view as well.

So perhaps part of the broad reconciliation challenge that lies ahead of this country over many, many years is the bringing together of all the veterans and that is a very big task, not one that this Commission can handle by itself, but one which has to be faced in building national unity.

120 A few weeks earlier, at the special hearing on children and youth in Johannesburg, on 12 June 1997, Mr Christo Uys made a similar statement:

Reconciliation is, according to our understanding, embedded in respect and therefore must we respect the struggle that was referred to in front of the [Commission] today in evidence, but we also ask that our role should be respected. We also have victims, people who died in the struggle and eventual reconciliation can only come about if these people are also honoured together with the comrades who were honoured by means of a play today.

Dealing with the legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge

121 Many testimonies serve as chilling reminders that the task of “transcending the divisions and strife of the past ... which left a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge” (Preamble to the Act) is far from complete. For example, a facilitator at the special hearing on children and youth in Durban gave this feedback from children’s testimonies and drawings:
She quoted from the testimony of a thirteen-year-old girl about the killing of her father six years earlier on the South Coast of KwaZulu-Natal:

That night my younger brother, my mum and myself went into the forest looking for our father, and then what I saw that night I have been carrying around with me ever since. My father had bullet wounds and stab wounds all over his body, and ever since that day I vowed to revenge my father’s death.

She said:

Another picture which I have here from an eight-year-old girl. She drew her father as a small or young man, and the mother being short, and when I asked the child why she is drawing the father short she said the reason she drew her father short it’s because the father was helpless, and they surrounded her father and they poured petrol on him and burnt him. What is very sad about this is that these children, most of them they know the people who did this, and those people are still alive and they see them every day. And another child, who is eight years old said, “I am just waiting for my revenge”.

Building a democracy where men and women can be at home

Ms Thenjiwe Mtintso said at the hearing on women in Johannesburg:

Chairperson, as the [Commission] wraps up its formal part of the work, as it publishes its report and as it breathes a sigh of relief for a job well done, we must know that the job continues. The mammoth task that still lies ahead is the continuous and consistent struggle for justice and protection of human rights, especially gender justice and gender rights.

The frightening statistics of violence against women and children which has reached, in my own view, Chairperson, genocide levels, have to be addressed. We cannot hope that there is going to be yet another [Commission] to address that, because in these sessions we’re backward looking. We’ve got to take the process forward; we’ve got to look in the now and the future.

We have just come out of this war. Part of the violence against women and children is because of that war. But part of that is the operation of patriarchy itself, because when male control and authority is in any way challenged or threatened, as it is being challenged and threatened every day in our country, it turns itself to the most violent forms. And with women and children, their bodies being used as, once again, the terrain of anger and struggle.
Democracy, reconciliation and nation-building remain threatened so long as patriarchy in all its forms and all the forms of patriarchy, Chairperson, are violent forms of patriarchy. They are actually a violation of human rights. We cannot limit human rights to what is in the Act. Gender inequality and gender injustice is a violation of human rights. It does not necessarily mean that we must have the hearings, but it means we must have the process of eradicating that.

As we today look back in our gruesome past, we must realise that our present and future remain in jeopardy, despite the good work of the [Commission], if the violence against women and children is allowed to continue.

The South African society needs to be mobilised in the same manner that it was mobilised against apartheid. In the same manner that we won that war against apartheid. Why are we not mobilising and engage in that war against violence against women and children? Why is the nation continuing as if nothing is happening? Why are these massacres allowed to happen? Why is this genocide? Why are we allowing it? Why is it being made a role of women?

It is not the role of Government alone. It is the role of this society, because if we do not do that, one year, two years down the line, we will have to have that Truth and Reconciliation Commission once again for us to come back and retell the stories that we suffered under democracy, Chairperson.

Within our own homes, the domestic violence in our own homes, the violence in our streets, the violence in the work place, the violence that’s permeating all of our society. Most of the time what is being highlighted, are the hijackings. I am not undermining this. I am not undermining the deaths. Look at the wall down Wits.¹⁴ That wall! Look at the faces! Ninety-nine per cent - I went there and looked and registered - 99 per cent are faces of men; where are the women who have been killed? Where are the women who have been raped? Where are the women who are getting battered in their own families? They are not in that wall. Why are they not in that wall?

Is that your work, Chairperson, as we build reconciliation? Because I get angry when I pass that wall. I get angry that the women’s own suffering is not being recognised by this country. I get angry because the [Commission] is silent about that. Because it is happening now. It is not happening in the days of apartheid, it is happening now.

¹²⁵ This is an extract from the submission by Dr Sheila Meintjes, on behalf of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, at the same hearing:

¹⁴ University of the Witwatersrand.
I think that what the [Commission] has done has been to open up ... a process which may well just be the tip of the iceberg. We call for further efforts and opportunities to be made for women to speak out. It might take ten or twenty or thirty or even forty years for women to acknowledge their experiences as it did for the women in South East Asia or for the victims of the holocaust to acknowledge sexual abuse by Nazi camp commanders.

126 The following extract deals with the role of women in a particular church, but can also be seen as a clear challenge for all South Africans to pay more than lip service to the constitutional ideal of a society where men and women can participate fully, where human rights are respected:

**Ms Joyce Seroke:** Bishop Michael, I would like to, through you, commend the CPSA [Church of the Province of Southern Africa] for coming to grips at last after a long and painful process of accepting women as priests in the church, but I would like to know what is the church doing to empower those women for meaningful participation within the church?

**Bishop Michael Nuttall:** Chairperson, as you will know this is a fairly recent development within the life of our church. It goes back to 1992. Perhaps we should have made that decision long before but, like so many other churches in this respect throughout the world, we have been on a journey and all of us have had to come to a profound change of mind when we’ve come to the point of accepting women clergy should be as free to operate within the life of our church as men clergy. So, we’ve only been involved in this for the past five years. We now have something like twenty-three women clergy out of 120 within the diocese which I’m part of ... but there’s still a very long way to go, and part of that long way to go is the need for the mindset to change because so many of us across the board, this is not a white or black phenomenon, but across the board, so many of us, particularly those of us who are male, but not only men, have got to make a major inner adjustment to this new reality within the life of our church. But as I said just now, I think that a new liberating process is underway for men and women alike in this process.

**Towards reconciliation at a community level**

127 The following extracts from statements at the post-hearing programme in Oudtshoom illustrate central aspects of the reconciliation process at a community level. Mr David Piedt, a community leader, reported:

So this was the place, the rural town in the Karoo, after the big march in August 1989 in Cape Town, where in September 1989 we mustered about
15,000 people in Oudtshoorn for the first big rural march. So in this town we decided on two things: the slogan "Submit or fight", because this was a very conservative place, extremely conservative, and the people in town had to make their choice early in the 'sixties: are we going to fight or are we going to submit? And the people took the alternative, and that is to fight back.

So, we headed for one hell of a confrontation. And after the change in the coming of the new Government and the freedom of the State President and everything, then people started to interact with one another. So what I am trying to say is that that phase of confrontation and conflict has passed in Oudtshoorn.

I spent four hours in a meeting yesterday with developers in Oudtshoorn... it went for a confrontation, but through means of interaction and negotiation we could reach some sort of an agreement and consensus.

So what I am trying to say is that this town is now on that way, and I am talking for the majority of people, and that includes white people, that there is a sincerity among the people: that we want to rebuild and reconstruct our town on a humanitarian basis, on the basis of human dignity, on the economic basis and on a social basis.

Mr Charles Narkin, representative of Western Cape Provincial Administration, Mental Health Services, said:

We had a meeting of about thirty people, nearly all of whom were from Oudtshoorn, and our mandate was to try and present a working programme that we can begin to implement with almost immediate urgency.

This group decided that they want to try and develop trauma services within their existing resources. There was an acknowledgement that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission cannot in the short term put up any reparation money. They cannot put up a lot of mental health resources. We must turn to the resources within Oudtshoorn and the resources within the Southern Cape.

So, the decision was that there would be two types of processes that will happen. First of all, the existing mental health workers will put the word out that ... people who have suffered from various forms of trauma [should] please feel that the health and the mental health services have an open door to receive them.

And this would also possibly include people who are perpetrators, who are suffering potentially the traumas of having played that role. Maybe deliberating about seeking amnesty, coming out into the open, seeking forgiveness, so it is really an open audit.
They have been trained, but they will get further training around the very particular nature of politically motivated trauma, as well as all the other trauma they deal with, like child abuse, sex abuse, violence, which is clearly no less in Oudtshoorn than in other communities – and we are very concerned about that.

But in addition to the traditional mental health workers, the decision was made by the group – and there were a lot of people there who immediately volunteered to set up a cohort of volunteers. They are going to be trained by Dr Van Wyk’s team and a supportive team led by myself from the Provincial Administration, where we are going to develop trauma work skills in this group of people, counselling skills, trauma skills, conflict resolution skills.

So, they are going to be armed with a set of skills that they can offer this community to ease some of the distresses and pains which are both chronic and acute. So, we are going to get going with training programmes, where these people, who are also the volunteers, will put the word out.

So, we want to just make a final message and a final statement to the community to say that put the word out that groups will be starting up. If people are suffering from trauma, if they are having all terrible symptoms and they cannot get their lives back on track, if they are having all kinds of problems which they feel are due to the traumatic events in their life, to feel that there is a supportive web being built up in this neighbourhood and in this community, by people in the community, and it will hopefully grow from strength to strength.

129 Mr Sipho Kroma, Mayor of Oudtshoorn, said:

I am saying that we have a democratically elected municipality in this town. And that democratically elected municipality has got a task and the task of making sure that we play a major role in the reconciliation of our people in this country.

One of the major roles that we have to play and that you must play in that municipality is to make sure that you participate in the whole issue of reparations and the healing of our people in this town. Because if our people are not healed, you are not going to be able to have a community to lead at the end of the day. We must and we are compelled to play a role at that level.

I am saying this, and I know that I am saying this on behalf of the majority of people in this town of ours, and I know that I am saying that on behalf of the majority of the Councillors who are within the Council.

As I mentioned that it is our task. People who are here who for the past three days have been part of this whole endeavour. I think what we need to
do now is to go to the other side and go and convince our brothers and sisters who are living in town and explain to them the importance of the Truth Commission and the importance of us coming together as a nation and the importance of us living together as brothers and sisters in the spirit of reconciliation, what that can do for our town.

There were people of the opinion that there can be no ways in which the people who were formally oppressed can reconcile within ourselves alone. We need to take our brothers and sisters in hand and bring them along with us. Even if that meant that we have to do that on a day to day basis and pursue and continue because it is very, very important for us to move together.

Let me further say that I hope that this is not the end of the whole process. That I hope that this is the first step towards healing and that with [the] step [taken] today we are going to form something concrete that is going to lead to us having a town that is healed.

Let me further say that, when I am saying these things, when I refer to the town I do not necessarily refer to the town council. I refer to the people of Oudtshoorn, to the community of Oudtshoorn. Together we can be able to build, to bridge the gap existing between us in this town. Together we can be able to make sure that our idea of reconciliation becomes a reality at the end of the day.

Some insights from a case study in Duduza

It would be wrong to make broad generalisations from a case study of a specific community where the Commission held a single human rights violations hearing. However, this work by an independent researcher does contain a number of important signposts for other communities on the road to reconciliation.

Duduza is a black township that is part of the Greater Nigel Area. Nigel is a town on the East Rand (Gauteng) with neighbouring African, Indian and Coloured townships. The total population of the town is approximately 150 – 200 000. Over half of these people live in Duduza.

The publicity around the establishment and functioning of the Commission, as well as its operation within Duduza has, at the very least, forced people to examine their own understanding of what reconciliation and forgiveness means to them and their community. For some, this may be primarily an intellectual exercise – looking at existing divisions and formulating some

15 Abridged version of work undertaken by Hugo van der Merwe, senior researcher at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, with funding provided by the United States Institute of Peace.
ideas about what should be changed, at what a reconciled community would look like. For others, it is a much more personal reflection, involving feelings of hatred, guilt and fear. Thinking about reconciliation means thinking about a process of overcoming the psychological barriers that they have been living with, often for many years.

The messages projected by the Commission and the support it was given by religious leaders and local politicians brought about some change in the way people viewed the idea of reconciliation. Many declared themselves committed to a process of reconciliation – contrasting this to their previous feelings of hatred and the desire for vengeance, the main response to their victimisation. For some, the main reason behind this change in attitude was the election of a new government. For others, it was simply the passage of time. Some victims, however, attribute their change of heart to the work of the Commission.

While some victims still find the idea of reconciliation, and especially forgiveness, insulting, it appears that for most the Commission has contributed to a greater commitment to the process of reconciliation. It has also created the space to pursue reconciliation. It is seen as a forum that provides a platform for storytelling, for revealing the truth, for holding the perpetrator accountable, for reparations, remorse and forgiveness. These are steps in a process that people now understand and accept as legitimate. They are steps that involve an exchange between victim and perpetrator, between individual and state. People have developed a fairly clear idea of what would constitute a fair exchange for them as individuals, involving both give and take.

Most of the conflict of the past was between community residents (particularly activist youth) and the security forces (police who were locally based, security police based in the regional head quarters, and the SADF). The mistrust between the community and the police has been changing, thanks in large part to the police-community forum that has been operating for a number of years. Many of the police who were seen as responsible for past abuses no longer work or live in Duduza and a new police station was built in the township. Nobody was aware of any amnesty applications that may have been submitted by members of the security forces in the area. There are also no pending court cases. It appears that few further details of the police atrocities in the community will be uncovered by the Commission.

The dynamics of the apartheid era conflicts had many spin-offs. The conflict environment led to a range of other associated divisions and intra-community dynamics. There were divisions arising from suspicions regarding police informers, collaborators and internal power struggles among ANC supporters.
Interpersonal conflicts were drawn into the political vortex and the dividing line between politics, criminal activity and interpersonal disputes became very indistinct.

These divisions are not resolved. People still mistrust each other. Victims still wonder if their neighbour or their councillor was the one who informed on them, or who spread the rumour about them being informers. People still wonder what secrets were still buried and how these secrets shape the operation of local politics. One example was a police officer, who is seen by many as implicated in past abuses, who is now a senior council employee. Many suspect that blackmail or other underhand deals are behind arrangements like these.

The political culture is also not liberated from the violent past. There is an increased sense of political tolerance, with people feeling more comfortable expressing support for opposition parties (rather than challenging the ANC internally). The present political leadership in the ANC is, however, alleged to have used intimidation in their fight for internal party control. New divisions are eclipsing those of the past, but they are still interwoven with the past. The emergence of new political parties (such as the United Democratic Movement) in the township draws on (and fans) suspicions that arose regarding past deeds in order to build a support base. Allegations of complicity with past abuses (both in terms of spying for the police or the use of violence directed at internal opposition) are common weapons in undermining support for one’s political opponents.

Blacks and whites still live very separate lives. Some blacks have moved into the white suburbs of Nigel, but many don’t feel particularly welcome. Racial incidents such as being barred from the health club or (as is commonly alleged) white Afrikaans schools still seem commonplace. Interaction between black and white councillors seems to have built a certain level of mutual trust and a sense of partnership, and this has been broadened through the operation of various council sub-committees. These initiatives have, however, only reached a very limited component of the respective communities. They are also seen as somewhat tentative gains that may easily be undermined by political campaigning before the next elections. They are relationships built on (and limited to) common interests in the social and economic development of the area. The parties have not talked openly about the past.

The attitudes of whites on the council towards reconciliation are built around the idea of a partnership between two communities. We are all in the same boat - we simply need to understand each other better and be more respectful of each other’s culture. They see themselves as advocates of reconciliation
among their own community which has to be coaxed into accepting the new status quo.

The Commission hearing was not attended by local whites. It can be assumed that many whites in the town (a traditionally conservative stronghold) saw some Duduza victims testifying at public hearings broadcast on television. Their attitudes, like most whites in South Africa, are a mixture of "we did not know – how can you blame us" or the common "let us rather forget about the past". Some see the Commission as an ANC witch-hunt that is trying to destroy the credibility of the previous government.

Reconciliation is not an event. People cannot simply one day decide that they want to forgive and forget. Most of the victims in this community are committed to a process of reconciliation. They are not necessarily demanding vengeance. They are, at the same time, not simply willing to move ahead as if nothing happened. They demand to hear the truth and to be given time to consider it. They are often not willing to forgive unless the perpetrators show remorse and some form of reparation is offered.

Many victims were understandably bitter about their suffering – while many are willing to engage in a process of reconciliation. The [Commission] has played a part in engaging victims in examining and articulating their needs within a reconciliation process. It has however not done enough in meeting these needs or in facilitating a process through which these needs could be met.

Being promised some form of reparation and being given the opportunity to go on stage and tell their stories was a very powerful experience for many victims. They felt that they now had a voice. But this momentum has to be sustained. The organisational base for them to continue to be heard has only materialised in very few areas. For the reconciliation process to be carried through to some conclusion requires a victim engagement process that gives them space to articulate and voice their concerns. The [Commission] provided for a moment of opportunity, rather than sustained mobilisation. Other processes that allow for victims’ (and perpetrators’) concerns and interests to be articulated and addressed need to be developed and sustained at community level. Khulumani, which was initially active in the community, was not able to sustain its activities due to financial constraints.

The violence experienced in this community had a wide range of dimensions, and inflicted deep damage on numerous social relations. While the main dimension of the conflict may have been between the black oppressed population and the state, this conflict was fought in various covert ways which undermined
and co-opted sections of the population and created internal divisions that require dedicated attention. The young and the old, neighbours, different ethnic groups have been turned against each other. Different forms of suffering are given different levels of recognition and priority by the [Commission]. People were victimised in different ways and thus have different needs in terms of reparations and social and physical reconstruction. These different interests often compete with one another and can lead to new conflicts within the community.

One important division is that between the population and the political structures. Victims particularly seem to feel alienated from the political system. They don’t feel that their needs are taken seriously by any of the political leaders. In extreme cases, victims see the political structures as perpetrator structures (representing the interests of amnesty applicants within their ranks). Thus, when the [Commission] consults with the community via the political structures it means (from this perspective) that they are consulting with the perpetrators and not the victims.

A longer-term reconciliation initiative would need to take the consultation process two steps further. It needs to engage with less developed community structures or networks that do not have a formal voice. Particularly in a community with a history of intense conflict, certain interest groups may not have organised and mobilised, because of fear and/or because of lack of resources. Unless there is assistance for the articulation of these interests, the process will not reach all sectors of the community.

Past conflicts have not disappeared. They have simply taken a new form. In some cases, the conflict entails almost exactly the same issues as in the past; it is simply the way that people pursue their incompatible goals that has changed. This leads to new alliances and new forms of mobilisation of support. Problems in leadership-follower relations have emerged as political leaders attempt to build a support base that is not simply geared at protest politics and which is not sustained by mass mobilisation. The ability of leaders to facilitate public participation processes is limited in this new era, and the public consequently feels that their elected leaders are out of touch or leave them in the dark.

New frustrations have thus emerged regarding old forms of representation, providing space for new political entrepreneurs to challenge the newly dominant political elite. Political entrepreneurs fan the resentments of the past to encourage suspicion and resentment of the existing local leadership. They draw in victims of past abuses (who generally feel neglected) as one element of their constituency.
The [Commission] process assisted in clarifying past conflicts characterising a limited period of our history. Future reconciliation initiatives must make the links between these divisions of the past and current community dynamics.

Victims are individuals with unique experiences and needs. Each victim has to go through a personal journey of dealing with the past. Similarly, each community has a unique history of conflict. There were common dimensions that happened all over the country, but the particular shape and intra-community dynamics took on many different forms. A reconciliation process needs to address these individual and community-specific histories.

One uniform national process is only capable of sketching a skeletal picture in broad terms. If left at that, it, in fact, is in danger of minimising the importance of dealing with particular issues when trying to squeeze the history of the community into [Commission] categories of meaning. A national process can draw attention to some of the dynamics and pressures that impact on a local community, but does not "explain" the local history.

Communities need to be engaged in creating their own agenda for reconciliation, and designing processes that allow local stakeholders to drive the process. The role of the [Commission] can help provide general models to communities regarding how the issue of past human rights abuses can be pursued in much greater depth.

Victims are not ready to engage in a reconciliation process unless they know more about what happened. They often say they are willing to forgive, but they need to know who to forgive and what they are forgiving them for. A willingness to reconcile is dependent on people’s ability to cope with and process their knowledge of what had happened. While the past remains hidden, a reconciliation process proceeds on very shaky foundations. The [Commission] has contributed to some of this revealing, but many individual victims are still in the dark about the details of their specific cases.

Victims need to feel that they are no longer in the vulnerable position that they found themselves in at the time of the victimisation. They need to feel that they are now safe from abuses and that if the threat of re-victimisation arises, their pleas for protection will be attended to. These fears are often shaped by local community circumstances rather than the national political situation.

Victims need to have done some personal work in working through what happened to them before they are ready to engage in a reconciliation process. They need to have stopped trying to run away from their memories and accept them as part of who they are. They should feel that their lives
are no longer completely dominated by this experience. The availability of local, accessible mental health support services and victim support structures is crucial in facilitating this step.

Victims also need to perceive that there is a possibility that things could be different. They need to be able to imagine that society could change for the better, that the divisions of the past can be overcome, that people can co-exist without constant fear and hatred. A vision of a society that is based on different values of human interaction is essential in motivating people to take the risk of engaging in a reconciliation process.

Some of these issues (truth, empowerment, healing, and a vision of a new society) will never be completely resolved, and some will be extensively addressed by a reconciliation process. Before such a process starts, however, there needs to be some substantial progress in meeting some of these pre-conditions.

Reconciliation involves various stages of development and change. One essential step is dialogue between adversaries. The victim-oriented and perpetrator-oriented aspects of the Commission’s work are broken into separate functions. Victims tell their stories in one forum and perpetrators in another. The interaction is thus often mediated purely by the media coverage of these events. While this may have been useful in providing safe space to engage them, or to maximise information gathering, the subsequent step of facilitating more direct dialogue still needs to be addressed.

For victims there is often a need to have personal interaction with the perpetrator. They want to be able to call that person(s) to account personally. They want to be able to relate their suffering and demand an explanation. Victims in other communities have reported a great sense of empowerment that goes with the ability to stand up to one’s victimiser. Some perpetrators have also expressed a need to apologise to their victims. There is also a need to be able to humanise the relationship; to deny the categories and stereotypes that allowed the divisions of the past. The actual dialogue in Duduza has, however, not yet started.

**Reconciliation and individuals: registering one’s individual commitment**

To coincide with the national Day of Reconciliation and to mark the second anniversary of the establishment of the Commission, four ‘Registers for Reconciliation’ were opened in December 1997, one in each of the regional offices.
The idea of such a register had been discussed informally among Commissioners and crystallised during a radio ‘phone-in programme, when listeners expressed a need for some way in which to articulate the regret and contrition they felt for past wrongs. Announcing the Register, the Commission said:

It has been established in response to a deep wish for reconciliation in the hearts of many South Africans; people who did not perhaps commit gross violations of human rights, but nevertheless wish to indicate their regret for failures in the past to do all they could have done to prevent such violations; people who want to demonstrate in some symbolic way their commitment to a new kind of future in which human rights abuses will not take place.

We know that many South Africans are ready and eager to turn away from a past history of division and discrimination. Guilt for wrongdoing needs to be translated into positive commitment to building a better society – the healthiest and most productive form of atonement.

Within a short time, dozens of people had come to the Commission offices to sign the Register, and even more used the Internet website to convey their messages. Many letters that were written to the Commission were also attached to the Register. The oft-repeated theme was regret for the past, thankful recognition of the changes that had taken place, and commitment to making a useful contribution to the future. Some of the messages were accompanied by donations to the President’s Fund for Reparations. Many asked for forgiveness. Many expressed gratitude for the opportunity “of admitting how we feel publicly at last”, to use the words of one contributor.

Commissioners discussed the Register with many other organisations, in the hope that the idea would take root and not be regarded solely as a Commission project. They encouraged churches and all religious denominations to offer a similar opportunity to their members, creating appropriate ceremonies. They also proposed that other ways of expanding the concept should be considered, possibly by municipalities where such a register might become a part of the history of the period of transformation in their region.

During such discussions, the challenging question was sometimes posed: “Is this Register not simply a way in which those who were privileged in the past can easily shed their guilt and feel that they have now done all that is required of them?” The answer is to be found in many of the entries themselves:
I can only say I chose not to know. I chose the safety of my own comfort over the pain of knowing... I raised my children with privilege, whilst those around me were deprived. I am so deeply sorry! And the opportunity to express this regret and offer apology does not unburden me. This privilege allows me to reach even further into my soul to express the remorse that I feel. It impels me to seek in my own small way to repair the damage to our people and our land caused not only by ‘perpetrators’, but also by us, the bystanders, in the tragedy of our past. It impels me also to rejoice in the present freedom to build a new and great South Africa.

It’s not too late – yes, I could have done more in the past, could have been more courageous. I regret that I didn’t. But now there is a new opportunity to commit to this country... to build respect for human rights, to help develop the country, to make the ideals enshrined in the constitution real.

EXAMPLES OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION INITIATIVES AS THE COMMISSION CLOSED

In the faith community: the CPSA in KwaZulu-Natal

Attempts are now being made to rectify these long-standing inequities within the life of our church. Black advancement into leadership roles has been significant, but still, within our church structures, we are significantly dependant on white skill and expertise which can easily look and feel like white power blocking the aspirations of black people. A transformation process is underway, spearheaded by a recently created black Anglican forum. This will promote and facilitate an adjustment process for the CPSA, as it moves into the new millennium, seeming to provide a new authenticity for our life together as a church, setting us free to be more truly African in the broadest sense, to engage in our mission and ministry in a more authentic incarnational way.

Chairperson, this is one of the ways in which our denomination sees its commitment to the future of this country and this sub-continent. To be a transformed church under God, serving a transformed society. Central to that task will be our desire to contribute to a continuing process of healing and costly, not cheap, reconciliation. I speak as a church leader now in a province which has seen well over 15 000 politically motivated killings in a decade of traumatic transition. The healing of the resultant wounds, let alone the other wounds, which are the legacy of apartheid, will engage the faith communities and others for a long time to come. One of the things which the KwaZulu-Natal Leaders Group is planning for 1998, is a series of pastoral
visits to places of pain where, in the company of local communities, liturgies of healing and cleansing will occur and symbolic actions will take place to facilitate reconciliation. Similarly, trauma workshops and workshops of repentance and restitution are available in our province to enable people bruised by a divided past to come together in a wholesome healing atmosphere in the presence of skilled facilitators which seem so essential to finding new hope for their lives... it's quite difficult to encourage people to participate in what is involved in that, but assisted by the insights and contribution of Father Michael Lapsley, we have engaged upon a process whereby people across the parish boundaries, as my brother Bishop was saying, have come together, normally in fairly small groups so that there can be an interchange of depth, have come together over a weekend to undertake an experience which involves actually telling one another stories. And out of that process of listening to one another, finding a new measure of healing and then gathering all that together into an act of Eucharistic worship at the end of the weekend. These have been remarkable successful as a supplement if you like, something complementing our whole truth and reconciliation process in the nation.16

In the health sector: a mini-Commission at the Faculty of Health Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand

At the health sector hearing in Cape Town, Professor Trevor Jenkins of the Medical Faculty of the University of the Witwatersrand spoke of his institution’s commitment to a “mini-TRC [Commission] process”:

For the [Commission] to be effective, to be fully effective, requires that the processes be taken into the places where people live and work and interact. We need, in fact, a mini-[Commission] in our institutions, and we believe that this mini-[Commission] process has already been triggered within our faculty in these last few weeks.

A great deal of hard work though, and creative thinking will undoubtedly be needed if members of the faculty are to be reconciled with one another. The privileged members of the faculty, who were not the victims of apartheid in the teaching hospital settings, must listen to the accounts of their black colleagues and former students. They must be reminded of the many ways in which they wittingly or unwittingly collaborated with the system. They must be prepared to experience and share some of the pain and hurts which their colleagues of colour experienced because of an accident of birth. In such a process, we believe we will all undergo changes and experience healing, and only

then will the faculty be able to develop into a cohesive structure capable of producing well-trained health care professionals motivated to serve the South African community.

So, we can’t really over-emphasise the importance of this submission being a beginning of a process which we are committing ourselves to pursue.

137 This commitment led to a formal announcement, on 5 May 1998, of a “programme of reconciliation” in the Faculty of Health Sciences at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. The first element in this “internal reconciliation process” established by the Faculty Board is an Internal Reconciliation Commission (IRC).

138 The objectives of the IRC are:

a To record the history of racial discrimination in the faculty;

b To record the history of resistance to apartheid by members of the faculty;

c To allow those who were discriminated against to tell their stories.

139 To achieve these objectives, the IRC will collect archival material, obtain written and verbal reports from any interested parties, and publish a final report summarising the findings and recommendations.

140 The announcement by the Dean, Professor Max Price, expresses the hope that “this process and the ensuing report will lead to a public acknowledgement by the Faculty of its record of discrimination and collusion with apartheid and also its opposition to racist government policies, and will begin the reconciliation process within the Faculty and the alumni. It will feed into the Faculty’s Equal Opportunities Programme which aims to redress past inequalities. And, it will also lead to recommendations for undergraduate teaching - to promote a human rights culture in health science graduates”.

In the business sector:

141 The following example of a truth and reconciliation initiative in the business community is based on a report in Business Day newspaper by Mzwandile Jacks, on 28 May 1998:
Hearings Disclose Dorbyl’s “Racist Past”

In May 1998, industrial holding company Dorbyl released a report by eight independent commissioners appointed two years ago “to conduct truth commission-style hearings and expose the group’s past to public and employee scrutiny”. The report identified past racism as a factor which continued to have a negative effect on staff morale and showed a lack of trust of management. Many of the complaints heard by the commission related to alleged unfair labour practices. Dorbyl Chief Executive Bill Cooper, who joined the company in 1994, said the process of conducting hearings showed aspects of the group’s past of which present senior management was unaware. It is reported that Mr Cooper said: “We also learnt that practices of the past were still rampant in some Dorbyl operations”.

As a result of this process, the group is reported to be in the process of establishing a body that will develop and debate new corporate policy. Mr Ketan Lakhani, the convenor of Dorbyl’s transformation process, stated that most employees were open to change. “We convinced people that the commission was not a witchhunt but an effort to make the company more productive.”

142 An editorial in the Sowetan newspaper on 29 May 1998 responded as follows to Dorbyl’s initiative:

The principle that only a complete and truthful disclosure of past human rights abuses can guarantee lasting reconciliation is now well established. So too is the belief that the obligation to come clean on the past extends beyond our political institutions. To that extent, business, academic and religious institutions also have a responsibility to ensure they disclose the extent of their role in sustaining apartheid. Dorbyl has taken a commendable lead in this regard. Its readiness to investigate and expose its past will go a long way towards repairing relations with workers. It will also help workers reassess their views about management and Dorbyl’s claimed commitment to the new political order. Other enterprises must emulate Dorbyl’s example. That will make a valuable contribution to the broader effort under way to construct a durable social partnership.
CONCLUSION

The work of the Commission dispels the “myth that things can be done with magic dust, to bring people together and then they just start working together. There are stages, actually, in reconciliation.” The following stages or signposts on the reconciliation road have been highlighted by this chapter:

Reconciliation does not come easily. It requires persistence. It takes time.

Reconciliation is based on respect for our common humanity.

Reconciliation involves a form of restorative justice which does not seek revenge, nor does it seek impunity. In restoring the perpetrator to society, a milieu needs to emerge within which he or she may contribute to the building of democracy, a culture of human rights and political stability.

The full disclosure of truth and an understanding of why violations took place encourage forgiveness.

Equally important is the readiness to accept responsibility for past human rights violations.

Reconciliation does not wipe away the memories of the past. Indeed, it is motivated by a form of memory that stresses the need to remember without debilitating pain, bitterness, revenge, fear or guilt. It understands the vital importance of learning from and redressing past violations for the sake of our shared present and our children’s future.

Reconciliation does not necessarily involve forgiveness. It does involve a minimum willingness to co-exist and work for the peaceful handling of continuing differences.

Reconciliation requires that all South Africans accept moral and political responsibility for nurturing a culture of human rights and democracy within which political and socio-economic conflicts are addressed both seriously and in a non-violent manner.

Reconciliation requires a commitment, especially by those who have benefited and continue to benefit from past discrimination, to the transformation of unjust inequalities and dehumanising poverty.

Canon Ben Photolo at the Reparation and Rehabilitation follow-up workshop in Sebokeng, 21 June 1997.
INTRODUCTION

1 We were seventeen individuals appointed by the President to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission). Although not representative of the South African society, we do come from different corners, so to speak, of our society. By definition, we had to have different understandings of our history and immediate past. We were differently exposed and therefore differently disposed. Even where we agreed on facts, their interpretation differed according to our various dispositions.

2 Because we see the world differently, in order to cope with it, we respond to it in different ways. We also represent a number of different value systems and empathise with other value systems. Simply stated, we understand some people better than we do others, and we relate better to some than to others.

3 At worst, we misrepresent each other. At best, we misunderstand each other, yet we are able to cope and live with each other. We do not necessarily love each other. We may not even like each other.

4 I was born towards the end of the Second World War, while my father was interned, “in detention without trial”. I was born into the Afrikaner Volk and the National Party. I shared its history and its myths. Choice was not an option. During the interview by the panel that put forward the names of potential members to the President, I stated that I supported apartheid under Verwoerd as a moral option that I believed would lead away from domination and discrimination. It took me more than a decade to shed my (ideological) milk teeth, recognise inconsistencies in policy and cut my more permanent (political) teeth. I shifted from Volk to nation.

Yet, when I entered politics, although my aim was nation, I entered the fold of the Volk. Only on looking back do I recognise elements of broader democratic choice. My politics expressed itself through the limited opportunities within the National Party. Only towards the mid-eighties, and then only through friends in struggle politics, did I begin to sense that a covert security ‘policy’ militated
against my understanding of the political policy of reform, aiming at a democratic dispensation. This sense came about mainly as a result of multiple discretionary detentions without trial of my friends. In their experiences, I recognised some of Afrikaner history.

When I left the National Party in January 1987, it was with agony, with pain. At the same time, it was with relief. In an atmosphere of a holy war, I positioned myself as part of both system and struggle, promoting both the necessity and reality of national unity. When the liberation movements were unbanned and negotiations started, I left politics in the sincere belief that a constitutional settlement was inevitable. I had no particular interest other than the well-being of the organism that was South Africa. Asked whether I could understand the right-wing Afrikaner, I responded that I had been there. Such is my disposition, my baggage. I wear it without pride or shame.

**WHY A MINORITY POSITION?**

The structure of the Commission was envisaged by the founding Act as an eighteen-month project with a clear three months to compile a report with recommendations to the President. No preparatory work was done. No infrastructure existed. No Commissioner was appointed because of any management expertise. We were all aware of the hugeness of the task and the urgency thereof. We hit the ground running. We did not plan our programme and scope of activities clearly. We initially agreed on an executive committee to plan and co-ordinate the Commission. For reasons that escaped my understanding, it was decided to abolish the executive on the grounds that it was ultra vires the Act. The deputy chair was mandated with overall planning and management responsibilities. In keeping with his responsibility, an outline for the report was prepared by a committee, with proposals for assigning different chapters to various authors, and the Research Department was given overall responsibility for its compilation. I had serious misgivings on both the principle and effect of submitting an outline for the report before we had reached a shared understanding of what we wanted to achieve, and before there had been some discussion on the analysis of data, which at that stage was in the early stages of being captured. The Commission accepted that discussion should precede drafts. A special meeting was arranged (facilitated by the head of Research and his staff) to discuss our understanding of the mandate and certain concepts and principles. This led to a process of drafts, lengthy discussions and positive interactions.
Our ever-expanding range of activities placed serious constraints on the time available. Meetings for discussion of the final report were often cancelled or reduced, yet we had to finish what we had set out to achieve. I give credit to the head of Research and his staff who tried their level best to facilitate discussions. Soon we fell back on a system of draft preparation followed by discussion, whilst at the same time working to meet the other requirements of the Act (victim findings, perpetrator findings, urgent interim reparation and amnesty hearings). Even reading of draft chapters became virtually impossible. We reverted to a committee system to read, discuss and recommend to the Commission the adoption of drafts. Of course, every Commissioner was entitled to attend and participate fully in any Committee discussion. However, since it was impossible even to read everything, the need to ‘trust each other’ became a recurrent theme. Of course we trust each other. But we can at best trust each other to reflect honestly our own narrow understandings and interpretations of information and data, not those of our fellow Commissioners. As I have already said, we all interpret facts to fit our various value systems.

As it is, various findings appear to me to display, if not a lack of understanding of, then certainly a lack of empathy with certain groups living within traditional or nationalistic value systems who were party to the conflict.

Furthermore, it became clear in plenary sessions for the adoption of the report that the discussions were based on the drafts, and the limited time for such discussion precluded any structural or philosophical change. The schedule for adoption and printing, determined by the lead times for editing by the Research Department and for the actual printing of the report, made any fundamental change impossible.

It followed that drafts virtually became final documents by default. Where already it had been impossible to read all, we now found it impossible even to check revised drafts, even though Commissioners had serious reservations on some of them. Speaking for myself and considering the sheer volume of this report, much of which I haven’t read, it goes against the grain for me to endorse (or reject) what I am surely not prepared or able to defend after publication. I proposed a delay in finalising the report, with some support but ultimately without success. Publication will lead to some reaction that we might have been able to avoid.

We agreed that I should withdraw from plenary sessions to read as much as was possible and prepare a position within the body of the report. Even where I did not share the views expressed, I would comment for the sake of a clear and better understanding of such views.
I sincerely hope that we will be able to find a way to revisit this report in our 
supplementary report after completion of the amnesty process, and that this 
report can be viewed as preliminary. I hope damage will be limited. The public 
debate that will ensue will assist us. My signature attached to this report is my 
identification with the idea and process envisaged in the Act. It is not to be read 
as an endorsement of the content.

What follows should therefore be seen as an attempt to facilitate a debate, 
which is bound to continue, with the aim of further promoting the overarching 
goal of national unity.

**NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION**

National unity and reconciliation is to be understood as a single concept. Like the 
concept of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is a single idea. To think or 
to argue that there is no national unity without reconciliation and no reconciliation 
without truth would be to imply that the Commission has to achieve or pursue its 
mandate in stages. This is not the structure of the Act. It is not in keeping with 
the spirit of the postamble to the interim Constitution. The postamble posits the 
Constitution as the foundation for transcending division and strife. The postamble 
is in a sense eschatological in its essence. It posits the unity which is to be 
achieved, nurtured and promoted amidst all the different views and understandings.

It is against this background that I make a few observations on the mandate, 
concepts and principles as discussed in the report.

**THE ROLE OF RELIGION**

The danger of applying religious frames to phenomena in general should not be 
underestimated. I may as well comment briefly here on the use (or abuse) of 
religion in justifying apartheid thinking. The writings of Dr AP Treurnicht (then a man 
of the cloth) on the moral justification of apartheid, basing his whole argument 
on an exegesis of scriptures, are but an example. I learnt my politics in church, 
and much more of my religion in politics. And without going into any detail, I take 
a dim view of some clergy who, in their submissions on behalf of their institutions, 
confess their mistake of having trusted their political leaders too much or too 
unconditionally. It may well be said by some politicians, and with more credibility, 
that they uncritically accepted their religious leaders’ (political) teachings of 
God’s will.
Religions, by their nature, are most often essentially dogmatic and absolutist. The juxtaposition of forces of light and forces of darkness, good and evil is inherent to religious thought. Who will not recognise this in the rhetoric of the conflicts of the past? The imposition of this framework on the political scene was probably the single greatest contributor to the escalation of the conflict through the Commission’s mandate period. The Bible was used not as canon but as cannon. Most gross violations were committed, as has often been testified, because of a belief in the justness of one cause and the evil of another.

Problems will never be solved at the level at which they are created. This is my main reservation about the structure of the report. The Act is far more advanced in terms of conflict resolution than is the frame of the report. The Act has as its focus gross human rights violations. The Act does not put apartheid on trial. It accepts that apartheid has been convicted by the negotiations at Kempton Park and executed by the adoption of our new Constitution. The Act charges the Commission to deal with gross human rights violations, with crimes both under apartheid law and present law. The Act does not ask us to deal with or expound on morality or ethics.

The Commission chose to take a moral-ethical approach, more by default than by design, and more so in its ongoing public statements than through its report. Publication of untested allegations rendered them public facts. It is widely believed, for instance, that the National Party government approved of a program to cause infertility to all black women by chemical means although, to the best of my knowledge, no corroborative evidence could be found and certainly no such finding has been made.

Apartheid had again to be found a crime against humanity. The judgement of a just struggle against an evil system had to be restated. There is no argument with this perspective from within the specific moral ethical frame. But the rhetoric does not take us beyond an endorsement of this one perspective on the conflicts of the past. It does not allow us to move beyond the level of dogma, of the absolute, to a level of politics, of the acceptance of politics with its different views and perspectives operating in civil society under and with acceptance of the processes set down by the Constitution.

There is no real historical evaluation of roles played by various actors. This is precluded by the moral-ethical approach. Whatever reservations people like FW de Klerk, Leon Wessels, Roelf Meyer and Pik Botha might have had, whatever
the moral imperative might have expected of them, one can but imagine what might have happened had they for moral reasons chosen a different political course of action during the reign of PW Botha. It is debatable whether we would have had our democracy by now, and one can only speculate about potential further escalation of the conflict.

22 It would serve us well to reframe and shift from good versus evil to good versus bad, where clearly even good has different meanings. This would allow us to get away from the absolutist to a frame of evaluation of policy, away from right versus wrong, from black versus white, to shades of grey.

TRUTH

23 Exaggeration is a natural consequence of human suffering. Often deponents were not present at the actual violations to which they testified and their stories were accounts of what they were told. They reflect oral history. They also reflect perspectives. Often deponents gave evidence in terms of their own understanding of what happened. Evidence was not tested. It was not intended to be tested. Except for a few statements, they were not even attested to under oath. Most deponents giving oral evidence, when taking the oath, made it clear that they would speak the truth “as they see it”.

24 This resulted in yet another debate in public across value systems. Those with strong minds raised their voices and criticised the Commission for accepting statements as fact without due testing.

25 The same problem arose with respect to information obtained through amnesty applications. Applicants generally downplayed their own roles in abuses. Because of the wording of the Act, applicants structured evidence to construct an order. While every application had to be dealt with on its own merit, all too often deceased individuals were implicated. The Amnesty Committee is not obliged to make a finding on implicated persons and seldom does. Implication may be blatantly false. It may also be an honest perspective, especially where there is reliance on implied rather than an explicit order from a superior authority. The same circumspection must be applied.

26 The interposition of extracts of such testimonies in the body of the report – where it deals with what actually happened and not with perspectives and understandings – poses a problem. We may have contributed to intensifying the debate by making
such interpositions. Awareness of this can ameliorate an otherwise useless and polarising debate on the work of the Commission and on our nation’s past.

27 Even though the report offers a good exposition of different concepts of truth, especially of factual truth and narrative truth and then of social or interactive truth, the distinction is not sustained. In arriving at findings, all is accepted as evidence, an ingredient of the factual truth. If we ignore the frame of our various dispositions through which evidence reaches us, we lose the context of the multiplicity of truth, both in dimension and in perspective. Truth, reconciliation and national unity can only be understood within the concept of multiple truths. Our perspectives decide our realities. Different elevations of an object give different pictures. It is only by sharing perspectives, by accepting them as real, that we can develop some form of understanding. To pour history into a mould is to recreate the potential for conflict which our Constitution and politics since 1990 have largely removed. A shared understanding of our history requires an understanding of different perspectives, not the building of a new national myth. Presenting ‘the truth’ as a one-dimensional finding is a continuation of the old frame. Nothing changes, sometimes not even content.

28 There is no denying the role of racism in the conflict, but to acknowledge the perspective of a cold war, of the threat of international communism, of nationalism, and then to find that the motivating force was racism, is a negation of all the former, a contradiction in terms, an arrival at a single truth again, not in the least conducive to reconciliation and national unity.

**RECONCILIATION**

29 Much has been made of the need to reconcile victims and perpetrators of gross human rights violations. However important this may be to individuals, the work and experience of the Commission has revealed how remote this ideal is, certainly as far as any significant numbers are concerned. Unfortunately, expectations of particular behaviour, determined by a religious frame, were once again imposed on communities seen as actors in the conflict.

30 The religious conversion model of confession, repentance and forgiveness is by the very dogma of religion at the level of the very personal, of the individual as against his or her God or offended neighbour. There is no short cut. Yet with regard to the crime of apartheid (and its evils), there was much rhetoric about how whites or Afrikaners should acknowledge the violations, accept the responsibility,
apologise to blacks and experience the liberation of their forgiveness. The religious paradigm is tendered as a solution for our ills. There is a call for representative confession, repentance and forgiveness. Experience shows that, despite “handsome apologies” by leaders in virtually every sphere of Afrikaner society, there are continued calls for an Afrikaner leader to stand up and apologise in order to experience the level and extent of black readiness to forgive.

31 National unity accepts different communities, accepts different cultures, accepts different value systems, accepts different religions, and even accepts different histories, provided there is some shared history. The work and activities of the Commission will certainly contribute to the further development of a shared history. However, such a history cannot be force-fed.

32 Reconciliation is built on a mutual understanding and acceptance of these differences and a capacity of people to manage conflict and live with others.

33 National unity and reconciliation calls for a commitment to share a future and for each, in his or her own way, to build towards that future. It calls for a commitment to respect law and the procedures and processes laid down by the Constitution. All of this already exists. It may be a fledgling, but it exists. It can only be enhanced.

34 If we can arrive at a position where we simply acknowledge the conflicts of the past (as required by the Act), recognising that there were perpetrators and victims of gross human rights violations in these conflicts, we will have advanced some way towards national unity. If we can reframe our history to include both perpetrators and victims as victims of the ultimate perpetrator - namely, the conflict of the past, we will have fully achieved unity and reconciliation and an awareness of the real threat to our future - which is a dogmatic or ideological division that polarises the nation instead of promoting genuine political activity. Somewhere down the line, we must succeed in integrating, through political engagement, all our histories, in order to discontinue the battles of the past. As with the negotiations that preceded the elections and the drafting of the Constitution, our understanding of history must accommodate all interpretations of the past. If we fail in this regard, we will fail to be a nation.

■ **AMNESTY**

35 The provisions for amnesty in the interim Constitution came at the very end of the negotiations. They followed in the wake of provisions for first temporary and
later permanent indemnity, sealing the negotiated settlement. They moved us away from strife and towards understanding, towards forgiveness (by the state) and away from vengeance. They endorsed our reconciliation and national unity after decades, centuries of strife. So we are faced with a paradox: The disclosure of sometimes horrendous deeds, crimes, gross violations of human rights, committed with political motive under an old order, to be followed by a joyous reintegration into society within a new order of the perpetrator of those self-same deeds. This is seeing both the deed and the doer and severing them from each other. This is part of restorative justice. This is part of the spirit of ubuntu. It is part of the restoration of the organism that is our nation South Africa.

Victims

36 There is a second leg to restorative justice as intended by the Act. This involves the state acknowledging violations committed against victims. The restoration of their dignity is to an extent an unhappy choice of words. It is a legal concept. Victims carried themselves with dignity, even when they broke down. In its deepest sense, human dignity cannot be bestowed on someone. The ‘reforming’ old order failed to understand that human dignity always exists. It cannot be bequeathed. It can only be acknowledged.

37 The process allowed victims to be reintegrated into society. In hearings, victims often approached the Commission almost in a foetal position as they came to take their seats and relate their stories. They told their stories as they saw them, as they experienced them, as they perceived what had happened to them. And as they left their seats, the image was wholly different. They walked tall. They were reintegrated into their community. They could re-assume their roles in society; they could manage themselves and the world around them again. They were healthy cells of the national organism. This too is restorative justice. This too is the spirit of ubuntu.

38 The challenge to our society is to receive the successful amnesty applicants joyously as an integral and healthy part of our society. It is also to acknowledge the (former) victims as healthy individuals with their own roles and the capacity to manage themselves.

39 Our natural responses are to maintain respectively aversion and pity – equally damaging to the individuals and to our nation.
The structure of apartheid policy as it emerged in the political system of our country is discussed elsewhere in the report. It originated and developed as a result of different influences over at least a century. Some examples are quoted in the report. I highlight and add a few to widen the context and understanding:

a. The unchecked reign, for many decades, of colonialism, which is concomitant with exploitation and disruption of cultures, customs and mindsets, and operated as a closed system without real access for indigenous people to the worlds and structures of the colonising powers;

b. The influence of British Empire politics, especially under Rhodes;

c. The reactive phenomenon of Afrikaner Nationalism, which created its own myths and history of an Afrikaner people dating back to their founding with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 (purely to facilitate trade), with a mission from God to evangelise Africa as His chosen people, seen as a parallel with Israel. Amnesty hearings of right-wing applicants showed ample evidence of remnants of this frame of mind, continuing right up to the end of the Commission’s mandate period.

d. The depression of the 1930s, poverty and, more specifically, the ‘poor white’ question;

e. The development of the legal structures of apartheid from 1948 to the late 1950s coinciding with the last days of colonialism and the civil rights struggle in the United States;

f. The launch by Dr Verwoerd of a change in policy, with a deepening of ideology, at the time of uhuru and decolonialisation, and especially after the “Winds of Change” speech by Harold Macmillan, then British Prime Minister. Arguing that discrimination and domination were indefensible, the new policy introduced the concept of partition to create a framework of independent nations, super-imposing the nationalistic perspective on African ethnic groupings. What is seldom appreciated is that it is virtually impossible for the ideological mind to view the world in a frame of reference other than its own. The system of ethnic nation states was perceived as a moral way out for the post-colonial ruling elite.
g As with all ideologies, practice could not be made to fit theory. Those homelands that became independent found themselves with democratic constitutions conflicting with traditional value systems, with their hierarchies and customs. Conflict with existing and emerging democratic forces continued and escalated.

■ APARTHEID’S SHIFT TO SECURITY RULE

41 Security legislation, initially adopted in the early 1960s, and vesting ever-increasing discretionary emergency powers, became institutionalised, both in South Africa and in the homelands.

42 By the late 1970s, it was clear to most in power that the policy framework was inadequate, that it was simply not working, and a policy of reform developed. The purpose of the new approach was clearly to attain stability and political accommodation, but there was no frame within which this was to be achieved.

43 The 1980s were marked by the dismantling of the structures of apartheid built during the 1950s. Whether this was a result of reform or collapse, or a combination of the two factors, is a matter of opinion.

44 The Tricameral Parliament, with its total exclusion of black Africans, led to spiralling conflict. The politics of the ruling party proved totally inadequate to deal with the demands flowing from the emergence of the United Democratic Front. Further emergency powers were conferred on the government.

45 From evidence that emerged during the life of the Commission, it is clear that activists were being abducted and killed under the protection of emergency legislation and regulations. This coincided with policy changes by the liberation movements with regard to legitimate targets, which led to attacks on community councillors, police, landmines, the killing of so-called collaborators generally and the phenomenon of necklacing. What fed on what during this stage of upward spiralling of the conflict will also remain a matter of opinion and debate.

46 The assassination of activists is distinguished from gross human rights violations committed in the name or on behalf of the liberation movements by its clandestine nature. It did not happen in the public domain of the ruling party’s body politic. The sense of horror and even betrayal expressed by the support base of the National Party and most of its leadership and even by the body politic of the then system politics in response to the revelations, is a strong indication of a
secret agenda or agendas. Neither the government nor the state or any of its operatives ever accepted responsibility for the assassinations.

47 Everything points to some measure of license given to or assumed by some within security and intelligence agencies. Actions by this establishment clearly militated against the efforts of (some) politicians of reform.

48 Amnesty applications have already shown the cover-up of some of these activities by superiors. The question of the (level of) involvement of politicians and senior officials is at issue. We failed to address this matter adequately. There are several reasons for this.

49 In my opinion, the first reason is that, against the backdrop of apartheid as a crime against humanity, the dominant perception within the Commission, at least sub-consciously, was of a criminal state.

50 Secondly, there was clearly some agreement to treat former President PW Botha differently - not to involve him directly in the processes of the Commission. Consequently, vital understandings of his mind and his perceptions were lost to the Commission. His written responses to questions came too late for proper analysis and integration into our understanding of the conflicts of the past. Questions that needed to be asked were lost in the subsequent legal tussles.

51 Thirdly, the chickens of the myths of Afrikaner nationalism and Afrikaner unity came home to roost. There was very little understanding of the struggle experienced within the Afrikaner. The Afrikaner and the state were approached as a single entity. When the National Party was recalled to the Commission, FW de Klerk was asked to account for the commissioning of assassinations. As an active politician and symbol of the old order, he was seen as fair game. Collective cabinet responsibility under Botha was interpreted as the collective intent of his government.

52 We as Commissioners made the mistake of not looking for simplicity on the other side of complexity. We simply stepped into the trap created by the myths of Afrikaner nationalism.

53 It is extremely difficult to believe that some operatives could get away for so long without some kind of shielding by at least some of their superiors and at least some politicians in government. At the same time, it is not at all plausible to assume a grand conspiracy of all members of government and senior bureaucrats, let alone by the National Party or the Afrikaner.
54 The question of whether and where such a shield existed unfortunately remains unanswered. Further amnesty applications may shed some light on the subject, which could be included in the further report on completion of the amnesty process.

THE PERIOD 1990 TO 1994

55 The period 1990 to 1994 is characterised in policy terms as one of negotiation towards a Constitution based on the principle of universal adult franchise. Even to suggest that the government had a secret agenda of human rights violations during this period would border on lunacy. To depict De Klerk as having had a double agenda or even, given his track record, of covering up, would be an injustice to him.

56 Gross human rights violations continued during this period, and may even have increased; though their nature changed. Conflict continues in parts of the country to this day, which strongly suggests that it would be an over-simplification to ascribe the conflicts of the past only to institutional structures.

APARTHEID AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

57 There is little room for debate that apartheid has been found by instruments of the international community to be a crime against humanity. The report, in its appendix to the chapter on The Mandate in Volume One, adequately addresses this issue. However, it needs to be further contextualised.

58 I have already alluded to the fact that apartheid policy from 1948 to 1960 was applied alongside the practices of colonialism. Measured by the contemporary yardstick of international human rights, it always was a crime against humanity. Slavery is a crime against humanity. Yet Paul, in his letters to the Ephesians and Colossians, is uncritical of the institution and discusses the duties of slaves and their masters. Given a different international balance of power, colonialism too might have been found a crime against humanity. Yet apartheid was first declared a crime against humanity by the United Nations General Assembly in 1973 – and not unanimously so. Moral imperatives are phenomena of their times and locations.

59 The Commission does not make any major contribution by again finding apartheid to be a crime against humanity. No doubt, it contributes to the needs and agendas
of human rights organisations and the cause of a human rights culture in general by highlighting what is now trite international law.

60 The question is whether such an unqualified finding does not create a double-edged sword in terms of the objectives of national unity and reconciliation. While the endorsement of a position in international law may contribute to national unity, it can as easily be divisive if separated from its historical context. This was the subject of debate within the Commission.

61 The permanent International Criminal Court has recently been established. Within its jurisdiction is the trying of crimes against humanity. There are efforts to have apartheid and apartheid crimes tried at this forum. The Commission is not prepared to recommend that the court’s powers be limited with respect to prosecution of apartheid as a crime against humanity and to past apartheid crimes.

62 In terms of conventions on apartheid as a crime against humanity, those who were functionaries of the system, politicians and bureaucrats alike, are considered criminals. Our government has already publicly taken a position against conferring such jurisdiction on the Court. The Commission would not take a position.

63 All gross human rights violations as defined in the Act constituted crimes under the laws that operated during the apartheid years, and as such may well be tried locally. Further, international law does not provide for the granting of amnesty for a crime against humanity. If international law were to be applied, the Commission might as well never have been established. I do not have to elaborate on consequences.

64 It is stated in the report that apartheid cannot be likened to genocide. By association, though, comparison continues. The question should seriously be asked whether an investigation of apartheid under international law would have any present or future legal or political value. While genocide remains a potential threat in many societies, apartheid as a system is dead and buried forever.

65 There is a certain wisdom in politics; so too in international politics. No tribunal was ever set up to try apartheid or apartheid crimes. It is unlikely that the international community will now override local political positions. The folly of doing so needs to be placed on record. It was a major disappointment to me that the Commission, primarily because of resistance of some Commissioners, would not support this proposal. At the time of writing this contribution, it has come to
my notice that a fellow Commissioner has again formulated a proposal along these lines. The outcome is not yet known.

■ ON VALUE SYSTEMS AND A HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE

66 I have been made aware again of the different value systems operating in different segments of our society. They transcend divisions of race, gender, ethnicity, religion and region, although some value systems seem to be more dominant in some communities than in others.

67 Conflict between value systems cannot be resolved through rigid and dogmatic enforcement of one at the expense of others. Often it cannot be resolved at all. Not only does the Constitution wisely account for this fact, but the political leaders of our country are also showing, in word and deed, great sensitivity to this reality. Such conflict can at best be managed. Paradigm shifts in value systems do not happen through debate but through exposure. In this sense, a value system is probably best described as a framework, a set of coping mechanisms, survival mechanisms for responding to your world as you see it.

68 Our Constitution, based on a democratic order, even entrenching human rights values, acknowledges the reality of traditional value systems and has regard for traditional leadership.

69 Democratic systems, for example, are by definition threatening to traditional systems, where leadership is determined by heredity and not by elections. Hierarchies are intrinsic to their existence. The concepts of merit, ethics and morality are very differently understood and judged.

70 The simultaneous operation of different value systems in society calls for wise systemic management if we want to promote a human rights culture at all. Of course, one can always measure another by one’s own value system. Invariably the other will be found wanting.

71 Promoting a human rights culture does not mean, at least to my mind, the moral judgement of others, especially if they do not share your mindset. As I have often said in the immediate past, I find moralising, if not counter-productive to reconciliation and national unity, offensive to my taste.
The task of the Commission, amongst others, is to report on the motives and perspectives of perpetrators and on the perspectives of victims. The draft chapter prepared for the Commission on this subject addresses the issue with much understanding and empathy, but in a general way and without an analysis of data. Perspectives quoted are used as examples. As in many other instances, the author had to draw primarily on theory and secondary sources.

I mention this aspect because I fear that the ensuing public debate will do very little to change structures of thinking, of the very value systems that caused the conflict. It is important to identify communities, operating social systems and geographies if society itself is to have a better understanding and awareness of underlying causes of conflict, which may have nothing to do with apartheid. Apartheid is no longer a threat. It will never be fashionable again. It will not rise from the dead. It was the content of an ideological mindset. Different ideologies, or even different rigidly enforced dogmas, may create similar threats to unity and reconciliation, to peace and stability, to survival itself. Small things may trigger major conflicts. They may well give rise to apparently unlikely and very violent alliances. “Value systems of a feather stick together.” Our immediate past bears testimony to this adapted adage.

HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE

Because of the subject matter of the Commission’s task and the focus on gross human rights violations, it is natural to focus on so-called liberal human rights, to the extent that issues such as unemployment, poverty and illiteracy are seen merely as phenomena in our society. Both in our Constitution and in international human rights instruments, certain rights are acknowledged and extrapolated from these phenomena. All who promote a human rights culture need to understand that social rights are indeed rights. Social rights are not passive. They are not, as liberal human rights have been characterised, prohibitive. They are active. Historically, it is the responsibility of government to actualise these rights through its policies. The report does mention the need to address these phenomena for the sake of national unity and reconciliation. However, policy measures and action plans adopted by authorities are by definition threatening to the liberal mindset. It is therefore necessary to promote discussion in the more affluent liberal rights society of all races, genders and religions, to integrate these social rights into their perception of rights. This has always presented a crisis to such thinking. But crises deepened may trigger paradigm shifts, and what is foreign and threatening may thus become integrated. Where the private sector acknowledges
these phenomena, they may become agendas for their resolution. This is the sigh of social rights protagonists. It is the culture underlying many of the speeches of government representatives. Can liberal society make it its agenda? If it does not do so, liberal human rights will remain an obstacle to the actualisation of social human rights.

75 The same approach can be adopted with regard to the so-called group rights of culture, language and self-determination, all integrated into society, with a view not to separation but to unity and reconciliation. As with traditionalism, the group phenomena were also acknowledged by the fathers of our Constitution, both in the chapter on human rights and in its provisions for deliberations in the Volkstaatraad.

76 Managing these conflicting mindsets calls for a ‘both and’ approach, very seldom an ‘either/or’ approach. Our politicians presently have a good gut feel for this need. However much energy it may demand, we should be wary of making exclusive choices without optimum accommodation of basic value system needs.

77 Lastly, all human rights have to be translated into rules, into dos and don’ts. That is a function of law and regulation. We need to know in simple terms what we must and must not do. Law must then be enforced. And if people comply with the law and live within the law, they are better left alone. They do not have to be made to like it or to observe it for any other reason than the reasons they themselves may choose.

■ RECOMMENDATIONS

Reparation and rehabilitation policy

78 I believe the individual reparation grant structured as cash payment to be unwise. It does not distinguish on the basis of either the harm suffered or the needs of individuals. While the expressed or implied purpose is that victims should be using such cash grants to take care of the needs flowing from the harm suffered, the real risk exists that other interests may weigh more. The argument that they should be free to choose how they use the grant sounds plausible at face value. It does not limit the risk, though, that real needs may become or continue to be a burden on the state. It does not take into account that a sizeable number of victims have not suffered any harm other than a wrongdoing or have since fully recovered, whether from emotional or physical suffering. On the other side, some individuals suffered immense physical or psychological harm, much of which is permanent,
and these are in need of ongoing treatment. The individual grants to victims as reparation should not be used to address the much wider phenomenon of poverty. Injection of larger sums of cash into poverty-stricken communities may cause friction and eventually not benefit the individual as intended.

79 I recommend that government considers a formula that allows for a multi-layered approach on the basis of affordability to the state. The first leg can be a lesser cash grant to acknowledge the wrongdoing to every individual. It will affirm the finding of victim status. Second, government can render services for all ongoing needs of victims that resulted from the violations suffered. This will include all medical or appropriate psychological treatment and could also include measures such as special housing subsidies or subsidised loans for housing materials where the violation suffered involved the loss of housing. It could include exemption from school fees for children where the breadwinner was lost to the family. No clear data is available yet, but an analysis of application forms may be able to give an estimate of the cost to the state of such an approach. In short, a needs-based policy would be the best approach and an assessment can be made as to the ability of the state to provide necessary services. Priority access to specific services can be arranged simply through the issuing of some form of identification.

Gross violations of human rights committed outside the borders of South Africa

80 The amnesty applications elicited by the amnesty provisions in the founding Act were the main source of information on gross human rights violations committed, the main source of our knowledge of what actually happened. Most of our investigations followed up on this information. A source of frustration to the investigation unit and the Commission in general was the refusal by some applicants or would-be applicants to disclose information on cross-border operations, because of the threat of extradition to and prosecution in other countries. In this regard, the provisions have failed the objective.

81 I believe that we cannot leave this issue unresolved. To ‘allow the law to take its course’ in this respect will spell disaster in capital letters. Most of these operations were carried out by operatives of the former South African Defence Force. Its senior officers, a large number of them now retired, attested to their loyalty to the country and its constitution. They have now accepted the new power realities brought about by the new Constitution. The South African National Defence Force
is presently one of the major guarantors of stability in our country and is, by all accounts, is one of the more successful examples of integration and transformation in our society. It is one of our more disciplined instruments. Even a hint of persecution of retired and serving officers may result in a risk of major destabilisation.

82 It is recommended that the President urgently place the subject on the agenda of the Southern African Development Community for attention and resolution. I deliberately refrain from making any suggestions as to how this matter may be pursued further.

On amnesty

83 It is premature to make any specific recommendation regarding amnesty before completion of the process. However, I will fail my conscience if I do not comment on a matter of my own experience relating to some applications refused, for example (and only as an example), for some actions by members of self-defence units which would never have occurred had it not been for the nature of the conflict, yet which fall outside the ambit of the provisions of the Act. One cannot help but feel that many would never have been criminals and that the imprisonment of some such individuals does not serve the interests of either the individuals concerned or that of society as a whole. Where prosecutions are pending, the courts can still consider such factors when passing sentence. Where unsuccessful applicants are serving long-term sentences, it is a totally different story.

84 I struggled with the question of whether to refer to this matter before the completion of the amnesty process. Silence may, however, cause injustice to such persons, given a global perspective. I simply raise the possibility of an inter-departmental committee to consider the issue with a view to devising some kind of special parole procedure where appropriate.

The need for closure

85 Recommendations for the establishment of special units to follow up on the uncompleted work of the Investigation Unit, in particular to investigate gross human rights violations that resulted from the political conflicts on the past, should be resisted. Such action would militate against the spirit of understanding, the transcending of the divisions of the past, against bringing to close a chapter in our history. It would negate the spirit of the agreement that gave us our democracy. It is a very sensitive issue that requires great wisdom. It would be politically
unfeasible to prosecute all those who committed gross human rights violations in the course of the liberation struggle and who failed to apply for amnesty. In consequence, the principle of even-handed treatment of perpetrators across the spectrum would be negated. One-sided prosecutions would send a message of amnesty first, Nuremberg second. The counter-argument is one of promoting a culture of impunity. It is as thin an argument as was the initial argument against amnesty. Criminal investigations of violations that do not stand the test of political motivation and thus fall outside the provisions of the Act may well proceed – should indeed proceed. Such investigations are, however, best left to existing structures of state. We need to reach a stage where we can clear our desks of the past without having to clear our memory. We can certainly do without agendas of the past to keep us from forgetting.

Analysis of data, research and public discussion

86 A qualitative analysis of the data that has been collected, especially from victim statements and testimonies or through the amnesty process, would have made a very valuable contribution to a better understanding of our society and the underlying endemic risks of the conflicts of the past repeating themselves in different forms. Unfortunately, we have not been able to undertake such an analysis.

87 It is recommended that institutions of learning and research, the private sector and civil society promote research programmes aimed at qualitative analysis of the data. It is further recommended that special sponsorships be made available for research programs aimed at a better understanding of the interaction of the different conflicting value systems in our society, and the management of such interaction towards further promotion of national unity and reconciliation.

■ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

88 At the outset, I accepted on principle the integrity of my fellow Commissioners. This was largely confirmed by my experience in practice, despite heavy argument and disagreement, sometimes ending in agreement. I have little doubt that other members will have had the same experience with their various colleagues. Some interpersonal relationships developed that I will always appreciate.

89 The chair of the Commission, Archbishop Tutu, has no equal when it comes to the acceptance of his bona fides, even where people may almost violently disagree
with him. The value of the symbolism of his chairing the Commission cannot be overstated. I wish him health and peace.

Dr Biki Minyuku was to me a pillar of reassurance of control, with a work ethic, if matched, not surpassed.

Special thanks too, to the director of research, Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio, for stimulating personal interaction and debate and for his efforts to promote similar opportunities within the Commission. How he coped with the responsibility of the compilation of the report, I will never understand.

Lastly, my appreciation to the President for having appointed me to the Commission. It is an honour and a privilege. It is not often a pleasure.
Response of the Commission to the Minority Position of Commissioner Wynand Malan

1. The Commission finds it regrettable that Commissioner Wynand Malan decided to withdraw midway through the process of discussion and drafting of the Commission’s report and eventually to formulate a Minority Position. We regard it as a particular drawback that he declined the opportunity of debating its contents within the Commission, as happened with every other section of the report, or of exploring the possibility of incorporating his position within the appropriate sections of the report itself. Our regret lies in the fact that, by so doing, he deprived both himself and the rest of the Commission of the opportunity of benefiting from the wholesome process of debating and considering the issues raised in the Minority Position and their possible impact on the report. It should be mentioned that, in our experience, the entire report has been enormously enriched by this process of debate and the impact of many perspectives within the Commission. The Commission has, however, been steadfast in its commitment to creating the opportunity for all shades of opinions and views to be fully expressed within the context of the Commission’s process as a vital part of its overall objectives. It is in this spirit that we approach the Minority Position expressed by Commissioner Malan.

2. It is informative to restate the provisions of sections 4(e) and (h) of Act 34 of 1995 (the Act) which guided the Commission in preparing its report:

4. Functions of Commission – The functions of the Commission shall be to achieve its objectives, and to that end the Commission shall –

(e) prepare a comprehensive report which sets out its activities and findings, based on factual and objective information and evidence collected or received by it or placed at its disposal;

(h) make recommendations to the President with regard to the creation of institutions conducive to a stable and fair society and the institutional, administrative and legislative measures which should be taken or introduced in order to prevent the commission of violations of human rights.
The general approach applicable to the work of the Commission, as set out below in the provisions of sections 36(1) and 36(5)(a) of the Act, was consistently followed by those Commissioners who prepared the report:

36. Independence of Commission -

(1) The Commission, its commissioners and every member of its staff shall function without political or other bias or interference and shall, unless this Act expressly otherwise provides, be independent and separate from any party, government, administration, or any other functionary or body directly or indirectly representing the interests of any such entity.

(5) Every commissioner and member of a committee shall–

(a) notwithstanding any personal opinion, preference or party affiliation, serve impartially and independently and perform his or her duties in good faith and without fear, favour, bias or prejudice.

We have some difficulty in responding effectively to the Minority Position of Commissioner Malan, in that it purports to deal with the Commission’s report in general terms without raising concrete cases or joining issue with specific portions of the report. It is drafted in subjective terms and apparently from the perspective of an erstwhile member of the parliamentary caucus of the then ruling National Party at the height of apartheid. This emphasis, and the personal historical and political account set out by Commissioner Malan, is most unfortunate and even inappropriate in the context of the Commission’s statutory framework.

Although we agree with Commissioner’s Malan’s observation that Commissioners “come from different corners, so to speak, of our society”, we interpreted our statutory mandate as requiring us to rise above this subjective diversity and execute the duties imposed upon us professionally and strictly in accordance with our mandate, despite our subjective views on specific issues. Where there is an irreconcilable conflict between a Commissioner’s statutory duty and the dictates of his/her conscience, the proper course would be to resign from the Commission. All Commissioners accepted this reality when they assumed office.

We deem it inappropriate to debate the host of personal opinions and subjective views set out in the Minority Position. These are strictly irrelevant to the report in view of the provisions of section 4(e) of the Act and, in any event, in many instances
do not relate to the content of the report. We do, however, feel compelled to rectify a number of factual inaccuracies which tend to misrepresent the Commission process.

7 We accordingly proceed to deal with some of these instances.

8 It needs to be emphasised that the process of writing the report commenced during 1997 after full discussion and agreement was reached within the Commission on the approach to be followed. As much time as circumstances permitted was allowed and allocated to the report writing process which was always regarded within the Commission as being of vital importance. All of the Commissioners were compelled to create sufficient time within extremely busy schedules to engage in the report writing process. We are satisfied that sufficient opportunity was created for all Commissioners, if they so wished, to participate to the fullest extent possible in writing the report.

9 Appropriate structures and persons within the Commission were mandated to prepare drafts of various sections within the report to serve as a basis for discussion. These drafts were by no means binding on the Commission or any commissioner. In practice, the majority of these drafts were substantially re-worked from time to time in the light of the debates within the Commission.

10 We are accordingly satisfied that the report gives a full and comprehensive account of all the work and activities of the Commission up to the point of its publication, in accordance with our statutory obligations. There is no basis whatsoever for regarding the report as “preliminary” or subject to revisiting in any subsequent reports.

11 We find Commissioner Malan’s characterisation of the testimony of witnesses in human rights violation hearings as largely influenced by exaggeration or in terms of their own understanding of what happened, to be impertinent and startlingly inappropriate. This attitude exhibits a total lack of appreciation of or sensitivity to the situation of victims of gross violations of human rights or the duties of the Commission as set out in section 11 of the Act, in particular to treat victims with compassion and respect for their dignity. We dispute the allegation that “most deponents giving oral evidence, when taking the oath, made it clear that they would speak the truth ‘as they see it’”. This is an unfounded generalisation. Quite significantly, no details or examples are given to substantiate this sweeping statement.
12 All findings were made on duly corroborated evidence and were made only after all parties who were adversely affected had been given adequate opportunity to respond, and all responses have been duly considered. The suggestion that, in making findings, the Commission relied upon improper material as “evidence” and failed to maintain the distinction between various “concepts of truth” is based on a complete lack of understanding of the findings process. As mentioned earlier, Commissioner Malan chose to withdraw from participating in certain of the Commission’s activities concerning finalisation of the report.

13 We note the views expressed regarding the influence of religion upon the reconciliation debate. In view of the fact that this is not linked to the content of the Commission report, we refrain from responding to this aspect. However, to the extent that this might amount to an attempt to criticise the approach or personal views and beliefs of members of the Commission, or to articulate some imagined attack upon Afrikaner leaders, it is deplored.

14 These are some of the aspects that need to be placed in proper perspective. On the whole, it is our view that Commissioner Malan’s failure to participate fully in the report writing process resulted in some misunderstanding of, and a lack of information about, the process itself and the content of the report. Some of the views he expressed relate to drafts rather than to the final version of the report. Most of this could have been avoided through discussion and contact with the Commission.

15 On the other hand, some of the aspects raised in the Minority Position are helpful and constructive and ought, in our view, to have been included in the body of the report. We can refer by way of example to the various influences listed under the heading “Apartheid from yet another angle” and to the recommendations concerning the analysis of data and research.

16 In conclusion, we wish to state that, although we question the wisdom of the course of action decided upon by Commissioner Malan, we remain appreciative of his contribution towards the Commission process and of the fact that he has shared a challenging mandate with the rest of us, often under trying circumstances.