TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

AMNESTY HEARING

DATE: 9TH OCTOBER 2000

NAME: HENRI VAN DER WESTHUIZEN

APPLICATION NO: AM8079/97

MATTER: JUSTICE ALBIE SACHS, INDRESS NAIDOO, MR SONNY SINGH, MR KEITH MOKWAPE, MS SUE RAPKIN, MR GOERGE MOKOENA, MRS SOPHIE PHINDA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PHINDA FAMILY

MURDER OF THREE ANC MEMBERS IN LESOTHO AND ABDUCTION OF SIMON MOGETLA

HELD AT: JISS CENTRE, JOHANNESBURG

DAY: 1

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START OF PROCEEDINGS NOT RECORDED

MR BIZOS: ... persons affected by this application. I will put the names of the persons that I am representing. Firstly, Mr Justice Albie Sachs, Mr Indress Naidoo, Mr Sonny Singh, Mr Keith Mokwape, Ms Sue Rapkin, Mr George Mokoena and Mrs Sophie Phinda and other members of the Phinda family.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Bizos. From the Amnesty Committee, do we have a representative?

MR MAPOMA: Yes Chairperson, my name is Zuko Mapoma, Leader of Evidence of the Amnesty Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: May I start with you, Mr Mapoma, I see we have a number of implicated persons, I counted up to six, there may be more, have they got notice as implicated persons?

MR MAPOMA: We issued notices to them, Chairperson. In fact, some of the implicated's notices were served to Mr Jan Wagener, representing the implicated persons, and others were served personally.

CHAIRPERSON: Have we had any communication from them or Mr Wagener?

MR MAPOMA: Yes, what he indicated is that he is not making representation on behalf of their clients to today in this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: But did he confirm instructions from them?

MR MAPOMA: I may have to look into that letter that he wrote us, I can't recollect, but he acknowledged receipt of the notice on their behalf.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mapoma.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) on record my instructing attorney's name, I'm sorry. It's Mr Eric van den Berg of Bell Dewar and Hall.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr George Bizos.

MR MAPOMA: May I, Chairperson, also for the record, mention that Mr Dawid Ndlovu from the office of the Deputy President, Mr Jacob Zuma, has requested that it be placed on record that he is here, attending on behalf of Mr Zuma, as a potential victim in this application.

CHAIRPERSON: What is his position going to be if Mr Zuma is implicated and he wants to ask questions? Does he have sufficient instructions in that regard?

MR MAPOMA: No, what he has indicated, Chairperson, is that he's going to listen to the whole story and then convey it to the Mr Zuma, whereafter at some stage after the hearing, if need be, they may put something in writing, in response to whatever comes out of the hearing.

CHAIRPERSON: I would advise you to inform him that this should be done as soon as possible, because it would be our wish that we don't delay unduly, in our decision in this matter.

MR MAPOMA: As the Chairperson pleases, I will do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mapoma. Mr van den Berg, before you call the applicant, do you wish to place anything on record?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Joubert.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Joubert?

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Honourable Chairman. No. Mr van der Westhuizen is present, he's prepared to take the oath and he'll be testifying in Afrikaans.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Before he does. Mr Bizos, is there anything you want to place on record before we call the applicant?

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Bizos. In what language is he going to testify?

MR JOUBERT: He'll be testifying in Afrikaans, Chairperson.

HENRI VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated. Mr Joubert.

EXAMINATION BY MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

Mr van der Westhuizen, your amnesty application appears from page 1 to 31 in the bundle, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR JOUBERT: This application, did you complete this by yourself or did you have legal representation when you completed it?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I completed the application myself.

MR JOUBERT: Did you receive any assistance from an attorney while you completed the form?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, none.

MR JOUBERT: I have consulted with you and we have gone through the matter again, are there any amendments which you would like to bring about?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, yes.

MR JOUBERT: I shall take you - Chairperson, I am not going to have the whole statement read into the record again, I will only highlight the problem areas, if that will suit you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR JOUBERT: On page 3 of the application, in the middle of the page at B, where the request is to mention any person who was injured or killed, I notice that nothing was filled in there. Did you have to fill in something there?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR JOUBERT: And what would that be?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As per the annexure indicated in the document.

MR JOUBERT: So you address that aspect fully ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What annexure would that be? Not just as per the annexure in the documents, there are annexures and we don't know which annexure he's referring to. Will it be Annexure C on page 19 of the paginated papers?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, Annexure C, C.2.

MR JOUBERT: Those are the annexures in which you discuss the incidents.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, yes.

MR JOUBERT: And then on page 5 of your application where reference is made to number C, where the question is whether you benefited in any way, financially or otherwise, the answer there is:

"No, for none of the mentioned amnesty applications, but for other actions."

Was this more than once?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, it was just the one time.

MR JOUBERT: And this is the one that you discuss later in your annexure?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, the one I mention in paragraph D.

MR JOUBERT: Is it then correct, it should refer to one incident and not to many incidents?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, yes.

MR JOUBERT: Then on the same page, paragraph 11(b) you say ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But before you proceed, Mr Joubert, the one incident you are referring to, what was the financial benefit and how did it come about that you are paid for that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If I may, Chairperson, I would like to discuss it, I think it will become clear later in what circumstances this financial gain occurred.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I want to know it up front.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: What happened was that the persons at that stage, with whom I had worked at the CCB, Mr Pieter Botes, requested me to assist him with the supply of foreign arms, in other words it was arms from Eastern origin, not South African weapons, for the use in actions as I refer to there, pseudo actions in neighbouring States. The reason why those arms were needed was because of the fact that it could not be traced back anywhere.

During this request I contacted Eugene de Kock from Vlakplaas and asked him whether he could assist me in supplying AK47s, rifles and other arms. And this happened, he assisted me, he agreed to assist me and Mr Botes then gave me an amount of between R7 500 and R10 000. That money was not channelled to Eugene de Kock at all and some of that money I used for personal gain.

In my consultation with my legal representative I have already referred to R3 500 that was used to put paving at my house and later I used some other money to channel it back to my co-workers whom I had used at that stage, with the collection of information in Swaziland and in Mozambique.

CHAIRPERSON: So this opportunity was not related to the work you were undertaking?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The R3 500, the R10 000 - between the R7 500 and R10 000 that I had received, that money I can probably qualify that part of it was ploughed back into my work to pay my co-workers and other members who collected information for me, but a part thereof I used for personal gain. That is why I wish to say that yes, some of the money went back into the system to assist me in the execution of my tasks, but I used R3 500 for my own personal benefit.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Mr Joubert.

MR LAX: Sorry, just before you do.

This is the incident referred to at page 24, C.5(a).

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, yes.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Honourable Chair.

On page 24 of the paginated documents, the arms and the tasks you performed to receive the arms from Mr de Kock to give to Piet Botes, before you received any money what was the purpose of supplying Mr Botes with arms?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As I have already said, Chairperson, those arms were - first there was a request from Mr Botes to obtain those arms for purposes of use in neighbouring States, so that the arms could not be traced back and in terms of the arms that were used in specific actions against the enemy at that stage, within the neighbouring States, of which Mr Botes and I were responsible for, namely Mozambique and Swaziland. It was a request, in other words they did not want to use South African arms and because the arms were of Russian origin, those arms were requested.

MR JOUBERT: Do you know what the arms were used for eventually?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I do not know what happened to the arms, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Are you assuming that these arms were used by the CCB, or their operatives, in one way or another?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's my humble opinion that it could have happened. I do not believe people had those types of capabilities and then not use those arms eventually. And that is just an inference I'm drawing. As far as I know, as far as my knowledge goes, I received the arms from Mr de Kock at Vlakplaas and I handed it over to Mr Botes. What he did with it, I do not know.

MR LAX: And then just one last thing before you move away from this incident. What is meant by the term "pseudo operation"?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: A pseudo operation is an operation that is executed, of which the origin, in other words the members involved and the circumstances of that operation cannot be traced back to South Africa, or to operatives in South Africa.

MR LAX: Thank you, please proceed.

CHAIRPERSON: Before I disturbed you, you were explaining the amendments you wish to bring forward, Mr Joubert, I'm sorry about that. You may proceed.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Honourable Chair.

I wish to take you back to page 5 where we were, we will discuss this in detail when we get there, but on page 5, 11(a), where the question is whether the acts, omissions or offences were committed in the execution under instruction and you answer that some of these actions were done under instruction. Are there any amendments you would like to bring about?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, Chairperson. Basically I said that the instructions that were executed were on the instructions ... this was an instruction, I acted in the capacity of the Army, but this also included the rest of the security community. In other words, it was not only with regard to the Army, we also worked together with the Security Branch and other institutions. And I would like to mention there that the instructions that were executed was on instruction from the whole security community and not only the SADF.

MR JOUBERT: And further in your answer in the same paragraph, in the final sentence of it where you say that the information was supplied to the regiments to enable the regiments to act here. What do you mean by the word "regiments"?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Once again at the stage while I was involved with the ANC project section, we were located at Special Forces Headquarters and primarily we were supposed to serve the regiments of Special Forces, but this led to the fact that we not only supplied and served the regiments of Special Forces, the whole Army could benefit from the information that we gave to them, as well as the Security Branch and other institutions.

MR JOUBERT: And then on page 6 of the documents, at the top of the page upon reaction on question 11(b), "particulars with regard to approval", you are saying here that the South African Defence Force, namely the Commanders in this regard, Gen-Maj Joop Joubert.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: My direct command structure at that stage was D-G Special Forces, at that stage -Chairperson, I would just like to go back here and once again say that the time period that we are covering here, you will see that I will cover two time periods, namely the time that I spent at Special Forces in an intelligence capacity, as well as Covert Collections. With regard to the actions that took place at that stage, the line of command was the Head of the Army, and we refer here to the late Gen Kat Liebenberg, because Special Forces resorted directly under that and the Commander at that stage was Maj-Gen Joop Joubert, and the rest of the line of command was Col Prinsloo, with whom I directly worked at the project section ...

MR JOUBERT: Is it correct that you received your instructions from Col Prinsloo and Gen Joubert?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct. The command structure of Special Forces received their instructions from higher authority, whether it was the Head of the Defence Force, maybe the State President, the Minister or the State Security Council, and then that information was conveyed via my Commander, Gen Joop Joubert, who then liaised with his Intelligence Co-ordinator, or his Intelligence Staff Officer, Col Prinsloo, and that information was then conveyed through to us.

MR JOUBERT: Very well.

CHAIRPERSON: But would you be informed by the one who eventually gives you the command that it comes to those people, or would you be given the details of what was discussed higher up?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, we never really knew what was discussed higher up, we received our instructions through an established channel. In other words, I directly listened to what my General told me, or the Senior Staff Officer of Intelligence, Col Mielie Prinsloo, that is where the instructions came from.

CHAIRPERSON: So when you speak of the higher up structures you are assuming that the instructions you'd eventually get through Prinsloo, must be coming from higher up?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I say again, Chairperson, the Senior Staff Officer of Intelligence at Special Forces, liaised closely with the Commanding General of Special Forces, Joop Joubert. The command structure from Gen Joubert to the top, we did not have much knowledge of that line of command. Whatever instruction that was received or whatever nature, was given from the Commanding General, Joop Joubert, whether he did it directly or whether he did it through his Senior Staff Officer.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Mr Joubert.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Not that you are one of the Commanders, but as the representative of the applicant.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Honourable Chair.

MR LAX: Just before you do, what was Prinsloo's initials or first name?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I speak under correction, but I think his initials were CJC, but we generally referred to him as Col Mielie Prinsloo.

MR LAX: Thank you, please proceed.

MR JOUBERT: Mr van der Westhuizen, while we are on this point of the command structure, were there any guidelines for Army operations across the border, that you were aware of?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, there were clear guidelines.

MR JOUBERT: Can you recall what those guidelines entails and could you just explain them to us.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The guidelines of cross-border operations in general, was - within the Security Forces there was a clear difference in terms of who was supposed to act across the border and who was supposed to act inside the country. Operations across the border in the neighbouring countries was a function that was given to the South African Defence Force, however there were exceptions to that rule. I want to almost say it was an unwritten rule, where the Security Branch, the South African Police, could take certain action within Lesotho and in Swaziland.

The reasons for this was that, I almost want to say that Lesotho and Swaziland were seen as a fifth and sixth province of South Africa and that there was close co-operation between the Security Branch, the Police in general and I think that includes all divisions of the Police, whether it be SANAB or whether it be Vehicle Theft, or Stock Theft Units, there was close co-operation between the Police and the Police Force of the neighbouring States, Lesotho and Swaziland. And because of that close co-operation that existed with specific reference to Lesotho and Swaziland, the Police or the Security Branch more often took action in those countries.

And I say once again, I do not know what the law says in that regard, but I do know that the South African Defence Force was responsible for the protection of the sovereignty of the country and we were supposed, the South African Defence Force, to conduct cross-border operations in neighbouring States, but with regard to Lesotho and Swaziland, the Security Branch was involved in many instances in those two neighbouring States.

MR JOUBERT: When the Army should conduct a cross-border operation, would such instructions come from Gen Joubert, or would it be an instruction that came from a higher authority?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, to answer that question, Gen Joubert was the Commanding General of Special Forces, he was not the Chief of the South African Defence Force, and as far as I know all operations that were conducted in neighbouring States were instructions that was discussed by the State Security Council and instructions in that regard was conveyed through to the institution who was responsible for the operation cross-border.

General Joubert did not have the powers to, or he was not supposed to approve of such operations, those operations had to be cleared with the commanding staff of the South African Defence Force, and that is a larger organisation and a larger structure than just him taking the decision by himself.

MR JOUBERT: And then with Annexure A, this is the curriculum vitae that you attach, there are certain things that have changed in this regard. Chairperson, it is not strictly relevant, but for sake of completion can I just indicate this to you?

Your working address on page 9 has changed.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR JOUBERT: What is the new one?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's Blackberry Street number 8, Swartkop Ext 4, Centurion.

MR JOUBERT: And then your telephone number at work has also changed.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, the new number is 663 5715, with the code 012.

MR JOUBERT: And on page 10, where you indicate your family background and you refer to your father, he's already deceased.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, he is.

MR JOUBERT: And then on page 11, at the bottom of the page where you there refer to an investigation that was conducted against you with regard to the Goldstone Commission. This investigation was completed and no charges were laid against you, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR JOUBERT: And the letter that you refer to is not the letter from the Goldstone Commission, but a letter from the office of the Attorney-General, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: Then on page 12, under the heading: "Additional to CV", and at point 4 where you give the addresses, it should read as you have stated previously.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: And then we arrive at Annexure B, where you deal with the political background, the political circumstances in which you acted. Chairperson, this is an aspect that has served so many times before the Amnesty Committee, I shall deal with this briefly if you want and if it is a contention point, we can go into detail about it.

Will you briefly indicate what the political background was that you found yourself in and where you were in the military set-up and in which you acted during your activities at Military Intelligence.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I think I have already given extensive background with regard to where I come from and so forth ...

CHAIRPERSON: When did you give that, because we have read the papers before us, but I haven't heard you say so?

MR JOUBERT: Maybe I can ask you as follows. Do you confirm the contents of your application, that it is correct except for as far as we will bring about amendments?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I confirm that.

MR JOUBERT: And you stand by your statements?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I do, Chairperson.

MR JOUBERT: An aspect that you would like to point out is on page 14 where you refer to the Church Street Bomb and what you experienced there, can you just elaborate on your personal experiences in that regard?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, on this specific day I - at that stage I still worked in the Pointens Head Office of Military Intelligence, or Military Intelligence Head Office which was located in Pointens, Church street. On that particular afternoon at approximately 4 o'clock, my colleagues and I - at that stage we were responsible for Malawi, to work at the conventional desk, we received the signal that three Malawi Ministers had been murdered and we had to send a telex to HSADF and it was with regard to the drawing up of this telex that we were busy and approximately twenty five after four that afternoon a tremendous blast shook the whole Pretoria and our office as well. At that stage I was in the corridor and I immediately knew that it was a bomb and that the extent of it I felt was great and I hastened myself to a window. I saw it was total chaos in Church Street, in-between Pointens and the Air Force Headquarters.

And as usual on a Friday afternoon, my former spouse always collected me from work at approximately quarter to four in the afternoon and she usually parked in the vicinity of where the motor bomb exploded and when I looked outside I saw a vehicle that appeared to be similar to my vehicle, that was thrown half on the pavement, I think it might just have been the impact of this tremendous explosion, and I have to say that I was tremendously shocked, I thought that it could be my wife in that vehicle and I rushed down downstairs. I did not use the lifts because I knew that there were other people who were hurt and so I just rushed downstairs.

When I arrived there, to my relief I saw that my wife was parked approximately 150 metres behind the car bomb and this whole scene played itself out in front of her. I have to say that it is a sight that I would never again want to see, it was a situation of total chaos, there was blood all over, there were vehicle fragments around, there were cars on fire, there were people running around.

I then took my wife with me and took her up to our office, because unfortunately the telex still had to go out that afternoon. But I must say that it was an image that's stayed with me always and it is an image that has influence me to a great extent, I think in my later actions and in my later career where I served at the ANC Project Section, as well as later with Directorate of Covert Collections.

MR JOUBERT: And on page 15, the second paragraph, the last sentence where you say there:

"My wife was unhurt and I hated ANC/MK all the more"

Is that still the position?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, circumstances have changed entirely now, we are in a new dispensation. I suppose we should all take hands and move forward, but that was a situation that had an immediate affect on me, because colleagues of mine were injured and some of my colleagues were killed, and I think it was the emotional state at that stage.

MR JOUBERT: On page 16, in the second-last paragraph you deal with a so-called Counter-Revolutionary Intelligence Team, or so-called Trevits, what were the primary tasks of Trevits?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, the whole Trevits issue was an issue that has been canvassed before and my involvement in the Trevits section, the Counter-Revolutionary Task Team, the purpose thereof was primary and that was to identify the ANC structures in the neighbouring States, and the purpose was to establish structures as to how the ANC appeared in the neighbouring States in terms of whether it was staff, facilities, training facilities, in other words camps, weapons cache points. And the reasons behind this was before you can act against your enemy, a structure had to be identified against which one could act. And the reason why Trevits was established was because of so many unsuccessful attempts of the Security Forces to act against the enemy if it was expected of them in the past.

And I think at that stage, in 1987, '86/'87, there was a need to establish a body in which ANC structures and ANC relevant information could be obtained, so that we could also at that stage - and when I here refer to the ANC, I refer to all its facets, whether it be MK or whatever it may be, to identify those structures in order to really act against them, whether it be in terms of strategy or whether it will be in a physical action against them.

MR JOUBERT: And on page 17, the second paragraph from the top, there you refer and you say:

"Actions against targets did not take place on intelligence or operational motivation but on the political climate"

What do you mean by that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, that is once again one of the aspects that for us within the Security Forces, caused great frustration. In our tasks and in our instructions we were supposed to collect any information on the ANC and the SACP and to develop that information, so that when any action is taken, that this could be done against facilities and that actions that are taken or would be taken, could be taken with the maximum affect, whether it be a disruptive affect or whether it be to nip the ANC in the bud. Consequently, in our work and in our work environment and in our modus operandi, we tried to determine who the most important ANC personalities were who functioned within specific neighbouring States, and we also looked at which facilities were used as transit facilities to infiltrate ANC cadres into the country.

We also looked at which facilities were used for the stockpiling of arms and when we obtained such information and when we were ready to brief the Generals in Staff with that information, we had a situation where we many times were informed that this was not the correct time to act now, because maybe it was an issue of the Security Council that sat at the United Nations, or whether a senior or highly placed delegation was in America or vice versa, where one had European delegates busy with negotiations with the South African Government. Or one could have the situation where the ideal target was there, but the political climate was not ready yet.

And then we had a situation where a Wimpy bomb explodes, actions are launched, landmines explode along the borders and then from the government's side there's an instruction to us that we must act now against the ANC. The problem there is unfortunately the ANC knew the modus operandi of the Security Forces of South Africa, and as soon as they did something, they vacated their premises. And somehow the political climate was forced down the Security Force's throats and we were told: "You must act now", but unfortunately the target is no longer there, because the potential target that was identified in the knowledge that 20 or 30 persons were in a transit facility, that was a target, but now to go and act against an empty facility, that is not a target.

Consequently, to a greater extent, the Army and I think the Security Branches had to dance to the tune of the politicians when it suited the politicians to take action and in those cases the Army were not ready to take any action, and when the Army was ready to take action, the politicians were not ready because of the political climate.

CHAIRPERSON: I had occasion to listen to how the Military Intelligence worked and I'll tell you this was in respect of the Botswana Raid. Now if you say - and what happened is that in the Botswana Raid, you would remember that the ANC had this conference in Kabwe on the 15th/16th of June 1985, and the Botswana Raid took place on the 14th of June 1985, by the military operation, and what we gleamed from that hearing was that the community of the intelligence was larger, in that it included a Military Security Force, you name it. Now when you say the political climate would not be ready, let's liken this to the Botswana Raid, when the ANC, knowing that the ANC would be having all their Heads in Kabwe but still strike in Botswana, what would be the political climate rather in the sense of being ready be in that sense? Because again they said with the Botswana Raid, they wanted to destroy mostly facilities, where you say that people would not be at those facilities, were the facilities not playing an important role for instance, where arms caches were kept or where the machinery of ANC would be working, SACP, PAC, you name it? What would now make the climate ready when you say you had now problems because you had to jump about? If I may phrase it that way.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I can't say much about the '85 incident in Botswana, but I think what you want know, if I understand you correctly, is how was it supposed to happen. There were many incidents that took place from 1986 where I was indirectly involved, and I can speak about my personal experience in this regard. If you can recall, in 1986, December '86, there was an instruction, there was an action in Swaziland where a certain ANC veteran Shadrack Mapomulu was killed and two Swiss citizens were abducted.

The impact that action had in terms a major success for the South African Security Forces, was zero. In fact, it was a great embarrassment for the South African Security community. It was an incident - we already showed the implications to National Intelligence before the whole operation took place, we already showed them what would happen. This actions took place on the grounds of intelligence handed to us by the then National Intelligence Service. The abduction of two Swiss citizens, we said that it was irrelevant and not necessary.

The death of Shadrack Mapomulu, he was a person who each day of his life he lived in the same facility and everybody knew where he was. Now to shoot him, that was really a total waste of a human life, but in spite of that we were forced to continue with that operation.

At that stage I was involved in the planning of the 1986, December '86 operation that would take place in Maputo, and some of my other colleagues were involved in this incident in Swaziland. Now we knew at that stage that there was a certain man called Ismail Ebrahim, he was in Swaziland and he played a very important role in the ANC and we knew that if we would take him out, then you would have a disruption. That is a disruptive operation, because this person was in touch with the structures within Swaziland, he knew where the other ANC members were. He was somebody that if you abduct him you could convince him to work with you, but National Intelligence said: "No, you don't touch that guy".

These actions took place and innocent people were abducted and an innocent person died. That was about the 18th of December 1986. Five days later or six days later, I stand to be corrected, Ismail Ebrahim went to Security Headquarters in Pretoria and until today we infer that he was abducted by teams of National Intelligence, but he was handed over to the Security Branch. The question that should be asked is, they knew, National Intelligence knew where this member was in Swaziland and the actions, that operation was supposed to be launched against him, not against a person like Shadrack Mapomulu who was only an ANC member.

CHAIRPERSON: My question is, when would the climate be right for an attack, because apparently confusion reigned and you had to devise means of attacking, but there would be the politicians, there would be National Intelligence, there would be Security Force Intelligence, there would be Military Intelligence, and all these people interacting, but for the climate to be correct for you to attack, for instance, in Swaziland, Mozambique or Lesotho, when would that climate be right? That's what I want to know.

MR LAX: Just one other aspect. You indicated that you didn't want to do that operation, but circumstances forced you, or you were forced, that was the term you used, what forced you, what was that all about?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, let me first answer your question. At several times we had situations where facilities were full of members on their way to infiltrate the Republic of South Africa, often we had situations where we knew exactly where the ANC's arms were, for example, in Mozambique or also in Swaziland.

I can once again inform you on the grounds of my physical involvement in these kinds of operations. To establish a force for cross-border operations is a very extensive operation and it needs lots of planning and thorough planning. When you have a situation where facilities lend themselves to be acted against, then I repeat that we went to our commanding officers and told them that we had a facility that should be acted against, then I was told that the political circumstances were as such that we could not do it.

What the political circumstances were at that stage, I don't know. I was a person, I was committed to my task, I had to do the necessary collection in order to prepare a target and as soon as the target was prepared, I had to present it. I could present it five or six times to the Generals in Staff and at each time I could have received the same answer, namely, that the time was not ready to act now.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have a discretion then, because what I understood you to say earlier, you got your instructions from your Commanders, either Joop Joubert or Mielie Prinsloo? Now if you have prepared a target and you tell them that you have prepared a target, would you strike without getting orders first?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, unfortunately you cannot strike before having received a clear instruction. An instruction did not come overnight, it was a thorough process that was followed. Now I'm talking from within my working environment within the Special Forces. The situation was, according to me, I want to say my appreciation of the situation, when the CCB was disbanded, they functioned according to different methods, they had a different modus operandi to mine ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, we want to know the one that you were involved in and let's forget the CCB for a moment, because you tell me that you would probably prepare a target for about seven times before you attack, I say, did you have a discretion, because what I understood you to say, correct me if I'm wrong, that you had to get orders from either Joubert or Mielie Prinsloo, as your Commanders, direct Commanders. When would that happen, because if you are receiving instructions, my understanding, I may be wrong, is that you have no discretion, you just do as you are told as a footsoldier? Would I be correct in that event?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, yes you are correct. I just want to tell you that Mielie Prinsloo was purely a Staff Officer, he had no powers for any operations. With the information I had, that I gave him, he could go to the General and tell him: "General, I think it's now the right time to act", or: "General, I think we must call together the Generals in Staff, so that we can discuss the potential targets. I did the target development and when the target was ready I presented it to my boss and he had no executive powers to carry out such an operation. That was Mielie Prinsloo. Gen Joubert, with the aid of the input from Mielie Prinsloo, he could tell the Minister or the Defence Force or Ops, they could make a presentation and tell them that this target was ready and it's urgent that we act now. Then once again, it was a situation where BG Special Forces in conjunction and co-operation with the Army, could say the time is not ready to act now.

And I repeat, some of those targets were presented as many as seven or eight times, because maybe it was a situation where the time was not ripe, so we couldn't act. And the two times where I was directly involved with the regiments, in other words the formal Special Forces regiments, it was a situation where I presented the total extent of those targets and during which the Generals in Staff in my absence, would discuss the impact of such operations. And let's just say taking into account the impact that those operations would have on the ANC, they took that detail and maybe to HSADF. I don't know the channels ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Let's put it this way. Your duty, wouldn't it be to collect information and there would be those higher up with that kind of information and if you probably say to them: "Look, (in your report) this target is ready to be attacked", they would take decisions and come back to you and say: "Attack", wouldn't that be the situation?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I was not an operative, I was not somebody who physically pulled the trigger, my order was only to collect information, not to collect information, not to - you had regiments to carry out operations. My orders were very clear: "You collect intelligence, intelligence with regard to targets and as soon as that target is one hundred percent prepared for a presentation to the Generals in Staff, or to your commanding officer, then you give it to him, he will go and he will get the approval that such an operation should be launched." As soon as he receives that order, then it's my task as an intelligence person to brief the regiments who would physically attack the targets, to tell them what the target looks like. In no circumstances was I involved in the physical operations against those targets.

So my task and my function was purely to collect information, to give it through, to obtain authorisation for such operations and to give that authorisation to the regiments and the regiments could use my knowledge if they wanted to in the physical carrying out of their operations. I could give them the finer detail about the target, which was also once again, an intelligence task.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, hence I asked you whether you had a discretion or not, because it would eventually come back to you. That's what I meant.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's true.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may proceed.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Now you explained your duties, I just want to make sure that there are no misunderstandings. You only collected information with regards to targets and you presented it to the Generals in Staff, correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR JOUBERT: And the Generals in Staff would then discuss this and they would get information from other bodies and they would then make a decision and they would formulate their decision and they would present it to a higher authority, correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR JOUBERT: You would not know what was decided?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR JOUBERT: And if a decision was taken that the target would be attacked, the decision would be given back to you, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, not necessarily.

MR JOUBERT: It would given directly to, for example, Four Reconnaissance Regiment?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR JOUBERT: And they could launch the attack without contacting you, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, yes.

MR JOUBERT: But they could contact you if they needed further information with regard to the target they had to attack, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR JOUBERT: And then they would contact to you to help them with further information.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR LAX: Sorry, can I just interpose?

Who was the Generals in Staff?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Sorry?

MR LAX: Who was the Generals in Staff?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The Generals in Staff consisted of a number of people. Usually the Generals in Staff is the Head of the Defence Force, the Army, the Head of Operations, the Head of the Air Force, the Head of the Navy, other Staff Officers, the Head of Intelligence and HSHB also, but while I was at Special Forces, I only know about the Head of the Army. The Head of the Army had his whole Generals in Staff. In other words, HS Ops, Head of the Air Force, Head of the Navy, Head of Intelligence and others members who were co-opted from time to time.

MR JOUBERT: Mr van der Westhuizen, let's get to the specific incident, page 19 of the paginated document. You talk about the murder and abductions ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Joubert, may I stop you there, I think before you start with the actual incidents, would it be an opportune time to take the tea break?

MR JOUBERT: It would be. I beg your pardon, Chairperson, I didn't notice.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We'll adjourn for 15 minutes for tea.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

HENRI VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Mr Joubert.

EXAMINATION BY MR JOUBERT: (cont)

Thank you, Honourable Chair.

We referred to page 19 just now, Annexure C, where you talk about the different incidents. You first discuss the incidents in Lesotho, where three ANC activists were killed and Simon Mogetla was abducted. Your involvement, you indicate here that the Security Branch members of Ladybrand, they performed these two operations, correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR JOUBERT: What was your involvement in this? How did you become involved in this and what did you do?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: During 1986, just after Metsing Leganya took command, a Security Committee was established to look at close co-operation between the government of Lesotho and the South African Government. I was sent to represent Military Intelligence at a Security Committee which had been established and which met regularly in Maseru and Ladybrand. We met more regularly in Maseru, because of the fact that the Security members of the Army and the Intelligence Service required that and because it was more practical for them to meet in Maseru.

The Security Branch of Ladybrand, under command of Frik Fouche, had a very good working relationship with the Lesotho Security Forces at that stage and it was decided that I would work from his office in Ladybrand for practical purposes. On the one hand the Security Committee which had been established after the '85 operation, which took place in December '85, where the Security Branch, namely Eugene de Kock and his group were involved while there was a team of the South African Defence Force present in Lesotho.

As far as I understood from discussions with Capt Fouche, intelligence information was given to the Security Branch and to the South African Defence Force and there was a situation where there was no co-ordination of operations in '85. This led to a situation where while the attack took place by the Police and Eugene de Kock, South African Defence Force members were in a hotel in Lesotho. This almost led to great confusion within the Security Forces and there could have been injuries, where South African Security Forces could shoot at one another.

In order to clear up this situation it was decided that Military Intelligence would send a representative to Ladybrand with the purpose of establishing closer co-operation between the Security Branch and the Defence Force, and that's the reason why I was sent to Ladybrand. But on the other hand, we also had to deal with a new government with new Security Forces, under the command of Gen-Maj Metsing Leganya.

This was a very unique opportunity for the Security Forces of South Africa, in that the Security Forces of Lesotho could be used for the tracing of ANC members, to arrest them and then to deport them to Zambia, Tanzania and other neighbouring States.

Because of that, I started working very closely with the Security Branch and the Security Branch gave me their files on ANC activists and I could use these files. The purpose of this was twofold, namely, to associate myself with the workings of this group but also to update my own information on what the ANC looked like in Lesotho.

Chairperson, I just want to go back to the period '85. I moved over and for the first time I was physically working on the ANC. I want say it's late '85, and in January '86 I had my first baptism of fire when I started working at the ANC Project section, which was settled at that stage in the Liberty Life building in Vermeulen Street in Pretoria. However, I didn't work there for a very long time, because in March/April I was sent to Lesotho, where I served on the Security Committee.

As I've said before, our instruction was to trace ANC and identify ANC members in Lesotho, whether they were persons or structures, and that information had to be conveyed to the Lesotho Security Forces, so that they could arrest those members and deport them. Some of these ANC members were kept in cells in Maseru before their deportation took place.

MR LAX: Can I just check something with you? The files you spoke about receiving, were those Lesotho Security files, or Ladybrand Security Branch files? I just wasn't clear on that.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Those were Security Branch files at Ladybrand.

MR LAX: Thank you. Please continue.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, during this whole time when I served in Ladybrand and while I was a member of the Security Committee with the Security Forces of Lesotho, there was a very good working relationship between us and I got new insight about the modus operandi of the Police Security Branch operations. And what happened at that stage was that Frik Fouche had close liaison with Eugene de Kock's team and one evening, I think it was in the winter of '86, I can't remember if it was in June or July, I know it was very cold, it was decided to do a reconnaissance action of an ANC facility, or of ANC facilities.

I, as well as members of C2, Snor Vermeulen, Willie Nortje and Steve Bosch were in one vehicle, while other members of the Security Branch in Ladybrand were in another vehicle. We went to a facility in the Maseru district. I can't remember the exact location of the facility. The facility was identified by W/O Jantjie. There would have been two or three very prominent ANC members. We went with him. I also wanted to look at the modus operandi of the Security Branch. It was the first time we crossed the border. At that stage I was staying at the Hilton Hotel in Maseru.

That evening I went with the Security Branch through the border post and we went to have a look at some of these facilities. At one of these facilities we stood quite a distance away from the house, I think it was about 100/150 metres away, but the other vehicle of the Security Branch members went closer to the house. I think it was a matter of 3, 4, 5 minutes afterwards that there was complete chaos. Maseru and many of its districts have no lights, it's quite a dark place, and the next moment there was gunfire and we rushed to a specific point and we waited there for the vehicle which was involved in the shooting.

Then we were informed afterwards, later that evening we were informed - well it could also have been the following day, I know the members dropped me off at the hotel in Lesotho. And as I've already said it was very cold, because I remember we had a glass of gluwein there. They dropped me off and the team of Eugene de Kock went back across the border with the other group which was involved in the shooting. I just want to say that Eugene de Kock's team and I, we were not involved in any shooting.

And the next day I was informed that as they went closer to the one door in Lesotho, when one member knocked on the door, one Security Branch member knocked on the door, the people inside the house apparently opened the door, they identified the person and they produced a handgrenade. It was during this incident that the support team which had to support this member, started shooting on the people inside the house. As I've said before, we immediately went away, we left immediately.

The next morning I was told what happened and I was informed that on the same evening an abduction took place of a man called Simon Mogetla. He was known in Lesotho as MK Old Timer. This member - during this same operation, this cross-border visit, this member was abducted by another team of the Security Branch. Once again I only learnt about the abduction the next morning, I wasn't part of the planning of the abduction. I must say at that stage I was quite new in the Security Branch and I think my presence with them was only because Eugene de Kock's team and myself had a very good relationship and they took me with them. That was also the group that dropped me off at the hotel the evening while the other teams went back to Ladybrand.

The next morning I was briefed by the members. Col Chris Smit came through from Bloemfontein the next morning, he briefed me and told me they had quite a success because they abducted this old man, Simon Mogetla, and he apparently had very good documentation with him. And secondly, because a shooting took place. He knew that I was involved and he congratulated me. Until today I don't know why he congratulated me, maybe because I was with the Security Branch, because I accompanied them on the mission.

From the office of the Ladybrand Security Branch he sent a telex to my commanding officer, I think it was still in the Pointens Building, to my boss, my former boss, Adm du Plessis. Adm du Plessis was very unhappy. He contacted me immediately saying that he didn't expect me to be involved in operations, my task and my function was to support the Security Branch in Ladybrand and to represent Military Intelligence on the Security Committee in Maseru.

Col Smit asked me that same morning to ask the Security Forces of Lesotho whether they knew about what happened that evening during the shooting and who died. They wanted to know who were the ANC members, what their real identities were, who was shot. The next morning during the Security Committee meeting, I asked the members of the Lesotho Security Forces what happened. At that stage they didn't have sufficient information, for them it was a possible love triangle, that the two members killed one another. I don't know if they realised the full extent of the operation, whether they knew that the Security Forces were involved. It didn't seem to be the case from my discussion with these members of the Lesotho Defence Force.

Two days later they gave us the fingerprints as well as photos from these members who were shot and they said that two ANC members were killed and that the third person only housed these people in the house in Maseru. I took that information through to the Ladybrand Security Branch. I cannot remember the names of the members who were shot. As far as my involvement goes, as well as the involvement of Eugene de Kock's team, it was only to observe. Let us say it was only in an observation capacity.

CHAIRPERSON: So your visitation - if I may interpose, your visitation to this facility was merely to observe and nothing else?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR JOUBERT: Mr van der Westhuizen, on page 20 from the third line, the top paragraph, you say:

"We were not involved in the shooting and left the scene with Jantjie's group"

you have just now said that you went with your vehicle to a point where Jantjie joined you. Will you please explain that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. The thing here is, Chairperson, that I must add that this is something that happened a long time ago and I cannot say with one hundred percent conviction that - I accept or I think that we did get to a specific point, I think it was the Basotho gate, where they said that they will just drive through, back to Ladybrand. I accept that it was so, but I cannot recall all that well.

MR JOUBERT: So you did not leave the scene with the group?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes when the shooting took place, we immediately left the scene.

MR JOUBERT: And then under "Instruction" on the same page you said Col Chris Smit from Bloemfontein knew beforehand about this incident. Do you know that he has knowledge from your own personal knowledge, or is this an inference that you draw?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I draw the inference because of the fact that the following morning Col Chris Smit from Bloemfontein was at his office and when the border post opened that morning, I, very early, went through from Maseru to Ladybrand and I met him there and he was quite satisfied with the operation and he immediately congratulated me, because I was present with the team. It however did appear from a conversation with W/O Jantjie that it was not the objective to shoot these people, but when the person took out the handgrenade, action was taken by the team that was there with him.

MR JOUBERT: Were you armed on that evening?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I was not.

MR JOUBERT: The other members were armed?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, they were.

MR JOUBERT: Did you know that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well at that stage it was standing practice for the Security Forces to always have arms with them in their vehicles, whether it be hidden in false compartments, or whether it - it was normal practice. I mean, at that stage, in 1986 the ANC was under pressure within Lesotho and I think many of those people were ready to take action even against the Security Forces and this is what caused the Security Branch from Ladybrand to carry arms with them. When we refer here to arms, I refer to service pistols. The night we went over I did not know that W/O Jantjie and his team had arms with them.

MR JOUBERT: Did you foresee the possibility that an incident will take place where shooting will occur?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: With regard to our training one could always foresee that you can get caught at a roadblock and one has to take action, that is probably so.

MR JOUBERT: And did you associate yourself with that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I did.

MR JOUBERT: After you heard about the abduction of Mr Mogetla ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: How could you associate yourself with mere observation? Is that crime, to observe?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I speak from the capacity where I am in terms of my application to the TRC ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, we are taking the incident as is from Lesotho, that I asked you a question, what was the purpose of your visitation to this facility and you said the purpose of visitation was to observe. I say, to observe, is it an offence?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I do not see it as an offence, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you go there to attack?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Not at all.

CHAIRPERSON: So you went there not knowing what was going to happen?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And your interest only arose to see what happens?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, I was with the team of Eugene de Kock and they invited me along with them.

CHAIRPERSON: And you were not armed?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I was not armed, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Mr Joubert.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Chair.

MR SIBANYONI: Maybe before that. And your superiors were unhappy by you going there? In other words, you wouldn't have received any blessings or authorisation from them.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Sibanyoni, what happened was the following. In my capacity, who had to work along with the Security Branch and who had to work with the Security Forces of Lesotho at that stage, I had a standing authorisation to move in and out of Lesotho as it pleased me. My task was to serve and to represent the Army on the Security Council. My task was not at that stage to become involved in any operations, because that was a stage where I had moved from a conventional desk for the first time to work on the ANC, and consequently I was not supposed to become involved in any actions. That is one. Secondly, at that stage I lived in Lesotho, in the Hilton Hotel.

Perhaps just to add to the question of the Chairperson with regard to whether I had a firearm, I could not carry a firearm because I did not have authorisation to carry a firearm at that stage. My involvement in Lesotho was to serve on the Security Committee, and that is what I did.

MR SIBANYONI: Maybe while you are still talking about that committee, there is one thing I wanted to ask. You said this committee was established immediately after Metsing Leganya took over the reigns in Lesotho, did that have anything to do with the fact that maybe Leganya was sympathetic to the South African Government? What was the basis of establishing a committee immediately after he took over?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Sibanyoni, it is the inference that I draw here today, that definitely, I mean we saw the extent of co-operation that took place at that stage between the Security Forces and the Security members of Lesotho, that it was very positive with us, and the inference that I draw is that at that stage we had a favourable relationship with Gen Metsing Leganya. I heard later that he was a good friend to South Africa. And in the corridors of Security Branches and Security buildings, many a time it was said that wasn't this guy probably an informant, wasn't he a person who moved close to the Security Forces of South Africa? And following on his take-over of power, but also the period before he took over power, that there was a good relationship and liaison between the South African Security Forces and Metsing Leganya.

MR SIBANYONI: While listening to you the impression I get is that the Lesotho Police, or the Security Forces of Lesotho were not only arresting your targets, your ANC people, and deporting them to Zambia and Tanzania, but they were also turning a blind eye for your people operating in Lesotho. Is my impression correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think your observation is quite correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Mr Joubert.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Chairperson.

You heard afterwards Mr van der Westhuizen, that Mr Simon Mogetla was abducted.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: Did you at that stage or at any stage convey the information with regard to the abduction to the police, or did you associate yourself with that action?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I accepted that the actions that took place was upon the instruction of the Security Branch. As I have already said earlier, the Police saw Lesotho as just another area to act in and I accept that that instruction, or the operation was approved by the Police' command structure and I do not believe that they would have done something like this on their own motivation.

MR JOUBERT: Did you associate yourself with this act?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I did.

MR LAX: Sorry. What dealings did you have with Mogetla? Any at all?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Not really, I was introduced to him, I saw him at Ladybrand, there at the Security Branch, he was sitting there and it was told to me that that was the person that had been abducted. I recognised him from photos that were taken during Operation Lebanta, the operation that I think took place in 1980 or '81 against Lesotho, in Maseru. He led many of the convoys, he was one of the guys who walked in front. I recognised his face quite easily and it was also said to me that this was the guy, maybe I will receive an opportunity to speak to him for purposes of bringing myself up to speed as to what was going on at that stage with regard to the ANC in Maseru.

MR LAX: Did you ever question him?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think I did speak to him, but not in the capacity of interrogation.

CHAIRPERSON: You're not sure?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I definitely spoke to him, but I mean in terms of conversation, not in interrogation or questioning.

MR LAX: So you just greeted him and spoke to him about this and that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: In general, yes, because the thing is at that stage, Frik Fouche and them told me that the Security Branch were busy working with him and they wanted to know what they could get from him in terms of follow-up actions to be taken in Lesotho.

MR LAX: Yes, and what happened to Mogetla after this?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I don't know what happened to him afterwards. I read from certain reports that were made and that appear here, that later he was sent back to Lesotho.

MR LAX: You had no knowledge that he was going to be abducted?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No. At that stage, Mr Lax, I - for approximately two or three months I was in Ladybrand. The relationship between the Security Branch and the relationship between the Army, were all aspects that I think my superiors would have hoped that I could fortify such relationships, that is why it was a healthy method to sit at the Security Branch Ladybrand and to see how the Police went about their business and how they worked with arrested terrorists. That on the one hand. On the other hand, I sat and my responsibility - I emphasise it once again, my responsibility was to be able to sit on the Security Committee, a change of government had taken place. In other words, I had to look at a healthy, at that stage a very healthy relationship had to be built between the Security Forces of Lesotho and the South African Defence Force.

My involvement with the Security Branch in Ladybrand was more from a practical viewpoint. They had communication, they had telephones, they had all those types of things. At no stage during my time of just about six or seven months, was I physically involved in any actions against the ANC, other than to go and identify whether the information that we had could be conveyed to the Security Forces of Lesotho, and that is that.

MR LAX: Yes, that's precisely why I say you had no knowledge of his intended abduction, you merely spoke to him at the Ladybrand Security Branch.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's right, Mr Lax.

MR LAX: And besides that, you had no other dealings with him at all.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR JOUBERT: Mr van der Westhuizen, you were reprimanded by your chief, Gen Joop Joubert, because you accompanied the Security Forces that evening. When you decided to accompany the Security Forces, how did you understand your tasks? What did you think, were you supposed to go with them, were you supposed to look at how they went about their business? What was the position?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Once again, it was a situation that it was the first time that I went along with the Security Branch and with members of Eugene de Kock's team, and I think those things all fell within my scope of duties, and in retrospect, I would not have known that they would become involved in physical acts, or actions. And then I know that I would have encountered problems from my commanders, as it indeed happened with regard to the General who contacted me and said I, under no circumstances, should become involved in police actions across the border. So yes, I think to me it was an issue of, it was a unique situation to me, I am in the Security Forces, I am trained to do many things, I am there to perform a certain task, I have to go and have a look and see where the ANC was. I was one of the liaison people with the Security Forces of Lesotho and I had to convey that detail to them and that is why I accompanied the team.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm wondering that you say you accompanying the Security Forces fell within the scope of your tasks, but I thought I heard you say your task was to gather information and not to be involved in any other thing. How could that now fall within your scope of tasks?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, moving around with Security Branch members and moving around with Security Force members, in my later time while I worked or served the DCC, that is what I did exactly, that was moving around in Swaziland, moving around and then I would get the opportunity in Mozambique to move around and identify where the ANC ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Let's confine ourselves to Lesotho. We are speaking of the incident in Lesotho, let's confine ourselves there, because we want to know precisely when you were sent to Ladybrand, what was your brief.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, once again, the night when I drove around with the Security Branch or the members who crossed the border, I was under the impression that we would go in to have a look at ANC facilities, or at facilities that were used by the ANC and to give that information through immediately the following day or during the course of the week to the Security Forces of Lesotho, so that they could take action to arrest these members. And that is why I still saw it's within the scope of my duties, to go and see and identify where those facilities were. The situation just developed that a shooting took place that I did not foresee it, but it did happen. But that was not the instruction, according to what I understood. The following ... that was not the instruction is to become involved in a shooting incident in Lesotho, but to physically go and see who was all in that facility.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr van der Westhuizen, do you think that when the Security Forces and ANC come face to face it would be just an exchange of pleasantries?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, in my capacity as a handler, I served as a handler for three or four years in Covert Collections, and I can assure you here that in many times in Swaziland, and I am a Security Force member, I one on one looked into the face of an ANC member, who at that stage did not know who I was but I knew who he was and my purpose was to collect information and to see whether I could not recruit him, possibly. I think - can I just say the following by saying that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, we are not speaking of people who don't know each other, I'm saying the Security Forces of South Africa and the ANC, when they come face to face, is it a question of: "Hello, the weather is cold in Lesotho"?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think once again it's a case of what the circumstances are, Chairperson. If the person who opens the door shows me a handgrenade, I would accept that some conflict of sorts will take place, but it was a case where I used co-workers, to send them in within a Security Force capacity. When you send someone in to do an operation and you come into contact with your enemy, then you will take him out, you will shoot him, that is so, but in many cases one had a situation where members handled people and where people went in and went to speak to ANC members. The fact that he was armed did not mean that he had to produce his firearm and shoot this person.

MR LAX: Can I just interpose on one other aspect. You mention that there were other black members of the Security Branch there, that's at the bottom of page 19, were some of these members askaris from Mr de Kock's unit?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Lax, not as far as I know. The members whom I knew were there were the members from the Security Branch at Ladybrand. There was one specific person, MK Works or Wax, I don't know whether he at that stage worked for Frik Fouche and them, or whether he was part of Eugene de Kock's team, but as far as my knowledge goes the members who were involved in this specific incident, there were no black members from Eugene de Kock's team, the members who were involved there were all members of the Security Branch at Ladybrand.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't understand you - if I may just come in, I don't understand you, you say you moved into two vehicles and you were in the vehicle with Jantjie, Bosch, Snor Vermeulen and the blacks were in the other vehicle, then on page 20, just at the top, the second sentence you say:

"At one of the facilities, W/O Jantjie and his group knocked on the door, after which several shots were fired."

Do you see that paragraph? My impression is that you were in the group, or in the car where Jantjie and his group, Bosch, Nortje, Vermeulen were. Where did you remain when ...(indistinct) the car in which you were and the people went to knock at the door? What happened to you, because you were in the same car as Jantjie?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I say once again this may have been a long time ago and perhaps I would say, even when I drew up this application for amnesty, it can be ... I am one hundred percent certain that at that stage I was with Snor Vermeulen, Steve Bosch, Willie Nortje, and we were in one vehicle and the other members were in another vehicle. And I want to emphasise, we were approximately 100 to 150 metres from the group who moved up to the door to knock on the door. We were not at all involved with that group of W/O Jantjie. Jantjie may have spoken to us before that, it is possible. W/O Jantjie played a very prominent role at the Security Branch of Ladybrand.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, what I want to understand is that my understanding from what is written and what you are saying is that you were in the same vehicle in which Jantjie was, or am I not reading it correctly?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, here it was - we were all in a group when we moved into this specific place, but we were not all in the same vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: No, what I understand Mr van der Westhuizen, I don't know if I'm reading it correctly, you say - look at page 19:

"This group consisted of Snor Vermeulen, Steve Bosch, Willie Nortje, W/O Jantjie, I and other black members of the branch. We drove in two vehicles and Vermeulen, Nortje, Bosch and myself were in the one vehicle and the blacks in another vehicle."

So the impression created immediately is that the whites were in one vehicle and the blacks were in another.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Would Jantjie then be in the car in which you were?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, he was with the group of the other black members, he was not in our vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand. You may proceed.

MR SIBANYONI: Can I just try to get clarity, was Jantjie white or black?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, no, Mr Sibanyoni, no, he was a black guy.

MR SIBANYONI: A black guy.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: He was a Warrant Officer at the Security Branch in Ladybrand.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Mr Joubert.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Honourable Chair.

On page 21 - and I am just pointing out the mistakes in your application form, but on page 21 of the paginated pages, and this deals with the incident of Mr Gibson Mondlane. The case Gibson Mondlane, in the documents reference is made to Gibson Nxube, did you know him as Gibson Mondlane?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, the second incident, Mr Gibson Mondlane, I knew purely on paper as Gibson Mondlane, that's how his name came through, as Gibson Mondlane "op 'n 'Valkoog'". He was the same person as Gibson Nxube.

MR JOUBERT: So that was the same person?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR JOUBERT: And in the second paragraph on page 21, you indicate that Gibson Mondlane was identified at a specific house in Maputo where he lived, was this on instruction that this identification was done, the identification of Gibson Mondlane? Why was it done, was it on the request of someone, or was it an instruction?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This was a request that any information that we could obtain that could confirm the ANC's presence, in other words, that could connect him to a facility with a physical address in Mozambique, in Maputo or wherever, it was not only with regard to Swaziland/Mozambique. I am now speaking of the total extent, the entire spectrum in which we functioned. There was a request that any such information be sent through immediately to the CCB.

MR JOUBERT: So this was a general request?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: And this information with regard to the movement of Mondlane, you also conveyed this to the CCB, Mr Pieter Botes?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: And then at a later stage you were requested by Mr Botes to specifically monitor Mr Mondlane, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: Were you beforehand aware that any action would be taken against Mr Mondlane, before this request?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, because by that stage when Mr Botes asked me to monitor him, or that I should see what would happen to Mr Mondlane, he said that yes, this man will become ill.

MR JOUBERT: And eventually you saw that this is indeed what happened?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: And you refer to a report where it was indicated that he was possibly poisoned and you say Mr Botes confirmed this to you?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: Was this with regard to the poisoning?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: And in this paragraph, the third paragraph on this page you further say that Mr Botes also said that you had to look at similar possibilities for him.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR JOUBERT: What did you understand by that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That any information that I could give to him would enable them to do, or to launch similar actions as, for example, Mr Mondlane.

MR JOUBERT: Then under the heading: "The Instruction", on the same page, the third line thereof you say:

"The only problem was that although the CCB and SM were the same client, I did not have contact with Botes"

Could you not contact Mr Botes at all, or what do you mean by this sentence?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, here it's a matter of the manner in which I drew up my whole amnesty application. The first thing is that Special Forces and CCB were the same institution, they were the same people. The CCB were seen as a subdivision of Special Forces. And the second thing is that there was a request that as far as possible - this was another unwritten rule with the CCB, which I think came from their Commander, Joe Verster, that members had to create their own capabilities. In other words, operatives had to establish their own capabilities, whether it be operational capabilities or intelligence capabilities, without talking to us first where we were at Special Forces Head Office. And I basically had no limitations on me to liaise with anyone, I could liaise with whoever I pleased. And in this regard it was a matter of Pieter Botes was not supposed to contact me, because they had to build up their own capabilities on ground level and in my capacity as Intelligence Officer who worked at ANC project section, I saw it within my instruction to convey this information to them because they worked in that area.

MR JOUBERT: The information that you collected, this was made available to other divisions of the Defence Force, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Not all files were handed over to Defence Force divisions, because it was of a very sensitive nature, but yes, within the Trevits regard it was asked to supply summarised versions to the Army, and this is what I did, but the CCB had complete list of my files.

MR JOUBERT: You didn't transgress any prescription or regulation by supplying it to the CCB?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR JOUBERT: So you would also not be able to say whether Mr Botes had any authorisation to liaise with you in that regard?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Except for the fact that it was an unwritten rule that they had to create their own capabilities. I do not know whether he was supposed to liaise with me or not.

MR JOUBERT: The attempted murder, the car bomb where Judge Albie Sachs was involved, in the second paragraph, the second paragraph from the bottom where you refer to the files. You say:

"Botes at this stage sat with approximately 21 duplicated target files which was handed over by me to him"

and further you say that:

"Botes was not supposed to have these files because he had to establish his own."

With the previous statement that you had given now, would this also be applicable to this paragraph?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR JOUBERT: But you did not state it quite that clearly.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: And in the final paragraph you say:

"What's important was the fact that Albie Sachs was not the target, because Indress Naidoo was the target."

Was Albie Sachs a target at any stage?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, yes. There was a stage when each and every ANC member who moved in Mozambique, was placed on a potential list, but with regard to this specific incident, according to my knowledge, Mr Indress Naidoo the target.

MR JOUBERT: So at that stage, Albie Sachs would not have been the target?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, he wouldn't have.

MR JOUBERT: You are saying that Mr Naidoo was the target, why do you say that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The entire aspect with regard to who was a target and who was not a target was a process that was followed within the working group, within the so-called Trevits working group who sat at Middelburg, where the entire intelligence community, in other words the Security Branch, Military Intelligence, National Intelligence, they all came in and said: "Who are the members who had to be taken out that would have an impact on the ANC's day to day circumstances within a certain target area?"

And at that stage, this was just after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, most of the ANC members left the country and a key group remained behind and this group I refer to is the group in the documents on page 22. And within the intelligence community it was valued that Mr Naidoo played a very important and prominent role in terms of the infiltration of MK members to Natal and the Eastern Transvaal, who on their part found their way open to the PWV area. And then that he would also be involved or had knowledge of where ANC members housed themselves in Mozambique, as well where the arms came from and where these arms were channelled.

MR JOUBERT: So was it so that Mr Naidoo was one of the persons about whom you gave a target file to Pieter Botes?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR JOUBERT: You did not hand any target over in which Mr Albie Sachs was the target.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR JOUBERT: On page 23 at the top, you say that:

"The car bomb in which Prof Albie Sachs was injured was meant for Naidoo."

Do you know that for a fact, or is it a inference which you draw?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Between myself, Chairperson, and Pieter Botes, there was some distance. My task was once again to collect intelligence, to interpret it and to process it into a useful form to the operative who had to take action against the facility. Mr Botes was one of the regional representatives of the CCB, he, on his part at his level, he had his own network of persons. He would obtain the information from me, my information went through to him and then he, because he moved around in the area of Mozambique, or he had people who moved around there, he sent that information through to them.

And from my side once again, I would give him a file, he takes it one step further and he goes to do what they call combat reconnaissance. In other words, he comes on ground level, he says there's a vehicle, he sees who uses the vehicle. All that detail that he collects, he does not necessarily give back to me. It is detail that he keeps to himself.

The question that was asked was: "Was Indress Naidoo the target?" When I handed the file over to him, that was the target. What Mr Botes decided while he was on ground level, I do not know. That is why I can also say that I can draw the inference that maybe they knew Albie Sachs was the target. They probably saw Judge Sachs driving the vehicle. I would not know. But my task was up to a specific point where I handed the file over and after that it was his task to go and do combat reconnaissance, because he would determine in which way the person would be eliminated, whether he will be shot, whether he will be killed by a car bomb, or in which manner.

CHAIRPERSON: So in short, you know nothing about the bomb placed in the vehicle which Mr Justice Sachs was in, you know nothing?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, what I know is from hearsay from some of my members or former colleagues I talked to in terms of the car bomb as such, that the person who physically drove the vehicle - or let us look at Indress Naidoo, the way in which he had to be taken out. I would have been unaware of that, because that's not my task, that does not fall within the ambit of my responsibility. That is a responsibility ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Can I stop you short. Really, you're going to give us a long story now and in essence, you didn't know that Prof Sachs was going to be taken out, you had no knowledge of that whatsoever. You didn't even know he was a target, correct? Just give me a yes or a no.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, it's not correct.

MR LAX: And therefore you had no expectation that he would be blown up by a car bomb, correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's right, that's correct.

MR LAX: Thanks, that's the short answer. Please continue.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you.

That vehicle of Judge Sachs, that was a target.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR JOUBERT: Now you say on page 23 that is was an instruction and you heard that Col Hekkies van Heerden prepared the bomb. How do you know?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: He told me personally.

MR JOUBERT: So you had knowledge of exactly what happened and why there was an attempt on the life of Judge Sachs.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR JOUBERT: And you did not disclose this information.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR JOUBERT: Then under C.4 on page 23, The Background, where you give the addresses, are you hundred percent sure of these addresses you refer to, or may there be errors?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: There could be differences. When I compiled my application I didn't have all the details, but some of the details are correct.

MR JOUBERT: Page 24, at the top of the page you say this was HSAW approved operation, do you know this for a fact, or are you drawing an inference?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I'm drawing an inference, because I don't know how this operation would take place or took place. Well it took place by means of a frigate, and that had to come from HSAW.

MR JOUBERT: Paragraph A, you talk about this in detail. Paragraph B, they also talk about Oupa Qgozo, and on page 25 you talk about, you say that this transaction was disclosed and Nieuwoudt, De Kock, Brink and yourself were reprimanded in the department. Were there any disciplinary steps taken, or what happened?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, there were no disciplinary steps taken against me.

MR JOUBERT: When you say you were reprimanded by them, what was the nature of this? The arms that were handed over, was this judged, or the way in which it was done?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think it was more about the way in which it was done, because one hand didn't know what the other was doing. The Security Branch members in the Eastern Cape learnt that arms were handed over to Oupa Qgozo and they criticised that because they didn't know where it came from. And I think it's after that request from Gen van Rensburg, when he spoke to us, when my former Head was called in and he was told that this sort of operation should not take place in future.

MR JOUBERT: Then on page 30, last paragraph, you talk about Trevits and the functions of projects stopped more-or-less after 1990, is this a fact?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I'm drawing an inference. From 1989, I stopped working with Trevits and projects, and at that stage I was transferred to Directorate Covert Collections.

MR JOUBERT: Then on page 31, in Annexure E, where you talk about the target list and you say:

"The following ANC Mozambique target files were handed over to Pieter Botes"

then you talk about a few incidents. Do you know if they are specific target files, or are they amongst others, target files?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I'd rather refer to these that, amongst others, I handed over these target files.

MR JOUBERT: Can you remember specifically which ones you handed over and which ones not?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I can't remember.

MR JOUBERT: On page 46 of the paginated pages, there is a copy of the newspaper article. In the left-hand column in the 3rd paragraph from the top, it says:

"Joseph played a minor role in ANC activities and I believe he was killed to involve ...(indistinct) in the Military Intelligence MI scheme."

Would you agree with that statement?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: On a personal capacity I don't agree completely, that was not the aim of our operation, we were not supposed to be involved.

MNR JOUBERT: "Sou dit staan op Militêre Inligting, of moontlik op die BSB?"

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Ja, this would rather fall back on the CCB.

MR JOUBERT: Then on page 48, there's a declaration by Atiso Padi, you also refer to him as MK Wax. Page 48, in the top two paragraphs he describes the incident in Lesotho where people were killed and where Simon Mogetla was abducted. He creates the impression that both - that you were involved in both of these incidents, you first went to the house where the shooting took place and firstly Simon Mogetla was abducted and then you went to the house where the shooting took place. How do you disagree with this?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As far as I know, that total operation took place on the same evening.

MR JOUBERT: And you understand your rendition of what happened. Page 50, there's a declaration by Judge Sachs, paragraph 2 in the middle, he says where he refers to the book he wrote: "The Soft Vengeance of a Freedom Fighter":

"It includes a reference to my meeting with Mr Henri van der Westhuizen, at his request, in my chambers, on which occasion he mentioned that he had been involved in planning the attack."

Do you agree with that statement, or is this something you disagree with?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: In terms of planning the attack, it sounds as if I was directly involved in his case, or in the operations against him. My involvement with regard to this whole matter only went as far as I've explained already, with the handing over of the necessary detail to Pieter Botes and from where he would have gone further and he would plan the actions. There was a clear ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, the question is, do you agree with what Mr Justice Sachs says at paragraph 2, when he says:

"It includes a reference to my meeting with Mr Henri van der Westhuizen, at his request, in my chambers, on which occasion he mentioned that he had been involved in planning the attack."

Do you agree with that statement or not?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, the planning of the attack against whom, Sir? Against Mr Sachs, or planning the attack to execute maybe, Mr Naidoo? That's the question that I just want to ..., because it sounds a little bit harsh, the way that Mr Sachs or Judge Sachs put it there. So I don't ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Do you understand the context in which Mr Justice Sachs is talking about here, the context in which he's talking? That he had a meeting with you in his chambers, at your request, and that you mentioned that you were involved in planning the attack. That's what he's saying. So what your counsel is asking you is, do you agree with that statement or not?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I do not agree.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may proceed Mr Joubert.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Honourable Chair.

Then on page 63 of the paginated pieces, there's an extract from Mr Justice Sachs book, on page 26 of the book, it's page 63 of the paginated pages, four lines from the top in left-hand column, he says:

"Even though I never thought I would be a target, because it was well known that I was not engaged in any kind of military or underground work."

MR JOUBERT: According to you, do you think he was involved in any military activities? Mr Sachs.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can't say that Judge Sachs was involved in any military activities, but that he was definitely involved in underground activities, definitely. According to the intelligence we received from National Intelligence, Judge Sachs was a prominent members who worked behind the scenes.

MR JOUBERT: And then from page 67 onwards, there's a transcription of a meeting that took place between you and various other persons. Do you agree with the broad content of this transcription?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I agree one hundred percent with the broad content of this transcription of the discussion that took place. I read through this piece, but there are a few errors.

MR JOUBERT: This discussion that took place wasn't structured, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR JOUBERT: It was a free discussion.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR JOUBERT: There are questions and interjections, and so it may be that some of the aspects addressed here out of context, they are addressed out of context.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR JOUBERT: It is also true that this is a bad transcription, there are many mistakes, whether it's spelling in syntax errors, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR JOUBERT: For example, one aspect on page 67, about eight lines into the transcription it is said:

"My wife was basically one-and-a-half metres behind the car that exploded"

That couldn't have been true?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR JOUBERT: So there are many other aspects that you cannot discuss now. Honourable Chair, there are various issues, I'm not going to address them, should they become relevant, then obviously the explanation can be given, but the transcription as such is in a very poor condition. On that basis, Mr van der Westhuizen is prepared to accept the broad statements contained therein are correct, but not necessarily always in context. If you wish, I could take you through the whole transcription, but that will take a very long time.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's just establish this aspect.

Mr van der Westhuizen, on page 67 you say this meeting took place on the 13th of July 1998, that you agree with?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: And it was at Indaba Hotel in Johannesburg, next to Fourways?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: And people who were present, Suzanne Rapkin, was she present?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: She was present, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mohammed Timol?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Sonny Singh?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Indress Naidoo?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) Blackenberg?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And this was taped and I see here:

"Not present: Keith Mokwape - out of the country, and Jacob Zuma - not present"

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: And this was taped?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: With your permission?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: With my permission.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LAX: Just for the record, you confirm what Adv Joubert has just said, that you, except for obvious spelling mistakes and syntactical mistakes and the odd thing out of context, broadly speaking, you agree with the broad terms of this? You confirm that.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR JOUBERT: Just one further issue on page 68, for example, in the middle of the paragraph you say:

"I received a letter from Judge Goldstone, saying that I was cleared, that they had nothing against me and the whole issue of the TRC thing came to the docket"

or to the doct(?) The letter you referred to, was that the letter you received from the Attorney-General?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's the one I received from the Attorney-General.

MR JOUBERT: I have no further questions at this stage to Mr van der Westhuizen. Thank you, Chair.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JOUBERT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Joubert. Mr Bizos, I see it's 1 o'clock, wouldn't it be better to commence your cross-examination after lunch?

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Judge. Yes, I think that that would be appropriate.

CHAIRPERSON: I think this is a good opportunity to adjourn for lunch. Would we take 45 minutes, just for sake of progress? Would anybody be inconvenienced by 45 minutes?

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: Let's hope you do. But should anybody have a problem, advise me, we can also start at two, but let's try to start at quarter to two. Thank you, we adjourn until quarter to two.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

HENRI VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Bizos.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr van der Westhuizen, I want to get clarity from you. What is it that you did in relation to Justice Albie Sachs? Tell us in your own words what it is that you did.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, if I want to place my involvement with regard to Judge Sachs into context, then I think it is necessary to know what I did. I think you have seen where I come from and what my precise function was ...(transcriber's interpretation) ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: No, I'm sorry to interrupt you, Sir, I'm sorry to interrupt you, we will get on much further and faster if you confined yourself in answer to the question. I know your background, I have read it, please don't take up any more time in relation to that. Tell us specifically what did you do in relation to Albie Sachs.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, as far as I'm concerned, I compiled a target file with regard to a facility, a vehicle concerning Mr Indress Naidoo, and that target file with its full details was handed over to Mr Pieter Botes, also known as Bobby Greeff, who worked for the CCB, the Civil Co-operation Bureau. In that document is contained all the details concerning Mr Indress Naidoo with regard to his routine, his personality, his house, his vehicle, etcetera, and I handed that file over to Mr Botes. Mr Botes used that information to launch a target operation against Mr Naidoo. This target operation was as follows. He, according to what he told me, a motor bomb which consists of liquid explosives was put into the car ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Just stop there for one moment please, let's get some clarity. Did you take any part in the decision made by anyone to eliminate or kill Mr Albie Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: My task and function was to compile target files and to hand them over for presentation ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr van der Westhuizen, is the question not simple? Did you take part in a decision that involved Mr Justice Albie Sachs? It's simple, it's yes or no. Did you take any part? Is that not what you want, Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Absolutely, thank you for ...(intervention)

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, it's correct. No.

MR BIZOS: No. Did you furnish any information to anyone before Mr Justice Sachs was injured, in relation to his movements, Sachs' movements, or his activities, or anything else about Mr Justice Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's correct.

MR BIZOS: Did you or didn't you?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I did.

MR BIZOS: Now with what intention did you collect that information?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The purpose of the collection of information was to create a clear picture of the ANC personalities and structures within Mozambique, Swaziland and other neighbouring States. They were operative there and it was to create a clear picture and that is why before, in the phase before '86, information was gathered about Mr Justice Sachs.

MR BIZOS: Was the picture that you painted to enable someone to eliminate Mr Justice Sachs, or merely to paint a broad picture of the ANC personnel?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: In all cases where we gathered information with regard to ANC personalities, including Mr Justice Albie Sachs, we ... because at that stage we were in the circumstances of ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Why do you complicate - I'm sorry again to interrupt you, why do you complicate the issue by having to let us have all sorts of things that you told us in relation to the background? The question was a simple one. In this picture that you collected, was there any intention on your part that it should be used for the purposes of eliminating Mr Justice Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR BIZOS: Did you assist anybody with the obtaining of the bomb that injured him, well knowing that it was intended to be used for Mr Justice Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR BIZOS: Did you take any step whatsoever at any time, to be of assistance to anyone who to your knowledge intended to kill Mr Justice Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR BIZOS: Why did you apply for amnesty in respect of the attempted murder of Mr Justice Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, because the target files that were prepared was done to take Mr Indress Naidoo out and he, the morning before Mr Sachs left for London, he used the vehicle and the bomb was in the vehicle.

MR BIZOS: Now listen to the question carefully and try and answer it. You will find that most of the questions that I ask are capable of being answered with a yes or no, but in this case an explanation was needed. If you took no part in any of the matters that we have dealt with up to now, why did you apply for amnesty in relation to the attempted murder of Mr Justice Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Because I feel that we hit the wrong target.

MR BIZOS: But you did not intend any harm whatsoever to Mr Justice Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: According to me I played a part in it, where information was wrongly used to take him out, Justice Sachs, or an attempt was made to eliminate him.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now in what of the various capacities that you have worked for the Security Forces, were you acting at the time that you were participating in this profile of Mr Justice Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: With the ANC project section at Special Forces Headquarters, in the capacity as Intelligence Officer responsible for Swaziland and Mozambique.

MR BIZOS: Was that before or after you started working for the CCB, or was it during your working for the CCB?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I never worked for the CCB.

MR BIZOS: Were you used as an instrument of the CCB?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I would say an instrument for the gathering of information, yes.

MR BIZOS: Now we have heard that the CCB was not an information gathering organisation, but an organisation in order to eliminate the enemies of the State, do you agree with that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Not one hundred percent, no.

MR BIZOS: Well we are not bookmakers and don't work in percentages, so would you please tell us to what extent you were working for the CCB at the time that you made this profile.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As a member of Special Forces and the fact that the CCB was an extension of Special Forces, my instructions were from the Commanding Officer of Special Forces and I was asked to support and we were asked by the CCB, or a request came to our offices and we helped with the compilation of intelligence profiles, the conveying of information to the CCB.

MR BIZOS: Now let us just get information about the other persons that you have mentioned in your application. Mr Indress Naidoo, what did you do in relation to him?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I helped with the compilation of target files on Mr Naidoo.

MR BIZOS: Now when you talk about target, what was he being targeted for?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Naidoo was seen as one of the prominent members who stayed behind in Mozambique after the Nkomati Accord, and he helped with the destabilisation of the RSA, and therefore he was seen as a target.

MR BIZOS: No, a target for what?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: A target to be eliminated.

MR BIZOS: And what part did you take in that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I compiled the full document in terms of where Mr Naidoo lived, the vehicle he used. It's a very complete target file we compiled on the target.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now you see as far as getting information is concerned, there can be two purposes for the information. Firstly, for you or someone else, with or without your assistance to decide as to whether he should be eliminated or not.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: The other would be, that it is assumed that she is a target for elimination, but your information gathering process is how most effectively to eliminate that person. Do you agree that that is a different type of information gathering?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Now in relation to Mr Indress Naidoo, what did you do, did you gather information in order to determine whether or not he should be a target for elimination, or did you gather information for the purposes of how whoever was to kill him, can best do it?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The latter is correct.

MR BIZOS: So was there a difference between your information gathering in relation to Mr Justice Sachs, as opposed to the information gathering in relation to Mr Indress Naidoo?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: The one was merely to record what he was doing, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: But Mr Indress Naidoo, it wasn't necessary for you to make enquiries as to what he was doing, he was notoriously known, in your eyes, as a perfect example of a target to be eliminated?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: And anyone that looked at your information in relation to Mr Sachs, would not have been able to carry out the plan to eliminate Mr Justice Sachs, because this was not the purposes of the information that you had put in the file.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Yes. If, according to you, Mr Indress Naidoo was the victim, would your employers, one or other of the branches of the South African Defence Force, have acknowledged that this was the work of the SADF, and that a dangerous terrorist, as you would have called him, was killed? Would that have been acknowledged?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: When Mr Justice Sachs was nearly killed, was that acknowledged that it was the work of the South African Defence Force?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I stand to be correct, but I think it was done, it was proved. I stand to be corrected.

MR BIZOS: It was acknowledged? Well let me remind you, wasn't it your way of doing things to not only deny what you had done outside the country, in Mozambique or anywhere else, but also to produce a "dekstorie" so that not only would you avoid responsibility, but also score an important point against your enemy, in this instance the African National Congress?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's correct.

MR BIZOS: By saying that there was comradely or brotherly hatred and descent and the one ANC member killed another?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's correct.

MR BIZOS: And you even had a special department for that purpose, to put out these "dekstories"?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Didn't that happen in Mr Justice Sachs' case?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I believe it also happened in his case.

MR BIZOS: That a "dekstorie" was put out? What was the "dekstorie"?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, I can't remember.

MR BIZOS: You can't remember. Now in your file, did you set out that Mr Justice Sachs was a Professor at the university, he was an academic and as far as you were concerned he was not a member of Umkhonto weSizwe and the contents of the file would have made it clear that he was not a target for elimination?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's correct.

MR BIZOS: Now to whom did you hand the file?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I handed the file to - and it's the file of Indress Naidoo, I handed it to Pieter Botes.

MR BIZOS: No, the one of Mr Sachs.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, the target in the case of Mr Sachs was a vehicle, it was vehicle.

MR BIZOS: To whom did you hand the file in which the results of your labours in reconnoitring Mr Justice Sachs was put? What did you do with that file?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Those files could also have been handed to Pieter Botes, yes.

MR BIZOS: Now unfortunately, you see the Committee isn't helped by "coulds" and mights", this was an important matter in relation to two important targets, we would like you to please give definitive evidence in relation to the matter. To whom did you had these files?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: In terms of the files on Albie Sachs, you continue referring to the file on Albie Sachs, there was information available with regard to each ANC personality, that's correct. That a file existed, which served as a target file. That file existed in the name of Mr Indress Naidoo, not in the name of Mr Justice Albie Sachs. I repeat, there was a lot of information with regard to Mr Justice Sachs, that's true, especially the National Intelligence Service was very much interested in Mr Sachs, because of his activities, but in terms of a target file, as I would define a target file, such a file did not exist on Mr Justice Sachs.

MR LAX: May I just interpose. I thought I heard you say in Afrikaans that there was a data base.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR LAX: It's not coming through on the translation unfortunately, because I'm listening to both at the same time. Please if you could just try and - I know it's difficult and I know at sometimes you missed out things, so ... I just wanted to put that record, because you did say there were data basis and it never came through in the translation.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR LAX: Can I just clarify this. There was never - as I've just heard you say, a target file on Albie Sachs, that you're aware of?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: A target file, Mr Lax, if I can expand on this, is quite a detailed document, but as far as possible all information with regards to a person is described in this file. The fact that there were files on each prominent ANC member. The Security Forces had files on all these people. There was not a target file on Mr Sachs. In other words, there was a not a target file handed to Pieter Botes about Prof Albie Sachs.

MR LAX: So the short answer is: "No, there wasn't such a file on him", as far as you're aware.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, there wasn't.

MR LAX: I understand that's completely different to whether there was a file on Albie Sachs, that's a completely different issue, but there wasn't a target file on him, in which he was targeted for some specific action or other?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR LAX: Whatever that action might be?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: You see, do you accept that whoever the bomb may have been intended for, that Mr Botes was the person who co-ordinated the explosion of the bomb in the motor car?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Now was there a good relationship between you and Mr Botes?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: A reasonable working relationship.

MR BIZOS: Well, it had to be a reasonable and a good one, because you were members of secret organisations within the South African Defence Force, and you had to trust one another, respect one another. Is that putting it correctly?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, did Mr Botes ever tell you that the blowing up of the car when an attempt was made to open the door by Mr Sachs, was a terrible mistake and you almost killed the wrong man? Did he ever tell you that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you ask him, didn't you ask him how come that the bomb that was intended for Mr Indress Naidoo almost killed Mr Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: And what did you say?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: To Mr Botes - I speak in his absence, Mr Botes worked on ground level, he did combat reconnaissance, to him a target was a target, whether it - to expand even further, should any person climb into the car on that day, whether it was the Judge or Indress, or Jacob Zuma, to him he argued it's a senior ANC target.

MR BIZOS: You say he argued. If you use that word, it means that there was a discussion about it. Was there?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, there was a discussion after the incident.

MR BIZOS: Well in that discussion did anybody say that "we almost killed the wrong man"?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I asked for which reason action was still taken against Albie Sachs, and I was told that he was not supposed to have opened the door.

MR BIZOS: Who told you this?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Pieter Botes.

MR BIZOS: I thought you had said precisely the opposite a very short while ago. Am I wrong in that? Am I wrong in thinking that you said precisely the opposite a short while ago?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's possible.

MR BIZOS: Well I'd like - before I proceed, I'd like a more, for my own purposes, a more definitive answer, or a more definite answer than that.

CHAIRPERSON: My note reads that: "Did Mr Botes ever tell you that it was a wrong target?" His answer was: "No".

MR BIZOS: Thank you, that's how I remembered it, thank you.

Well are you now satisfied that you gave a contradictory answer a short while ago?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Botes said it was the wrong target and I asked him: "Why did you do it", and he said that any target is a target.

MR BIZOS: It doesn't explain the contradiction, but don't let's take up too much time with it. Now, are you aware as to whether Mr Botes claims with some pride that he made mincemeat of Mr Justice Sachs' arm, indicating clearly that he was the intended target?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I have no knowledge of that.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I will hand in two chapters from the book written by Mr Pauw, in order to put - it's called:

"Into the Heart of Darkness - Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins"

published in 1990.

MR LAX: This is Jacques Pauw, Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Jacques Pauw, yes.

You see, I am going to suggest to you that this bomb was in fact, on the version of Mr Jacques Pauw, intended for Mr Justice Sachs, and that your version that it was a mistaken attack, is incorrect. What do you say to that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's correct.

MR BIZOS: What is correct, what I'm putting to you, or your version?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I stay with my version, because according to me, that's the factual version.

MR BIZOS: Now you see, Mr Botes is quoted at page 222, at the bottom of the page, as having said the following:

"I made mincemeat out of Albie's arm."

"Gleeful, triumphant, smug. I was looking at a man sitting across from me in a Pretoria restaurant, gorging himself on a rump stead and beer. He called himself Marius and said that he was a senior member of a secret death squad within the SADF, that was called the CCB."

Now let's take it step by step. Was Mr Botes known as Marius?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I only knew him as Pieter Botes or Bobby Greeff.

MR BIZOS: Well maybe he changed. And:

"that he was a senior member of a secret and mysterious death squad within the SADF, that was called the CCB"

Is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR BIZOS:

"Why did you blow Sachs up?"

"I have never met Albie and have nothing personal against him. But we knew that he was working for Umkhonto. It was war and soldier shouldn't cry."

"He wasn't a soldier, he was an academic."

"I was a soldier and Albie was a soldier, no matter what he said."

"Are you proud of it?"

"It was a huge success. It was a professional job done by a group of highly skilled and dedicated soldiers."

"Why was it a success?"

"You know, in a war it is sometimes better to main than to kill the enemy. We knew that everywhere Sachs went in Maputo, people would see the stump where his arm once was and say: 'look, the boers blew it off', knowing that we can do the same to anybody we choose."

"How many assassinations were you involved in?" (I ask him)

"Six" (came the matter of fact reply) He added:

"Ons het hulle geroer. (we shook them up)"

Now would you agree that if Mr Botes told Mr Pauw the truth, that that is quite inconsistent with any plan not to murder Mr Justice Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: And that this version - I'm sorry, it was written in 1997, I gave a wrong year, it was in 1997.

CHAIRPERSON: Whilst you are at it, Mr Bizos, can we mark it Exhibit A?

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may proceed.

MR BIZOS: Thank you.

And this version that was told to Pauw, is quite inconsistent with an accidental injury to Mr Justice Sachs, would you agree with that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I agree.

MR BIZOS: Are you still a friend of Mr Botes?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I saw Mr Botes many years ago and as far as I know, I am definitely no longer a friend of his.

MR BIZOS: I see. Now this denial of claiming responsibility of killing academics at least by some of the people involved in the killings, was used before, wasn't it? And in particular in relation to Ruth First, killed in Mozambique, a professor at the very university that Mr Sachs was at, and a "dekstorie" went out that it was her husband, Mr Joe Slovo that had killed her, you recall that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I recall that.

MR BIZOS: Were you perhaps influenced by similar motivation in saying that it was not intended for Mr Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, I shall repeat, no.

MR BIZOS: Because even when it became apparent that the South African Police were responsible for the killing of Ruth First, the "dekstorie" continued, that it was really intended for her husband, Joe Slovo, who was the leader of Umkhonto weSizwe. Were you perhaps in any way influenced by that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR BIZOS: Okay. Did you go to see Mr Justice Sachs at his chambers at the Constitutional Court in Braamfontein, Johannesburg?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Do you remember when it was?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I am entirely certain, but I think it was in late '97, maybe early '98.

MR BIZOS: Well was it before or after you made your application for amnesty?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It was before I completed my application.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Yes, well that is a correct answer, as would appear from a document that I will shortly hand in. Now, your application for amnesty was filed on the 9th of May 1997? It's the date.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Was it one day before the second-last extension for the filing of applications was made?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I am not entirely certain of the date and the closing dates. I think my application lay at the A-G's office for quite some time as well.

MR BIZOS: Well you say at the A-G's office, did the A-G complete your application for amnesty, or?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It was my whole application, or rather my evidence against Wouter Basson, it was against the presence, that I was not in the presence that I filled it in, but I discussed it with him.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Was that with Adv Torrie Pretorius?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, Torrie Pretorius.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but that was even before Basson was arrested that your application was made.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: But now is it a coincidence that your application was put in the day before the applications were to be filed at that time?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It is a coincidence.

MR BIZOS: Why did you go to Mr Justice Sachs' office?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think the first reason was that I wanted to meet him, because within myself I felt that he was the wrong person at the wrong time. That was the one reason. And the other reason was inherently I wanted to go and speak to him and get that behind me. It was something that I personally felt that this was someone who was injured and had suffered damage and he was not supposed to.

MR BIZOS: Did he advise you to make an application for amnesty and to be careful to tell the whole truth?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: He did ask me, I think he asked me whether I will apply for amnesty and I told him that I would, and he told me: "Remember the day when you appear before the Amnesty Committee, you must give them your whole story.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Did that lead you to apply for amnesty, or did that play a part in your decision to make an application?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think the whole incident with regard - yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now have you made any other applications for amnesty for other events?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR BIZOS: And the evidence that you gave against Wouter Basson is not any of the transactions that we are dealing with here?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, it was something else entirely.

MR BIZOS: We will leave it at that, proceedings are still pending, so we mustn't say anything more about it.

Now unfortunately Mr Justice Sachs had to go overseas for important duties, he has written a statement which I want to hand in and read to you for your comment. I will read it paragraph by paragraph and if you disagree with any portion of it, I'd like you to please stop me, so that we can have your account of the events as you remember it, rather than what is written. To put that in as Exhibit B.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BIZOS:

"Amnesty Application by Mr Henri van der Westhuizen - Statement by Albie Sachs:

I was in my chambers about two years ago, when I received a message from reception that somebody calling himself Henri, had arrived to see me. I went to the security entrance with a measure of anticipation. Henri had telephoned a few days earlier to say that he was going to testify to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission about the bomb which had led to my car exploding and I losing my right arm. Naturally I was keen to see the person who had the courage or the foolhardiness or just the interest, to want to see me."

Have you got any comment in relation to that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Nothing.

MR BIZOS:

"I opened the door with my security pass and a slender youngish man came forward. He introduced himself as Henri and gave the surname. Who was this person whom I had never seen until that moment? Who did not know me, who had no anger towards me, whom I did not hate, for whom I was just a figure? Who had tried to extinguish my life. What passed through his head, how had he functioned, how did he fit into the group that was on the other side (the 'enemy the apartheid State'), which was almost as anonymous to me as I was to them? I did not wish to pre-empt the interrogation of the Commission. I just wanted him to say as much as he was willing to say."

I'm sorry, anything to say about the second paragraph?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: ...(no reply)

MR BIZOS:

"He would have seen the dossier on me, it would have shown that I had been in exile in Mozambique, neighbouring on South Africa, working on the reconstruction of the Mozambique legal system. That although I had been an active member of the African National Congress and especially on the Constitutional Committee, I was not involved in any underground activity or military or intelligence work at all. Yet they had chosen me and tried to eliminate me. Why? I was an intellectual and challenged their claim that no political system could be found to enable black and white to live together as equals in South Africa. Every intellectual dreams of being taken seriously by someone, but not that seriously."

Any comment in relation to that paragraph?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: ...(no reply)

MR BIZOS:

"We spoke for about two hours. He looked at me almost with a measure of jealousy. Here he was, sitting in my chambers, beautiful pictures on the walls. I was a Judge of the Constitutional Court, the highest court in the country, and he was now a demobilised soldier, with a torn past and a fragmented future. He had not even been given a golden handshake, but a brass one, a modest sum of money compared to what the retiring Generals had got. Yet he had been willing to invest his energies, his intelligence, maybe even his life, for his country, for apartheid and now he had been cast aside. He too had injuries, he told me, he had been shot in the leg and walked with a slight limp. He seemed petulant. I was on the court and he was unemployed. We would have gone on eyeing each other and talking forever. I stood up and said: (Henri a cheap emotion surged in me, I was tempted to say I cannot shake your hand, but you know why? Normally, if someone comes to my office, when I say goodbye I shake that person's hand, but I can't shake your hand. I can't now. Go to the Truth Commission, tell your story, help the country, do something for South Africa and then perhaps we can meet again).

When he walked back to the security door he was without the upright soldier's posture he had had before and looked uncomfortable, uneasy and sad. He went through the door. I said farewell, and he disappeared.

Some months later I was at a party in Johannesburg, feeling quite light-headed after a heavy year's work in court. In the midst of the music and hilarity, I heard a voice saying to me: 'Hello". I turned around and saw a familiar face smiling at me, looking very happy. The person spoke again: 'Hello, I am Henri, do you remember me?' He was beaming. I asked him what had happened. He told me that he had written to the TRC, giving them all the information he could and had applied for amnesty in relation to six different matters. Then he stopped talking, looked at me and said: 'You told me that afterwards maybe', and I responded: 'Yes, Henri, I said to you that afterwards, if you co-operated with the Truth Commission, if you did something for South Africa, maybe we could meet again. I've only got your word for it, but I can see from your face you are telling the truth.' I put out my hand and shook his hand. He went away elated. I moved away and almost fainted in the arms of a friend of mine.

The Amnesty Committee is now hearing. I hope he is telling the truth and that he fulfils his side of the amnesty ...(indistinct). Sending him to jail won't make my arm back, but living in an open and a democratic country has grown roses and ...(indistinct) in the empty space.

We've had too many bombs in this country, their bombs and our bombs. We need to solve our problems without violence. I wish Henri well. He had the courage to come and see me. We looked into one another's eyes and each found a person in the other. Now thanks to the orderly and humane process of the Truth Commission, we can live together in one country, not as predator and prey, but as equal citizens. That is my soft, irreplaceable joyous vengeance.

Johannesburg, 3 October 2000."

Have you any comment to make in relation to the factual matters that are contained in this statement, Exhibit B, Sir?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I just want to, Mr Chairman, draw your attention to page 2. I was not shot in the leg, I was shot in the hand.

MR BIZOS: No, but that may be a lapse of memory on the part of the Judge. Anything else? all right.

Now I'm going to ask you some questions, which may help in this process of reconciliation, that Justice Sachs speaks about. You have a university degree?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: In philosophy and politics?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Political Science and an Honours in National Strategy.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Was this National Strategy the sort of thing that people holding themselves out as counter-revolutionary warfare philosophers were dishing out?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think today if I think back, yes. Perhaps that was we all thought, that we were these great experts. That's correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And all these people with doctorates that were teaching you, in the end result you have been proven wrong. The enemy was not as bad as they told you it was?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Yes. But now although there were these differences and all the euphemisms of Civil Co-operation Bureaus, other euphemistic names for hit squads, there was a cohesion, was there not? They were not kept entirely apart?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Now was there a discussion among yourselves, among your superior officers, as to whether killing people was part of State policy at the time?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I would not have been involved in such a type of discussion, but no, I cannot express myself with regard to that.

MR BIZOS: Well I think that you have already answered in a substantial part, that question. Where did the final responsibility for the acts of murder and attempted murder and serious damage to property, where did it come from, where was the source of the authority?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, I would say that it comes from the highest authority. At that stage the government of the day with its whole security management system, the State Security Council and how they functioned. I personally feel that when it is there and when I refer to "there", I speak of the security management system that gave the instruction through to the soldier at ground level.

MR BIZOS: Was there a close co-operation between the South African Police and the Army in appropriate cases, for the purposes of killing people?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Definitely.

MR BIZOS: Was the Army's capability in relation to provide bombs, poisons, arms, for the purposes of killing citizens of the country, well known amongst you?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think amongst the members who served at our level, yes, there was close co-operation and one knew about these types of things.

MR BIZOS: Who was your immediate officer?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: My direct boss was Col Mielie Prinsloo, who was the Senior Staff Officer of Special Forces. He was the Senior Staff Officer, Intelligence and he directly reported to the Commanding General of Special Forces, Gen Joop Joubert.

MR BIZOS: Did your immediate officer or your boss as you call him, know what was happening, that people were being killed?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Definitely.

MR BIZOS: Where is he now?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think he is a retired farmer somewhere close to Warmbaths.

MR BIZOS: What was his rank at the time that he decided to become a farmer?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: He was a Colonel.

MR BIZOS: Do you know if he got a package?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Definitely.

MR BIZOS: How do you know that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The reason why he farms, no-one - ja, it may be so, but maybe I should go back and say I do not know for sure, a hundred percent, but he definitely will have a package because that generation of Commanders all went out with earlier pension. They received a good handshake from the State. That was the normal practice for senior officers, to receive a reasonably good package.

MR BIZOS: Did he buy the farm, or did he inherit it, do you know?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think he bought the farm.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Have you got a sense of grievance against your superior officers?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Not really, I actually feel sorry for them. I think it's more a case of I feel sorry for them, because to a certain extent I think some of them do not have the courage to come forward today to say what role they played. I feel more sorry for them than what I hate them. I think if we come to the politicians, that's a different story.

MR BIZOS: What is the story there?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, I think there no-one can just take action, one needs to get instructions from the top and even the Generals have limited authorisation and he certainly must also receive instructions from his superiors, or from his chiefs he must receive instructions. And if I look what happened to fellow soldiers, fellow colleagues, what is happening to them now, then I do not see any one of us protected. No-one came to us and said: "Listen here, the South African Government, the old National Party takes collective responsibility for your actions."

MR BIZOS: Your Minister was Gen Malan?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: He declared that, when he was acquitted in Durban, that he swore before God that he had never done anything wrong. Have you got any comment to make in relation to that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I have none. It's his conscience.

MR BIZOS: Now we've dealt with Justice Sachs and indirectly with Mr Indress Naidoo. What was the information that you sought for Sonny Singh?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As in the case of Indress Naidoo, we had a look at those members who remained behind after the Nkomati Accord. Who remained behind was the Political Military Council, PMC, and at that stage we were served with information by one of Mr Singh's and the other members' former colleagues, Lefoshi Glory Sedibe September, who is now deceased, that Mr Singh and the other members as mentioned in the report, were the prominent personalities within Mozambique, who at that stage were busy with the destabilisation of the RSA, with regard to specific reference to Natal and Eastern Transvaal.

MR BIZOS: Did you do anything, were you party to a decision to kill Mr Singh?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: There was - yes.

MR BIZOS: Whose decision was it?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It was upon instruction from my Commanding General.

MR BIZOS: Gen Joubert?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you know, either through Gen Joubert or anyone else, that the Head of the Army had redefined murder?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR BIZOS: That you had to do it in an unconventional way and not be found out, and that was not murder?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think - if I can just elaborate on that point, I think it may have been applicable to the period after 1987, as far as I know. In 1986 there was an operation that would have taken place in Mozambique and that was an operation that was definite, or possibly had to be approved at the highest level and that was a conventional operation, not an unconventional operation.

MR BIZOS: Tell us the difference between the two.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think conventional capability is one where one uses the conventional and Forces available to you to use against the enemy. To act unconventionally, and I think what you refer to specifically is a pseudo type of operation where one has to act against your enemy by using pseudo operatives, so that if that thing becomes known one could say that it was not one of your Forces who did this.

MR BIZOS: What was your participation in the decision making of Mr Sonny Singh, or what act did you perform in relation to that decision?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The action that was taken, or the decision that was taken in 1986, was that a cross-border operation would take place against identified ANC facilities with special reference to the six members mentioned in the amnesty application, which includes Mr Singh. That was a conventional operation where use was made of two frigates to move around from Simon's Town right into the bay of Mozambique, and from there the operation would take place within Mozambique, in Maputo. So in other words, one made use of the mechanisms of the Army that was available to it, to transport Forces.

MR BIZOS: What part did you have in that decision?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The part that I played was that I was the Intelligence Officer who supplied the target files to the various teams who were responsible for action against the various targets as identified in that operation.

MR BIZOS: It didn't succeed?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It did not take place, no.

MR BIZOS: And in relation to Mr Keith Mokwape, what part did you take in relation to that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Concerning all the mentioned members, I played exactly the same role and I was the Intelligence Officer who moved in with the frigates, with the boats into the bay of Mozambique. And the reason why I was present was basically because I knew the detail concerning what the facilities looked like on the inside. This was obtained through agents.

MR BIZOS: Whom did you use as agents?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: We had a wide spectrum of agents that we used.

MR BIZOS: Would you like to name them?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, I think at this present stage there are some of them who are in certain positions in government who fulfil their duties. They helped and probably the destruction of some of their colleagues, but today they play a very important role in the public life and it is about an ethical code that I have towards them, to protect their lives as well.

MR BIZOS: And what about Sue Rapkin? Why was she on the list?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: She was also seen - the members mentioned in there, Jacob Zuma, Keith Mokwape, Rue Rapkin, Singh, Pillay, Timol, they were all seen - and Indress Naidoo, they were all seen as the group at that stage, who played the most important role in the disruption of South Africa and specifically in Natal and the Eastern Transvaal. And that also included the role that they played within the PMC regard, in Swaziland.

MR BIZOS: Are you sure that your informers were not really people on your side that you want to protect?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, no.

MR BIZOS: Would you have given their names if they had been? Would you have had no moral problem in relation to that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If it would have assisted the reconciliation process, probably. May I just add here, Mr Bizos, that I think the members present here will also know that I think one of the biggest breakthrough's that we established in 1986, was the abduction of September out of Swaziland. The information that we obtained from him was invaluable to me who sat and worked there, and I think following on the inputs that we received from a person like September, we could consequently direct and distribute and better our collection abilities.

MR BIZOS: And George Mokoena, was he in the same basket, so to speak, as far as you were concerned?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: George Mokoena was someone who was well known by September.

MR BIZOS: No, but wasn't he on your list? I just want to check on page 28. I've made a note of the name, but I don't remember where his name appears on the ... It appears on page 31, Mr Chairman, towards the bottom of the page.

And please tell us about what you did in relation to Samuel Phinda.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Samuel?

MR BIZOS: Samuel Phinda.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, I see you refer here to Annexure E as potential target lists that also existed with regard to certain members. I do speak under correction, Samuel Pinta(sic), I think he was also known as Black Sam and I think he lived in 466 Augustino Neto, if I'm not mistaken. This was a transit facility and because of the importance that transit facilities played for us, because those facilities would be full at some time and then one would want to know if the facility was full, in order to send in operatives.

MR BIZOS: What happened to him?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I don't know what happened to him, I don't know where he is now. The last time I heard about him was when he was at this facility 466 Augustino Neto, if it is this Sam you're talking about.

MR BIZOS: Does the name Gibson Mondlane mean anything to you?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: What happened to him?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Gibson Mondlane or Gibson Nxube was the person that Mr Pieter Botes sent the poison to by means of one of his agents and this particular member died after he consumed this poison.

MR BIZOS: Did you have anything to do with that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: What basically happened - yes, indirectly I was involved, yes.

MR BIZOS: How were you involved?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: At Special Forces we participated, or we had insights into a process of collection which was known as "Valkoog". "Valkoog" was a telex interception capability that existed at National Intelligence Services, at the present Rietvlei Dam, and this capacity enabled a person to intercept any telexes which moved from the ANC, whether it be from Head Office to the various RPMC machineries or the RPMCs in Mozambique or Swaziland, Lesotho, wherever, to intercept those telexes. And in the case of Mr Gibson Nxube or Mondlane, as I read his name on some "Valkoog" interceptions, I had the complete programme of Mr Mondlane. I intercepted the entire programme, and this detail and it was exceptionally detailed. One knows exactly when this person will fly, you know what he will fly with, you know who will pick him up at the airport, you know to which facility he will be taken within Mozambique, you know how long he will stay there. He had communications with the ANC Headquarters in Lusaka. All the detail there was in this telex.

And as I have already mentioned in my application, we received a request from the CCB where we could couple a person positively to a facility, who his contacts are and what his movements were, so that we could give that information to them. And that information was given through to Mr Pieter Botes. Mr Pieter Botes also told me that I should monitor this guy and have to keep them up to speed with regard to this guy's activities. Who Gibson Mondlane was, I would not know. He was a low-level ANC operative in the ANC structures in Mozambique, but the data as requested by Mr Botes was handed over to him. He, in other words, sat with all the detail.

Approximately three days later, Mr Botes contacted me and told me: "Watch this guy's movements, we have a man who is moving quite close to him", or "We will take a man that we will deploy close to him." Approximately five days later I received a request from Mr Botes, in which he asked me to see whether this guy was ill, whether I picked up anything in terms of his physical health condition. I did not ask him for what reasons, but approximately seven, eight or nine days alter we started receiving telexes again in which it was said that Mr Mondlane was extremely ill. And that detail I took and I gave it to him.

It was approximately three days later when we received another telex in which it was said that Mr Mondlane was dead. And afterwards, Mr Botes confirmed to me that when I could obtain similar detail, I have to give it to them as quickly as possible, and he also told me that it was them who was responsible for the poisoning of Mr Gibson Mondlane. And that is the role that I basically played, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: At the time that you were gathering the information, you knew of the intention to poison him?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I did not know what the intention of it was, what I did do was, as the previous request, I gave it to him. I did not have knowledge beforehand.

MR BIZOS: Well what did you think they would do to him once you gave them the information?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Once again it was a case that Mr Botes and his team filled one additional role that we did not, that was the tactical reconnaissance of any potential target, recruitment or whatever. And that is one aspect that the CCB did a lot, it was to recruit agents in the ANC that would enable them to get closer to the leadership of the ANC, for purposes of similar acts as mentioned here. So it was a normal practice to supply that detail to him. And where I suspected something was at the fourth or fifth day when he told me: "Take note, this person will become ill."

MR BIZOS: Are you sure that he was part of the PMC structures and not in the Department of Information and Publicity?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Mondlane was - I never indicated that he was a member of the PMC. According to my knowledge, the top names that I mentioned, those were the members of the PMC. I never said he was a member of the PMC.

MR BIZOS: I see. Who was Mr Botes' superior officer?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Joe Verster, Col Joe Verster from the CCB.

MR BIZOS: How did you know that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well Joe Verster was the boss of CCB. I knew that from the capacity of myself who worked at Special Forces. I knew that Mr Verster was the Commander of the CCB.

MR BIZOS: Was he a person who kept a close watch on what his officers were doing in the field?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Definitely.

MR BIZOS: Do you know him personally?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I must have met Mr Verster personally on three occasions.

MR BIZOS: In relation to what?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The first time when I met him was, I think I just commenced work at Special Forces, at the Headquarters, in the Intelligence Division, and then I met him for the first time and I think it was about a presentation that was done and I was introduced to him. The second time that I met him was during a function, I think it was December, where there was a joint function between members of the CCB, Intelligence Division at Special Forces Headquarters and between certain Security Branch members. The third time when I met him it was not a meeting as such, but more where he attacked me personally in terms of I who worked too closely with the police and that I had jeopardised some of their operations in Swaziland. Those were the three times.

MR BIZOS: Now did the people that worked for the CCB in Swaziland and in Mozambique - did you have anything to do with Lesotho?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Not in terms of the members of the CCB - or wait, yes there was a member with the name of Peter Standton, he was a former Rhodesian and he was the link between the CCB and the Security Branch at Ladybrand.

MR BIZOS: Did people that worked in Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, South West Africa, as it was then known, and were connected with the CCB, strictly confine themselves to a particular area, or did they, as the occasion arose, work in one or other country outside the borders of South Africa, as well as in South Africa?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, I think they were supposed to be regionally bound, because each and every one of them had a Regional Co-ordinator and I think as far as possible the members had to attempt to work within their region. The reason for this was to obtain specialist knowledge in terms of the areas in which they operated. But I accept that there were exceptions to that rule, that other members may have moved wider. The example that I can mention is the example of Pieter Botes, where he worked not only in Mozambique, but he also worked in Namibia or the former South West Africa.

MR BIZOS: This must have concerned you as an individual and as a person who wants to bring about reconciliation. Special Forces with or without the assistance of the CCB, how many persons would you say in the ANC and the PAC, in the liberation movement broadly, you must have thought about this, how many people did they kill?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can exercise an easy option here and say many, but I know you're looking for specific numbers. If I look at the operation in Lesotho, I think in the early '80s, Operation Beanbag in Mozambique, I think in '81, the operation in Matola, if I look at other areas and operations that took place, I want to allege that there was no more than a hundred people. That no more than a hundred people were killed. I refer to external, I do not know what the situation was in the country, maybe it was much more, but I am telling you here from my framework of reference, in terms of the ANC, but if we refer to SWAPO, then it must be many, many more. If we refer to PAC, ANC, maybe a hundred, maybe two hundred. I think internally - I don't know, but I know outside the country it was not many. We always said that the impact that we made as the Army on the ANC as an organisation, was very minute when it comes to in terms of South African Defence Force actions.

MR BIZOS: Which members of the CCB did you know besides Verster, Botes, who else?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I know of many other members who were in the CCB, because I must tell you Mr Bizos, that the CCB's greatest recruitment took place within a Special Forces milieu, in other words those were people who belonged to regiments, so I know of many of the members who belonged to the them CCB.

MR BIZOS: You would be able to identify them?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, in certain instances I can identify many of them. I will not say that I can identify all of them, because there was also a phase where the CCB started recruiting under policemen and I did not know those people that well.

MR BIZOS: Please tell us how many people, and give us as many names as you can of the people that were recruited from the Special Forces into the CCB. Take your time. Just give us the names.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can try to start from the top: Joe Verster himself comes from the CCB ranks. The late Corrie Meerholtz, he was a senior ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Give us the second name that you mentioned now.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Corrie Meerholtz.

MR BIZOS: But before that.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Joe Verster.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you say Lafras somebody?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, no.

MR BIZOS: Oh. Carry on please.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Lafras Luitingh. Is that what you want to hear?

MR BIZOS: Well it's not that I want to hear it, can you tell us that he was a member of the Special Forces that was taken over into CCB?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: What was his rank?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think he was a Major or a Captain at that stage.

MR BIZOS: Was he close to Verster? Were Verster and Luitingh close to one another?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I don't know much about the relationship between Lafras and Joe, I think there were many other guys who had a better relationship with Joe Verster, but I accept that they would have been close to each other.

MR BIZOS: Let's have the names please.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: David Fourie.

MR BIZOS: What was his rank?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: He was close to a Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel now. Turbo Terblanche - don't you want me to write down a list, that would be much easier.

MR BIZOS: Well if it will help you, yes please do. Before we go away from here.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Then I can do that, that's correct, yes. I think it will be easier.

MR BIZOS: And we'll hand the list in.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, whilst he's writing the list, because I'm very interested in the list, could we take a five minutes adjournment and give him the opportunity to do so?

MR BIZOS: Yes thank you, Mr Chairman.

If you need longer, I'm sure that the Chairman will give you longer.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

HENRI VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: (s.u.o.)

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. The witness is preparing a list but it looks as if it's going to be longer than we thought, may I suggest that we admit a signed list by him as members of the CCB under the authority of Mr Verster, and we will hand it in tomorrow? But it looks as if we might be able to conclude the proceedings. I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Bizos. Mr Joubert, in respect of the list, do you confirm what Mr Bizos just said?

MR JOUBERT: Yes, Honourable Chairman, we had a discussion, I've requested my client to prepare a list. He will do that after the proceedings, prepare it tonight or whatever and then I will make it available to the Committee and to Mr Bizos.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Before you do anything, Mr Joubert, there would be Mr Mapoma, we shouldn't forget the Evidence Leader in this respect. Mr Mapoma, do you have any questions to ask?

MR MAPOMA: I have no questions Chairperson, thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR MAPOMA

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mapoma. Any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR JOUBERT: Just one or two very short aspects, Honourable Chair.

Mr van der Westhuizen, you delivered your evidence and I would just like to summarise by asking about the aspects you apply for amnesty for, specifically would be in regard to the case of Mr Gibson Mondlane. You apply for amnesty for murder insofar as you may be implicated in that and anything that might arise from this, is this correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR JOUBERT: With incident 2 and 3, the murder of the three activists in Lesotho and the abduction of Simon Mogetla, you also apply for amnesty for murder and where you could have gained from that afterwards ...(no further interpretation)

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, yes.

MR JOUBERT: And with regard to the incident of attempted murder on His Honourable Justice Sachs, you there request amnesty insofar as you are an accomplice in the attempted murder, defeating the ends of justice, possibly malicious damage to property, and any other delicts which might emanate from the evidence, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR JOUBERT: And finally, with reference to incident 5, which is the Trevits incident, the gun running, gun smuggling, with special reference to paragraph B in the document, you there request amnesty for any transgression of the Weapons and Ammunitions Act, possible defeating the ends of justice, as well as any other delicts which might emanate from the evidence, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR JOUBERT: And then finally, you indicated to me that you would like to say something to the victims in this regard.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

Chairperson, I sit here now and I have to say that it gladdens my heart to read what Judge Sachs had written in his statement which was handed up as, I think, Exhibit B.

The day when I went to see the Judge in his chambers it took much out of me to look into his eyes and I think what I saw there was what I personally had taken away from many people in this country of ours. I there told myself that I would dearly in my own manner, and I think the manner that I took was to come to the Amnesty Committee to say sorry for whatever I had done. I was only a small cog, a small instrument. I think I am honest and I do not speak on my own behalf, there are many people, and I would regard myself as relatively young, that feel that we did an injustice to the broader population of our country. There are many things today that do not go as well as we all want it to, but I think if we all beforehand, years ago, had reached out to each other, other than trying to destroy each other, then things would have worked out much better for us today.

I say once again, I was a small cog in the whole process and there are many people who were hurt in the process, and the tragedy of it is that many parents lost their children, many brothers lost their sisters and vice versa, and probably it was the short-sightedness that we suffered from in terms of being part of a so-called policy that to a greater extent was part of our education. The only thing I can say is that to me as a person, I sit here and I hope that what I have said today, I was under oath, that it was conveyed correctly and that there really is a great sorrow in my heart for those people who were hurt over all these years. It was a long process and it was a long struggle and today we look forward. I think we have country that is beautiful, where everyone reaches their hand to the other and we all say: "Let us build together for a new South Africa".

I also feel that if I today could not add my part here, then I in the future would have had to live with a very heavy heart and heavy conscience. Therefore, I would like to say to those ones who were injured through my direct or indirect actions, I would like to ask for forgiveness and express my hope that I could play a bigger role in this country, so that we can take this country and project it as the country in Africa, and not only the country in Africa, but also the country in the world. Thank you, Chairperson.

MR JOUBERT: That will be all, thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JOUBERT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Joubert. Are you going to lead any further evidence, Mr Joubert? Before I come to that, I beg your pardon, my Panel has got a question or two to ask. You may proceed.

MR LAX: Thanks, Chairperson, just a few.

Mr van der Westhuizen, you'll recall that I asked you previously why were you forced to go on with the Mapomulu incident, and you said you would answer Mr Bizos' question first, but you didn't get back to mine.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Sorry, Mr Lax, just on that point, I was never involved physically in the Shadrack Mapomulu, because that was an operation that simultaneously ran with the operation that I was on my way to Maputo. There were other members from my team, Chris Everts who represented me there, he was the guy who was involved in that specific incident. Whether he crossed the border, I do not know. I say once again, at that stage I was with the frigates on my way to the bay of Maputo. So I was not involved in that incident.

MR LAX: And then just small issue. You said that while you were in Maseru on the night Mogetla was abducted, when the shooting broke out, you told us you had to stand by and wait for a vehicle to pick you up.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, that is not correct, we were in the vehicle, we were in our own vehicle. I've already mentioned the three members who were with me, we immediately drove away from the scene and I do speak under correct, but I think we met again somewhere in Maseru. The reason for this is quite simple. The members whom I was with had to drop me off at my hotel, because I spent the night at the hotel and consequently they went back across the border and they left me behind. We were four members in a vehicle and the black group who were with us were in another vehicle. They were on their own. We moved separately.

MR LAX: If I got it wrong, that's fine, but the record will clearly say what your answer was. In any event, I want to just move on to two other small areas. The first was, with regard to Mr Botes, did he act as a liaison for the CCB, with yourself and others like you, or was the relationship that you had with him where you gave him files, merely something that you did as you indicated, on a personal basis, not necessarily something you should have been doing?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think the last-mentioned explanation is the correct one.

MR LAX: Because I have sat and listened through six weeks of CCB hearings in Cape Town and what we have been told in that hearing was that the CCB did not have its own intelligence capacity at all, it was not their intention to develop such a capacity and in fact, they relied on State structures for that capacity. Now what you've told us here today is obviously quite different to that, in the sense that it was your understanding that they were to develop their own intelligence structures.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Lax, the only thing I can say is the following. Perhaps it was the easiest option for them, to receive the files of the information from us and that is why they refer to it as, they were dependent on the State structures. I was not present when you sat there, the only thing I can say to you is that I know that the information that we collected and the information that they collected was not the same, because they concentrated more on combat intelligence. The raw data that we took, we processed it and placed it into a bundle which we would hand over to them. Yes, we were part of a collection point where they would receive their information from, but I can assure you that, unless I have my facts incorrect, but they had their own budgets for collections intelligence and they tried, because of the untraceability of their actions, they tried to work on the basis that they had to create their own intelligence capabilities.

MR LAX: Were there other colleagues of yours who were liaising with someone like Mr Botes?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: At that point in time, my presence in Special Forces, yes there was. I would not say directly with Mr Botes, but I do know that Chris Nel had contact with Mr Botes and Chris Nel, later he went over to the CCB.

MR LAX: His role in the CCB was actually to act as a, the English word escapes me, as a "skakel", as a liaison. That was his role in the CCB, as I've been led to understand it.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Do you refer to Mr Nel now?

MR LAX: Precisely.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think Mr Nel's function was more to co-ordinate intelligence within the CCB and to give it through and not to serve as a liaison.

MR LAX: And then in your capacity you must have become aware that there were people infiltrating into the country, in other words many of the people you would have become aware of, for example in Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, made their way through various structures into the country. Did you give the CCB or other instances information relating to those individuals and the fact that they had in fact entered the country?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR LAX: I want to just to another area, it's the only area that hasn't really been covered adequately in cross-examination, it's the question of, you indicated in at certain point, for example, that you knew that Mr Naidoo was a target for elimination.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR LAX: How did you become aware that a decision had been taken that he was a target for elimination, for example?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: At the time of myself, when I handed over the files to Mr Botes, there were six members on the PMC, according to our information there were six important members, which included the names that appear in my application and by the time when I handed over that file to Mr Botes and he told me that they were working on the Indress file, I knew that Mr Indress Naidoo was the target, he was the target. And once again it was a case of where the final file was handed over to him with the knowledge that Mr Naidoo was a priority target, according to our intelligence, and Mr Botes took this whole file further for preparation. So he took the file from there, with the knowledge also that we within Trevits, as well as in the ANC project section, identified Mr Naidoo as a priority target.

MR LAX: That's precisely my point. How did you know that? You knew that through Trevits and through your Desk in the prioritisation of your targets.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's right.

MR LAX: And that's what you've said in a roundabout way, but that is primary issue. Now what I want to know from you is, how were targets ranked and determined for particular action? The reason I ask this is quite simple. It wouldn't make sense to someone in your position, to be simply filtering out information if you didn't know what it was going to be used for. If you knew someone had to be eliminated, you would filter out information with that understanding, and that information would be very different to the information you might want to filter out if the idea was just, for example, to throw a rock through his window, or to scare the hell out of him. Isn't that so? I mean it's self evident.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR LAX: So it was self evidence to me and that's why I asked the question, that in order for you to get adequate information, you would need to know what the purpose and the object of that information being gathered was. And therefore, if you were getting information on Mr Naidoo and the object was to blow him up or to kill him or to murder him in some way or other, eliminate him, you would gather information with that object in mind.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR LAX: Now where - you've said this in a sense, that Trevits was the place where the prioritisation took place.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR LAX: And by prioritisation, as prioritisation not only in terms of the priority with which a person's file should be worked on, but the priority in terms of the kind of action that should be taken against that person.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR LAX: The highest priority being elimination.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR LAX: And the lowest priority being something much less than that, whatever that might be, is that correct?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR LAX: Now, how long were you on Trevits for?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Three years, approximately three years.

MR LAX: And in that time, how many targets were prioritised for elimination, that you're aware of?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I would say a few. There was quite a lot, especially ...(intervention)

MR LAX: More than 10, more than 20?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Like in Swaziland you had a top 10 and in Mozambique you would have a top 10, and that was also applicable to, later on, Lesotho and Botswana and all those areas.

MR LAX: Right. Were any targets prioritise internally?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No. No, our function was very clear, it's to work externally, not internally.

MR LAX: So as far as you know no targets in Trevits that you were part of, ever were determined internally?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR LAX: Where were internal targets prioritised?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think when Trevits - I lie, there was a new section which started looking at people who refused to join the Army, they were looking at ANC personalities, facilities, activities, within the borders of the country which belonged to Security Force Headquarters. They were primarily responsible for that. At one stage we brought in somebody to help us with that, but it was not a major success. What he did was to look at the End Conscription Campaign guys and to look at guys who came into the country from time to time, but it was a question of responsibility. In terms of Special Forces Headquarters, there wasn't authorisation that we could - I talk about our specific sections, that we were allowed to work on internal targets, we could work on external targets. The Security Police could use people from the CCB or the Defence Force, or from - ja, let's say the CCB, to look at actions against identified ANC members in the country. I talk about the period for which I was part of Trevits and Special Forces, until 1989.

MR LAX: Was there any other structure besides Trevits that you are aware of, that would have excluded Special Forces? Because their brief was external, up until a point. I say that in a qualified way, because we know Operation Marion was an internal operation and it was part of Special Forces. You may not know that, but you can rest assured that it's a fact. That aside though, was there any other structure that you may know of, in terms of which internal targets may have been prioritised for elimination. That, for example, might not have used Special Forces or yourself. Because clearly, someone was determining priority targets, that must be self evidence to you. If you look at Vlakplaas' operations and you look at other groups of policemen who weren't in Vlakplaas, who were also determining targets for elimination.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I didn't know of any other structures.

MR LAX: Okay. Thank you, Chair, that covers me.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ilan.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

Mr van der Westhuizen, the way you explained the frustration, or the thoroughness in which the preparation was made, namely that you will go and make a presentation and the operation will not approved, people will say the time is not right, I find it a little bit difficult that the operation was for Naidoo and all of a sudden when it was implemented, it affected Judge Albie Sachs. Can you explain this?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If I understand you correctly, Mr Sibanyoni, it is so, we had to make presentations quite regularly to our Commanding staff at Special Forces, of potential targets and when the Generals in Staff, or the commanding staff felt that operations could be carried out in the neighbouring States, then we usually called in the Generals in Staff and we made presentations to them, and it is in that capacity that you would prioritise who would be a target and had to be taken out, or who you would present as a potential target.

When you look at those kinds of operations and actions, you look at an action which takes place by using the regiment, like 4 Reconnaissance Regiment. This regiment is a seaward regiment, they could get access very easily to Maputo and Mozambique. When we would have to deal, for example, or when we made these presentations and they tell you, the Generals in Staff tell you, but the instruction they get from higher authority is that it could not take place, there was another alternative. But you already determined a priority list and that priority list existed also within the CCB and the CCB did not have to, according to me they did not have to follow the same working system as a regiment. A regiment is something you cannot hide, a frigate has to be obtained from the Head of the Navy, it's logistics, it's authority, etcetera.

In the case of the CCB, they could very easily or more easily get away with actions which was like pseudo kind of operations. They would use an agent, they would use an agent, they send the guy in, he blows up the person, he poisons the person, you don't have all that red tape, the bureaucracy you have to follow, that we followed being an ANC project section within Special Forces. So the modus operandi of the CCB was much easier than the modus operandi of a conventional regiment that had to carry out cross-border actions, that's why it was easier. So that guy would sit with the information, he would have access to the information and it would be easier for him to push this through with the General to do this elimination, where for me, I'm bound to a regimental operation and action. I don't know if that answers your question.

MR SIBANYONI: So you are saying this is possible, maybe the Special Forces were targeting Naidoo and then in terms of the CCB, they were seeing the priority target as Justice Sachs?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It is possible that the person on ground level - no it can't, it can't ...

MR SIBANYONI: It's not possible?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, it's not possible, it can't.

MR SIBANYONI: According to your version the attack on Justice Sachs was a complete mistake, but according to the interview Jacques Pauw had with Botes, Botes gives the impression that indeed they were targeting Sachs. What is your comment?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's correct. I have nothing more to say about that except the following, that Pieter Botes could, while he was at ground level and while he was busy collecting combat intelligence, they could have seen that Mr Justice Sachs would use the vehicle and that they continued with the operation.

When I handed the file to Mr Botes, the target was Indress Naidoo. So the person Botes, at ground level, could take the decision, he could take the decision himself to say: "We see it is not Indress Naidoo who uses the car, it's Albie Sachs" and he could have continued with the operation. I had no control over that situation.

MR SIBANYONI: According to the reconnaissance you did, the car belonged to Naidoo?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

MR SIBANYONI: I thought I read something where the Judge says "my car".

CHAIRPERSON: Annexure A.

MR SIBANYONI: In Annexure A. What is your comment about that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think the ANC members present will know that there were many people who used the same cars, they used some of the same cars and the vehicle, the Honda, the specific Honda was at one stage also used by Joe Slovo. So I also find it difficult that the Judge said it was his car, because we linked that car to the facility and to Indress Naidoo.

MR SIBANYONI: Yes, that is on page 1 of Annexure A, where he speaks about "my car".

CHAIRPERSON: Exhibit A, not Annexure.

MR SIBANYONI: Exhibit A.

Okay, you have responded to that. Lastly, apart from co-operating with you, these Security Police of Swaziland an Lesotho, were they also providing intelligence as to the personnel, the structures of the ANC in their countries?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Sibanyoni. Mr Lax, you said you had one more question.

MR LAX: Sorry Chair, there was one I just forgot about and that was, it just peaked my interest seeing this thing about the ECC here and I see that you were there at the appropriate time, in Trevits that is. Do you recall the name Gavin Evans or Michael Evans or Gavin Michael Evans?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Do you refer to Trevits or to ECC?

MR LAX: It's a name that would have come up at Trevits, in connection with the ECC.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it rings a bell. It rings a bell, but I can't remember, I think he was a ECC member.

MR LAX: And Bruce White?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I can't recall.

MR LAX: You see, again just to reinforce this issue and that is that we were told by the members of Region 6, who applied for amnesty, and their Regional Manager and their Co-ordinator, and Mr Verster, that the names that came out of their sources as potential targets were confirmed by some Defence Force structure, as priorities.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Lax, I might just reply to this ...(intervention)

MR LAX: For example, just to give you an example. The name Dullah Omar, for example, was sent through to some Defence Force structure and came back as a permissible target for elimination. You don't know about that structure?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I don't know that structure.

MR LAX: Thanks, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Joubert, anything arising out of what the Panel asked?

MR JOUBERT: I have no questions, thank you Honourable Chair, and there will be no further evidence led on behalf of Mr van der Westhuizen.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me ask Mr George Bizos whether there's anything arising from what the Panel asked.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: There are one or two questions arising out of the Panel's questions. We have heard from many persons who have applied for amnesty, particularly for elimination of individuals, that the orders came right from the top and when asked, they said that the elimination of prominent people had to be authorised by the Security Council. We have some evidence to this effect, such as the Goniwe matter, for instance, where "druk telegram" - I heard it so often in Afrikaans, I've forgotten the English.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Telex.

MR BIZOS: Telex, ja. That a telex sent was by a Brigadier in Port Elizabeth, to Gen van Rensburg, the Secretary of the Security Council Secretariat, to remove permanently Goniwe, his brother and Calata. Now in answer to Mr Lax you said that other than Trevits - I don't remember the other structure that you mentioned, you knew of no other. Was it known in the circles that you moved, that there were some targets that had to be authorised by the highest authority?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Bizos, I think so, yes, I think so. I think even - yes, I think so, yes. It's my opinion that actions against, even in our case, actions that had to take place, we heard that it came from the highest authority, now who the highest authority was, did it stop with the Minister of Defence, did it come from the State Security Council? It's an inference I'm drawing, but I believe that the State Security Council, they were the people who gave the instructions from the highest authority.

MR BIZOS: Now from what you knew of the CCB and its workings under its Manager Director, Mr Verster, did Mr Verster consider himself bound by rules and regulations and procedures, or did he take it upon himself to do things? For instance, if he decided that someone was to be eliminated, was he capable of issuing orders himself that that should be done?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I have no knowledge of that, I can't see that, Mr Bizos, no. I think, would he have done something like that, he would have exceeded his authority and I have no knowledge of that, I can't say anything about it.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Bizos. Mr Mapoma, anything arising out what the Panel asked?

MR MAPOMA: Nothing, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr van der Westhuizen, that concludes your evidence.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: I believe you don't have any witnesses to call, Mr Joubert, is that so?

MR JOUBERT: I have no witnesses and I still have no further questions, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, are you calling anybody?

MR BIZOS: No. I beg your pardon, there is one witness, Mr Chairman, the mother of the deceased, Samuel Phinda. Her full names are Sophie Noltena Phinda. She has indicated that she has something to say to the Committee, she is ready to take the oath.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you say it under oath, or does she just want to say it so?

MR BIZOS: It should be left to her, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: What language is she going to testify in?

MR BIZOS: Sotho, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Sophie, are you prepared to take the oath? She is not going to speak under oath, Mr Bizos. Do you want to lead her, Mr Bizos, or does she want to speak out of her own volition?

MR BIZOS: Well I'll just ask her one or two preliminary questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: Was Samuel Phinda your only son?

MS PHINDA: Yes, that's correct.

MR BIZOS: And were you widowed at an early stage?

MS PHINDA: Yes, that's correct.

MR BIZOS: And was your son looked for by the police?

MS PHINDA: They were looking for him at the time when he was preparing to go, but at that time he was not staying with me, he was attending school at Morris Isaacson in Soweto. I heard that the police were looking for him. They also came to my place and I was detained because they wanted me to tell them where he was.

MR BIZOS: Do you know what eventually happened to your son?

MS PHINDA: The person who was staying with him came to tell me that my son has just disappeared.

MR BIZOS: Was he ever found?

MS PHINDA: Yes, thereafter I received a telegram from Mozambique, in Lusaka rather, and I was told that he is dead.

MR BIZOS: Where did he die?

MS PHINDA: He died in Mozambique.

MR BIZOS: Did they tell you what the cause of death was?

MS PHINDA: They did not tell me, they said to me they did not know how he died.

MR BIZOS: Now there are things that you wish to say to the Committee in relation to your personal circumstances and what affect your son's death had on you, would you like to say that please.

MS PHINDA:

"I was greatly affected by my sonís death and there's nothing that I can say to those people who killed him, because he was my only child. His father died before him, so he was the only person that I looked up to. Before he died the police used to come to me and detain me, because they wanted to know where my son was. I did not know where he was.

I lost my job in 1986 because of these detentions, so since then I became sick, even today I am still sick. Even today, I am staying alone at home. So I'm saying to those people who killed my son, I thank them because today they are living with their children. I am supposed to be looking up to my son, there's nobody that I can look up to today. I am staying alone at my place.

There's nothing further that I can say to them, I will just say to them they are fortunate that today they are still living with their children and their loved ones. They have achieved what they intended to achieve. That's what I can say to them.

I am struggling today, since 1986. Even the day after I came from Mozambique, I was detained. They take his certificates and everything that belonged to him. Since then I was never employed, because they used to detain me regularly and they would assault me every time they put me into detention.

As a result of that I think there is nothing I can say to them, but I can say to this man, you are fortunate that today you are living with your children and your wife, you are enjoying your life, but I'm living in sorrow today."

MR BIZOS: Is there anything else you wish to say?

MS PHINDA: There's nothing further that I wish to say, except to say this man should enjoy his life, God will answer my prayers. He is enjoying himself with his children, his family. They killed my son. He and those people who were working with him, they will answer one day to God. There's nothing further, Chairperson, that I can say. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: That concludes what you wanted to say? Thank you, Mrs Phinda.

I've heard the hurt in you and I'm fortunate that I could pick up the nuances, because you spoke a language I understand. I would only thank you for coming forward to grace this process even with a broken heart. That we had hoped that all these years you might have got the truth how he was killed. We've got the applicant before us, he could not shed much light in that respect and we apologise to you. I want to say again that the applicant has told us that had this, or rather the people of South Africa, if they had extended hands, we would have been in a much better country. We know some of our beloved ones vanished without trace for the betterment of this country in which today you and I can pride ourselves of.

I say take courage that your son did not die in vain, he died for a noble cause. We know the personal grief you have, but I say take courage that today the conflict that polarised the country, made it two nations within one country, has hopefully ended and we are all going to live as brothers and sisters and that you'll find a niche. I know today you may not see your way forward, but I can promise you if you can take courage in this process, you will find that you have true healing and that you find a place in this country. I thank you again on behalf of this Panel, for having come forward.

Mr van der Westhuizen, you have asked for forgiveness, the forgiveness you spoke of and you asked for. The long process and the long struggle shouldn't have taken place, South Africa should have extended hands to one another and we have had a better country and we would have lived better in the whole of Africa. If I accept it that you are sorry with the words you spoke, but we will get to your application, I just want to thank you for the words you've spoken in this regard.

Mr Mapoma, are you going to call any evidence before I come to Mr Joubert?

MR MAPOMA: No, I have no further evidence, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are we in a position to conclude this matter by short argument?

MR BIZOS ADDRESSES: ...(inaudible) on the instructions of our clients. Mr Chairman, we leave the decision as to whether amnesty should be granted or not, to the Committee. We regret that Mr Justice Sachs could not be here, but I think that his words are convincing words, he leaves it to you to make a decision, having regard to what the applicant has said and done. The applicant not only went to Mr Justice Sachs, he went to the other applicants(sic) as well, in which he made a long statement. And if I may say so, it is refreshing to come across an applicant who apparently has taken the steps that this applicant has taken before the hearing of the application, in order to come to terms to himself and the actual and potential victims of his actions.

We leave it to the Committee on those instructions, Mr Chairman. He has already given evidence that he has co-operated and I have reason to believe that he has co-operated with the Attorney-General in relation to matters that relate to people who have not taken advantage of the amnesty process. I do not wish to say anything further, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Mr Bizos. Mr Joubert.

MR JOUBERT IN ARGUMENT: Thank you, Honourable Chair.

I would submit that the application of the applicant has complied with the requirements of the Act, as set out in Section 20(1)(a) and as set out in Section 20(1)(b), regarding the political motives and these issues, that they have been fully addressed in prior amnesty applications.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it that Mr Bizos did not go into the background of his political motivation, so I take it it was accepted by Mr Bizos. So you can just address us on the aspect of full disclosure.

MR JOUBERT: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

I would submit that the applicant has made a full disclosure of all the relevant facts as is required of him in terms of the Act. He has given the evidence to the best of his ability. He's answered truthfully and honestly to all questions put to him, there were very few discrepancies. And I would submit that those that did arise are of such a nature that they should not impact on his credibility or the fact that he attempted to make a full disclosure. I would furthermore also submit that although certain questions that were put to him were not strictly relevant to the specific application serving before you, he, notwithstanding that, proceeded to answer to the best of his ability and as indicated prior, to prepare a proper list of the members who were serving under Joe Verster with the CCB, and this will be submitted. And I submit this is a further indication of his endeavours to take part in any reconciliation that can be made and can be reached through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Furthermore, as to the specific acts for which amnesty is requested, I have addressed that in my re-examination, I don't know whether you wish me to amplify on any of those issues.

CHAIRPERSON: If you had not done that in re-examination, I wasn't going to give you murder for instance, for Mondlane. At best it's defeating the ends of justice, at best, if I were to. I don't know what's your view.

MR JOUBERT: On Gibson Mondlane, Chairman, I would submit that the applicant was aware, although it be after the fact, of what had transpired and there is a possibility that he may be an accessory after the fact, and in that regard I would submit that amnesty be granted for murder. It's on that basis that amnesty for murder is requested regarding Mr Gibson Mondlane.

CHAIRPERSON: And the abduction of Simon Mogetla?

MR JOUBERT: A similar situation there, he became aware of this after the abduction and nothing was done about that, so he may also there be an accessory after the fact.

CHAIRPERSON: And just in Mr Justice Sachs?

MR JOUBERT: Regarding Mr Justice Sachs, he has requested for attempted murder, also it will be as an accessory after the fact, he became fully aware of the attempt which was made, he knew full well who the persons were who were involved and no disclosure was made at that stage, or no charges were filed and I think in that regard there may be a very strong argument that he may be an accessory after the fact.

As far as he had been providing information pertaining to the motor vehicle in which Judge Sachs was at the time of the explosion, there may also be an argument to make out, although thin, that the information provided may also institute the possibility of the argument relating to common purpose, and that he may have foreseen that whoever would be driving this vehicle may be killed and that he accepted that possibility. So the issue of common purpose may also come into play, but be that as it may, it has been requested as an accessory after the fact, for attempted murder on Judge Sachs.

CHAIRPERSON: What about defeating the ends of justice by withholding information?

MR JOUBERT: Yes, defeating the ends of justice - Mr Chairman, I did not address you now on all the issues, I just answered on your questions, during the re-examination I indicated we would be requesting for defeating the ends of justice on all these plans. The possibility may also come into play here regarding malicious damage to property in damage, blowing up the vehicle. And we have also requested that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Is it damage or destroying?

MR JOUBERT: It would probably more be destroying in this particular matter. We have put in ...(indistinct) clause in which we say for any crime or delict which may arise out of the incident.

And then pertaining to the Trevits and the weapons issue, we requested amnesty for any offence relating to the act of, the Weapons and Ammunitions Act, and this would obviously only be in relation to part (b). You will recall that there were two Acts of weapons that were moved about and in the first one there was remuneration for Mr van der Westhuizen ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I wanted you to address us on that, where he got remuneration.

MR LAX: Can I ask this question, before you give up so easily, because you may be doing your client a disservice. Was your client motivated by the money he was going to receive, or did he just get it after the event? 'Cause really, that's the thrust of that Section.

MR JOUBERT: Mr Lax, I will answer that. If I may just deal with the issue pertaining to Oupa Qgozo first, I would request that there be granted amnesty in that regard, for any offence in the Arms and Ammunitions Act. Relating to the issue where remuneration was received by Mr van der Westhuizen, the evidence I would submit, and I think Mr Lax has probably indicated that properly now, is that the initial transaction was done with the ordinary political motivation and in the line of his duties and in fulfilling his duties and the remuneration came to play afterwards. This was money which was handed to him by the CCB, of which he went and more than three-quarters of this, or the larger part of this, as he testified, was put back into the system, to his co-workers, people who he had to remunerate for services rendered, etcetera, and it's a very small amount which he, in the end took for himself. The argument would be there that consideration be given that this act was not performed with the purpose of receiving personal gain, the personal gain is something which came after the act had been completed and which was not an issue initially. And that in that regard the Committee should seriously consider granting amnesty on that specific issue as well. Should it please the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mapoma.

MR MAPOMA: I have no submissions to make, Chairperson, thank you.

NO SUBMISSIONS BY MR MAPOMA

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, can I resort to the wisdom of grey hair for the last word?

MR BIZOS: Thank you for the compliment, Mr Chairman, but I don't want to become involved in the legal arguments in relation to whether there is any deficiency. In relation to the remuneration, I haven't got the Act in front of me, but I think it must be the predominance of motive.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that's what it is.

MR BIZOS: If it's a "pasella", so to speak, after the event, it may not be that that was the motive, it's the reason why the Act was done. I would say that it may be that if a person actually expected a bonus when the person was killed or helped to kill, that may be a different situation, because you have to examine, if I remember correctly, the motive in terms of (3) of the person, so that if he knows that if he succeeds he's going to get a bonus, may be a different situation. If he doesn't and by the way thereafter there is some ex-gratia payment, if it deserves that sort of name. That's all I wish to say.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Mr Bizos.

This brings us to the conclusion of the application of Mr Henri van der Westhuizen. The Act requires that we give our decision in writing. I sincerely hope that the decision would not be unduly delayed and such a decision will be sent to all parties present today, and in that respect is reserved.

Thank you very much. I must thank all legal representatives, Mr Joubert, Mr George Bizos, Mr Mapoma, thank you very much for the assistance you have rendered to this Panel and made our job somewhat easier to come to a decision. Thank you very much.

We adjourn for the day. I suppose Mr Bizos, you don't have to come tomorrow, Mr Joubert can make arrangements that they give you the copy of Annexure C, will that suffice?

MR BIZOS: That suffices.

CHAIRPERSON: I mean to your attorney in other words.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: On Wednesday, Mr Bizos, okay.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, we adjourn for the day.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS